GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES
In the early summer of 1915 there was a vague impression in some
quarters, unsupported, so far as I am aware, by any confirmatory
evidence, that the enemy might exhibit greater activity at sea. But
during June, so far as could be ascertained by our intelligence system
and by our submarine patrols, the Germans made no attempt to move to
sea, but concentrated attention on increased submarine activity. The
Grand Fleet, for various reasons unconnected with this development,
spent the greater part of the time in harbour, exercising in Scapa
Flow, the ships from the Rosyth base being sent up in pairs to exercise
and carry out gunnery and torpedo practices. The opportunity of this
change of base was usually taken for a searching sweep whilst _en
route_ between the bases, so that the North Sea was continually under
observation.
On June 11th, however, the Grand Fleet went to sea for a cruise
in northern waters principally for gunnery practices and battle
exercises, which were carried out on a large scale. On this occasion
the sea-planes working from the _Campania_ were utilised, so far as
I am aware, for the first time in history in observing the movements
of the squadrons, which were ordered to represent a large hostile
fleet. From this beginning, there was a great development in the work
of heavier-than-air craft operating with a fleet. The first step
was the provision of a flying-off deck in a ship for sea-planes,
as the extreme difficulty experienced by sea-planes in rising from
the water, except in very fine weather, rendered the provision of a
flying-off deck essential; the next was the substitution of aeroplanes
for sea-planes, working from special carriers; and, finally, the
provision of flying-off platforms in fighting ships themselves, first
in light cruisers, afterwards in battle cruisers, and, eventually,
in battleships; these successive developments were rendered possible
by the progressive improvement in aircraft. In this way, naval power
was given the assistance which air power could give it, both in
reconnaissance and in making its gunnery more effective.
The Scapa force proceeded to the westward through the Pentland Firth
on the 11th. It carried out target practice at special targets towed
by colliers to the north-westward of the Shetlands on the 12th, being
joined by the Cromarty force (the 1st Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser
Squadron) that evening; the fleet then separated for night-firing.
The Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had also left Rosyth on the 11th,
carried out night-firing on the 12th, and the whole Grand Fleet
practised battle exercises on the 13th, the Battle Cruiser Fleet
afterwards firing at the targets which were towed by colliers, and
rejoining my flag at daylight on the 14th. On that day further battle
exercises were carried out. The _Campania_, with her sea-planes, again
took part in these exercises, and an improvement in the scouting work
of the sea-planes was noticeable. The Fleet then returned to the
various bases, the Scapa force passing westward of the Orkneys.
Whilst the main portion of the Grand Fleet was exercising in northern
waters, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with
one-half of the 1st Flotilla, cruised in the central portion of the
North Sea.
Other operations during the month included:
From the 1st to the 3rd, and the 5th to the 7th, further mine-sweeping
operations were carried out by the Fleet sweepers and paddle sweepers
in connection with the German mine-field in the southern portion of
the North Sea, the operation being covered by four light cruisers
and a force of destroyers. The work of clearing that portion of the
mine-field, which it was decided to sweep up, was completed on the
7th. On several days during the month a force from Harwich, comprising
light cruisers and destroyers, was cruising off the Dutch coast with
the object of intercepting and attacking zeppelins. The force did not,
however, meet with any success.
From the 4th to the 7th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, with three armed
boarding-steamers and three destroyers, operated on the two trade
routes, St. Abbs Head to the Skagerrak and Rotterdam to Norwegian
ports, examining all vessels encountered; nothing of special interest
occurred. But when returning during a thick fog to Scapa the armed
boarding-steamer _Duke of Albany_ grounded on the Lother Rock, Pentland
Firth, at 4 A.M. on the 7th, remained ashore for seven days, and was
considerably damaged.
From the 18th to the 21st the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the light
cruisers _Nottingham_ and _Birmingham_, of the 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron, accompanied by four destroyers, swept across the North Sea,
steering to the eastward from Rosyth to the entrance to the Skagerrak,
thence to the coast of Norway and back to Rosyth. This force was
attacked by at least three submarines during the sweep, and torpedoes
were fired at the _Birmingham_ on the 19th, and at the _Argyll_, the
_Roxburgh_ (on two occasions), and the _Nottingham_ on the 20th. Two
torpedoes were fired at the _Nottingham_. These ships were proceeding
at high speed and all the attacks failed, except the second attack
on the _Roxburgh_ (Captain C. R. de C. Foot), which was hit in the
bows by a torpedo at 2 P.M. on the 20th in Lat. 56.47 N., Long. 0.38
E. Fortunately, the damage was well forward, and the _Roxburgh_ was
able to maintain a speed of 14 knots during her return to Rosyth, all
available destroyers of the 1st Flotilla being sent out to meet and
screen her in. At the time of the attack the _Roxburgh_ was proceeding
at high speed and zigzagging, with one destroyer screening her. The
ship was considerably damaged, and her repairs at a dockyard occupied a
lengthened period.
The incident furnished an example of the risks run by heavy ships
cruising in the North Sea in waters frequented by submarines,
unless accompanied by a much stronger screen of destroyers than it
was possible to provide owing to the paucity of destroyers and the
immense amount of work required of them. It was noted at the time, and
considered to be suspicious, that a large fleet of trawlers flying
neutral colours was fishing in the neighbourhood of these submarine
attacks.
As a result a force comprising three armed boarding-steamers and
three destroyers was despatched from Scapa on June 26th to examine a
fleet of neutral fishing vessels working to the south-eastward of the
Pentland Firth and on the ordinary track of the Fleet when proceeding
to sea. Six vessels were sent in for detailed examination, but nothing
suspicious was found on board. The fishing fleet, however, shifted its
ground to a position clear of the track of the Fleet.
Operations against enemy submarines carried out by Grand Fleet forces
during June included the following:
_June 1st to 2nd._--A division of destroyers endeavoured, without
success, to locate and attack a submarine 60 to 80 miles to the
eastward of May Island.
_June 4th to 5th._--Two destroyers and two sloops operated against
a submarine, with a supposed tender, to the eastward of the
Pentland Firth.
_June 5th._--The armed trawler _Hawk_, of the Peterhead area,
disabled submarine U 14 by gun fire and sank her by ramming at 7.30
A.M. in Lat. 57.15 N., Long. 0.32 E. One officer and 21 men were
rescued. It was a fine exploit, typical of the consistently good
work of the vessels of the Peterhead patrol; it was a success that
was specially welcome at this time when submarines were very active
in northern waters.
There were many other engagements between auxiliary patrols and
submarines during the month, but no other _certain_ successes. It was
believed that at least one submarine was sunk in a deep mine-field
which had been laid at my request off Tod Head on the Aberdeen
coast. Appended are notes of further operations against the enemy’s
under-water craft:
_June 18th and 19th._--Anti-submarine operations by three
destroyers and sloops were carried out in the Fair Island Channel.
_June 20th._--Four destroyers were operating against submarines to
the westward of the Orkneys.
_June 21st and 22nd._--The _Botha_ and eight destroyers of the 1st
Flotilla were operating against submarines in an area between Lat.
56.20 and 57.10 N. and Long. 1 E. to 1 W.
_June 21st._--Four destroyers and six gunboats were operating to
the east of the Pentland Firth against a submarine.
_June 23rd._--Submarine U 40 was sunk 50 miles S.E. by S. of Girdle
Ness at 9 A.M. by submarine C 24, working in company with a trawler.
_June 23rd._--A division of destroyers was sent to operate against
a submarine to westward of the Fair Island Channel.
_June 24th–26th._--Three sloops were engaged in searching for a
submarine to the eastward of Orkneys and Shetlands.
_June 26th._--A large force, comprising 20 armed trawlers from
Granton in the Firth of Forth, began to operate against submarines
in an area round Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E., remaining out until July
7th. Two armed trawlers, with C class submarines in company, were
also operating to the southward of this position.
_June 30th–July 1st._--A force of eight destroyers was operating
against submarines in the Fair Island Channel.
The anti-submarine operations by destroyers or sloops met with no
success. The invariable difficulty was the provision of a sufficiently
large number of vessels to keep the submarine down long enough to cause
her to exhaust her battery power, a period of some 48 hours. When
destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet were used for anti-submarine
operations at any distance from the base, the disadvantage of their
not being available to accompany the Fleet to sea in an emergency
had to be accepted. This would have led to awkward results had the
Fleet proceeded to sea with any considerable shortage of destroyers
for screening purposes on passage south and for Fleet purposes during
a Fleet action. The dilemma was one which faced me during the whole
period of my command of the Fleet.
My experience convinced me that anti-submarine operations by destroyers
in such open waters as existed near the northern bases had but little
prospect of success unless undertaken by a considerably larger number
of vessels than were usually available at Scapa for such operations; a
contributory reason for the shortage of destroyers was that in addition
to the operations carried out by the heavy ships, cruisers and light
cruisers, for which the presence of destroyers was necessary, there was
a constant call on these vessels for escort work during the movements
of single ships or of squadrons between bases.
Other events of interest during this month included:
The formation of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron of new light cruisers
under the command of the late Commodore Le Mesurier, C.B., in the
_Calliope_. This squadron was attached to the Battle Fleet, and in
cruising order at sea was usually stationed from three to five miles
ahead of the Battle Fleet to act as an advanced submarine screen
forcing submarines to dive. From this position it could reach the
van of the Fleet on deployment for action, and was stationed there
for the purpose of attacking enemy destroyers with gunfire and the
enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes. It was a squadron on which, as
Commander-in-Chief, I kept a hold so that I might be certain it would
be at my disposal when action with the enemy was joined. Other light
cruiser squadrons, which occupied an advanced position in the cruiser
screen, could not be depended upon with the same certainty to occupy
the van position to which they were allotted during a fleet action,
since they might become engaged with enemy vessels of the same class.
The battle cruiser _Inflexible_ joined the Fleet from Gibraltar on June
19th.
The _Liverpool_ left to pay off on the 26th for repair to boilers.
Rear-Admiral W. B. Fawckner took charge of the 10th Cruiser Squadron
base at Swarbachs Minn on the 18th.
During the month observation mine-fields at the entrance to Cromarty
and off Hoy Sound, Scapa Flow, were completed.
A short visit was paid to the Fleet at Scapa Flow by the Archbishop
of York on the 26th. He held a Fleet Confirmation in the _Iron
Duke_, a great open-air service on Flotta Island, many thousands of
officers and men attending; there was another service at Longhope,
and, in addition, he visited the majority of the ships. He was indeed
indefatigable and left amidst the most sincere expressions of regret.
To me personally his visit gave the greatest pleasure. From Scapa he
passed to Invergordon, where, during a two days’ stay, he held a large
open-air service, and visited most of the ships based there, moving on
to Rosyth, where an impressive open-air service took place in one of
the large graving-docks.
The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued throughout the
month, an average of 73 ships being intercepted weekly and 15 sent in
for detailed examination.
A serious attack was made by an enemy submarine on the fishing fleet
some 50 miles to the eastward of the Shetlands on the night of the
23rd–24th June, about 16 drifters being sunk by bombs and gunfire. This
incident emphasised the necessity for better control over the movements
of our fishing vessels in northern waters and of providing some form of
protection for them. Steps were taken in both directions, although they
naturally resulted in some unavoidable reduction in the operations of
the fishing fleet.
The weather at Scapa during June was very misty, fog or mist being
experienced on the 7th, 8th, 12th, 13th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and
30th.
During July, 1915, fleet movements were kept to the lowest possible
minimum owing to a threatened strike in the Welsh coal-fields, which
eventually took place on the 18th, and caused considerable anxiety as
to its effect on Fleet movements.
From the 11th to the 14th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the 1st, 2nd
and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd
and 4th Flotillas, and the _Campania_ cruised in the vicinity of the
Shetland Islands and carried out a series of battle exercises during
the cruise. The Battle Cruiser Fleet made a sweep between the 11th and
13th down to the Dogger Bank. Whilst the Battle Fleet was at sea the
destroyer flotillas were sent into Balta Sound (Shetland Islands) to
complete with fuel in case a move south on the part of the Battle Fleet
became necessary.
On the 28th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with two ships of the
1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, the 4th
Light Cruiser Squadron, and 14 destroyers of the 1st and 4th Flotillas
from Rosyth and Scapa, together with Commodore Tyrwhitt and four light
cruisers and 12 destroyers from Harwich, left their bases to carry out
an operation in the Skagerrak, with the object of intercepting trade
and searching for any enemy vessels. Only one German vessel (a trawler)
was encountered, and she was sunk after removal of the crew. A Danish
steamer was sent in to a British port with a guard on board and the
force returned to their various bases on the 31st.
As the threatened coal strike limited the movements of the coal-burning
heavy ships, the oil-burning destroyers were used for anti-submarine
work to a greater extent than would have been desirable if greater
activity of the Fleet had been anticipated.
Operations against enemy submarines included:
On July 1st the _Hampshire_ reported that a torpedo had been fired
at her in the Moray Firth. Twelve destroyers and all available local
patrol vessels were sent to endeavour to locate and sink the submarine.
The steamboats from the ships at Cromarty were also despatched to
operate in the various bays in the Moray Firth, where a submarine
might elect to lie on the bottom. The boats exploded a large number
of charges on the bottom in the hope of forcing any submarine to the
surface. The operations were abandoned on the evening of the 2nd, the
submarine not having been located.
On the 4th a division of the 2nd Flotilla hunted for another submarine
reported in the Moray Firth.
From the 5th to the 10th the sea-plane carrier _Campania_, with a
flotilla leader, eight destroyers, four sloops and a large number
of trawlers and net-drifters, operated against submarines that were
reported to be passing through the Fair Island Channel, being based
on Pierowall Harbour, in the north of the Orkneys. The destroyers,
sloops and patrol vessels operated in conjunction with the sea-planes.
No success was achieved, however, although these extensive operations
covered a large area.
On the night of the 16th a division of destroyers operated against
a submarine reported to the southward of the Pentland Firth, off
Duncansby Head, but again without result.
From the 15th to the 19th six sloops and seven gunboats were despatched
against submarines in the Fair Island Channel and north of the
Shetlands, the _Campania’s_ sea-planes again assisting from Pierowall
Harbour. Destroyers were also helping during a portion of the period
covered by the operations. On the 16th the gunboat _Speedwell_ reported
having sighted the periscope of a submarine, ramming her at a speed
of 15 knots. The submarine was struck on her starboard quarter at an
angle of 10 degrees, but there was, unfortunately, no evidence to show
that she was sunk, although it was probable that she was considerably
damaged. She was not seen again. On the same day a submarine was
reported by the armed yacht _Zaza_, as being in a drift-net 12 miles
east-north-east from Fair Island. Local patrol vessels, gunboats and
four destroyers concentrated on the position and explosive charges
were fired, but without certain result. From the 25th to the 27th a
sub-division of destroyers searched, fruitlessly, a large area to the
northward of the Hebrides for submarines and a reported submarine base
ship. They were assisted by four sloops operating in the area from the
26th to the 30th.
On the 18th and 19th a division of destroyers was engaged in moving a
neutral fishing fleet away from an area to the eastward of the Firth
of Forth where they interfered with Fleet operations. Submarine C 27
had for some little time been operating against submarines in the North
Sea from Scapa, in tow of a trawler, to which vessel she was connected
by telephone. This idea, which had first been conceived at the Rosyth
base, had also been put into operation at Scapa, the arrangements being
made under the direction of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville. On July 20th
the trawler _Princess Louise_, Lieutenant Morton, R.N.R., being in
command, with Lieutenant Cantlie, R.N., a submarine officer, on board,
was towing Submarine C 27 (Lieutenant-Commander Dobson) in a submerged
condition when a German submarine, U 23, was sighted 1¼ miles off on
the port bow. C 27 was informed by telephone, telephonic communication
then breaking down. U 23 opened fire at a range of 2,000 yards on the
_Princess Louise_. Lieutenant Cantlie, being unable to communicate
further with C 27, slipped the tow and proceeded to abandon the trawler
with every appearance of haste. U 23 closed to within 600 yards and
stopped. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Commander Dobson, hearing nothing
further by telephone, but noticing the splash and explosion of the
projectiles in the water, got well clear of the trawler after slipping,
and then brought his periscope to the surface for a look around.
He sighted U 23 about 900 yards off, closed to a good position for
attack within 500 yards, and fired his first torpedo, which missed.
His second shot hit; there was a heavy explosion, and U 23 sank; four
officers and six men were picked up out of a crew of 34. The whole
attack was exceedingly well managed and a very well deserved success
scored, which reflected much credit on all concerned in the operations.
On the 26th a submarine was engaged about 120 miles east of Dundee by
the armed trawler _Taranaki_, which claimed to have sunk her.
On the 27th an engagement took place between the armed trawler No. 830
and a submarine to the southward of St. Kilda, the trawler reporting
that the submarine was hit several times by gunfire and considered to
have been badly damaged.
Other events of interest during the month included an attempt by the
_Digby_ to tow the Norwegian steamer _Oscar II._, damaged by collision
with the _Patuca_ on July 1st, into Stornoway, the destroyers _Fury_
and _Staunch_ being detached from Scapa and local patrol vessels from
Stornoway to assist. In spite of perseverance under very bad weather
conditions, during which the ships and the destroyers were handled with
great ability, the _Oscar II._ sank on the night of the 3rd.
An expedition consisting of the armed merchant-ship _Columbella_, the
sloop _Acacia_ and the two trawlers _Arley_ and _Mafeking_, left Scapa
on July 29th for Bear Island and Spitzbergen to search for a reported
German submarine base and wireless station. These vessels carried out
as thorough a search as was possible, in face of the ice-fields in the
neighbourhood of the islands; but no trace of a submarine base was
discovered, nor could it have been possible for one to operate under
such conditions.
The average figures per week for the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the
month were:
Number of ships intercepted, 62; number of ships sent in with armed
guards, 10; number of ships on patrol, 15; number of ships refitting,
coaling or on passage to or from base, 9.
German submarines were active in the vicinity of the ships of the
10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, and the _Columbella_ was
unsuccessfully attacked on the 21st.
Some armed boarding steamers were detailed to assist the 10th Cruiser
Squadron during the month, being withdrawn from the patrol eastward of
the Pentland Firth.
The anti-submarine defence of the base at Swarbachs Minn was
practically completed during the month.
An event of great interest to the officers and men of the Fleet was
a visit from His Majesty the King, who arrived at Scapa on July 7th,
crossing from Thurso in the _Oak_, escorted by a portion of the 2nd
Flotilla. During His Majesty’s visit he stayed with Admiral Sir Stanley
Colville at Longhope and spent two very busy days with the Fleet.
His Majesty visited all the flagships, and a large number of the
officers and men of the ships of each division of the Battle Fleet and
of each vessel in the cruiser squadrons were assembled on board the
various flagships and passed before the King. His Majesty reviewed the
officers and men of the smaller vessels, destroyers, sloops, etc., on
the island of Flotta, visited hospital ships, and reviewed the great
mass of auxiliary vessels anchored in Scapa Flow, being greeted with
enthusiastic loyalty by the crews of these vessels: visited the various
shore batteries, and inspected the anti-submarine defences and the boom
vessels. The weather was bad, but the programme was carried out in
spite of these conditions. The officers and men of the Fleet derived
the utmost encouragement from His Majesty’s gracious visit. The King
made the following signal to the Commander-in-Chief as the _Oak_ left
the Fleet, escorted by a portion of the 4th Flotilla:
“I am delighted that I have been able to carry out a long-cherished
desire to visit my Grand Fleet. After two most interesting days
spent here, I leave with feelings of pride and admiration for the
splendid force which you command with the full confidence of myself
and your fellow-countrymen.
“I have had the pleasure of seeing the greater portion of the
officers and men of the Fleet. I realise the patience and
determined spirit with which you have faced long months of waiting
and hoping. I know how strong is the comradeship that links all
ranks together.
“Such a happy state of things convinces me that whenever the day of
battle comes my Navy will add fresh triumphs to its old glorious
traditions.”
In reply to His Majesty’s gracious message, I expressed the
appreciation of the officers and men of the Grand Fleet, adding that it
was “my conviction that the glorious traditions of the Navy are safe in
the hands of those I have the honour to command.”
During August the coal strike continued to influence Fleet movements to
a certain extent.
On August 2nd the _Iron Duke_, the 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st
Cruiser Squadron carried out target practice from Cromarty. This was a
new departure, the practice hitherto having been limited to firing at
a small target towed by other ships or by a collier to the northward
or eastward of the Shetlands, or firing at a rock. Both were highly
unsatisfactory methods, which did not enable the gunnery efficiency of
ships to be either tested or greatly improved. Accordingly I decided
to risk sending ships out from Cromarty to fire at a large target of
the pattern used in peace practices; it was towed across the Moray
Firth, the ships firing and the towing vessels being protected from
submarine attack by destroyers, sloops and gunboats. The system was an
improvement, although very expensive in the employment of destroyers,
etc. It was continued until practice in the Pentland Firth took its
place. The usual procedure was for two ships, screened by destroyers,
to be on the firing ground at a time, firing either independently or
with concentrated fire, with two more vessels approaching the firing
ground ready to fire when the first pair had finished. On completion
of practice the first pair returned to harbour and were met at the
entrance by the third pair, to which they turned over their destroyers.
Careful organisation insured that ships did not have to wait at the
entrance, nor was there delay for the target to be turned round for the
return run. A large number of destroyers, sloops or gunboats, patrolled
to seaward of the target to prevent submarines from approaching. The
total number usually employed screening and patrolling during a day’s
firing was from 22 to 28.
The _Iron Duke_, with the 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Cruiser
Squadron, proceeded to Scapa on completion of the practice, being
relieved later by another battle squadron and cruiser squadron in
accordance with the routine which had been established of changing
bases periodically. The special service ship No. 6 left Scapa for
Rosyth, with two destroyers, to endeavour to “draw” submarines to
attack her and give the destroyers an opportunity of engaging them; but
no attack took place.
From August 5th to the 9th extensive anti-submarine operations were
carried out to the westward of the Orkneys by a force consisting of
nine destroyers, six sloops, five gunboats and a large number of patrol
trawlers. The operations covered a very large area, the general idea
being to compel any submarine intending to pass round the Shetland
Islands or through the Fair Island Channel to submerge for a period
that would exhaust her batteries and eventually bring her to the
surface to recharge. The limited duration of darkness in northern
latitudes assisted the operations of the hunting vessels. No _certain_
success was attained. A submarine was sighted on the 6th at 7 P.M.,
and a heavy explosion, under water, close to the sloop _Hollyhock_ at
9.30 P.M. on the same night might have been due to a submarine coming
to grief, while another submarine was sighted at 10.30 A.M. on the 7th.
Examination of a sailing vessel found in the vicinity of this latter
submarine was unproductive.
The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on August 6th to cruise off
the Norwegian coast, and the battleships _Albemarle_ and _Russell_, of
the 6th Battle Squadron, arrived at Scapa for practices, having left
the Channel Fleet.
On August 7th I returned in the _Iron Duke_ to Cromarty in order to
meet the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer who were about
to visit Invergordon. At 9 A.M. on the 8th a wireless report was
received in the _Iron Duke_ that a submarine was attacking a steamer
off Rosehearty on the southern shore of the Moray Firth. The “duty”
destroyer division was ordered to sea at once, and the remaining
three available destroyers followed shortly afterwards. Meanwhile,
the destroyer _Christopher_, already on patrol in the Moray Firth,
reported herself in action at 11 A.M. with the submarine, which had
submerged, the report stating that the merchant-ship had been sunk. The
second destroyer on patrol, the _Midge_, assisted in the search for the
submarine, as did the remaining destroyers and patrol trawlers, without
result. At 10 A.M. the trawler mine-sweepers, which had been carrying
out the usual routine sweep on the southern shore of the Moray Firth,
reported the discovery of a mine-field to the northward of Banff, and
several reports were received during the day of drifting mines being
sighted along the coast and in the Firth. All destroyers were ordered
in at 4 P.M., except the two on patrol and any others in touch with the
submarine, and vessels remaining on patrol were given the limits of the
mine-field as far as they had then been ascertained.
Such investigation as could be hurriedly carried out during the day,
by signal and wireless, revealed the fact that a yacht and a trawler
on patrol on the night of the 7th–8th had sighted strange lights, but
without identifying the vessel carrying them, and it became apparent
that a German surface mine-laying vessel had been at work. The night
had been somewhat misty. Directions were at once sent by wireless
to the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, still at sea, to proceed at full
speed towards the Horn Reef to endeavour to intercept the returning
mine-layer, and the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons, from Rosyth,
were also sent out for the purpose; the Admiralty was also informed,
and as a result the Harwich force was sent on the same mission.
As the other squadrons proceeded, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron was
directed to the Skagerrak in case the mine-layer endeavoured to return
by that route, whilst the remaining light cruiser squadrons made for
the Horn Reef. All the mine-sweepers and the destroyers engaged in
the anti-submarine operation mentioned earlier were recalled to fuel
with all despatch, and sweeping by the Fleet mine-sweepers, trawlers
and destroyers, organised on a large scale, was begun on the 9th
and continued until clear routes for the ships at Cromarty and for
merchant-ships, gradually extending to 10 miles in width, had been
swept on both the northern and southern shores of the Moray Firth.
These sweeping operations were greatly delayed by persistent fog,
although a clear channel sufficiently wide to admit of the exit of the
squadrons at Cromarty was quickly swept. The _Campania_ was sent to
Cromarty, so that her sea-planes might assist to locate the mines, but
in the rather thick waters of the Moray Firth they were of no use for
this purpose.
On the afternoon of the 9th news was received that the destroyer _Lynx_
had been sunk by a mine at 6 A.M. that morning in a position stated to
be two miles to the northward of the mine-field as then located. It was
very regrettable that only three officers and 21 men were saved out of
her fine ship’s company; those lost included her captain, Commander
John F. H. Cole, an officer of great promise. The loss of such a
comparatively shallow draft vessel showed that some of the mines had
been laid near the surface, and mine-sweeping operations were suspended
near the time of low water.
At 4.30 P.M. Commodore Tyrwhitt, of the Harwich force, reported that
the German mine-layer _Meteor_, which had been sighted by his vessels
in the vicinity of the Horn Reef, had been abandoned and sunk by her
own crew and that he had subsequently rescued four officers and 39
men, survivors of the armed boarding-steamer _Ramsey_, who had been
prisoners on board the _Meteor_. The _Ramsey_ had been on patrol
south-east of the Pentland Firth, and it was ascertained from the
survivors later that she had sighted and closed the _Meteor_, which
was disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, shortly after daylight on
August 8th, with the intention of boarding her. On closing, however,
the _Meteor_ suddenly showed her true character; her powerful armament,
hitherto concealed, opened a heavy fire on the _Ramsey_, which was
returned by the latter ship’s greatly inferior armament of 12-pounder
guns. But the surprise was too complete and the odds too heavy, and the
_Ramsey_ was sunk very quickly with her colours flying, four officers
and 39 men out of a complement of 97 being picked up by the _Meteor_.
Acting-Lieut. P. S. Atkins, R.N.R., the senior surviving officer of the
_Ramsey_, came north to report himself to me, and gave full details
of his experiences. He stated that when the officers of the _Meteor_
abandoned and sank their ship on sighting Commodore Tyrwhitt’s force,
the crew, with the British prisoners, went on board a neutral fishing
vessel. Shortly afterwards the British light cruisers passed close
to the fishing vessel, and Lieut. Atkins signalled to the Commodore,
stating that they were survivors of the _Ramsey_ and asked to be taken
off. He added that the Commodore, who was at that time being attacked
by both aircraft and submarines, replied, “Steer south-west; I will
return and pick you up.”
Lieut. Atkins thereupon asked the Captain of the _Meteor_ to steer
south-west, but the Germans naturally enough objected, as they desired
to make their own coast. However, in spite of the fact that the British
were unarmed and numerically very inferior, their arguments prevailed
and a south-west course was steered for a short time until another
fishing vessel was sighted; the British suggested transferring to
her; this was agreed to by the Germans. As the British were leaving,
the German captain, Konstten-Kapitän von Knorr, asked Lieut. Atkins
if he had any money, to which he replied, “How could I, seeing that
you picked me up in pyjamas?” Captain von Knorr pressed money on him,
but Lieut. Atkins said that he did not see that he would require
it. However, he eventually took it, Captain von Knorr handing him
an English £5 note and other money. It is pleasant to record so
gentlemanly and courteous an act, which stands out in strong contrast
to the usual behaviour of German naval officers during the War. The
money was given to me, and I sent it to the Admiralty, asking that it
might be repaid, with the thanks of the British for the courtesy shown
to our prisoners of war.
The 1st, 2nd and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons were ordered to return to
their bases on receipt of the news of the sinking of the _Meteor_.
The mine-sweeping operations in the Moray Firth on August 9th showed
that the mine-field was larger than had been at first reported, and
additional paddle mine-sweepers were sent from the Clyde to assist the
other vessels.
Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna were on board the _Iron Duke_ from the 7th
to the 9th, and various matters of importance were discussed. When
questioned as to urgent requirements I pressed for the building of a
large number of sloops, a class of vessel which had proved most useful,
both as mine-sweepers and as patrol vessels, and which could supplement
the numerous destroyers then building, which took much longer to
complete.
The persistence of the fog at this period is shown by the fact that the
_Agincourt_, returning to Scapa from Portsmouth, was unable to enter
the base for 36 hours after passing Cape Wrath, only 60 miles distant,
and was forced to cruise to the westward, making repeated attempts at
entry. The _Ajax_ was similarly delayed in entry for 12 hours during
the same period.
On August 10th the armed merchant-ship _India_, of the 10th Cruiser
Squadron, was torpedoed and sunk by an enemy submarine off the coast of
Norway with considerable loss of life.
Four destroyers were sent on August 13th to locate and engage a
submarine that had attacked one of the Fleet mine-sweepers. They did
not succeed in finding her, but on the following day an armed yacht
engaged a submarine off the Aberdeen coast and claimed to have hit her
by gunfire; and the trawler _Shamrock_ claimed to have run over another
submarine.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, the 4th Light Cruiser
Squadron from Scapa, and seven destroyers carried out a search between
the 16th and 18th for enemy vessels in the northern and central portion
of the North Sea, sweeping towards the Skagerrak, and covering a large
area by wide zigzags.
The _Iron Duke_ returned to Scapa from Cromarty on the 16th.
From the 18th to the 21st the _Lion_, with the 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was cruising in the North Sea
and carrying out exercises off the Shetland Islands, proceeding to
Scapa for practices on the 21st, and returning to Rosyth on the 23rd.
On August 18th the Fleet mine-sweeper _Lilac_, Lieut.-Commander Leslie
Fisher, while at work on the Moray Firth mine-field, struck a mine.
The whole fore part of the ship was destroyed and the wreck of it hung
down from the after part, causing her to draw 30 feet of water forward,
instead of the usual nine to ten feet. The weather was very bad and
a heavy sea running, but by great persistence and good seamanship,
aided by very gallant work on the part of her own crew and that of the
_Hollyhock_, Captain Preston, senior officer of Fleet mine-sweepers,
who was in command of the _Hollyhock_, succeeded in towing her to
Peterhead. She was eventually reconstructed and rejoined the Fleet
mine-sweeping flotillas. The value of this class of vessel was clearly
shown by the incident.
Eight destroyers from Scapa, with a flotilla leader, were carrying out
on August 23rd and 24th anti-submarine operations in the Fair Island
Channel, and a division was similarly employed east of May Island, in
the Firth of Forth.
Between August 24th and 26th the 3rd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons
exchanged bases, between Scapa and Rosyth, carrying out a wide search
of the North Sea _en route_, destroyers screening the ships by day.
On the 24th Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G., relieved Rear-Admiral
Hugh Evan-Thomas in the 1st Battle Squadron, the latter officer being
designated to take command of the new 5th Battle Squadron (five ships
of the “Queen Elizabeth” class), as it was formed.
On August 30th–31st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers,
searched to the eastward of May Island for enemy vessels; and from
August 31 to September 1st the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied
by four destroyers, was cruising between the Firth of Forth and the
Dogger Bank for the same purpose.
During the month the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons carried out target
practice in the Moray Firth, and all battle squadrons and cruiser
squadrons proceeded to sea for cruises, independently, from their
bases, screened by destroyers.
His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales visited Sir Stanley Colville at
Longhope during the month, remaining for six days. He went on board
many of the ships of the Grand Fleet.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron report for the month showed the average
weekly results as follows: Ships intercepted, 65; ships sent in, 13;
number of vessels on patrol, 14; number refitting, coaling or _en
route_ to or from patrol, 9.
The weather at Scapa was very misty. Fog or mist was experienced on the
3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 23rd, 31st.
There were no gales.
On August 3rd the large floating-dock from the Medway, which had been
towed to the Tyne, was reported as ready for use.
On the 29th the old light cruiser _Brilliant_ arrived at Lerwick to
act as guard and depot ship at that base, which was being developed as
a secondary examination base for vessels sent in by the 10th Cruiser
Squadron.
An extended patrol to the south-eastward of the Pentland Firth during
the month was maintained by three armed boarding steamers and three
destroyers.
The principal events of September, 1915, may perhaps be given most
conveniently and briefly in diary form:
On September 1st eight destroyers, fitted for mine-sweeping, swept
the waters to the westward of the Pentland Firth. This was the first
occasion on which destroyers were used for this purpose.
September 1st and 2nd.--The _Black Prince_ and four light cruisers,
with six destroyers, carried out a sweep to the eastward from Scapa.
September 2nd–5th.--The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
Cruiser Squadrons, and the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron were cruising
in northern waters. Destroyers screened the Fleet out and back, but
did not remain with it during the cruise, being kept at the base,
ready fuelled, in case it became necessary to move to the southward.
Battle exercises and night-firing were carried out during the cruise,
as opportunity offered. The battleship _Superb_ reported sighting the
periscope of a submarine.
On September 2nd the Fleet was visited by five French gentlemen of
eminence, and a representative of the United States Press. This was
the first visit paid to the Grand Fleet base by anyone not immediately
connected with the Service, and we were flattered that the occasion
should have brought to Scapa Flow representatives of our gallant Allies
from across the Channel. The Fleet left immediately after the visit,
and an opportunity was afforded our visitors of seeing the ships leave
harbour.
September 4th.--Another mine-sweeping sloop, the _Dahlia_, Lieutenant
G. Parsons, R.N., struck a mine in the Moray Firth mine-field during
sweeping operations. She was very badly damaged; Lieut. Parsons himself
was severely injured. The ship reached Invergordon with the loss of
three killed and one missing. She was subsequently repaired.
September 7th.--The 3rd Cruiser Squadron left Scapa, with destroyers,
swept down in the direction of the Horn Reef, and arrived at Rosyth on
the 9th without sighting enemy vessels. Visibility was low during the
sweep.
September 8th.--The 7th Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth, with destroyers,
swept out to the eastward, towards the Skagerrak, then turned to the
northward and arrived at Scapa on the 10th.
Two destroyers were damaged by collision with steamers in a fog on the
8th, necessitating repairs at a dockyard in both cases.
September 10th–12th.--The _Lion_, with the 1st and 3rd Battle Cruiser
Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and 16 destroyers,
was cruising in the North Sea to cover mine-laying operations carried
out by our mine-layers in the Heligoland Bight, the remainder of the
Grand Fleet being, as was usual on such occasions, at short notice
for steam. The _Fearless_ and a destroyer, part of the force with
the battle cruisers, collided while at sea, the former sustaining
considerable damage.
September 11th.--The _Patia_ and _Oropesa_, of the 10th Cruiser
Squadron, collided; the _Patia_ was seriously damaged, and was
brought into port under convoy of a destroyer and armed trawlers with
considerable difficulty, being unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine
_en route_.
September 12th.--Submarine E 16, attached to the Grand Fleet flotilla,
was sent to the coast of Norway from Aberdeen to operate against an
enemy submarine thought to be operating in those waters. On the 15th
E 16 sighted a hostile submarine off the Norwegian coast and sank her
with a torpedo. This success, one of the earliest achieved by one
submarine operating against another, was very encouraging after the
somewhat similar success of C 27 in July.
September 17th.--The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers,
left Rosyth to sweep to the Skagerrak. They returned on the 19th,
without having sighted any enemy vessels.
September 23rd.--The destroyer _Christopher_ was damaged in collision
with the armed boarding-steamer _King Orry_ in a fog.
September 26th.--The s.s. _Caribbean_, which had been fitted out
as a receiving-ship for dockyard workmen, encountered very heavy
weather whilst _en route_ from her port to Scapa, and got into serious
difficulties, taking in a great deal of water. Her wireless distress
calls off Cape Wrath were answered by sending to her assistance the
light cruiser _Birkenhead_ from Scapa, together with tugs and yachts
from Scapa and Stornoway. At 4.45 A.M. on the 27th the _Birkenhead_ and
patrol vessels, which were then standing by, took off most of the crew
of the _Caribbean_, which sank at 7.30 A.M., unfortunately with the
loss of 15 lives.
During the month the battle and cruiser squadrons carried out
independent cruises by day and at night from the Scapa and Rosyth
bases, being screened by destroyers during the exercises. The squadrons
of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, also, all visited Scapa for the purpose of
carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices.
A widely extended patrol by one or more light cruisers with destroyers,
working to the south-eastward from Scapa, was maintained during the
month, in order to guard against any attempt at mine-laying in the
Pentland Firth by enemy vessels disguised as merchant-ships. Similar
precautions were taken at Rosyth. This patrol was henceforth regularly
established when the conditions of the moon rendered attempted
mine-laying operations at night probable.
The sweeping operations in the Moray Firth were continued on a large
scale throughout the month, and clear channels on each shore were
provided. Up to September 19th, 222 mines had been accounted for out
of the 450 which survivors of the _Ramsey_ stated had been laid by the
_Meteor_. The Moray Firth mine-field, in the centre of the Firth, was
purposely left undisturbed, as it formed an excellent anti-submarine
defence in that position and reduced the area to be patrolled by our
vessels.
The 3rd Cruiser Squadron became non-existent during the month, two
ships being detached by the Admiralty on special service, and the
remaining two sent into port for somewhat extensive repairs.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron’s _weekly average_ for the month worked out
at:
Ships intercepted, 64; sent in with armed guards, 11; number of
vessels on patrol, 13; number absent or _en route_ to or from patrols,
10.
The weather at Scapa showed fog or mist on the 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th,
14th, 18th, 23rd and 24th; a very heavy gale occurred between the 25th
and 28th, during which great damage was done to the anti-submarine
obstructions at Scapa, and a good deal of damage was suffered on the
mainland in the north of Scotland, a portion of the Highland Railway
being washed away.
Between June and August, 1915, I had pressed upon the Admiralty my
opinion that we should carry out a much more comprehensive mining
policy in the Heligoland Bight. I had urged this early in the War,
but the view taken at the Admiralty was that mining on any large
scale would impede both our submarine operations and also any Fleet
operations that might be undertaken in those waters. I felt that unless
we adopted one of two policies--namely, either a close watch by surface
ships on the exits from the German bases, or an extensive mining
policy--we could never feel that we should receive sufficient warning
of the exit of enemy forces as to prevent mischief being done. The
close blockade by surface ships was not a feasible operation in view
of the number of craft at our disposal and the submarine danger; our
submarines were too few in number and had not the necessary means of
communication to take the place of surface ships.
I could see no alternatives to very extensive mining, limited only by
the number of mines that could be produced. The mining proposed by
me was intended to hamper the operations of both surface vessels and
submarines. I pointed out that earlier in the War the view had been
expressed to me by the Admiralty that we should not risk our cruisers
too freely in the North Sea owing to the submarine danger, and that,
if we adhered to this policy, it was impossible to insure that the
exits to the Fleet bases would not be mined by surface mine-layers,
as the _Meteor_ incident had shown, and as was also indicated by the
success of our own infrequent mining excursions to the Heligoland Bight.
The correspondence resulted in increased activity on the part of our
mine-layers, but the success of our work was unfortunately handicapped
by defects in the pattern of mine in use at that time, especially as
against submarines.
In 1917, shortly after my return to the Admiralty, I undertook a
very extensive mining policy. In the previous year, during Sir Henry
Jackson’s period as First Sea Lord, a new and much improved mine was
designed, the trials of which were carried out after I relieved him.
This was one of the replies to the submarine. One hundred thousand
of these mines were ordered by me early in 1917 to carry out various
schemes for mining the Heligoland Bight and the Straits of Dover. Later
in 1917, with the assistance of the United States, provision was made
for the large mine-field across the North Sea known as the Northern
Barrage. It was not until the large supplies of mines became available
in the autumn that really effective results against submarines by
mining began to be achieved, although the operations of German surface
vessels had previously been hampered to a very considerable extent.