THE SUBMARINE PERIL, TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY
Events were to prove that my period of command of the Grand Fleet was
drawing to a close, my transfer to the Admiralty occurring at the end
of November, 1917.
But before coming to that development something must be said in
continuation of the narrative of the work of the Grand Fleet.
During the month of September, 1916, there was not much movement by
the Fleet as a whole. On the 4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth, swept
towards the Naze, then down to the southward of the Little Fisher Bank,
and back to Rosyth. On the same day three divisions of destroyers from
Scapa endeavoured without success to locate a submarine reported by
the _Talisman_ to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries. On the 7th a
further unsuccessful search for a submarine was carried out in the same
locality.
On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons left Rosyth and
Scapa respectively to exchange bases, carrying out a search of the
North Sea _en route_, and on the 20th two light cruisers and four
destroyers left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on the
4th.
On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the eastward made
it necessary to move the patrol line of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
temporarily farther west.
On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 4th
Light Cruiser Squadron, _Campania_, and the destroyer flotillas left
Scapa for a cruise between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the
Norwegian coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light cruisers,
and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit. Battle exercises were
carried out during the cruise. A submarine was reported on the intended
track of the fleet on return, and the base was, therefore, approached
by another route, the available local patrol vessels being employed to
keep the submarine submerged during the entry of the fleet to Scapa.
Submarines were again active during the latter part of the month in
the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the
position of the squadron being shifted for that reason.
On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth to
search the waters to the southward of the German North Sea mine-field,
returning on the 28th.
On the same date the yacht _Conqueror II._, the patrol trawler _Sarah
Alice_, and two British steamers were torpedoed in the Fair Island
Channel by enemy submarines. On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow,
destroyers were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate
against the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these waters.
Early on the 30th the _Lion_, with the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser
Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and accompanied by a
destroyer escort, left Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze,
then turned to the northward and proceeded to Scapa.
During September the cruiser patrols were continuously maintained to
the northward of the Shetlands and on the Archangel routes, each patrol
consisting of a cruiser and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine
patrol, consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the Horn
Reef. The enemy had presumably found the patrols inconvenient, and
German destroyers on several occasions during the month cruised at
night in the area patrolled with a view to interrupting our submarines
when recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent change of
position at night. Submarine G 12, when returning from patrol on the
29th, sighted an enemy submarine on the surface, and, being unable to
get into position to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did
not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged.
The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flotilla (the 10th
Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the month, the base being the
River Tees, and the parent ship the _Lucia_, with two attendant
destroyers. The formation of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also
commenced, this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be
formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet destroyers to 100.
On the 21st the new battle cruiser _Repulse_, heavily armed and of high
speed, but with inadequate protection for a battle cruiser, joined the
Fleet at Scapa to work up gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour
protection of this ship was about equal to that of the _Australia_
and _New Zealand_, and she was greatly inferior in this respect to
the _Lion_, and later battle cruisers. As already stated, experience
during the War had demonstrated very clearly that our battle cruisers
were at a marked disadvantage in engaging German vessels of the same
class, unless they were provided with better protection than that given
to the _Australia_ and earlier vessels. Proposals were, therefore,
forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very considerably to the deck
protection of both the _Repulse_ and her sister ship, the _Renown_.
These proposals were approved and the work carried out at the Fleet
bases. Although the ships were much improved by the alteration, they
were still far inferior in protection to the German battle cruisers.
On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built on the Tyne, for
light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at Invergordon, and was a very
useful addition to that most valuable refitting base.
The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser Squadron during
September were:
No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on patrol, 15; No.
absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; No. on special
service, 0.
The favourable weather and short nights, combined with the large number
of vessels maintained on patrol were responsible for the increase in
the number of ships intercepted.
The weather as a whole was good during the month. Fog or mist was
prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th and 27th, and a gale occurred on
the 18th. Otherwise the conditions were favourable.
In the early part of October, the activities of the enemy’s submarines
in the White Sea, which had been considerable during the month of
September, became more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three
Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Sletness, and a British
vessel and Russian steamer fell victims to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N.,
Long. 35.3 E. Some submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in
Lat. 69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the attack
was successful. The _Fearless_, now a submarine parent ship, and
three submarines started for the White Sea on October 13th from Scapa
to operate from Alexandrovsk against the hostile submarines. They
arrived on the 20th and began operations at once. During their stay in
the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any enemy submarines,
but there was a marked decrease in enemy operations, possibly due to
the cramping effect of the presence of our vessels in those waters.
The _Fearless_, with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return
passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these waters before
the ice began to form.
On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships of the 2nd Cruiser
Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to
the eastward, returning on the 4th.
On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and swept towards the
Naze, thence proceeding to a position to the south-westward of the
Little Fisher Bank, in which our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef
patrol had reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting
suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours were found there
by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; three were selected and sent in for
examination, but were found to be in order.
On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left Scapa to meet at sea
the airships stationed at Longside, near Peterhead, with a view to
gaining experience in airships and light cruisers working together.
The programme arranged could not be completed owing to bad weather,
but was carried out on a subsequent occasion, and some useful hints
were gained. This work was undertaken as a preliminary to the airships
being detailed to accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south,
as the number of these craft completing in the near future justified
such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of the Zeppelin
type, it was felt that those of the smaller class might be able to
carry out useful reconnaissance work ahead of the Fleet if moving south
on the western side of the North Sea. We had already had considerable
experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German High Sea Fleet in
this respect. That experience had fully confirmed the views put forward
in 1913 on this subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval
Air Service came under my supervision. These views were expressed on
an occasion when the building of a fleet of Zeppelins was being urged
on behalf of the Navy. It was then pointed out with emphasis how
great would be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in
connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual conflict was
proceeding as to the relative values of Zeppelin and heavier-than-air
craft, but the views expressed were that whatever future there might
be for the latter as development proceeded, there was no likelihood
of their having the radius of action necessary for scouting work in a
fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already possessed it. My
apology for making mention of this fact is that it controverts the
assertion so constantly made that the senior officers in the Navy were
not alive to the value of air-craft before the War.
On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some cruisers of the 2nd
Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left
Scapa to cruise to the eastward, returning on the 10th.
On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers left for a sweep,
but were recalled on the 16th owing to bad weather.
On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth
for a position to the westward of Ekersund, and thence swept down to
the Little Fisher Bank and back to Rosyth, without sighting anything of
interest.
On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers left
the northern bases to spread on a line between Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1
E., and Lat. 60 N., Long. 4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags,
on a course approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order to
search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was repeated during
daylight hours on two successive days; no enemy vessels were sighted.
On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and the 14th and 15th
Flotillas left Scapa for a watching and exercise cruise to the
eastward, returning on the 24th.
During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried out during the
month of October, the Flag officers were directed to carry out battle
exercises based on the tactics employed by the enemy during the Jutland
action, with a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet
these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from all Flag
officers.
On October 24th a division of destroyers, together with sea-planes, was
sent to the Fair Island Channel to operate against enemy submarines
reported to be using this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during
the patrol.
On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak to operate against
an enemy decoy vessel reported in those waters. On the same day the
_Kildonan Castle_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a
submarine and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N., Long. 18.30
W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol line was consequently moved
temporarily to the westward, and trawlers were despatched to the
neighbourhood.
On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth
to carry out a reconnaissance of the waters south of the German North
Sea mine-field. They returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy
vessels.
On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th Flotilla left Rosyth
for an observation and exercise cruise in the central and northern
positions of the North Sea, and returned without incident on November
3rd.
During the month the Northern patrol north of the Shetlands by one
cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer was continued, as were the
patrol on the Archangel route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn
Reef.
The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following
figures:--
No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on patrol, 12; No.
absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 12; No. on special
service, 0.
Bad weather during the month interfered with the operations of the
squadron; gales were experienced on the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th.
There was little fog or mist.
On November 1st I left the _Iron Duke_ at Cromarty and proceeded to the
Admiralty at the request of the First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was
the result of letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing
danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and the necessity
for the adoption of most energetic measures to deal with this danger.
It had been for some time my opinion that unless the Navy could devise
effective means, first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly,
to protect our communications more successfully until the submarines
could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of our being forced into
making an unsatisfactory peace. From information furnished to me it
was evident that the Germans were making special efforts to increase
the number of their submarines very largely, and there did not seem
to be much prospect, with the methods we were at the time employing,
of destroying submarines at a rate at all approaching that of their
construction.
So far as I was aware there was an insufficient reserve of food in
the country to provide against the consequences of successful action
by enemy submarines; and the construction of merchant-ships on an
adequate scale to replace those lost had not been taken in hand, this
being obviously an essential measure. I had written semi-officially for
eighteen months before on the matter.[T] It seemed to me questionable
whether our organisation at the Admiralty included a sufficiently
numerous and important staff, having as its sole business the work of
dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem which was assuming
such very serious proportions. It did not appear that new proposals
and inventions for dealing with the submarine campaign were being
pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly because of the
absence of such an organisation, of difficulties connected with labour
and _matériel_; and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers
confronting us would be successfully combated.
[T] The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food
supplies or, at that time, for merchant-ship building.
I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, was alive to the
danger, and that it caused him much anxiety. We had corresponded very
freely on all subjects during his tenure of office at the Admiralty,
and I was aware of his views on matters connected with the War, on
which we had always been in complete agreement. His direction and
assistance in connection with matters concerning the development
and employment of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me, and
invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that in putting forward my
views as to the new and serious danger confronting us, and the possible
methods of dealing with it, I should be rendering him assistance in
combating the menace. One of my suggestions was the formation of a
committee, or department, at the Admiralty under a senior officer,
and composed of some of the clever and younger officers who had
shown marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole object would
be the development of arrangements for dealing with the submarine
warfare against merchant shipping, and the production of the necessary
material. I pointed out that our existing methods were not meeting with
the success attained at an earlier period, and gave the reasons which,
in my opinion, were responsible for this result.
I had also formed and expressed the opinion that the High Sea Fleet
would not be risked again in a Fleet action, at any rate, until the
submarine campaign against merchant shipping had been fully tried and
had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I suggested to the
Admiralty the desirability of reducing the number of destroyers in the
Grand Fleet by one flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines
in waters where such action had some chance of success. I pointed
out, once again, that offensive action against submarines in the
northern part of the North Sea (the only waters in which Grand Fleet
destroyers could be used, and yet be available for work with the
Fleet in an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results,
as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water open to them,
always dive and escape. The areas in which destroyers _could_ act more
effectively against submarines were comparatively narrow and deep
waters; in restricted localities, such as some parts of the English
Channel, where the depth did not allow of their resting on the bottom,
if hunted. My contention was that it was probably wise to reduce the
number of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen
the force required to deal with the submarine danger, even if this
reduction necessitated sending the Grand Fleet to sea short of one
battle squadron, should it have to deal with a grave emergency, such
as attempted invasion. The alternative, which I felt _we could not
face_, was to run the graver risk of serious disaster from successful
submarine warfare on merchant shipping.
It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would _not_ risk a fleet
action for some time, and even if this Fleet undertook an operation
having as its objective some military advantage, I considered that
with the 1st, 2nd and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had
been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be engaged with
every prospect of success, provided always that it was well screened
from submarine attack and carefully handled. The only direction, apart
from an attack on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet
could inflict any material damage on us and which the Grand Fleet could
expect to be in a position to prevent, lay in attempted invasion. The
bombardment of coast towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could
not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it happened to be at sea
and in the right position at the right moment.
The objection which might be raised to this policy, which was otherwise
to my mind correct, was the effect on the public mind of the High Sea
Fleet being at sea without being brought to action, even if it could
achieve no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised very
fully the force of this objection, and the responsibility involved
in disregarding it. On the other hand, the submarine danger to our
shipping was most pressing and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with
at all costs, and without delay, since the existence of the armies as
well as that of the civil population depended on merchant shipping.
I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admiralty on November 5th.
On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron
and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa to cruise eastward of the
Shetland Islands, returning on November 4th.
On the 3rd the _Botha_, with four destroyers of the 14th Flotilla, left
Scapa for a sweep northward along the Norwegian coast from a position
near Udsire Lighthouse on the probable track of enemy submarines
returning to their bases. On the same day the _Faulknor_ and six
destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried out a similar
sweep to the northward, starting from the vicinity of the Little Fisher
Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th
Flotilla from Rosyth supported both forces.
At 1.20 P.M., on November 5th, submarine J 1 on patrol off the Horn
Reef, sighted four enemy battleships of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6
N., Long. 6.53 E. A considerable sea was running, making it difficult
to prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had a strong
destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack were very difficult.
But Commander Lawrence succeeded, in spite of these difficulties, in
firing his four bow torpedoes at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them
took effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned to the
southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a considerable period, but
unsuccessfully. It was learned subsequently that the two damaged ships
managed to reach port, but this fact does not detract from the great
credit attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack under
exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident showed, as in previous
cases, the efficiency of the German system of underwater protection in
their capital ships.
On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against enemy submarines on
their expected tracks.
From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was experienced in
northern waters; several merchant ships were disabled and assistance
was rendered to them by the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by
tugs from Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the 17th.
On the 18th the _Otway_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, intercepted the
Norwegian steamship _Older_, which was found to be in charge of a prize
crew from a German submarine. She had on board, in addition, survivors
of an Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the submarine.
The _Otway_ recaptured her, but was not in time to prevent the Germans
from exploding several bombs in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did
not, however, succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway.
During the period up to November 19th, the weekly average of work of
the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:--
No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on patrol, 13; No.
absent, 11; No. on special service, 0.
The weather throughout the period to the 19th November was very bad,
and the figures showed a corresponding reduction in the number of ships
intercepted.
Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 16th, 17th and 18th.
On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 1st and 2nd
Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers proceeded
to sea for a cruise in northern waters, during which battle exercises
were carried out.
Shortly before the _Iron Duke_ slipped from her buoy, and whilst the
remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its way out of harbour, I received
a telegram from the First Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post
of First Sea Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I
consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and he stated his
opinion that I ought to accept the post in order to be in a position
to put into practice the views I held as to the steps required to deal
with the submarine menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to
leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since the outbreak
of the War, for a position which I knew was the most difficult that a
sailor could be called upon to fill in war time.
I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to do whatever was
considered best for the Service, and in accordance with the wish
expressed in his telegram, agreed to meet him at Rosyth.
I then followed the Fleet to sea in the _Iron Duke_, and having
completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned over the Command of the
Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (second in command), with directions
that the ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded in the
_Iron Duke_ to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning of the 27th.
I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the 27th, on the question
of taking up the work at the Admiralty, and accepted the appointment.
He intimated to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir
David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the Grand Fleet, and
informed me also of the other changes in Flag appointments that would
be effected. I made suggestions on some of these matters.
Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started my preparations
for the change of duties and the transfer of command. I was under
no delusion as to the difficulty of the task before me. The attacks
already made upon the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses
due to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids on our
coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with the means existing,
fully prepared me for what was to come.
I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the production of fresh
material, could become effective for a period of at least six to twelve
months. Indeed, I was so certain of the course that events would take,
that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of the _Iron Duke_
(a very difficult task in view of the intense regret that I felt at
leaving them), I said that they must expect to see me the object of the
same attacks as those to which my distinguished predecessor, Sir Henry
Jackson, had been exposed. I was not wrong in this surmise. I left the
_Iron Duke_ with a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and cannot
close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet during my twenty-eight
months’ service as Commander-in-Chief better than by quoting my
farewell memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so well.
“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains, officers and
men of the Fleet which it has been my privilege to command since the
commencement of the War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all
ranks for their loyal support during a period which I know must have
tried their patience to the breaking-point.
“The disappointment which has so constantly attended the southern
movements of the Fleet might well have resulted in a tendency to
staleness and a feeling that the strenuous efforts made to maintain the
highest state of efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for
testing the result were so seldom provided by our enemy.
“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to be able to say,
with absolute confidence, that the spirit of keenness and enthusiasm
has constantly grown, and I am convinced that the Fleet gains in
efficiency from day to day. We have benefited by experience, and we
have turned that experience to good account.
“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest regret, I do so
with the knowledge that officers and men are imbued with that spirit
which has carried their forefathers to victory throughout all ages,
whenever and wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and
whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, I am
perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they will meet more than
their match, ship for ship in all classes, and that the result will
never be for one moment in doubt.
“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious victory resulting in
a just and lasting peace!
“J. R. JELLICOE,
“Admiral.”
Appendix I
BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH
_Iron Duke,
18th June, 1916._
No. 1395 H.F. 0022.
The Secretary
of the ADMIRALTY,
SIR,--
Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that
the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May, 1916, to
the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.
2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the
general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left
its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions
issued by me.
3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were as
follows:
(_a_) Those in company with me:
_Iron Duke_--Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag).
_Marlborough_--Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E.
Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff).
_Colossus_--Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of
Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.).
_Hercules_--Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.
_Neptune_--Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard.
_Collingwood_--Captain James C. Ley.
_Revenge_--Captain Edward B. Kiddle.
_Agincourt_--Captain Henry M. Doughty.
_St. Vincent_--Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.
_Bellona_--Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton.
_King George V._--Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of
Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.).
_Orion_--Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of
Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.).
_Centurion_--Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.
_Conqueror_--Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill.
_Erin_--Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.
_Thunderer_--Captain James A. Fergusson.
_Monarch_--Captain George H. Borrett.
_Ajax_--Captain George H. Baird.
_Boadicea_--Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.
_Benbow_--Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral
Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.).
_Superb_--Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Alexander L. Duff, C.B.).
_Canada_--Captain William C. M. Nicholson.
_Bellerophon_--Captain Edward F. Bruen.
_Temeraire_--Captain Edwin V. Underhill.
_Vanguard_--Captain James D. Dick.
_Royal Oak_--Captain Crawford Maclachlan.
_Blanche_--Captain John M. Casement.
_Minotaur_--Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of
Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.).
_Hampshire_--Captain Herbert J. Savill.
_Cochrane_--Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.
_Shannon_--Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.
_Defence_--Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.).
_Duke of Edinburgh_--Captain Henry Blackett.
_Black Prince_--Captain Thomas P. Bonham.
_Warrior_--Captain Vincent B. Molteno.
_Invincible_--Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.).
_Indomitable_--Captain Francis W. Kennedy.
_Inflexible_--Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.
_Calliope_--Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.
_Caroline_--Captain H. Ralph Crooke.
_Comus_--Captain Alan G. Hotham.
_Constance_--Captain Cyril S. Townsend.
_Royalist_--Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.
_Canterbury_--Captain Percy M. R. Royds.
_Chester_--Captain Robert N. Lawson.
_Active_--Captain Percy Withers.
_Castor_--Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O.
_Tipperary_--Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour.
_Broke_--Commander Walter L. Allen.
_Shark_--Commander Loftus W. Jones.
_Acasta_--Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.
_Spitfire_--Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny.
_Sparrowhawk_--Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.
_Achates_--Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C.
_Ambuscade_--Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.
_Ardent_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.
_Fortune_--Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.
_Porpoise_--Commander Hugh D. Colville.
_Unity_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.
_Garland_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.
_Christopher_--Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.
_Contest_--Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master.
_Owl_--Commander Robert G. Hamond.
_Hardy_--Commander Richard A. A. Plowden.
_Midge_--Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish.
_Ophelia_--Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.
_Kempenfelt_--Commander Harold E. Sulivan.
_Ossory_--Commander Harold V. Dundas.
_Martial_--Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.
_Magic_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.
_Minion_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.
_Mystic_--Commander Claude F. Allsup.
_Mons_--Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.
_Mandate_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie.
_Michael_--Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.
_Marne_--Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.
_Milbrook_--Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.
_Manners_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.
_Moon_--Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin.
_Mounsey_--Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.
_Morning Star_--Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.
_Faulknor_--Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling.
_Marksman_--Commander Norton A. Sulivan.
_Obedient_--Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell.
_Mindful_--Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley.
_Marvel_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.
_Onslaught_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.
_Mænad_--Commander John P. Champion.
_Narwhal_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.
_Nessus_--Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.
_Noble_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.
_Opal_--Commander Charles G. C. Sumner.
_Nonsuch_--Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon.
_Menace_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.
_Munster_--Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.
_Mary Rose_--Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.
_Mischief_--Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.
_Oak_--Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.
_Abdiel_--Commander Berwick Curtis.
(_b_) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty:
_Lion_--Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of
Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.); Captain
Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff.
_Princess Royal_--Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying the
Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.).
_Tiger_--Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.
_Queen Mary_--Captain Cecil I. Prowse.
_New Zealand_--Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of
Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.).
_Indefatigable_--Captain Charles F. Sowerby.
_Southampton_--Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.
_Nottingham_--Captain Charles B. Miller.
_Birmingham_--Captain Arthur A. M. Duff.
_Dublin_--Captain Albert C. Scott.
_Galatea_--Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.
_Inconstant_--Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.
_Phaeton_--Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.
_Cordelia_--Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish.
_Falmouth_--Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.).
_Birkenhead_--Captain Edward Reeves.
_Gloucester_--Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.
_Yarmouth_--Captain Thomas D. Pratt.
“_Barham_”--Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.).
_Warspite_--Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.
_Valiant_--Captain Maurice Woollcombe.
_Malaya_--Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O.
_Champion_--Captain (D.) James U. Farie.
_Nestor_--Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham.
_Nomad_--Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.
_Narborough_--Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.
_Obdurate_--Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams.
_Petard_--Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson.
_Pelican_--Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.
_Nerissa_--Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge.
_Onslow_--Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.
_Moresby_--Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.
_Nicator_--Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta.
_Fearless_--Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper.
_Acheron_--Commander Charles G. Ramsey.
_Ariel_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.
_Attack_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James.
_Hydra_--Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.
_Badger_--Commander G. A. Fremantle.
_Goshawk_--Commander Dashwood F. Moir.
_Defender_--Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.
_Lizard_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.
_Lapwing_--Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.
_Lydiard_--Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.
_Liberty_--Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King.
_Landrail_--Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart.
_Laurel_--Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet.
_Moorsom_--Commander John C. Hodgson.
_Morris_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.
_Turbulent_--Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.
_Termagent_--Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.
_Engadine_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.
4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadrons and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas,
supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my
directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which
was accompanied by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd
Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th
Flotillas.
5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after
the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly
course steered by the latter during the first hour of their action
with the enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable,
as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward
the main fleets would never have been in contact.
The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and
admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron
under Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times,
disadvantageous conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with
the best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable
advantage in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the
German Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and
German battle cruisers in the matter of protection must not be
forgotten. The German vessels are in this respect equal to powerful
battleships, whereas our battle cruisers, particularly those of the
2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, are very lightly protected.
The main difficulty with which our ships had to contend was the bad
light. All reports mention the difficulty experienced in seeing the
enemy vessels to the eastward, whilst remarking on the clearness of
the western horizon. A photograph taken from _Malaya_ during the
action indicates this fact very clearly.
During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged with
the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the
advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and
the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting
qualities of the personnel.
6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir David
Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon
the scene:
“At 2.20 P.M. reports were received from _Galatea_ indicating
the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was
immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to
place my force between the enemy and his base.
“At 2.35 P.M. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the
eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward
and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the
Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly
altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at
3.31 P.M. They appeared to be five battle cruisers.
“After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders
spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the
battle cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we
had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light
cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station
ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the
course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the
work of the light cruiser squadrons was excellent and of great
value.
“From a report from _Galatea_ at 2.25 P.M. it was evident that
the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit
of light cruisers, so at 2.45 P.M. I ordered _Engadine_ to send
up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out
very quickly, and by 3.8 P.M. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant
F. J. Rutland, R.N., as Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin,
R.N., as Observer, was well under way; her first reports of the
enemy were received in _Engadine_ about 3.30 P.M. Owing to clouds
it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four
enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900
feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire
on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered
with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant
Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated
on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such
circumstances are of distinct value.
“At 3.30 P.M. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of
Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th
Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly
converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards,
and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The
5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now
bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was
good, the sun behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy
and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically
good.
“At 3.48 P.M. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both
forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered
to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E.,
the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500
yards.
“Shortly after 4 P.M. _Indefatigable_, after a violent explosion,
fell out of the line, turned over and sank.
“At 4.8 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened
fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to
slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through
a screen of enemy submarines. The destroyer _Landrail_ of 9th
Flotilla, who was on our port beam trying to take station ahead,
sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though
causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of
_Lydiard_ and _Landrail_ undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers
from closer submarine attack. _Nottingham_ also reported a
submarine on the starboard beam.
“Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, _Nestor_, _Nomad_,
_Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_, _Obdurate_,
_Nerissa_, with _Moorsom_ and _Morris_ of 10th Flotilla,
_Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ of the 9th Flotilla, having been
ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity
offered, moved out at 4.15 P.M. simultaneously with a similar
movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out
in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before
arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they
intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15
destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with
the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle
cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their
torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in
this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle cruisers was
rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having
dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore
unfavourable for torpedo attack.
“_Nestor_, _Nomad_ and _Nicator_, gallantly led by Commander
the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of _Nestor_, pressed home their
attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them
at a range of 6,000 and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy
fire from the enemy’s secondary armament. _Nomad_ was badly hit
and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently
_Nestor_ and _Nicator_ altered course to the S.E., and in a short
time the opposing battle cruisers having turned 16 points, found
themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships.
Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and
their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo
at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards.
Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, _Nestor_ was badly hit
and swung to starboard, _Nicator_ altering course inside her to
avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last
torpedo. _Nicator_ made good her escape and subsequently rejoined
the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. _Nestor_ remained stopped, but was
afloat when last seen. _Moorsom_ also carried out an attack on the
enemy’s battle fleet.
“_Petard_, _Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ also pressed home
their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after
the engagement with enemy destroyers. _Petard_ reports that all
her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy’s line, while _Nerissa_
states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These
destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His
Majesty’s Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions.
“From 4.15 to 4.43 P.M. the conflict between the opposing battle
cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th
Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately
at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and
rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18
P.M. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to
the north-eastward had become considerably reduced and the outline
of the ships very indistinct.
“At 4.26 P.M. there was a violent explosion in _Queen Mary_; she
was enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of
her officers and men were subsequently picked up by _Laurel_.
“At 4.38 P.M. _Southampton_ reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet
ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 P.M. the enemy’s
Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in
succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course
to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers
altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued.
_Southampton_ with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the
southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the
enemy battle fleet and came under a very heavy but ineffective
fire. _Southampton’s_ reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle
Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the
enemy battle cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy
battle fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter
course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in
_Barham_, this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.
“At 4.57 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and
came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet.
_Fearless_ with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle
cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. _Champion_
with 13th Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At
5 P.M. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been
following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard
bow; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.
“The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being
silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the
enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up
clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had
turned their van at about 6 P.M. Between 5 and 6 P.M. the action
continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000
yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment,
and undoubtedly one of their battle cruisers quitted the line in
a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal
observation and was corroborated by _Princess Royal_ and _Tiger_.
Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5
P.M. _Onslow_ and _Moresby_, who had been detached to assist
_Engadine_ with the seaplane, rejoined the battle cruiser squadrons
and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of _Lion_. At 5.10
P.M. _Moresby_, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy
ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight minutes later
she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the 6th
ship in the line. _Moresby_ then passed between the lines to clear
the range of smoke, and rejoined _Champion_. In corroboration of
this, _Fearless_ reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily
on fire at about 5.10 P.M., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of
smoke and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of
_Queen Mary_ and _Indefatigable_.
“At 5.35 P.M. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position
of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the
north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He
was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment
at the head of his line, and probably acting on information
received from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged
with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide _Indomitable’s_
report). Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 P.M. British
cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 P.M. the leading
battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon
altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought
the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the
Commander-in-Chief that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east.
At this time only three of the enemy battle cruisers were visible,
closely followed by battleships of the ”König“ class.
“At about 6.5 P.M. _Onslow_, being on the engaged bow of _Lion_,
sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from
us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. _Onslow_ at
once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from
4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. _Onslow_ then
closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all
torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by
a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired.
Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer
proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had
three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged and
torpedoed her. The enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the
remaining torpedoes were fired at them; having started correctly,
they must have crossed the enemy’s track. Damage then caused
_Onslow_ to stop.
“At 7.15 P.M. _Defender_, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots,
while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell
which damaged her foremost boiler, closed _Onslow_ and took her
in tow. Shell were falling all round them during this operation,
which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy
weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was
re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1. P.M. 1st June,
when _Onslow_ was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances
of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am
recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of _Onslow_, and
Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of _Defender_, for special recognition.
_Onslow_ was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral
Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, as follows:
“‘Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a
destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled
condition soon after 6 P.M. She apparently was able to struggle
ahead again, and made straight for the _Derfflinger_ to attack her.
The incident appeared so courageous that it seems desirable to
investigate it further.’”
PROCEEDINGS OF BATTLE FLEET
7. On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted,
the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and
Destroyer Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course
to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that
elapsed before the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the
steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested.
Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner
in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet
maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the
older vessels.
The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the
Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet,
was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in
reckoning between _Lion_ and the _Iron Duke_, which was inevitable
under the circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third
Battle Cruiser Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward,
and it was not until 5.30 P.M. that this squadron observed flashes
of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward.
Rear-Admiral Hood sent the _Chester_ (Captain Robert N. Lawson)
to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light
cruisers at about 5.45 P.M. The engagement lasted for about twenty
minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with
great skill against heavy odds, and although the ship suffered
considerably in casualties her fighting and steaming qualities were
unimpaired, and at about 6.5 P.M. she rejoined the Third Battle
Cruiser Squadron.
The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward,
and at 6.10 P.M. sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking
station ahead of the _Lion_ at 6.21 P.M. in accordance with the
orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He
reports as follows:
“I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out
magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action
ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval
ancestors. At 6.25 P.M. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support
of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only
8,000 yards from the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot
fire into her, and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At
the same time I made a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of
the bearing and distance of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 P.M.
_Invincible_ blew up.
“After the loss of _Invincible_, the squadron was led by
_Inflexible_ until 6.50 P.M. By this time the battle cruisers were
clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3
miles, and I ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong
the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this
time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy
ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note
that after 6 P.M., although the visibility became reduced, it was
undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals
their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very
severely and establish a definite superiority over them. The damage
received by our ships during this period, excepting the destruction
of _Invincible_, was slight. From the reports of other ships and
my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered severely,
battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was
crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our
battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron were
also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas
shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely
said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.
“From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third
Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our
starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 P.M. attacked with
the torpedo. _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ both fired torpedoes at the
leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo
hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light
Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with
gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that
the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired.
Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and
effective attack. _Indomitable_ reports that about this time one of
the _Derfflinger_ class fell out of the enemy’s line.”
8. Meanwhile, at 6 P.M., _Canterbury_ (Captain Percy M. R. Royds)
had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on
the torpedo-boat destroyer _Shark_ (Commander Loftus W. Jones),
_Acasta_ (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and _Christopher_
(Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr); as a result of this
engagement the _Shark_ was sunk.
9. At 5.45 P.M. the report of guns had become audible to me, and at
5.55 P.M. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard
beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the
position of the enemy’s battle fleet could not be determined. The
difference in reckoning between _Iron Duke_ and _Lion_ mentioned in
paragraph 6 added to the uncertainty of the general situation.
10. Shortly after 5.55 P.M. some of the cruisers ahead, under
Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, were seen
to be in action, and reports received show that _Defence_, Flagship
(Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and _Warrior_ (Captain Vincent B.
Molteno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light
cruiser at this time, which subsequently sank.
11. At 6 P.M. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers,
were sighted by _Marlborough_ bearing before the starboard beam of
the battle fleet.
At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet,
reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and at
6.14 P.M. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.
At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle
cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to
ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.
12. I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir
David Beatty’s report, and during deployment the fleets became
engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers
ahead of the battle fleet.
The divisions of the battle fleet were led by:
The Commander-in-Chief,
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,
Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram,
Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee,
Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff,
Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson,
Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt.
13. At 6.16 P.M. _Defence_ and _Warrior_ were observed passing down
between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy
fire. _Defence_ was seen to blow up and _Warrior_ passed to the
rear disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during
his engagement with the enemy’s light cruisers and in his desire to
complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the
enemy’s heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in
close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his
ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not
known when _Black Prince_ (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same
squadron, was sunk, but as a wireless signal was received from her
between 8 and 9 P.M. reporting the position of a submarine, it is
possible that her loss was the result of a torpedo attack. There
is much strong evidence of the presence of a large number of enemy
submarines in the vicinity of the scene of the action.
14. The First Battle Squadron, which was in the rear on deployment,
became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening fire
at 6.17 P.M. on a battleship of the “Kaiser” class. The centre
squadron, which had previously been firing at an enemy light
cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 P.M. on a battleship of the “König”
class, and the van squadron commenced immediately afterwards.
At 6.6 P.M. the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron,
then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard
wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of _Barham_,
and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form
ahead of the remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the
direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manœuvre
which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from
the enemy battle fleet. An accident to _Warspite’s_ steering gear
caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship
in the direction of the enemy’s line, during which time she was
hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Phillpotts to
extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.
Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was
possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy’s battle
line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever
visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but
never more than eight to twelve.
The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from
6.17 P.M. to 8.20 P.M. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards,
during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from
S.E. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly
turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks
and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and
the alterations, of course, had the effect of bringing the British
Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on
the bow of the enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle
line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his
bases.
At 6.55 P.M. _Iron Duke_ passed the wreck of _Invincible_ with
_Badger_ standing by. I was not aware of the loss of _Queen Mary_
and _Indefatigable_ until the following day.
15. During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High
Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective
fire kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand
Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were
seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the
line, and at least one to sink. The enemy’s return fire at this
period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was
insignificant.
THE BATTLE CRUISERS IN THE VAN
16. Sir David Beatty reports:
“Between 7 and 7.12 P.M. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. to
regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 P.M. again sighted them
at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time
were two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the
‘König’ class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward,
but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved
considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged
at 7.17 P.M. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 P.M. my
course was S.W., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship
bearing N.W. by W. Again after a very short time the enemy showed
signs of punishment, one ship being on fire while another appeared
to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy’s
line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as
with a pall, under cover of which they undoubtedly turned away, and
at 7.45 P.M. we lost sight of them.
“At 7.58 P.M. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons
to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy’s line,
and at 8.20 P.M. we altered course to west in support. We soon
located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily
engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship
was hit repeatedly by _Lion_ and turned away 8 points, emitting
very high flames and with a heavy list to port. _Princess Royal_
set fire to a three-funnelled battleship; _New Zealand_ and
_Indomitable_ report that the third ship, which they both engaged,
hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which
now came down enveloped them, and _Falmouth_ reported they were
last seen at 8.38 P.M. steaming to the westward.
“At 8.40 P.M. all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if
struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As,
however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an
occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a
great vessel. This seems a very probable explanation in view of the
condition in which the enemy was last seen.”
17. As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much
on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and
by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a “following” or
“chasing” fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired,
but only one took effect (on _Marlborough_), and even in this case
the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action.
The menace of effective torpedo attack on a long line, however, in
weather conditions which were ideal for the purpose, contributed to
the difficulty of keeping within effective gun range of the enemy.
Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.
DETAILS OF BATTLE FLEET ACTION
18. The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,
came into action at 6.15 P.M. with the enemy’s Third Battle
Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe
punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and
light cruisers which were also engaged. The fire of _Marlborough_
(Captain George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This
ship commenced at 6.17 P.M. by firing seven salvoes at a ship of
the “Kaiser” class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship,
and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable
list to starboard, but re-opened at 7.3 P.M. at a cruiser and at
7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König”
class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The
manner in which this effective fire was kept up, in spite of the
disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo, was most
creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.
The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards.
The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy’s return fire
than the remainder of the battle fleet, with the exception of
the Fifth Battle Squadron. _Colossus_ was hit but not seriously
damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.
In the Fourth Battle Squadron--in which squadron my Flagship _Iron
Duke_ was placed--Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, leading one
of the divisions, the enemy engaged was the Third Squadron and
some of the battle cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and
light cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter,
but the fire of the squadron was effective. _Iron Duke_, having
previously fired at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire
at 6.30 P.M. on a battleship of the “König” class at a range of
12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting
commenced at the second salvo, and only ceased when the target
ship turned away. The rapidity with which hitting was established
was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organisation of the
flagship so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C.
Dreyer.
The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed
at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the
mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.
The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir
Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the “Kaiser” or
“König” classes between 6.30 and 7.20 P.M., and fired also at an
enemy battle cruiser which had apparently dropped back severely
damaged.
19. During the action between the battle fleets, the Second Cruiser
Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, with
the addition of _Duke of Edinburgh_ of the First Cruiser Squadron,
occupied a position at the van of the battle fleet and acted as a
connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser
fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not
have an opportunity of coming into action.
The attached cruisers _Boadicea_, _Active_, _Blanche_, and
_Bellona_ carried out their duties as repeating ships with
remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.
The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E.
Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to
attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 P.M. and again at 8.18 P.M. when
they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under
Commodore James R. P. Hawkesley to attack. On each occasion the
Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore
Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their
object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack,
when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet
at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The _Calliope_ was hit several
times but did not sustain serious damage, although, I regret to
say, she had several casualties. The light cruisers attacked the
enemy’s battleships with torpedoes at this time, but were not able
to observe the result; an explosion on board a ship of the “Kaiser”
class was seen, however, at 8.38 P.M.
During these destroyer attacks, four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers
were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers and
destroyers.
NIGHT DISPOSITIONS
20. At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat
of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching
darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the
night with a view to its safety from such attacks whilst providing
for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manœuvred to
remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a
position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from
destroyer attack and at the same time be favourably situated for
attacking the enemy’s heavy ships.
NIGHT ATTACKS BY FLOTILLAS
21. During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked,
but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore
Hawkesley and Captains Wintour and Stirling, delivered a series of
very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy
losses.
22. It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth
Flotilla occurred, including that of _Tipperary_ with the gallant
leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his
flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering
severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels
was taken and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.
Two torpedoes were seen at least to take effect on enemy vessels as
the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from
_Spitfire_ (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the
other from either _Ardent_ (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden),
_Ambuscade_ (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or _Garland_
(Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).
23. The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan
J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked,
which consisted of six large vessels besides light cruisers,
comprised vessels of the “Kaiser” class, and were almost completely
surprised. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at
the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third
ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack
made twenty minutes later by _Mænad_ (Commander John T. Champion)
on the five vessels still remaining resulted in the second ship in
the line being also hit and blown up.
The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on
reaching the rear of the line, but _Onslaught_ was the only vessel
which received any material injuries. In _Onslaught_ Sub-lieutenant
Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot,
R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship
successfully out of action and reached Rosyth.
24. During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla,
_Castor_ (Commodore John R. P. Hawkesley) leading, the flotilla
engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point blank
range.
The 13th Flotilla under the command of Captain James U. Farie in
_Champion_ took station astern of the battle fleet for the night.
At 0.30 A.M. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear
of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to the _Petard_
and _Turbulent_, switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire
which severely damaged _Petard_ and disabled _Turbulent_. At 3.30
A.M. _Champion_ was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy
destroyers. _Moresby_ reports four ships of “Deutschland” class
sighted at 2.35 A.M. at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes
later an explosion was felt by _Moresby_ and _Obdurate_.
_Abdiel_, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out
her duties with the success which has always characterised her work.
There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas;
they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of
them.
Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light
Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close
action for about fifteen minutes at 10.20 P.M. with a squadron
comprising one enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which
period _Southampton_ and _Dublin_ suffered rather heavy casualties,
although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired.
It is reasonable to suppose that they inflicted considerable damage
on their opponents.
PROCEEDINGS ON 1ST JUNE
25. At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet being then to the
southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in
search of enemy vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own
cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 A.M. Vice-Admiral Sir
Cecil Burney transferred his flag from _Marlborough_ to _Revenge_,
as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed
of the squadron. _Marlborough_ was detached by my direction to a
base, being unsuccessfully attacked _en route_ by enemy submarines.
The visibility early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less
than on 31st May, and difficulty was experienced in meeting all
ships, the torpedo-boat destroyers not rejoining until 9 A.M.
The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of
the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the
destroyers _Ardent_, _Fortune_, and _Tipperary_ were picked up, and
the _Sparrowhawk_, which had been in collision and was no longer
seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large
amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 P.M.,
it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning
to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached
without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser squadron
was detached to search for _Warrior_, which vessel had been
abandoned whilst in tow of _Engadine_ on her way to the base owing
to bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but
no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by
a light cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident
that she foundered.
26. The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30
P.M. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.
LOSSES
27. The conditions of low visibility under which the day action
took place, the approach of darkness and the tactics adopted by
the enemy of retiring under cover of torpedo attacks, enhance the
difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted,
or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most
careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testified
to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews
with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that
the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to
numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards
the particular class of vessel, particularly those which were sunk
during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk it is
unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by
gunfire and by torpedo attack.
28. The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him,
and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the water.
I particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled
German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly
after deployment, under a heavy fire which was returned by the
only gun left in action. But after the arrival of the British
Battle Fleet, there appeared to be no desire on the part of the
High Sea Fleet to continue the engagement. The battleships turned
away on each occasion of being sighted soon after fire was opened,
and although the British Fleet remained in the proximity of the
battlefield and near the line of approach to German ports until 11
A.M. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances
from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to
enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft, the enemy made no
sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the
High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved
this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been
known to the enemy, as at 2.50 A.M. the fleet engaged a Zeppelin
for quite five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity
to note and subsequently report the position and course of the
British Fleet.
29. I deeply regret to report the loss of H. M. Ships mentioned in
this despatch, and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss
of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon.
Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse,
Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles
J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished
with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They
led officers and men who were equally gallant and whose death is
mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their
duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.
THE PERSONNEL OF THE FLEET
30. The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night
actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do
them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious
traditions of the past were most worthily upheld--whether in heavy
ships, cruisers, light cruisers, or destroyers--the same admirable
spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with
a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The
heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.
I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the
Fleet filled me.
31. I have now given details of the work of the various ships
during action. It must never be forgotten, however, that the
prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department,
and that during action the officers and men of that department
perform their most important duties without the incentive which a
knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The
qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under
these conditions, and they were, as always, most fully maintained
throughout the operations under review. Many ships attained speeds
that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly
their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were
conspicuous by their absence, and many instances are reported of
magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of
injured ships.
32. The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out
very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely
admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials
for performing critical operations and with their staff seriously
depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the
greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.
33. It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot
of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the
flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions, and the
squadrons and flotillas mentioned as well as the individual vessels
composing them were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also
the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Squadrons of the battle fleet and the 2nd
Cruiser Squadron.
34. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have named the Commanding
Officers of all the ships mentioned above, and I desire to place
on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all vessels
were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill
and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous
throughout the day.
I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand
Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton
Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander
L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest
F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the battle fleet.
They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney’s
squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy
battle fleet than the squadrons ahead, and under a leader who has
rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the
squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir
David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action
in rear of the battle fleet in the most judicious manner in the
evening.
Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant
leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He
appreciated the situation at once on sighting first the enemy’s
lighter forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle
fleet. I can fully sympathise with his feelings when the evening
mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for
which he had manœuvred and for which the vessels in company with
him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on
this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest
value.
Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded
him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner in
which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron into
action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William
C. Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good
work performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command
respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore
William E. Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He
states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes
and used their forces to the best possible effect. I most fully
endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract
from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his
staff:
“I desire to bring to your notice the great assistance that I
received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief
of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment
was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My
Flag-Commander, The Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most
valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling
me to take advantage of the enemy’s discomfiture; my secretary,
Frank T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as
they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping
the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander
Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under
the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his
signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these
officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the
manœuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the
enemy’s fire.”
35. I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant
work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden,
K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war
his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment,
his long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and
his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest
assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety
inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the
stages leading up to the Fleet action and during and after the
action he was always at hand to assist, and his judgment never at
fault. I owe him more than I can say.
My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G.,
the Captain of the Fleet, who also renders me much assistance in
the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation
is largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and
replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much
assistance to me during the action.
Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Commander Roger
M. Bellairs of my staff, plotted the movements of the two fleets
with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander
the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my staff, acted as observer
aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. These
officers carried out their duties efficiently during the action.
The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander
Alexander R. W. Wood, assisted by the other signal officers, and
all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. My
Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was also
of much service to me throughout the action.
The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the Fleet
and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and
after the action is a great testimony to the indefatigable work
carried out by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have
been invaluable throughout the war.
A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all
ships.
My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and Victor
H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the
action. Their records have been of much assistance.
To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am
indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning
throughout the operations.
36. In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of
their Lordships the names of other officers and men who did not
come under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of
specially distinguishing themselves.
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(_Signed_) J. R. JELLICOE,
_Admiral_, _Commander-in-Chief_.
Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022, dated 18th June,
1916.
LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS CONSIDERED TO BE SUNK, 31st May–1st June, 1916.
_Battleships or Battle Cruisers._
2 Battleships, “Dreadnought” type Certain.
1 Battleship, “Deutschland” type Certain.
1 Battleship or Battle Cruiser Probable.
1 Battleship, “Dreadnought” type Probable.
_Light Cruisers._
4 Light Cruisers Certain.
1 Heavy ship or Light Cruiser Certain.
_Torpedo-boat Destroyers._
6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers Certain.
3 Torpedo-boat Destroyers Probable.
_Submarines._
1 Submarine Certain.
3 Submarines Possible.
Appendix II
ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA, ON SUNDAY, 24th JANUARY, 1915
ADMIRALTY,
_3rd March, 1915_.
The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir David
Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle Cruiser
Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, the 24th of
January, 1915:--
_H.M.S. Princess Royal,
2nd February, 1915._
SIR,--I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th January,
1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company:
The Battle Cruisers _Lion_, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield,
C.V.O., flying my flag; _Princess Royal_, Captain Osmond de B.
Brock, Aide-de-Camp; _Tiger_, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; _New
Zealand_, Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the
flag of Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O.; and
_Indomitable_, Captain Francis W. Kennedy.
The Light Cruisers _Southampton_, flying the broad pendant of
Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O.; _Nottingham_, Captain
Charles B. Miller; _Birmingham_, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and
_Lowestoft_, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my
port beam.
Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in _Arethusa_, _Aurora_,
Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, _Undaunted_, Captain Francis G. St.
John, M.V.O., _Arethusa_, and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead.
At 7.25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly
afterwards a report reached me from _Aurora_ that she was engaged
with enemy’s ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E.,
increased to 22 knots, and ordered the Light Cruisers and Flotillas
to chase S.S.E. to get in touch and report movements of enemy.
This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed, my wishes
had already been forestalled by the respective Senior Officers, and
reports almost immediately followed from _Southampton_, _Arethusa_,
and _Aurora_ as to the position and composition of the enemy, which
consisted of 3 Battle Cruisers and _Blücher_, 6 Light Cruisers, and
a number of Destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course
to S.E. From now onwards the Light Cruisers maintained touch with
the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements.
The Battle Cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the
southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme
visibility. At 7.30 A.M. the enemy were sighted on the port bow
steaming fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles.
Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our
position on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to
S.E. parallel to them, and settled down to a long stern chase,
gradually increasing our speed until we reached 28.5 knots.
Great credit is due to the Engineer Staffs of _New Zealand_ and
_Indomitable_--these ships greatly exceeded their normal speed.
At 8.52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear
ship, the Battle Cruisers manœuvred to keep on a line of bearing so
that guns would bear, and _Lion_ fired a single shot, which fell
short. The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with Light
Cruisers ahead and a large number of Destroyers on their starboard
beam.
Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.9
A.M. _Lion_ made her first hit on the _Blücher_, No. 4 in the line.
The _Tiger_ opened fire at 9.20 A.M. on the rear ship, the _Lion_
shifted to No. 3 in the line, at 18,000 yards, this ship being
hit by several salvoes. The enemy returned our fire at 9.14 A.M.
_Princess Royal_, on coming into range, opened fire on _Blücher_,
the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards at 9.35 A.M. _New
Zealand_ was within range of _Blücher_, which had dropped somewhat
astern, and opened fire on her. _Princess Royal_ shifted to the
third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her.
Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a
position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul
our range with their smoke; but the enemy’s destroyers threatening
attack, the _Meteor_ and “M” Division passed ahead of us, Captain
the Hon. H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous
ability.
About 9.45 A.M. the situation was as follows: _Blücher_, the fourth
in their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely
from gunfire; their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire.
_Lion_ was engaging No. 1, _Princess Royal_ No. 3, _New Zealand_
No. 4, while the _Tiger_, who was second in our line, fired first
at their No. 1, and when interfered with by smoke, at their No. 4.
The enemy’s destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen
their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now
appeared to have altered course to the northward to increase their
distance, and certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port
quarter of their leader, thereby increasing their distance from our
line. The battle cruisers, therefore, were ordered to form a line
of bearing N.N.W., and proceed at their utmost speed.
Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack.
_Lion_ and _Tiger_ opened fire on them, and caused them to retire
and resume their original course.
The Light Cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port
quarter of the enemy’s line, enabling them to observe, and keep
touch, or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line.
At 10.48 A.M. the _Blücher_, which had dropped considerably
astern of enemy’s line, hauled out to port, steering north with
a heavy list, on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition.
I consequently ordered _Indomitable_ to attack enemy breaking
northward.
At 10.54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and
I personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our
starboard bow. Immediately turned to port.
At 11.3 A.M. an injury to the _Lion_ being reported as incapable
of immediate repair, I directed _Lion_ to shape course N.W. At
11.20 A.M. I called the _Attack_ alongside, shifting my flag to
her at about 11.35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the
Squadron, and met them at noon retiring N.N.W.
I boarded and hoisted my flag in _Princess Royal_ at about 12.20
P.M., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since
the _Lion_ fell out of the line, namely, that _Blücher_ had been
sunk and that the enemy Battle Cruisers had continued their course
to the eastward in a considerably damaged condition. He also
informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop
bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of the survivors of
_Blücher_.
The good seamanship of Lieut.-Commander Cyril Callaghan, H.M.S.
_Attack_, in placing his vessel alongside the _Lion_ and
subsequently the _Princess Royal_, enabled the transfer of flag to
be made in the shortest possible time.
At 2 P.M. I closed _Lion_ and received a report that her starboard
engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 P.M. I
ordered _Indomitable_ to take her in tow, which was accomplished by
5 P.M.
The greatest credit is due to the Captains of _Indomitable_ and
_Lion_ for the seamanlike manner in which the _Lion_ was taken in
tow under difficult circumstances.
The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation was a
conspicuous feature.
I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men
who specially distinguished themselves.
Where all did well it is difficult to single out Officers and Men
for special mention, and as _Lion_ and _Tiger_ were the only ships
hit by the enemy, the majority of these I mentioned belong to those
ships.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(_Signed_) DAVID BEATTY,
Vice-Admiral.
INDEX
_Abdiel_, 289, 373, 433, 465, 484
Aberdeenshire coast, a U-boat rammed and sunk off, 209
_Aboukir_, loss of, 15, 37, 105, 132
_Acacia_, 233
_Acasta_, 9, 176, 464
in Jutland battle, 332, 333, 356, 387, 476
_Achates_, 9, 464
_Acheron_, 466
_Achilles_, 8, 88, 212, 419
accident on, 163
sinks a German raider, 276
_Acorn_, 9
_Active_, 9, 134, 144, 145, 318, 380, 381, 439, 464, 482
Admiralty, adopt Scapa Flow as main Fleet Base, 15
Intelligence Division of, 187
naval policy of, 34, 302
vigorous mine-laying policy adopted by, 249
Adriatic, battleships withdrawn from, 303
Aeroplane attacks 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 165
Aeroplanes over the Orkneys, 95
substituted for seaplanes, 222, 283
_Africa_, 8, 266
Agadir crisis, 91
_Agamemnon_, 10
_Agincourt_, 108, 152, 241, 308, 318, 463
in Jutland battle, 357, 360
joins 4th Battle Squadron, 121
Aircraft carriers, development of, 72
in warfare, 70, 153
Airships as scouts, 37, 450
_Ajax_, 8, 93, 98, 107, 135, 152, 241, 290, 318, 463
_Alarm_, 9, 142
_Albemarle_, 10, 93, 98, 212, 237, 249, 266
_Alcantara_, 272, 273
sinking of, 273
Alderson, Captain, 207
Alexander-Sinclair, Commodore E. S., 203, 320, 466, 489
Alison, Lieut.-Commander Roger V., 466
Allen, Commander Walter L., 464
Allsup, Commander Claude F., 464
_Alsatian_, 73, 105, 107, 109, 127, 131, 135, 169
captures concealed Germans, 138
_Ambuscade_, 9, 176, 286, 464
in Jutland battle, 376, 483
America enters the War, 303
American battleships join Grand Fleet, 303
_Amethyst_, 10
Ammunition, for Army use, 114
ships, 84
_Amphion_, 10
_Amsterdam_, 217
_Andes_, 272, 273
rescues German survivors, 274
_Andromache_, 11
_Anglia_, 104
Anti-submarine defences, German, 30
obstructions, 144, 146
obstructions damaged by gales, 247, 267
operations, British, 146, 218 _et seq._, 282
_Antrim_, 8, 89, 138, 159, 211, 419, 424
_Apollo_, 11
_Arabis_, sinking of, 269
Arbuthnot, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert, 8, 191, 334, 342, 410, 463, 477
death of, 335, 410, 487
_Ardent_, 9, 483
in collision, 250, 286
loss of, 376, 385, 485
_Arethusa_, 111
in action, 493, 494
_Argyll_, 8, 89, 223
aground off Scottish coast, 252
_Ariel_, 209, 466
sinks a submarine, 214
_Arlanza_, 253, 431
_Arley_, 233
Armour piercing shells, a new type of, 69, 417
Committees’ investigations on, 69
limitations of British, 306
Armour protection, improved, 417
question of, 394 _et seq._, 468
Arnot, Midshipman R. G., 484
Asquith, Right Hon. H. H., visits the Fleet, 237, 241
_Assistance_, 8, 80, 83, 105, 114, 116, 138, 143, 186, 197
Atkins, Acting-Lieut. P. S., 239, 240
Atlantic, Von Spee’s squadron in, 24, 157, 161
_Attack_, 466, 496
_Attila_, capture of, 108
_Audacious_, 8, 135, 149, 150, 151
loss of, 148 _et seq._
_Aurora_, 194, 493, 494
_Australia_, 24, 203, 204, 210, 290, 418
in collision, 285
Austrian steamer captured, 108
Back, Captain Eric, 260
Backhouse, Captain Oliver, 463
Backhouse, Commander Roger, 7
Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald, 154
_Badger_, 467
rescues survivors, 338, 356, 479
Baird, Captain George H., 463
Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., becomes First Lord, 453
offers Admiral Jellicoe post of First Sea Lord, 458
Baltic, the, British submarines in, 434
proposed operations in, 129
_Barham_, 249, 320, 325, 328, 345, 348, 352, 360, 463, 472, 478
in collision, 258
Barron, Commander J. O., 333, 356, 464, 476
Bashmakoff, M., 275
Bate, Lieut.-Commander C. L., 465
Battle Cruiser Fleet, aircraft attached to, 71
Instructions to, 53
organisation of, 203
title altered, 204
Battle Cruiser Fleet’s action, 316 _et seq._
Battle Cruiser Squadron, reorganisation of, 418
Battle cruisers, function of, 304
question of armour, protection of, 305, 306
Battle Fleet, composition of, 7
aircraft provided for, 71
Battleships, “all-big-gun” type of, 34
and Battle Cruisers, British and German, 307 _et seq._
Battleships, British and German, 31
dummy, 171
_Bayano_ sunk by submarine, 210
Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis, commands 1st Battle Squadron, 7, 85,
149
discusses question of blocking Zeebrugge, 154
exchange of command, 180, 182
Beamish, Captain Tufton P. H., 466
Bear Island, reported enemy base and wireless station at, 233
Beattie, Lieut.-Commander Kenneth A., 466
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, 8, 111, 177, 178, 203, 285, 322, 466,
477, 494
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, and Jutland battle, 320, 321, 325,
341, 345, 369, 440, 442, 468, 480
despatch on North Sea battle, 493 _et seq._
tribute to, 411, 489
Belgian coast, sweeping the, 170
Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander R. M., 7, 359, 490
_Bellerophon_, 8, 110, 318, 463
_Bellona_, 7, 88, 94, 97, 98, 173, 202, 318, 442, 463, 482
in collision, 180
_Benbow_, 169, 173, 186, 318, 352, 355, 463
Bentinck, Captain Rudolf W., 2, 7, 41, 465
tribute to, 489
Beresford, Lord, 35
_Berliner Tageblatt_, Captain Persius’ admissions in, 408
Bernard, Captain V. H. G., 463
Best, Commander the Hon. Matthew R., 7, 490
Betty, Captain, 185
_Biarritz_, 292
Bingham, Commander the Hon. E. B. S., 324, 463, 470
awarded V. C., 325
Bircham, Lieutenant, 77
_Birkenhead_, 246, 251, 255, 319, 466
_Birmingham_, 8, 88, 178, 182, 203, 223, 319, 466, 493
sinks a submarine, 93, 119
_Black Prince_, 171, 187, 244, 290, 318, 336, 380, 463
uncertainty of her end, 336, 337, 478
Blackett, Captain Henry, 463
Blake, Lieut.-Commander C. P., 467
_Blanche_, 8, 88, 175, 202, 207, 272, 273, 318, 463, 482
Blockade, Ministry of, 76
work of the Fleet, 73 _et seq._, 96, 97, 189
[_see also_, Cruiser Squadron (10th)]
Block-ships sunk in Scapa Flow entrances, 167
_Blonde_, 8, 88, 202, 290
goes ashore, 433
_Blūcher_, 152, 494, 495
sinking of, 195, 197, 496
Blunt, Captain W. F., 10, 466
_Boadicea_, 4, 8, 88, 202, 318, 438, 463, 482
damaged by heavy seas, 175
Boarding steamers, increased force of, 171
Bonham, Captain Thomas P., 463, 478
death of, 487
Borrett, Captain George H., 463
_Botha_, 225, 267, 457
Boxer campaign, 62, 63
Boxer, Lieut.-Commander Henry P., 465
Boyle, Captain the Hon. Algernon D. E. H., 466
Bradford, Vice-Admiral E. E., 8, 48, 108, 176, 179, 208
and Dogger Bank action, 196
_Brandenburg_, 132
interned by Norwegian Government, 133
_Brisk_, 9
_Britannia_, 8, 199
aground in Firth of Forth, 198
British Expeditionary Force, transport of, 22, 23, 37
British Fleet, anxiety for safety of, 28, 31
British Navy (_see_ Navy)