CHAPTER XII_The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

On May 31st, 1916, the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet fought the

action which has become known as the Battle of Jutland. The despatch[G]

describing the battle, as published some weeks later, was not quite

in its original form as written by me. After a conference held at the

Admiralty, early in June, modifications were made: some of them because

it was considered that certain passages might convey useful information

to the enemy, and others because it was thought to be undesirable to

draw attention to certain features of British design. Amongst the

latter was the insufficiency of the armour protection of our earlier

battle cruisers.

[G] See Appendix.

Throughout the War it had been our policy to cause our battle cruisers,

with their attendant light cruisers, to occupy when at sea an advanced

position, often at a considerable distance from the Battle Fleet.

Battle cruisers were designed and built in order that they might keep

in touch with the enemy and report his movements when he had been

found; hence the heavy guns which they carried. They were intended

to find the enemy for the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy’s

strength in order to report to the Battle Fleet. Had this policy not

been adopted the enemy’s battle cruisers could not have been brought to

action on such occasions as the engagement of January 24th, 1915. And

in the cases of raids on our coast, the battle cruisers were always

sent ahead at full speed to endeavour to cut off the enemy battle

cruisers.

Bearing in mind our superiority in numbers in the middle of 1916 and

the heavier armaments carried by our ships, the real risk involved

in this policy was that of our battle cruisers being drawn on to the

enemy’s Battle Fleet, and one or more of our vessels being disabled.

Provided that our ships were not disabled, they would, owing to their

higher speed, have no difficulty in clear weather in keeping out of

range of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, if it were sighted, whilst still

maintaining touch with it, and driving off lighter vessels. With the

added support of the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been

grouped with the Battle Cruiser Fleet owing to the absence of the 3rd

Battle Squadron at Scapa Flow, the tactical advantage of our ships was

even stronger, provided always that the 5th Battle Squadron had an

excess of speed over the fastest enemy’s Battle Squadron.

In these circumstances, when preparing my despatch, I had felt it

necessary on the highest grounds, as well as only just to the officers

and men of our battle cruisers, to give some explanation of the heavy

losses incurred by our ships in the early part of the action, when we

were opposing six battle cruisers (supported, though at long range,

by four battleships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, comprising the

5th Battle Squadron) to five enemy battle cruisers, which were not

then supported by the German Battle Fleet. Inquiry into this matter

showed that one explanation was that our ships were very inadequately

protected by armour as compared with the German vessels of the battle

cruiser type. It was considered undesirable to draw attention to this

publicly while the war was in progress.

The relative values of protection and gun power had frequently engaged

my serious attention. It was also a subject of much discussion amongst

writers on naval matters, some of whom went to the length of suggesting

that all available weight should be put into gun power and that ships

should be left practically without armour. Their views were based on

the argument that “the best defense is a powerful offensive.” Although

this argument is very true when applied to strategy, the War has shown

its fallacy as applied to _matériel_. The loss of the _Good Hope_,

_Monmouth_, _Queen Mary_, _Indefatigable_, _Invincible_, _Defence_,

and _Warrior_, and the considerations to which these losses gave rise,

convinced naval officers afloat, even if they did not convince others

less intimately associated with the Fleet during the War, that ships

with inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those which

possess them to a considerably greater degree, even if the former are

superior in gun power. The conviction was strengthened by the knowledge

we obtained, that German ships, far more frequently hit by gunfire,

torpedo, or mine than many of our ships that sank, were yet taken

safely into port owing, partly, to their defensive qualities, but,

partly, to the limitations of our armour-piercing shell at that time.

There has been in the past a tendency in some quarters, when comparing

the relative strength of the British and German Fleets for the purpose

of future provision of large vessels in the Navy Estimates, to make

comparison only on the basis of the _gun power_ of the vessels of the

two Navies. Great superiority in fighting qualities on the part of the

British Fleet was suggested by this blindness to other considerations.

During my pre-War service at the Admiralty this question was often

under discussion, and I consistently demurred to this line of argument

as being very misleading, and pointed out that the true comparison lay

between the _displacement_ of the ships of the various classes, because

if we assumed, as War experience has since shown that we were justified

in assuming that the German naval designers and constructors were not

inferior in ability to our own, it was obvious that, taking ships of

equal displacement and equal speed, and about contemporary date, if

our vessels possessed superiority in gunfire, the Germans must possess

superiority in some other direction. It was well known at the Admiralty

that their superiority lay in greatly increased protection, combined

with heavier torpedo armament.

We were also aware that the German vessels were fitted with small tube

boilers, which were very economical in weight for a given horse-power,

and, consequently, the German vessels obtained thereby a further

advantage, the weight saved being presumably utilised in giving the

ships additional protection. In other words, they adopted a different

disposition of the weight available in each ship.

The tables on pp. 308–11 give particulars of the armament, protection,

and displacement of the capital ships of the two Navies engaged in the

Battle of Jutland, so far as they are known to me.

The main facts revealed by an examination of these tables are:

BATTLESHIPS

1. The German ships of any particular period were of considerably

greater displacement as compared with contemporary British ships.

2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of armour than

their British contemporaries.

TABLE I

BRITISH BATTLESHIPS

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------

| | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

“Royal Sovereign” Class (5)| 1913–14 | 25,750 | 21.5 | 3,400 | 8, 15″ | 4 | 13″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 13″ | 1″ to 4″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 14, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Queen Elizabeth” Class (5)| 1912–13 | 27,500 | 25.0 | 3,400 | 8, 15″ | 4 | 13″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 13″ | 1″ to 3″ | Ditto

| | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Iron Duke” Class (4) | 1911–12 | 25,000 | 21.0 | 4,300 | 10, 13″.5 | 4 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 11″ | 1½″ to 2½″ | Ditto

| | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“King George V.” Class (3) | 1910–11 | 23,000 | 21.0 | 4,000 | 10, 13″.5 | 2 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Orion” Class (4) | 1909–10 | 22,500 | 21.0 | 4,100 | 10, 13″.5 | 2 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Ditto

| | | | | 13, 4″ | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

_Canada_ | Emergency | 28,000 | 22.75 | 3,800 | 10, 14″ | 4 | 9″ | 7″ and 4½″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 10″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up

| War | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

_Erin_ | Ditto | 23,000 | 21.0 | 2,800 | 10, 13″.5 | 3 | 12″ | 9″ and 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 11″ | 1½″ to 3″ | Ditto

| | | | | 16, 6″ | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

_Agincourt_ | Ditto | 27,500 | 22.0 | 3,800 | 14, 12″ | 3 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 12″ | 1″ to 1½″ | Ditto

| | | | | 20, 6″ | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Hercules” Class (3) | 1909–10 | 20,000 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 11″ | 8″ | 2½″ | 2½″ | nil | 11″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to main deck only.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“St. Vincent” Class (2) | 1907–8 | 19,250 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 10″ | 8″ | 2″ | 2″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto

| | | | | 13, 4″ | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Bellerophon” Class (3) | 1906–7 | 18,600 | 21.0 | 3,500 | 10, 12″ | 2 | 10″ | 8″ | 6″ | 5″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto

| | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

_Dreadnought_ | 1905–6 | 17,900 | 21.0 | 4,000 | 10, 12″ | 4 | 11″ | 8″ | 6″ | 4″ | nil | 11″ | ¾″ to 3″ | Ditto

| | | | | 20, 12 pds.| | | | | | | | |

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

TABLE II

BRITISH BATTLE CRUISERS

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------

| | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

_Tiger_ (1) | 1911–12 | 28,500 | 29.0 | 6,800 | 8, 13″.5 | 2 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 9″ | 1″ to 3″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 12, 6″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Lion” Class (3) | 1909–10 | 26,350 | 28.0 | 4,600 | 8, 13″.5 | 2 | 9″ | 6″ | 4″ | 4″ | nil | 9″ | 1″ to 2½″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 15, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to upper deck.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“New Zealand” Class (3) | | 18,800 | 26.0 | 4,000 | 8, 12″ | 2 | 6″ | | 4″ | 4″ | nil | 7″ | 1″ to 2½″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 14, 4″ | | | | | | | | | to main deck.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Inflexible” Class (3) | 1905–6 | 17,250 | 25.0 | 3,800 | 8, 12″ | 4 | 6″ | | 4″ | nil | nil | 7″ | ¾″ to 2½″ | Ditto

| | | | | 12, 4″ | | | | | | | | |

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

TABLE III

GERMAN BATTLESHIPS

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------

| | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

“König” Class (4) | 1911–12 | 25,390 | 23.0 | 4,200 | 10, 12″ | 5 | 14″ | 10″ | 6″ | 6″ | 8″ | 14″ | 2½″ to 3″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to upper deck and

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Kaiser” Class (5) | 1909–11 | 24,410 | 21.0 | 3,700 | 10, 12″ | 5 |13″.75 | 9″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 11¾″ | 1½″ to 4″ | Ditto, but at

| | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | after end side

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Heligoland” Class (4) | 1908–9 | 22,440 | 20.5 | 3,100 | 12, 12″ | 6 |11″.75 | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 7¾″ | 11¾″ | 1½″ to 2¾″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to main deck and

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

“Nassau” Class (4) | 1907–8 | 18,600 | 20.0 | 2,800 | 12, 11″ | 6 |11″.75 | 7¾″ | 6″ | 4″ | 6½″ | 11″ | 2″ to 4¾″ | Ditto

| | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | |

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

TABLE IV

GERMAN BATTLE CRUISERS

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------+-------------------

| | | | | | +-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

“Derfflinger” Class[H] | 1911–12 | 26,180 | 28.0 | 5,600 | 8, 12″ | 4 | 12″ | 8″ | 5″ | 5″ | 7″ | 11″ | 1″ to 3.2″ | Side armoured up

| | | | | 14, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | | to upper deck with

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

_Seydlitz_ | 1910–11 | 24,610 | 26.75 | 3,700 | 10, 11″ | 4 | 11¾″ | 8″ | 4″ | 4″ | 6″ | 10″ | 1″ to 3¼″ | Ditto

| | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | |

_Moltke_ | 1908–9 | 22,640 | 27.25 | 3,200 | 10, 11″ | 4 | 11″ }| tapering | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 10″ | ? same as | Ditto

| | | | | 12, 5″.9 | | }| | | | | | _Seydlitz_ |

| | | | | | | }| | | | | | |

_Von der Tann_ | 1907–8 | 19,100 | 26.0 | 2,900 | 8, 11″ | 4 | 9¾″}| | 4″ | 4″ | 5″ | 9″ | ? same as | Side armoured up

| | | | | 10, 5″.9 | | }| | | | | | _Seydlitz_ | to main deck with

---------------------------+-----------+--------------+-------+----------+------------+-----------+-------+--------------+--------+--------+-----------+--------+------------+-------------------

[H] _Lutzow_ was similar.

TABLE V

Comparison of weight of armour in British and German ships of the same

date. N. B.--The German figures are approximate.

-----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+--------

-----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+--------

_Monarch_ British | 22,500 | 4,560 | 2,010 | 6,570 | 545 | 88½

_Kaiser_ German | 24,410 | 5,430 | 3,130 | 8,560 | 564 | 95

| | | | | |

_Queen Mary_ British | 27,000 | 3,900 | 2,300 | 6,200 | 660 | 89

_Seydlitz_ German | 24,610 | 5,200 | 2,400 | 7,600 | 656 | 93½

-----------------------+--------------+-----------+----------------+-------+---------+--------

_Note._--Similar comparisons between other ships of the same date would show similar results.

3. All German Dreadnoughts were provided with side armour _to the

upper deck_, whilst nine of the earliest British Dreadnoughts

were provided with armour protection to the _main deck only_, thus

rendering them far more open to artillery attack. The “Orion” class

of battleship and the “Lion” class of battle cruiser, designed

during my service at the Admiralty as Controller, were the first of

our Dreadnoughts armoured to the upper deck.

4. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships was in

nearly all cases thicker than in their British contemporaries,

whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in _all cases_

considerably greater in the German ships.

5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually greater than

in the British vessels and the watertight subdivision more complete.

6. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo

tubes than the British vessels.

BATTLE CRUISERS

1. The earlier German battle cruisers were of greater displacement

than their British contemporaries.

2. The German ships carried a greater weight of armour than their

British contemporaries.

3. Five out of our nine battle cruisers were without protection

above the main deck, the whole of the German vessels being provided

with protection to the upper deck.

4. The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all positions,

including deck protection, as well as more complete watertight

subdivisions.

5. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo

tubes than the British ships.

As against the additional protection of the German ships our vessels

of contemporary design were provided in all cases with heavier turret

guns, whilst the German ships carried heavier secondary armaments.

A point of considerable interest, which should also be mentioned

because it was to prove important, was that the Germans possessed

a delay-action fuse which, combined with a highly efficient

armour-piercing projectile, ensured the burst of shell taking place

_inside_ the armour of British ships instead of _outside_, or whilst

passing through the armour, which was the case with British shells of

that date fired against the thick German armour.

The fuel capacity of the ships of the two Navies was not widely

different, although the British ships, as a rule, were fitted to carry

more fuel. Although I arranged, after the first few months of war, to

reduce the amount of fuel carried by our ships very considerably--in

fact, by more than 25 per cent.--I was unable to reduce it further in

coal-burning ships without sacrificing some of the protection afforded

by the coal, since in our case it was necessary to be prepared to do a

considerable amount of steaming at high speed, involving expenditure

of coal, before obtaining contact with the enemy. It would have been

unwise to contemplate meeting the Germans with coal below what I may

call the “safety line.” On the other hand, it was well known that,

as the Germans had no intention of fighting an action far from their

bases, they had effected a very much greater reduction in the quantity

of fuel carried with consequently a corresponding advantage in speed.

There was yet one other matter of great importance, namely, the

vulnerability of the ships of the two Navies in regard to under-water

attack. Here the Germans possessed a very real advantage, which stood

them in good stead throughout the war. It arose from two causes:

1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside the ships, and in

many cases its greater thickness.

2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer skin of the ship

and the consequent additional protection to under-water attack afforded

thereby.

In regard to the first point, the great majority of our ships only

carried partial internal protection, that is, protection over a portion

of the length of the ship. The protection was usually confined to the

region of the magazine and shell-rooms. In the German ships it ran

throughout the length of the vessel.

As to the second point, it was possible to place the protective

bulkhead farther “inboard” in the German ships without cramping

machinery and magazine spaces, because the ships themselves were of

much greater beam. Consequently the explosion of a mine or a torpedo

against the hull of the ship was far less likely to injure the

protective bulkhead and so to admit water into the vitals of the ships

than was the case with a British vessel. The result was that, although

it is known that many German capital ships were mined and torpedoed

during the war, including several at the Jutland battle, the Germans

have not so far admitted that any were sunk, except the pre-Dreadnought

battleship _Pommern_ and the battle cruiser _Lutzow_, whose injuries

from shell fire were also very extensive.

On the other hand, British capital ships, mined or torpedoed, rarely

survived. The recorded instances of escape are the _Inflexible_ (mined

in the Dardanelles) and the _Marlborough_ (torpedoed at Jutland), and

in the latter case, although the torpedo struck at about the most

favourable spot for the ship, she had some difficulty in reaching port.

The question will be asked why it was that British ships were under

this disadvantage. The reply is that the whole of our Dreadnought

battleships, designed before the War, were hampered by the absence

of proper dock accommodation. The German Emperor once remarked to

me at Kiel on this subject, that we had made the mistake of building

our ships before we had proper dock accommodation for them, whilst

in Germany they had provided the dock accommodation first and had

designed the ships subsequently. He was quite right, although, since

docks took a long time to construct, the German policy involved delay

in shipbuilding, whereas we got ships of a type, and hence our margin

of superiority in 1914. As each successive type of Dreadnought was

designed, our constructive staff were faced with the fact that if they

went beyond a certain beam the number of docks available would be

insufficient; and it was always a matter of great difficulty to obtain

money with which to construct adequate docks. Docks make no appeal

to the imagination of the public and cost a great deal of money. The

result was that August, 1914, found us with a superiority in ships,

but woefully lacking in dock accommodation; and for this reason alone

a Fleet action early in the War, resulting in considerable damage to

heavy ships, would have produced embarrassing results.

It is only just to our very able constructive staff at the Admiralty to

point this out; it was one of the reasons which led to the German ships

being much better equipped to withstand under-water attack than were

our own. It is devoutly to be hoped that this lesson will be borne in

mind in the future, and adequate dock accommodation provided for the

Fleet.

The matter is one of which I have considerable personal knowledge,

since it came within my province as Controller in 1909–11 and was also

given to me to examine whilst Second Sea Lord in 1913. It is needless

to say that on both occasions the necessities were pointed out with

emphasis. These remarks are not out of place, as will be shown, as

an introduction in a consideration of the Battle of Jutland, if that

action is to be rightly judged.

In following the proceedings of the Fleet it is essential to bear

in mind that the time of receipt of signals, especially of reports

emanating from the bridge of a ship, is not a true indication of the

time at which the officer making the report began his task. A varying

but considerable interval is bound to elapse; this includes the time

taken to write out the report, transmit it to the wireless office or

signal bridge, code it, signal it, decode it on board the receiving

ship, write it out and transmit it to the bridge. The interval is

greater with wireless than with visual signals.

I.--THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEET’S ACTION

The Grand Fleet put to sea on May 30th for the purpose of carrying out

one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea. The orders from me under

which the Fleet acted were as follows:

Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, with the 2nd Battle Squadron from

Cromarty, was directed to pass through a position in Lat. 58.15 N.,

Long. 2.0 E., and to meet the remainder of the Battle Fleet at 2 P.M.

on the 31st at position (A) in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E.

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the

5th Battle Squadron, was directed to proceed to a position in Lat.

56.40 N., Long. 5 E., economising fuel in the destroyers as much as

possible; it was expected that he would be in that position by about 2

P.M. on the 31st, after which he was directed to stand to the northward

to get into visual touch with the Battle Fleet.

[Illustration:

Operations of

BATTLE CRUISER FLEET

II·00 p.m to VI·15 p.m. 31^{st}. May.]

The _Iron Duke_ and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, together with the

3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the newly commissioned light cruisers

_Chester_ and _Canterbury_, which had been carrying out gunnery and

torpedo practices at Scapa, left that base during the evening of May

30th, and proceeded towards position (A), Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15

E., having met the 2nd Battle Squadron _en route_ at 11.15 A.M. in

Lat. 58.13 N., Long. 2.42 E. Sir David Beatty had been informed before

sailing that the Battle Fleet would steer towards the Horn Reef from

the position in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E.

At 2 P.M. on May 31st the Battle Fleet was about 18 miles to the

north-westward of the position (A), being actually in Lat. 57.57 N.,

Long. 3.45 E., in organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been slightly

delayed for the purpose of enabling the usual and necessary practice of

examining trawlers and other vessels met with _en route_ to be carried

out without causing the examining vessels to expend unnecessary fuel

in regaining station. We had to be on our guard against scouts. The

divisions were in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard in the order:

1st–6th Divisions (screened by the 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas) with

the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet.

The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were stationed 16

miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six miles apart on a line of

direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.; the cruisers being eight miles apart

and their positions being in the order from east to west:

(F.) (F.)

_Cochrane_ _Shannon_ _Minotaur_ _Defence_ _Duke of Edinburgh_ _Black Prince_

. .

. _Warrior_

_Hampshire_ (linking ship 6 miles astern of the _Minotaur_)

The attached cruisers, the _Active_, _Boadicea_, _Blanche_, and

_Bellona_, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and the 3rd Battle

Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers _Chester_ and _Canterbury_,

about 20 miles ahead, the whole steering S. 50 E., and zigzagging, the

speed of _advance_ being 14 knots.

The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below:

Line of Advance.

1st Div. 2nd Div. 3rd Div. 4th Div. 5th Div. 6th Div.

_King George V._(F.) _Orion_ (F.) _Iron Duke_ (F.F.) _Benbow_ (F.) _Colossus_ (F.) _Marlborough_ (F.)

_Ajax_ _Monarch_ _Royal Oak_ _Bellerophon_ _Collingwood_ _Revenge_

_Centurion_ _Conqueror_ _Superb_ (F.) _Temeraire_ _Neptune_ _Hercules_

_Erin_ _Thunderer_ _Canada_ _Vanguard_ _St. Vincent_ _Agincourt_

F., Flagships; F.F., Fleet Flagship.

It may be added in further explanation that the flagships of the Battle

Fleet were:

_Iron Duke_, Fleet-Flagship.--Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe

(Commander-in-Chief).

_King George V._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram,

Commanding 2nd Battle Squadron.

_Orion._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral in the

2nd Battle Squadron.

_Superb._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in the

4th Battle Squadron.

_Benbow._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Commanding

the 4th Battle Squadron.

_Colossus._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, Rear-Admiral in

the 1st Battle Squadron.

_Marlborough._--Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Commanding

1st Battle Squadron and second in command of the Grand

Fleet.

The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron, with destroyers,

were at 2 P.M. in Lat. 56.46 N., Long. 4.40 E., and had turned to the

northward, steering N. by E., speed 19½ knots, in the order:

The _Lion_ and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead,

screened by the light cruiser _Champion_ and 10 destroyers of the 13th

Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead

three miles E.N.E. of the _Lion_, screened by six destroyers.[I] The

5th Battle Squadron, in single line ahead, was five miles N.N.W. of

the _Lion_, being screened by the light cruiser _Fearless_ and nine

destroyers of the 1st Flotilla. The Light Cruiser Squadrons formed a

screen eight miles S.S.E. from the _Lion_, ships spread on a line of

direction E.N.E. and W.S.W., five miles apart in the order from west to

east:

2nd Light Cruiser 3rd Light Cruiser 1st Light Cruiser

Squadron Squadron Squadron

_Southampton_ (F.) _Nottingham_ _Falmouth_ (F.) _Birkenhead_ _Inconstant_ _Galatea_ (F.)

_Birmingham_ _Dublin_ _Gloucester_ _Cordelia_ _Phaeton_

[I] These destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but

happened to be at Rosyth.

It should be added that the flagships were:

_Lion._--Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir David

Beatty.

_Princess Royal._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock,

commanding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.

_New Zealand._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, commanding

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron.

_Barham._--Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commanding 5th

Battle Squadron.

The _Engadine_, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed between the light

cruisers _Gloucester_ and _Cordelia_, and the light cruiser _Yarmouth_

acted as linking ship between the _Lion_ and the light cruiser screen.

The first report of enemy vessels was received from the _Galatea_, the

flagship of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, commanding the 1st

Light Cruiser Squadron, who, at 2.20 P.M., sighted two enemy vessels

to the E.S.E. apparently stopped and engaged in boarding a neutral

steamer. Sir David Beatty, recognising the possibilities of the

situation, immediately turned his fleet to the S.S.E., the course for

the Horn Reef, so as to get between the enemy and his base.

At 2.35 P.M. the _Galatea_ reported a large amount of smoke “as from

a fleet” bearing E.N.E., followed by a report that the vessels were

steering north. The course of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered

to the eastward and N.E. towards the smoke, the enemy being sighted

at 3.31 P.M. and identified as five battle cruisers accompanied by

destroyers.

Meanwhile the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their

direction, and, judging the situation accurately, spread to the

east without waiting for orders, forming a screen in advance of the

heavy ships. Our Light Cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels

of a similar class at long range. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,

under Commodore W. E. Goodenough, with his broad pendant in the

_Southampton_, came in at high speed towards the battle cruisers and

formed ahead of them on an E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 P.M. sighted

enemy battle cruisers bearing E.N.E.

On receipt of the _Galatea’s_ report, Sir David Beatty ordered the

_Engadine_ to send up a sea-plane to scout to the N.N.E. This was

the first time that sea-planes had been used for reconnaissance work

with a fleet in an action, and the event is notable for that reason.

The low-lying clouds made observation difficult, but the sea-plane,

with Flight-Lieutenant F. S. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant

Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was able, by flying low

under the clouds, to identify and report four enemy light cruisers, the

report being received on board the _Lion_ at 3.30 P.M. The sea-plane

was under heavy fire from the light cruisers during the observation. By

this time the line of battle was being formed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser

Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the

destroyers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas taking station ahead. The

course was E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, the speed 25

knots, and the range 23,000 yards. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on

a line of bearing in order to clear the smoke.

The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the movements of the

Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing N.N.W., distant 10,000 yards; the

weather was favourable, the sun being behind our ships, the wind S.E.,

and the visibility good.

Meanwhile the wireless reports from the _Galatea_ to the _Lion_ had

been intercepted on board the _Iron Duke_, and directions were at once

given to the Battle Fleet to raise steam for full speed, the ships

being at the time at short notice for full speed. The cruisers had been

ordered to raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 P.M. the Battle

Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 3.30 P.M. I directed

Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their ships of the situation. The

earliest reports from the _Galatea_ had indicated the presence of light

cruisers and destroyers only, and my first impression was that these

vessels, on sighting the British force, would endeavour to escape via

the Skagerrak, as they were to the eastward of our vessels and were

consequently not in so much danger of being cut off as if they turned

to the southward. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well

placed for cutting the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place,

was ordered to frustrate any such intention; but at 4 P.M., on the

receipt of the information of the presence of enemy battle cruisers, it

was directed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. About 3.40 P.M. I received

a report from Sir David Beatty that he had sighted five battle cruisers

and a number of destroyers, and he gave his position at the same time.

As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was reported, course

was altered in the Battle Fleet to close our battle cruisers, and speed

increased as rapidly as possible. By 4 P.M. the “Fleet Speed” was 20

knots, being higher than had previously been obtained. Zigzagging was

abandoned on receipt of the _Galatea’s_ first report. The battleships

were also directed to keep clear of the wake of the next ahead in order

to prevent loss of speed from the wash.

At 3.48 P.M. the action between the battle cruisers began at a range

of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened by the two forces practically

simultaneously. At the commencement the fire from the German vessels

was rapid and accurate, the _Lion_ being hit twice three minutes after

fire was opened, and the _Lion_, _Tiger_ and _Princess Royal_ all

receiving several hits by 4 P.M.; observers on board our own ships were

also of opinion that our fire was effective at that stage.

At about 4 P.M. it was evident by the accuracy of the enemy’s fire

that he had obtained the range of our ships, which was then about

16,000 yards. The enemy bore well abaft the beam, and course was

altered slightly to the southward to confuse his fire control. Course

was altered two or three times subsequently for the same purpose. The

German ships frequently zigzagged for the purpose of confusing our fire

control.

At this period the fire of the enemy’s ships was very rapid and

accurate; the _Lion_ received several hits, the roof of one of her

turrets being blown off at 4 P.M. At about 4.6 P.M. the _Indefatigable_

was hit, approximately at the outer edge of the upper deck level in

line with the after turret, by several projectiles of one salvo; an

explosion followed (evidently that of a magazine) and the ship fell out

of the line, sinking by the stern. She was again hit by another salvo

forward, turned over and sank.

About this time (4.8 P.M.) the 5th Battle Squadron came into action,

opening fire at a range between 19,000 and 20,000 yards. This slower

squadron was some distance astern of the battle cruisers and, by reason

partly of the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and partly

of the light to the eastward having become less favourable, difficulty

was experienced in seeing the targets, not more than two ships being

visible at a time. At 4.12 P.M. the range of the enemy’s battle

cruisers from our own was about 23,000 yards, and course was altered

from S.S.E. to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire had slackened owing to the

increase in range.

The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing the line of

our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the periscopes of enemy

submarines were also made by more than one ship.

In accordance with the general directions given by Sir David Beatty

to the destroyers to attack when a favourable opportunity occurred,

the _Nestor_, _Nomad_, _Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_,

_Obdurate_, _Nerissa_, _Moorsom_, _Morris_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagant_

moved out at 4.15 P.M.; at the same time a similar movement took place

on the part of an enemy force of one light cruiser and 15 destroyers.

Both sides first steered to reach an advantageous position at the

van of the opposing battle cruiser lines from which to deliver their

attack, and then turned to the northward to attack. A fierce engagement

at close quarters between the light forces resulted, and the enemy lost

two destroyers, sunk by our vessels; and, in addition, his torpedo

attack was partially frustrated; some torpedoes were fired by the

enemy, two of which crossed the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which

had been turned away to avoid the attack.

During this action, which reflected the greatest credit on our

destroyers, several of our attacking vessels, owing to their having

dropped back towards the rear of our line, were not in a good position

to attack the enemy’s battle cruisers with torpedoes. The _Nestor_,

_Nomad_, and _Nicator_, most gallantly led by Commander the Hon.

E. B. S. Bingham in the _Nestor_, were able to press home their

attack, causing the enemy’s battle cruisers to turn away to avoid

their torpedoes. The _Nomad_ was damaged and forced to haul out of

line before getting within torpedo range of the battle cruisers, but

the _Nestor_ and _Nicator_ succeeded in firing torpedoes at the battle

cruisers under a heavy fire from the German secondary armaments. The

_Nestor_ was then hit, badly damaged by the fire of a light cruiser,

and remained stopped between the lines. She was sunk later by the

German Battle Fleet when that force appeared on the scene, but not

before she had fired her last torpedo at the approaching ships. The

_Nomad_ was also sunk by the German Battle Fleet as it came up, but

this vessel also fired her torpedoes at the fleet as it approached. In

both these destroyers the utmost gallantry in most trying circumstances

was shown by the officers and men. It is gratifying to record that

a considerable proportion of the ship’s company of both destroyers

was picked up by German destroyers as the German Battle Fleet passed

the scene. After completing her attack upon the battle cruisers, the

_Nicator_ was able to rejoin her flotilla. The _Moorsom_ also attacked

the enemy’s Battle Fleet and returned. In the meantime, the _Petard_,

_Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagant_ succeeded in firing torpedoes

at long range (7,000 yards) at the enemy’s battle cruisers. For his

gallantry on the occasion of this destroyer attack Commander the Hon.

E. B. S. Bingham, who was rescued from the _Nestor_ and taken prisoner

by the Germans, received the Victoria Cross.

Meanwhile the engagement between the heavy ships had become very

fierce, and the effect on the enemy battle cruisers began to be

noticeable, the third ship in the line being observed to be on fire

at 4.18 P.M., whilst our ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were also

inflicting and receiving some punishment. The accuracy and rapidity of

the fire from the enemy’s vessels was deteriorating at this period;

our own ships were much handicapped by the decreasing visibility, due

partly to the use by the enemy of smoke screens, under cover of which

he altered course to throw out our fire.

The flagship _Barham_, of the 5th Battle Squadron, received her first

hit at 4.23 P.M.

At about 4.26 P.M. a second disaster befell the British battle

cruisers. A salvo fired from one of the enemy’s battle cruisers hit the

_Queen Mary_ abreast of “Q” turret and a terrific explosion resulted,

evidently caused by a magazine blowing up. The _Tiger_, which was

following close astern of the _Queen Mary_, passed through the dense

cloud of smoke caused by the explosion, and a great deal of material

fell on her decks, but otherwise the _Queen Mary_ had completely

vanished. A few survivors from this ship and from the _Indefatigable_

were afterwards rescued by our destroyers. The loss of these two fine

ships with their splendid ships’ companies was a heavy blow to the

Battle Cruiser Fleet, the instantaneous nature of the disaster adding

to its magnitude.[J]

[J] I was not aware of the loss of the _Queen Mary_ and

_Indefatigable_ until the morning of June 1st.

At 4.38 P.M. Commodore Goodenough, in the _Southampton_, Flagship of

the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been scouting ahead of the

Battle Cruisers, reported that the enemy’s Battle Fleet was in sight

bearing S.E., and steering to the northward, and gave its position. Sir

David Beatty recalled his destroyers, and on sighting the Battle Fleet

at 4.42 P.M. turned the battle cruisers 16 points in succession to

starboard. This movement was followed by the enemy’s battle cruisers,

and Sir David Beatty directed Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to turn his

ships in succession 16 points to starboard. Commodore Goodenough led

the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron to a favourable position from which

to observe the movements of the enemy’s Battle Fleet, within 13,000

yards’ range of the heavy ships, and, in spite of a very heavy fire,

clung tenaciously to these ships and forwarded several reports of their

position and movements; the skilful manner in which the Commodore,

aided by his captains, handled the squadron under this fire undoubtedly

saved the ships from heavy loss. Owing to the constant manœuvring of

the ships of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron during the engagement,

the position of the _Southampton_, as obtained by reckoning, was

somewhat inaccurate, as was to be expected. This fact detracted from

the value of the reports to me; the position of the enemy by latitude

and longitude, as reported from time to time to the _Iron Duke_,

was consequently incorrect. This discrepancy added greatly to the

difficulty experienced in ascertaining the correct moment at which

to deploy the Battle Fleet, the flank on which to deploy, and the

direction of deployment. Such discrepancies are, however, inevitable

under the conditions.

The necessary move of the battle cruisers to the southward in their

pursuit of the enemy, at a speed considerably in excess of that which

the Battle Fleet could attain, resulted in opening the distance between

the two forces, so that at the time of the turn of Sir David Beatty’s

force to the northward, the _Iron Duke_ and the _Lion_ were over 50

miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 45 miles per hour.

As soon as the position of the _Lion_ was known after the receipt of

the report of enemy battle cruisers being in sight, Rear-Admiral the

Hon. H. S. Hood was directed to proceed immediately to reinforce Sir

David Beatty’s force, whose position, course and speed was signalled to

the Rear-Admiral. The latter officer reported his own position and gave

his course and speed as S.S.E., 25 knots. At the same time the Battle

Fleet was informed that our battle cruisers were in action with the

enemy’s battle cruisers, and an inquiry was addressed to Rear-Admiral

Evan-Thomas to ascertain whether he was in company with Sir David

Beatty, a reply in the affirmative being received, with a report that

his squadron was in action.

At this time I was confident that, under the determined leadership

of Sir David Beatty, with a force of four of our best and fastest

battleships and six battle cruisers, very serious injury would be

inflicted on the five battle cruisers of the enemy if they could be

kept within range.

The report of the presence of the German Battle Fleet, which was

communicated to our Battle Fleet, did not cause me any uneasiness in

respect of the safety of our own vessels, since our ships of the 5th

Battle Squadron were credited with a speed of 25 knots. I did not,

however, expect that they would be able to exceed a speed of 24 knots;

the information furnished to me at this time gave the designed speed of

the fastest German battleships as 20.5 knots only. Even after making

full allowance for the fact that our ships were probably carrying

more fuel and stores proportionately than the Germans, and giving

the Germans credit for some excess over the designed speed, no doubt

existed in my mind that both our battleships and our battle cruisers

with Sir David Beatty could keep well out of range of the enemy’s

Battle Fleet, if necessary, until I was able to reinforce them. I

learned later, as an unpleasant surprise, that the 5th Battle Squadron,

_when going at its utmost speed_, found considerable difficulty

in increasing its distance from the enemy’s 3rd Battle Squadron,

consisting of ships of the “König” class, and on return to Scapa I

received a report from the Admiralty which credited this enemy squadron

with a speed of _23 knots_ for a short period, this being the first

intimation I had received of such a speed being attainable by them.

To return to Sir David Beatty. The action between the battle cruisers

was renewed during the retirement of our ships to the northward, and

the two leading ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, the _Barham_ and

_Valiant_, supported our battle cruisers by their fire, whilst the two

rear ships of that force, the _Warspite_ and _Malaya_, engaged the

leading ships of the enemy’s Battle Fleet as long as their guns would

bear, at a range of about 19,000 yards.

The light cruiser _Fearless_, with destroyers of the 1st Flotilla,

were now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers, and the light cruiser

_Champion_, with destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, joined the 5th Battle

Squadron. The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been in

the rear during the southerly course, now took up a position on the

starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle cruisers, the 2nd Light

Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. During this northerly run

the fire from our ships was very intermittent, owing to the weather

thickening to the eastward, although the enemy was able at times to

fire with some accuracy.

From 5 P.M. until after 6 P.M. the light was very much in favour of

the enemy, being far clearer to the westward than to the eastward. A

photograph taken on board the _Malaya_ at 5.15 P.M. towards the western

horizon established this clearly. Our destroyers, shown silhouetted

against the bright horizon, were at this time at least 16,000 yards

distant.

Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30 minutes after

5.12 P.M. owing to the enemy’s ships being invisible, fire being

reopened at about 5.40 P.M. on the enemy’s battle cruisers, three or

four of which could be seen, although indistinctly, at a distance of

some 14,000 yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52, however, our fire seemed

to be effective, the _Lion_ alone firing some 15 salvoes during this

period.

At 5.10 P.M. the destroyer _Moresby_, which had rejoined the Battle

Cruiser Fleet after assisting the _Engadine_ with her sea-plane, fired

a torpedo at the enemy’s line at a range of between 6,000 and 8,000

yards from a favourable position--two points before the beam of the

enemy’s leading battle cruiser.

At 5.35 P.M. the _Lion’s_ course was gradually altered from N.N.E.

to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled movements and resulting

position of the British Battle Fleet. The enemy’s battle cruisers also

gradually hauled to the eastward, being probably influenced in this

movement by reports received from their light cruisers, which were by

this time in contact with the light cruiser _Chester_ and in sight of

our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Hood.

The proceedings of these vessels will now be described.

At 4 P.M., in accordance with my directions, the 3rd Battle Cruiser

Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, proceeded at full speed to reinforce

Sir David Beatty. At 5 P.M. the squadron, comprising the _Invincible_

(Flag), _Inflexible_, and _Indomitable_, in single line ahead in that

order, with the destroyers _Shark_, _Christopher_, _Ophelia_, and

_Acasta_, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had the light cruiser

_Canterbury_ five miles ahead and the light cruiser _Chester_ bearing

N. 70° W., and was steering S. by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was

rapidly decreasing. According to the _Indomitable’s_ report, objects

could be distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings,

and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then onwards, according to

the same report, the visibility varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards,

although other reports place it higher at times.

At 5.30 P.M. the sound of gunfire was plainly heard to the

south-westward, and the _Chester_ turned in that direction to

investigate, and, at 5.36 P.M., sighted a three-funnelled light cruiser

on the starboard bow, with one or two destroyers in company. The

_Chester_ challenged and, receiving no reply, altered course to west to

close, judging from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel was

hostile.

As the _Chester_ closed, course was altered to about north in order

to avoid being open to torpedo attack by the destroyer on a bearing

favourable to the latter. This turn brought the enemy well abaft the

port beam of the _Chester_ and on an approximately parallel course.

During the turn the _Chester_ sighted two or more light cruisers astern

of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser opened fire

on the _Chester_, the latter replying immediately afterwards, at a

range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility at this time, judging by

the distance at which the enemy’s light cruisers were sighted from the

_Chester_, could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy’s fourth

salvo hit the _Chester_, put No. 1 gun port out of action, and killed

and wounded a large proportion of the gun crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3

port guns. The light cruisers sighted by the _Chester_ undoubtedly

belonged to one of the enemy’s scouting groups stationed on the

starboard bow of their battle cruisers.

Captain Lawson of the _Chester_, in view of the superior force to

which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. and towards the 3rd

Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing the enemy’s light cruisers, all of

which had opened a rapid and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy

vessels turned after the _Chester_, and during the unequal engagement,

which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson successfully manœuvred

his ship with a view to impeding the accuracy of the hostile fire,

realising that she was in no condition to engage such superior forces

successfully in her damaged state.

The _Chester_ closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and took station

N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at a later

phase of the action. The ship suffered considerable casualties, having

31 killed and 50 wounded; three guns and her fire control circuits were

disabled; she had four shell holes a little distance above the water

line. It was on board the _Chester_ that the second Victoria Cross of

the action was earned, posthumously, by Jack Cornwell, Boy 1st Class,

who was mortally wounded early in the action. This gallant lad, whose

age was less than 16½ years, nevertheless remained standing alone at a

most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action,

with the guns’ crew, dead and wounded, all round him.

Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd Battle Cruiser

Squadron at 5.40 P.M., and Rear-Admiral Hood turned his ships to

starboard and brought the enemy light cruisers, which were engaging

the _Chester_, and from which vessels the flashes came, on to his

port bow. During this turn the destroyers attached to the 3rd Battle

Cruiser Squadron were brought on to the port quarter of the squadron.

As soon as Rear-Admiral Hood made out his position he led his squadron

with the _Canterbury_ between the enemy and the _Chester_, on a course

about W.N.W., and at 5.55 P.M. opened an effective fire on the German

light cruisers with his port guns, at a range of about 10,000 to

12,000 yards. The enemy vessels turned away from this attack and fired

torpedoes at the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were

seen later from the _Indomitable_. At about 6.10 P.M. the _Invincible_

and _Indomitable_ turned to starboard to avoid these torpedoes, three

of which passed very close to the latter ship, and ran alongside within

20 yards of the vessel. The _Inflexible_ turned to port.

Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted astern of the first

group, and the four British destroyers, _Shark_, _Acasta_, _Ophelia_

and _Christopher_, attacked them and the large destroyer force in

company with them, and were received by a heavy fire which disabled

the _Shark_ and damaged the _Acasta_. On board the _Shark_ the third

V.C. of the action was earned by her gallant captain, Commander Loftus

Jones, this award also being, I regret to say, posthumous.

The attack of the British destroyers was carried out with great

gallantry and determination, and having frustrated the enemy’s torpedo

attack on the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, Commander Loftus Jones

turned his division to regain his position on our battle cruisers.

At this moment three German vessels came into sight out of the mist

and opened a heavy fire, further disabling the _Shark_ and causing

many casualties on board; Commander Loftus Jones was amongst those

wounded. Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, commanding the _Acasta_, came

to the assistance of the _Shark_, but Commander Loftus Jones refused

to imperil a second destroyer, and directed the _Acasta_ to leave him.

The _Shark_ then became the target for the German ships and destroyers.

Commander Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only undamaged

gun in action, ordered the last torpedo to be placed in the tube and

fired; but whilst this was being done the torpedo was hit by a shell

and exploded, causing many casualties. Those gallant officers and men

in the _Shark_ who still survived, continued to fight the only gun left

in action, the greatest heroism being exhibited. The captain was now

wounded again, his right leg being taken off by a shell; but he still

continued to direct the fire, until the condition of the _Shark_ and

the approach of German destroyers made it probable that the ship would

fall into the hands of the enemy, when he gave orders for her to be

sunk, countermanding this order shortly afterwards on realising that

her remaining gun could still be fought. Shortly afterwards she was hit

by two torpedoes, and sank with her colours flying. Only six survivors

were picked up the next morning by a Danish steamer. In recognition of

the great gallantry displayed, the whole of the survivors were awarded

the Distinguished Service Medal. Their names are: W. C. R. Griffin,

Petty Officer; C. Filleul, Stoker Petty Officer; C. C. Hope, A.B.;

C. H. Smith, A.B.; T. O. G. Howell, A.B.; T. W. Swan, Stoker.

At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of our advanced

cruiser line, which at 5 P.M. was about 16 miles ahead of the Battle

Fleet, the latter being at that time in Lat. 57.24 N., Long. 5.12 E.,

steering S.E. by S. at 20 knots. It should be noted that, owing to

decreasing visibility, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to

be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard flank had

closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30 P.M. The 3rd Battle

Cruiser Squadron was about 16 miles due east of the advanced cruiser

line, but was steering more to the southward on a converging course at

a speed of about five knots faster.

At 5.40 P.M. firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line, and shortly

afterwards ships were seen from the _Minotaur_ to be emerging from the

mist. Rear-Admiral Heath, the senior officer of the cruiser line, had

recalled the ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on hearing the firing

and had ordered them to form single line ahead on the _Minotaur_. He

then made the signal to engage the enemy, namely, the ships in sight

ahead; but before fire was opened they replied to his challenge and

were identified as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron,

engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers and steering to the westward.

At 5.47 P.M. the _Defence_, with the _Warrior_ astern, sighted on a

S. by W. bearing (namely, on the starboard bow) three or four enemy

light cruisers, and course was altered three points to port, bringing

them nearly on a beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in

the _Defence_, then signalled “Commence fire.” Each ship fired three

salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. The salvoes fell short, and the

_Defence_ altered course to starboard, brought the enemy first ahead,

and then to a bearing on the port bow, evidently with the intention

of closing. The latter alteration of course was made at 6.1 P.M.,

and by this time projectiles from the light cruisers were falling

in close proximity to the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_. These ships

opened fire with their port guns at 6.5 P.M. and shortly afterwards

passed close across the bows of the _Lion_ from port to starboard.

One light cruiser, probably the _Wiesbaden_, was hit by the second

salvoes of both ships, appeared to be badly crippled, and nearly

stopped. Our ships continued to close her until within 5,500 yards.

From about 6.10 P.M. onwards they had come under fire of guns of heavy

calibre from the enemy’s battle cruisers, but Sir Robert Arbuthnot, as

gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, was evidently bent

on finishing off his opponent, and held on, probably not realising

in the gathering smoke and mist that the enemy’s heavy ships were at

fairly close range. At about 6.16 P.M. the _Defence_ was hit by two

salvoes in quick succession, which caused her magazines to blow up and

the ship disappeared. The loss of so valuable an officer as Sir Robert

Arbuthnot and so splendid a ship’s company as the officers and men of

the _Defence_ was a heavy blow. The _Warrior_ was very badly damaged

by shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain Molteno was

able to bring his ship out of action, having first seen the _Defence_

disappear. From diagrams made in the _Warrior_ it appears that the

German battle cruisers turned 16 points (possibly with a view either

to close their Battle Fleet or to come to the aid of the disabled

_Wiesbaden_), engaged the _Defence_ and _Warrior_, and then turned back

again. This supposition is confirmed by sketches taken on board the

_Duke of Edinburgh_ at the same time. Owing to the smoke and the mist,

however, it was difficult to state exactly what occurred. From the

observations on board the _Warrior_ it is certain that the visibility

was much greater in her direction from the enemy’s line, than it was in

the direction of the enemy from the _Warrior_. Although the _Defence_

and _Warrior_ were being hit frequently, those on board the _Warrior_

could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly, and it

is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert Arbuthnot not

realising that he was at comparatively short range from the German

battle cruisers until he was already under an overwhelming fire.

The _Warrior_ passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron at the period

when the steering gear of the _Warspite_ had become temporarily

disabled.[K]

[K] _Cf._ page 350.

The _Duke of Edinburgh_, the ship next to the westward of the _Defence_

and the _Warrior_ in the cruiser screen, had turned to close these

ships when they became engaged with the enemy’s light cruisers in

accordance with a signal from the _Defence_. The _Duke of Edinburgh_

joined in the engagement, but, on sighting the Lion on her starboard

bow, did not follow the other ships across the bows of the battle

cruisers, as to do so would have seriously incommoded these vessels;

she turned to port to a parallel course and eventually joined the 2nd

Cruiser Squadron.

The _Black Prince_ was observed from the _Duke of Edinburgh_ to turn

some 12 points to port at the same time that the _Duke of Edinburgh_

turned, but her subsequent movements are not clear; the German accounts

of the action stated that the _Black Prince_ was sunk by gunfire at

the same time as the _Defence_, but she was not seen to be in action

at this time by any of our vessels, and, moreover, a wireless signal,

reporting a submarine in sight and timed 8.48 P.M., was subsequently

received from her. It is probable that the _Black Prince_ passed to

the rear of the Battle Fleet at about 6.30 P.M., and that during the

night she found herself close to one of the German battle squadrons,

and was sunk then by superior gunfire. In support of this theory, the

German account mentions that a cruiser of the “Cressy” type was sunk

in that manner during the night. None of the ships of this class was

present during the engagement, but the _Black Prince_ might well have

been mistaken for a ship of this type in the circumstances.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND, AS DEPICTED DY A GERMAN ARTIST,

SHOWING THE “WIESBADEN” SINKING BETWEEN THE BATTLE LINES

The print from which this was reproduced was found in a German dug-out

between Ostend and Zeebrugge, on November 4, 1918]

We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about 6.10 P.M. at the

termination of their engagement with enemy light cruisers, turning to

avoid torpedoes fired at them. At about this time Rear-Admiral Hood

sighted the _Lion_ and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at about

6.16 P.M. hoisted the signal to his squadron to form single line ahead,

and turned to take station ahead of the _Lion_ and to engage the

hostile battle cruisers, which at 6.20 P.M. were sighted at a range of

8,600 yards.

A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and the fire of the

squadron was judged by those on board the _Invincible_ to be very

effective. Rear-Admiral Hood, who was on the bridge of the _Invincible_

with Captain Cay, hailed Commander Dannreuther, the gunnery officer

in the fore control, at about 6.30 P.M., saying, “Your firing is very

good. Keep at it as quickly as you can; every shot is telling.” At

about 6.34 P.M. the _Invincible_, which had already been hit more than

once by heavy shell without appreciable damage, was struck in “Q”

turret. The shell apparently burst inside the turret, as Commander

Dannreuther saw the roof blown off. A very heavy explosion followed

immediately, evidently caused by the magazine blowing up, and the

ship broke in half and sank at once, only two officers, including

Commander Dannreuther, and four men being subsequently picked up by

the destroyer _Badger_. The British Navy sustained a most serious loss

in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, one of the most distinguished

of our younger flag officers, and in Captain Cay and the officers and

men of his flagship. The difficulties of distinguishing enemy ships

even at the close range of this engagement is revealed by the fact

that the officers in the _Invincible_ and _Indomitable_ were under the

impression that they were engaging battle cruisers, whilst officers

in the _Inflexible_, stationed between these two ships in the line,

reported that her fire was being directed at a battleship of the

“Kaiser” or “König” class, and that only one ship could be seen.

Just before the loss of the _Invincible_, the 3rd Light Cruiser

Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Napier, had carried out an

effective torpedo attack on the enemy’s battle cruisers; both the light

cruisers _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ fired torpedoes at the leading

battle cruiser. It was thought that one of the torpedoes hit its mark

as a heavy under-water explosion was felt at this time.

After the loss of the _Invincible_, the _Inflexible_ was left as leader

of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the _Invincible_ had been

passed, course was altered two points to starboard to close the enemy

ships, which were disappearing in the mist. A further turn to starboard

for the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 P.M., the battle

cruisers being clear of the leading battleships (which were bearing

N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle

Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the

_Inflexible_ and _Indomitable_ took station astern of the _New Zealand_.

The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. The _Chester_

with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which by 5.40 P.M. had got ahead

of the Battle Fleet’s cruiser screen, encountered some of the light

cruisers composing the enemy’s screen, and engaged them, and, in doing

so, drew the enemy’s light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser

Squadron, which, with the _Canterbury_ and destroyers, turned to about

W.N.W. to assist the _Chester_ and to engage the enemy vessels.

In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was made by four

British destroyers on the enemy’s light cruisers. This attack was

apparently thought by the Germans to come from the flotillas with the

Battle Fleet, as far as can be judged from their report of the action;

the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubtedly mistaken

by their vessels for the van of our Battle Fleet, since mention is made

in the German report of the British Battle Fleet having been sighted

at this time by the German light forces, steering in a westerly or

north-westerly direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of the High

Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard.

So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course at this time,

the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly course

before, through, and immediately subsequent to deployment, gradually

hauling round afterwards, first through south to south-west, and, then,

to west, _but it was not until_ 8 P.M. _that a westerly course was

being steered_.

The only point that is not clear is the identity of the light cruiser

engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron.

The ship engaged by the _Defence_ and _Warrior_ was apparently the

_Wiesbaden_. It seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser

Squadron engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have been

another light cruiser in the enemy’s screen. The two engagements took

place at almost the same time, the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opening

fire at 5.55 P.M., and the _Defence_ and the _Warrior_ (the 1st Cruiser

Squadron) commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at about

5.50 P.M. and continuing it with the port guns at 6.5 P.M. It is hardly

possible, even in the conditions of low visibility that prevailed,

that the two squadrons could have been engaging the same vessel.

Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer _Onslow_,

commanded by Lieut.-Commander J. C. Tovey, which at 6.5 P.M. sighted

an enemy’s light cruiser in a position on the bows of the _Lion_

and favourable for torpedo attack on that ship. The _Onslow_ closed

and engaged the light cruiser with gunfire at ranges between 2,000

and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely damaged by shell fire,

succeeded in closing a German battle cruiser to attack with torpedoes;

she was struck by a heavy shell before more than one torpedo could

be fired. Lieut.-Commander Tovey thought that his order to fire all

torpedoes had been carried out, and finding that this was not the case,

closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, and then sighting

the Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes at battleships. The

_Onslow’s_ engines then stopped, but the damaged destroyer _Defender_,

Lieut.-Commander Palmer, closed her at 7.15 P.M. and took her in tow

under a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night and

the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought her back to home

waters, transferring her on June 1st to the care of a tug.