ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION
The year 1916 opened and still no general action had been fought in
the North Sea, which the Grand Fleet continued to dominate, paying
its price--though not so heavy as might have been expected--for the
influence it exerted on all the operations--naval, military and
economic--to which the country had by that time been committed in face
of the active operations pursued by enemy submarines and mine-laying
craft.
On January 5th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth to cruise in the
northern part of the North Sea, and returned during the night of the
8th–9th.
The facility with which enemy mines could be laid in the vicinity of
naval bases during the long winter nights, when there was little or no
moon (as shown, _inter alia_, by our own mine-laying in the Heligoland
Bight, which, though not very frequent in 1916, became constant in
1917), led me to extend still further the patrols from the bases at
such times; from January 2nd to January 10th inclusive, the patrol
vessels (two light cruisers and a destroyer) worked in an area about
140 miles and between bearings 80 and 130 degrees from the Pentland
Firth, the ships being in the area by 2 P.M. each day. Similar patrols
were ordered to be instituted from the Rosyth base. The enemy, however,
instead of mining the exit from the bases to the eastward, selected
the western approach to the Pentland Firth for the purpose, possibly
because of the considerable mercantile traffic using this route. The
patrols in this direction did not extend so far from the base, the sea
being very frequently too heavy in the winter months; the practice was
to search the route periodically for mines.
The weather early in January had been very bad, and both sweeping and
patrol work were impracticable. In these circumstances the enemy raider
_Moewe_, disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, which had probably
passed up the Norwegian coast and round the north of the Shetland
Islands, laid an extensive and very scattered mine-field between Cape
Wrath and a position about north from Strathie Point, on the Scottish
coast, on the night of January 1st or 2nd. The work of the _Moewe_ was
facilitated by the fact that the lights on Cape Wrath and Sule Skerry
Island were necessarily exhibited at night for the sake of the large
mercantile traffic using the Pentland Firth and the Minches.
On January 6th, at 7 A.M., the pre-Dreadnought battleship _King Edward
VII._, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, left Scapa for Belfast to refit,
and at 10.47 A.M., when in Lat. 58.43 N., Long. 4.12 W., a violent
explosion occurred under the starboard engine-room. Captain Maclachlan
first reported that the ship had been torpedoed, but later came to the
conclusion that she had been mined, as was eventually found to be,
undoubtedly, the case. The ship heeled at once to starboard, and both
engine-rooms filled. A strong westerly wind was blowing at the time
with a rising sea.
As soon as the report was received at Scapa the flotilla leader
_Kempenfelt_ and 12 destroyers were sent out to assist and to keep
the submarine under, if one were present. Tugs were also despatched.
Meanwhile the collier _Melita_, which had arrived on the scene,
proceeded to take the _King Edward VII._ in tow, assisted by the
_Kempenfelt_; but the ship was very low in the water and unmanageable,
and the tow parted. At 4 P.M., the battleship having by this time a
heavy list, Captain Maclachlan decided to abandon her for the night,
and the destroyers _Musketeer_, _Marne_, _Fortune_ and _Nessus_ were
taken alongside her in a heavy sea with great skill; they embarked all
hands without loss of life, although the destroyer _Musketeer_ received
considerable injury from projections on the side of the battleship.
The destroyer _Nessus_ and a tug stood by the _King Edward VII._ until
8.10 P.M. when she turned over and sank. The _Africa_, also of the
3rd Battle Squadron, _en route_ from Belfast to Scapa, passed safely
through the mined area a few hours before the _King Edward VII._ was
mined--a very fortunate escape!
Steps were at once taken to divert traffic from passing between Cape
Wrath and the Pentland Firth, and a large force of mine-sweepers was
detached to ascertain the limits of the mine-field and to sweep clear
a passage along the coast. The mine-sweepers were based, some on Loch
Eribol, an anchorage between Strathie Point and Cape Wrath, and some
on Scapa, but continuous bad weather interfered with the sweeping
operations to such an extent that, between January 7th and January
21st, no sweeping was possible except close in shore in sheltered
water. On January 14th a German mine drifted ashore in Dunnet Bay, near
Thurso, and any doubt as to the cause of the loss of the _King Edward
VII._ was thereby removed.
On January 7th the battleship _Albemarle_ left Scapa for Archangel,
and, on the 9th, Submarine D 7 left Blyth to operate in the Skagerrak;
she returned on the 16th, having met with no success.
On January 12th a very heavy north-westerly gale was experienced at
Scapa. The oiler _Prudentia_ drifted across the bows of the _Iron Duke_
during the night and sank, and one ammunition-ship, one store-carrier,
a tug and three trawlers went ashore. The wind registered 80 miles an
hour at the shore observatory during this gale. The _Iron Duke_ was
undamaged.
Between January 20th and 22nd three ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
on patrol suffered considerable damage from the heavy seas. The month
of January, as a whole, was indeed conspicuous for the exceptionally
bad weather prevailing in northern latitudes and over the whole North
Sea. Great injury was done to all the anti-submarine obstructions at
Scapa, many of them being entirely destroyed. In order to make the base
temporarily as secure as possible from submarine attack, the Fleet was
directed to make and lay improvised net obstructions.
On January 24 the destroyer _Talisman_ reported that a torpedo had been
fired at her off Blyth. The _Botha_ and 10 destroyers were sent out
from Rosyth to locate and destroy the submarine, but they saw nothing
of her.
On January 25th the _Ebro_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, picked up a
dismasted Norwegian sailing-ship and towed her to Lerwick, arriving on
the 28th.
On January 26th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with six destroyers,
and the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with five destroyers, left Rosyth
for operations in the Skagerrak. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and
destroyers, during daylight on the 27th, swept through the Skagerrak to
the Skaw, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron being in support. The ships
then moved to the northward; at daylight on the 28th, the whole force,
joined by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and three destroyers from
Scapa, spread on a line 210° from Udsire Lighthouse and again swept
into the Skagerrak. The squadrons then returned to their respective
bases. During the operations the remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet
was at short notice for steam. No suspicious vessels were sighted
outside territorial waters, but Commodore Le Mesurier, of the 4th Light
Cruiser Squadron, reported a stream of small vessels passing along the
Norwegian coast inside territorial waters.
On January 28th the senior officer of the mine-sweepers reported that
he had swept a clear channel along the north coast of Scotland from
Cape Wrath to Scapa, between the coast and the Whiten Bank mine-field
laid by the _Moewe_. This channel was instituted for warships only for
use in daylight. Mercantile auxiliaries were directed to steer to the
northward from Cape Wrath, thence to make Noup Head, on the north-west
coast of the Orkneys, passing afterwards down the west coast to Scapa;
all other vessels were ordered to pass through the Fair Island Channel
to their destination.
During the month of January gunnery practices were carried out, both in
the Moray Firth and in the Pentland Firth.
The operations of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were much restricted by the
bad weather experienced, the weekly average showing:
Number of ships intercepted, 21; number sent in, 8; number of ships on
patrol, 11; number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 10;
number on special service, 2.
Gales were experienced at Scapa or the neighbourhood on January 5th,
6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd,
24th and 30th. The weather during the month both at Scapa and in the
whole northern area was exceptionally severe, and seriously hampered
the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the movements of all small
craft.
Independent squadron exercises at sea by day and by night from the
various bases were continued in January, as was the change of base of
the Rosyth squadrons to Scapa and Cromarty for practices.
At 6 A.M. on February 1st the 1st Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers
left Scapa, steering towards the little Fisher Bank, whence the
destroyers returned to Scapa, and the squadron proceeded to sweep up
the Norwegian coast during daylight hours and thence to Scapa. These
sweeps up the coast were undertaken because it was considered probable
that enemy raiders, attempting to pass out of the North Sea, would hug
the coast on passage.
On February 2nd the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was at
sea endeavouring to intercept zeppelins returning from raiding our east
coast. The fishing trawler _King Stephen_ on this day sighted Zeppelin
L 19 in a sinking condition in the North Sea.
On February 5th Submarine D 8 left Blyth to operate off the Norwegian
coast. She returned on the 13th.
On February 7th the 7th Cruiser Squadron proceeded to a position about
150 miles to the south-eastward from Scapa for patrol during the night
and returned on the 8th, on which date the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried
out a similar patrol, returning on the 9th.
On the night of February 10th the 10th Sloop Flotilla, operating from
the Humber under the orders of the Rear-Admiral of the East Coast,
was attacked by enemy torpedo craft in the vicinity of the Dogger
Bank, and the _Arabis_ was sunk. On receipt of the news, and pending
further information as to the strength of enemy forces at sea, the
Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth during the night of the 10th–11th,
and proceeded to the southward; the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron sailed
from Harwich; and the remainder of the Grand Fleet left its bases at
Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth to rendezvous in the North Sea and move to
the southward. The situation became clear during the 11th, when it was
evident that the enemy’s force, which had consisted only of destroyers,
had returned to its base.
At 10.30 P.M. (the Battle Fleet being then in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 0.20
E.) orders were given for the Grand Fleet to return to its bases, and
the squadrons arrived on the 12th.
From the 17th to the 19th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the armed
boarding-steamers _Dundee_ and _Duke of Clarence_, from Scapa,
swept from that base to the Utvoer Lighthouse (Lat. 61.2 N., Long.
40.31 E.), thence down the Norwegian coast and to Rosyth, the armed
boarding-steamers returning to Scapa. The only vessels sighted were two
enemy submarines off the coast of Norway.
On February 18th the new battleship _Malaya_, the gift of the Federated
Malay States, arrived at Scapa and joined the 5th Battle Squadron.
On February 22nd Submarines D 7 and E 30 were sent to the Skagerrak to
examine and board merchant-vessels with a view to stopping the iron
ore trade from Narvik to Rotterdam. Armed guards were sent in the
submarines. They were ordered, during the latter part of their cruise,
to operate against two enemy submarines reported off the Norwegian
coast. They returned on February 28th, not having met, outside
territorial waters, the submarines or with any vessels which were
engaged in the iron ore trade.
On February 24th two divisions of destroyers were sent without result
to operate against a submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel.
On February 26th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 7th
Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and flotillas,
left Scapa before daylight for a watching and exercise cruise in the
northern part of the North Sea. A sweep to the Heligoland Bight,
in conjunction with the Harwich force, had been intended, but was
abandoned on receipt of a report from Commodore Tyrwhitt that the
weather and other conditions were unsuitable for his operations. Battle
exercises took place during the afternoon, and the Battle Cruiser
Fleet, which left Rosyth at 1.30 P.M. on the 26th, joined the Battle
Fleet at 8 A.M. next day. During that day further battle exercises were
carried out, including deployments of the whole Grand Fleet from its
cruising order, so that the battle cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers
and destroyers might become accustomed to taking up the stations
assigned to them on deployment under certain conditions. The exercises
were of considerable interest. The Fleet returned to its bases on the
28th.
During the absence of the Fleet from Scapa the mine-sweeping sloops
patrolled to the eastward of the Orkneys to prevent mine-laying in the
approaches to the base.
On February 28th dispositions were made to intercept any enemy vessel
that might be attempting to pass out into the North Sea. Information
from neutral sources had led to a belief in the possibility of such an
attempt being made. As was almost inevitable on such occasions, the
information was received after the event, that is, it was reported that
the vessel in question had already left German waters. The dispositions
were made, therefore, on this assumption, and in making them it was
necessary to place our vessels in areas which the enemy might be
expected to pass through in daylight.
The dispositions were designed to intercept the ship, whether her
mission were mine-laying near our bases, or an attempt to pass out
into the Atlantic. The _Patia_ and _Columbella_, of the 10th Cruiser
Squadron, were directed to patrol a line running north-east from Lat.
61.45 N., Long. 0.50 E., and ships of the same squadron on the C Patrol
line were directed to extend this line to the north-eastward. The
_Alcantara_ and _Andes_, of the same squadron, already on a special
patrol line, were ordered to remain in their position till further
orders. Two ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and four destroyers
left Rosyth at 8 P.M. on the 28th to patrol the area covering the
Farn Island--Skaw and the May Island--Skaw trade routes, working to
the eastward. Early on the 29th the _Comus_ and the _Calliope_, of
the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had sailed on the 28th with two
destroyers for areas in the vicinity of Lat. 58.38 N., Long. 2.30 E.,
and Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 3.0 E. respectively, were directed to patrol
lines 40 miles long, running 50° to 230° respectively from a position
in Lat. 61 N., Long. 1.10 E. The _Blanche_, which had also sailed, was
ordered to a position Lat. 61.30 N., Long. 0.0. The _Minotaur_ and a
destroyer were sent to patrol the Fair Island passage during daylight
on the 29th. Steps were also taken to cover the approaches to the
Pentland Firth against mine-laying.
At 8.55 A.M. on the 29th the _Andes_, Captain G. B. Young, R.N.,
reported by wireless that an enemy vessel was in sight in Lat. 61.58
N., Long. 1.8 E., and gave her course, speed and description; her
enemy character was assumed owing to her movements. The _Alcantara_,
Captain T. E. Wardle, R.N., was not at this time in sight of the
_Andes_, but sighted her at 9.10 A.M. chasing a strange vessel, joined
in the pursuit, and, at 9.15 A.M., being then about 6,000 yards from
her, ordered her to stop. She complied and informed the _Alcantara_
that she was the Norwegian s.s. _Rena_ from Rio to Trondjhem. She was
flying the Norwegian flag, which was also painted on her sides. At
9.40 A.M. the _Alcantara_, then about 2,500 yards on the quarter of
the stranger, began to hoist out a boat for the purpose of boarding.
At this moment the other vessel opened a heavy fire from her hitherto
concealed armament, throwing her Norwegian ensign and staff overboard
and hoisting a German ensign at the main. But she still showed the
Norwegian flag on her sides, where it was displayed throughout the
action. At the close range at which fire was opened hitting commenced
immediately, and as the first hits on the _Alcantara_ cut all her
communications, Captain Wardle experienced great difficulty in passing
orders to the guns. But the enemy’s fire was returned quickly and with
effect, in spite of the difficulty of communication. Both ships went
ahead and a hot action ensued; the enemy fired torpedoes, one of which
hit the _Alcantara_ between the boiler-rooms at about 10 A.M., causing
them gradually to fill.
By 10.15 A.M. the enemy was badly on fire and stopped. A few minutes
later, at 10.22 P.M., boats were observed to be leaving her and the
_Alcantara_ ceased firing. The latter ship was by this time listing
heavily and was abandoned shortly afterwards, sinking at 11.2 A.M. The
_Andes_, which had been engaging the enemy at a longer range than the
_Alcantara_, rendered assistance to the boats of the two ships.
On receipt of the first signal from the _Andes_, the _Calliope_,
_Comus_ and _Blanche_ had been ordered to the scene at full speed. The
_Comus_, Captain Alan G. Hotham, R.N., the nearest vessel, with the
destroyer _Munster_, arrived on the spot Lat. 61.48 N., Long. 1.40 E.,
as the _Alcantara_ was sinking. The _Munster_ picked up the crew of
the _Alcantara_, and as the enemy raider still had colours flying the
_Comus_ proceeded to sink her by gunfire and to pick up the survivors
in her boats. The _Calliope_ and _Magic_ arrived at 1 P.M., but, not
being required, returned to their patrol line. The enemy vessel turned
out to be the disguised raider _Grief_, armed with four 5.9-inch guns
and two torpedo tubes; she had a complement of 306, of whom 209,
including many wounded, were rescued by the _Comus_ and _Andes_.
The incident showed the great difficulty of carrying out blockade work
under modern conditions when dealing with an unscrupulous enemy. A
raider disguised as a neutral, and armed with torpedo tubes, is a most
difficult customer to deal with, and every neutral vessel had perforce
to be treated as “suspect” after an incident of this nature. It is not
possible to examine a vessel without boarding her, and, except in very
fine weather, it is necessary for the boarding ship to be close to
the suspected ship before lowering her boat, as the latter obviously
cannot pull long distances. The experience of the _Alcantara_ showed
the danger of closing the ship to be boarded. An attempt to solve
the problem was made by informing all neutrals that, when any of our
vessels displayed a certain signal, the ship to be boarded should steam
towards the boarding boat, this boat being lowered some distance away.
But, in order to carry this into effect, we were obviously dependent to
a large extent on the co-operation of neutrals, which was not always in
evidence.
Modern blockade work undoubtedly bristles with difficulties which did
not exist in the days of our forefathers, not the least being the
advent of the torpedo and the submarine. The German method of solving
such difficulties was to sink vessels at sight, but such methods did
not, and never will, appeal to the British mind, or to the mind of any
seaman belonging to the Allied nations.
During February, 1916, the somewhat shorter nights, combined with more
favourable weather, gave the 10th Cruiser Squadron better opportunities
for the blockade, and the average weekly results were: Number of ships
intercepted, 39; number sent in, 111; number of ships on patrol, 12;
number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number
detached on special service, 1.
Gales were experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on February
6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 14th. The usual exchange of bases for practices
and the independent squadron exercises at sea from the bases were
carried out during the month.
On March 1st a party of distinguished Russian gentlemen visited
the Fleet at Scapa Flow, leaving again in the evening. The party
included M. Danchenko, Count Alexis Tolstoy, M. Vladimir Nabakoff, M.
Bashmakoff, M. Yegoroff and M. Chukovsky.
On March 2nd the new battleship _Valiant_, a vessel of the “Queen
Elizabeth” class, arrived at Scapa and joined the 5th Battle Squadron.
Submarine D7 was despatched on March 5th to the Kattegat to intercept
trade and to ascertain the situation there on the chance of any enemy
vessels being found. She did not sight any enemy craft. On the same day
the 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth for a watching and exercise cruise
in the centre portion of the North Sea. On the 6th the remainder of
the Grand Fleet proceeded into the North Sea for a southerly sweep,
concentration being ordered to take place in the vicinity of the
“Long Forties,” the centre of that area being in Lat. 57.20 N. on the
meridian of Greenwich. The weather, however, became very unfavourable
for destroyers, and speed had eventually to be reduced to such an
extent that the sweep was abandoned, and the Fleet returned to its
bases on the 7th.
On March 9th a patrol consisting of one cruiser and one armed
boarding-steamer was instituted in an area north of the Shetlands.
It was designed to cover the track of vessels _en route_ between the
north of Iceland and a point on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity
of Stadlandet (Lat. 62.10 N., Long. 5.10 E.), as it was considered
probable that this route might be taken by enemy raiders as well as
by vessels attempting to evade the blockade. The patrol was continued
throughout the year, although occasionally modified in details and
frequently doubled in strength. It was eventually successful in
intercepting and sinking the German raider _Wolf_, in the spring
of 1917, the _Achilles_ (Captain F. M. Leake, R.N.) and the armed
boarding-steamer _Dundee_ (Commander Selwyn Day, R.N.R.) being the
vessels engaged in this operation. This patrol was also of use for
blockade work.
On March 11th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a division
of destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, left Rosyth at 7.30 A.M. for
operations off the Norwegian coast, the objective being the capture
of any enemy merchant-ships found outside territorial waters between
Ekersund and the Naze. It had been ascertained that some of the German
merchant-ships engaged in trade with Norwegian ports, and especially
Narvik, occasionally ventured outside territorial waters in this
locality. It was the only locality, besides the vicinity of Stadlandet,
in which they did so venture, and in which, therefore, there was a
chance of capturing them. The remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet
sailed later, on the 11th, for a position to the southward of the Naze
for supporting purposes. It was also intended that the remainder of the
Grand Fleet should be cruising in the neighbourhood. But an easterly
gale sprang up, which prevented the destroyers from accompanying the
Battle Fleet, and this portion of the programme was cancelled; Sir
David Beatty was informed that, if the weather conditions farther
south prevented his destroyers from screening the battle cruisers, the
latter should return to their base and a light cruiser squadron be
left to support the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The conditions being
unfavourable for destroyers, this course was adopted. The weather
eventually became too bad for the light cruiser squadrons to maintain
their speed, and the sweep, which was unproductive, was curtailed.
Submarine E30 proceeded into the Kattegat on March 14th to intercept
contraband trade and for reconnoitring purposes. She did not sight any
enemy vessels, but sent in one neutral vessel suspected of carrying
contraband.
The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was at sea on March 14th
and 15th, and the _Roxburgh_ and two destroyers left Rosyth on the 15th
for another sweep on the Norwegian coast from Udsire Lighthouse to the
Naze. This was again unproductive.
The cruiser _Theseus_ left Barry on the 15th for Alexandrovsk in the
White Sea. On the same date the cruiser _Crescent_, _en route_ from
Scapa to the south, was fired at and missed by a submarine south of the
Hebrides.
On the 19th the light cruiser _Calliope_, with two destroyers, left
the Tyne, where she had been refitting, with orders to proceed to the
Naze and sweep _up_ the Norwegian coast to Udsire; and the _Comus_
and two destroyers left Scapa to proceed to Udsire to sweep _down_
the Norwegian coast to the Naze, the object being again the capture
of any German merchant-ships found outside territorial waters in this
locality. The _Calliope_ was forced to put in to Rosyth owing to a
serious fire occurring in her after boiler-room. The _Comus_ completed
her sweep in bad weather without sighting any enemy vessels.
On March 24th the Harwich force sailed to carry out aerial operations
off the Danish coast, involving an attack on the enemy’s zeppelin
shed at Tondern, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet left early that day to
cover the operation. In the course of the operations the destroyers
of the Harwich force were stationed in positions to pick up returning
sea-planes, some of them being despatched to the southward of the Horn
Reef for this purpose. Some German outpost trawlers were encountered
here by the destroyers; they were engaged and destroyed. But during
the engagement the destroyer _Medusa_ was rammed by the destroyer
_Laverock_, being very seriously damaged. The _Medusa_ was taken in
tow, but, the weather becoming very bad, the towing hawser parted, and
all attempts to get her in tow again after dark failed. Our vessels
were in close proximity to the enemy bases, and it was evident that
the enemy would be aware of the incident by means of his directional
wireless system, since a good deal of wireless signalling on the part
of our ships had been necessary. It was expected, therefore, that he
would send out a considerable force of destroyers during the dark
hours to attack our vessels. In these circumstances, and in view of
the weather conditions, Commodore Tyrwhitt rightly judged it expedient
to abandon and sink the _Medusa_, and gave orders to this effect. The
ship’s company of the _Medusa_ was taken off in a most seamanlike
manner by Lieutenant-Commander Bullen of the _Lassoo_.
Owing to the bad weather and the darkness it was difficult for
Commander Tyrwhitt to ascertain the exact conditions, but during the
night of the 25th, having sent his destroyers ahead, he steered with
his light cruisers in order to pass to the northward of the enemy’s
North Sea mine-field. At about 10 P.M. two enemy destroyers were
sighted on the port bow of the _Cleopatra_ (flying Commodore Tyrwhitt’s
broad pennant) at a distance of about 800 yards. Their presence was
betrayed by the flame from their funnels; they were evidently part of
the force which, as anticipated, had been sent out by the enemy. The
_Cleopatra_ at once opened fire and headed for the destroyers, and when
it was seen that they were crossing from port to starboard, Captain
Loder Symonds of the _Cleopatra_ ported his helm and rammed the second
destroyer very neatly amidships, cutting her practically in half. There
was a tremendous crash, followed by what seemed to be two explosions,
one possibly a boiler explosion, and the second due to either a mine
or depth-charge, causing considerable damage to the stem piece of the
_Cleopatra_. The injury was subsequently found to be far too great to
have been caused by the impact alone. The sudden alterations of course
by the _Cleopatra_, combined with the gunfire and explosions, had
thrown the squadron into some confusion, and, although fighting and
navigation lights were all switched on very smartly, the _Cleopatra_,
in separating from the sinking destroyer, found herself across the
_Undaunted’s_ stem; the latter was somewhat seriously damaged, and
reported subsequently that she could only steam at slow speed. The
Commodore, therefore, remained near the _Undaunted_ for the night.
Meanwhile the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had left Rosyth on the 24th
to cover the operations, was in the vicinity of the Harwich force, and,
on the morning of the 26th, the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, except the
_Undaunted_, closed the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and the force swept back
towards her position, not sighting any enemy vessels. Three of the
light cruisers covered the _Undaunted_ during her passage to the Tyne,
where she was sent for repairs. Considerable difficulty was experienced
in locating the _Undaunted_, owing to a difference in “dead reckoning”
between the various ships. In order to be prepared for eventualities
the remainder of the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea during the night of
the 25th–26th, heavy snowstorms being experienced by both the Scapa
and Cromarty forces on leaving their bases; the visibility was also
very low; a heavy south-westerly gale sprang up when the snow ceased.
During the early afternoon of the 26th the wireless reports from the
Vice-Admiral of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, Commodore Tyrwhitt, and the
_Undaunted_ cleared up the situation, the latter ship reporting herself
as hove to until the weather moderated.
By 4.30 P.M., when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the “Long Forties,”
the sea had become so heavy and steep that destroyers with the Battle
Fleet could not safely steam at 10 knots, and, as the presence of the
whole Battle Fleet was no longer necessary in southern waters, and
the _Undaunted_ was approaching a safe area, the 5th Battle Squadron
was detached at high speed, without destroyers, to assist in covering
her passage back to the coast, and the remainder of the Battle Fleet
and cruiser squadrons were ordered back to Scapa and Cromarty. The
_Iron Duke_ convoyed the destroyer flotillas in order that they could
be given their position, as the coast was approached. The weather
moderated during the night, and the fleet arrived at its bases on the
27th. Two destroyers collided off Noss Head just before daylight on the
27th, one, the _Michael_, being somewhat seriously damaged.
By 8 A.M. on the 27th the _Undaunted_ was in Lat. 56.35 N., Long. 2
E., and the 5th Battle Squadron returned to Scapa, the Battle Cruiser
Fleet arriving at Rosyth on the 27th.
The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st and 7th Cruiser
Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and flotillas again proceeded
to sea on March 29th, for a watching and exercise cruise in the
northern part of the North Sea. Battle exercises were carried out on
the 30th. The Fleet returned to its bases on the 31st, the destroyers
having to return independently as they were unable to maintain Fleet
speed through bad weather conditions.
During March the system of carrying out target practice in the Pentland
Firth off Dunnet Head, instead of in the Moray Firth was regularly
instituted, and no further practices took place in the Moray Firth
during the year 1916. The new procedure proved to be most satisfactory
in every respect, no difficulty ever arising, except that of towing the
target in the strong tides of the Pentland Firth.
On March 19th the battleship _Hercules_, which had been laid up at
Scapa with a defective turbine for nearly six weeks, completed her
repairs. These were carried out with the assistance of artisans from
the engine contractors.
The usual visits to Scapa of the squadrons from Rosyth for the purpose
of practices continued.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s weekly average for March showed: Number of
ships intercepted, 43; number sent in, 11; number on patrol, 12; number
absent at bases, or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number on special
service, 1.
A great deal of fog, mist and snow was experienced during the month,
and the weather generally in northern waters was bad, gales occurring
on the 6th, 11th, 12th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th.
On April 2nd zeppelins reached the Firth of Forth and attacked Leith
and Edinburgh, but did not make any attempt on the Fleet at anchor. The
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was sent to sea in the hope of intercepting
some of them during their return passage, but saw nothing of them.
On April 3rd the _Devonshire_ and two destroyers left Rosyth and
proceeded to the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of Udsire lighthouse,
and swept thence to the Naze to intercept German merchant-ships, or
neutrals with contraband which might be found outside territorial
waters. One Swedish steamer was sent in; heavy traffic in territorial
waters was reported.
On April 5th three submarines left Blyth to operate against enemy
submarines on the route which it was thought was taken by them between
the Shetlands and Heligoland. They were directed to work on lines about
30 miles apart, zigzagging across the lines. They did not, however,
sight any enemy submarines. Anti-submarine operations of this nature by
the submarines attached to the Grand Fleet were carried out at frequent
intervals during the remainder of the year 1916 whenever any craft
were available for this purpose; the plan of operations was constantly
varied. The general scheme was to place our craft in positions through
which hostile submarines were expected to pass, or along the routes
which they usually took.
On April 6th the _Roxburgh_ left Rosyth with two destroyers, to repeat
once again the operation of sweeping down the Norwegian coast from
Udsire to the Naze. The search was again unproductive.
On April 12th the armed liner _Campania_ returned from a lengthy
refit at Liverpool, during which the ship had, at my request, been
provided with a “flying-off” deck for her sea-planes, as experience
throughout the War had shown conclusively that it was of little use
to depend on sea-planes rising from the water, except under the most
advantageous conditions, and that the only system which would give
reasonable certainty of the machines being able to get into the air
when required was to fly them from the ship. At the same time I
formed the conclusion, after consultation with Captain O. Schwann, of
the _Campania_, and pressed it upon the Naval Air Service, that the
sea-plane should be replaced by aeroplanes flown from ships, since
the weight of the floats of sea-planes greatly limited their climbing
powers, their radius of action and their speed. This alteration to the
_Campania_ was the commencement of the system, gradually introduced,
of providing light cruisers, battle cruisers and battleships with
scouting aeroplanes, which could rise from the ship under practically
all conditions. I make no apology for referring again to this subject
in view of its importance.
The _Campania_ had also been fitted to carry a kite balloon aft, for
use for spotting the fall of shot and for reconnaissance purposes. This
fitting was the beginning of the arrangement, gradually introduced
during 1916, of carrying kite balloons in capital ships. The success
in large ships led, before the end of the year, to their being also
provided for light cruisers, destroyers, and other small craft, an
arrangement which proved to be of great use for anti-submarine and
convoy work.
On April 17th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were
modified; “A” and “C” patrols took up a line running from Lat. 56.30
N., Long. 11.30 W. to Lat. 63.30 N., Long. 16.00 W., ships 40 miles
apart and steering 70° and 250°. Two ships were also stationed to the
northward of Iceland.
On April 20th a force left to carry out an extensive sweep into the
Kattegat, designed (1) to intercept and examine all mercantile traffic,
(2) to operate against enemy vessels in the Kattegat, (3) to engage any
enemy vessels drawn out from North Sea ports by the movements in the
Kattegat of the light forces, which it was intended should be sighted
from neutral shores in the expectation that they might be reported to
the enemy by his agents.
The force included three submarines, which were ordered to positions
commanding the northern entrance to the Sound, and the Great and Little
Belts, so that enemy forces drawn from the Baltic by the movement might
be engaged by them. On April 21st, however, it was decided to move
south to the vicinity of the Horn Reef with the whole Grand Fleet,
the object being to induce the enemy to keep the ships of the High
Sea Fleet in North Sea ports instead of sending them to the Baltic,
where they might cause interference with the relaying the Russian
mine-fields, an operation which became necessary at this season of the
year after the ice had broken up. It was thought that the appearance
of the Grand Fleet in the vicinity of the Heligoland Bight would
probably effect this object better than the operation in the Kattegat.
Consequently the Grand Fleet left its bases on the 21st, with orders
for the battle and cruiser squadrons to concentrate on the morning of
the 22nd in a given position to the eastward of the “Long Forties,”
whilst the Battle Cruiser Fleet took station some 40 miles ahead of the
Battle Fleet in its cruising formation. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd
Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were ordered to an area from which they
could concentrate later, with the remainder of the Battle Fleet, if
required.
At 2.30 P.M. of the 22nd the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was detached,
with three destroyers, to proceed to the Skagerrak, with directions
to arrive in the vicinity of the Skaw by daylight on the 23rd, and to
sweep out to the westward. The Battle Cruiser Fleet was ordered to
push ahead, and at 6 P.M. of the 22nd was in Lat. 56.11 N., Long. 5.26
E., cruising in an area north-west of the Horn Reef until daylight,
when it was intended to steer for the Horn Reef, provided the weather,
which had become misty, was sufficiently clear. The Battle Fleet, with
cruiser squadrons disposed ahead, steered to the eastward from Scapa
until shortly before dark, and then altered course to South 18 East for
the Horn Reef, to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet by daylight on the
23rd.
The weather had been gradually thickening since 3 P.M., and at 6 P.M.
Sir David Beatty reported that the _Australia_ and _New Zealand_ had
collided in a fog and had received damage necessitating both ships
returning to their base. By 10 P.M. the Battle Fleet and cruisers
were also in a dense fog, which continued throughout the night. It
was undesirable to close the Danish coast under such conditions with
so large a Fleet; the Battle Fleet, cruisers and destroyers, when to
the westward of the Little Fisher Bank, were accordingly turned to the
northward, the order of turning being rear squadrons first and thence
to the van, so as to reduce the danger of collision. Special signals
had been introduced to provide for such circumstances, and were of
great use on this occasion.
In spite, however, of this precaution, some difficulty was experienced
in carrying out the turn in the dense fog that prevailed, especially
amongst the destroyers, and three of them, namely, the _Garland_,
_Ardent_ and _Ambuscade_, were in collision; the _Ardent_ was so
seriously damaged forward that it became necessary to tow her back to
a repairing-port, stern first. During the night a neutral steamer,
in passing through the Fleet in the fog, collided with the battleship
_Neptune_, doing considerable injury to that ship.
The weather cleared somewhat during the morning, and the Fleet cruised
to the westward of the Little Fisher Bank until it was certain that
the damaged destroyers were safely on their way to their bases. The
operations were then abandoned, as the conditions were unsuitable, and
the destroyers had not sufficient fuel to admit of the Fleet remaining
out for a further twenty-four hours, so as to repeat the sweep to the
Horn Reef on the following day.
The whole Fleet returned to its bases during the 24th, fuelled, and
again proceeded to sea for another movement south during the evening
of that day, the 5th Battle Squadron being sent on in advance of
the remainder of the Battle Fleet in order to gain touch with and
strengthen the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was, of course, short of the
_Australia_ and _New Zealand_, damaged in collision.
At 4.6 A.M. on the 25th, however, whilst steering to the southward, a
report was received from Commodore Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the
Harwich force, that he had sighted enemy battle cruisers and light
cruisers in Lat. 52.24 N., Long. 1.57 E. This report at once influenced
the direction of the sweep, and the Battle Fleet increased to full
speed, and shaped a course to pass down the searched channel to the
westward of the German mine-field to support the Battle Cruiser Fleet
and the 5th Battle Squadron, which proceeded at full speed on a course
designed to intercept the enemy battle cruisers during their expected
return passage to their ports. At 4.20 A.M. the Admiralty informed me
that the enemy was bombarding Lowestoft, and that the 5th Light Cruiser
Squadron was in touch with the enemy’s ships; and at 5.40 A.M. the
Aldeburgh wireless station reported enemy battle cruisers in sight
steaming to the eastward.
At 11 A.M. the _Iron Duke_, with the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, was
in Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 0.0; the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser
Squadron were about 35 miles and the 5th Battle Squadron about 70
miles to the southward, the Battle Cruiser Fleet being well to the
south-eastward in the direction of Terschelling, and, as appeared
later, having evidently only just barely missed cutting the enemy off
from his base. The Battle Fleet stood on to the south-eastward until
the afternoon, when it became evident that the Germans had escaped to
their bases, and the Fleet then turned to the northward and shaped
course for the bases, arriving on the 26th.
On returning, my opinion was asked by the Admiralty as to the steps
which could be taken to minimise the danger of a recurrence of such
raids on unfortified towns on the south-east coast as that of the 25th.
Although they inflicted no military damage, they were undoubtedly a
great annoyance owing to the alarm of the inhabitants, and might result
in much loss of life. I suggested that the placing of the 3rd Battle
Squadron in the Humber or in the Thames might act as a deterrent,
and in any case would make it necessary for the enemy to bring heavy
ships, which would give us an opportunity of inflicting injury by
submarines or by the ships of the Grand Fleet, if, by good fortune,
we happened to be cruising sufficiently far to the southward at the
time. The presence of the squadron in southern waters would be useful,
also, in the unlikely event of landing raids, and would provide a good
backing to the Harwich force, although the difficulties of movement,
due to the frequent mine-laying by enemy submarines in southern waters,
were considerable. I pointed out that since the arrival of the 5th
Battle Squadron and the other new ships, the 3rd Battle Squadron was
no longer required to strengthen the Grand Fleet; the ships of the
“Revenge” class were also approaching completion. The proposal was
adopted, and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron sailed
for the Humber on the 29th, _en route_ to the Medway. On that port the
3rd Battle Squadron was based in future, the ships of the 3rd Cruiser
Squadron being gradually withdrawn for service in foreign waters. The
Admiralty also stationed some of the monitors in the more important
undefended ports.
During the month of April a policy, suggested by me, of placing the
Captains (D) in flotilla leaders instead of in light cruisers, was
adopted. This was made possible by the completion of several vessels of
the class. The object was to add the light cruisers thus released to
our all too slender light cruiser force.
The average weekly figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron during April
were:
Number of ships intercepted, 40; number sent in, 10; number of ships on
patrol, 12; number absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9;
number on special service, 1.
A very considerable amount of mist and fog was experienced during the
month, and gales on the 8th, 16th and 24th.
On May 2nd forces left for an aerial operation in the vicinity of the
Horn Reef. The operation was covered by the Grand Fleet. One of its
objects was, as before, to attract the attention of the enemy’s naval
forces to the North Sea. Even if no enemy force were actually drawn
out, it was expected that the presence of the Grand Fleet in southern
waters would soon become known to the enemy from neutral sources, with
the result that vessels of the High Sea Fleet, intended for operations
in the Baltic, might be detained in, or brought back to, North Sea
ports. From information obtained subsequently from reliable sources, it
appeared that the operation produced the intended result. Between the
afternoon of May 2nd and daylight on the 3rd the Fleet left its bases.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with 16 destroyers convoying the
sea-plane-carriers _Vindex_ and _Engadine_, proceeded to a position
just north of the Horn Reef, arriving at dawn on May 4th; the objective
of the sea-planes was the zeppelin sheds at Tondern. The mine-layer
_Abdiel_ proceeded to lay mines on the night of the 3rd–4th to the
southward of the Vyl Lightship on the expected track of enemy vessels
_en route_ to the North Sea via the Horn Reef. The mine-layer _Princess
Margaret_ was directed to lay mines on the same night across the
expected route taken by enemy vessels if coming out along the route
passing the West Frisian Islands. Both mine-fields were completed
without any interference on the part of the enemy.
Three submarines were sent to positions off the Horn Reef, three
to positions off the Vyl light vessel, and three to positions off
Terschelling, to arrive on the evening of the 3rd.[E]
[E] Two of our submarines collided while submerged off the Horn
Reef, one being slightly damaged.
The Battle Cruiser Fleet and destroyers proceeded to a position for
supporting the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, near the Horn Reef, with
directions to arrive at daylight on the 4th, and the Battle Fleet,
with its cruiser squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the
destroyer flotillas, to a supporting position to the northward of
the Battle Cruiser Fleet. The list of ships absent from the Fleet on
this occasion, owing to refit, repair, or to being engaged on other
operations, is given below; it is useful as showing the reduction that
takes place in the nominal numbers comprising a watching fleet at any
given moment: Battleships, _Ajax_ and _Dreadnought_; battle cruisers,
_New Zealand_, _Australia_, _Invincible_; cruisers, _Black Prince_,
_Warrior_, _Donegal_; light cruisers, _Southampton_, _Gloucester_,
_Blonde_; destroyers, 3 from the 1st Flotilla, 6 from the 2nd Flotilla,
3 from the 11th Flotilla. During the passage south, the 4th Light
Cruiser Squadron was detached to endeavour to locate a zeppelin
reported by directional wireless to be in the centre of the North Sea
(zeppelins had been seen off the north-east coast on the night of the
2nd). The search was unsuccessful, but the zeppelin descended off
Stavanger later and was destroyed.
On the morning of the 4th the conditions for sea-planes seemed from the
Battle Fleet to be ideal, but, once more, the difficulty of getting
these machines to rise from the water was experienced, a slight sea
being sufficient to prevent all, except one, from carrying out the
attack. This one sea-plane reported having dropped bombs on the
objective. The remainder were damaged by the sea.
At 10 A.M. a zeppelin, L 7, was sighted by the 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron and attacked by gunfire by the _Galatea_ and _Phaeton_. She
was damaged sufficiently to cause her to descend near submarine E 31 in
the vicinity of the Vyl Lightship. E 31 completed her destruction and
rescued seven survivors.
[Illustration: OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF MAY 2^{ND.} TO 5^{TH.} 1916.]
The Fleet cruised in the vicinity of the Horn Reef during May 4th, no
enemy vessels being sighted, and then returned to its various bases.
A thick fog was experienced during the return passage, which was made
without incident; the Cromarty force was, however, taken to Scapa,
as a submarine had been reported off Tarbet Ness in the Moray Firth.
On May 9th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa to carry out
another sweep on the Norwegian coast between the Naze and Udsire
Lighthouse. The squadron was divided, two ships proceeding to the Naze
and two to Udsire, arriving in position at daylight on the 10th and
then sweeping towards each other. One neutral steamer, carrying iron
ore for Lübeck, was intercepted outside territorial waters and sent in.
On the same day the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for Scapa,
searching the central portion of the North Sea _en route_.
On the 9th, 11th and 13th the ships on the northern patrol off the
Shetlands moved in to Stadlandet for a short period, on the chance of
intercepting ships outside territorial waters.
On the 14th an unsuccessful search for a reported submarine was carried
out to the south-east of the Pentland Firth.
On the 15th Submarines D 7 and E 30 left for the Kattegat to operate
at the northern end of the Sound and off Anholt Island. One German
merchant-steamer was intercepted and sunk outside territorial waters
off the Kullen on the 22nd by E 30. On the 18th another submarine was
sent to operate off Goteberg in Sweden. She returned on the 25th, not
having sighted any enemy vessels.
On the same day a reliable report was received that an exceptionally
large force of enemy submarines was now operating in the North Sea,
and additional precautions were taken at all the bases to strengthen
the patrols and to protect inward- and outward-bound vessels. The
Vice-Admiral of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was warned to be ready to
move all his patrol lines to given alternative positions, and on the
19th was directed to move his ships to the most western of these
lines. Precautions against mine-laying by submarines were also taken,
and the waters to the eastward of the “Long Forties,” through which the
Fleet usually passed when on passage south, were examined by the Fleet
mine-sweepers, protected by destroyers, on the 21st and subsequent
days. These vessels searched without result on the 22nd for a submarine
which was being chased by a patrol vessel in this neighbourhood.
On the 21st the _Donegal_ and two destroyers were sent to the vicinity
of the entrance to Bergen to intercept a steamer which, it was thought,
had passed through the 10th Cruiser Squadron blockade during a fog. The
ship however, called later at Kirkwall, and the force was recalled.
On the 23rd the first of a series of deep mine-fields in the Moray
Firth, which I had requested might be laid with the object of catching
enemy submarines, was placed in position by the mine-layer _Biarritz_.
On the 24th the _Donegal_ and an armed boarding-steamer were sent to
patrol off Stadlandet with a view to intercepting ships engaged in the
iron ore trade from Narvik. This, as before stated, was one of the few
positions at which ships were obliged for navigational reasons to leave
territorial waters.
On the 24th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, which had
been at Rosyth, left for another search off the Norwegian coast from
the Naze to Udsire, and thence to Scapa. The search was unproductive.
On the 26th two submarines were despatched to operate against enemy
submarines off the Norwegian coast, and, on the same date, the 1st
Light Cruiser Squadron, with six destroyers, left, via the searched
channel, to carry out a reconnaissance to the southward of the German
North Sea mine-field. The squadron proceeded as far east as Long. 6 E.,
but, unfortunately, sighted nothing.
The _Broke_ and 12 destroyers left on the 27th to search for a
submarine reported to have been sighted to the eastward of the Pentland
Firth, and returned on the 28th, not having seen her; but on the
27th Trawler Unit No. 42, working from Peterhead, reported having
engaged and sunk a submarine at 12.45 P.M. in Lat. 57.10 N., Long.
1.20 E., thus adding one more success to the record of this patrol. On
the 30th Fleet-sweeper _Gentian_ was missed, in a position about 40
miles due east of the Pentland Firth, by a torpedo fired evidently by
the submarine that had been hunted on the 28th. A half flotilla and
sea-planes were sent out to search, and a submarine was sighted at 3.45
P.M. near the position given, but she dived and got clear away.
The movements of the Fleet between the time of leaving and returning to
the bases in connection with the Battle of Jutland are given in Chapter
XI., but some mention may be made of an incident which occurred on the
night of May 31st. A report was received at Scapa that an enemy raider
might be attempting to escape into the Atlantic. The Vice-Admiral of
the 10th Cruiser Squadron was directed to assume a patrol north of the
Shetlands in accordance with a plan which had been pre-arranged to meet
such a case. On June 3rd, after the return of the Fleet to its bases,
light cruisers were sent out to patrol to the north-westward of the
Orkneys, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron was then directed to fall back
to a position farther west to form a second patrol line. Nothing came
of the matter.
During the month of May the weekly average results of the 10th Cruiser
Squadron showed: Number of vessels intercepted, 55, besides 17
trawlers; number sent in, 18; number of ships on patrol, 11; number
absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; number on special
service, 2.
A good deal of fog and mist was experienced during the month, the worst
periods being from the 17th to the 20th, 24th, 26th, and the 28th to
30th.
During the month of May the firing exercises in the Pentland Firth
continued, as did the usual exchange of bases between squadrons.
During the months of March, April and May, a flotilla of submarines had
been gradually organised as a unit of the Grand Fleet. It was named
the 11th Submarine Flotilla, was based on Blyth, with the _Titania_ as
parent ship and the _Talisman_ and _Trident_ as attendant destroyers.
Separate spheres of activity for the Grand Fleet submarine flotillas
and for the submarine flotillas based on Harwich and Yarmouth were
also arranged, the dividing line running from a position a little
to the southward of the Horn Reef to Flamborough Head. The line was
subsequently slightly altered once or twice as the strength of the
Grand Fleet submarine flotillas increased, but the general principle
was that the Grand Fleet submarines worked to the northward of such a
line and the remaining submarines to the southward.
It may not be out of place here to mention the organisation for
getting the Grand Fleet to sea from its bases to any desired point of
concentration with rapidity and safety, and of bringing the Fleet back
into the bases in face of probable submarine or mine attack.
As the Grand Fleet increased in size, and the danger from mine and
submarine grew, so the problem of leaving Scapa Flow and re-entering
that base with safety became more complicated. The necessity for the
Fleet leaving harbour in the shortest possible time and with the
fewest possible number of signals was obvious. Similarly on returning
the various squadrons had to enter the base with the least practicable
delay in order to avoid giving submarines engaged in watching the
approaches an opportunity for getting into positions for attacking
the squadrons in rear, after having sighted those in the van. The
operations, both of departure and entry, were rendered all the more
difficult owing to the very strong and erratic tides experienced in the
Pentland Firth, while all ships navigating at night had to be navigated
without showing lights.
The usual method of departure from Scapa was as follows: A “Preparatory
Signal for leaving Scapa” consisting of one word was made as soon as
I decided to take the Fleet to sea. On receipt of this “Preparatory
Signal” all ships raised steam for 18 knots at two hours’ notice.
Patrol destroyers were recalled by the Commodore (F) for refuelling.
All officers and men absent on patrol duty in drifters were also
recalled, and every preparation was made for leaving harbour. The
Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands warned the outer patrols
that the Fleet might be leaving shortly.
Whilst the Fleet was raising steam in readiness to be off at two hours’
notice a signal was made which indicated the time at which the first
squadron to leave was to move ahead from the anchorage, together with
the speed to be maintained after passing the submarine obstructions.
No further signals were necessary. The organisation provided for the
order in which squadrons were to leave, as well as the interval between
squadrons or divisions, which in daylight was usually one mile from the
rear ship of one squadron, or division of four ships, to the leading
ship of that following, or two miles at night. The organisation also
provided for successive squadrons or divisions being taken alternately
north or south of the Pentland Skerries if the Fleet proceeded to the
eastward, in order that the interval between those following the same
course might be increased.
In the strong tides, particularly at night, some such procedure had to
be adopted, because the tide was not felt until the ships were clear of
Swona Island, and then the effect of it, if running to the westward,
and particularly at the period of spring tides, when it has a speed of
10 knots, was to bring a leading squadron or division back on top of
that in rear of it. Frequently also a ship, emerging from slack water
into the strength of the tide, would be caught by the tide on the bow,
and, unless the greatest possible care was taken to watch the steering
(and even sometimes in spite of every care), the ship would be turned
round through 8, 12 or even 16 points,[F] becoming a danger to those
astern of her, as she would be almost unmanageable for a time. Such a
situation on a dark night, with a large fleet showing no lights, was
not pleasant, and it speaks well for the skill shown in handling the
ships that no accident occurred from this cause.
[F] 8 points = 90 degrees.
The practice in regard to the destroyers, when they accompanied the
Fleet (as was necessary after the first twelve months of war), was
for the various groups which were detailed by the Commodore (F) to
screen the squadrons or divisions of the heavy ships, to meet them
just outside the submarine obstruction and screen them from there in
daylight, or on moonlight nights, and to form astern on dark nights, in
readiness to re-establish the screen at daylight. In the early days of
the War, and indeed for the first eighteen months, the practice was for
the destroyer flotillas to be stationed some 10 miles from the Battle
Fleet at night in order to avoid any chance of their being sighted and
mistaken for enemy destroyers; but this procedure caused considerable
delay in forming the submarine screen at daylight, and in thick weather
the destroyers frequently experienced difficulty in finding the Battle
Fleet. Consequently, it became the practice to keep the destroyers
actually in company at night, and this procedure was undoubtedly
preferable.
After the various squadrons had passed the Pentland Skerries, the
organisation provided for their taking certain defined routes; the
usual practice was to use three routes with the squadrons divided
between them, the routes being about seven miles apart.
A concentration point, which the squadrons would reach at the ordered
speed shortly after daylight, was given in the departure signal, and
the squadrons closed in on this point at the appointed time, so that
the whole Battle Fleet, including detachments coming from Cromarty,
was concentrated shortly after daylight, with the cruisers in their
assigned positions scouting ahead.
The organisation of the Battle Fleet provided for the strongest
squadron being on the eastern flank, because it was considered that the
enemy would invariably make towards his bases if touch was gained, and
it was desired to have our strongest squadron in the van.
The “departure” organisation was carefully worked out by my Staff and
very minutely described in the Grand Fleet orders. It was most useful,
the whole Fleet, comprising frequently 50 or more battleships, cruisers
and light cruisers, and as many as 50 destroyers, being in daylight
under weigh in one hour, and clear of the harbour in an hour and a half
after the signal was made to proceed; on dark nights this time was
lengthened by half an hour.
When returning to Scapa Flow, the usual practice was for the time of
entry to be arranged so that the leading squadrons passed the Pentland
Skerries shortly before dawn, in order to minimise the danger from
submarine attack; but it was not, of course, always possible to arrange
the time of entry in this manner. In returning to Scapa, when the
arrival was thus timed for dawn, the different squadrons were disposed,
as a rule, in two separate lines, the lines being some five miles apart
and the squadrons in each line having an interval of about three miles
between them. One line would enter the Pentland Firth by passing north
of the Pentland Skerries and the other by passing south of these rocks,
the object being to confuse any enemy submarines that might be watching
the approaches, and also to get the Fleet into the Firth as quickly
as possible, as once in the tideway there was little to fear from
submarine attack.
If the Fleet entered Scapa Flow during darkness, the ships anchored
in the centre of the Flow in certain specified berths, and waited for
daylight before taking up their berths in the Fleet anchorage; towards
the end of my period of command, however, coloured lights were arranged
to be placed as leading-marks for the Fleet anchorage, so that ships
could proceed to their final berths under all conditions.
As regards mines, an exploratory search of the channel intended to be
used was always carried out, if time permitted, before the Fleet left,
and similarly before it returned. Three channels were used, each some
7 to 10 miles in width--one passing up the east side of the Orkneys,
one running to the eastward from the Pentland Skerries, and one passing
down the Scottish coast for a short distance and then to the eastward.
Usually the second of these channels was used.
The principal difficulty with which we had to deal when leaving or
returning was fog. In a really dense fog there was great risk in
attempting to leave Scapa with a large fleet, owing to the strong tides
to be encountered in the Pentland Firth, and nothing but the gravest
emergency would have justified the attempt being made. If it became
really necessary, an organisation had been provided to meet the case,
and the attempt would have been made. The interval between the various
squadrons would have been considerably greater, and the time occupied
in leaving would have been correspondingly increased.
The conditions for leaving the other two fleet bases, Cromarty and
Rosyth, were, of course, simpler, owing to the absence of the very
strong cross-tides, but fog was even more prevalent at Rosyth than
at Scapa, and the operation of leaving with a considerable number of
ships was not at all an easy one. It was skilfully performed under
difficulties on very numerous occasions and with remarkable freedom
from accident during my period of command. The approach to the Firth
of Forth in thick weather was difficult, and many anxious moments were
experienced in making the land when the position of the ships had not
been accurately ascertained by sights for some time before approaching
the base. These approaches could have been mined by the enemy with
great ease by surface ships had they been sufficiently enterprising,
and it was a standing wonder to me that the attempt was never made.