THE DOGGER BANK ACTION
Developments in the intelligence system at the Admiralty, initiated at
the outbreak of war by Rear-Admiral Henry F. Oliver, the Director of
the Intelligence Division, and an improvement in the efficiency of our
directional wireless stations and of wireless telegraphy generally, led
to our being able to obtain more reliable knowledge of the movements of
enemy vessels. The result was that it had become unnecessary towards
the end of 1914 to keep the Fleet so constantly at sea in anticipation
of enemy movements. It was very desirable to spare the ships to
some extent since it was increasingly evident that the War would be
prolonged, and we had already had several warnings that the strain of
constant sea work was telling on the efficiency of the machinery. Two
very disquieting examples of this were the failure of condenser tubes
on a large scale, particularly in the battleships, and the trouble
developing in the boilers of a very considerable number of light
cruisers.
The problem of training personnel was also beginning to prove serious.
In order to commission the large number of new ships which had been
laid down since Lord Fisher, full of energy and ideas, had taken up
the office of First Sea Lord (the number, of all sorts, building and
projected, being more than 600), it became evident that it would be
necessary to remove trained men from the Grand Fleet and to replace
them with boys or untrained landsmen. Under these conditions the
individual efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work, as
well as in such matters as signalling (visual and wireless) and the
other factors which are essential in a fighting ship, could only be
maintained if we could spend sufficient time in harbour, during which
regular instruction could be given; this instruction to be followed by
frequent practices under way, in conditions where the ships would not
be liable to attack by enemy submarines, and need not, therefore, be
screened by the overworked destroyers. The organisation for carrying
out this work at Scapa Flow was, therefore, greatly elaborated.
Steps were taken to start a school for training young wireless
operators at Scapa, first on board each ship, and, later, in a
specially fitted merchant ship. The want of wireless operators had
been most seriously felt since the War began. In addition to the needs
of new warships of all classes in this respect, the requirements for
merchant ships, trawlers and other patrol craft were immense and
could not be met. In this branch of instruction Lieut.-Commander
R. L. Nicholson, the Fleet wireless officer on my staff, carried out
invaluable work in organising and starting the school. The training of
young ratings in visual signal duties was also taken in hand vigorously
under Commander A. E. Wood and the signal officers of the Fleet. The
Grand Fleet became, in effect, a great school for turning out trained
personnel for the Navy as a whole, whilst still keeping watch over the
High Sea Fleet, and controlling the North Sea and its northern exit,
thus carrying out its rôle as the centre and pivot of the whole naval
side of the War.
Early in 1915 the subject of the instruction and education of the
midshipmen also exercised my attention. On mobilisation all the cadets
had been removed from Dartmouth and sent to sea, with their training,
of course, very incomplete. During the first months of the War, when
the ships were either at sea or, if in harbour, were coaling, it was
impossible to give these young officers any regular instruction, and,
whilst they were learning much that would be invaluable to them in
the future, it was evidently highly desirable that their systematic
education should be continued as far as was possible during a war.
Steps were accordingly taken in this direction. The first essential
was to obtain naval instructors for the ships carrying midshipmen. The
policy of the Admiralty, for some years before the War, had been to
reduce gradually the number of naval instructors afloat, the idea being
that the training at the Colleges and on board the training cruisers
rendered the presence of instructors at sea unnecessary. I never held
this view personally, but, in any case, it was clear that, as the
cadets had gone to sea with less than half their course completed,
further instruction at sea was necessary. The specialist officers
afloat could not undertake this work under war conditions and strong
representations were, therefore, made to the Admiralty on the subject.
Eventually a number of gentlemen were entered specially for this
instructional work and, after a short course of training in navigation
at Greenwich, were sent to the Fleet, where their work proved to be of
great value to the rising generation of officers.
The blockade was becoming daily more effective, although the blockading
cruisers worked at so great a distance from the German coast. The only
interference ever attempted by the enemy was by submarine attack or
by mines, and during the year 1915 no great success was achieved by
them in this respect when the conditions are considered. The regular
blockading squadron, the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was assisted in its
work by the sweeps of our cruisers and light cruisers, accompanied
occasionally by the Battle Fleet. In addition to the discharge of
these duties, the Battle Fleet engaged in periodical cruises, during
which battle exercises were carried out for the purpose of maintaining
efficiency in the handling of the ships and squadrons and of giving
the fresh officers, who were frequently joining the Fleet, to replace
others required for the new ships, experience in the work of the Grand
Fleet under the novel war conditions.
Pursuant to this general policy, the Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained
in harbour until January 10th, and then left for a cruise to the
westward of the Orkneys and Shetlands. Gunnery practices were carried
out by day and at night, as well as battle exercises, and the Fleet
returned to Scapa during the day and the night of the 13th. The 3rd
Battle Squadron left Rosyth on the 12th for a cruise in the North Sea,
and on the night of the 13th–14th passed to the westward of the Orkneys
for gunnery practice, returning to Rosyth on the 15th.
Other events of interest during the first fortnight of January were
the return of the _Princess Royal_ from North American waters on the
1st; a short cruise in the centre of the North Sea by the 1st Battle
Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron between the 3rd and
the 5th, and by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron between the 6th and the 8th;
a cruise by the 1st Cruiser Squadron to the westward of the Orkneys
between the 4th and 6th, and by the 6th Cruiser Squadron between the
6th and the 9th, and the 10th and 14th. On January 4th the _King George
V._ completed the work of retubing her condenser.
On the 9th all ships at Scapa raised steam ready for leaving, in
consequence of a report of a submarine being sighted in Hoy Sound, and
available destroyers and trawlers were sent to patrol in the vicinity
of the Hoy anti-submarine Fleet obstructions until the Battle Fleet
left harbour on the 10th.
Gales were experienced at Scapa on the 1st, 13th, 16th and 19th of
January.
On January 15th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted,
under Vice-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore, K.C.B., whose flag was
transferred from the _Leviathan_, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, to the
_New Zealand_; the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron then comprised the _New
Zealand_, _Indomitable_ and _Invincible_ (the last not having yet
arrived). Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., took command of
the 1st Cruiser Squadron in place of Sir Gordon Moore, flying his flag
in the _Defence_, which took the place of the _Leviathan_; the latter
vessel was transferred to the 6th Cruiser Squadron. Rear-Admiral A. C.
Leveson, C.B., relieved Sir Robert Arbuthnot as Rear-Admiral in the 2nd
Battle Squadron, flying his flag in the _Orion_.
On the 17th the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for a cruise in the centre and southern
portions of the North Sea, and on the 19th, at dawn, arrived in
position Lat. 55 N., Long. 5.30 E. to support Commodore Tyrwhitt in
carrying out a reconnaissance in Heligoland Bight. Nothing was sighted
beyond an airship and a sea-plane, and the force was ordered to return
to its bases and arrived during the night of the 20th–21st.
On the 18th the Admiral commanding at Queenstown reported that a
German mine had been washed ashore at Portrush, as well as bodies and
wreckage, apparently belonging to the _Viknor_, an armed merchant
cruiser of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. Anxiety had been felt as to the
safety of the _Viknor_ for two or three days owing to no reply to
wireless signals being received from her, and the ships of the 10th
Cruiser Squadron had been directed to search for her. The report from
Portrush pointed to the probability that she had struck a mine off the
north coast of Ireland, either in the _Audacious_ minefield or a field
further to the southward, and had been lost with all hands in the very
heavy weather prevailing at the time in this vicinity. All traffic
round the north of Ireland was stopped until sweepers were able to
examine the whole area.
At this time a large number of German mines were being constantly
reported both in the North Sea and on the west coasts of Scotland and
Ireland, having evidently broken adrift from their moorings in the
heavy weather which had been generally prevalent. These mines, which
were not safe when adrift, as provided for under The Hague Convention,
were a source of some danger to ships, particularly at night. On the
18th the battleship _Superb_, having developed defects in one of her
turbines, was sent to Portsmouth. She was absent from the Fleet until
March 11th.
On January 19th, the orders for the 10th Cruiser Squadron (blockading
squadron) were somewhat modified by me; the new centre lines of patrol
positions being:
Patrol A.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 62.20 N., Long.
10.0 W.
Patrol B.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 61.10 N., Long.
1.15 E.
Patrol C.--A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 59.40 N., Long. 9.0
W.
Patrol D.--Eastern line of patrol to be 80 miles in the direction
335° from St. Kilda.
The ships were ordered to patrol on east and west courses on each side
of the centre line at a speed of at least 13 knots by day, zigzagging.
At the same time four ships were directed to carry out a special patrol
of the Norwegian coast between the parallels of 62 N. and 62.20 N.
This patrol was maintained until the 22nd. As indicating the growing
work of the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the efficiency of
the blockade, the Rear-Admiral of the 10th Cruiser Squadron reported
on January 18th that 80 ships had been intercepted by his squadron
since December 26th, 52 of which were eastward-bound. The strength
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 21 ships, exclusive of
the _Viknor_, the loss of which ship with her fine ship’s company was
deeply regretted.
A patrol to the eastward of the Pentland Firth was at this period
being worked by the _Sappho_ and five armed boarding-steamers, which
were supported at night by one or two cruisers or light cruisers as
necessary.
The _Monarch_ returned from being repaired at Devonport on the 20th.
Temporary repairs to the _Conqueror_ had been completed about January
18th, but the ship was detained pending more favourable weather
conditions; on the 21st she left for a southern dockyard, escorted by
four destroyers. On clearing the Pentland Firth, however, she found
that the sea was too heavy for the passage to be made with safety in
her damaged condition, and the ship returned to Scapa, where further
work was taken in hand and it was decided that it would be necessary to
dock her in the floating-dock at Invergordon to effect more permanent
repairs for the passage south than could be carried out by divers at
Scapa. She reached Invergordon on January 24th.
On January 23rd the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st
Light Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth left for a sweep in the southern
portion of the North Sea, in conjunction with the Harwich force. The
remainder of the Grand Fleet acted in support. The 1st and 2nd Battle
Cruiser Squadrons (except the _Queen Mary_, which was absent refitting)
and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed to a rendezvous, where
the Commodore (T), with available destroyers and light cruisers, was
ordered to meet them.
The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were ordered to the
vicinity of the battle cruisers’ rendezvous.
The _Iron Duke_, the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st,
2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron,
available destroyers of 2nd and 4th Flotilla (a total of 28 destroyers)
left Scapa during the evening of the 23rd and proceeded towards the
same rendezvous.
At 7.20 A.M. the _Aurora_, of the Harwich force, reported that she was
in action with enemy vessels; at 7.30 A.M. Sir David Beatty reported
enemy battle cruisers and cruisers in sight in Lat. 54.53 N., Long.
3.32 E., steering east. At 7.55 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, commanding
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported his position as Lat. 55.10
N., Long. 3.32 E., and enemy vessels in sight, consisting of battle
cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers, steering between south-east
and south. On receipt of these reports the Battle Fleet increased to 19
knots speed, and steered to support the battle cruisers, and the 3rd
Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which were further to the
southward, were ordered to steer for Heligoland at full speed, to act
in immediate support. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was also sent on
ahead at full speed to join the other forces.
The proceedings of the force under Sir David Beatty are best described
in his report given in an Appendix.
During the early part of the engagement Sir David Beatty kept me
informed of his position and proceedings, but at 11.30 A.M. a report
was received from Sir Gordon Moore that he was heavily engaged with the
enemy battle cruisers in Lat. 54.21 N., Long. 5.4 E. The fact that this
report was made by this officer caused me some uneasiness at first, as
it implied that the _Lion_ could not signal, but as the Rear-Admiral
made no mention of any casualty to the _Lion_, I concluded the cause
was some breakdown in her wireless arrangements and that all was well.
At 11.50 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, commanding the 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron, reported the enemy steering south-east at 25 knots, and at
noon that he had lost touch with them; at 12.5 P.M. Rear Admiral Sir
Gordon Moore reported that he was retiring north-west, and, later,
north-north-west, that the _Blücher_ was out of action, and that the
remaining enemy battle cruisers were out of sight; he added that the
_Lion_ had hauled out of action. He gave his position as Lat. 54.19 N.,
Long. 5.22 E.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet’s position at noon was Lat. 56.29 N.,
Long. 3.22 E., with the cruisers 15 miles ahead and the 2nd Light
Cruiser Squadron ahead of the cruisers. At 1.15 Rear-Admiral Moore
reported in reply to my enquiry that Sir David Beatty was on board the
_Princess Royal_, that the _Lion_ was damaged and detached; Sir David
Beatty then reported that the _Lion’s_ speed was reduced to 12 knots,
that the _Blücher_ had been sunk, and two other enemy battle cruisers
seriously damaged, and that he was covering the retirement of the
_Lion_, which was steaming with her starboard engine only.
The hit which disabled the _Lion_ was a piece of luck for the enemy.
At 2 P.M. Vice-Admiral Bradford, commanding the 3rd Battle Squadron,
reported that he was turning to the northward, having all the battle
cruisers in sight. The 3rd Battle Squadron was sighted from the _Iron
Duke_ at 3.30 P.M., and stationed on the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. Sir
David Beatty had meanwhile directed the _Indomitable_ at 3.38 P.M. to
take the _Lion_ in tow, and this operation was effected by 5 P.M. At 4
P.M. the _Iron Duke’s_ position was Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 4.7 E., and at
4.30 P.M. the battle cruisers were in sight from the _Iron Duke_. The
Battle Fleet then turned to the northward, keeping in company with the
battle cruisers until dark.
At 7 P.M. the _Lion’s_ starboard engine became disabled and the speed
was still further reduced.
At dusk the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and all destroyers of
the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with the Battle Fleet, except those vessels
which were short of fuel, had been detached to assist the remaining
destroyers in screening the _Lion_ and her escort against destroyer and
submarine attack. The heavy ships, battleships and battle cruisers,
stood to the northward to be clear of torpedo attack. The night passed
without incident, the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons joining the
battle cruisers during the darkness. Wireless messages were sent on the
24th to the Senior Naval Officer, Tyne, to send out tugs to meet the
_Lion_, and this was done.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet and the battle cruisers remained cruising
in the North Sea during daylight on the 25th, except the 3rd Battle
Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which were detached to Rosyth at 8
A.M.
[Illustration: MOVEMENTS FROM JAN^Y. 23^{RD}. TO 25^{TH}. 1915.]
During these operations many floating mines were sighted and sunk.
The battle cruisers proceeded to Rosyth at dusk, and the Battle Fleet
to Scapa, except the _Iron Duke_ and _Centurion_, which were sent to
Cromarty, the _Iron Duke_ to dock and refit and the _Centurion_ to act
as “stand by” Fleet-Flagship during the refit. The _Lion_ arrived at
Rosyth at 6.35 A.M. on the 26th in a dense fog and was taken up harbour
for temporary repairs, the _Assistance_ being sent from Scapa to Rosyth
to help in the work. The main injury to the _Lion_ was caused by two
hits under water, which pierced the feed tank and displaced an armour
plate; the permanent repairs were completed on the Tyne, the work
being carried out by the aid of coffer dams, there being no dock there
capable of taking the ship. Her casualties consisted of 11 men wounded.
The only other battle cruiser that received injury was the _Tiger_, in
which ship Engineer Captain Taylor, a most valuable officer, and five
men were killed, 11 being wounded; the material damage to the ship was
slight.
The enemy, as the result of this action, suffered the total loss of the
_Blücher_; and two battle cruisers, the _Derfflinger_ and _Seydlitz_,
sustained severe injuries, a serious fire or explosion occurring in
one of the after turrets of one ship, which put that, or possibly both
after turrets, out of action and caused a large number of casualties
amongst the crew. It was ascertained at a later date from German
prisoners that the condition of one, if not of both ships on return
to harbour was very serious; the casualties, as well as the material
injury, were heavy. It was stated subsequently that the _Derfflinger_
had 60 killed and 250 wounded, and the _Seydlitz_ about 100 killed.
One of our destroyers, the _Meteor_, was damaged in the action, but
was towed back to port and repaired.
On the 26th the 6th Cruiser Squadron was reconstituted and composed of
the _Drake_, _Leviathan_ and _Cumberland_, and a 7th Cruiser Squadron
was formed under the command of Rear-Admiral A. W. Waymouth, consisting
of the _Minotaur_ (flagship), _Hampshire_ and _Donegal_. The 1st and
6th Cruiser Squadrons were sent to Scapa, and the 2nd and 7th to
Cromarty.
The _Britannia_, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, grounded in the Firth of
Forth in the fog on her way back to Rosyth, was ashore for 36 hours,
and suffered considerable damage, necessitating repairs at a dockyard.
On the 27th January the 1st Cruiser Squadron and a division of
destroyers sailed to cruise in the centre portion of the North Sea and
returned on the 30th, being relieved by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. On
January 28th the battle cruisers _Princess Royal_ and _Queen Mary_,
with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, left Rosyth to support operations
being carried out in the Heligoland Bight by Commodore Tyrwhitt and
Commodore Keyes on January 30th and 31st. Owing to fog the operations
could not be carried out, and the force returned to its bases on the
30th.
A report of a submarine inside Cromarty Harbour on the 29th caused
ships to raise steam preparatory to leaving, and all small craft to
search for the submarine, but on investigation it was considered that
the report was unreliable.
On January 30th enemy submarines appeared in the Irish Sea, one of them
opening fire on Walney Island, where the works of Messrs. Vickers,
Limited, are situated. At about this date, owing to marked enemy
submarine activity in the Irish Sea, the ships of the 10th Cruiser
Squadron were directed to coal temporarily at Loch Ewe instead of at
Liverpool, and two divisions of Grand Fleet destroyers were detached to
the Irish Sea to assist in hunting the submarines.
During January the number of drifting German mines in the North Sea was
very considerable. Many were sighted and sunk by the Fleet when at sea;
the 2nd Cruiser Squadron alone, when on patrol on the 30th and 31st
January sinking 12 mines.
At the end of January the condition of the Grand Fleet was as follows:
BATTLE FLEET
_Iron Duke_, Fleet-Flagship, refitting.
_1st Battle Squadron_:
7 ships (_Superb_ was away).
_2nd Battle Squadron_:
6 ships (_Conqueror_ was unserviceable).
_4th Battle Squadron_:
7 ships (complete).
_3rd Battle Squadron_:
6 ships (_Commonwealth_ and _Britannia_, refitting).
_1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
2 ships (_Lion_ was effecting temporary repairs;
the _Tiger_ refitting).
_2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
1 ship (_Indomitable_ refitting after a fire, due to defective
electric circuits).
_1st Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (complete).
_2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
3 ships (_Natal_ refitting).
_3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
3 ships (_Roxburgh_ refitting).
_6th Cruiser Squadron_:
3 ships (complete).
_7th Cruiser Squadron_:
3 ships (complete).
_1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (complete).
_2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (_Liverpool_ refitting).
_2nd Flotilla_:
11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea).
_4th Flotilla_:
11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea).
The shortage of destroyers at this period was exceedingly marked.
During February the Battle Fleet remained in harbour. No enemy
movements took place or were expected as several changes were
being made in the High Sea Fleet commands; the principal of these
was the relief of Admiral von Inghenol by Admiral von Pohl as
Commander-in-Chief. It was anticipated that the new Flag officers would
exercise their squadrons in order to become familiar with them before
attempting any operations.
The opportunity was taken of refitting the _Iron Duke_, and the ship
remained at Invergordon, in the Cromarty Firth, until February 23rd.
It was becoming desirable to give the officers and men of the Battle
Fleet some change from Scapa Flow, where there were no opportunities
for landing for exercise or recreation, and arrangements were made by
which battle, as well as cruiser squadrons should visit Invergordon
periodically for this purpose. The 2nd Battle Squadron accordingly
arrived at this base on February 24th.
During the first half of February, 1915, eight destroyers were absent
from the Grand Fleet flotillas, working in the Irish Channel against
submarines, leaving only a total of 20 to 22 available for the Fleet;
an insufficient number for screening purposes. This deficiency made it
desirable to keep the Battle Fleet in harbour, except in an emergency.
The enemy’s submarine activity became much more marked during February.
Early in the month the German Admiralty proclaimed that after February
18th all the waters round the British Isles would be declared unsafe
for merchant-ships of all nationalities, and intimated that Allied
merchant-ships would be destroyed in these waters and that neutral
merchant-ships ran similar risks. Enemy submarines began to operate
in increasing numbers in the English Channel, to the westward of the
English Channel, in the Irish Sea and off the west coast of Ireland, as
well as on the east coast of England, and the losses of merchant-ships
from submarine attack became serious. The destroyers of the Grand
Fleet that remained at the northern bases were kept fully employed in
searching for and hunting reported submarines.
In addition to the maintenance of the blockade by the 10th Cruiser
Squadron, cruiser and light cruiser squadrons carried out various
patrol and search operations during the month. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron
cruised in the centre portion of the North Sea from February 1st to
3rd; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron cruised off the Shetland Islands from the
11th–13th, then swept down the Norwegian coast and returned to Cromarty
on the 15th; the new 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron carried out a sweep in
the southern portion of the North Sea between the 16th and 20th with
destroyers in company; the new 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron cruised to
the westward of the Shetlands for exercise between the 15th and 18th,
then passed into the North Sea and swept to the southward, returning
to Scapa on the 20th; the 1st Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the 17th
for the vicinity of the Norwegian coast, swept down towards the Naze
and then returned to patrol north of the Shetlands until the 21st, when
the squadron arrived at Scapa; the four light cruisers attached to the
Battle Fleet, _Bellona_, _Blanche_, _Boadicea_, and _Blonde_, with four
destroyers, left Scapa on the 18th for a line N. 37 E. 60 miles long
from Lat. 57.30 N., Long. 0.30 W., with directions to sweep towards the
Naze by day and patrol the line at night; they remained on this duty
until the 21st. The 7th Cruiser Squadron cruised to the westward of the
Fair Island Channel from the 19th to the 22nd, and available destroyers
of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were patrolling to the eastward of the
Fair Island Channel and the Moray Firth respectively during the same
period.
The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left Rosyth on the 23rd
to cover the Fleet mine-sweepers whilst searching for mines along a
projected Fleet track in the North Sea, but, the sea being too heavy
for mine-sweeping, the squadron carried out a patrol instead until the
25th, when the mine-sweeping operations took place, lasting until the
27th, when the squadron returned to Rosyth.
This searching mine-sweep was carried out because of the increasing
probability of the enemy laying mines intended to catch our heavy
ships when proceeding towards the southern portion of the North Sea,
and the consequent necessity for a periodical examination of a route
which the Fleet could traverse with some safety. This policy was
maintained throughout the period of my command, alternative routes
being periodically examined; although it was obviously impossible to
carry out this examination frequently, it did afford some chance of a
mine-field being discovered before serious losses were sustained by the
Fleet.
During the month of February a reorganisation of the battle cruiser
and light cruiser squadrons was carried out by Admiralty orders, and
a “Battle Cruiser Fleet” instituted under the command of Sir David
Beatty, with the title Vice-Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet.
The organisation was as follows:
_Lion_, Fleet-Flagship.
_1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
_Princess Royal_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock), _Queen
Mary_, _Tiger_.
_2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
_Australia_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham), _New
Zealand_, _Indefatigable_.
_3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
_Invincible_ (to be Flag), _Inflexible_,[D] _Indomitable_.
_1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
_Galatea_ (Broad pennant of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair),
_Cordelia_, _Caroline_, _Inconstant_.
_2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
_Southampton_ (Broad pennant of Commodore W. E. Goodenough),
_Nottingham_, _Birmingham_, _Lowestoft_.
_3rd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
_Falmouth_ (Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), _Yarmouth_,
_Gloucester_, _Liverpool_.
[D] The _Inflexible_ had not yet joined by the end of February.
The Battle Cruiser Fleet remained an integral portion of the Grand
Fleet. In some respects the term “Fleet” was an unfortunate selection,
as it implied, incorrectly, an independent organisation. On my taking
office as First Sea Lord at the end of 1916, the title was altered to
the more appropriate one of Battle Cruiser Force.
The _Australia_ joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Rosyth on February
17th, and the _Invincible_, having concluded the very successful
operations in the South Atlantic under Sir Doveton Sturdee, which
culminated in the destruction of Admiral von Spee’s Squadron of
cruisers and light cruisers, arrived at Scapa for gunnery practices
during the latter part of February, and joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet
at Rosyth early in March; the _Indefatigable_ also arrived on the 24th
from the Mediterranean.
The _Tiger_ arrived in the Tyne on February 1st for refit, and left
again on the 8th. The _Lion_ reached the Tyne for repairs on February
9th, remaining there for the remainder of the month. The strength of
the destroyer force working with the Grand Fleet was increased on
February 19th by the addition of the light cruiser _Fearless_ and two
divisions of destroyers from the 1st Flotilla. These vessels had been
relieved at Harwich by new destroyers of the “M” class. This addition
brought the destroyer force actually with the Grand Fleet up to a total
of 48, and further additions were now gradually made from the 1st
Flotilla at Harwich as new destroyers were completed to relieve them.
His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet on February 27th by
visiting the ships based on Rosyth.
In the course of February the destroyers of the “River” or “E”
class, based at Scapa for local defence, were replaced, by Admiralty
directions, by destroyers of the “C” class (old 30-knot type). This
change, although dictated by the general naval situation, limited
considerably the range of activity of the local defence vessels, owing
to the poorer sea-going qualities of the destroyers of the “C” class.
During the month the destroyer _Erne_ was wrecked off Rattray Head
on the Aberdeen coast, and became a total loss; the _Goldfinch_ went
ashore in a fog in the north of the Orkneys and was also lost; the
_Sparrowhawk_ also went ashore, but was got off, though considerably
damaged. The armed merchant-cruiser _Clan McNaughton_, of the 10th
Cruiser Squadron, was lost with all hands during the month, the
supposition being that she foundered in one of the numerous heavy
gales. Although a prolonged search was carried out, only a certain
amount of wreckage was found. The loss of this ship and her efficient
ship’s company brought once more into prominence the excellent work
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the risks to which the ships were
subjected.
The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were daily increasing, and
the number of ships passing the blockade line unexamined was becoming
very small. During one week in February sixty-seven vessels were
intercepted and eighteen of them sent in with prize crews on board.
During February the old battleships _Hannibal_ and _Magnificent_ were
relieved as guard-ships by the old cruisers _Crescent_ and _Royal
Arthur_.
Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee succeeded Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas
Gamble in the command of the 4th Battle Squadron during the month;
Admiral Gamble’s period of command had expired. Sir Doveton Sturdee,
who had served as Chief of the Naval Staff early in the War, came to
the Fleet fresh from his Falkland Islands victory.
The weather at the northern bases during February was less boisterous
than usual. There was a good deal of misty and foggy weather in the
early part of the month, and a considerable amount of snow towards the
end.
During March the principal movements of the Fleet were as follows:
From the 4th to the 10th, the 6th Cruiser Squadron was, with the
_Orotava_ of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, cruising off the Norwegian
Coast.
From the 7th to the 10th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was cruising in
the northern portion of the North Sea, accompanied by the 1st, 2nd,
and 7th Cruiser Squadrons and the 4th Flotilla; and the Battle Cruiser
Fleet was also cruising during the same period in the central part
of the North Sea. The opportunity was taken of carrying out various
battle exercises. The 2nd Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser Squadron did
not return with the remainder of the Battle Fleet on the 10th, but
remained at sea until the 11th. The 4th Flotilla was forced to shelter
at Lerwick from the 7th to the 9th owing to bad weather. From March
10th to the 13th the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were
cruising in the centre portion of the North Sea.
From the 16th to the 19th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet again cruised
in the northern and central parts of the North Sea, accompanied
by the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadron, and the 2nd Flotilla. The 2nd Flotilla, however, could not
remain at sea on the 17th owing to bad weather and was sent back to
Scapa. A collision occurred between the _Nemesis_ and _Nymphe_, which
necessitated the docking of both vessels for repairs. The flotilla
was ordered out again from Scapa early on the 18th, but only seven
destroyers were available, and they reached the Fleet at 2 P.M. on that
date.
The Battle Fleet and cruisers carried out a strategical exercise in
the early morning of the 18th, and then steered for the bases, a
projected second exercise being abandoned as the Fleet was by this time
in an area which was not considered safe from submarine attack; the
visibility was also very high, and it was suspected that at least one
enemy submarine might be in the neighbourhood.
At noon the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 58.21 N., Long. 1.12 E.,
zigzagging at a speed of 15 knots, and the 4th Battle Squadron had just
been detached to proceed to Cromarty, when at 12.18 P.M. Vice-Admiral
Sir Cecil Burney commanding the 1st Battle Squadron signalled that a
submarine’s periscope had been sighted from the _Marlborough_, the
leading ship of the port wing column, and that a torpedo fired by the
submarine had passed just astern of the _Neptune_, the rear ship of the
column. The Fleet was at once turned away from the submarine 12 points
to starboard (ships turning together) and speed was increased to 17
knots.
At 12.30 P.M. the 4th Battle Squadron was crossing under the stern
of the remainder of the Battle Fleet and signals were being made
to Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee to steer clear of the position
in which the submarine was sighted, but before any movement was
effected the officer of the watch, Lieutenant-Commander Piercy, of the
_Dreadnought_ of that Squadron, sighted a periscope close to, one point
on the port bow, the submarine apparently steering a southerly course
and zigzagging. Captain Alderson, commanding the _Dreadnought_, at once
altered course direct for the submarine, increased speed, followed,
and rammed her. The bow of the submarine came out of the water and her
number, U 29, was plainly visible. She sank immediately. The _Blanche_,
which passed close to the spot, reported a large quantity of wreckage,
one article of clothing and much oil and bubbles on the surface, but no
survivors.
It seems probable that the captain of the submarine, after firing at
the 1st Battle Squadron, was confused by the movements of the 4th
Battle Squadron crossing astern of the remainder of the zigzagging
Fleet, at high speed, and in trying to get clear failed to observe the
_Dreadnought_ until too late. The _Dreadnought_ was admirably handled.
On arrival of the Fleet in harbour I wired to the Admiralty urging that
the fate of U 29 should be kept secret. The secrecy regarding the loss
of this submarine, commanded by Commander Weddingen, was much resented
in Germany, and many accusations of treacherous conduct levelled at the
British, probably in the hope that we might give information as to her
fate. The policy of secrecy was certainly correct, as it left the enemy
entirely ignorant of our methods, and possibly had some effect of the
moral of the submarine crews.
The Fleet steered to the eastward until well clear of the area in case
other submarines were present, and then shaped course for the bases,
arriving on the 19th.
On March 29th the Grand Fleet left its bases with the intention of
carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, but the plan was abandoned and
the Fleet returned to its bases on the following day.
The principal movements of destroyers during March, additional to the
regular patrols and fleet movements, were as follows:
From March 2nd to March 5th search was made by a half flotilla for a
number of oil drums reported as moored in certain areas in the North
Sea. The report indicated that the enemy might be refuelling submarines
in this manner; the search disposed of the supposition.
From March 8th to March 10th the Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland,
Sir Robert Lowry, in conjunction with Vice-Admiral Bradford, who was
the Senior Flag Officer of Grand Fleet ships at Rosyth, and was,
therefore, responsible for all movements of these ships from the Rosyth
base, organised a search on a large scale for a submarine reported to
be operating off the Aberdeenshire coast. The vessels employed in this
operation comprised trawler patrols and destroyers of the 1st Flotilla,
and they were rewarded on March 10th by forcing the submarine--U 12--to
the surface, when H.M.S. _Ariel_, very skilfully handled, succeeded in
ramming and sinking her. Ten of her crew of twenty-eight were rescued.
The _Ariel_ was considerably damaged, and was docked at Leith for
repairs.
On March 20th and 21st a division of destroyers hunted a submarine in
the Moray Firth without success.
On March 12th the _Faulknor_ and six destroyers were detached from the
Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against submarines in the Irish Sea.
In the course of the month the small steamers, specially fitted as
mine-sweepers for the Grand Fleet, were withdrawn for service abroad.
The increasing number of mines in the North Sea and the paucity of
mine-sweepers led me to decide on March 22nd to fit eight destroyers
each from the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with light mine-sweeps, and the
work was taken in hand. These vessels were intended to augment the
regular force of mine-sweepers in an emergency, as it was felt that a
movement of the High Sea Fleet for an important naval operation would
in all probability be preceded by extensive mine-laying outside the
Fleet bases, and a much stronger sweeping force than we possessed was
required to enable a passage for the Fleet to be rapidly cleared.
The _Conqueror_ rejoined the Fleet on March 6th after effecting repairs
which had been carried out by Messrs. Cammell Laird at Liverpool with
most commendable rapidity.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron experienced a further loss during March, the
_Bayano_ being sunk by a submarine off Corsewall Point, Galloway, on
March 11th, with considerable loss of life.
In the course of this month Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant succeeded
Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham in command of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron,
the latter succeeding Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon Moore in command of the
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron; Vice-Admiral Patey transferred his flag
from the _Australia_ to the _Leviathan_ to proceed to the West Indies
as Commander-in-Chief, and the 6th Cruiser Squadron was broken up, the
ships being transferred to service abroad.
The enemy submarines were very active against merchant shipping during
March, and our losses were considerable, both from this cause and from
mines.
During March the weather at the northern bases was not very boisterous,
but a great deal of mist and fog was prevalent during the first
fortnight, and during the last fortnight snow fell on at least seven
days. An average of fifty-six ships per week was intercepted by the
ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month.
During April, 1915, intended Fleet movements were prevented on several
occasions by bad weather, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron and other ships
at sea experienced exceptional gales; the principal movements carried
out were as follows:
From the 5th to the 8th the 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron
and five destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the North Sea
(central portion), and from the 5th to the 9th the Battle Cruiser Fleet
with eight destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the northern
portion of the North Sea.
On April 8th the _Lancaster_, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, and the
_Caribbean_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, were detached to watch the
Norwegian coast between Lat. 62 and 64 N.
On April 11th the whole Grand Fleet proceeded to sea; the Battle Fleet
met the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth,
and cruised in the centre portion of the North Sea during the 12th
and 13th, returning to the various bases on the 14th to fuel. The
opportunity was taken of carrying out battle exercises.
Whilst the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was passing down east of the
Orkneys at 2.30 P.M., and was being met by the 2nd and 4th Flotillas,
which had come out to screen the ships in, the _Neptune_ reported
having sighted a submarine’s periscope, but as the Fleet was steaming
at 18 knots and the destroyers were taking up screening stations it was
not considered that successful attack was probable, and the Fleet held
its course for Scapa.
Submarines were also sighted during the day by the _Antrim_ in Lat.
57.18 N., Long. 1.2 E., and by the Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 58.15
N., Long. 2.40 E., but no successful attack resulted.
The Grand Fleet proceeded to sea again for a sweep in southern waters
on the 17th, and at 8 A.M. on the 18th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet,
with the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser Squadrons looking out ahead and the
2nd and 4th Flotillas screening, was in Lat. 57.25 N., Long. 1.4 E.,
steering at 18 knots’ speed for a position in Lat. 56.30 N., Long.
3.30 E., where it was intended to meet the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd
Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth.
The junction took place at 4 P.M., the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which
had been ordered to a position a little farther south, arriving there
at this time. No enemy vessels having been sighted, the whole Fleet
was turned to the northward shortly before dusk, when in the vicinity
of the Little Fisher Bank, to the westward of Northern Denmark.
During the night the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron
were detached to return to Rosyth, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas to
Scapa; the Vice-Admiral, Battle Cruiser Fleet, was directed to cruise
independently on the 19th; and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the
1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, proceeded to the eastward of the
Shetlands; target practice was carried out during daylight of the
19th and the night of the 19th–20th, and the Battle Fleet returned to
its bases at Scapa and Cromarty during the night of the 20th–21st and
fuelled. During the cruise the _Achilles_, of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron,
reported sighting a submarine at 2.40 P.M. on the 18th.
On the 19th the _Albemarle_ and _Russell_, of the 6th Battle Squadron,
which had rejoined the 3rd Battle Squadron from the Channel ports, were
detached from Rosyth to Scapa for practices.
The Grand Fleet again proceeded to sea on the night of the 21st for
another sweep towards the Danish coast, and at 8 A.M. on the 22nd
the forces from Scapa and Cromarty, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 4th
Battle Squadrons, _Russell_ and _Albemarle_, 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser
Squadrons, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, were in position Lat. 58.4
N., Long. 0.27 E.
At 4.30 P.M. the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron joined
the Commander-in-Chief, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet took station ahead
of the cruiser screen. At dusk no enemy ships had been sighted and the
Fleet turned to the northward again, the _Iron Duke’s_ position being
Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 4.53 E.
The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and the Battle Cruiser
Fleet were detached to return to Rosyth during the night, and the
remainder of the Fleet arrived at the Scapa and Cromarty bases on the
23rd.
During these two southerly sweeps the Fleet sighted a large number of
neutral steamers and trawlers which were closely examined, but nothing
suspicious was found, although the interception of German wireless
messages, when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the trawlers, raised
suspicions that they were acting as look-out vessels; this suspicion
was strengthened by carrier pigeons being sighted from various ships.
One Norwegian steamer which was found to be carrying magnetic ore to
Rotterdam was sent to the Firth of Forth.
Movements of interest of individual ships during April included the
arrival of the _Lion_ at Rosyth on the 7th after completion of all
repairs, the arrival of the new Battleship _Warspite_, of the “Queen
Elizabeth” class, at Scapa on the 13th, and the commissioning on the
26th of four more mercantile vessels to join the 10th Cruiser Squadron.
The _Invincible_ was sent to the Tyne to change some of her 12-inch
guns, which had become worn during the Falkland Island engagement.
On April 10th Rear-Admiral Tottenham succeeded Rear-Admiral Waymouth in
command of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, the latter officer’s health having
unfortunately broken down.
On April 7th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were
rearranged somewhat in view of the lengthening of the days:
Patrol Area A was north of the Faroes, the centre line being
occasionally shifted.
Patrol Area C had as its centre a line from Cape Sydero in
the Faroe Islands to Lat. 58.30 N., Long. 8.0 W.
Patrol Area E was north of Iceland.
Patrol Area F was south of Iceland.
Patrol Area G had as its centre the meridian of 3° E. Long.
between Lat. 62 N. and 63½ N. A cruiser was sent to
strengthen the patrol in this area.
During the month the average number of vessels intercepted weekly by
the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was 68, of which an average
number of 23 was sent in weekly for examination.
Enemy submarines were very active in April, and destroyers were sent
out frequently from the Fleet bases to endeavour to destroy craft
reported in the vicinity--particularly in the neighbourhood of the
Fair Island Channel--but no success was achieved, except in the case
of the _Ariel_ and U 12. The look-out and navigational arrangements
for the Pentland Firth were improved during April by the establishment
of telephonic communications between Scapa and the Island of Swona.
Arrangements were also gradually perfected for obtaining the exhibition
of all navigational lights and fog signals in the Pentland Firth on
demand by our ships at all times. The weather at Scapa during April was
bad.
Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th. There
was a great deal of mist and fog during the latter part of the month as
well as a moderate amount of snow.
The enemy laid a large mine-field in the middle of the southern portion
of the North Sea during April, thus pursuing the policy which it was
expected he would adopt, regardless of the interests of neutrals.
Fortunately, information as to its existence was obtained in time
to prevent any of our ships from falling victims to the mines. But
the mine-field was undoubtedly well placed strategically so as to
interfere with the freedom of movement of our Fleet in southern waters
if it were endeavouring to bring the High Sea Fleet to action, since
it necessitated our ships making a wide detour to the eastward or
westward to reach the waters to the southward of the mine-field; it was
doubtless laid with this object in view.
In May the Grand Fleet flotillas were much occupied in endeavouring
to locate and destroy enemy submarines, and the movements of the
heavy ships were curtailed during the month owing to the absence of
destroyers for the purpose of acting as a submarine screen.
The principal work of the destroyers in this connection--officers
and men showing a fine spirit in carrying out what were frequently
fruitless searches--was as follows:
_May 1st–3rd._--The 2nd Flotilla was engaged in operations against
enemy submarines reported, first, in the Fair Island Channel and,
then, to the eastward and south-eastward of the Pentland Firth. The
flotilla did not succeed in gaining touch with the submarines.
_May 5th–7th._--One half of the 1st Flotilla was searching for a
submarine off the Aberdeenshire coast, without result.
_May 7th._--One division of the 2nd Flotilla was acting against a
submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel, and then proceeded
to work down the shipping route west of the Hebrides and Ireland in
the hope of catching a submarine attacking trade.
_May 8th._--Half the 4th Flotilla was searching for submarines off
the east coast of the Orkneys.
_May 10th–11th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching
for a submarine reported to be off North Ronaldshay; later, this
division was reinforced by all available destroyers from Scapa,
with orders that the force was to continue the search during the
night, burning searchlights to assist the work and cause the
submarine to submerge, thus exhausting her battery power.
_May 13th._--Six destroyers were searching for a submarine reported
west of Thurso.
_May 15th._--A division of the 1st Flotilla left Rosyth to operate
against a submarine off Aberdeen.
_May 16th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching for a
submarine reported approaching the Fair Island Channel.
_May 19th–20th._--A division of the 4th Flotilla was acting against
a submarine reported west of the Orkneys.
The principal Fleet movements during the month were:
_May 2nd to May 5th._--Two forces, each consisting of two light
cruisers and eight destroyers, were engaged in carrying out a
thorough examination of all vessels, especially fishing craft, found
in the areas usually traversed by the Fleet during southerly sweeps
in order to ascertain whether any were acting as German look-out
ships under neutral colours. A considerable number of vessels were
examined, especially trawlers, and some were sent in for more detailed
examination at the bases, but nothing incriminating was discovered.
Between May 5th and 10th the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser
Squadron cruised in the northern portion of the North Sea, being
screened out from Rosyth by a half flotilla. On the return towards
Rosyth in Lat. 56.49 N., Long. 0.39 E., and before being met by the
screening destroyers, the 3rd Battle Squadron, two torpedoes were fired
by a submarine; they were aimed apparently at the _Dominion_, but both
missed. The squadron was in division in line ahead, steaming at 15
knots, and was zigzagging at the time.
On May 6th the mine-layer _Orvieto_ and eight destroyers left Scapa to
carry out a mine-laying operation in the Heligoland Bight. The force
ran into a dense fog, and a collision occurred between the destroyers
_Comet_ and _Nemesis_, the latter being seriously damaged. The force
was directed to return and left Scapa again on the 8th, carrying out
the operation successfully during the night of the 10th–11th; it
returned on the 12th.
The light cruisers _Phaeton_ and _Royalist_ left Scapa on May 12th for
a position north of the Shetlands, in order to intercept a neutral
steamer reported to have left Bremerhaven on May 11th with wireless
installations on board. The C Patrol of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
was also moved to a position to intercept this vessel, and the light
cruiser _Sappho_ and armed boarding steamer _Amsterdam_ were placed on
the western side of the Fair Island Channel. The force returned on the
14th, the report proving to be incorrect.
The whole Grand Fleet carried out a sweep of the central part of the
North Sea between May 17th and 19th, the forces from Scapa, Cromarty
and Rosyth meeting at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. 0.0 at 7
A.M. on the 8th, and sweeping to the south-eastward at a speed of 16
knots until the afternoon, with the Battle Cruiser Fleet some thirty to
fifty miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. The Fleet returned to its bases
on the 19th, not having sighted any hostile vessels. Battle tactics
were exercised during the passage north.
On May 21st the Fleet mine-sweepers, which had been sent to Aberdeen
beforehand in readiness, left with an escort of two light cruisers to
examine the mine-field reported to have been laid in the centre of
the southern portion of the North Sea. Two of the sweepers collided
in a fog on leaving Aberdeen, and another went ashore; the remainder
proceeded and located the north-east corner of the mine-field on the
22nd and 23rd; they returned to Aberdeen on the 24th, after examining
_en route_ a position in which it was reported that paraffin barrels
were moored. These were destroyed. It was thought that they might be
intended for German submarines.
Whilst the Fleet sweepers located the north-east corner of the
mine-field, paddle sweepers, under the escort of two light cruisers
from Harwich, located the south-west corner. The search was
subsequently continued under the same conditions, and the limits of the
mine-field, which covered a large area south of Lat. 56 N. and east of
Long. 2.30 E., were determined. The enemy made no attempt to interfere
with the sweeping operations, if indeed he was aware of them.
On the 21st the patrol, comprising the _Sappho_ and armed boarding
steamers, hitherto maintained in an area east and south-east of the
Pentland Firth, was moved temporarily to the west of the Firth on
account of submarine activity. Destroyers from the Grand Fleet replaced
the original patrol at night, the interception of mercantile traffic
being carried out by the armed boarding steamers to the westward. The
destroyer _Rifleman_ grounded in a fog on the 22nd, necessitating
docking for repairs.
A new form of anti-submarine operation was begun on May 23rd by the
Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scotland (Admiral Sir R. Lowry). This
consisted of two C-class submarines operating with an armed trawler,
the idea being that the trawler should invite attack by a submarine,
thus giving our submarines an opportunity of sinking the enemy by
torpedo attack.
On May 24th the Admiralty telegraphed that Italy had entered the War on
the side of the Allies.
On the next day I proceeded in the _Iron Duke_ to Rosyth to confer with
Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who had succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea
Lord. The conference took place on the 26th and was of an important
nature. The general naval policy, so far as it concerned the Grand
Fleet, was discussed, and arrangements made as to the procedure to be
followed in future. Sir Henry Jackson asked that Commodore Everett
might join him at the Admiralty as Naval Assistant, and, with the
consent of Commodore Everett, this was arranged. His place as Captain
of the Fleet was filled by Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., of the
_New Zealand_. It was with great regret that I parted with Commodore
Everett; his long experience in the Fleet under Sir George Callaghan
and his intimate knowledge of fleet work and unfailing tact had been
of the greatest possible assistance. The _Iron Duke_ returned to Scapa
on the morning of the 28th. On the 26th Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace
Hood, C.B., had hoisted his flag in the _Invincible_ as Rear-Admiral
commanding the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The battleship _Queen
Elizabeth_ arrived at Scapa from the Dardanelles on the same day.
From May 29th to 31st the Grand Fleet carried out another sweep in the
North Sea, the direction on this occasion being towards the Dogger
Bank. The forces from Scapa and Cromarty concentrated in Lat. 57.35
N., Long. 0.0 at 7.15 A.M. on the 30th, and steered to the southward
at 17 knots’ speed. The Rosyth force steered for a point farther south
and was in sight from the cruiser line at 9.30 A.M., being ordered to
keep ahead of the Fleet. The sweep was continued until the Dreadnought
Battle Fleet was in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank. No enemy vessel
was sighted.
The Fleet then turned to the northward and, owing to a northerly swell,
speed had to be reduced on account of the destroyers. During the night
the Rosyth force was detached to its base. Speed was increased as the
weather improved, and the Scapa and Cromarty forces arrived on the
morning of May 31st. The _Iron Duke_ left Scapa for Cromarty during the
afternoon of May 31st, and arrived that evening.
During the month the procedure of moving squadrons between Scapa and
Cromarty was continued. At this period a second line of submarine
obstructions, which was designed to prevent the entry of destroyers,
as well as submarines, into Scapa Flow, advanced considerably towards
completion. Progress was also made with the laying of mine-fields
at the entrance. The anchorage at Swarbachs Minn, in the Shetlands,
had been selected as a secondary coaling base for the ships of the
10th Cruiser Squadron, and steps were taken to prepare a submarine
obstruction for the entrance, and to provide the necessary labour for
coaling the ships from colliers.
The blockade work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued actively
during the month, the average number of ships intercepted per week
being 62, and the average number sent into port for closer examination,
16.
The weather at Scapa during the month was misty, fog being experienced
on the 5th, 6th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 27th and 28th, and snow on the 11th
and 12th. The wind during the month was not strong.