THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND--(_Continued_)
II.--THE BATTLE FLEET IN ACTION
The “plot” made on the reports received between 5 and 6 P.M. from
Commodore Goodenough, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and the report
at 4.45 P.M. from Sir David Beatty in the _Lion_ giving the position
of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, showed that we, of the Battle Fleet,
might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately ahead and that the cruiser
line ahead of the Battle Fleet would sight the enemy nearly ahead of
the centre. Obviously, however, great reliance could not be placed on
the positions given by the ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which
had been in action for two hours and frequently altering course. I
realised this, but when contact actually took place it was found that
the positions given were at least twelve miles in error when compared
with the _Iron Duke’s_ reckoning. The result was that the enemy’s
Battle Fleet appeared on the starboard bow instead of ahead, as I had
expected, and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated.
There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the reckoning on board the
_Iron Duke_, as the movements of that ship could be “plotted” with
accuracy after leaving Scapa Flow, there being no disturbing elements
to deal with.
The first accurate information regarding the position of affairs was
contained in a signal from the _Black Prince_, of the 1st Cruiser
Squadron (the starboard wing ship of the cruiser screen), which was
timed 5.40 P.M., but received by me considerably later, and in which
it was reported that battle cruisers were in sight, bearing south,
distant five miles. It was assumed by me that these were our own
vessels.
Prior to this, in view of the rapid decrease in visibility, I had
directed Captain Dreyer, my Flag-Captain, to cause the range-finder
operators to take ranges of ships on bearings in every direction and
to report the direction in which the visibility appeared to be the
greatest. My object was to ascertain the most favourable bearing in
which to engage the enemy should circumstances admit of a choice being
exercised. Captain Dreyer reported that the visibility appeared to be
best to the southward.
At 5.45 P.M. the _Comus_ (Captain Hotham), of the 4th Light Cruiser
Squadron, which was stationed three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet,
reported heavy gunfire on a southerly bearing, i.e., three points from
ahead, and shortly afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing
south-south-west although no ships could be seen.
At about 5.50 P.M. I received a wireless signal from Sir Robert
Arbuthnot, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, reporting having sighted ships
in action bearing south-south-west and steering north-east. There was,
however, no clue as to the identity of these ships. It was in my mind
that they might be the opposing battle cruisers.
At 5.55 P.M. a signal was made by me to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney,
leading the starboard wing division in the _Marlborough_, inquiring
what he could see. The reply was: “Gun flashes and heavy gunfire on the
starboard bow.” This reply was received at about 6.5 P.M.
The uncertainty which still prevailed as to the position of the enemy’s
Battle Fleet and its formation caused me to continue in the Battle
Fleet on the course south-east by south at a speed of 20 knots, in
divisions line ahead disposed abeam to starboard, the _Iron Duke_ at 6
P.M. being in Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 5.39 E.
[Illustration:
H. M. S. “IRON DUKE” AND 3RD DIVISION OF THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYING
AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND]
The information so far received had not even been sufficient to justify
me in altering the bearing of the guides of columns from the _Iron
Duke_ preparatory to deployment, and they were still, therefore, on the
beam. The destroyers also were still disposed ahead in their screening
formation, as it was very desirable to decide on the direction of
deployment before stationing them for action.
At 5.56 P.M. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported strange vessels in sight
bearing south-south-west and steering east, and at 6 P.M. he reported
them as British battle cruisers three to four miles distant, the _Lion_
being the leading ship.
This report was made by searchlight and consequently reached me shortly
after 6 P.M., but as showing the interval that elapses between the
_intention to make a signal_ and the actual receipt of it (even under
conditions where the urgency is apparent, no effort is spared to avoid
delay, and the signal staff is efficient), it is to be noted that
whereas the report gave the bearing of our vessels as south-south-west,
notes taken on board the _Colossus_ placed our battle cruisers one
point on the starboard bow of that ship, that is, on a south-south-east
bearing and distant two miles at 6.5 P.M.
Shortly after 6 P.M. we sighted strange vessels bearing south-west from
the _Iron Duke_ at a distance of about five miles. They were identified
as our battle cruisers, steering east across the bows of the Battle
Fleet. Owing to the mist it was not possible to make out the number of
ships that were following the _Lion_.
At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the position of
the enemy’s Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire were visible from ahead
round to the starboard beam, and the noise was heavy and continuous.
Our cruisers ahead seemed to be hotly engaged, but the fact that they
were not closing the Battle Fleet indicated to me that their opponents
could hardly be battleships.
In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to clearing up the
situation without altering the formation of the Battle Fleet, a signal
had been made to the Battle Fleet at 6.2 P.M. to alter course leaders
together, the remainder in succession, to south (a turn of three
points). Speed was at the same time reduced to 18 knots to allow of
the ships closing up into station. Immediately afterwards it became
apparent by the sound of the heavy firing that enemy’s heavy ships
must be in close proximity, and the _Lion_, which was sighted at
this moment, signalled at 6.6 P.M. that the enemy’s battle cruisers
bore south-east. Meanwhile, at about 5.50 P.M., I had received a
wireless report from Commodore Goodenough, commanding the 2nd Light
Cruiser Squadron, to the effect that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore
south-west from their Battle Fleet; in other words, that his Battle
Fleet bore north-east from his battle cruisers.
In view of the report from Sir Cecil Burney that our battle cruisers
were steering east, and observing that Sir David Beatty reported at
6.6 P.M. that the enemy’s battle cruisers bore south-east, it appeared
from Commodore Goodenough’s signal that the enemy’s Battle Fleet must
be _ahead_ of his battle cruisers. On the other hand, it seemed to me
almost incredible that the Battle Fleet could have passed the battle
cruisers. The conflicting reports added greatly to the perplexity of
the situation, and I determined to hold on until matters became clearer.
The conviction was, however, forming in my mind that I should strike
the enemy’s Battle Fleet on a bearing a little on the starboard bow,
and in order to be prepared for deployment I turned the Fleet to a
south-east course, leaders together and the remainder in succession,
and the destroyer flotillas were directed by signal, at 6.8 P.M., to
take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. This order disposed
them as follows:
[Illustration]
There was, however, a very short interval between this signal to
the destroyers and the signal for deployment, and consequently the
destroyers did not reach their positions before deployment. The
subsequent alterations of course to the southward and westward added to
their difficulties and delayed them greatly in gaining their stations
at the van of the Fleet after deployment. The correct position for the
two van flotillas on deployment was three miles ahead of the Fleet, but
slightly on the engaged bow.
At 6.1 P.M., immediately on sighting the _Lion_, a signal had been made
to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet.
This signal was repeated at 6.10 P.M., and at 6.14 P.M. he signalled:
“Have sighted the enemy’s Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west”; this
report gave me the first information on which I could take effective
action for deployment.
At 6.15 P.M. Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, in the _Barham_, commanding
the 5th Battle Squadron, signalled by wireless that the enemy’s
Battle Fleet was in sight, bearing south-south-east. The distance was
not reported in either case, but in view of the low visibility, I
concluded it could not be more than some five miles. Sir Cecil Burney
had already reported the 5th Battle Squadron at 6.7 P.M. as in sight,
bearing south-west from the _Marlborough_.
The first definite information received on board the Fleet-Flagship of
the position of the enemy’s Battle Fleet did not, therefore, come in
until 6.14 P.M., and the position given placed it thirty degrees before
the starboard beam of the _Iron Duke_, or fifty-nine degrees before the
starboard beam of the _Marlborough_, and apparently in close proximity.
There was no time to lose, as there was evident danger of the starboard
wing column of the Battle Fleet being engaged by the whole German
Battle Fleet before deployment could be effected. So at 6.16 P.M. a
signal was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the port
wing column, on a course south-east by east, it being assumed that the
course of the enemy was approximately the same as that of our battle
cruisers.
Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to admit of our battle
cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet, as there was danger of the
fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them.
During the short interval, crowded with events, that had elapsed since
the first flashes and sound of gunfire had been noted on board the
_Iron Duke_, the question of most urgent importance before me had been
the direction and manner of deployment.
As the evidence accumulated that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was on our
starboard side, but on a bearing well before the beam of the _Iron
Duke_, the point for decision was whether to form line of battle on the
starboard or on the port wing column. My first and natural impulse was
to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the Fleet
into action at the earliest possible moment, but it became increasingly
apparent, both from the sound of gunfire and the reports from the
_Lion_ and the _Barham_, that the High Sea Fleet was in such close
proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in
such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers would be ahead
of their Battle Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, the
operations of destroyers attacking from a commanding position in the
van would be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle
Fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers
during such a deployment, as such an event would throw the Fleet into
confusion at a critical moment.
[Illustration:
H. M. S. “IRON DUKE” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
H. M. S. “ROYAL OAK” AND “SUPERB” ASTERN, AND “THUNDERER” AHEAD]
The further points that occurred to me were, that if the German ships
were as close as seemed probable, there was considerable danger of
the 1st Battle Squadron, and especially the _Marlborough’s_ Division,
being severely handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet
before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist. The 1st
Battle Squadron was composed of many of our weakest ships, with only
indifferent protection as compared with the German capital ships, and
an interval of at least four minutes would elapse between each division
coming into line astern of the sixth division and a further interval
before the guns could be directed on to the ship selected and their
fire become effective after so large a change of course.
The final disadvantage would be that it appeared, from the supposed
position of the High Sea Fleet, that the van of the enemy would have
a very considerable “overlap” if the deployment took place on the
starboard wing division, whereas this would not be the case with
deployment on the port wing column. The overlap would necessitate a
large turn of the starboard wing division to port to prevent the “T”
being crossed, and each successive division coming into line would have
to make this turn, in addition to the 8-point turn required to form
the line. I therefore decided to deploy on the first, the port wing,
division.
The further knowledge which I gained of the actual state of affairs
after the action confirmed my view that the course adopted was the best
in the circumstances.
The reports from the ships of the starboard wing division show that
the range of the van of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at the moment of
deployment was about 13,000 yards. The fleets were converging rapidly,
with the High Sea Fleet holding a position of advantage such as would
enable it to engage effectively, first the unsupported starboard
division, and subsequently succeeding divisions as they formed up
astern. It is to be observed that it would take some twenty minutes to
complete the formation of the line of battle.
The German gunnery was always good at the start, and their ships
invariably found the range of a target with great rapidity, and
it would have been very bad tactics to give them such an initial
advantage, not only in regard to gunnery but also in respect of torpedo
attack, both from ships and from destroyers.
A subsequent study of the reports and the signals received has admitted
of the accompanying plans being drawn up.
The reports on being reviewed fit in very well, and show clearly how
great would have been the objections to deploying to starboard. It
will be seen that the bearings of the enemy Battle Fleet, as given
by the _Lion_ and the _Barham_ at 6.14 and 6.15 respectively, give a
fair “cut,” and the bearing on which the _Marlborough_ opened fire
enables the position of the Battle Fleet to be placed with considerable
accuracy.
Assuming that the German Battle Fleet was steaming at 17 knots on an
easterly course between 6.14 and 6.31, it will be observed that at the
latter time it bore 21 degrees before the starboard beam of the _Iron
Duke_ at a range of 12,000 yards. The _Iron Duke_ actually engaged the
leading battleship at this time on a bearing 20 degrees before the
starboard beam at a range of 12,000 yards. The accuracy of the “plot”
is therefore confirmed, so far as confirmation is possible. It appears
certain that between about 6.0 P.M. and 6.16 P.M. the German battle
cruisers turned 16 points towards their Battle Fleet, and again turned
16 points to their original course. This is borne out by observations
on board the _Warrior_, which ship was being engaged by the _starboard_
guns of enemy vessels. The German account also shows such a turn at
this period.
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, had
sighted the _Marlborough_ at 6.6 P.M. and the remainder of the 6th
Division of the Battle Fleet a little later. Not seeing any other
columns, he concluded that the _Marlborough_ was leading the whole
line, and decided to take station ahead of that ship. At 6.19 P.M.,
however, other battleships were sighted, and Admiral Evan-Thomas
realised that the Fleet was deploying to port, the 6th Division being
the starboard wing column. He then determined to make a large turn of
his squadron to port, in order to form astern of the 6th Division,
which by this time had also turned to port to form line of battle.
During the turn, which was very well executed, the ships of the 5th
Battle Squadron were under fire of the enemy’s leading battleships, but
the shooting was not good, and our vessels received little injury.
Unfortunately, however, the helm of the _Warspite_ jammed, and that
ship, continuing her turn through sixteen points came under a very
heavy fire and received considerable injury. The disabled _Warrior_
happened to be in close proximity at this time, and the turn of the
_Warspite_ had the effect for the moment of diverting attention from
the _Warrior_, so that the latter vessel got clear.
The _Warspite_ was well extricated by Captain Phillpotts from
an unpleasant position and was steered to the northward to make
good damages, and eventually, in accordance with directions from
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, returned independently to Rosyth,
considerably down by the stern owing to damage aft, but otherwise not
much injured.
By 6.38 P.M. the remaining ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were in
station astern of the _Agincourt_ (1st Battle Squadron), the last ship
of the line.
At 6.33 P.M., as soon as the battle cruisers had passed clear, the
speed of the Battle Fleet was increased to 17 knots, and this speed
was subsequently maintained. The reduction of speed to 14 knots during
the deployment caused some “bunching” at the rear of the line as the
signal did not get through quickly. The reduction had, however, to be
maintained until the battle cruisers had formed ahead.
Experience at all Fleet exercises had shown the necessity for keeping a
reserve of some three knots of speed in hand in the case of a long line
of ships, in order to allow of station being kept in the line under
conditions of action, when ships were making alterations of course to
throw out enemy’s fire, to avoid torpedoes, or when other independent
action on the part of single ships, or of divisions of ships, became
necessary, as well as to avoid excessive smoke from the funnels; for
this reason the Fleet speed during the action was fixed at 17 knots.
The experience of the 1st Battle Squadron, in which some ships had at
times to steam at 20 knots, is proof of the necessity for this reserve.
[Illustration: _Plan 8_
_APPROXIMATE_ POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE GRAND FLEET AT 6.45. P.M. ON
31st. MAY 1916.]
At 6.14 P.M. the enemy’s salvoes were falling near ships of the 1st
Battle Squadron, and the _Marlborough’s_ Division of the Battle
Squadron became engaged with some ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet at
6.17 P.M. immediately after turning for the deployment. At this time
fire was opened by the _Marlborough_ on a ship stated to be of the
“Kaiser” class, at a range of 13,000 yards and on a bearing 20° abaft
the starboard beam; this knowledge enables us to deduce the position of
the van of the German Battle Fleet at this time.
Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy’s Fleet steering to
the eastward, the battle cruisers leading, followed by the Battle Fleet
in single line, the order being, four ships of the “König” class in the
van, followed by ships of the “Kaiser” and “Heligoland” classes, the
rear of the line being invisible. A report that had reached me at 4.48
P.M. from the Commodore of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron indicated
that ships of the “Kaiser” class were in the van of the Battle Fleet.
The order of the Fleet may have been changed subsequent to this report,
but there is no doubt that ships of the “König” class led during the
Fleet action. The point is not, however, of importance.
At about 6.38 P.M. the 6th Division was in line and our deployment was
complete.
Enemy shells had been falling close to the _Colossus_ and her 5th
Division since 6.18 P.M., and these ships opened fire at 6.30 P.M.;
but the conditions of visibility made it difficult to distinguish the
enemy’s battleships.
At 6.23 P.M. a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed down the line,
on the starboard, or engaged, side of our Fleet, apparently partly
disabled. Her identity could not at the time he clearly established,
but her German colours were flying and she was in a position for
attacking the Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 P.M. the _Iron Duke_
fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with turret guns by
other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear of the line.
At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most difficult to
distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible to form an opinion
on board the _Iron Duke_, in her position towards the centre of the
line, as to the formation of the enemy’s Fleet. The identity of ships
in sight on the starboard beam was not even sufficiently clear for me
to permit of fire being opened; but at 6.30 P.M. it became certain
that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of the Battle Fleet and
that the vessels then before the beam were battleships of the “König”
class. The order was, therefore, given to open fire, and the _Iron
Duke_ engaged what appeared to be the leading battleship at a range of
12,000 yards on a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other ships
of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squadron) opened fire
at about the same time, and the van divisions (2nd Battle Squadron)
very shortly afterwards; these latter ships reported engaging enemy
battle cruisers as well as battleships. The fire of the _Iron Duke_,
which came more directly under my personal observation, was seen to be
immediately effective, the third and fourth salvoes fired registering
several palpable hits. It appeared as if all the enemy ships at that
time in sight from the _Iron Duke_ (not more than three or four, owing
to smoke and mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second
battleship was seen to turn out of the line badly on fire, and settling
by the stern. A large number of observers in the _Thunderer_, _Benbow_,
_Barham_, _Marne_, _Morning Star_ and _Magic_ stated afterwards that
they saw this ship blow up at 6.50 P.M.
The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged about 12,000
yards to the southward, though much less on other bearings, but ranges
could not at times be obtained from the range-finders of the _Iron
Duke_ at a greater distance than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 P.M.,
in a temporary clear channel through the mist, good ranges of 15,000
yards were obtained of a battleship at which four salvoes were fired by
the _Iron Duke_ before she was again hidden by smoke and mist. The very
baffling light was caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly
also by the heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the opposing
Fleets. The direction of the wind was about west-south-west with a
force 2, causing the enemy’s funnel smoke to drift towards our line,
thus further obscuring our view of his Fleet.
The visibility at the rear of the battle line was apparently greater
than in the centre at about 7 P.M., and the enemy’s fire, which was
probably being concentrated on our rear ships, was more accurate at
this period, but quite ineffective, only one ship, the _Colossus_,
being hit by gunfire, although numerous projectiles were falling near
the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons.
Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the Battle Fleet
could see only three or four enemy vessels at any one time, those in
the ships of the rear division did occasionally see as many as eight,
and were consequently better able to distinguish the formation and
movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing
to the small number of ships in sight, due to smoke and mist, to
distribute the fire of the battleships by signal in the customary
manner; the only course to adopt was for the captains to direct the
fire of their guns on to any target which they could distinguish.
The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-east by east, as
already stated, but the van had hauled on to south-east without signal
shortly after deployment in order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 P.M.,
as the range was apparently opening, the course was altered by signal
to south “by divisions” in order to close the enemy. The _King George
V._, leading the van of the Battle Fleet, had just anticipated this
signal by turning to south. The alteration was made “by divisions”
instead of “in succession” in order that the enemy should be closed
more rapidly by the whole Battle Fleet.
This large turn (of four points) “by divisions” involved some small
amount of “blanketing” of the rear ships of one division by the leading
ships of that next astern, and at one time the _Thunderer_ was firing
over the bows of the _Iron Duke_, causing some slight inconvenience
on the bridge of the latter ship; the “blanketing,” however, was
unavoidable and the loss of fire involved was inappreciable.
At 6.45 P.M. one or two torpedoes crossed the track of the rear of
our battle line, and the _Marlborough_ altered course to avoid one.
They were apparently fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which
were barely visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to those
on board the _Iron Duke_. They might, however, have been fired by
enemy battleships which were within torpedo range, or by a submarine,
the _Revenge_ reporting that it was thought that one had been rammed
by that ship. The tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by the
observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by very skilful handling of
the ships by their captains.
At 6.45 P.M., however, a heavy explosion occurred under the fore
bridge of the _Marlborough_, abreast the starboard forward hydraulic
engine-room. The ship took up a list of some seven degrees to
starboard, but continued in action so effectively that she avoided
three more torpedoes shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.3 P.M.,
and at 7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the “König”
class, hitting her so frequently that she was seen to turn out of line.
The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to his flagship stated
that the vessel had been struck by a “mine or torpedo.” It was assumed
by me that a torpedo had hit the ship, as so many vessels had passed
over the same locality without injury from mine. This proved to be the
case, the track of this torpedo not having been sufficiently visible to
enable Captain Ross to avoid it.
The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy’s torpedoes being
visible was a matter of great surprise to me, and I think to other
officers. Reports had been prevalent that the Germans had succeeded
in producing a torpedo which left little or no track on the surface.
The information as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me
until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one torpedo was
reported by observers on board the destroyer _Oak_ to have passed close
ahead of the _Iron Duke_ at about 7.35 P.M., finishing its run 2,000
yards beyond that ship, and a second was observed by the _Benbow_ to
pass apparently ahead of the _Iron Duke_ at 8.30 P.M., neither of them
was seen on board the flagship by the trained look-outs specially
stationed for the purpose.
Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to south, a signal was
made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to take station ahead of the _Iron
Duke_ and for the 1st Battle Squadron to form astern. This signal
had, however, been already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the
_Iron Duke_ in accordance with the general battle orders giving
discretionary powers to the commanders of squadrons, and the line had
been partly reformed before the signal was made.
An incident occurred at about 6.47 P.M. which was an indication of the
spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which it is impossible to speak too
highly. The destroyer _Acasta_, which had been badly hit aft during
her attack on enemy light cruisers in company with the _Shark_ and
had her engines disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her commanding
officer, Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, signalled the condition of his
ship to the _Iron Duke_ as that ship passed, leaving the _Acasta_ on
her starboard or engaged side. The ship’s company was observed to be
cheering each ship as they passed. It is satisfactory to relate that
this destroyer and her gallant ship’s company were subsequently brought
into Aberdeen, being assisted by the _Nonsuch_.
Shortly after 6.55 P.M. the _Iron Duke_ passed the wreck of a ship
with the bow and stern standing out of the water, the centre portion
apparently resting on the bottom, with the destroyer _Badger_ picking
up survivors. It was thought at first that this was the remains of
a German light cruiser, but inquiry of the _Badger_ elicited the
lamentable news that the wreck was that of the _Invincible_. It was
assumed at the time that she had been sunk either by a mine or by
a torpedo, and, in view of the safe passage of other ships in her
vicinity, the latter appeared to be the more probable cause of her
loss. Subsequent information, however, showed that she was destroyed by
gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already recorded.
At 7 P.M. Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that the enemy was to
the westward.
Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile, brought the enemy’s
line into view once more, and between 7.0 and 7.30 P.M. the Battle
Fleet was again in action with battleships and also battle cruisers,
as they could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period was
very baffling. The range varied from as much as 15,000 yards at the van
to as little as 8,000 in the rear, this difference in range indicating
that the enemy’s Fleet was turning to the westward, as shown in the
accompanying plan facing page 358.
In spite of the difficult conditions the fire of many of our
battleships was very effective at this period. Some instances may be
given. At 7.15 P.M. the _Iron Duke_, as already mentioned, engaged a
hostile battleship at 15,000 yards’ range and on a bearing 74 degrees
from right ahead. At 7.20 she trained her guns on a battle cruiser of
“Lutzow” type, abaft the beam, which hid herself by a destroyer smoke
screen; at 7.17 P.M. the _King George V._ opened fire on a vessel,
taken to be the leading ship in the enemy’s line at a range of about
13,000 yards; the _Orion_ at a battleship[L]; the _St. Vincent_ was
“holding her target (a battleship) effectively till 7.26 P.M., the
range being between 10,000 and 9,500 yards”; the _Agincourt_ at 7.6
P.M. opened fire at 11,000 yards on one of four battleships that showed
clearly out of the mist, and judged that at least four of her salvoes
“straddled” the target; the _Revenge_ was engaging what were taken
to be battle cruisers, obtaining distinct hits on two of them; the
_Colossus_ from 7.12 to 7.20 P.M. was engaging a ship taken to be a
battle cruiser, either the _Derfflinger_ or _Lutzow_, at ranges between
10,000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct hits, two being
on the water line; whilst the _Marlborough_, as already mentioned,
“engaged a ship of the ‘König’ class.” Other vessels reported being in
effective action during this period. The _Royal Oak_, the ship next
astern of the _Iron Duke_, opened fire at 7.15 P.M. on the leading ship
of three vessels taken to be battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000
yards; this ship was hit and turned away, and fire was shifted to the
second ship which was lost to sight in the mist after a few rounds had
been fired. It was difficult to be certain of the class of vessel on
which fire was being directed, but one or more of the enemy’s battle
cruisers had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 P.M., as a result of the
heavy punishment they had received from our battle cruisers and the 5th
Battle Squadron, and were engaged by ships of the Battle Fleet.
[L] The _Calliope_ reported at 7.1 P.M.: “Two enemy
battleships, ‘König’ class, engaged by _Orion’s_ division,
observed to be heavily on fire.”
Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships of the 1st
Battle Squadron were afforded more opportunities for effective fire
than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and the fullest use was made of
the opportunities. This squadron, under the able command of Sir Cecil
Burney, was known by me to be highly efficient, and very strong proof
was furnished during the Jutland battle, if proof were needed, that his
careful training had borne excellent results. The immunity of the ships
of the squadron from the enemy’s fire, whilst they were inflicting on
his vessels very severe punishment, bears very eloquent testimony to
the offensive powers of the squadron.
[Illustration: APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE
GRAND FLEET
At 7. 15 P.M. 31st May 1916.
_Probable approximate course of the German Battle Fleet, as evidenced
by the positions of the ships engaged at the time, shown in Red._
The Battle Cruisers and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, have crossed from
the port to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet.
Note. Their battle station is between 5 and 6 miles slightly on the
engaged bow of the Van of the Battle Fleet.
The 2nd Battle Squadron is forming ahead of the Iron Duke.
The 1st Battle Squadron is forming astern of the Iron Duke.
The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron is getting into its battle-station on
the Van of the Battle Fleet.
The 4th and 11th Flotillas are moving towards their battle stations.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron is coming up from the rear of the Battle
Fleet to join the Battle Cruisers.
The Minotaur and Cruisers are trying to get up to their battle stations
ahead of the Battle Fleet.]
At 7.5 P.M. the whole battle line was turned together three more points
to starboard to close the range further; immediately afterwards two
ships ahead of the _Iron Duke_ reported a submarine a little on the
port bow; at 7.10 P.M. a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a
cruiser, was observed to be approaching on a bearing S. 50 W. from the
_Iron Duke_, and the Fleet was turned back to south in order to turn on
to the submarine and bring the ships in line ahead ready, for any
required manœuvre. A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges
between 10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the destroyers
turned and passed towards the rear of the line in a heavy smoke screen.
One destroyer was seen by several observers to sink from the effects of
the gunfire.
At a sufficient interval before it was considered that the torpedoes
fired by the destroyers would cross our line, a signal was made to the
Battle Fleet to turn two points to port by subdivisions. Some minutes
later a report was made to me by Commander Bellairs (the officer on my
Staff especially detailed for this duty and provided with an instrument
for giving the necessary information) that this turn was insufficient
to clear the torpedoes, as I had held on until the last moment; a
further turn of two points was then made for a short time. As a result
of this attack and another that followed immediately, some twenty or
more torpedoes were observed to cross the track of the Battle Fleet,
in spite of our turn, the large majority of them passing the ships
of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons at the rear of the line. It was
fortunate that, owing to the turn away of the Fleet, the torpedoes were
apparently near the end of their run, and were consequently not running
at high speed. They were all avoided by the very skilful handling of
the ships by their captains, to whom the highest credit is due, not
only for their skill in avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in
which the ships, by neighbourly conduct towards each other, prevented
risk of collision and kept their station in the line. The captains were
most ably assisted by the admirable look-out kept by the organisation
that existed for dealing with this danger.
The skill shown could not, however, have prevented several ships from
being torpedoed had the range been less and the torpedoes consequently
running at a higher speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Scapa Flow
showed conclusively that the percentage of torpedoes that would hit
ships in a line when fired from destroyers at ranges up to 8,000 yards
was comparatively high, even if the tracks were seen and the ships
were manœuvred to avoid them. One very good reason is that torpedoes
are always a considerable but varying distance ahead of the line of
bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to judge the position
of the torpedo from its track. Many ships experienced escapes from
this and other attacks; thus the _Hercules_ reported that she “turned
away six points to avoid the torpedoes, one of which passed along the
starboard side and 40 yards across the bow, and the other passed close
under the stern”; the _Neptune_ reported that “the tracks of three
torpedoes were seen from the fore-top, one of which passed very close
and was avoided by the use of the helm”; in the _Agincourt’s_ report,
a statement occurred that “at 7.8 P.M. a torpedo just missed astern,
it having been reported from aloft and course altered”; and again,
“at 7.38 P.M. tracks of two torpedoes running parallel were observed
approaching; course altered to avoid torpedoes which passed ahead; and
at 8.25 P.M. torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full speed;
torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the starboard bow”; the
_Revenge_ remarked, “at 7.35 P.M. altered course to port to avoid two
torpedoes, one passed about ten yards ahead and the other about twenty
yards astern, and at 7.43 P.M. altered course to avoid torpedoes, two
passing astern”; the _Colossus_ stated, “at 7.35 P.M. turned to port
to avoid a torpedo coming from starboard side”; the _Barham_ at this
period reported that “at least four torpedoes passed through the line
close to the _Barham_”; the _Collingwood_ reported, “torpedo track was
seen 20 degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship; large
helm was put on and the torpedo passed very close astern; at the same
time another was seen to pass about thirty yards ahead.” The captain of
the _Collingwood_, in remarking on the destroyer’s attack, added, “the
great value of this form of attack on a line of ships is, to me, an
outstanding feature of the Battle Fleet action.”
The first two-point turn was made at 7.23 P.M. and the Fleet was
brought to a south by west course by 7.33 P.M. (that is, to a course
one point to the westward of the course of the Fleet before the
destroyer attack). The total amount by which the range was opened by
the turns was about 1,750 yards.
The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the 4th and 11th Flotillas had been
delayed in reaching their action station at the van until about 7.10
P.M., owing to the turns to the westward made by the Battle Fleet to
close the enemy. In accordance with arrangements made previously to
counter destroyer attacks, these vessels were ordered out to engage
the enemy destroyers, which, according to the report of the Commodore
Le Mesurier, commanding the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, were steering
towards the head of the division led by the _King George V._, the van
ship of the Battle Fleet. Although not very well placed for the first
attack for the reason given above, they were in a very favourable
position to counter the second destroyer attack, which took place at
7.25 P.M. The enemy’s flotilla was sighted bearing 30 degrees before
the starboard beam of the _Iron Duke_ at a range of 9,000 yards and was
heavily engaged by the light forces and the 4th, 1st, and 5th Battle
Squadrons. During this attack three enemy destroyers were reported as
sunk by the fire of the battleships, light cruisers and destroyers; one
of them, bearing a Commodore’s pendant, being sunk at 7.50 P.M. by a
division of the 12th Flotilla, consisting of the _Obedient_, _Marvel_,
_Mindful_ and _Onslaught_, which attacked them near the rear of our
battle line. The _Southampton_ and _Dublin_, of the 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron, attacked and sank a second destroyer at this period. At least
six torpedoes were observed to pass ahead of, or through the track
of, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron during their attack on the German
flotilla.
The destroyer attacks were combined with a retiring movement on the
part of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, the movement being covered with the
aid of a heavy smoke screen. Although this retirement was not visible
from the _Iron Duke_ owing to the smoke and mist, and was, therefore,
not known to me until after the action, it was clearly seen from the
rear of our line, as is indicated by the following citations:
The Captain of the _Valiant_ stated in his report: “At 7.23 P.M.
enemy’s Battle Fleet now altered course together away from us
and broke off the action, sending out a low cloud of smoke which
effectually covered their retreat and obscured them from further
view.”
The Captain of the _Malaya_ reported, referring to this period:
“This was the last of the enemy seen in daylight, owing to their
Battle Fleet having turned away.”
Sir Cecil Burney stated in regard to this period: “As the destroyer
attack developed, the enemy’s Battle Fleet in sight were observed
to turn at least eight points until their sterns were towards our
line. They ceased fire, declined further action, and disappeared
into the mist.”
The Captain of the _St. Vincent_ said: “The target was held
closely until 7.26 P.M. (32 minutes in all), when the enemy had
turned eight or ten points away, disappearing into the mist and
with a smoke screen made by destroyers to cover them as well.”
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas remarked: “After joining the Battle
Fleet the 5th Battle Squadron conformed to the movements of the
Commander-in-Chief, engaging the rear ships of the enemy’s battle
line, until they turned away and went out of sight, all ships
apparently covering themselves with artificial smoke.”
The Captain of the _Revenge_ recorded: “A flotilla of destroyers
passed through the line and made a most efficient smoke screen. At
this period the enemy’s fleet turned eight points to starboard and
rapidly drew out of sight.”
In the German account of the action at this stage, it is stated, in
more than one passage, that the British Fleet during this action
between the Battle Fleets was to the northward of the High Seas
Fleet. This is correct of the earlier stages. The account refers to
the attacks on our line by the German destroyer flotillas, and states
finally that in the last attack the destroyers did not sight the heavy
ships, but only light cruisers and destroyers to the north-eastward.
The accuracy of this statement is doubtful, since the destroyers were
clearly in sight from our heavy ships. But the account then proceeds to
state that “the German Commander-in-Chief turns his battle line to a
southerly and south-westerly course _on which the enemy was last seen_,
but he is no longer to be found.”
This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships bore north and
north-east from the enemy and then that the enemy turned to south and
south-west, that is, _directly away from the British Fleet_. Thus the
fact that the German Fleet turned directly away is confirmed by Germans.
No report of this movement of the German Fleet reached me, and at
first it was thought that his temporary disappearance was due to
the thickening mist, especially as firing could be heard from the
battleships in rear, but at 7.41 P.M., the enemy Battle Fleet being no
longer in sight from the _Iron Duke_, course was altered “by divisions”
three points more to starboard (namely, to south-west) to close the
enemy, and single line ahead was again formed on the _Iron Duke_ on
that course.
At this period the rear of our battle line was still in action at
intervals with one or two ships of the enemy’s fleet, which were
probably some that had dropped astern partially disabled, but by 7.55
P.M. fire had practically ceased.
At about 7.40 P.M. I received a report from Sir David Beatty stating
that the enemy bore north-west by west from the _Lion_, distant 10 to
11 miles, and that the _Lion’s_ course was south-west. Although the
battle cruisers were not in sight from the _Iron Duke_, I assumed the
_Lion_ to be five or six miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet,
but it appeared later from a report received in reply to directions
signalled by me at 8.10 P.M. to the _King George V._ to follow the
battle cruisers, that they were not in sight from that ship either.
At this time the enemy’s Battle Fleet seems to have become divided, for
whilst Sir David Beatty reported the presence of battleships north-west
by west from the _Lion_, other enemy battleships were observed to the
westward (that is, on the starboard bow of the _Iron Duke_), and the
course of the Fleet was at once altered “by divisions” to west in order
to close the enemy; this alteration was made at 7.59 P.M.
It will be observed that all the large alterations of course of the
Battle Fleet during the engagement were made “by divisions” instead
of “in succession from the van, or together.” The reason was that in
this way the whole Fleet could be brought closer to the enemy with far
greater rapidity, and in a more ordered formation, than if the movement
had been carried out by the line “in succession.”
The objection to altering by turning all ships together was the
inevitable confusion that would have ensued as the result of such a
manœuvre carried out with a very large Fleet under action conditions in
misty weather, particularly if the ships were thus kept on a line of
bearing for a long period.
The battleships sighted at 7.59 P.M. opened fire on the ships of
the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had moved out to starboard of
the battle line to engage a flotilla of enemy destroyers which were
steering to attack the Battle Fleet. The _Calliope_, the flagship of
Commodore Le Mesurier, was hit by a heavy shell and received some
damage, but retained her fighting efficiency, and fired a torpedo at
the leading battleship at a range of 6,500 yards; an explosion was
noticed on board a ship of the “Kaiser” class by the _Calliope_.[M] The
ships sighted turned away and touch could not be regained, although
sounds of gunfire could be heard from ahead at 8.25 P.M., probably
from our battle cruisers, which obtained touch with and engaged some
of the enemy’s ships very effectively between 8.22 and 8.25 P.M. The
_Falmouth_ was the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in touch
with the enemy, at 8.38 P.M.; the ships then in sight turned eight
points together away from the _Falmouth_.
[M] All our battle cruisers felt this heavy explosion which was
clearly concussion under water, and may have been caused by
the _Calliope’s_ torpedo obtaining a hit.
At 8.30 P.M. the light was failing and the Fleet was turned “by
divisions” to a south-west course, thus reforming single line again.
During the proceedings of the Battle Fleet described above, the battle
cruisers were in action ahead as mentioned in Sir David Beatty’s report
in the Appendix.
At first, touch with the enemy was lost owing to the large alterations
of course carried out by the High Sea Fleet, but it was regained at
7.12 P.M., the battle cruisers opening fire at 7.14 P.M., though only
for two and a half minutes, and increasing speed to 22 knots. At
this period the battle cruisers were steering south-west by south to
south-west, and this course took them from the port to the starboard
bow of the Battle Fleet by 7.12 P.M. The movements of our battle
cruisers, which were at this time between four and five miles ahead of
the van of the Battle Fleet, could not be distinguished, owing, partly,
to the funnel and cordite smoke from the battle cruisers themselves,
but even more to the funnel smoke from the numerous cruisers, light
cruisers and destroyers which were attempting to gain their positions
ahead of the van.
The movements of the enemy’s fleet could not be distinguished from our
Battle Fleet owing again to their own funnel and cordite smoke, and,
also, to the smoke screens which ships and destroyers were making to
conceal their movements.
It will be realised that these conditions, which particularly affected
the Battle Fleet, did not apply to the same extent to our ships ahead
of our Battle Fleet. They had little but the smoke of the enemy’s
leading ships to obscure the view. Farther to the rear, the Battle
Fleet had the smoke of all our craft ahead of it as well as that of the
enemy’s long line of ships.
[Illustration:
H. M. S. “SUPERB” OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
H. M. S. “CANADA” ASTERN OF “SUPERB”]
Conditions which were perhaps difficult ahead of the Battle Fleet
were very much accentuated in the Battle Fleet. Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn
Jerram, in his report, remarked on this point: “As leading ship, in
addition to the hazy atmosphere, I was much hampered by what I imagine
must have been cordite fumes from the battle cruisers after they had
passed us, and from other cruisers engaged on the bow, also by funnel
gases from small craft ahead, and for a considerable time by dense
smoke from the _Duke of Edinburgh_, which was unable to draw clear.”
The general position at 6.45 P.M. and again at 7.15 P.M. is shown in
plans 8 and 9.
At 7.10 P.M., according to remarks from the _Minotaur_, flagship of
Rear-Admiral W. L. Heath, commanding the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the
position as seen from that ship was as follows: “The 2nd Cruiser
Squadron was in single line ahead three to four miles on the port side
of the _King George V._, gaining on her slightly, but with all the
destroyers and light craft between her and the _King George V._ The
battle cruisers were about four miles distant on the starboard bow
of the _Minotaur_; owing to their higher speed, the battle cruisers
rapidly increased their distance from the Battle Fleet to some eight
miles.”[N]
[N] Judged by reports from other cruisers the positions here
described should be timed at about 6.50 to 7 P.M., and the
diagrams show this accordingly.
At 7.5 P.M. according to a report from the _Shannon_, of the 2nd
Cruiser Squadron, the _Shannon’s_ course was S. 10 W., “the 2nd Cruiser
Squadron endeavouring to take station on the engaged bow of the Battle
Fleet; the Battle Fleet still engaged, the battle cruisers not engaged
and turned slightly to port.” And again at 7.22 P.M. a report says:
“The _Duke of Edinburgh_ had now taken station astern of the _Shannon_,
the battle cruisers were engaged and had wheeled to starboard. Leading
ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were starting to cross the bows
of the Battle Fleet from port to starboard. Battle cruisers firing
intermittently, light cruisers making their way through the destroyer
flotillas to attack the enemy light cruisers.” Rear-Admiral Heath
stated: “At 7.11 P.M. I proceeded with the squadron at 20 knots to take
up station astern of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was then engaged
with the enemy.” He added: “One salvo fell short on the starboard bow
of the _Minotaur_ and some others in close proximity”; and later says,
“even when the salvo referred to in the preceding paragraph fell, no
more than the flashes of the enemy’s guns could be seen.”
Further remarks from the _Shannon_, at a later stage, were: “At 8 P.M.
Battle Fleet altered course to starboard to close the enemy, and by
8.15 was lost to sight, bearing about north by east.”
“At 8.15 P.M. Battle Fleet, out of sight from _Shannon_, was heard to
be in action.”
“At 8.30 P.M. the visibility of grey ships was about 9,000 yards.” “At
8.45 P.M. _King George V._ again sighted, bearing north-north-east.
Visibility had again improved, and her range was estimated at about
10,000 yards. Conformed to her course S. 75 W. to close enemy.”
At 7.20 P.M. the ships engaged by our battle cruisers turned away and
were lost to sight. They were located for a moment at 8.20 P.M. with
the aid of the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, and, although they
disappeared again at once, they were once more located and effectively
engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 P.M. at about 10,000 yards range. They
turned away once more and were finally lost to sight by the 3rd Light
Cruiser Squadron (the last ships to keep in touch) at 8.38 P.M.,
steaming to the westward.
This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers had of putting
the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon’s work. They had, under the
very able and gallant leadership of Sir David Beatty, assisted by the
splendid squadron so well commanded by Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone far to
crush out of existence the opposing Battle Cruiser Squadron.
It will be seen from the above account that our battle cruisers
experienced great difficulty in locating and holding the enemy after
7.20 P.M., even when far ahead of the Battle Fleet, with its small
craft, and therefore in a position of freedom from the smoke of our own
vessels and the enemy’s line. After this time, 7.20 P.M., the battle
cruisers were only engaged for some six minutes. The enemy turned away
on each occasion when he was located and showed no disposition to fight.
The visibility by this time had become very bad; the light was failing,
and it became necessary to decide on the disposition for the night.