GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS
It is hardly surprising if the work and purpose of the Navy had
somewhat faded from public interest during the century that had elapsed
since the Napoleonic Wars, the last occasion on which the inhabitants
of this country had felt that their safety depended on maritime power.
Indeed, it had fallen to the lot of a distinguished officer in a
foreign navy, Captain Mahan, to awaken interest in this matter, and to
point out the all-important influence which Sea Power had exerted, and
would exert, on history.
Associations such as the Navy League had been formed, having as their
object the enlightenment of our countrymen, and although a great work
was done in this direction, the mere necessity for such work is an
indication of the extent to which the nation had forgotten the lessons
of the past.
I therefore offer no apology for making some reference to the use and
purpose of the British Navy.
The main objects for which our Navy exists may be shortly summed up
under four heads:
1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use of the sea, this
being vital to the existence of an island nation, particularly
one which is not self-supporting in regard to food.
2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic pressure to bear
on our adversary by denying to him the use of the sea, thus
compelling him to accept peace.
3. Similarly in the event of war to cover the passage and assist
any army sent overseas, and to protect its communications and
supplies.
4. To prevent invasion of this country and its overseas Dominions by
enemy forces.
The above objects are achieved in the quickest and surest manner by
destroying the enemy’s armed naval forces, and this is therefore the
first objective of our Fleet. The Fleet exists to achieve victory.
But history has always shown that it is a very difficult matter to
impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary, and that, instead of
giving us the opportunity of destroying his armed naval forces, he
usually keeps the main body of those forces--the Battle Fleet--in
positions of safety in fortified harbours, where they are a constant
threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval Power, and force
upon that Power a watching policy so that the enemy may be engaged,
should he put to sea, before he is able to gain any advantage.
The watching policy in the great wars of the Napoleonic era was
carried out by keeping our squadrons, through fair or foul weather,
in the vicinity of those ports of the enemy in which his fleet lay.
Occasionally our ships were driven off by stress of weather, but
they regained their stations as soon as conditions permitted. During
this war, however, the advent of the submarine and destroyer, and,
to a lesser extent, the use of the mine rendered such dispositions
impossible.
No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity of enemy bases
without the certainty that she would fall an early victim to the
attacks of submarines. Destroyers could, it is true, afford some
measure of protection, but destroyers have a very limited range of
action, and could not keep the sea off the enemy’s distant coast even
in good weather for a sufficient length of time. Periodical relief of
the destroyers was an impossibility, owing to the great numbers that
would be required for this purpose.
Moreover, even if the submarine danger could be overcome, the heavy
ships would be so open to attack by enemy destroyers at night, if
cruising anywhere near enemy bases, that they would certainly be
injured, if not sunk, before many days had passed.
These facts had been recognised before the War and a watching policy
from a distance decided upon, the watch being instituted for the
purpose of preventing enemy vessels from gaining the open sea, where
they would constitute a danger to our sea communications. Now a watch
maintained at a distance from the port under observation is necessarily
only partial, except in circumstances where the enemy has to pass
through narrow straits before gaining open water.
The chances of intercepting enemy ships depend entirely on the number
of watching vessels and the distance that those on board them can see.
At night this distance is very short--on a dark night not more than a
quarter of a mile, and even in daylight, under the average conditions
of visibility obtaining in the North Sea, it is not more than six to
eight miles.
The North Sea, though small in contrast with the Atlantic, is a big
water area of about 120,000 square miles in extent. The width across
it, between the Shetland Islands and Norway (the narrowest portion), is
160 miles, and an additional 40 miles (the Fair Island Channel) would
need to be watched also if a patrol were established along this line.
A consideration of all the circumstances had led to the adoption by the
Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the
Admiralty had determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in the
event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that the Grand Fleet
would control the North Sea, and that the Channel Fleet would watch the
English Channel, thus, in combination, holding the enemy’s main force.
To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main Battle Fleet
should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a strategic position in the
North Sea where it would act in support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying
out sweeps to the southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be
favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to action should it
put to sea.
This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the result of
experience in the various naval manœuvres carried out in previous
years in the North Sea. These had demonstrated quite clearly that the
alternative policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North
Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an impracticable
one, it having been shown on many occasions that evasion of a single
patrol line during the hours of darkness, or even daylight, under the
conditions of visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is
a very simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying regular
patrol positions is always in peril of successful submarine attack; the
loss of the cruisers _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_ showed this. It is
also open to a concentrated attack by surface vessels.
The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet
were based, therefore, on this general idea, and when the Grand Fleet
proceeded to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders at 8.30 A.M. on
August the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out this
general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral
Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in the Channel in accordance with the
general strategic dispositions.
The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand Fleet comprised the
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, with their attached cruisers;
the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron,
strengthened by the addition of the _Falmouth_ and _Liverpool_; the
2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These dispositions
continued in force for some three weeks, when the strong influence of
the submarine on naval strategy began to make itself apparent.
The ideas held in pre-War days as to the capabilities of submarines
were found, after a short experience of war, to need modification. In
the first place, it became quickly apparent that the German submarines
possessed a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably
greater than those of our own submarines. It had been, for instance,
looked upon as a considerable achievement for our submarines to keep
the sea for a period of five to seven days, and they had not operated
at any great distance from the coast. It is true that submarines had
on occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but they were then
usually escorted, or even towed, and the number of days from port to
port did not approach the length of time for which German submarines
remained at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans possessed a
considerable superiority in the number of submarines which were capable
of operating overseas, and the frequent sighting of enemy submarines
as far north as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War,
combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy had established
a regular submarine patrol in the centre of the North Sea, made it
evident that the German submarines would constitute a very serious
menace to our heavy ships.
The comparative strength in submarines in Home Waters at the outbreak
of war was as follows:
_German_--
U Boats 28 of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea
work, but were as good as our D class.
_British_--
{ of which D 1 was unreliable and the remaining
D Class 8 { units of the D class were not equal to the
{ U boats.
E Class 9
C Class 34 } Unfit for oversea work and used only for local
B Class 3 } defence of the coast or in the Channel.
The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under construction, whilst
we were building 19, apart from two experimental vessels of which
nothing resulted.
Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in pursuance of a
policy introduced by the Admiralty in 1913–14 of widening the area of
supply of these vessels. This policy had far-reaching and beneficial
results on the subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it
enabled us to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would
otherwise have been the case.
A change in previous naval practice was considered necessary at an
early period, because vessels moving at anything but high speed,
particularly in the case of a number of ships in company, ran very
considerable risks in waters where we might expect enemy submarines to
be operating, unless screened by a strong force of destroyers. This
conclusion affected the movements and operations of the Battle Fleet,
since the number of destroyers we possessed was quite inadequate to
form a screen for a Battle Fleet and a Battle Cruiser Squadron which
constantly kept the sea. The number required, for such a screen to
be effective, was at least 40 for the Battle Fleet alone as then
constituted, and that number, 40, was all that we had stationed at the
Northern Base. The fuel capacity of destroyers was only sufficient for
them to remain at sea in company with a fleet for some three days and
nights, whereas the Fleet itself could remain out for three or four
times that period. Moreover, the destroyers could not be kept nearly
so constantly at sea as the large ships owing to their requirements
in the way of boiler-cleaning and the refit and adjustment of their
more delicate machinery, and the necessity for giving not only the
machinery, but the personnel, periods of rest. The heavy ships, then,
had two alternatives, either to remain at sea without a destroyer
screen or to return to harbour with the destroyers. In the early
days the first alternative was adopted, the risk being accepted, but
minimised as far as possible, by keeping the ships in the northern part
of the North Sea.
A further danger soon made itself apparent. It became evident at an
early period, as many naval officers had expected, in view of German
language at the Hague Conference, that our enemy intended to throw
overboard the doctrines of international law when he could gain any
advantage by doing so. He accordingly proceeded at once to lay mines
in positions where he thought they would be advantageous to his
operations, in utter disregard of the safety, not only of British,
but also of neutral merchant ships. It was, therefore, thought very
probable that he would elaborate this practice by laying mines in the
North Sea in positions where he anticipated they might prove effective
against the Grand Fleet, and that he would do this without issuing any
warning to neutral countries. Consequently, if the main Battle Fleet
were kept moving continuously in the central and southern waters of
the North Sea, in which waters the enemy could easily lay mines with
little danger of his operations being witnessed (as he could carry
them out under cover of darkness), it was evident that considerable
risks might be incurred without our being aware of the fact. The policy
of attrition of our Battle Fleet might thus be carried out with such
success as to produce equality, or even inferiority, on the part of the
British Fleet as compared with the German, in a comparatively short
space of time. The only safeguard against such action which we could
take would be to keep mine-sweepers constantly working ahead of the
Battle Fleet. But the number of mine-sweepers that we possessed was
wholly inadequate for such a task; and even if this had not been so,
to carry out such an operation would have necessitated the speed of
the Battle Fleet being reduced to some 10 knots, the maximum sweeping
speed of mine-sweepers, and it would have been forced also to steer a
steady course without zigzagging, conditions rendering the battleships
exceedingly vulnerable to submarine attack.
The first effect, therefore, of the submarine menace, combined with
possible German action in regard to mine-laying, was to cause the
Battle Fleet to confine its movements _under ordinary conditions_ to
the more northern waters of the North Sea, where the risk might be
taken of cruising without the presence of a screen of destroyers, and
where it was improbable, owing to the depth of water and the distance
from enemy bases, that the Germans would be able to lay mines without
discovery.
The fact that this course of action would be forced upon us as the
submarine and destroyer menace grew had often been present in my mind
in pre-War days, when I had expressed the view that the beginning of
a naval war would be a conflict between the small craft, whilst the
larger and more valuable vessels were held aloof. I have no doubt that
this opinion was very generally held by officers of experience.
The northward movement of the Battle Fleet was combined with the
establishment of certain cruiser patrol _areas_ in the North Sea. These
areas, which were purposely made large, were watched on a regular,
organised plan by our Cruiser Squadrons, moving at fairly high speed
in such a manner as to reduce the submarine risk to the cruisers to
a minimum, whist at the same time they kept as effective a watch as
possible, first, to intercept German war vessels that might be covering
a raid on our coasts or transports, or trying to reach the open sea to
operate against trade, and, secondly, to ensure that all merchant ships
entering or leaving the North Sea should be closely examined in order
to enforce the blockade.
This patrol policy was associated with periodical sweeps of cruisers,
supported by the Battle Fleet, down into the southern waters of the
North Sea, the object being to catch the enemy’s fleet at sea, if
possible, and in any case, owing to our movements being probably
reported to the Germans by neutral merchant ships, to make them feel
that they could never move a force to sea without the possibility of
encountering our Fleet engaged in one of these southern sweeps, which
we carried out at irregular intervals. A typical sweep is illustrated
in accompanying plans. On these occasions the Battle Fleet was kept
strictly concentrated during the southern movement, and was screened
as far as possible by destroyers against submarine attack; and at
times mine-sweepers were directed to work ahead of the Battle Fleet.
When this was not possible, owing to the small number of mine-sweepers
available or the state of the weather, some of the older battleships
of the 6th Battle Squadron, if they were in company, were stationed
ahead of the main Battle Fleet in order that, should a minefield be
encountered, these older ships would be the first to strike the mines,
thus giving sufficient warning to enable me to manœuvre the more
valuable ships clear of the field.
This general policy was continued until the attack on the _Theseus_
and loss of the _Hawke_, belonging to the 10th Cruiser Squadron, by
submarine attack on October 15th, 1914, showed that even under the
dispositions then adopted, our larger cruisers were being risked to too
great an extent when working without destroyers in the central part of
the North Sea.
The next move, therefore, was the withdrawal of the cruiser patrols to
a safer position farther to the northward and eastward of the Shetland
Islands, this being combined with a watch by the smaller craft on the
Fair Island Channel, and on the Pentland Firth approaches to the North
Sea. Under these conditions the Battle Fleet was often kept either in
a position westward of the Orkneys, where it was in support of the
cruisers and at the same time formed a second blockade line, or it
cruised to the north and east of the Shetland Islands, the cruiser
patrols working farther south.
In all the dispositions which were made for a watch on the northern
entrance to the North Sea, the principle kept in mind was the necessity
for such an organisation of the patrols as to have, in so far as
numbers permitted, two lines, or two areas, watched. The two areas were
at such a distance apart that vessels moving in or out of the North
Sea were forced, so far as all human foresight could provide, to pass
through the waters occupied by one of the two groups of ships during
daylight hours; the distances apart were regulated according to the
length of the night at the different seasons of the year.
As the Battle Fleet worked farther to the northward and westward, it
became possible to make use of the heavy ships to assist in blockade
work without running undue risks from submarines, and the blockade
increased correspondingly in effectiveness. As time went on, however,
the provision by the Admiralty of a larger number of armed merchant
cruisers enabled us to establish an effective blockade line by the
use of these vessels alone, backed up by Cruiser Squadrons when such
were available. The withdrawal of the Battle Fleet to more northern
and western waters first took effect when the Fleet Base was shifted
temporarily from Scapa to Lough Swilly. When this occurred, it did not
affect the policy of frequent cruiser sweeps into the southern portion
of the North Sea, supported by the Battle Fleet, which were still
continued.
The dispositions that have been described took account naturally of two
other very important factors.
The first was the transport of our Expeditionary Force to France. It
was highly probable that the enemy would endeavour to interfere with
this movement, and in the early days of the War it would not have been
a difficult matter for him to cause us some loss. His failure to make
at least some attempt in this direction showed a lack of enterprise
which surprised me, as I think it surprised most naval officers.
The conditions for him were distinctly favourable. Our main Fleet was
based, as he must have been aware, far away to the northward, and if he
had timed an attack on the cross-Channel traffic for a period during
which he reckoned that the Grand Fleet, or at least the destroyers,
were returning to the base to fuel, he would have stood a good chance
of making the attack and returning to his base before that Fleet could
intervene. Consequently, he would only have had to deal with the
comparatively light forces based in southern waters. On the other hand,
if our Fleet arrived on the scene without destroyers, the Germans would
have possessed no mean advantage.
The enemy was provided with a large number of modern destroyers,
and some of them would have been well expended over a Channel dash,
which would in all probability have met with some success. During the
transport of the Expeditionary Force the heavy ships of the Grand Fleet
kept the sea as far as possible in order to cover the movement, but the
destroyers were constantly returning to the base to fuel.
The second factor which had considerable influence on Fleet
dispositions was the possibility of an attempt at a raid or invasion
by the enemy. Such a move was not very likely in the earliest days of
the War, when the nights were comparatively short and the Expeditionary
Force had not left the country. It is also probable that the enemy had
few troops to spare for the purpose. But the chances became greater as
we denuded the country of men, and the conditions in other respects
became more favourable. In October and November, 1914, I held and
expressed the opinion that, if raids were attempted, landings would
probably be effected in the rivers on the East Coast, the entrances
to which were either unprotected or inadequately protected. A beach
landing on our East Coast can only be carried out in fine weather, and
the chances of encountering favourable conditions on arrival off the
coast are not great, and I always doubted the attempt being made. In
our rivers the opportunities are greater, and are not so dependent on
fine weather, and I suggested to the Admiralty that a simple preventive
in this case was to place merchant ships in position ready to be sunk
across the channels (which are narrow and shallow), the ships being
fitted with explosive charges below ready to blow out the bottoms in
case of necessity. I mentioned the names of certain retired naval
officers who, I felt certain, would make all the necessary preparations
in a very few days. I believe that my proposals were carried out.
The danger of raids, however, and the consequent responsibility thrown
upon the Admiralty for their prevention, during a period when we had
very little military force in the country, led to a division of the
Fleet by Admiralty direction, which, however necessary, had certain
disadvantages from a strategic point of view.
The 3rd Battle Squadron, consisting of eight ships of the “King Edward
VII.” class, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron of four ships of the “County”
class, were ordered to be based on Rosyth, together with destroyers
for screening purposes. The eventuality that had then to be faced was
that of the remainder of the Grand Fleet having to engage the High Sea
Fleet, since concentration with the 3rd Battle Squadron could probably
not be effected without the risk of losing the opportunity of engaging.
At this time the battle cruisers _Princess Royal_, _Invincible_,
and _Inflexible_ were in the Atlantic operating against Von Spee’s
squadron; and the _Australia_, _Indomitable_ had not joined the Grand
Fleet. The _Tiger_ was not yet ready, so that at times our battle
cruiser force consisted of only three ships, the _Lion_, _Queen Mary_,
and _New Zealand_.
Throughout the War the responsibility of the Fleet for the prevention
of raids or invasion was a factor which had a considerable influence on
naval strategy.
If the Fleet, with destroyers, carried out a sweep in the North Sea,
or if it was at sea for a cruise having exercises for its main object,
there was bound to be present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief
the chance that he might be required suddenly to move south to
engage the High Sea Fleet which had put to sea to cover a landing.
If his destroyers were short of fuel at such a moment very serious
consequences might ensue, and therefore all cruiser sweeps or other
operations had to be curtailed to prevent such a situation arising.
One other factor exercised a cramping effect upon our naval strategy
throughout the War, namely, the bombardment of our undefended towns on
the East Coast. Such bombardments were of no immediate military value
to the enemy, but, in spite of the fact that the majority of the Press,
and the public, realised that the Navy should not be led into false
strategy because of these bombardments, it was difficult for the Fleet
to ignore them, and I have no doubt that the Germans relied upon this
fact.
Whilst the Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, it was quite impossible
to ensure that the enemy would be brought to action after such an
operation, since to attain this end it would have been necessary
for the Fleet, or a portion of it, to be constantly cruising in the
southern portion of the North Sea. This was not practicable, even had
it been desirable, because of the impossibility of keeping destroyers
with the heavier ships, and in any case it was false strategy to divide
the Battle Fleet, as such a course might well have resulted in disaster.
The usual course adopted was to base the Battle Cruiser Fleet on
Rosyth, and for that Fleet to cruise from that neighbourhood. The speed
of the battle cruisers enabled them to get away from a decidedly
superior enemy force of battleships if encountered, but there was
always some risk in this case of a ship being disabled; the flag
officer in command would then have been faced with the unpleasant
alternative of abandoning her or of risking his whole force to cover
her retreat.
Had we been able to keep an effective look-out off the enemy ports, so
as to obtain warning of their ships leaving, the difficulty would not
have been so great, but our submarines in those days (the only class
of vessel which could be used for such a purpose) were not fitted with
wireless installations with which they could signal from the required
positions, or indeed from positions anywhere near the enemy’s coast,
and, in any case, it must be borne in mind that at night the exit
of enemy vessels unobserved, even under the conditions of a close
submarine look-out, is a comparatively easy matter.
At this stage it is convenient to remark upon the condition of British
naval bases. As is well known, the Grand Fleet was moved to Scapa Flow
during the latter days of July, 1914, and the defenceless condition
of the Base, both against destroyer attack and submarine attack, was
brought very strongly into prominence by the presence of so valuable a
Fleet at this Base.
The anchorage known as Scapa Flow has three main entrances navigable by
all ships, the Hoxa, the Switha, and Hoy Channels, and, in addition,
has some more narrow, shallow and tortuous entrances on the eastern
side, the main one being Holm Sound. The question of providing gun
defences for this Base, which the Admiralty had decided a year or two
before the War was to be the main Fleet Base, had been discussed on
more than one occasion, after examination by a committee of officers
on the spot; but, since finance governs defence, and the Admiralty
from year to year had insufficient money for even more urgent needs,
no action had been taken. Scapa Flow lies some 450 miles from the
German naval bases, and was, therefore, open to an attack by enemy’s
destroyer flotillas as well as, of course, by submarines. Its main,
indeed its only, safety against such attacks by submarines lay in
the navigational difficulties attendant upon entry into the harbour,
combined, as regards destroyer attacks, with the possibility of an
enemy’s force being intercepted on its outward or homeward passage,
or of its being successfully engaged in the vicinity of the base.
The sailing directions laid great stress upon the difficulties of
navigations in the approaches to this Base, due to the very strong and
varying currents, but the Germans were well acquainted with the Orkney
and Shetland Islands. They had indeed made it a practice to send ships
to visit these islands fairly frequently before the War, and they were,
therefore, as well able to judge of the difficulties of entry into
Scapa Flow as we were; and seeing that we used it as a main Fleet Base,
they could deduce the fact, if they did not know it already, that the
difficulties of entry were not insuperable.
Sir George Callaghan, under these conditions, on the arrival of the
Fleet at Scapa Flow at the end of July, took immediate steps, with
the resources at his disposal in the Fleet, to improvise defences for
the Base against destroyer attack. All that he could do was to land
some 12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet and mount them at
the entrances. No searchlights could, however, be provided, so that
the guns were not of much value at night. Arrangements were also made
for placing light cruisers and destroyers at the various entrances to
assist these defences. The further step, of course, was taken when
the Fleet was present at the Base of placing patrols to the eastward
of the Pentland Firth. It was not felt in the Fleet, however, that
these measures gave much security even against destroyer attack on a
dark night, and, it gave no security whatever against submarine attack.
Nothing but _obstructions_ of some kind could give that security. The
matter was frequently discussed. Although many brains had been at work,
no satisfactory anti-submarine obstruction had been devised. Under the
urgent pressure of war the solution was found. The conclusion generally
held by experienced submarine officers was that, whilst the least
important entrances, such as the Hoy, the Switha and the Holm Sound
Channels, would be extremely difficult for the passage of a submarine,
entry by the Hoxa Sound Channel was quite practicable by a determined
submarine officer. So much for the Base at Scapa Flow.
At Cromarty the conditions were somewhat better. The only entrance
to this Base is comparatively narrow, and was defended against the
entry of destroyers and larger vessels by guns, which had been mounted
by the Admiralty before war broke out. There was, however, no boom
protection against the entry of destroyers, and the conditions in
regard to submarine attack were the same as at Scapa Flow, there being
no obstructions.
At Rosyth the same conditions prevailed as at Cromarty, namely, the
harbour was defended by guns only against attack by destroyers. In this
case, the guns were manned by the military, and not by marines, as at
Cromarty; again the harbour was quite open to submarine attack.
[Illustration:
DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A SUBMARINE BEING
REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW
]
[Illustration:
THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW
]
Consequently, the anxiety of officers in command of Fleets or Squadrons
at anchor in any of the Bases used by the Grand Fleet was immense.
For my part, I was always far more concerned for the safety of
the Fleet when it was at anchor in Scapa Flow during the exceedingly
brief periods which were spent there for coaling in the early days of
the War, than I was when the Fleet was at sea, and this anxiety was
reflected in the very short time that the Fleet was kept in harbour. It
was also the cause of my taking the Fleet to sea very hurriedly on more
than one occasion owing to the reported presence of a submarine in the
anchorage, and considerable risks were accepted in getting the Fleet to
sea in very thick weather at night on at least one of these occasions.
I have often wondered why the Germans did not make greater efforts
to reduce our strength in capital ships by destroyer or submarine
attacks on our bases in those early days. They possessed, in comparison
with the uses for which they were required, almost a superfluity of
destroyers, certainly a superfluity as compared with ourselves, and
they could not have put them to a better use than in an attack on Scapa
Flow during the early months of the 1914–1915 winter.
In August, 1914, Germany had 96 destroyers in home waters fit for such
an operation, all with a speed of, or exceeding, 30 knots, this number
being in addition to a total of 48 more destroyers, rather smaller and
with speeds varying between 26 and 30 knots, which were quite fit for
work in the Baltic or in the vicinity of German bases in the North Sea.
This country had in home waters at the same period only 76 destroyers
that could be compared with the German vessels in view of modern
requirements, and 33 of these had a speed of only 27 knots. Of the 76
destroyers, 40 were allotted to the Grand Fleet proper, the remaining
36 being based on Harwich. We had in addition 11 large and fast
destroyers of the “Tribal” class which, owing to their small fuel
capacity, were only of use in southern waters and were appropriated
to Dover. And we possessed 25 destroyers of the “River” class, of a
nominal speed of only 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot destroyer;
the latter class was only fit for patrol work in the vicinity of the
coast.
It may be said that similar reflections to those I have mentioned might
be made by the Germans as regards our own movements, and that they were
surprised that we did not attack their Fleet at anchor. The answer
is obvious to those aware of the conditions. We were very short of
destroyers for fleet work, and we were well aware of the thoroughness
of the defences of the German naval bases. We knew that they not only
possessed the most powerful and ample artillery defences, but we knew
also that the Germans had a very efficient mining service, and we were
justified in assuming that they had protected their naval bases by
extensive minefields. We, on the other hand, were entirely unprovided
with this particular form of defence.
In view of the known quality of German artillery and mine defences
and the thorough nature of their organisation, my own view was that
they also possessed, in all probability, anti-submarine defences.
For these reasons, together with the important fact that the German
rivers are so shallow that our submarines could not enter them in a
submerged condition, it appeared to me that an attack on their ships
in harbour would meet with no success, and that we could not afford
to expend any of our exceedingly limited number of destroyers, or
submarines, in making an attack which would, in all human probability,
be foredoomed to failure. Later knowledge of the German defences proved
the correctness of this view. I can only imagine that the Germans
credited us, also, with possessing harbour defences and obstructions
which in our case were non-existent, although we did our best in the
Fleet to give the impression that we had obstructed the entrances, for,
pending the provision of proper obstructions, we improvised various
contrivances. It may have seemed impossible to the German mind that
we should place our Fleet, on which the Empire depended for its very
existence, in a position where it was open to submarine or destroyer
attack.
This view, however, did not relieve the minds of those responsible for
the safety of our Fleet from the gravest anxiety whenever the more
valuable ships were in the undefended harbours.
A comparison of numbers between the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet
in the early part of the War shows the following figures. Only ships
that had completed their training and were fit to fight in the line are
included:
BATTLESHIPS
(B., British; G., German)
-----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+--------
Date |Dreadnoughts| Pre- | Battle | Light |Destroyers|Airships|Cruisers
| |Dreadnoughts|cruisers|cruisers| | |
-----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+--------
August 4th, 1914 | | | | | | |
B | 20 | 8 | 4 | 12 | 42 | | 9
G | 13 | 16 | 3 | 15 | 88 | 1 | 2
October 1st, 1914| | | | | | |
B | 20 | 12 | 6 | 12 | 42 | | 10
G | 15 | 16 | 3 | 14 | 88 | 3 | 2
January 1st, 1915| | | | | | |
B | 21[B] | 8 | 6 | 17 | 44 | | 14
G | 16 | 16 | 4 | 12 | 88 | 6 | 1
April 1st, 1915 | | | | | | |
B | 23 | 8 | 9 | 18 | 54 | | 17
G | 17 | 16 | 4 | 14 | 88 | 6 |
October 1st, 1915| | | | | | |
B | 25 | 10 | 10 | 25 | 66 | | 15
G | 17 | 16 | 4 | 15 | 88 | 12 |
-----------------+------------+------------+--------+--------+----------+--------+--------
[B] 21 completed, but two of these (_Monarch_ and _Conqueror_) were seriously damaged
and one other battleship was refitting.
The above list gives the vessels nominally available.
In comparisons of the strength at Germany’s _selected_ and our
_average_ moment, the following facts should be remembered, and were
necessarily taken into account by me at the time:
(_a_) We usually had at least two battleships, one or two light
cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and perhaps one battle
cruiser under refit, in addition to any other vessels that might be
temporarily disabled.
(_b_) Germany would see to it that none of her ships was refitting when
planning an operation, and she could reinforce her Fleet by several
light cruisers and two or more flotillas of destroyers from the Baltic.
(_c_) The pre-Dreadnoughts were not a very important factor on either
side owing to inferiority of speed, and, in the case of our ships, the
comparatively short range of their guns, due to the small amount of
elevation of which their mountings admitted.
(_d_) The German Zeppelins, as their numbers increased, were of great
assistance to the enemy for scouting, each one being, in _favourable
weather_, equal to at least two light cruisers for such a purpose.
(_e_) Account is not taken in the British figures of the Harwich force,
as this force could not be counted upon to effect concentration with
the remainder of the Grand Fleet at the German selected moment.
(_f_) The British cruisers, not being very modern, lacked the speed
necessary for efficiency as scouts. They were very slightly faster than
the battleships of the “Dreadnought” type, and, owing to their lack of
speed, they were awkwardly placed if they came within range of an enemy
Battle Squadron or Battle Cruiser Squadron. On the other hand, they
were very superior in fighting qualities to the German light cruisers.
It will be seen from the above statements that the enemy had by far
his best opportunity from the naval point of view in the early months
of the War, as he was then much nearer equality of strength with the
Grand Fleet than at any later period. A carefully laid trap, which
included minefields and submarines, with the High Sea Fleet as a bait,
might have been very effective at any period of the War in inflicting
considerable losses on us. The Germans had their best opportunities
between November, 1914, and February, 1915. After April, 1915, the
situation got steadily worse for the enemy.
The lesson of vital importance to be drawn from this review of relative
naval strength, is that if this country in the future decides to
rely for safety against raids or invasion on the Fleet alone, it is
essential that we should possess a considerably greater margin of
superiority over a possible enemy _in all classes of vessels_ than we
did in August, 1914.