INCIDENTS AT SEA--NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914
On November 1st I left Lough Swilly to confer at the Admiralty with the
First Lord and the First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, who had relieved the
Marquis of Milford Haven in this post. During this conference, held on
November 2nd, the requirements of trawlers, drifters, etc., for the
patrol of the vicinity of the various fleet bases, the Minches, and the
waters surrounding the Orkneys and Shetlands were discussed at length
and decisions reached. The defence of the bases was also considered.
I stated that the requirements of patrol vessels for the Orkney and
Shetland areas were a total of 72, and for the Minches of 36.
The future general naval policy was also discussed, one of the main
questions being that of the 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons joining the
Channel Fleet. It was determined that this step should be taken and
the necessary orders were given. I agreed to it with some reluctance,
as there was obviously no prospect of the 3rd Battle Squadron being
able to join the Dreadnought Fleet before a Fleet action if stationed
in southern waters, and a dispersion of the Fleet, which resulted in
the main Battle Fleet having but a slender preponderance of strength
over the High Sea Fleet, was a measure which was open to considerable
objection. The increasing necessity for refitting our ships, which
involved sending them as far away as Portsmouth or Devonport, combined
with the failures in condenser tubes that were occurring, led to two,
or three, or even more battleships being absent at a time, on passage,
laid up, or refitting. At the German selected moment, our main Battle
Fleet might well at this period have been reduced to 18 ships (all
Dreadnoughts), whilst the High Sea Fleet was just rising to a strength
of 16 Dreadnoughts and 16 pre-Dreadnoughts.
Later, however, after the raid on East Coast towns, the 3rd Battle
Squadron was again detached from the Channel Fleet and based on Rosyth,
with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron; the two squadrons arrived there on
November 20th after passing west of Ireland and coaling at Scapa. The
6th Battle Squadron remained in southern waters. The object which it
was desired to attain by this last distribution, which was ordered
from the Admiralty, was to have a naval force based farther south than
Scapa, to be more immediately available in the case of an attempt by
the enemy to land a hostile force on our east coast.
I returned to Lough Swilly at noon, November 3rd, and found the Fleet
under orders from the Admiralty to proceed to Scapa at once. These
orders were cancelled after my arrival, and the movements of the Battle
Fleet left to my discretion. I proceeded to sea with the 1st, 2nd and
4th Battle Squadrons at 3.45 P.M. and, passing south of Tory Island,
made for the vicinity of the Bills Rocks on the coast of Galway, for
target practice, which was carried out on the 4th, the Fleet then
proceeding to the northward.
The Battle Fleet was screened out of Lough Swilly by the 2nd Flotilla,
which then left for Scapa. This flotilla had been employed during the
stay at Lough Swilly in providing patrols off the entrance and in
hunting for submarines, reports of which were very frequent.
Prior to leaving Lough Swilly, news arrived from the Admiralty that
the light cruiser _Undaunted_, of the Harwich force, was being chased
by several German vessels in southern waters, and that hostile
battle cruisers had been sighted off Gorleston. These occurrences
had, presumably, led to the ordering of the Fleet to Scapa. As it
was thought that the operations of the German battle cruisers might
be part of a general movement, orders were sent to the 3rd Battle
Squadron to join the Commander-in-Chief at Scapa, the 1st and 2nd
Battle Cruiser Squadrons being directed to proceed with all dispatch
towards Heligoland, with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron; the 2nd and
6th Cruiser Squadrons were ordered to Scapa to coal, and the 10th
Cruiser Squadron to the Shetlands for the same purpose, ready for
eventualities. These orders were cancelled when it became apparent that
the German movement was local, and that our ships would be too late to
intercept the enemy. On this occasion, the German cruiser _Yorck_, when
returning to port, struck a German mine and sank.
The base at Loch-na-Keal was abandoned when the Fleet left Lough
Swilly, and the obstructions removed by the battleship _Illustrious_.
On November 3rd the Admiralty issued a general notice proclaiming the
North Sea as an area in which hostile operations were being carried
out, and pointing out the danger incurred by neutral vessels which
entered the North Sea without first ascertaining the steps necessary
for safety.
On November 5th the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ left Cromarty for
Devonport by Admiralty orders, prior to proceeding to search for
Admiral von Spee’s squadron in the South Atlantic. This order, the
necessity for which was apparent, and the subsequent results of which
were undoubtedly of high value, had, however, the effect of still
further weakening the Grand Fleet.
The _Iron Duke_, with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons cruised
between the Hebrides, Faroe Islands and Shetlands after November 4th,
and carried out gunnery practices and battle exercises as opportunity
occurred. The 1st Battle Squadron was sent to Scapa to coal on the 7th,
the 2nd Battle Squadron on the 8th, and the _Iron Duke_ and 4th Battle
Squadron arrived there on the 9th.
The 2nd, 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were engaged on blockade work
during this period.
On November 6th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron and one-half of the 4th Flotilla, was sent from
Cromarty to carry out a sweep of the North Sea, passing through the
following positions, namely:
1. Lat. 56.0 N.
Long. 1.30 E.
2. Lat. 57.50 N.
Long. 5.0 E.
3. Lat. 60.10 N.
Long. 3.15 E.
4. Lat. 61.20 N.
Long. 3.0 E.
5. Lat. 61.0 N.
Long. 1.0 E.
6. Lat. 58.50 N.
Long. 0.0 .
thence the Battle Cruiser Squadron and destroyers were to go to
Cromarty and the light cruisers to Scapa.
The new battle cruiser _Tiger_, which had been working up gunnery
and torpedo practices at Bantry Bay in the south of Ireland, arrived
at Scapa on November 6th to continue her practices and to join the
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. It was felt that she would prove a very
welcome reinforcement when efficient, since the departure of the
_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ had left us in a questionable position
with regard to battle cruisers as compared with the Germans.
After the Battle Fleet left Lough Swilly, and in consequence of
information sent to me by Admiral Colville as to the slow progress
being made with the submarine obstructions, orders were given to the
various ships to prepare sections of rope net submarine detectors for
use in the entrances to Scapa Flow, and these were rapidly placed
in position by the Fleet in Hoxa, Switha and Hoy Sounds when the
ships arrived at Scapa, armed trawlers being detailed to watch each
section. It was very disappointing to find on returning to the base
that so little headway had been made with the supply of material for
the permanent submarine wire net obstruction, and that the Fleet was
still, therefore, open to submarine attack. The increase in the number
of patrol trawlers, however, for service in the vicinity of the base
gave some protection to the entrances, and relieved the hard-pressed
destroyers to a welcome extent.
At this time the watching and blockading cruisers were disposed in
areas between the Shetland Islands, Faroe Islands, and Iceland and to
the north-westward of the Hebrides, but the whole of the cruisers were
beginning to show signs of overwork.
The Rear-Admiral commanding the 10th Cruiser Squadron reported that
all his ships, which were very old, were showing increasing signs of
needing thorough repair at a dockyard, and arrangements were put in
hand for sending them, three at a time, to the Clyde. In addition, the
_Antrim_, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, reported condenser defects;
the _Drake_, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, was at Scapa making good
defects, which were constantly developing, and the _King Alfred_ and
_Leviathan_, of the same squadron, were refitting at dockyard ports. In
spite of these incidents, however, large numbers of steamers were being
intercepted daily by cruisers, battleships and destroyers, and sent
into Kirkwall for examination. About this time the increase in the
number of patrol craft at Scapa made it necessary to add considerably
to the administrative organisation at that base, and requests were
sent to the Admiralty to provide depôt ships for the local defence
destroyers, the patrol trawlers, and the other small craft, as well as
adequate administrative staffs.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until November 17th with
steam ready at from two to three hours’ notice, and on that date the
2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron,
and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a half flotilla as a screen, left
their bases to take up positions for preventing a suspected attempt on
the part of the enemy to send some ships into the Atlantic. The 2nd
Battle Squadron worked to the westward, and the remaining vessels to
the eastward of the Shetland Islands. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron returned to Scapa on the 20th and the
2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the 21st.
A heavy gale was experienced in the northern part of the North Sea and
in the waters surrounding the Orkneys and Shetlands from November 11th
to November 13th, and all work in the harbour had to be suspended,
ships lying with steam up, whilst at sea most of the cruisers were
obliged to lay to. At Scapa all the sea-plane sheds were wrecked by the
gale, and the sea-planes damaged.
During this stay of the Battle Fleet at Scapa the routine was
introduced of carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices inside the
harbour, two or three ships being under way at a time for the purpose.
This routine was subsequently carried out whenever the Fleet, or any
portion of it, was at Scapa and the greatest possible benefit was
derived from it. It was found possible to carry out practice from all
guns, up to and including 6-inch, inside the harbour by day and night,
besides the ordinary sub-calibre firing and torpedo practices by ships,
and by destroyers attacking ships, or divisions of ships.
On November 11th, the battle cruiser _Princess Royal_ sailed for
Halifax, by Admiralty orders, for the purpose of strengthening the
North American Squadron in operations against Admiral von Spee’s
squadron, should it appear in northern waters. I protested, as
Commander-in-Chief, against sending so powerful a ship as the _Princess
Royal_, armed with 13.5-inch guns, since her absence left our Battle
Cruiser Squadron inferior in strength to the German battle cruiser
force. I suggested that the _New Zealand_, carrying 12-inch guns, was,
owing to her economical coal consumption, more suited to the work
required and strong enough for the purpose. However, the _Princess
Royal_ sailed and remained absent from the North Sea until the
beginning of January, 1915.
At this period, reports of enemy submarines being sighted, more
particularly by shore observers in the Hebrides, Orkneys and Shetlands,
were very numerous, and destroyers and patrol craft were frequently
being sent to search suspected bases or sheltered bays in which
submarines might be taking refuge. All such searches were, however,
fruitless, although in many cases the reports were very circumstantial
and convincing.
On November 18th the mine-sweeping gunboats, whilst searching the
Fair Island Channel, sighted a submarine on the surface and chased
her at a speed of 18 knots, but could not overhaul her. The submarine
subsequently dived. This incident was the first practical proof of the
high surface speed possessed by German submarines.
Destroyers were sent out immediately from Scapa to assist in the
search, with orders to use their searchlights after dark in order to
force the submarine to keep under water and so exhaust her batteries.
The search, however, proved abortive, although continued for 24 hours.
The use of searchlights for this purpose, begun on this occasion,
became common later on.
A submarine was sighted by the 2nd Battle Squadron at 9 A.M. on the
19th, well to the westward of the Orkneys, and this may have been the
vessel chased by the mine-sweepers.
During the gale on November 12th, the ships of the 10th Cruiser
Squadron--the old “Edgar” class of cruisers--which were on patrol
between the Shetlands and Faroe Islands had suffered much damage, many
of them showing signs of leaking and straining; boats and ventilators
were washed away; and water in large quantities found its way below.
It became evident that these old ships were not sufficiently seaworthy
to withstand the winter gales of northern latitudes without first
undergoing a thorough repair, and arrangements were made to send them,
three at a time, to the Clyde for survey and refit. The survey of the
first three, however, revealed that some months’ work would be required
to make them efficient for winter blockade duty, and it was then
decided by the Admiralty to pay off the whole squadron, and to utilise
the crews to commission armed merchant ships, which would be far more
suitable, as they could keep the sea for much longer periods.
The ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been using Swarbachs Minn,
a harbour in the Shetland Islands, as an occasional coaling base. This
was evacuated on November 20th in consequence of the receipt of a
report that a submarine attack on the harbours in the Shetland Islands
was probable, all of these harbours being, at that time, defenceless
against such attack. On leaving the base, the ships of the 10th Cruiser
Squadron, not already at a refitting port, were ordered to dockyard
ports to pay off.
On November 20th, during practice, a lyddite common shell detonated in
one of the 9.2-inch guns of the _Achilles_, and the muzzle of the gun
was blown off, eleven of the gun’s crew being injured. This occurrence
cast doubt on the safety of the whole of the lyddite shell afloat, and
restrictions on their use were issued, but were eventually removed,
after the withdrawal of all suspected shell of this nature.
At dusk on November 22nd the Grand Fleet left its bases for the purpose
of carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, and to support an aerial
operation in the Heligoland Bight. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd
Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were included in this movement, and met
the remainder of the Fleet at sea at 9.30 A.M. on November 23rd in
Lat. 57.40 N., Long. 2.30 E.
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser
Squadron, 6th Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd and 4th Flotillas, took part
in the operation, the Fleet proceeding south in cruising order, with
destroyers screening the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
against submarine attack by day. The channel eastward of the Pentland
Firth was, as usual, searched by the mine-sweeping gunboats prior to
the departure of the Fleet.
The Commodore (T) from Harwich, with three Light Cruisers and eight
destroyers, was directed to co-operate in the aerial operations. During
daylight on the 23rd opportunity was taken to carry out two tactical
exercises. The _Iron Duke’s_ position at midnight was Lat. 56.55 N.,
Long. 4.11 E. Ships were ordered to be at action stations by dawn on
the 24th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron and a division of destroyers, was detached in the
afternoon of the 23rd with directions to be in Lat. 55.10 N., Long.
6.20 E. by 5.30 A.M. on the 24th.
The _Drake_ reported her port engine disabled at 1 P.M. on the 23rd,
and had consequently to be sent back to Scapa.
During the night the Admiralty informed me that the aerial operations
had been abandoned, as it was thought that the enemy had a force
present in the Bight, which would be too strong for our detached
vessels. I then directed the Commodore (T) to meet the 2nd Cruiser
Squadron at its daylight position in Lat. 54.50 N., Long. 7.6 E., and
thence to proceed towards Heligoland and endeavour to draw any enemy
forces that might be encountered towards our Fleet. The 1st Battle
Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed also to
proceed to the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to give any necessary support.
The weather on the 24th was fine and bright with high visibility.
The Commodore (T) reconnoitred Heligoland and reported at 10.40 A.M.
that there was smoke behind the island, and ships steaming to the
southward; and that he had sighted a submarine. The Rear-Admiral of
the 2nd Cruiser Squadron reported at 11 A.M. that he had only sighted
destroyers, and that he could not draw the enemy towards him, and so
was returning to the northward with Commodore (T). The Vice-Admiral
of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, who was supporting, turned to the
northward shortly afterwards, his noon position being Lat. 54.47 N.,
Long. 6.35 E. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was attacked at 12.35 P.M. by
an aeroplane, which dropped five bombs near the _Liverpool_, which was
in company.
The Battle Fleet cruised in support, the 10 A.M. position of the
_Iron Duke_ being Lat. 55.23 N., Long. 5.30 E. At 2 P.M. the Battle
Fleet turned to the north-westward, sighting the 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron astern at 3.30 P.M. The battle cruisers and light cruisers
were stationed 15 miles to the eastward of the Battle Fleet during the
night, and the necessary dispositions were taken to provide against a
destroyer attack during the night.
On November 25th two more tactical exercises were carried out. During
the afternoon the wind increased, and thick weather set in, and by
daylight on the 26th a heavy southerly gale was blowing, so the
attached cruisers were sent to the bases for shelter. The 1st Battle
Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron, and the destroyers, had been detached at midnight on the 25th
for Scapa, Rosyth and Invergordon respectively. The original intention
was to take the remainder of the Fleet farther north for target
practice, but it was abandoned owing to the bad weather, and the _Iron
Duke_, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron
arrived at Scapa on the 27th.
During the absence of the Fleet, the German submarine U 18 was rammed
at 12.20 P.M. November 24th by mine-sweeping trawler No. 96, one mile
off the Hoxa entrance to Scapa. U 18 was damaged in the collision,
dived, hit the bottom and received further damage. All the available
patrol craft were ordered to the spot most promptly by the Vice-Admiral
commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands and hunted her. She finally came
to the surface and surrendered off Muckle Skerry in the Pentland
Firth. The submarine sank as the crew came on deck, the sea cocks,
probably, having been previously opened. The commanding officer of the
submarine, who had apparently intended to try to enter Scapa Flow,
expressed great surprise to Admiral Colville at the absence of the
Fleet. It seemed possible that he had been deterred from his attempt
by the sight of the buoys across the entrance, probably suspecting the
presence of an obstruction which, however, was _not_ there. The sinking
of the submarine caused the greatest gratification to the local defence
forces at Scapa and acted as an incentive to further efforts. It was
also, probably, a deterrent to further attacks on the Fleet at Scapa,
as the circumstances in which U 18 was sunk were kept most secret in
order that the enemy might be led to think that her destruction was due
to nets or mines. Indeed, it is very likely that this incident and the
secrecy observed had important results in preventing the loss of ships
of the Grand Fleet when at anchor in Scapa Flow.
Great submarine activity occurred at this time in the vicinity of the
Orkneys and Shetlands. The _Dryad_ sighted a submarine on the 24th in
Lat. 58.35 N., Long. 1.45 W.; a second was sighted by an armed trawler
off Copinsay on the same day; and a third was sighted from the shore,
proceeding to the eastward through the Pentland Firth. On the 25th U
16 was sighted by a collier and trawler in Lat. 58.46 N., Long. 2.15
W., and later by the mine-sweeping gunboat _Skipjack_ not far from this
position.
On the return of the Fleet arrangements were made for constructing,
with Fleet resources, net obstructions across the Hoy entrance to Scapa
Flow, and, in view of the attempt of U 18, all patrols were stiffened
to the utmost extent possible.
During November 27th and 28th the strong gale continued, interfering
considerably with the work on the submarine obstructions. Several
reports of the sighting of submarines in harbours in the north of
Scotland, the Orkneys and Shetlands were received during the last
days of November, and destroyers and patrol craft were kept very busy
in searching the various bays and harbours. In many cases charges
were exploded on the bottom in bays in which it was considered that a
submarine might be lying, in the hope of forcing her to the surface. No
known result, however, was obtained.
The Fleet remained in the various bases until the end of the month,
the ships in Scapa Flow carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices
and working at the obstructions. The _King George V._, which had
just returned from refit at a dockyard, developed condenser defects
necessitating partial retubing; she was the fourth battleship in which
this defect had occurred since the War started, a period of only four
months, and it will be realised that such wholesale breakdowns caused
me uneasiness.
During November the work of sinking block-ships in all the entrance
channels to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and Hoy entrances, was carried
out. Unfortunately the block-ships had been sent up in a light
condition without cement ballast which, I was informed, could not be
supplied, and they began in many cases to break up or to shift their
position during the winter gales. This fact, combined with the great
difficulty experienced in sinking them in the exact positions required
owing to the strong tides prevailing (up to at least eight knots in
strength), and the very short periods of slack water, rendered the work
of blocking only partially effective.
At the end of November the effective state of the Grand Fleet was as
follows:
Fleet-Flagship: the _Iron Duke_.
_1st Battle Squadron_:
7 ships, the _Neptune_ being away refitting.
_2nd Battle Squadron_:
7 ships, of which one, the _King George V._, was disabled,
retubing condensers.
_3rd Battle Squadron_ (Pre-Dreadnoughts):
7 ships, one ship refitting at twelve hours’ notice for steam,
and the 8th ship returning from a dockyard refit.
_4th Battle Squadron_:
5 ships (complete).
_1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (the _Princess Royal_ having been detached to North
America).
_2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
3 ships. The _Shannon_ was refitting.
_3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (complete).
_6th Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (complete).
_1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
5 ships. The _Liverpool_ was refitting.
_2nd Flotilla_:
15 destroyers (5 refitting).
_4th Flotilla_:
15 destroyers (5 refitting).
_10th Cruiser Squadron_:
_Nil_ (paid off).
_Armed Merchant-Cruisers_:
2 (2 were coaling at Liverpool).
_Mine-sweeping Gunboats_:
5 (3 were refitting).
The two new battleships, the _Emperor of India_ and _Benbow_, the
former flying the flag of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, C.B., had arrived at
Berehaven in the south of Ireland on December 1st to “work up” after
commissioning. On the same date the _Leviathan_ arrived at Cromarty
to act as flagship of the 1st Cruiser Squadron under the orders of
Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore. His flag was transferred to her from
the _New Zealand_ on December 2nd.
On the night of December 2nd a very violent gale sprang up at Scapa
Flow, during which several ships dragged their anchors, in spite of
two anchors being down and steam up; the gale lasted until the morning
of the 4th. All communication between ships in Scapa Flow, even by
drifter, was suspended, and the light cruisers at sea on patrol were
forced to lie to. An officer and one man were washed overboard from a
picket-boat sheltering under the stern of a store-ship and drowned.
On December 3rd Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, lately in command of the
10th Cruiser Squadron, hoisted his flag in the armed merchant ship
_Alsatian_ to command the merchant cruisers attached to the Grand
Fleet, which were now constituted as the new 10th Cruiser Squadron.
At 1.45 P.M. on December 3rd the destroyer _Garry_, Commander W. W.
Wilson, of the local defence force, reported that she was engaging a
submarine at the Holm Sound entrance to Scapa Flow. This submarine was
possibly sheltering there from the bad weather. Destroyers and trawlers
were at once sent out to assist, and the submarine was last reported
diving to seaward. Several rounds from her 12-pounder gun were fired by
the _Garry_ at the submarine’s conning tower, but apparently without
effect, and an attempt to ram her also failed owing to the heavy sea
and very strong tides. The submarine and the _Garry_ fired torpedoes
at one another, the submarine’s torpedo passing under the stern of the
_Garry_. All ships were directed to raise steam for leaving harbour on
receipt of the first report from the Garry, from which it was not clear
whether the submarine had passed through Holm Sound into the harbour,
but this order was cancelled when it was ascertained that she was
outside.
On December 4th all the mine-sweeping gunboats attached to the Grand
Fleet were sent to Sheerness by Admiralty direction for the purpose of
carrying out sweeping operations off the coast of Belgium; trawlers
were then the only sweeping vessels left with the Grand Fleet.
On December 5th another heavy gale was experienced, lasting until the
following morning, and all small craft at sea were forced to shelter.
In consequence of representations made to the Admiralty of the
inadequacy of the mine-sweeping force at this time attached to the
Grand Fleet, owing to the withdrawal of the gunboats, steps were taken
to fit out eight small steamers for the purpose, and I was informed
that they would arrive on various dates during the month of December.
These vessels did not prove very satisfactory as mine-sweepers in
northern waters, and were withdrawn later for use in the Mediterranean.
During the stay of the Fleet in Scapa Flow work on the improvised
submarine obstructions was continued by naval parties with all possible
speed, and, meanwhile, work on the permanent obstructions was in hand,
though progressing but slowly, owing to the difficulty experienced in
fitting out the trawlers at Inverness with the necessary winches and
providing the required moorings.
On December 6th bad weather was again experienced. Orders were issued
on this date for a sweep down the North Sea, but were cancelled on
receipt of information from the Admiralty that the recent bad weather
had caused a very large number of mines to break adrift in the
southern portion of the North Sea. On the same day the light cruiser
_Sappho_ and three armed boarding steamers were sent to Loch Ewe
and based there with orders to work north-west of the Hebrides for
the interception of trade; the force of armed boarding steamers was
increased later. These vessels were mostly Irish mail packets. Rather
extensive alterations were necessary, after they had been sent up,
before they were fit for their duties.
During the early part of December the ships of the 2nd and 6th Cruiser
Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were mainly engaged in
Areas 3, 4 and 6; the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was at Rosyth and working to
the eastward from that base.
On December 7th Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore, K.C.B., assumed
command of the newly constituted 1st Cruiser Squadron, and the
_Leviathan_ and _Duke of Edinburgh_ arrived at Scapa on that date;
the _Warrior_ and _Black Prince_, with the above ships, comprised the
squadron. On December 7th, two merchant ships, the s.s. _Michigan_
and _City of Oxford_, disguised as men-of-war, arrived at Scapa.
These vessels, with several others, had been fitted out at Belfast
by Admiralty orders with dummy turrets and guns, and altered with a
view to representing certain British battleships and battle cruisers.
The whole of these were formed into a squadron under the command of
Commodore Haddock, C.B., R.N.R., of _Olympic_ fame, and termed the
Special Service Squadron. The disguise of the ships was carried out
very cleverly, though presumably at considerable expense. They would
have been of value had it been possible to select vessels of a suitable
speed, but the highest speed attainable by any vessel in the squadron
was not more than nine to ten knots, whilst the speed of the squadron
as a whole did not exceed seven knots. The ships could not under these
conditions accompany the Fleet to sea, and it was very difficult to
find a use for them in home waters. Commodore Haddock was, later,
detached with the squadron to Loch Ewe, where the ships were worked
up to carry out fleet movements. This he did most successfully, so
that, had the ships possessed the requisite speed, use might have been
made of them as a squadron for various decoy purposes. But, under the
conditions existing, this was impossible, and eventually the squadron
was disbanded with the exception of one vessel; the experiment was
tried of sending her to sea disguised as a disabled man-of-war with a
considerable heel to one side, and with patrol craft accompanying her
as if for protection, in the hope that a submarine might be induced
to attack her and so afford the patrols an opportunity of sinking the
submarine.
This scheme, however, met with no success. All the vessels were
restored to their original conditions for trading purposes, with the
exception of some which were sent to the Mediterranean and to North
America, where it was reported that they were of some use.
On December 8th another gale was experienced. The _Thunderer_, which
had developed condenser defects, left for Devonport on the 8th for
refit and for retubing condensers; yet another case of this defect!
On December 9th the 1st Battle Squadron proceeded to sea to cruise to
the north-westward of the Shetland Islands and to carry out gunnery
practices as convenient. In consequence of bad weather the Vice-Admiral
sent the attached cruiser _Bellona_ back to Scapa for shelter.
On December 10th the new battleships _Benbow_ and _Emperor of India_
arrived from Berehaven to strengthen the 4th Battle Squadron, and
proved very welcome additions to the Fleet. They, as well as all
other new ships joining, necessarily spent several weeks in practices
before becoming efficient to join the Fleet at sea, or to take part in
action. Owing to the hurried completion of these two ships, a great
deal of fitting work was also required before they were in a proper
condition, and this delayed their practices considerably. On the 11th
another gale was experienced which lasted until the 14th. The weather
during this period was very bad, and ships at sea (including the 1st
Battle Squadron which returned to Scapa on the 12th) met with very bad
weather. Destroyers on patrol were unable to maintain their stations
and were forced to run for shelter, and one of them, the _Cockatrice_,
suffered some damage.
On the 12th the work of retubing the port condenser of the _King George
V._ was completed; the starboard condenser was not taken in hand owing
to the small margin of superiority of the Battle Fleet over the High
Sea Fleet at this time.
During this stay of the Battle Fleet some very necessary work in the
ships of the “Iron Duke” class was partially carried out. These ships
were the first modern battleships fitted with 6-inch guns for their
secondary armament, and the gunports were very low. Early in the War
it was found necessary to unship the ports altogether, as the sea
washed them away constantly. Water then had free access to the inside
of the ship through the opening between the revolving shield and the
ship’s side, and, except in fine weather, water entered freely. In bad
weather the water, as deep as three to four inches, was continually
washing about the living decks and finding its way below through the
open hatches, to the great discomfort of the ship’s company, who were
continually wet, and to the detriment of efficiency. Arrangements were
devised on board the _Iron Duke_ to overcome this trouble, and steps
taken to have all the necessary fittings made at various contractors’
yards. A partial bulkhead was fitted in rear of the guns to confine
the water which entered the ship, and watertight indiarubber joints
provided between the gun shields and the ship’s side. The result was
satisfactory, and similar changes were made in the ships of the “Queen
Elizabeth” class and in the _Tiger_. The two after 6-inch guns, which
were on the main deck level, were removed altogether at the first
opportunity, and the ship’s side and armour completed in the after
embrasure in all these ships, as it was apparent that these guns could
never be worked at sea, being only a few feet above the water line.
The guns themselves were mounted in new unarmoured casemates on the
superstructure deck level. The work connected with the forward 6-inch
guns was entirely carried out at Scapa, with the ships at short notice
for steam, and in some cases the workmen remained in the ships and
continued the work at sea.
On December 12th serious defects in the boilers of the _Liverpool_
became apparent and the speed of the ship was limited to 17 knots. This
defect, which first showed itself in this ship, gradually affected the
boilers of the same type in all ships so fitted, as they experienced a
certain degree of wear, and from this time onwards there was usually
one, and occasionally two, light cruisers paid off for the purpose of
carrying out the necessary repairs which occupied a period of two or
three months. This reduction in the number of efficient light cruisers
was serious, at a time when our numbers compared badly with those
possessed by the enemy.
On December 14th directions were given to the 2nd Battle Squadron
and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa, the 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron at Cromarty and all the available destroyers which were at
that base, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, to proceed to
sea to meet at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.20 N., Long. 0.10 W., at 2.30
P.M. on December 15th, the force then to proceed to the southward
with a view to sweeping the western portion of the North Sea. The 2nd
Battle Squadron--without the _Thunderer_, which was refitting, and,
therefore, comprising only six ships--left Scapa early on the 15th, but
in passing through the Pentland Firth the attached cruisers _Blanche_
and _Boadicea_ were seriously damaged by the heavy sea running as
the result of the late exceptional gales, and were forced to return.
The _Boadicea_ had her bridge washed away and lost several men swept
overboard and drowned. This ship was sent to the Clyde for repairs;
the damage to the _Blanche_ being less was made good at Scapa. The
number of destroyers accompanying the force was, unfortunately, very
inadequate, the 2nd Battle Squadron being unprovided with any vessels
of this class, as the weather conditions in the Pentland Firth made
it out of the question for destroyers to go to sea from Scapa. It
was decided not to postpone the sweep on this account. I ordered all
available destroyers out from Cromarty in the hope that the weather
conditions in the Moray Firth might be better than at Scapa; only seven
were available, however, and I therefore asked the Admiralty to direct
the Commodore (T), with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, to meet
the northern force at a southern rendezvous at daylight on December
16th. This proposal was not carried out, however, the Harwich force,
which was at sea, remaining a considerable distance to the southward.
Whilst the force was on passage to the southward, the destroyers
_Lynx_, _Ambuscade_, _Unity_, _Hardy_, _Shark_, _Acasta_ and
_Spitfire_--which had left Cromarty with the battle cruisers and on
reaching the rendezvous were stationed 10 miles ahead of the 2nd Battle
Squadron--sighted and became engaged before daylight on December
16th with a strong force of enemy destroyers, and, later, with one
enemy cruiser and three light cruisers. The destroyers appeared to
be screening ahead of the other vessels and both destroyers and
cruisers were engaged by our small destroyer force. It was difficult
to ascertain the result of the engagement so far as the German vessels
were concerned, although the _Hardy_ claimed to have hit a light
cruiser at close range; the _Hardy’s_ steering-gear was disabled by
enemy fire, two men killed and one officer and 14 men wounded. The
_Ambuscade_ and _Lynx_ were also holed, the _Lynx_ having one man
wounded. The _Hardy_ finally withdrew under escort of the _Lynx_. The
engagement caused our own destroyers to become scattered and separated
from the Battle Squadron, and in the course of the day they proceeded
to various east coast ports to repair and refuel, the _Hardy_ being
escorted to the Humber by the _Spitfire_. No report of this engagement
reached me at the time. My first information of the presence of enemy
forces in the vicinity of our coast was obtained by intercepting
at 8.55 A.M. a wireless message from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral
commanding the 2nd Battle Squadron, timed 8.35 A.M., stating that
Scarborough was being shelled. The Grand Fleet was at once ordered to
raise steam, and left at 12.15 P.M., steering for a position Lat. 57
N., Long. 2.30 E. The weather had now moderated sufficiently to allow
of destroyers accompanying the Fleet.
Meanwhile Sir George Warrender, who was in command of the 2nd Battle
Squadron and was the senior officer of the forces at sea, on receipt
of the Admiralty telegram had turned to the northward to endeavour to
intercept the enemy forces on their return passage. Wireless signals
were intercepted in the _Iron Duke_ indicating that the scout _Patrol_
was being engaged by two enemy battle cruisers and that battleships or
battle cruisers were off Scarborough and light cruisers off Hartlepool.
I knew that a gap between two mine-fields laid by the enemy off our
coast existed between Lat. 54.20 N. and 54.40 N. and concluded that any
enemy forces operating off our coasts would pass through this gap. At
10 A.M., therefore, after intercepting the various messages mentioned
above, I reminded the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron and
the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron by wireless that
this gap existed, and that the enemy would probably emerge there, and
Sir George Warrender at 10.26 A.M. directed Sir David Beatty to pass
through the gap towards our coast. The Admiralty at 10.30 signalled,
however, to the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron that the enemy
was probably returning towards Heligoland, and that he should keep
outside the mine-fields and steer to cut off the enemy. Sir George
Warrender then directed Sir David Beatty to obey this latter order.
I had ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea from Rosyth immediately
on receipt of the first news of the enemy, and Vice-Admiral Bradford,
whose squadron was at short notice for steam, left at 10 A.M. with
directions from me to proceed to lat. 55.50 N., Long. 1.10 W., my
object being for this force to intercept the enemy should he pass out
to the northward of the German minefields instead of through the gap
between them.
Sir George Warrender, with the 2nd Battle Squadron, the 3rd Cruiser
Squadron being in company, was informed of these dispositions by me.
At 11.40 A.M. he signalled that at 12.30 P.M. he would be in Lat. 54.24
N., Long. 2.0 E. Sir David Beatty, with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was to the north-westward of the
Battle Squadron, and the Commodore (T) some 60 miles to the southward,
having been ordered by the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron,
at 10.28 A.M., to steer for a position in Lat. 54.20 N., Long. 1.30
E. The weather throughout the whole morning had been very misty, with
a visibility of about five miles, and sufficient sea to cause a great
deal of spray when ships were steaming at high speed.
At 11.30 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, in the _Southampton_ (1st Light
Cruiser Squadron), sighted an enemy light cruiser and destroyers
steering to the southward, gave chase with the _Birmingham_ and engaged
them; owing to the spray washing over the ship, and to the mist, no
result was visible. Three other enemy light cruisers, or cruisers, were
sighted to the south-westward shortly before 11.50 A.M., at about which
time touch with these vessels was lost.
At 12.16 P.M., German cruisers and destroyers were sighted in Lat.
54.23 N., Long. 2.14 E. by the 2nd Battle Squadron distant about
five miles on a bearing north by west, steering to the eastward,
having evidently come out through the gap in the mine-fields as was
anticipated; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at this time was some 15
miles north of the Battle Squadron. It seems probable that the German
force passed either between our 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle
Cruiser Squadron, or ahead of the former and astern of the latter. On
sighting our Battle Squadron, which turned to close, the enemy steered
to the northward and disappeared shortly afterwards in the mist,
steaming at high speed, and without being engaged by the 2nd Battle
Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron did not sight any enemy
forces.
The escape of the enemy’s force was most disappointing, seeing that
our own squadrons were in a very favourable position for intercepting
the raiders. Low visibility was the main reason for their escape, but
the absence from the Battle Squadron (through the bad weather in the
Pentland Firth) of its attached cruisers and of a sufficient force of
destroyers was a contributory cause, as well as the fact of our light
cruisers having lost touch with the enemy at 11.50.
At 3 P.M. the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron informed me of
the main features of the position, and stated that he was in Lat. 54.43
N., Long. 1.55 E., steering to the northward, with the 3rd Cruiser
Squadron, adding that he had ordered the battle cruisers and light
cruisers to rejoin him.
At about 2 P.M. the Admiralty informed me that it was thought, from the
information given by our directional stations, that other ships of the
High Sea Fleet were probably at sea, and at 6.30 P.M. I gave all our
forces a rendezvous at which to meet at 6 A.M. on the 17th.
The force from Scapa, consisting of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons,
with the 2nd Flotilla, and the 1st, 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons,
met at this time the force under Sir George Warrender, the 3rd Battle
Squadron under Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, and the Commodore (T)
with three light cruisers, and proceeded to the southward. During
the afternoon of the 17th the Admiralty was able to ascertain (by
directional wireless telegraphy) and to inform me that the ships of the
High Sea Fleet, previously reported, were now in harbour.
Opportunity was then taken of the whole Fleet being in company with
the Commodore (T) to carry out a battle exercise. At dusk the Commodore
(T) was detached to Harwich, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser
Squadron to Rosyth, the 2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd Flotilla to Scapa,
and the _Marlborough_ to Rosyth, for the purpose of allowing Sir Lewis
Bayly and Sir Cecil Burney to exchange commands in accordance with
orders received from the Admiralty by wireless telegraphy when at sea.
The light cruiser _Bellona_ and the flotilla leader _Broke_ collided
during the battle exercises, and were seriously damaged, being sent to
Rosyth under the escort of the _Devonshire_.
During the 17th wireless messages intercepted in the _Iron Duke_ showed
that the enemy raiding force had laid a large number of mines off the
Yorkshire coast and that some British and neutral merchant ships had
been sunk as a result.
During December 18th the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st Battle
Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained at sea to
the eastward of the Orkneys, and in the evening the battleships shaped
course for Scapa, arriving on the 19th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron reaching Cromarty on the same day. The
1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons also proceeded to Cromarty, and the 6th
Cruiser Squadron remained out on patrol.
During the 18th a submarine was reported inside Scapa Flow, and the 2nd
Battle Squadron raised steam; but investigation showed that the report
was not well founded.
The strength of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 18 ships,
and directions were given by me to the Rear-Admiral commanding to
establish patrols as follows:
Patrol A.--North of the Faroes and to westward of Long. 5.30 W.
Patrol B.--North of the Shetlands and to westward of Long. 1.0 W.
Patrol C.--South of the Faroes and to westward of a line joining
Sydero and Sule Skerry lighthouses.
Patrol D.--West of the Hebrides and a line N.½W. from St. Kilda.
The _Sappho_ and the seven armed boarding-steamers, now available, were
based on Loch Ewe, and completed the blockade line between Patrol D and
the Hebrides. They were, however, shifted later on to Scapa, where they
were employed on patrol and boarding duties in the approaches to the
Pentland Firth, or at sea with cruiser squadrons.
On December 20th a report was received that the submarine obstruction
in Hoxa Sound had been found to be pierced; this led to steam being
raised by all ships at Scapa, and the usual search by small craft was
ordered; boats were also sent to explode charges on the bottom in the
vicinity of the damaged portion of the submarine obstruction, where
it was thought a submarine might have been entangled. Another alarm
took place later, due to some trawlers inside Scapa Flow mistaking the
concussion due to the explosion of these charges for torpedoes and
firing warning signals in consequence. The precautions were kept in
force until after daylight on the 21st. On that date Vice-Admiral Sir
Cecil Burney arrived at Scapa in the _Marlborough_ and assumed command
of the 1st Battle Squadron, Sir Lewis Bayly taking over the command of
the Channel Fleet.
On the 21st the 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron left
Cromarty for Rosyth in obedience to directions from the Admiralty that
the battle cruisers and light cruisers were to be based on the latter
port. This change was one result of the Scarborough raid.
The mine-sweeping gunboats rejoined the Grand Fleet on this date.
On December 23rd the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, with the _Iron
Duke_, proceeded to sea to the westward of the Orkneys, and carried out
target practice at the Sulis-Ker Rock, north of the Hebrides, on the
24th, passed through the Pentland Firth at 6 P.M. on that date, and
proceeded into the North Sea for a sweep into southern waters.
During daylight of the 25th the 1st Battle Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla
and the 6th Cruiser Squadron from Scapa, the 3rd Battle Squadron, the
3rd Cruiser Squadron, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, and the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons
and 4th Flotilla from Cromarty met the _Iron Duke_, and the 2nd and
4th Battle Squadrons at given rendezvous between Lat. 56.45 N., Long.
1.30., and Lat. 56.14 N., Long. 3.20 E.
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney was under treatment on board a hospital
ship and too unwell to take his squadron to sea. Admiral Sir Stanley
Colville was, therefore, directed to hoist his flag on board the
_Marlborough_ and to assume temporary command of the 1st Battle
Squadron.
The whole Fleet was together by 1.20 P.M. on the 25th, steering
south-south-east at 15 knots. At 1.40 P.M. the _Birmingham_ and
_Southampton_, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, both sighted
submarines about 15 miles to the south-westward of the Battle Fleet.
The Battle Fleet was then gradually turned from the
south-south-eastward course to north-north-eastward until 3 P.M., being
then in position Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 3.43 E. Course was altered to
north-north-west at 3.15 P.M. and speed reduced. At 9.15 P.M. the Fleet
again turned to the southward, speed having to be reduced owing to the
sea becoming too heavy for the destroyers. By midnight a south-westerly
gale was blowing.
At 8 A.M. on December 26th the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.58 N., Long.
2.16 E., with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser
Squadron 40 miles to the southward; a speed of 11 knots was the most
that the destroyers could keep up without risk of serious damage, and,
as the weather was getting rapidly worse, they were detached at 8.10
A.M. to their bases.
By 10 A.M. a whole gale was blowing from the south-eastward. The sweep
was abandoned and course altered to the northward. At 11 A.M. the
Rosyth and Cromarty squadrons were ordered to proceed to their bases,
the _Indomitable_, which had joined the Fleet at 8 A.M. from the
Mediterranean, being ordered to Rosyth, there to join the 1st Battle
Cruiser Squadron. The destroyers and light cruisers suffered somewhat
from the gale, the 2nd Flotilla unfortunately losing three men, and
from the light cruiser _Caroline_ one man was washed overboard.
Bad weather continued during the passage north with a very rough sea,
and on nearing the Pentland Firth the Dreadnought Battle Fleet found
the conditions to be exceptionally severe, with a following wind which
caused the funnel smoke to obscure objects ahead of the ships. The
ships were directed to enter Scapa Flow in the following order: 2nd
Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron; the 2nd
Battle Squadron was timed to enter at 6 A.M.--some time, of course,
before daylight, which, at this period of the year at Scapa Flow, is
about 8.30 A.M.
As the rear subdivision of the 2nd Battle Squadron approached the
entrance, the ships as usual having no lights showing, the _Monarch_
altered course and stopped to avoid a patrol trawler which she suddenly
sighted close under her bows. The _Conqueror_, astern of her, was
unable to avoid the _Monarch_ and the two ships collided; the stern
of the _Monarch_ and the starboard bow of the _Conqueror_ were very
seriously damaged, rendering both ships unseaworthy. They were brought
into the harbour and safely berthed.
Meanwhile, the 1st Battle Squadron, following astern of the 2nd Battle
Squadron, entered safely. The _Iron Duke_ was leading the 4th Battle
Squadron, and, on intercepting the wireless messages indicating that
something was wrong, I stood through the Pentland Firth to the westward
with the 4th Battle Squadron until the situation had become clearer.
The dawn was very late and a furious gale was blowing, with a very
heavy sea and strong tide in the Firth. These conditions made the
handling of the battleships very difficult when they turned through 16
points to return to the eastward.
The _Iron Duke_ and 4th Battle Squadron entered at 10 A.M. The whole
Fleet remained with two anchors down and steam up on account of the
weather until 1 P.M., when the wind and sea moderated, and by the
morning of the 28th normal conditions were resumed. As a result of the
gale, it was necessary to send the destroyers _Hope_, _Redpole_ and
_Ruby_ to dockyards for repairs.
On the 28th a new Light Cruiser Squadron, termed the 2nd Light
Cruiser Squadron, was formed, consisting of the _Falmouth_ (Flag
of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), _Gloucester_, _Yarmouth_ and
_Dartmouth_.
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney now resumed command of the 1st Battle
Squadron.
Enemy submarines were active at the entrance to the Firth of Forth at
this time; a torpedo was fired at T.B. No. 33 and another at T.B. No.
31 on the 25th, and two submarines were sighted during the 28th off the
entrance to the Tay.
Temporary repairs to the _Monarch_ and _Conqueror_ were begun as soon
as the weather permitted, and the former ship was able to leave Scapa
for Devonport for thorough repair on December 29th. It was found
necessary to obtain salvage plant and assistance in the case of the
_Conqueror_, which had sustained very extensive underwater injury over
a considerable length, and Captain Young, of the Liverpool Salvage
Association, for whose services I applied at once, was sent up with
the salvage ship _Rattler_, arriving on December 31st. The _Conqueror_
was taken into Switha Sound and the repair ship _Assistance_ secured
alongside her, and excellent temporary repairs were effected by the
18th January, by the staff of the _Assistance_, Captain Betty, R.N.,
and by the salvage artificers under Captain Young.
The second condenser of the _King George V._ was taken in hand for
retubing at this time.
At the end of 1914 the condition of the Fleet was:
Fleet-Flagship: _Iron Duke_.
_1st Battle Squadron_:
8 ships (complete).
_2nd Battle Squadron_:
4 ships (the _Conqueror_ and _Monarch_ being disabled and the
_King George V._ retubing her second condenser).
_3rd Battle Squadron_:
7 ships (_Commonwealth_ refitting).
_4th Battle Squadron_:
7 ships (complete) but two new ships, the _Benbow_ and _Emperor
of India_, not yet efficient.
_1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
5 ships (_Princess Royal_ was away).
_2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
3 ships (_Black Prince_ refitting).
_2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (complete).
_3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (complete).
_6th Cruiser Squadron_:
2 ships (complete).
_1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
4 ships (complete).
_2nd Light Cruiser Squadron_:
2 ships (2 not joined).
_10th Cruiser Squadron_:
14 ships (4 coaling and refitting).
_2nd Flotilla_:
16 destroyers (4 refitting).
_4th Flotilla_:
17 destroyers (3 refitting).