THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916
It may not be out of place here to touch upon the general naval
situation in the spring of 1916--that is, on the eve of the Battle of
Jutland. What were the strategical conditions? To what extent was it
justifiable to take risks with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks
the full consequences of which could not be foreseen owing to the new
conditions of naval warfare?
The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our available capital
ships. There was very little in the way of reserve behind it. The
battleships _not_ included in the Grand Fleet were all of them
pre-Dreadnoughts and therefore inferior fighting units. They consisted
of seven ships of the “King Edward VII.” class, two ships of the “Lord
Nelson” class, and four of the “Queen” class, all of these ships being
in the Mediterranean except five of the “King Edward VII.” class. They
were required there either for work with the Italian Fleet or for the
operations in the Ægean. Five of our light cruisers were also in the
Mediterranean.
The French and Italian Battle Fleets were also in the Mediterranean,
but, owing to political considerations and their duty in watching
the Austrian Fleet, there was little prospect of their leaving that
locality.
It is interesting to compare this situation with that existing a
century earlier. In September, 1805, the month before Trafalgar, the
disposition of British ships in commission in home waters and the
Mediterranean is given in the following table:
------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+-------
| | Ships | | Sloops |
Station | Commander-in-Chief | of the | Frigates | and | Total
| | Line | | small |
| | | | vessels |
------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+-------
From Shetland to Beachy | | | | |
Head | Lord Keith | 10 | 15 | 155 | 180
Channel | Port Admirals | | 1 | 51 | 52
Guernsey and Jersey | Sir J. Saumarez | | 2 | 12 | 14
Off Ushant, etc. | Admiral Cornwallis | 26 | 15 | 20 | 61
Irish | Lord Gardner | | 10 | 14 | 24
Mediterranean | Lord Nelson | 26 | 19 | 24 | 69
In port refitting and | | | | |
destined to reinforce | | | | |
Lords Nelson and | | 11 | 7 | 17 | 35
Cornwallis | | | | |
------------------------+--------------------+--------+----------+---------+-------
In addition to Nelson’s force of 26 capital ships and 19 frigates, the
Navy had, therefore, in commission in home waters and the Mediterranean
a yet more numerous force of 47 capital ships and 50 frigates. The main
portion of this force was with Cornwallis off Ushant, and was watching
Brest. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we had 155 sloops and
small vessels.
In 1916, in addition to the Grand Fleet of 39 capital ships (including
battle cruisers) and 32 cruisers and light cruisers, we had in
commission in home waters and the Mediterranean only 13 capital ships
(all of pre-Dreadnought types and, therefore, obsolescent) and 5 light
cruisers. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we had, exclusive of
the Grand Fleet and Harwich force, about 60 destroyers (mostly of old
type), 6 P boats, and 33 old torpedo boats.
In September, 1805, we had building 32 ships of the line in England,
besides 10 under construction in Russia, and 36 frigates. In May, 1916,
we had building five capital ships and about nine light cruisers.
A consideration of these figures will show that the situation at the
two periods under review was very different, in that, in 1805, the
force engaged at Trafalgar was only a relatively small portion of the
available British Fleet, whilst in 1916 the Grand Fleet included the
large majority of the vessels upon which the country had to rely for
safety.
Earlier in the War, at the end of October, 1914, I had written to
the Admiralty pointing out the dangers which an intelligent use of
submarines, mines and torpedoes by the Germans, before and during a
Fleet action, would involve to the Grand Fleet, and had stated the
tactics which I had intended to employ to meet the expected German
movement in order to bring the enemy to action in the shortest
practicable time and with the best chance of achieving such a victory
as would be decisive. I stated that with new and untried methods of
warfare new tactics must be devised to meet them.
I received in reply an expression of approval of my views and of
confidence in the manner in which I proposed to handle the Fleet in
action.
Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, did the margin of
superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High Sea Fleet justify me in
disregarding the enemy’s torpedo fire or meeting it otherwise than by
definite movements deduced after most careful analysis of the problem
at sea with the Fleet and on the tactical board.
The severely restricted forces behind the Grand Fleet were taken into
account in making this decision. There was also a possibility that the
Grand Fleet might later be called upon to confront a situation of much
wider scope than that already existing.
The position gradually improved after 1916. During the latter half of
that year the remaining ships of the “Royal Sovereign” class joined
the Grand Fleet, and greatly increased the ratio of strength of the
Fleet as compared with the High Sea Fleet. Early in 1917 it was also
possible to withdraw the four battleships of the “Queen” class from the
Adriatic. This greatly eased the manning situation. And in April, 1917,
the culminating event was the entry of the United States of America
into the War on the side of the Entente. In December, 1917, the United
States sent a division of battleships to join the Grand Fleet, and it
was apparent that we could count upon the whole battleship strength of
the United States Navy, if required, to second our efforts.
Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the light cruiser and
destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet increased steadily after the
Battle of Jutland, and to a very considerable extent reduced the danger
of successful torpedo attack on the Grand Fleet in action by surface
craft. The inclusion of the K. class submarines--submarines of high
speed--in the Grand Fleet in 1917 made it very probable that any losses
suffered by us by submarine attack would be more than compensated by
enemy losses from the same cause.
In spite of the fact that, in 1918, the situation in regard to battle
cruisers was becoming unsatisfactory, the general effect of all these
considerations upon the tactics of the Grand Fleet was bound to be
overwhelming. The position was assured, and we could have afforded to
take risks later on which, in 1916, would have been most unwise.