THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND--(_Continued_)
III.--THE NIGHT ACTION
The situation, which had never been at all clear to me owing to the
fact that I had not seen more than a few ships at a time, appeared to
be as follows:
We were between the enemy and his bases, whether he shaped a course
to return via the Horn Reef, via Heligoland direct, or via the swept
channel which he was known to use along the coast of the West Frisian
Islands.
I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward of us. He had been
turning on _interior_ lines throughout. We had altered course gradually
during the action from south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points,
or 146 degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his
ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it was possible
that ships, which had fallen out owing to damage, might be to the
northward.
The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to my mind,
but for several reasons it was not my intention to seek such an action
between the heavy ships.
It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments against it.
In the first place, such a course must have inevitably led to our
Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a very large destroyer
force throughout the night. No senior officer would willingly court
such an attack, even if our battleships were equipped with the
best searchlights and the best arrangements for the control of the
searchlights and the gunfire at night.
It was, however, known to me that neither our searchlights nor their
control arrangements were at this time of the best type. The fitting
of director-firing gear for the guns of the secondary armament of our
battleships (a very important factor for firing at night) had also
only just been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay was
due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without these adjuncts
I knew well that the maximum effect of our fire at night could not
be obtained, and that we could place no dependence on beating off
destroyer attacks by gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch
with the heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with no
corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were no effective antidote
at night, since, if they were disposed with this sole object in view,
they would certainly be taken for enemy destroyers and be fired on by
our own ships.
But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers, the result
of night actions between heavy ships must always be very largely a
matter of _chance_, as there is little opportunity for skill on either
side. Such an action must be fought at very close range, the decision
depending on the course of events in the first few minutes. It is,
therefore, an undesirable procedure on these general grounds. The
greater efficiency of German searchlights at the time of the Jutland
action, and the greater number of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships,
combined with his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the
Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement of such
an action.
The question then remained as to the course to be steered. The first
desideratum was to keep the British Fleet between the enemy and his
bases, so as to be in a position to renew the action at dawn. Daylight
was rapidly disappearing; it was necessary to form the Fleet for the
night as quickly as possible to avoid visual signalling after dark; and
it was also necessary to place our destroyers in a position where the
chances of their coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a
minimum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attacking the enemy’s
capital ships during the night. The Grand Fleet was formed at the time
in practically a single line, steering approximately west-south-west. I
considered that a southerly course would meet the situation and would
enable me to form the Fleet very quickly, and, if I put the destroyers
astern, they would fulfil three conditions: first, they would be in
an excellent position for attacking the enemy’s fleet should it also
turn to the southward with a view to regaining its bases during the
night (which seemed a very probable movement on the part of the enemy);
secondly, they would also be in position to attack enemy destroyers
should the latter search for our fleet with a view to a night attack
on the heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of our own ships,
and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error or of our
battleships firing on them would be reduced to a minimum.
Accordingly, at 9 P.M., I signalled to the Battle Fleet to alter
course by divisions to _south_, informing the Flag officers of the
Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and the
officers commanding destroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that
they should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed the Battle Fleet
to assume the second organisation and to form divisions in line ahead
disposed abeam to port, with the columns one mile apart. This had the
effect of placing the Battle Fleet as shown in the diagram:
1 mile 1 mile 1 mile
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2nd 4th 1st 5th
Battle Squadrons.
My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was to ensure that
adjacent columns should not lose sight of each other during the night,
and that therefore they would not mistake our own ships for those of
the enemy.
As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly course the
destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles astern of
the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 P.M. a signal was made to the mine-laying
flotilla leader _Abdiel_ (Captain Berwick Curtis) to proceed to lay
a mine-field in a defined area some 15 miles from the Vyl Lightship,
over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet would pass if the ships
attempted to regain their ports during the night viâ the Horn Reef. The
_Abdiel_ carried out this operation unobserved in the same successful
manner as numerous other similar operations had been undertaken by this
most useful little vessel; from the evidence of one of our submarines,
stationed near the Horn Reef, which reported on return to her base
having heard several underwater explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 A.M.
on June 1st, it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines.
At 10 P.M. the position of the _Iron Duke_ was Lat. 56.22 N., Long.
5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots, and the order of the Fleet from
west to east was:
Battle Cruiser Fleet (except 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron); Cruiser
Squadrons;
Battle Fleet;
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle Squadron;
4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet;
11th, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from west to
east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet.
Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward for the night a
destroyer attack took place on the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron at the
rear of our Battle line. This was reported to me shortly after 9 P.M.,
but immediately afterwards a further report stated that the enemy had
been driven off to the north-west.
At 10.4 P.M. Commodore Hawkesley, in the _Castor_, commanding the
destroyer flotillas, after dropping astern, sighted three or more
vessels at a range of 2,000 yards which he took to be enemy battle
cruisers. If the German report is to be believed, the ships were light
cruisers and included the _Hamburg_ and _Elbing_. The enemy at once
opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the _Castor_ was hit, and her
bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged, making it impossible to
signal to the 11th Flotilla, which the _Castor_ was leading. The damage
to the _Castor_ was slight. The _Castor_, _Magic_, and _Marne_ fired
torpedoes at the enemy, but the remaining destroyers of the flotilla
refrained from doing so, not being certain of the identity of the
vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after a violent detonation,
following on the discharge of the torpedoes, had been felt in the
engine-rooms of the destroyers near the _Castor_.
At 0.15 A.M. the _Castor_ sighted a German destroyer on her starboard
bow and opened fire with all guns at point-blank range. She was not
seen again.
At 10.20 P.M. the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted and engaged five
enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with four light cruisers, probably
of the 4th Scouting Group. The enemy again opened fire with great
rapidity and accuracy, and concentrated his fire on our two leading
ships, the _Southampton_ and _Dublin_, at very short range. Both
vessels suffered considerable damage during the 15 minutes’ engagement
and there were fairly heavy casualties; three fires which broke out on
board the _Southampton_ were promptly extinguished by fine work on the
part of the officers and men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had
been much cut up by shell fire.
The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but fierce engagement,
and it is probable that the German light cruiser _Frauenlob_, whose
loss was admitted by the enemy, was sunk during this action, which took
place in that case between our own 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron and the
German 4th Scouting Group.
At 11.30 P.M. the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked enemy cruisers
steering a south-easterly course. Again the vessels sighted opened fire
immediately, and the flotilla leader _Tipperary_, commanded by Captain
Wintour, the leader of the flotilla, was severely damaged by gunfire
and set on fire forward; the _Broke_, leader of the 2nd half Flotilla,
received injury to her steering-gear, rendering her temporarily
unmanageable and causing her to ram the destroyer _Sparrowhawk_, with
the result that it became necessary to abandon the latter destroyer
on the following morning after taking off her crew. The destroyer
_Spitfire_ (Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Trelawny), next astern of the
_Tipperary_, fired torpedoes at a four-funnelled cruiser which appeared
to be hit and in a sinking condition, and the _Spitfire_ then collided
with a German light cruiser and, in scraping along her side, carried
off some 29 feet of her skin plating.
The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engagement, while
steering to the south-eastward, came into contact at midnight with the
enemy’s 2nd Battle Squadron, and one ship (probably the _Pommern_)
was torpedoed and sunk either by the _Ardent_ (Lieutenant-Commander
Marsden) or _Ambuscade_ (Lieutenant-Commander G. A. Coles) or _Garland_
(Lieutenant-Commander R. S. Goff). A heavy and accurate fire was opened
by the enemy and the destroyer _Fortune_ (Lieutenant-Commander F. G.
Terry) was sunk.
The flotilla was again in action a little later with some enemy
battleships, and the _Ardent_ attacked, and fired a torpedo, but the
result could not be observed as a very heavy fire was concentrated
on the _Ardent_, which sank with colours flying after a very gallant
night’s work. It is sad to record that Lieutenant-Commander Marsden and
one man were the only survivors, being picked up by a destroyer on June
1st after having been five hours in the water.
The 12th Flotilla had formed after dark astern of the 1st Battle
Squadron. The 1st Battle Squadron was somewhat astern of the remainder
of the Fleet during the night, owing to the _Marlborough_ not being
able to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the revolutions for this
speed. Consequently the 1st Flotilla was also more than five miles
astern of the main portion of the Battle Fleet. At 11.30 P.M. also this
flotilla was obliged for some little time to steer a south-easterly
course, owing to the movements of another flotilla on the starboard
hand, the identity of which cannot be determined with certainty. The
result was that the 12th Flotilla was probably some ten miles to the
north-eastward of the 1st Battle Squadron by midnight. The incident was
a fortunate one since it brought the flotilla into contact with one of
the enemy’s battle squadrons.
At 1.45 A.M. Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in the _Faulknor_,
sighted on the starboard bow this battle squadron, consisting of six
ships steering south-east. The leading ships were thought to belong to
the “Kaiser” class. Captain Stirling altered his course to one parallel
to that of the enemy and increased speed to 25 knots to draw ahead,
with the intention of turning to attack on a north-westerly course (the
reverse of the enemy’s course), in order to give an opportunity of
getting into close range. This attack was carried out at 2 A.M. at a
range of about 3,000 yards, and all destroyers fired their torpedoes at
the second and third ships in the line. Some took effect on the third
battleship in the line, the explosion being so violent and the flame
reaching to such a height that it appeared to those in our destroyers
that the explosion of the torpedoes must have detonated the magazine
and destroyed the ship.
Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the enemy light
cruisers, which were in company with the battle squadron. The destroyer
_Mænad_ (Commander J. P. Champion) had, however, not turned to the
north-westward with the remainder of the flotilla, as it had been
anticipated that the attack would have been made with torpedo tubes
bearing to starboard, and her tubes were not ready to fire to port.
Commander Champion held on the south-easterly course and, turning later
than the rest of the flotilla, fired one port tube, then turned again
to south-east, trained his tubes to starboard, and at 2.25 A.M. fired
two torpedoes to starboard at the fourth ship in the line at a range
between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, one of which took effect. In this case,
too, the flame of the explosion reached the mast head, and the ship was
not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her were visible.
It is of interest to note that at the time of the first attack on this
squadron six battleships were visible. After the first attack only five
were seen by Captain Stirling, and twenty-five minutes later five were
sighted by the _Mænad_, and after the _Mænad’s_ attack only four were
visible. The evidence that at least one of the battleships was sunk was
considered at the time to be very strong, particularly as the reports
from the _Mænad_ and from Captain Stirling were sent to me quite
independently, and Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that
Captain Stirling had reported six ships as the original number in the
battle squadron, and five as the number remaining after his attack.
When Captain Stirling had located the enemy’s battle squadron he
reported the fact by wireless, but the signal was, unfortunately, not
received by any ship, owing, presumably, to the strong interference
caused by German wireless signalling at the time.
The destroyers of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas took station astern
the Battle Fleet in company with the _Champion_ (Captain Farie), leader
of the 13th Flotilla; the _Fearless_, leader of the 9th Flotilla,
had not been able to maintain touch with her flotilla. Many of the
destroyers of these flotillas lost touch with the _Champion_ during the
night, and the flotillas became somewhat scattered.
At 12.30 A.M. a large vessel, taken at first for one of our own ships,
crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed, passing close to the
_Petard_ and _Turbulent_. She rammed the _Turbulent_ and opened a heavy
fire on both the _Turbulent_ and _Petard_; the _Turbulent_ sank and the
_Petard_ was damaged.
At 2.35 A.M. the destroyer _Moresby_, of the 13th Flotilla, sighted
four battleships of the “Deutschland” class, and attacked, firing one
torpedo; an explosion was subsequently heard.
It was impossible to state with certainty which of our destroyers
were actually successful in their attacks. The enemy, of course,
denied that any marked success was obtained by our attacks, but
information obtained after the action made it certain that at least
four battleships of the “Dreadnought” type were hit by torpedoes,
in addition to the pre-Dreadnought battleship _Pommern_, which was
admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was the light cruiser
_Rostock_.
Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot be attributed
to particular destroyers, the work of the flotillas as a whole, and
particularly of the 4th and 12th Flotillas, was characterised by the
splendid dash, skill and gallantry for which our destroyers had been
conspicuous throughout the War. They were most ably led and achieved
magnificent work under very difficult conditions.
There is no doubt at all that the German organisation for night action
was of a remarkably high standard. In the first place, the use of star
shell, at that time unfamiliar to us, was of the greatest use to them
in locating our destroyers without revealing their own positions; and,
secondly, their searchlights were not only very powerful (much more so
than ours), but their method of controlling them and bringing guns and
searchlights rapidly on to any vessel sighted was excellent. It also
appeared that some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of
their secondary armament.
The increased offensive power given by these devices did not, however,
prevent our destroyers from inflicting great damage on the enemy during
their night attacks, although they led to the loss of some valuable
destroyers and still more valuable lives. Captain Wintour, leader
of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide experience of destroyer work
and a fine leader, was a very heavy loss, and other splendid officers
perished with their gallant crews. Our destroyer service has, indeed,
every reason to be exceedingly proud of the achievements of the
flotillas, both during the day action of May 31st and during the night
following that action.
Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at intervals during the
night, and, curiously enough, the under-water explosions, four or five
in number, were quite clearly recorded on a barograph in the _Malaya_,
a ship well placed for the purpose, as she was in the rear. There is
little doubt that these records showed the explosion of our torpedoes
against enemy ships.
From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark that our
destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired with great frequency
by the enemy, and they produced a very brilliant illumination, leaving
the enemy ships in complete darkness and not revealing their positions.
At 11 P.M. the light cruiser _Active_, astern of the 2nd Battle
Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern, and shortly afterwards
saw searchlights switched on and a heavy fire opened against this
vessel by a ship, or ships, on her starboard quarter. She appeared to
be heavily hit and to sink. It is possible that this ship may have been
the _Black Prince_, which had apparently lost touch with our fleet
during the day action.
Shortly after this incident the _Active_ passed over some submerged
object which she bumped heavily. Subsequent examination showed
that some 15 feet of her bilge keel had been torn away. It was not
conceivable that the object struck could have been submerged wreckage
from any ship which had taken part in the action, no fighting having
taken place in the vicinity, and it seemed possible that the _Active_
had struck an enemy submarine. At 11.30 P.M. the _Colossus_ also passed
over some submerged object which was felt to scrape along the bottom
of the ship. Subsequent examination showed damage to both starboard
propeller blades. Again there is doubt as to what the obstruction could
have been; it was certainly not wreckage from any ship that had been in
action.
At 2 A.M. on June 1st Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney informed me that
the _Marlborough_ could not maintain the Fleet speed of 17 knots any
longer, on account of the stress on the bulkheads, and that she had
been obliged to ease to 12 knots. I directed him to order the ship
to proceed to the Tyne or Rosyth, passing south of the German mined
area. Sir Cecil Burney called the light cruiser _Fearless_ alongside
the _Marlborough_, and was transferred in her, with his Staff, to
the _Revenge_, the _Fearless_ being then detached to escort the
_Marlborough_.
Some idea of the area covered by the different engagements which
constituted the Battle of Jutland will be gathered from a consideration
of the distances steamed by our ships during the operations.
The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between 3.48 P.M., the time
of opening fire, and 6.17 P.M. the time that the Battle Fleet commenced
action, and a further distance of some 57 miles to 9 P.M., when the
Fleet turned to the southward for the night. The Battle Fleet steamed
some 47 miles between the commencement of their engagement with the
High Sea Fleet and the turn to the southward at 9 P.M.
The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the period covered by the
night action--9 P.M. to 2 A.M.
At 2.47 A.M., as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered course to north
and formed single line ahead in the order--2nd Battle Squadron, 4th
Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron (less the 6th Division). The 5th
Battle Squadron rejoined at 3.30 A.M. and took station ahead of the 2nd
Battle Squadron.
The weather was misty and the visibility even less than on May 31st,
being only some three or four miles, and I considered it desirable
under these conditions, and in view of the fact that I was not in
touch with either my cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger
of submarine attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the
enemy’s Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th Division of the
Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight, having dropped astern during
the night owing to the reduction in speed of the _Marlborough_ and
the change of flag from the _Marlborough_ to the _Revenge_. Partly on
account of the low visibility, and partly because of the inevitable
difference in dead reckoning between ships, due to their many movements
during the action and during the night, considerable difficulty was
experienced in collecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to
the destroyer flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and whose
facilities for computing their positions under these conditions
were only slight; but the same difficulty was experienced with all
classes of ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause me any
surprise. The cruisers were not sighted until 6 A.M., the destroyers
did not join the Battle Fleet until 9 A.M., and the 6th Division of the
Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle Squadron, was not
in company until the evening.
The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet (particularly
the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for
the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my
intention when deciding to steer to the southward during the night.
It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet and the
destroyers before renewing action. By the time this concentration was
effected it had become apparent that the High Sea Fleet, steering for
the Horn Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German minefields
in the early morning on the way to their ports. The presence of a
Zeppelin, sighted at 3.30 A.M., made it certain that our position at
that time would be known to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the
information obtained from our wireless directional stations during the
early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet must have passed
the Horn Reef on a southerly course shortly after daylight.
At 3 A.M. the destroyer _Sparrowhawk_, which was lying disabled in Lat.
55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted a German light cruiser two miles to
the eastward, steaming slowly to the northward. After being in sight
for about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank, bows
first. The _Sparrowhawk_ was subsequently sighted by the _Marksman_ and
others of our destroyers, and, being too seriously damaged for towing
back to a base, was sunk by the _Marksman_.
Shortly after 3.30 A.M. the report of gunfire to the westward was
audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38 Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier,
commanding the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that he was
engaging a Zeppelin in a position to the westward of the Battle Fleet.
Course was altered “by divisions” to west at 3.44 A.M., as it seemed
that the presence of the airship might possibly indicate the presence
also of the High Sea Fleet. At 3.50 A.M. a Zeppelin was in sight from
the Battle Fleet, but nothing else; course was altered back again to
north and fire opened on the airship, which, however, was too high for
the fire to be effective. She disappeared to the eastward. She was
sighted subsequently at intervals.
At 4.10 A.M. the Battle Fleet was formed into divisions in line ahead,
disposed abeam to starboard, in order to widen the front and to reduce
the risk of submarine attack. At 4.25 A.M. the cruiser _Dublin_
reported by wireless that she had sighted an enemy cruiser and two
destroyers, and she gave her position.
At 5.15 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle Fleet in
accordance with orders signalled, and was directed to locate the
cruiser reported by the _Dublin_, whilst the Battle Fleet searched to
the south-eastward for one of the enemy’s battle cruisers which was
thought to be in a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still
making for a German port. At 4.45 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat.
55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E.; at 5 A.M. the Commodore of the flotillas
(Commodore Hawkesley), with destroyers, reported himself as being in
Lat. 55.48 N., Long. 6.22 E.; at 5.48 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was
in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 6.16 E., steering south-east at 18 knots, and
at 6.15 A.M. altered course to south. At 6 A.M., not having met the
destroyers, the Battle Fleet altered course to south-east, with the
cruisers in company, steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course
until 7.15 A.M., at which time course was altered to north, the Battle
Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7.30 A.M. and to north at 8 A.M.
The _Dublin_ was sighted at 7.55 A.M. and reported having lost sight in
a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N., Long. 6.32 E., of the cruiser and torpedo boat
destroyers she had reported, and, in reply to further inquiries, stated
that the cruiser was apparently not disabled and was steaming fast.
At 8.15 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 6.10 E.,
steering north at 17 knots, turning at 8.52 A.M. to a south-west course.
Between 8 A.M. and 9 A.M. a considerable amount of wreckage was passed,
and the bodies of dead German bluejackets were seen in the water. The
wreckage of the destroyer _Ardent_ was also passed. Drifting mines in
considerable numbers were seen during the whole forenoon of the 1st
June, and there were one or two reports of submarines being sighted.
At 10 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the
Battle Fleet, and course was altered to north by west, the destroyers,
which had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine screen.
At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 5.25 E.,
and at 12.30 P.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was in Lat. 56.32 N., Long.
6.11 E.
It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had either sunk or had
passed inside the mine-fields _en route_ to their bases. It had been
evident since the early morning, from the definite information obtained
by our directional stations, that the enemy’s fleet was returning to
port. All our own injured vessels were also _en route_ for their bases,
and I decided to return with the whole Fleet, and gave the necessary
instructions to the Rosyth force to return independently. Diagram 4
shows the movement of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the
forenoon of June 1st.
The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had been kept in port by
Admiralty orders on May 31st, and was despatched to sea on the morning
of June 1st, when I was informed that it was being sent out to join me
and to replace vessels requiring fuel. At 7 A.M. I instructed Commodore
Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to screen the _Marlborough_
to her base; he informed me at 2.30 P.M. that he had sighted the
_Marlborough_. At 10.40 A.M. I had reported to the Admiralty that I
did not require the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt to
strengthen the _Marlborough’s_ escort and told him that I did not need
his ships. They would have been of great use at daylight in June 1st
had they been on the scene at that time, and it is needless to add how
much I should have welcomed the participation of the Harwich force in
the action had circumstances admitted of this. I knew well the extreme
efficiency and the fine fighting spirit of this force which, under its
gallant and distinguished commodore, had rendered such splendid service
throughout the War.
The _Marlborough_ reported at 11 A.M. that a torpedo had been fired at
her and had missed. Some anxiety was felt about the ship on the morning
of June 2nd, as bad weather set in and her pumps became choked; tugs
were ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber at 8 A.M.
The _Warrior_, which had been taken in tow by the sea-plane carrier
_Engadine_, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 3.54 E. at 8 A.M. on the
1st June, but the crew was taken off by the _Engadine_ and the ship
abandoned later in the day, as the weather had become bad and it
was evident the ship could not remain afloat. The work of rescue
was very smartly carried out, the _Engadine_ being skilfully placed
alongside the _Warrior_ in a considerable sea way by her Captain,
Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson, and the large number of wounded
transferred to her. The reports as to the condition of the _Warrior_
were not clear, and it was feared that she might remain afloat, and
later fall into the hands of the enemy. Therefore I detached the 2nd
Cruiser Squadron, and subsequently the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron,
to search for her. The search continued until the evening of June
23rd, no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a report
received subsequently from the Captain of the _Warrior_ that her
condition was such that she must have sunk shortly after having been
abandoned. During the search for the _Warrior_, one of the cruisers of
the 2nd Cruiser Squadron sighted a submarine on the surface at dusk,
opened fire, and tried to ram. It was reported quite definitely that
the submarine had been sunk. Later evidence showed, however, that the
submarine was one of our own vessels of this class, that she had a
very narrow escape, but had dived in time to escape injury. This was
one instance, amongst others, of our own submarines being mistaken for
an enemy, attacked by our own ships, and considered to be sunk. The
difficulty of ascertaining definitely the result of an engagement with
a submarine was thereby exemplified, and was one of the weighty reasons
which led the Admiralty during the War to refrain from publishing any
figures giving the results of engagements with submarines.
Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the destroyer _Broke_,
and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was directed to search for that vessel
also, assisted by two light cruisers. She, however, arrived safely
in the Tyne, having been delayed by bad weather. Other disabled or
partially disabled destroyers requiring assistance to reach port were
the _Acasta_, towed by the _Nonsuch_, and the _Onslow_, towed by the
_Defender_.
The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled, and was reported
ready for sea at four hours’ notice at 9.45 P.M. on that date.
_Note._--In the diagrams embodied in this chapter there are some slight
departures from those which accompanied my original despatch to the
Admiralty.
That despatch was sent in under constant pressure for its early receipt
and at a time when I, in common with my Staff, was very fully occupied
with the arrangements connected with the repair of damaged ships, the
constructive alterations which the action had shown to be necessary
in our ships, and the various committees which I had formed to report
on different subjects in the light of our experience. I was not,
therefore, able to give the personal attention to the reports which
later opportunities have afforded me, and such slight modifications
as I have made are due to a closer study of these reports, and of the
signals received during May 31st.
* * * * *
One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to send to the King
on the morning of June 3rd a message of humble duty, respectful and
heartfelt wishes on His Majesty’s birthday.
The following reply was received from His Majesty, and communicated to
the Fleet:
“I am deeply touched by the message which you have sent me on
behalf of the Grand Fleet. It reaches me on the morrow of a battle
which has once more displayed the splendid gallantry of the
officers and men under your command. I mourn the loss of brave men,
many of them personal friends of my own, who have fallen in their
country’s cause. Yet even more do I regret that the German High Sea
Fleet in spite of its heavy losses was enabled by the misty weather
to evade the full consequences of an encounter they have always
professed to desire, but for which when the opportunity arrived
they showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the enemy
immediately after the opening of the general engagement robbed
us of the opportunity of gaining a decisive victory, the events
of last Wednesday amply justify my confidence in the valour and
efficiency of the fleets under your command.
“GEORGE R. I.”
The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gracious message, and
I added in my telegram to His Majesty that it was “a matter of the
greatest gratification to all ranks to receive such an expression
of Your Majesty’s approval and sympathy for the loss of our gallant
comrades.”