THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA
On September 1st the Dreadnought Battle Fleet with the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron and the 2nd and 4th
Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, cleaning boilers, storing, and taking in
ammunition, etc. The Fleet was at the usual anchorage off Scapa Pier,
on the north side of the Flow; the ships which were fitted with torpedo
nets had them out, as was customary, unless colliers or store-ships
were alongside.
The _Falmouth_, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was anchored to the
westward of Holm Sound, and the remainder of this squadron formed the
outer or southward line of ships, all at two hours’ notice for steam.
The weather during the day was dull and misty, with rain at times.
At 6 P.M. the _Falmouth_ reported the periscope of a submarine in
sight inside the harbour, and immediately opened fire, four rounds
being fired by this ship; she reported having probably hit the
submarine. Directly afterwards the _Vanguard_, one of the outer line
of battleships, also opened fire on an object reported as a periscope,
as did one of the E class destroyers, which was patrolling between the
Fleet and the Hoxa entrance.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh immediately steam
was ready, which was at 8.30 P.M., and to endeavour to locate the
submarine and keep her under.
The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope, at short notice, was also
instructed to weigh at once and search for the submarine. The whole of
the ships present were ordered to raise steam with all despatch, and
to prepare for torpedo attack, and the small craft, such as drifters,
steamboats, motor-boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready and which
could be collected, were at once organised in detachments to steam up
and down the lines at high speed and outside the Fleet, with the object
of confusing the submarine and endeavouring to ram her, if sighted.
Colliers and store-ships which had steam ready were directed to weigh
and to go alongside the battleships that were not fitted with torpedo
nets, in order to act as a form of protection against torpedoes fired
at these valuable vessels. All ships in the outer lines were directed
to burn searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine.
At about 6.30 P.M. the _Drake_ reported a submarine in sight from that
ship, thus confirming the earlier reports.
The Fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon as steam was
ready and to proceed to sea. By 9 P.M. the weather was exceedingly
thick inside the harbour and considerable difficulty was experienced
in getting the Fleet out, as at this time there were no navigational
facilities of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick
weather; but by 11 P.M. all the ships had left the harbour without
accident, and, although there was a dense fog outside, the Fleet
cleared the Pentland Firth successfully.
The _Assistance_ was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left after the Fleet,
reporting having sighted a submarine in the entrance whilst going out.
The 2nd Flotilla was left behind to locate and, if possible, destroy
the submarine, and the 4th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa
and Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet the Fleet
at 7 A.M. on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct from destroyers,
remaining in the harbour was the _Cyclops_, lying off Scapa with
the telegraph and telephone cables on board, and directions were
given to Rear-Admiral Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of the
mine-sweeping gunboats, the submarine reported sunk by the _Falmouth_.
No trace of a submarine was discovered, and subsequent investigation
showed that the alarm _may_ have been false, the evidence not being
conclusive either way. The incident, however, made it clear that
protection against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as
the Fleet could not remain at a base that was as open to this form
of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible action, in the event of
an alarm being given of the presence of a submarine, was to take the
Fleet to sea, and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time
from a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of insecurity was
created, which would be bad for moral, and the ships were deprived of
opportunities for cleaning boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which
experience was showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the
Fleet was to be maintained.
The matter was at once represented to the Admiralty and proposals were
made for blocking all the entrances to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and
Hoy entrances, by sinking old merchant ships in the channels. Pending
the supply of reliable defences for the main entrance, Rear-Admiral
Miller was directed to requisition a large number of net-drifters.
The plan was to lay drift nets in the entrance to be watched by the
drifters, the nets having indicator buoys attached to them and floating
on the surface, so that the presence of a submarine might be indicated
by the buoy moving with the net.
The navigational difficulties of the narrower entrances were,
meanwhile, the only obstacles to the passage of submarines through
them, but it was realised that these were considerable. The opinion was
formed, however, that the Hoxa entrance presented no insurmountable
difficulty of this nature to a determined submarine commander.
By this date the local defence flotilla of destroyers consisted of
vessels of the E class. A request was made for basing a hunting
flotilla of 16 trawlers on Kirkwall, these vessels being intended to
guard the approaches to the Pentland Firth and to act as submarine
hunters generally. It was also suggested that a monetary reward should
be offered to the personnel of any trawler through whose agency a
submarine was captured or destroyed.
The mine-sweeping force at Scapa had been strengthened by the addition
of a flotilla of trawlers, and the mine-sweeping gunboats and trawlers
were continuously employed in keeping certain fixed channels of
approach to the Pentland Firth swept and clear of mines. These vessels
were, therefore, not available for anti-submarine work, except to the
detriment of their mine-sweeping duties.
On September 1st the available cruiser squadrons were employed in Area
No. 6, supported by the 3d Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron.
From September 1st to September 5th the Battle Fleet remained at sea,
cruising in the area between the north-east coast of Scotland and the
coast of Norway, in support of the cruiser squadrons working to the
southward, and opportunity was taken to continue the exercises of the
Fleet in battle tactics, together with occasional gunnery practice. The
_Orion_, of the 2nd Battle Squadron, was still absent from the Fleet,
retubing condensers; the _King Edward VII._ rejoined on the 2nd, after
exchanging defective guns; and the _Dominion_ was then detached to
Devonport to exchange her damaged 12-inch guns.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been strengthened by the arrival
of the _Inflexible_ from the Mediterranean, and was employed during
this period in support of the cruiser sweeps, the Squadron joining the
Battle Fleet on the 3rd for battle exercises.
During the period under review reports from time to time of the
sighting of enemy submarines appeared to indicate that they were
working on a line Ekersund-Pentland Firth, the line which they were
apparently occupying during the first few days of the War, when U 15
was sunk by the _Birmingham_.
Information received on September 3d suggested that enemy cruisers
might have passed, or might be intending to pass, into the North Sea
via the Skagerrak. The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and
accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, were, therefore, directed to sweep to
the entrance to the Skagerrak, arriving there by noon of September 4th,
starting from a position in Lat. 58 N., Long. 2.36 E., at 4 A.M. that
day. From the Skagerrak the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons were to make
a detour to the south-westward with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron,
the latter proceeding then to Rosyth and the Cruiser Squadrons to
Cromarty; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd Flotilla,
was directed to sweep on a wide front towards the Pentland Firth on
the Ekersund-Pentland line in search of enemy submarines, which it was
hoped might be caught on the surface at night. Thence the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron was to proceed to Scapa to fuel, and the 2nd Flotilla
to the westward of the Orkneys to search for submarines, returning
to Longhope at 9 P.M. on September 6th. The 4th Flotilla, which had
been with the Battle Fleet, was directed at the same time to sweep the
western portion of the Ekersund-Pentland line for submarines, and then
to return to Longhope.
These orders were carried out, but no enemy vessels of any sort were
sighted, except that at 6.30 A.M. on the 5th the _Thetis_, mine-layer,
working south-eastward of the Orkneys, reported a suspicious vessel,
thought to be a German cruiser. The 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and
1st Light Cruiser Squadron closed in on the position, but the ship was
eventually identified as one of our own vessels.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe at 4 P.M. on the 5th
to coal, two mine-sweeping gunboats having been previously detached to
that base to search the entrance for mines.
During the early days of September frequent reports were received of
enemy mines having been discovered on the east coast, and several
vessels were sunk, as a consequence, including the gunboat _Speedy_.
It appeared that the enemy was laying the mines from merchant vessels
flying neutral or even, possibly, British colours, as well as from
regular mine-laying ships. The large number of vessels trading on the
east coast and of fishing craft at sea, both British and neutral,
greatly increased the difficulty of preventing these operations. The
task of boarding and examining even a considerable percentage of these
vessels involved a heavy strain. Our cruiser sweeps were showing this
daily. The Admiralty’s attention was drawn to the matter, and the
question was raised of establishing some restrictions, particularly as
regards the areas in which fishing should be permitted.
The extinction of a large proportion of our coast lights was also
proposed, the burning of which enabled the enemy to fix his position
accurately when engaged in mine-laying operations. This policy of the
extinction of lights, thus started, gradually became general, and
eventually only the most important lights were exhibited at night, and
the large majority of these were only shown when requests were made
by men-of-war who required them for entering port, the time of their
exhibition being thus reduced to a minimum.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe until 6 A.M. on
September 7th, and then proceeded to sea. The _Orion_ was left behind
to complete work on her condensers and rejoined the Fleet at sea on
September 9th, having been absent for twenty-one days.
The _Agincourt_, the new battleship which since commissioning had
been engaged in gunnery and torpedo practices either at Scapa or to
the westward of the Orkneys, joined the 4th Battle Squadron at sea
on September 7th in order to give her officers experience in working
with the Fleet. There had been great difficulty in carrying out her
practices because she had not been supplied with “sub-calibre” guns,
and this deficiency could not be made good for some months; this caused
much delay in raising her battle efficiency. However, she was manned
with officers and a ship’s company of a very high standard and, in
spite of all disadvantages, the early gunnery practices carried out by
her in company with the Fleet showed that she would eventually prove to
be a most valuable addition to the Fleet.
Representations had been made by me to the Admiralty that the
presence of a senior Flag officer in general command of the Orkneys
and Shetlands, who would be responsible for the defences of these
islands and the Fleet bases, was very necessary, the work of actual
administration of the base at Scapa Flow being sufficient fully to
occupy the time of Rear-Admiral Miller.
Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville accepted the post, and as
it was very desirable that the officer holding this position should be
junior to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, he paid me the
compliment of expressing his desire to be placed junior on the list to
myself, a reversal of our proper respective seniorities.
He was, accordingly, appointed, and came to Loch Ewe on September 6th,
to confer with me before taking up his appointment. He accompanied me
to sea in the _Iron Duke_ on the 7th in order to talk matters over, was
embarked on board the _Oak_ to the westward of the Orkneys, and took
up his command on arrival. The result was immediately most beneficial.
He was able to devote his whole time to the questions of defence and
organisation and relieved me of all these matters which had, as was
inevitable under the previous arrangement, occupied so much of my time
in harbour and so much of my thoughts at sea.
On September 6th the Portsmouth floating dock arrived safely at
Cromarty.
During September 7th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded northward
from Loch Ewe _en route_ to the North Sea, and passed through the Fair
Island Channel at 10 P.M., being joined at 4 A.M. by the 3rd Battle
Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth after dark on
this date and proceeded to the north-eastward, being joined at 4 A.M.
on the 8th by the _Sappho_ and four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla.
These smaller vessels were intended to carry out boarding duties in
order to avoid the danger to the large ships from submarine attack,
consequent on stopping for this purpose. The 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron swept to the south-eastward of Area 6 during daylight on
the 8th, and during the night of the 8th and daylight of the 9th was
on a patrol area approximately between Lat. 55 N., Long. 2 E., and
Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 2.40 E., with the object of intercepting possible
enemy mine-layers. The Battle Fleet carried out gunnery practices and
exercised battle tactics during the 8th eastward of the Orkneys, and at
dark proceeded to the southward to support an extensive sweep into the
Heligoland Bight which it had been decided to carry out on September
10th. The dispositions for this sweep were generally as follows:
The 1st and 3d Flotillas from Harwich, supported by the 1st Light
Cruiser Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to the northward, and
the 7th Cruiser Squadron to the westward, swept out the Heligoland
Bight from east to west, commencing from a position some ten to twelve
miles from Heligoland, which position was to be reached one hour before
dawn. The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, spread
20 miles ahead, was in position Lat. 55.9 N., Long. 4.24 E. at 8 A.M.
on September 10th, steering S.S.E. at 12 knots speed of advance.
The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons to the
southward, cruised to the north-westward of Heligoland until 11 A.M.
on the 10th, by which time it was clear that the sweep had been
unproductive. No German vessel of any sort was sighted, except one
seaplane reported by the 7th Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd Flotilla was
stationed with the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen, and to assist
the attached cruisers in boarding duties during the day, and the
4th Flotilla, which had been working with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser
Squadrons, principally for boarding duties, was also directed to join
the Battle Fleet on the morning of the 10th, but by reason of the
thick weather did not do so until 2 P.M. Owing to the large number of
trawlers that were met with, nearly all of which were flying neutral
colours, the boarding duties were very onerous. Considerable suspicion
attached to these trawlers because frequently Telefunken wireless
signals were noticed to be very strong after the Fleet had passed these
vessels; but close examination failed to reveal anything suspicious in
those that were boarded, no wireless apparatus being discovered in any
of them.
The conditions on September 10th were very unfavourable for the sweep
into the Bight. Thick weather prevailed both before and after daylight,
and the visibility varied from between two and five miles. The mist
prevented the junction of the 4th Flotilla with the Battle Fleet for
eight hours, a circumstance which would have had awkward consequences
had the High Sea Fleet been encountered with its full complement of 80
to 100 destroyers, as might have been the case in such close proximity
to German ports.
It was noted at the time that the conditions were very unfavourable
for a Fleet action owing to the low visibility combined with the glare
produced by the occasional sunshine and absence of wind. A passage in
the notes made on this occasion referred to such conditions as follows:
“The weather conditions ... were very unfavourable for a general action
owing to the low visibility and the glare caused by brilliant sunlight
and absence of wind.... The conditions make it impossible for the
Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the Fleet to know what is going on
in the van and rear ... besides being entirely favourable to tactics
largely based on the employment of torpedo craft or mine-layers.
“In addition there are great difficulties in concentrating detached
ships and flotillas and in forming the Fleet prior to battle, also in
the recognition of ships and destroyers.”
This passage is of interest because of its bearing on the Jutland
battle some two years later when somewhat similar conditions prevailed.
The difficulty of recognition mentioned made so much impression on my
mind that special daylight recognition devices which could be seen at
a considerable distance were subsequently devised and used by our own
light cruisers and destroyers when in the presence of the enemy.
When it became evident that there were no enemy vessels to engage,
I organised a sweep to the northward on a large scale, with a view
to intercepting any enemy ships that might be at sea and of closely
examining all merchant ships and fishing vessels which were met with.
The starting-point of the sweep was Lat. 55.30 N., Long. 4.0 E., the
dispositions being:
The _Invincible_ (which had now joined the Battle Cruisers) and the
_Inflexible_, to sweep towards Dundee.
3rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen at 12 knots speed of advance.
1st Light Cruiser Squadron towards Pentland Firth at 11 knots speed
of advance.
2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Fair Island at 10 knots speed of
advance.
All ships spread as widely as visibility admitted.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (which now once more included the
_New Zealand_) to be in general support.
The Battle Fleet with divisions spread four miles apart to extend
the sweep to the eastward.
These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 2.
At 3 A.M. on the 11th the sweep was directed to turn to N. 16 E., and,
later, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was stationed in a new area, No. 7,
between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.30 N., between 50 and 150 miles from
the coast. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron was sent to Cromarty to coal; the
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron rejoined
the Battle Fleet, and the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ were sent to
Scapa to coal, as well as the 3rd Battle Squadron, a half flotilla of
destroyers screening these vessels into the base.
During the 11th and 12th the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron carried out battle tactics and gunnery exercises, and the
Battle Fleet then proceeded to Loch Ewe, and the 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to fuel.
During the passage south and north numerous reports of floating mines
were received. The majority proved to be fishermen’s bladders which at
this time were being frequently reported by merchant ships as floating
mines.
The Admiralty now informed me that a patrol of the 3rd meridian of
East Long. between the parallels of 55.30 N. and 53.30 N. had been
established by the 1st and 3rd Flotilla, the patrol consisting of eight
destroyers and one light cruiser, supported by two cruisers of the
“Bacchante” class, the object being to catch enemy mine-layers. I was
also informed that a patrol of the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch
coast, was being maintained to guard the Eastern Channel and Thames
approaches.
On September 11th the _Hibernia_ reported a 12-inch gun cracked, the
fifth since the outbreak of war!
On the same day salvage operations on the armed merchant-cruiser
_Oceanic_, which had gone ashore in a fog on Foula Island on September
8th, were abandoned owing to heavy weather. The vessel broke up
eventually.
Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears reported that the Portsmouth floating dock
would be ready for work on September 21st, a very smart piece of
mooring work having been carried out by Captain Munro, R.N., the King’s
Harbour Master.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe coaling, storing and
cleaning boilers, etc., from 5 P.M. on September 13th until 6 P.M.
on September 17th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, except the
_Inflexible_ and _Invincible_, remained at Scapa until September 18th.
Meanwhile the usual cruiser sweeps in the North Sea in Areas 3, 6 and
7 were carried out by the 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and
the Mine-layer Squadron, supported by the _Invincible_, _Inflexible_
and 3rd Battle Squadron, which left Scapa on the morning of September
14th for the purpose. The armed merchant-cruisers _Alsatian_ and
_Mantua_ were patrolling eastward of the Shetlands.
Advantage was taken of the stay at Loch Ewe to make general
arrangements with the Admiralty for the defence of that base, and on
September 17th the First Lord of the Admiralty, with the Chief of War
Staff, the Director of Intelligence Division, Commodores (S) and (T)
arrived at Loch Ewe to confer with me. The bombardment and capture
of Heligoland was also discussed. The proposals had been previously
forwarded to me by Mr. Churchill, and had been carefully examined
by myself, Rear-Admiral Charles Madden, the Chief of Staff, and by
the Flag officers commanding the Battle Squadrons. The opinions of
these officers against the operation were unanimous. It had not been
suggested that the Grand Fleet should be used for the operation, except
as a supporting force; the older battleships were intended for this
purpose. But the arguments against the operation were overwhelmingly
strong. It was pointed out that ships were no match for heavy
fortifications such as were known to exist on Heligoland; that direct
fire from high-velocity guns with a low trajectory would be ineffective
against well-placed, heavily protected and well-concealed land guns;
that, even if a storming party were able to land and to capture the
island, it would be quite impossible to hold it, situated as it was
close to German naval bases, for if we could take it in a fortified
condition, it would be far easier for the Germans to recapture it
with the fortifications demolished; that it would be under continuous
attack by sea and air, and that any attempt to hold it, if captured,
would involve keeping the Grand Fleet constantly in southern waters,
which, owing to the number of small craft then available, was an
impossibility. Aircraft spotting, which would be a necessary adjunct,
was at that time in its infancy, and we had no vessels specially suited
for bombardments at long range, such as the monitors which, later on,
carried out such useful work on the Belgian coast. After a conference,
at which the Flag officers were present, I thought that the idea would
be abandoned.
This was not the case, however, and the matter was taken up later
at the Admiralty with Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, commanding the
Channel Fleet. His view coincided with those expressed by the Flag
officers at the Loch Ewe conference, although he was of course prepared
to carry out any orders that might be given him. The idea was not
finally abandoned for some time. The opinions of Sir Cecil Burney and
myself were identical, as indeed were those of every Flag officer with
whom I discussed the matter, with one single exception, a junior Flag
officer.
[Illustration: SWEEP OF SEP^{T.} 8^{TH.} TO 11^{TH.} 1914.]
Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill’s visit was that of
operations in the Baltic, but as no large operations of this nature
could be attempted without the assistance of Allied battleships, in
order to maintain supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no
steps were taken.
By this date a regular programme of dockings and refits for all ships
was recognised as necessary, and battleships were now being detached
one at a time for this purpose. For some months after the commencement
of the War, it was not possible to allow ships more than four days
for docking and for the execution of the most urgent work, except in
cases of accident or very serious defects, as our margin of superiority
was none too large, and we were already experiencing a good deal of
trouble with condenser tubes, necessitating ships being laid up for the
work of retubing; but the work achieved in the four days was a very
fine tribute to the dockyard organisation and to the industry of the
dockyard men.
The Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe on the evening of September 17th,
the _Erin_, a new battleship bought, incomplete, from Turkey, being
in company for the first time in order to accustom her officers to
working the ship with the Fleet. Target practice was carried out to
the westward of the Orkneys during the forenoon of the 18th, but was
interfered with by bad weather--a frequent experience. The Battle
Fleet then proceeded into the North Sea, via the Fair Island Channel,
the position at midnight, 18th, being Lat. 59.23 N., Long. 1.13 W.,
and course south. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa with the
1st Light Cruiser Squadron on the evening of the 19th, and the 2nd
Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty at the same time, all for the southward
for a sweep into the Heligoland Bight, supported by the Battle Fleet,
in search of the enemy and with a view to carrying out a thorough
examination of trawlers suspected of acting as look-out vessels for the
enemy.
While on passage south during the 19th the Battle Fleet was exercised
at battle tactics. At midnight on the 19th the Battle Fleet was in
position Lat. 58.3 N., Long. 2.24 E., and at 8 A.M. on the 20th, in
Lat. 57.8 N., Long. 3.20 E., having met the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. The
2nd Flotilla had been under orders to leave Scapa in time to meet the
Battle Fleet at 8 A.M. on the 21st, but, owing to bad weather, the
orders were cancelled and the flotilla returned to Scapa, as did the
4th Flotilla, which was to have accompanied the battle cruisers. During
daylight of the 20th the Battle Fleet cruised towards the Norwegian
coast to the northward of Lat. 57 N., in support of the battle cruisers
engaged in examining trawlers in the vicinity of the Little Fisher
Bank; it turned to the southward at 4 P.M. to rendezvous, at 5 A.M. on
the 21st, in Lat. 56 N., Long. 3.30 E., with the 3rd Battle Squadron,
which had been coaling at Scapa and had left on the 20th to join the
Commander-in-Chief.
At 7 A.M. on the 21st the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 55.45 N.,
Long. 3.30 E., and the Vice-Admiral of the battle cruisers having
reported at 6.20 A.M. from a position in Lat. 55.16 N., Long. 4.52
E., that the weather was too bad to admit of the search of trawlers
being carried out satisfactorily, the operation was abandoned and the
Fleet turned to the northward, as it was considered that an incomplete
examination would do more harm than good.
During this period the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was working in Area 7,
and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in Area 6, as usual; the _Alsatian_ and
_Mantua_, with the _Drake_, of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping
down the Norwegian coast and then returned to resume their patrol east
of the Shetlands, where they were joined by the armed merchant ship
_Teutonic_.
The 2nd and 4th Flotillas left Scapa on the 20th and joined the Battle
Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Squadron respectively on the 21st.
All wireless telegraphy signalling at sea was stopped between 4 P.M.
on the 20th and 4 P.M. on the 21st, in order that the enemy should not
become aware of the movements of the Fleet, as such knowledge might
prevent the High Sea Fleet from putting to sea and possibly deprive us
of our opportunity of catching it.
During the passage of the Fleet to the northward, an extensive sweep
was carried out during daylight of the 21st. The Battle Fleet covered a
front of 40 miles, and battle cruisers and cruisers prolonged the front
to the eastward and westward.
On the evening of the 21st I was informed by wireless telegraphy from
the Admiralty of a report that a German force of two light cruisers,
with destroyers and submarines in company, had been sighted from
Esbjerg on the 20th, proceeding to the northward. The whole Fleet was
turned to the southward at midnight on the 21st, and spread at dawn to
cover a front of 104 miles from the Norwegian coast westward, sweeping
to the northward, to endeavour to intercept the enemy vessels if they
had continued a course to the northward. The sweep to the northward
was continued until 10 A.M. The _Iron Duke_ was in position Lat. 59
N., Long. 2.35 E., when the line was directed to wheel towards the
Orkneys and Shetlands on a course N. 51 W. During the 22nd, visibility
was very good, but no enemy vessels were sighted, and the Dreadnought
Battle Fleet and battle cruisers passed to the westward of the Orkneys
during the night, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron being
detached to support the cruisers searching in the North Sea areas.
At 7.45 A.M. on the 22nd wireless telegraphy signals from the _Cressy_
were intercepted indicating that the _Aboukir_ and _Hogue_ had been
sunk by submarines in Lat. 52.18 N., Long. 3.41 E. These vessels were
patrolling the “Broad Fourteens,” off the Dutch Coast, under Admiralty
orders. No further details were received, beyond a wireless signal from
Commodore (S), at 11.30 A.M., that he was proceeding in the _Fearless_
with seventeen destroyers to Terschelling to endeavour to intercept the
enemy submarines on their way back. The Commander-in-Chief, thereupon,
ordered the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (from the southern position of Area
7) to proceed at once to support the Commodore (S). By directions,
however, given by the Admiralty these orders were cancelled, and the
forces returned.
At 10.30 P.M. I ordered the armed merchant-cruisers to proceed at
once to a position off Trondhjem, as a report had been received that
the German liner _Brandenburg_, lying at that port, was likely to
sail. Constant reports to this effect were received for several days,
and the _Brandenburg_ was heard using her wireless telegraphy on
September 25th. The patrol was maintained until September 28th, when
contradictory reports were to hand--one that she had been seen at sea
on the 27th, and the other that she was being interned by the Norwegian
Government. The latter report proved to be correct. The patrol was then
moved to a position off the Utvoer Lighthouse, Lat. 61.3 N., Long. 4.30
E., to intercept the German destroyer _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_, said
to be leaving a Norwegian port.
During the 23rd the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and battle cruisers
attempted to carry out gunnery practices, but thick weather interfered.
The force returned to Scapa to fuel, arriving on the 24th; the 3rd
Battle Squadron arrived for the same purpose on the 25th.
On the 23rd and 24th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron proceeded from Area 7 to
sweep up the Norwegian coast, thence going to Cromarty to coal. The
squadron arrived there on the evening of the 25th.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until the evening of
the 25th, when it proceeded out to the westward of the Orkneys; on the
26th bad weather again prevented target practice, a heavy westerly gale
being experienced. This moderated on the morning of the 27th, when the
Battle Fleet was to the eastward of the Shetlands, but increased again
to a very strong gale during that day, with a wind force of 70 miles
per hour and a very heavy confused sea.
A considerable amount of damage was done to wireless masts, topmasts,
etc., and several ships had boats damaged or washed away. The ships of
the “Iron Duke” class took in large quantities of water through their
6-inch gun ports, due to these guns being mounted at such a low level.
The gale continued during the 28th, veering to the northward, and
moderated on the 29th, on which date the Battle Fleet, which had moved
to the southward during the 28th, returned to Scapa, being met and
screened by destroyers which had not been able to join the Fleet at sea
owing to the bad weather.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the morning of the 26th,
and proceeded to the Norwegian coast, sweeping down as far as the
Naze in search of enemy ships, particularly the s.s. _Prinz Friedrich
Wilhelm_, reported to be about to leave Bergen. It was also to support
the _Drake_, _Nottingham_, _Falmouth_, and two destroyers, which had
been sent to the vicinity of the Naze to meet Submarines E1 and E5. The
latter vessels had been reconnoitring in the Skagerrak and Kattegat for
enemy vessels. The two submarines and the destroyers experienced very
heavy weather on their return across the North Sea, and some anxiety
was felt for their safety.
The 3rd Cruiser Squadron proceeded to Area 2 on the 26th, and on the
29th was sent to watch off the entrances to Bergen in Norway for
the German s.s. _Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm_. The squadron returned to
Cromarty on October 1st. On the 28th the _Princess Royal_ left the
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (proceeding to Scapa to fuel, _en route_)
to meet, and protect, a convoy of Canadian troops about to leave the
Dominion for the United Kingdom. The _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_,
which had been cruising north of the Faroe Islands, joined the
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at sea on the 29th. For the purpose
of supporting the cruisers in the North Sea area, the 3rd Battle
Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron sailed from Scapa on the arrival of
the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. Additional precautions against attack
by submarines were taken during the stay of the Fleet at Scapa on
this occasion, as reports indicated the presence of a considerably
increased number in the North Sea. These precautions included more
numerous patrols by destroyers of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas outside the
entrances to Scapa, and necessarily involved a greatly increased strain
on the destroyers.
Further precautions against submarine attack were also found necessary
in the Firth of Forth, and the arrival of light cruisers at Leith for
refit were temporarily suspended by Admiralty orders owing to the
presence of submarines in the vicinity. Two torpedoes were fired at the
destroyer _Stag_, and another at a torpedo boat off May Island on the
25th. The destroyer _Cheerful_ was also fired at on the 26th.
The month of October, 1914, opened with the Dreadnought Battle Fleet
at Scapa, with the exception of the _Ajax_, which was _en route_ to
Devonport to refit, and the _Audacious_, which was on passage from
Devonport after refit. The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were at sea
supporting the cruisers, except the _Exmouth_, of the 6th Battle
Squadron, which was at Devonport refitting. The 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron, the _Invincible_, and the _Inflexible_, were at Scapa; the
_Princess Royal_ was cleaning boilers and preparing for her trip to
Halifax.
Of the cruisers, the _Devonshire_, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, was
refitting at Cromarty; the _Theseus_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was
returning from the White Sea, where she had been to fetch some Russian
officers; the _Mantua_ and _Alsatian_, armed merchant-cruisers, were at
Liverpool, coaling and making good defects.
Of the destroyer flotillas, the _Active_ and five destroyers of the 2nd
Flotilla, and two of the 4th Flotilla, were absent refitting.
On October 1st regulations were brought into force under which a large
number of coastal navigational lights were extinguished, as also were
regulations closing the east coast ports to neutral fishing craft;
other regulations were issued to control the movements of fishing
vessels in certain areas. On October 10th further orders, under which
additional coastal navigation lights were extinguished (principally in
the North of Scotland), became effective.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa until 5 P.M. on October
2nd, and then proceeded into the North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron sailed at daylight, October 3rd, and the newly constituted
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the _Invincible_ and
_Inflexible_, with the _Sappho_ and three mine-layers, left at 2 P.M.
on October 3rd.
On October 3rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took up pre-arranged
positions designed to secure a close watch over the northern portion of
the North Sea, partly with a view to an interception of all traffic,
and partly to ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the North Sea
during the ensuing week. The main object was the protection of an
important convoy of Canadian troops, which was crossing from Halifax,
and which the battle cruiser _Princess Royal_ and the battleship
_Majestic_ had been sent to meet and to protect. The _Princess Royal_
arrived at the rendezvous at 8 P.M. on October 7th, and waited for the
convoy, which was two and a half days late.
The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during the period Oct.
3rd–11th approximately as follows:
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island
Channel from the western side.
The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruisers, the
_Sappho_ and three mine-layers, was stationed to the northward and
eastward of the Shetland Islands.
The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion of
Area No. 4.
The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5.
The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5.
The mine-sweepers patrolled to the eastward of the Fair Island
Channel.
The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread,
worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the 3rd Battle Squadron
to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle Squadron was
utilised to watch the waters between the Dreadnought Battle Fleet
and Norwegian territorial waters.
The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern
approaches of the Pentland Firth, some to work off the Norwegian
coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle
Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to the
bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and for
shelter when the weather necessitated this.
These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3.
The _Princess Royal_ met the Canadian convoy in Lat. 49.45 N., Long.
27.5 W., at 8 P.M. on October 10th. On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle
Fleet passed to the westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until
daylight on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle
Cruiser Squadron, with the _Teutonic_, being withdrawn from the patrol
north of the Shetlands to a patrol line north-west from Sule Skerry
lighthouse, Lat. 59.6 N., Long. 4.24 W., during the night of the 11th
and remaining there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for
Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged in this operation
returned to their bases for fuel, except the 3rd Battle Squadron (the
ships of which had coaled two at a time during the operation) and the
cruiser squadrons, which had been relieved as necessary to fuel.
Whilst the Fleet was engaged on this service the following incidents
occurred. On October 2nd the _Alsatian_ took six concealed Germans off
a Danish steamer. At 5 A.M. on October 7th a submarine was reported
inside Loch Ewe, being sighted by a collier and by the _Assistance_;
she was fired at by the latter ship, in misty weather. On receipt of
the report I ordered all vessels to leave Loch Ewe at once, and sent a
division of destroyers there from Scapa to search for the submarine.
Later investigation indicated that the report was well founded.
On October 9th the _Alsatian_ sighted an enemy submarine in Lat. 61.42
N., Long. 0.50 W.; on the same day at 3 P.M. the _Antrim_, flagship
of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, when in Lat. 59 N., Long. 4.40 E., was
missed by two torpedoes fired at her by a submarine which the _Antrim_
just failed to ram after the attack; numerous reports of enemy aircraft
having been sighted on the East and West coasts of Scotland were also
received.
On October 10th the _Liverpool_ and one-half of the 4th Flotilla were
sent to the Norwegian coast to examine the islands in the vicinity of
Udsire light, Lat. 59.19 N., Long. 4.50 E., to ascertain that they
were not being used as German submarine bases, in view of the attack
on the _Antrim_ in that vicinity on the 9th. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron
supported. Nothing was seen that lent colour to this idea.
Ships of the Battle Fleet were detached to the northward, two or three
at a time, during the operations, to carry out gunnery practices by day
and by night. Thick fogs were prevalent during the whole period, and
ships detached from the Fleet experienced very considerable difficulty
in rejoining. The foggy weather nearly resulted in a serious collision
between a battleship of the 6th Battle Squadron and one of the
Dreadnought Battle Fleet, the two ships passing within a few feet of
each other on opposite courses.
On the return of the Battle Fleet to Scapa on the morning of October
12th, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville reported that a partial submarine
obstruction was in place across the Hoxa entrance. The presence of even
a partial obstruction reduced the danger of submarine attack on the
Fleet whilst coaling, a matter which had given me much anxiety since
the beginning of hostilities.
[Illustration: APPROXIMATE DISPOSITIONS OCT^{R.} 3^{RD.} TO 11^{TH.}
1914.
WHILST CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING.]
On arrival in harbour it was found that the condenser tubes of the
_Iron Duke_ were in a bad condition, although the ship was quite
new, and that the condensers would need either complete, or
partial, retubing. The discovery was very disconcerting when taken in
conjunction with the case of the _Orion_, the condensers of which ship
had been retubed during September; it naturally led to suspicion being
directed to the condenser tubes generally of other ships, from which
reports of cases of tubes occasionally giving out were being received.
The whole question was taken up with the Admiralty, requests being
made that all available spare tubes should be sent at once to the
Northern bases, together with some dockyard fitters who could assist
the artificers of the Fleet in the work of retubing. Representations
were also made as to the urgent necessity of increasing the stock of
reserve tubes in case the defects became general in the Fleet owing to
the ships being so constantly under steam at sea. The task of replacing
the defective tubes in the _Iron Duke’s_ condensers was begun at once,
with the help of the artificers of the Fleet, and the _Centurion_ was
detailed as the spare Fleet-Flagship in case of emergency. But at this
time the _Iron Duke_ was not kept specially in harbour for retubing
work, this being carried out as opportunity occurred, although under
considerable difficulties, since the labour of suddenly preparing for
sea, with a condenser undergoing retubing, was very appreciable. The
manner in which this heavy work was taken in hand and rapidly completed
in several ships, largely by Fleet labour, demonstrated the extreme
efficiency and very fine spirit of the engine-room departments of the
ships of the Grand Fleet.
From the 12th to the 16th October the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons
remained at Scapa, and at 6 P.M. on the 16th they left to carry out
target practice to the westward of the Orkneys. The 2nd Battle Squadron
left Scapa on the evening of the 13th to support the cruisers in the
North Sea; it joined the 3rd Battle Squadron already there, the ships
of which were being detached to Scapa two at a time to fuel and to
overhaul their machinery. It was found necessary to give these ships,
with reciprocating engines, five days off duty periodically in order to
carry out necessary adjustments.
The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron
and two divisions of destroyers, left Scapa at 5.30 P.M. on the 12th,
to carry out a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea. This force
swept on the 13th on a broad front down to the Dogger Bank, thence to
the Norwegian coast, and to the northward on the 14th in conjunction
with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron (which was then prolonging the sweeping
line), without sighting any enemy vessels. The battle cruisers and
light cruisers took up a position on the 15th to support the cruiser
squadrons on patrol, the destroyers proceeding to Lerwick to fuel.
The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron remained at Scapa. The 2nd Cruiser
Squadron was working the N.E. corner of Area 6, and the 10th Cruiser
Squadron at this period was working the south-western portion of Area
No. 6. At 1.15 P.M. on October 15th the _Theseus_ reported that a
torpedo, which had missed, had been fired at her in Lat. 57.50 N.,
Long. 0.33 E.
On receipt of this report orders were given that the ships of the 10th
Cruiser Squadron, on patrol, were to be withdrawn to the northern
corner of the area, and later, at 8 P.M., orders were sent that
they were to join the 2nd Battle Squadron still farther north, and
to be used by the battleships (which were spread for the purpose of
intercepting trade or enemy’s ships) for boarding purposes. Meanwhile
the senior officer of the 10th Cruiser Squadron ships operating in Area
6 (H.M.S. _Edgar_) reported that he could get no reply to wireless
signals from the _Hawke_. The _Swift_, with a division of destroyers,
was ordered to proceed from Scapa at high speed to the last reported
position of the _Hawke_ in Lat. 57.47 N., Long. 0.12 E., to search
for the ship. Two other divisions of destroyers were sent, later on,
to assist the _Swift_. It is to be noted that a submarine had been
reported off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast at 8.30 A.M. on the 14th,
but this report did not reach the _Iron Duke_ until the afternoon of
the 15th.
The _Swift_ reported on the 16th having picked up a raft with an
officer and 20 men, survivors of the _Hawke_, which had been sunk by
a submarine in Lat. 57.40 N., Long. 0.13 W., on the 15th. Shortly
after sighting the raft, the _Swift_ was attacked by the same or
another submarine (it was thought by more than one) whilst engaged in
her work of rescue, and torpedoes were fired at her. Captain Wintour
subsequently stated that he was only able to effect the rescue by
manœuvring at high speed in the midst of the wreckage, etc., using
the destroyers with him to screen his movements. His experience was
an unpleasant one, as he naturally desired to remain on the spot
until he had ascertained with certainty that he had picked up all the
survivors, and this he proceeded to do with praiseworthy persistence,
bringing them to Scapa. On the 16th reports were also received that the
destroyers _Alarm_ and _Nymphe_ had been attacked by submarines to the
eastward of the Pentland Firth, and that the _Nymphe_ had rammed the
submarine that had attacked her. Later examination of the _Nymphe’s_
bottom by divers showed that her starboard propeller was damaged.
At 4.18 P.M. on the same day, the 16th, it was reported from one of the
shore batteries that a submarine was close into the Switha entrance to
Scapa Flow. The ships inside were immediately ordered to raise steam
with all despatch, and the usual precautions were taken of patrolling
the harbour with every available small craft, including destroyers,
tugs, trawlers, drifters and picket-boats; and colliers and store-ships
were as usual sent alongside the battleships, which were not fitted
with torpedo nets, as a precaution.
The scene in the harbour on such occasions was a busy one. Small craft
of every nature were patrolling at the sight of a periscope; all guns
were manned; torpedo nets, where fitted, were placed in position;
and every effort was made to ensure that the Fleet was as adequately
guarded by the available patrol craft as circumstances admitted. All
large ships except the repair ships _Cyclops_ and _Assistance_ left
harbour during the night, the _Iron Duke_ joining the 1st and 4th
Battle Squadrons west of the Orkneys.
At noon on the 17th Sir Stanley Colville, who had been requested to
organise a careful search for the reported submarine, signalled that
a submarine was believed to be inside Scapa Flow and had been hunted,
but not actually located. Reports had been received that officers and
men on board several of the destroyers, and the gunboat _Leda_, had
seen the periscope of the submarine, and that a torpedo had actually
been fired at one of the hunting vessels. It was, however, ascertained
subsequently that this torpedo was one which had been accidentally
discharged by one of our own destroyers.
The accuracy or otherwise of these reports has never yet been
determined with certainty, but many of the officers engaged in the
search were convinced at the time that a submarine was actually inside,
and that they had seen her. Indeed, a good many rounds were fired
during the day at objects which were thought at the time to be a
periscope.
The reports signalled to me convinced me that, until the matter was
cleared up with certainty, and until some more absolute security
against submarine attack on the Fleet at anchor could be provided, it
was courting disaster to base battleships or battle cruisers at Scapa
Flow. We had seen in the loss of the _Hawke_ that enemy submarines
could quite well operate in northern waters, and it was thought to be
only a matter of time before they would attempt an attack on the Fleet
in Scapa Flow, if indeed the attempt had not already been made.
I decided, therefore, that it was necessary to seek for a temporary
base which could be used with safety whilst the submarine obstructions
at Scapa were being perfected. The incident that had already occurred
at Loch Ewe cast doubt on the safety of that base, since it was
unprovided with any obstructions at all and the depth of water made it
impossible to improvise them with Fleet resources.
Accordingly I looked for other and more easily obstructed ports, and
eventually decided on Lough Swilly for the main part of the Fleet,
and Loch-na-Keal in the Island of Mull for the ships for which
berthing-space could not be found at Lough Swilly. Both ports possessed
comparatively narrow entrances, and at Lough Swilly the water was so
shallow as to make it difficult for a submarine to enter submerged.
It was also a “defended port” and therefore possessed an organisation
which would be useful for regulating the entry of ships.
The extensive dispositions necessitated by the temporary change of base
were at once ordered. Colliers, store-ships, and auxiliaries of one
kind and another, which were either _en route_ to, or at, Scapa Flow,
were diverted to the new bases; the 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Battle
Cruiser Squadron were ordered to Loch-na-Keal to fuel and to improvise
anti-submarine obstructions at the entrance; and the _Illustrious_
was ordered there from Loch Ewe to act as guard ship; the 1st and 4th
Battle Squadrons and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron were detached to
cruise to the north-westward of the Hebrides for blockading purposes,
and to carry out practices; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd
Cruiser Squadron and 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were sent to Lough
Swilly to coal. The cruiser blockade and look-out line was withdrawn
farther to the northward owing to the danger from submarines incurred
in operating in the central or southern portions of the North Sea
on a regular patrol, and the impossibility of providing destroyers
as a screen for the ships. The new line was to the northward of the
Shetland Islands, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and armed
merchant-cruisers carried out the patrol. There were, therefore, two
lines of blockade, one formed by the heavy ships north-westward of the
Hebrides, the second to the northward of the Shetland Islands. The
organisation was such that it was probable that vessels attempting to
evade the blockade would pass one of the two lines during daylight
hours. In making these new dispositions it was still intended to keep
the North Sea itself under observation by frequent cruiser sweeps.
Numerous reports of submarines in the Minch at this time led to the
_Active_ and two divisions of destroyers being sent there to search
for them, and the remainder of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were divided
between blockade duty in the Pentland Firth, work at Scapa Flow, and
in the vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands, and with the ships at
Loch-na-Keal and Lough Swilly.
On October 21st the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Cromarty to
coal. Owing to the receipt of information from the Admiralty early that
day, that it was reported that some German cruisers, destroyers and
submarines had left Danzig on October 17th for the North Sea, the 1st
Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were ordered to
leave their bases that morning, proceed into the North Sea, and sweep
down on a broad front to the Skagerrak, screened by the 4th Flotilla
of destroyers. The latter had to be sent back to their base on October
22nd owing to heavy weather. The remainder of the force swept up to the
Skaw without sighting any enemy vessels, then north along the Norwegian
coast, and proceeded, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron to Cromarty and
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa.
On October 21st a submarine was reported just outside Cromarty by an
armed trawler, and another report was received of one having been
sighted by the destroyer _Lynx_. The submarine obstruction at Cromarty,
designed by Captain Munro, had now been completed, and the base was
considered secure. It would, however, only accommodate a small portion
of the Fleet.
The dispositions given above were maintained until October 22nd, when
the _Iron Duke_, 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, the _Active_ and two
divisions of destroyers of the 2nd Flotilla, arrived at Lough Swilly.
The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons and 2nd Cruiser Squadron took their
place to the north-westward of the Hebrides as an outer blockade line
and support for the cruiser squadrons. The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron
and four destroyers were detached to the southern part of the North
Sea on the 23rd to support the Commodore (T) in carrying out aerial
operations in the Heligoland Bight. The operations failed owing to the
difficulty the sea-planes experienced in rising off the water, and the
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron returned to Cromarty.
On arrival of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons at Lough Swilly,
steps were immediately taken to lay an anti-submarine obstruction at
the entrance, and this was very smartly completed with the limited
resources of the squadrons by 4 P.M. on the 23rd, and for the first
time since the declaration of war the Fleet occupied a secure base.
Wire hawsers provided by the ships of the Fleet were suspended at
varying depths between six colliers which were anchored across the
entrance, with target rafts as intermediate supports.
It was a fairly effective obstruction, and armed steamboats from the
fleet patrolled near it with destroyers as a support.
The relief to those responsible for the safety of the Fleet was
immense, and attention was at once turned to the well-being of the
personnel, which had been pressed very hard, and to improving the
efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work. Battle practice
targets were ordered over from Lamlash, in the Island of Arran, a
pre-War practice base, with the intention of carrying out practice in
the waters north-west of Ireland. The work of retubing the condensers
of the _Iron Duke_ was once more taken in hand, and ships were given
the opportunity of overhauling and adjusting machinery, steam being
put back to longer notice than had previously been possible. The
anti-submarine defence was continually strengthened and improved during
the stay of the Fleet, and the colliers supporting it were gradually
replaced by trawlers and drifters.
In order to give the men some much-needed diversion and exercise a
pulling regatta was organised and held on October 26th, and the men
were landed for route marches as frequently as possible during the
stay of the ships at Lough Swilly.
On the 26th a submarine was reported inside Cromarty harbour, but Sir
David Beatty, who was there with the battle cruisers, stated, after
investigation, that he did not consider the report was true.
Discussions took place with the Admiralty during the stay of the Fleet
at Lough Swilly on the subject of trawlers for the patrol of the
Minches and vicinity, and the requirements were given as thirty-six
trawlers for this service, which was considered next in importance to
the provision of an adequate patrol force of this nature for the waters
in the vicinity of the bases at Scapa Flow and Cromarty.
The stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly was rendered memorable by the
unfortunate loss of the _Audacious_, then one of our most modern
battleships.
Orders had been given to the 2nd Battle Squadron to carry out target
practice against the two battle practice targets obtained from Lamlash,
and the squadron left Loch-na-Keal on the evening of October 26th
for a rendezvous in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 8.30 W., at daylight on the
27th, where the targets which had left Lough Swilly in tow of two
tugs, the _Plover_ and _Flying Condor_, escorted by the light cruiser
_Liverpool_, were to be met.
The squadron was in Lat. 55.34 N., Long. 8.30 W. at 9 A.M. on the 27th,
preparing for the practice, when at that hour the _Audacious_ struck
a mine whilst turning. The explosion resulted in the flooding of the
port engine-room and partly flooding the centre engine-room. It was
not clear at the time whether the ship had been mined or torpedoed.
The _Monarch_ having reported sighting a submarine at 11 A.M., a
precautionary signal was made to Sir George Warrender to keep the
squadron clear of the _Audacious_.
Meanwhile all available destroyers, tugs, trawlers and other small
craft were sent from Lough Swilly and Loch-na-Keal to assist the
_Audacious_ and to prevent the submarine (if one were present) from
doing further damage; and the armed boarding steamer _Cambria_ escorted
the collier _Thornhill_ (provided with towing hawsers) to the scene.
The hospital-ship _Soudan_ was ordered out to give help to survivors
in case the _Audacious_ sank or to the injured, and the _Liverpool_
was directed to stand by her, but to keep moving at high speed. The
battleship _Exmouth_ was put at “short notice” ready to tow the
_Audacious_ in if necessary. Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, commanding
the 1st Battle Squadron, came on board the _Iron Duke_ to suggest that
he should proceed to the scene to render any assistance, an offer of
which I very gladly availed myself, as Sir George Warrender, in the
2nd Battle Squadron, could not close the ship whilst the danger of
submarine attack existed.
Shortly after the _Audacious_ struck the mine, the s.s. _Olympic_,
on passage from the United States to Liverpool, closed the ship on
learning of the disaster, and Captain Haddock, C.B., R.N.R., who was
in command, at once volunteered to help in any way possible. Captain
Dampier, of the _Audacious_, asked that his ship might be taken in tow
and brought into Lough Swilly, and Captain Haddock, disregarding the
danger of submarine attack or of being mined, took immediate steps to
carry out this request. Unfortunately a considerable sea was running,
which increased during the day. In spite of the most magnificent and
seamanlike handling of the _Olympic_ by Captain Haddock, and later in
the day excellent work on the part of the master of the _Thornhill_,
the hawsers constantly parted, owing to the state of the sea and the
weight of the _Audacious_, the stern of that ship being almost awash
by the afternoon. The two ships were worked in a manner which Sir
Lewis Bayly reported as beyond praise. The attempts to tow the injured
ship had to be abandoned before dark, and Sir Lewis Bayly, Captain
Dampier and the few officers and men who had remained on board to work
the hawsers, etc., were taken off the _Audacious_ by 7.15 P.M. The
remainder of the ship’s company had been removed without accident,
in spite of the heavy sea, in the course of the day by destroyers,
trawlers, and other small craft, and in the boats of the _Audacious_.
The work of the destroyers on this occasion was, as usual, of the
greatest value, and the exceedingly seamanlike handling of the _Fury_
by Lieutenant-Commander Sumner, who, in the teeth of the greatest
difficulties, took heavy wire towing hawsers between the _Audacious_
and the towing ships on several occasions, elicited from Sir Lewis
Bayly expressions of warm admiration. Arrangements were made for the
_Liverpool_ to stand by the _Audacious_ during the night, but at 9
P.M. she suddenly blew up with great violence and sank. The cause of
this explosion was never ascertained with certainty. At the time the
ship blew up the _Liverpool_ was not far distant, and a good deal of
_débris_ fell on the deck of that ship, killing one petty officer. This
was the only casualty due to the loss of the _Audacious_.
Meanwhile, at 1.8 P.M., information reached me from Kingstown that the
s.s. _Manchester Commerce_ had been sunk on the night of the 26th by a
mine in the vicinity of the disaster to the _Audacious_, and at 4.40
P.M. a report came from Malin Head that a four-masted sailing vessel,
the _Caldaff_, had also struck a mine in the neighbourhood on the
previous night.
These unfortunately belated reports disposed at once of any idea that
submarines had attacked the _Audacious_, and at 5 P.M. the _Exmouth_
sailed from Lough Swilly to attempt to tow her in. Steps had already
been taken to warn outward and homeward bound vessels of the existence
of the mine-field and to divert all traffic clear of it; and all
mine-sweeping gunboats were ordered to Lough Swilly to locate the exact
limits of the mine-field and to sweep a clear passage along the north
coast of Ireland.
On the arrival of the s.s. _Olympic_ at Lough Swilly, orders were given
that no communication between the ship and the shore was to take place.
I wired to the Admiralty suggesting that the loss of the _Audacious_
should be kept secret for as long as possible, so that the enemy should
not learn of it, as the fact would afford him encouragement at a time
when the military situation was extremely critical for the Allies, and
also because, as a general policy, it was desirable to conceal from the
enemy any serious losses of which he could otherwise have no immediate
knowledge.
This procedure was approved for the time, because of the military
situation, and the _Olympic_ was kept at Lough Swilly for several days.
This was necessary as she had on board a considerable number of United
States passengers, and it was known that they had taken photographs of
the _Audacious_ in a sinking condition.
Amongst these passengers was Mr. Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel
Company, and it was made known to me after a day or two that he
had come over on very important business connected with War Office
contracts, and wished to proceed to London. After an interview with
him, this was agreed to, and I asked him to call on Lord Fisher of
the Admiralty in connection with the construction of some submarines
which I ascertained from him that his firm was in a position to build
very rapidly and which would be of the greatest value to us. He did
this, and with the most satisfactory results, as ten submarines were
constructed--as he promised--in the extraordinarily short space of five
months. These vessels were most useful to us later.
The 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons were at Lough Swilly during the
remainder of October; the 2nd Battle Squadron proceeded to Lamlash on
the 29th to coal, and to Lough Swilly on November 1st; the 3rd Battle
Squadron went to Scapa on the 27th; and the 6th Battle Squadron to
Lough Swilly.
On October 27th a trawler reported very suspicious movements on the
part of a large steamer to the westward of the island of Sule Skerry
(west of the Orkneys). It appeared possible that the ship might be a
German mine-layer, and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa was sent
to a position 120 miles from Fair Island on the Fair Island--Heligoland
line, to intercept her on returning, with orders that, at daylight on
the 29th, she should spread widely and sweep towards Fair Island, then
sweeping over to the Norwegian coast near Jaederen’s Point, spreading
at daylight on the 30th and sweeping up a line approximately N. 15
W. from Heligoland, before returning to Scapa. Destroyers of the 4th
Flotilla were also sent out from Scapa on the 28th in search of the
suspected vessel, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were disposed
so as to cut her off if she passed to the north of the Shetlands. The
ship was not sighted, and no mines had been laid.
The Grand Fleet was considerably weakened at this time apart from the
loss of the _Audacious_. The _Ajax_ had developed condenser defects;
the _Iron Duke_ had similar troubles; the _Orion_ had to be sent to
Greenock for examination of the turbine supports, which appeared to be
defective; the _Conqueror_ was at Devonport refitting, and the _New
Zealand_ was in dock at Cromarty. The _Erin_ and _Agincourt_, having
been newly commissioned, could not yet be regarded as efficient, so
that the Dreadnought Fleet only consisted of 17 effective battleships
and 5 battle cruisers; the German Dreadnought Fleet at the time
comprised 15 battleships and 4 battle cruisers, with the _Blücher_ in
addition. The margin of superiority was, therefore, unpleasantly small
in view of the fact that the High Sea Fleet possessed 88 destroyers and
the Grand Fleet only 42.
During the stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly numerous reports of the
presence of submarines on the west coast of Scotland were received, a
large number of the reports coming from the coast watchers. Destroyers
were sent on many occasions to search the localities from which the
reports emanated, and the various harbours that could be used by
submarines as a base were frequently examined. At this period it was
considered possible that enemy submarines, acting so far from their
home ports as the west coast of Scotland, would be working from a short
or from a floating base. It was not thought--from experience with our
own submarines--that they would be self-supporting at this distance,
and the best method of limiting their activities, if not destroying
the submarines, was to find their base. Later experience, and a
closer knowledge of German submarines, however, showed that they were
independent of such bases.
It is very doubtful whether any enemy submarines passed to the westward
of Scotland during October. We, at any rate, found no certain evidence
that they were present, in spite of the very numerous reports of their
being sighted. Similarly, reports were constantly being received of
air-craft (both Zeppelins and aeroplanes) being seen in the north of
Scotland; many of the rumours were of the most circumstantial nature,
some coming even from warships. It is quite certain that these reports
were founded on optical illusions, and it may be said that little
credence was attached to them at the time.
But the currency of many rumours in those early days of the War,
sometimes supported by statements of the most plausible character,
were not only embarrassing, but frequently involved a great deal of
unproductive cruising, for it was impossible to ignore anything which
would enable us to find out the enemy’s movements or intentions.
At the end of October, news came of the unfortunate wreck of the
hospital ship _Rohilla_ off Whitby, with considerable loss of life.
About this time the German land forces occupied the Belgian coast. The
effect of this occupation on naval strategy was considered in the Grand
Fleet, and Sir Lewis Bayly and I discussed the blocking of Zeebrugge
by sinking ships across the channel. Sir Lewis Bayly considered the
scheme feasible, and wrote to me on the subject. I then suggested to
the Admiralty that such an operation should be carried out. It was not
considered practicable by the Admiralty at the time. It is perhaps of
interest to note that the subject was discussed as early as 1914.
Some two years later I caused the question to be reconsidered after
taking up the appointment of First Sea Lord at the Admiralty (it had
been under consideration between 1914 and 1917). More than one plan
was discussed between Admiral Bacon (commanding the Dover patrol)
and myself; one idea, which I favoured, was to utilise ships of the
“Apollo” class, cutting down their upper works to render them less
visible during approach. Meanwhile, other schemes for driving the enemy
from the Belgian coast were in operation, so the question of blocking
was deferred. In September, 1917, when it became clear that the object
in view would not be effected by military operations during that year,
I gave directions to the Plans Division of the Naval Staff, of which
Rear-Admiral Roger Keyes had recently become the head, that plans
for blocking Zeebrugge were to be prepared; later, after considering
an independent proposal by Sir Reginald Bacon for attacking the mole
by landing parties from monitors run alongside it, I decided that
the operation was to be combined with the landing on the Zeebrugge
mole. The main objective for the landing was the destruction of enemy
destroyers known to be lying alongside the mole, and I considered that
this landing would also be very useful in creating a diversion to
facilitate the approach of the block ships. The scheme was eventually
approved by me in November, 1917, and the training of the storming
party and selection of the block ships were taken in hand.