THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES
The Grand Fleet may be said to have come into being only at the
outbreak of the War, when it was so christened. As with the name, so
with the organisation.
The great majority of the really effective ships in the Grand Fleet
were the outcome of the policy initiated by Admiral of the Fleet Lord
Fisher of Kilverstone when he took up the appointment of First Sea Lord
in 1904 in the Administration of the Earl of Selborne. One of Lord
Fisher’s first acts--and he carried through a number of other changes
which reacted favourably on the efficiency of the Fleet for war--was
the introduction of the “all-big-gun” type of battleship, of which the
_Dreadnought_, laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905, was the
earliest example. She was closely followed by the three “all-big-gun”
battle-cruisers of the “Invincible” class, which were of the same
programme--1905–6. Much criticism was levelled at the _Dreadnought_,
but even more at the principle embodied in the battle-cruisers--ships
with the speed of cruisers, but the same calibre armament as
battleships. The War has fully justified Lord Fisher’s conception.
Our superiority _in capital ships_ at the outbreak of war was due
to the efforts of the Boards presided over by Lord Selborne and his
successors from 1904 onwards, and Lord Fisher held the post of First
Sea Lord for five and a half years of that period. At the beginning
of 1909, during Mr. McKenna’s tenure of office as First Lord, great
efforts were necessary to ensure the maintenance of a sufficient
standard of superiority in capital ships over Germany, and to make good
our deficiencies in destroyers. The nation has good reason for the
most profound gratitude to Mr. McKenna for the very strong attitude he
assumed at this highly critical period. Reference to the table on page
31 will show the position that would have arisen if the four additional
“Dreadnoughts” had not been included in the 1909–10 building programme.
In the later Administration, presided over by Mr. Churchill, continued
efforts were necessary, and were made, and steps were also taken with
a view to meeting the crying need for modern light cruisers; Lord
Beresford had for some years been pointing out how essential it was to
add largely to our programmes of light cruisers and destroyers.
So much for construction in pre-War days when the Germans were carrying
out their Navy Acts, one following the other in rapid succession.
It is also of interest to note the part which Lord Fisher took in
building up the Fleet organisation that existed in 1914. He introduced
the system of manning the older ships, not in the first line, with
nucleus crews composed of the principal officers and ratings. These
ships were thus rendered capable of being put, in a very short
time, into a condition in which they were fit to fight. This system
superseded the old arrangement, by which ships not in full commission
were not manned at all. Although it naturally led to a reduction in the
total number of fully-manned ships, a disadvantage which was minimised
by reducing squadrons abroad, it is probably accepted now that in the
circumstances existing at the time the nucleus crew system is far
preferable; it raised the general standard of the whole Navy in British
waters, and facilitated the use of the Royal Fleet and Naval Reserves
on the outbreak of war.
I.--THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRAND FLEET
In the organisation existing before the War, the Home Fleets comprised
the First, Second and Third Fleets--in fact, practically all ships in
home waters which it was intended to mobilise on the outbreak of war.
The war organisation, as carried out, divided the Home Fleets into two
parts.
The _First_, the Grand Fleet, included the First Fleet, comprising the
latest-built ships; the force stationed at Harwich; four ships of the
6th Battle Squadron; the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons from the Second
and Third Fleets respectively; and the mine-laying Squadron from the
Second Fleet.
The _Second_, or Channel Fleet, included the older battleships, the
5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons, the 5th and 7th Cruiser
Squadrons, and a sweeping flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was
commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914, when
he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of the Grand Fleet.
Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th Battle Squadrons and
the 5th Cruiser Squadron were manned before mobilisation with nucleus
crews, and were consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at
Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons and 7th Cruiser
Squadron were not manned until mobilisation, and the crews consequently
required training. This training was carried out near Plymouth, and
the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney’s command on September 3rd,
1914.
The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed as a look-out force
in the Straits of Dover during the time that the Channel Battle Fleet
was patrolling to guard the passage of the Expeditionary Force. They
were subsequently ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and
three of them, the _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, were sunk whilst
patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast.
These, then, were the conditions when War opened. It was only natural
that war experience should show very quickly the many directions
in which we had to recast, or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to
introduce new arrangements.
Peace manœuvres, however useful, can never be a substitute for war
experience. They are many factors which render peace manœuvres unreal.
In the first place, the available ships have to be divided so as
to form the opposing fleet, “an enemy”; secondly, a matter of far
greater moment, the manœuvres occupy much too short a period, and
many of the difficulties affecting both _matériel_ and personnel are
not experienced; thirdly, the conditions of war cannot be reproduced
without serious inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships;
finally, in our own manœuvres there was a tendency in the rules to give
the torpedo less than its proper value as a fighting weapon.
But, more than all, it was the conditions under which war broke out
that made it necessary for us in the Grand Fleet to build up what was
almost a new organisation.
(_a_) The submarine had just become a most formidable weapon; its
development during the War was extraordinarily rapid.
(_b_) The airship as a scout was in its infancy at the start, but
it also developed with great rapidity, as did the heavier-than-air
machines.
(_c_) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly developed by the
enemy, both defensively and offensively.
(_d_) The effective range both of the gun and of the torpedo was
quickly shown to be much greater than had been considered possible
before the War.[C]
(_e_) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity, and was put to
many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days.
[C] In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out
at a maximum range of about 9,500 yards, and only on one
occasion, when the _Colossus_ fired at a target at 14,000
yards off Portland in 1912, had this range been exceeded.
On the other hand, we were very fortunate in having the Fleet
concentrated at the outbreak of war. People had often pictured war with
Germany coming as a bolt from the blue, and even naval officers feared
that when the occasion did arise, it would be found, as had previously
been the case, that fear of precipitating a conflict might lead the
Government to delay concentration with the result that our squadrons
would be separated when war was actually declared. Fortunately, the
Admiralty in the last days of July, 1914, placed us at once in a strong
strategic position. For this action the nation should be grateful to
the First Lord and First Sea Lord.
It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history, there
was general expectation that a great Fleet action would at once be
fought. No doubt this arose, partly, from the boastings of German naval
officers in pre-War days, and partly from a knowledge of the great
sacrifices the enemy would incur unless he could dispute effectively
our command of the sea. Most people found it difficult to imagine that
the High Sea Fleet (built at vast expense, and rightly considered
by the enemy to be an efficient weapon of war) would adopt from
the outset a purely passive rôle, with the inevitable result that
German trade would be swept from the seas. But there were two factors
tending to make the High Command adopt this course. First, there was
the fear that action with the Grand Fleet would so weaken the High
Sea Fleet as to cause the command of the Baltic to pass into Allied
hands, with a consequent landing of Russian troops on German soil as
the result. This fear had been present in the German mind ever since
the days of Frederick the Great, when Russia threatened Berlin during
the Seven Years’ War. The second point, no doubt, was that the German
High Command realised that, if Germany adopted a defensive rôle with
her Fleet, it created, by far, the most difficult situation for us.
Repugnant as this might be to high-spirited German naval officers, it
was unquestionably the worst policy for us, for, whilst the German High
Sea Fleet remained “in being” as a fighting force, we could not afford
to undertake operations tending to weaken our Grand Fleet, particularly
in the earlier period of the War when our margin of superiority at
Germany’s “selected moment” was not great. The main disadvantage to
the Germans, _apart from their loss of trade_, lay in the inevitable
gradual weakening of the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and it
is highly probable that this loss of morale was in the end responsible
for the series of mutinies which broke out in the High Sea Fleet during
1917 and 1918, culminating in the final catastrophe in November, 1918.
In my view, the passive rôle was carried much too far.
II.--THE STAFF ORGANISATION
To pass to the development of the organisation.
Almost the first question was that of Staff and Staff work. In the days
before the War, the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets
consisted of the following officers:
(_a_) A Personal Staff, comprising a Flag-Commander, Flag-Lieutenant,
and Secretary. The Flag-Captain was also, in a sense, on the Personal
Staff.
(_b_) A General Staff, comprising a Captain of the Fleet with his
Secretary, a Wireless officer, a Signal officer, and the clerical staff
of the Secretary.
In addition, the organisation provided for the appointment of two War
Staff officers, on mobilisation for war.
This was the Staff which, together with an additional Signal officer, I
found in the _Iron Duke_, on assuming command of the Grand Fleet.
It had always been my intention, on relieving Sir George Callaghan in
December, 1914 (as was originally arranged before the War broke out, as
I have explained), to add to the above, a Captain, for the operational
side of the Staff, leaving the Flag-Captain responsible only for the
Command of the Fleet-flagship, this being, in my opinion, sufficient
work and responsibility to occupy his whole time; and I had prepared
an organisation of the Staff of the Fleet-flagship in accordance with
which the work should be divided into two distinct branches, the
operations and the _matériel_ side, each with a secretariat. I had
communicated my views to the officers selected for the Staff. This, in
my judgment, was the correct line for any Naval Staff organisation, and
it was later introduced by me into the Admiralty Naval Staff.
When informed, just prior to the declaration of War, that I might be
required to take over the command of the Fleet, I decided to ask, as
the first step, for the services of Rear-Admiral Charles E. Madden as
Chief of the Staff.
I had brought with me from London on my own Staff, as Second in Command
of the Grand Fleet, a Captain (Captain Bentinck), with the title of
Captain on the Staff, a Secretary with assistants, a Flag-Lieutenant, a
Signal officer, a Wireless officer, a War Staff officer, and a Signal
Boatswain. These, with the exception of Captain Bentinck (who joined
Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender’s Staff), I took to the _Iron Duke_,
and my Staff then comprised:
A Rear-Admiral as Chief of the Staff.
A Commodore as Captain of the Fleet.
Two Secretaries, with the necessary clerical staff.
A Flag-Lieutenant.
Three Signal officers.
Three Wireless officers (very soon reduced to two).
Three War Staff officers.
Two Signal Boatswains.
A Fleet Coaling officer also joined the Staff.
The main difficulty in providing a Flag officer afloat with a
suitable staff is that of accommodation, and this difficulty was
somewhat serious when I doubled the staff on board the _Iron Duke_.
However, it was successfully overcome. The Staff was organised into
two branches--Operations and _Matériel_--the former directly under
the Chief of the Staff, the latter immediately under the Captain of
the Fleet. On proceeding to sea, however, the work of the Captain of
the Fleet became, of necessity, very largely reduced, and he joined
the operational side, arrangements being made by which either he or
the Chief of the Staff was always on the bridge in my absence, as
we soon found under the new conditions, consequent on the advent of
the submarine as an important factor in naval warfare, that it was
essential that an officer should be constantly on the bridge who could
take immediate action in moving the Fleet, or any portion of it, as
might be required.
Even so, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief was so frequently
required, at a moment’s notice, owing to the swiftness with which a
modern fleet moves, that I never left my sea cabin, which was under the
bridge, to go to the after part of the ship when the Fleet was at sea.
The duties of my Staff afloat were separated, as already stated, under
two headings. This division, as is clear from the above remarks,
affected their duties in harbour more than when at sea. In the
latter case the two branches combined, and the whole staff became
“operational.”
The Staff work under these conditions was carried out in the war-room,
situated under protection, below the conning tower. Here the movements
of our own ships were recorded, as well as those of the enemy until we
were nearing contact. All intelligence was sent from the bridge to this
centre by the Signal officers, and the situation at any moment could be
seen by a glance at the charts kept by the War Staff officer on duty.
When we were nearing enemy vessels or enemy waters, the work was
shifted from the war-room to the Admiral’s shelter on the bridge, so
that the situation could be seen by me more readily; and finally, when,
as on May 31st and August 19th, 1916, the two fleets were nearing
touch with one another, the “plot” of the movements as reported was
continually under my observation.
At ordinary times, in harbour, the Staff officers engaged on the
operational side were following the movements of such enemy vessels
(chiefly, of course, submarines) as were known to be at sea, as well
as those of our own vessels. (In the latter case frequent orders to
ships were necessary to ensure that they did not meet each other at
night--when risk of collision would be incurred owing to ships not
carrying lights, or in thick weather.) They put into execution the
orders given by myself or the Chief of the Staff, and were engaged in
elaborating plans of future movements and drawing up the necessary
orders for such movements as I had in contemplation. They were also
engaged in arranging all gunnery, torpedo and other practices and
exercises, and in the constant work of the production, revision and
issue of orders for the organisation and tactical working of the Fleet.
On the _matériel_ side, the Staff work comprised that of storing,
provisioning and fuelling the Fleet, all questions of instruction,
training, personnel, discipline, mails, refits and repairs, etc.
In action each member of the Staff had his own particular duty allotted
to him. The secretaries took notes and recorded proceedings; certain
officers had as their sole duty that of watching and reporting to me
every movement of enemy vessels; one officer was detailed to attend
solely to torpedo attacks made by the enemy, keeping me informed of
their progress and of their possibilities; another dealt with all
questions relating to concentration or distribution of fire, bringing
to my notice any signals required to give effect to our preconceived
arrangements; each signal officer had his own special duty, one being
responsible that all signals for tactical movements made visually
were also made by “short distance” wireless telegraphy. One wireless
officer worked in the main office and one in the auxiliary office.
The Staff was so organised as to leave the Commander-in-Chief free to
take a comprehensive survey of the whole position, whilst ensuring
that nothing that should be done was left undone. It must, however,
be realised that the rapidity of movement of fleets is so great
that, at critical moments, the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet, or the
Flag Officer Commanding a Squadron, must of necessity make instant
decisions; there is no time for consultation or for advice.
III.--PREPARATION OF CRUISING ORDERS
One of the earliest steps taken in organising the Grand Fleet after
the declaration of War was to lay down definitely the various
cruising orders for the Battle Fleet and its “look-out” screen of
battle-cruisers, cruisers and light cruisers. There had been much
discussion for some years before the War as to the best disposition of
cruisers ahead of a Battle Fleet. None of the arrangements that had
been under discussion was adopted as a whole, but war experience led
to a series of diagrams being drawn up giving the cruising stations of
all the various classes of cruisers and other light craft under the
different conditions that might exist. These included diagrams showing
the cruiser disposition with the fleet moving towards enemy waters,
under conditions of ordinary visibility, by day, or in low visibility
by day, both with the Battle Cruiser Fleet in company and without
it; a similar diagram when moving away from enemy water by day (this
being to meet the possible case of an attempted attack by destroyers
as the fleet steered away from enemy waters); diagrams were got out
for steering towards or away from enemy waters at night; and, finally,
diagrams were prepared, both for day and night, for the dispositions of
the cruisers and other light forces after an action.
Several different cruising diagrams for the Battle Fleet itself, both
by day and at night, were similarly drawn up. Some of these were
specially designed to give such safety from submarine attack as was
possible to the main body of the Fleet, in the not unlikely event of
destroyers being absent, from bad weather, shortage of fuel, or other
causes. The dispositions for use at night provided for the use of
destroyer attack, and were designed to give safety from collision, due
to squadrons inadvertently closing each other in the darkness, when
showing no lights; this was a very possible event during the course
of a long night when a very slight error in steering, or a slight
difference in compasses, will rapidly bring two squadrons together that
started the night five miles apart. It was necessary to keep squadrons
separated, as a long line of ships greatly facilitated successful
submarine attack, whilst a slight dispersal of squadrons gave greater
freedom of movement in the case of destroyer attack. At the same time
it was necessary to provide for concentrating the Fleet quickly at
daylight.
The question of submarine screens was taken up at the commencement of
war. This matter had naturally been considered before the War, but was
in its earliest stages, and, although an efficient disposition of a
screen of destroyers is a comparatively simple matter when there is no
lack of destroyers, the case is different when a fleet is very short
of the requisite number, as was our experience, and one destroyer had
often to be disposed to endeavour to do the work of two.
Diagrams of submarine screens were, therefore, drawn up to meet the
different conditions resulting from the presence of varying numbers of
destroyers, or a decreased number of ships requiring to be screened,
and also providing for the ships being in various formations. In
November, 1916, the number of these diagrams was seventeen.
Early in the War the danger of successful submarine attack on warships
at sea, whether in company or proceeding singly, had impressed on us
the necessity of taking every precaution for safety, and the practice
of the fleet steering zigzag courses was devised and generally
adopted in accordance with my directions. In the case of a fleet or
squadron, the usual practice was to carry out the alterations of course
by turning the ships together; occasionally the turn was made “in
succession,” but this was exceptional. In small squadrons, the turns
were occasionally made at fixed time intervals without signal.
Zigzagging had a very beneficial effect on the manner in which officers
of watches kept station in a fleet, since there is no better practice
than keeping station on a line of bearing, a far more difficult matter
to the novice than keeping station astern of another ship. I attribute
the excellent manner in which the ships were handled in 1915 and 1916
very largely to this early experience. Much theoretical investigation
was instituted to determine the method of zigzagging, both in a fleet
and in a single ship, which gave the greatest protection against
submarine attack, and actual experiments took place with our own
submarines with a view to forming correct conclusions; the flag
officers of the fleet rendered me much assistance in this as in all
other matters.
The experience of the Grand Fleet was utilised in the instructions
subsequently issued to merchant ships, and the value of zigzagging
in reducing the danger of submarine attack was clearly shown during
the year 1917 by the comparative immunity of merchant ships that
complied with the orders as compared with those that did not do so.
Occasionally, of course, zigzagging brought a ship into danger, but
this was exceptional as compared with the general immunity given.
When the convoying of merchant ships through the submarine zone was
instituted in 1917, after I had returned to the Admiralty, the Grand
Fleet experience was again of value in the preparation of instructions.
The supremely important question of how best to handle in action the
large and increasing Fleet engaged my attention from the commencement.
In drawing up the various instructions for the conduct of the Fleet,
both when cruising and in action, I availed myself of the advice and
assistance of the experienced flag officers commanding the various
Squadrons. Much discussion took place on these matters, and many of the
dispositions adopted formed the subject of actual experiment at sea
before being incorporated in the orders.
The successful and rapid deployment of the Battle Fleet from its
cruising formation was a matter of the greatest importance, and
constant practice in carrying out this manœuvre under every varying
condition was given to the Fleet when at sea. Various arrangements were
introduced having as their object the simplification and shortening of
the manœuvre, with a view to bringing the heaviest possible fire to
bear on the enemy’s fleet as quickly as possible. Orders were drawn
up to meet cases of deployment in thick weather, when the enemy might
be sighted at short range, and immediate independent action by a
divisional Flag Officer would be necessary.
In the early part of the War the rapid deployment of the Fleet for
action was complicated by the presence of the 3rd Battle Squadron of
pre-Dreadnoughts--the vessels of the “King Edward VII.” class--as the
speed of the ships of this squadron was some three knots less than that
of the rest of the Battle Fleet. I endeavoured to solve this problem
by practical experience. Much depended on the tactics likely to be
adopted by the enemy’s Battle Fleet. The main difficulty lay in the
fact that if the 3rd Battle Squadron was placed on one flank of the
Battle Fleet when in cruising order and deployment towards that flank
became necessary in conformity with an enemy movement, thus placing
the slow 3rd Battle Squadron in the van, the fleet speed of the whole
Battle Line was necessarily reduced to some 14 knots, in order to have
the necessary reserve of speed in hand. If, on the other hand, the
3rd Battle Squadron was placed in the centre of the Fleet, the Fleet
speed was again reduced to that attainable by this squadron. It was
desirable to devise a cruising order for the Battle Fleet which would
admit of the 3rd Battle Squadron being in the rear after deployment,
in whichever direction deployment took place. There was still the
objection, which had to be accepted, that a turn of 16 points forced
upon us by the enemy would place this squadron in the van.
The cruising order eventually adopted placed the pre-Dreadnought
Squadron in rear of the Dreadnought Squadrons, with a view to the
slow squadron turning in the opposite direction to the remainder on
deployment, and eventually taking station in rear of the Dreadnought
Fleet. This involved accepting some delay in getting the 3rd Battle
Squadron into effective action.
[Illustration: Plan N^{o.} 1]
The question was not one of importance subsequent to April, 1915, from
which date our superiority in battleships of the Dreadnought type was
sufficient to give me confidence that the High Sea Fleet, engaged under
suitable conditions, could be crushed in action without the aid of
the 3rd Battle Squadron; but during the winter of 1914–15, when our
superiority in Dreadnoughts was frequently very slight, and the enemy
possessed two pre-Dreadnought Battle Squadrons, our 3rd Battle
Squadron was a necessary addition to the Grand Fleet.
The Battle Orders indicated the position to be occupied by our
battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers on deployment,
as well as that of the fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of
ships of the “Queen Elizabeth” class, when that squadron joined the
Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued shortly after war
commenced were modelled on a Battle memorandum which I had prepared
when in command, first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd
Battle Squadron. But the changing situation soon made alterations and
additions necessary, and the Orders were under constant revision.
The tactics to be pursued by the different units of the Fleet in action
under all conceivable conditions were provided for as far as possible.
Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that the
Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after deployment control
the movements of all the squadrons comprising that fleet under the
conditions of modern action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the
great length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events, and
increase the difficulty of communication. The necessity for wide
decentralisation of command, _after the deployment_ of the fleet for
action, was emphasised.
As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid on this
point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were, of course, kept
fully acquainted with the general ideas under which the Fleet would
act, so that they might be able to interpret my wishes when acting
independently. Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close
watch on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that squadrons
could conform to his movements. The general lines on which I intended
to engage were defined. These included the range at which it was
intended to open the engagement, the range below which it was not
intended to close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks to
be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to this rule which
might become necessary. Emphasis was laid on the supreme necessity for
a free use of our own torpedoes when opportunity occurred.
After the experience of the engagement on January 24th, 1915, between
the battle-cruisers, and especially as our superiority increased and
the High Sea Fleet gave no sign of a desire to engage, the conviction
became stronger than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy
would fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of
tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines and torpedoes,
_since a retiring fleet is in a position of great tactical advantage in
the employment of these weapons_. The Tactical Board was in constant
use for a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the other
flag officers.
In the earliest stages of the War, when the German submarine strength
was not great, one of the main problems to be considered in regard to
a fleet action was the employment of our destroyers and light cruisers
to attack the enemy’s Battle Fleet with torpedoes and to counter his
similar attacks, which, owing to his great superiority in destroyers,
was a matter of supreme importance. The knowledge, too, that his light
cruisers and destroyers, as well possibly as some of his heavier ships,
were fitted for mine-laying (which was not the case with us) made it
necessary to take into account the probability that he would use this
form of attack at the commencement of a general action, or during
the stages leading up to it. Later, when his submarines increased
in number, the method of countering the use of such vessels by the
enemy, in the preliminary stages of a fleet action, had also to be
considered, particularly as it was not until 1916 that the Grand Fleet
was provided with any submarines of this type, and not until 1917 that
submarines which could maintain the Fleet-speed at sea became part of
the organisation.
The comparative immunity of the van from torpedo attack by the enemy,
if the fleets were approximately abeam of one another, and the risks
run by the centre and rear were pointed out, as were the different
conditions produced in the case of a retiring enemy, or one which had a
position of torpedo advantage.
The influence of the torpedo on tactics became greater as the War
progressed, owing to the advance made in the technique of these
weapons. Before the opening of hostilities, for instance, torpedoes had
a maximum range of about 10,000 yards. We made many improvements in our
torpedoes as the War progressed, including a great increase in range,
and we had every reason to believe that the Germans were making similar
progress, and that the range of their torpedoes was as much in excess
of the pre-War range as was that of our own weapons.
The threat of successful torpedo attack even from battleships in the
line was, therefore, an important factor to be taken into account,
with the ships of the opposing fleets formed in single line at the
close intervals which are necessary for successful co-operation and
the concentration of power afforded by a shortened line. Investigation
into possible alternative formations for fighting a fleet action was
constantly proceeding, but the single line, or a modification of it,
was, under most conditions, the best that could be devised.
It was pointed out that, although our Fleet would be manœuvred for
advantage in gunnery position, it might be necessary to engage under
unfavourable gunnery conditions in order to prevent the enemy reaching
his own waters.
Several new manœuvres were introduced and practised by the Fleet with
a view to countering possible tactics on the part of the enemy. These
included a “turn away” or a “turn towards” to counter a serious attack
by torpedoes; a quick method of reversing the course of the Fleet
without impairing its organisation to meet enemy tactics necessitating
such a move; rapid methods of re-forming single line; etc. Other
new tactical methods were introduced as time progressed to meet the
changing conditions of modern warfare.
Detailed orders were drawn up in regard to the conduct of the Fleet
after an action, so far as it was possible to foresee the conditions
that might arise. The object was to arrange to continue the attack by
light craft, whilst safeguarding the heavy ships against counter-attack
by light forces.
In the orders which were issued for the guidance of the destroyers both
before, during, and after an action, endeavour was made to provide for
all these contingencies. The stations of the flotillas, including the
Harwich flotillas, if they were present, were laid down, and each had
its particular duties assigned to it. General directions were given for
the employment of the destroyers, wide latitude being reserved to the
officers commanding flotillas.
The treatment of disabled ships was legislated for.
The duties of each class of vessel, battle-cruiser, cruiser and light
cruiser when in cruising order, or in action, or after an action, were
defined, particular emphasis being laid on the necessity for ships in
the van, when in action, gaining a position of torpedo advantage in
regard to the enemy’s Battle Fleet, whilst at the same time engaging
enemy vessels of a similar class and preventing torpedo attacks on our
own Battle Fleet from developing.
Thus it was laid down as the leading principle in the General Cruiser
Instructions, that after gaining touch with the enemy the first
essential was to maintain that touch. Instructions were also given that
in the event of the enemy’s advanced forces becoming engaged with our
Battle-Cruiser Fleet, the cruisers in our advanced line were to push
on and gain touch with the enemy’s Battle Fleet. It will be seen later
that this situation arose during the Jutland battle.
The Instructions for battle-cruisers laid down the principle that _in
action_ their primary function was the destruction of the similar enemy
vessels if present, and, after their destruction or in their absence,
to attack the van of the enemy’s Battle Fleet. Prior to action their
duty was defined as giving information as to the enemy’s Battle Fleet,
whilst denying similar information to the enemy. The Vice-Admiral
commanding the Battle-Cruiser Fleet was given a free hand to carry out
these general instructions.
The Instructions for the 5th Battle Squadron (the ships of the “Queen
Elizabeth” class) were drawn up to provide for the battle-cruisers
being either absent or present. In the former event, this squadron
took the place, and the duties, of the battle-cruisers; with our
battle-cruisers present and in the van, the 5th Battle Squadron was
ordered to take station ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet
in the case of a deployment towards Heligoland, and in rear of the
Battle Fleet in the case of deployment _away from_ Heligoland. The
object of this latter disposition was to place the High Sea Fleet at
a disadvantage should it execute a 16-point turn after deployment. In
order to enable the 5th Battle Squadron to carry out its functions in
action, it was stationed between the Cruiser Line and the main Battle
Fleet when in cruising order.
The Instructions to the light cruisers defined their duties in action
as being to attack the enemy’s light cruisers and torpedo craft, to
support our destroyers, and to attack the enemy’s battle line with
torpedoes. For this purpose most of the light cruiser squadrons were
required to be in the van on deployment.
The Instructions for destroyers laid emphasis on the fact that
they should carry out an early attack on the enemy’s Battle Fleet,
commencing their attacks in clear weather, as soon as the Battle Fleet
were engaged. Under conditions of low visibility, they were instructed
to attack without waiting for the Battle Fleets to be engaged. It was
pointed out that destroyers closing the enemy’s Battle Fleet for the
purpose of an attack were also in the best position for preventing
successful attacks on our own fleets.
As soon as submarine flotillas were attached to the Grand Fleet, in
1916, instructions for their conduct before, during, and after action
were drawn up. Instructions for two other classes of vessel, namely,
mine-layers and sea-plane carriers, had been issued earlier, vessels of
the mine-laying type, but of a slow speed, having been attached to the
Fleet from the commencement of War, and sea-plane carriers, possessing,
however, but slow speed and inferior arrangements, having joined during
1915.
IV.--THE TRAINING OF THE FLEET
Inseparable from the question of the management of the Fleet before
and during action was that of the working together of its units at sea
by day and at night. This matter was, of course, one to which great
attention had been devoted by Sir George Callaghan, who, when he handed
over the Fleet to me, gave me a fighting machine trained to a very
high pitch of perfection by an officer who was a past master in fleet
training.
But it was inevitable that war conditions should make even greater
demands on the skill of the personnel than had previously been
necessary, and in no direction was this more necessary than at night,
the number of ships in company being far greater than had previously
been usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling added to
the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions, fleets cruising
on dark, stormy nights without showing any lights, did so for
comparatively short periods, during which the more experienced officers
could, to a certain extent, remain on deck.
Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed more than a very
dim light at the stern, and frequently not even that, adding greatly
to difficulties of fleet cruising. Consequently provision had to be
made for ensuring safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and
considerable foresight and great skill on the part of officers was
necessary.
Single ships and squadrons that might by any possibility pass close
to one another during hours of darkness were warned beforehand of the
danger, and arrangements made so that they should be aware of each
other’s positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions so as
to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which otherwise might
open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all sorts were similarly warned so
far as this was possible, but in their case the conditions, owing to
difficulties of communication, were frequently much more embarrassing.
Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night had to be such as
to reduce to a minimum the necessity for signals, whilst giving freedom
of action in an emergency. What applied to conditions of darkness
applied equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for ensuring safety
in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren, could not as a rule be
employed, since the blasts might give warning to the enemy and place
the Fleet open to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the
other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in close company
with the larger ships for screening purposes against submarines led,
in the case of sudden fog, to a difficult situation, as, before the
Fleet could safely carry out any manœuvre, it was essential to get the
destroyers clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by the
large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued to meet all these
conditions, and the best testimony to the training of the Fleet prior
to the War was the remarkable freedom from accident during the early
months after the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly
commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by no means handy
vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisation, was also a source of
great gratification to me, and must have been most satisfactory to the
officers and men concerned.
The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particularly in light
craft, the higher speeds attained by its units, the extreme importance
of reducing signalling by wireless at sea to an absolute minimum,
except in the presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate
attention on the question of the efficiency of our signal arrangements.
Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to be stopped, because by
means of _directional_ wireless stations the positions of ships using
wireless telegraphy could be determined by the enemy. As time went on,
we felt that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and in some
cases even the _name_ of the ship so signalling. This we deduced from
the fact that we ourselves made progress in this direction. The fact of
a German fleet being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if
much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally concluded that the
enemy could similarly locate any of our squadrons using the same means
of communication. That was an inevitable inference.
The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in the first place,
to endeavour, by means of carefully compiled and elaborate orders, to
reduce the amount of signalling that would ordinarily be required after
the Fleet had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the
Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions that could be
anticipated, and whilst this made the orders somewhat lengthy so as to
meet every possibility, the object was achieved.
Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea in daylight,
arrangements were made to pass signals in and out between the most
advanced cruisers and the Fleet Flagship by searchlight, except in the
presence of the enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time
occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet manœuvring when
much to the southward of the latitude of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of
Aberdeen, was also carried out by visual signalling.
Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the Fleet to
enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not possible to use visual
signalling at night, except with carefully shaded lamps which were
only visible at a distance of about a quarter of a mile, and then only
by the ship addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at
night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort had then
to be made to wireless, but by signalling before dark all expected
movements during the night, and by arranging the course of the Fleet
so that few alterations were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost
absolute wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when important
information from the Admiralty and elsewhere was to be transmitted to
the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior officers of squadrons, or to single
ships when at sea engaged in operations, etc., and early in the War
we had to devise a method by which this could be done without calling
up the ships in question by wireless, thus necessitating a reply from
them, and thus possibly acquainting the enemy of their position.
After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of communicating
the required information without causing the ship herself to
divulge her position was devised by the Fleet Wireless officer,
Lieutenant-Commander R. L. Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and
gradually was greatly extended during the later stages of the War.
It must not be thought that, because wireless signalling at sea
was restricted, it was not intended to make full use of it when
necessary and when silence was no longer required, such as when the
fleets were within sight of one another. On the contrary, a great
advance was made during the War in the use of wireless telegraphy for
manœuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in every other direction. So
proficient did the ships become under the organisation introduced
by Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very
efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in 1916
I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as much ease and
rapidity as by visual signals. At the beginning of the War ten minutes
to a quarter of an hour would elapse before I could be sure that all
ships had received a manœuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole
Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to three minutes.
This great improvement was due to new methods introduced, as well as to
incessant practice in harbour.
Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was very considerable
indeed, and I owed a great debt of gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander
Nicholson, the other wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and
the wireless officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress
was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme shortage of wireless
personnel for the expanding Fleet and the large number of auxiliary
vessels commissioned, we were forced to discharge many of the best
operators in the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by
boys trained in the Wireless School established by the Fleet at Scapa
Flow.
A point which war experience brought into considerable prominence
was the difficulty of distinguishing, with sufficient rapidity,
enemy vessels from our own ships both before, and, more particularly
during, action. The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but
was greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines. Steps were
taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrangements made for certain
distinguishing marks visible at long distances to be worn during
daylight by our own surface vessels. The question of identification at
night was more difficult, and although we effected improvement in this
respect also, the results were not so satisfactory.
Of the original experimental work carried out by the Fleet at Scapa
Flow none was more important than that connected with the safety of
ships from mines. Early in the War it had become obvious that there was
danger of a serious weakening of the Grand Fleet by successful mine
attack, and no safeguard existed beyond the work of the mine-sweepers;
these vessels could not work far afield, and in bad weather could not
work even close to their bases, whereas the Fleet might be required to
proceed to sea when mine-sweeping was impracticable.
A solution of this difficulty was required. Commander Cecil V. Usborne,
of the _Colossus_, in these circumstances proposed to me the trial of
an apparatus which he suggested should be towed from the bows of ships;
it was intended to fend off any mine encountered, provided the ship did
not strike it absolutely “end on.” I ordered immediate trials; all the
necessary _matériel_ was provided with Fleet labour and appliances,
and starting with trials in a picket boat, they were continued until
a series of experiments commenced in large ships, battleships and
cruisers. I placed Rear-Admirals A. L. Duff and A. C. Leveson in charge
of the experiments and great progress was made, although absolute
success was not obtained.
Lieutenant Dennis Burney, the son of Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, visited
the base at this juncture, and, knowing his inventive turn of mind,
I discussed the matter with him at considerable length. Lieutenant
Burney soon afterwards put forward proposals for effecting the required
object. His idea was to utilise apparatus which he had devised earlier
for other purposes. His scheme was of a more elaborate nature than
that devised by Commander Usborne, and necessitated the manufacture
of appliances by outside manufacturers. I urged the Admiralty to take
up the question at once; this was done, and the experiments, started
at Portsmouth, were transferred to Scapa Flow as soon as preliminary
success had been obtained.
The two devices were then tried over a considerable period at Scapa
Flow, still under the immediate direction of Rear-Admirals Duff
and Leveson, who threw themselves wholeheartedly into the task,
Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt taking up this work in their occasional
absence. After many disappointments the Burney system was proved to be
successful, and I at once requested that manufacture on a large scale
should be proceeded with. The device was of an elaborate character,
and many persons at first were sceptical as to its value, owing partly
to early difficulties in manipulation. But Rear-Admirals Duff and
Leveson rendered the greatest assistance in overcoming objections, and
gradually it came to be seen in the Fleet that we had become possessed
of a most valuable safeguard. By the time I relinquished the Command a
very large number of battleships, battle-cruisers, and cruisers, and
some light cruisers had been fitted, and the gear was working well.
Owing to Lieutenant Burney’s efforts, improvement was constantly being
effected, with the result that during 1917 the fitting was universal.
During that year it was instrumental in saving several warships from
damage by mines, and in 1918 the number of ships saved was also
considerable.
The initial idea was that of Commander Usborne, and both he and
Lieutenant Burney displayed much energy in working out their respective
devices. But it was through Lieutenant Burney’s ingenuity that final
success was achieved. Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson eventually brought
the appliance to perfection, with the result that it was generally
adopted. A modified arrangement of the same nature was fitted to
merchant ships during 1917 and 1918, and proved of very great value.
As was inevitable, my thoughts turned at an early stage of my Command
to the necessity for constant improvement in the fighting efficiency
of the Grand Fleet. My knowledge of the German Navy, which was
considerable, left me under no delusions as to its character. I had
made it my business to keep myself very fully acquainted with German
progress. I had first been brought into close touch with the modern
German Navy during service in China from 1899 to 1902, which included
the Boxer campaign, when I saw a great deal of its officers and men.
I had then formed a high estimate of its efficiency, and subsequent
touch on many occasions with the German Fleet had convinced me that in
_matériel_ the Germans were ahead of us, and that the personnel, though
lacking the initiative and resource and seamanlike character of the
British, was highly disciplined, and well educated and trained. I knew
also that the German Fleet was in no way short of officers; this was
the case with us owing to the constant political pressure in the years
before the War, and I expected that this shortage of officers would be
a great handicap to us as the War progressed. The branch of the German
Navy from which I expected very good work was the destroyer service. I
had seen German destroyers manœuvring.
Finally I knew, perhaps better than most of our officers, how efficient
was the gunnery and torpedo work of the High Sea Fleet, and how rapid
had been its advance in the year or two before the War. A great
increase had been made in the allowance of ammunition for practice.
Before the War this was much higher than our own, and there was no
doubt in my mind that the German allowance would be well expended.
Indeed, we had obtained information which placed this beyond question.
I was well acquainted personally with many of the flag officers and
captains in the German Navy and had some idea of their views on naval
warfare. Amongst those whom I knew best were Admiral von Ingenohl, the
then Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, Vice-Admiral von Lans,
commanding a Battle Squadron, Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of the Naval
Staff, who later succeeded Admiral von Ingenohl, Grand-Admiral von
Tirpitz, Admiral von Holtzendorff, a former Commander-in-Chief of the
High Sea Fleet, who succeeded Admiral von Pohl as chief of the Naval
Staff, and Admiral von Usedom, who did conspicuous work in the shore
batteries during the Dardanelles operations. My knowledge of these
officers led me to expect good work in the High Command, and I also
expected that they would be well supported.
It is interesting to record that I took part in a Conference of Allied
naval officers in a pagoda at the end of the Great Wall of China in
company with Admiral von Holtzendorff (the then German Flag Captain
in China) after the capture of the Shan-hai-Kwan forts, in 1900,
and that Admiral von Usedom succeeded me as Chief of the Staff to
Admiral--afterwards Admiral of the Fleet--Sir Edward Seymour, when I
was wounded during the international expedition for the relief of the
Peking Legations. I had met both these officers on several subsequent
occasions, as well as Admiral von Lans, who was in command of the
_Iltis_ at the capture of the Taku forts by the Allies in the Boxer
campaign.
My knowledge of the German Navy was a strong reason, had no others
existed, for making me desirous of doing all that was possible to
increase our own gunnery and torpedo efficiency.
The Germans possessed an excellent practice ground in Kiel Bay, with
every appliance for carrying out gunnery exercises, and I felt sure
that they had rendered it safe from any hostile attack, and that the
German Fleet would be able to maintain and improve its efficiency as
time progressed.
We were not in so fortunate a position. There had been no recent
opportunity for carrying out gunnery and torpedo exercises and
practices; Scapa Flow had not been used as a base for such work in
peace time, except for destroyers, and consequently no facilities
existed there, although the proximity of Cromarty, which _had_ been a
Fleet practice base, neutralised this disadvantage to a certain extent
at a later period. But there was no protected area outside the harbour
where practices could be carried out in safety, and the harbour itself
was not at first secure against submarine attack. Much use, however,
was made of the Moray Firth outside Cromarty later when submarine
obstructions had been provided, and the Germans had obligingly laid
a mine-field which protected the practice area from seaward. At the
commencement of the War, then, it was necessary to depend on fleet
resources for the provision of targets for gunnery practices, and the
practices themselves were carried out under conditions which laid the
ships open to submarine attack. This was most unsatisfactory, and the
work suffered considerably as the result. The opportunity provided by
constant sea work in the first months of the War was, however, utilised
to carry out such gunnery practices as the conditions admitted.
At first the custom was for the Fleet to use small targets which the
ships carried with them. These were unsuitable; their small size
rendered them frequently invisible at even moderate ranges in any sea,
and I felt that the Fleet could not make progress under such conditions.
Practice at rocks or small islands was next resorted to, but no really
suitable rocks existed, and, in any case, practice at them eventually
involved too much risk of submarine attack, as the German submarines
began to find their way to the westward of Scotland. Towards the end
of 1915 it became possible, owing to the increase in the number of
destroyers attached to the Fleet, and to the provision of submarine
obstructions at Cromarty, to carry out gunnery practices at long ranges
at targets in the Moray Firth, and real improvement dated from that
period.
Later still, battle practice targets were brought to Scapa Flow, and
the long-range firing was carried out in the Pentland Firth, a still
more convenient place.
Meanwhile Scapa Flow itself had been developed for all the preliminary
gunnery practices which could be carried out with guns up to 6-inch
in calibre, and also for night firing and for torpedo work. The
fine stretch of water was secure from submarine attack after the
obstructions had been provided, and ships could practise by day and
night without danger of attack. The Flow was simply invaluable for this
purpose. Ships were firing, running torpedoes, practising fire control
exercises, carrying out experiments and exercising in dealing with
attacks by destroyers, day after day, from daylight until dark.
After dark, night firing was frequently carried out, and occasionally
a division of battleships was exercised in steaming in company, without
lights, in order to give the officers of watches practice. When the
constant sea work of the earlier months of the War gave place to
occasional cruises, the seagoing and fighting efficiency of the Fleet
was maintained at a remarkably high standard as a result of the work in
Scapa Flow.
During the period 1914–16 a marked advance was undoubtedly made in
gunnery efficiency. At an early period of the War a memorandum was
issued pointing out the necessity for increased attention to drill
and organisation. Absolute perfection was insisted upon, and it was
obtained, by the strenuous efforts of officers and men. I knew that we
had to deal with an enemy who would be as perfect as constant drill
could ensure.
A great extension of the system of Director Firing, by which one
officer or man could lay and fire all the guns, was made. The situation
in this respect before the War was that a few ships had been fitted for
the system, which had been devised by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. But a
very large number of officers were sceptical as to its value compared
with the alternative system; there was considerable opposition to it,
and the great majority of the ships were not fitted. In some cases the
system was not favoured even in the ships provided with it.
It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry out competitive trials of the
Director System and the alternative system already in use, and the
results of these trials had fully confirmed me in my previous opinion
of the great value of the Director System. I was able to press these
views on my return to the Admiralty at the end of 1912 as Second Sea
Lord, and it was then decided to provide all the later ships with the
arrangement. Little progress had, however, been made when the War
broke out, only eight battleships having been fitted.
Early in 1915 arrangements were made, with the assistance of Sir Percy
Scott and the warm support of Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, by
which the battleships and battle-cruisers were supplied with this
system, without being put out of action or sent to a dockyard for
the purpose. The necessary instruments were manufactured at various
contractors’ shops, and the very laborious task of fitting them, and
the heavy electric cables, on board the ships was carried out by
electricians sent to the various bases. The complicated work naturally
took a considerable time, and many vexatious delays occurred; but
gradually all ships were fitted, Sir Percy Scott rendering invaluable
assistance at headquarters.
As a first step, the system was fitted to the heavy guns mounted in
turrets, and by the date of the Battle of Jutland there were few ships
that were not supplied with the system, although six of those last
fitted had not had much experience with it.
The conditions under which that action was fought converted any
waverers at once to a firm belief in the Director System, and there was
never afterwards any doubt expressed as to its great value.
Further efforts were made later to accelerate the work, and the system
was extended to smaller vessels. This had been the intention even
before the action, but there were then still many who were unconvinced.
However, during the remainder of 1916 and 1917 the work was pressed
forward, and the system became universal for all guns and in all
classes of ships.
The improvement in what may be termed the application of existing
methods of fire control may now be mentioned. Throughout the War
we had gradually, as the result of practice, increased greatly the
effective range at which ships could engage, and stress had been laid
on the necessity for bringing the fire rapidly on to the target in
order to obtain early hits. Improvement was perhaps most rapid in the
five or six months following the Jutland action. In this action the
Fire Control Instruments, as adopted in the Service, which were the
outcome of the work of naval officers, were found to meet the gunnery
requirements most successfully. The only important improvement that was
made was the provision of additional means for keeping the observation
of Fire Instruments trained on the correct enemy ship. Various
committees were formed immediately after the battle in order that full
advantage might be taken at once of our experience. The result was the
introduction of new rules for correcting gunfire; these, in addition
to greatly increasing the volume of fire from a ship, also rendered it
difficult for the enemy vessels to evade punishment by dodging tactics.
[Illustration: SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS]
[Illustration: A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915]
In order to cope more successfully with the latter development, more
experiments were ordered, having as their object the determination of
the inclination of the enemy vessel to the line of bearing from us, and
various methods of obtaining this inclination were recommended to the
Fleet. The most promising at the time that I relinquished command of
the Fleet was that proposed by Lieutenant J. W. Rivett-Carnac, R.N.,
the range-finding expert of the Grand Fleet, who had investigated this
inclination problem for some years. A great increase in the rapidity
with which the fall of shot were “spotted on” to a target resulted from
all this work. It is not too much to say that the interval between
opening fire and the moment at which the salvoes began to “straddle”
the target was certainly halved, and the rapidity of fire when the
enemy was “straddled” was very greatly increased. The new firing rules,
by standardising the system of correcting fire, produced a marked
increase in the efficiency of the methods by which the fire of two
ships was concentrated on to one target and generally paved the way for
the solution of many gunnery problems which the Fleet had previously
been unable to solve completely.
The use of smoke screens was closely investigated as a result of our
experience of the German use of this device. Prolonged experiments were
carried out at Scapa Flow to ascertain the possibilities and the best
method of using smoke screens, and they were also used during battle
tactics and during range-finder exercises. The trials included the use
of smoke shell as well as funnel and artificial smoke.
In another direction efforts were made to increase efficiency. The
Jutland battle convinced us that our armour-piercing shell was inferior
in its penetrative power to that used by the Germans, and immediately
after the action I represented this with a view to immediate
investigation. A Committee sat to consider the matter. In 1917, as
First Sea Lord, I appointed a second Committee.
With one of the old type of armour-piercing shells of a particular
calibre as used at Jutland the shell would, with oblique impact at
battle range, _break up whilst holing a certain thickness of plate_,
and the shell could not, therefore, reach the vitals of the enemy’s
ships. A shell of the new type, as produced by the 1917 Committee,
of the same calibre would at the same oblique impact and range _pass
whole through a plate of double the thickness_ before exploding and
could therefore with delay action fuse penetrate to the magazines of a
capital ship. Had our ships possessed the new type of armour-piercing
shell at Jutland, many of the enemy’s vessels, instead of being
only damaged, would probably not have been able to reach port. The
manufacture of these new type shells for the Fleet was well advanced
before the end of 1917.
The value of the torpedo as a fighting weapon in action, from ships,
from destroyers, and from submarines, was also greatly increased. The
torpedo practices at Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character,
were of the greatest possible use.
The real cause underlying the improvement was the great keenness
displayed by officers and men. Their one idea was to strive for the
highest efficiency, and there was never apparent the least sign of
weariness or staleness in repeating time after time exercises and
practices with which they were so familiar. No tribute that I can
pay to the personnel of the Grand Fleet in this connection could be
sufficiently high. I know that under my successor the improvement in
fighting efficiency continued.
Owing to the collapse of the moral of the personnel of the German Navy,
culminating in the surrender for internment of the majority of their
capital ships, the Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in
action the methods adopted as a result of our experience during the
first two years of war, and perfected by two years’ further training.
Had the German fleet come out to battle a terrible punishment awaited
it!
Mention has been made of the development of aircraft during the War.
The possibilities resulting from the use of the air for reconnaissance
work, for assisting in the direction of gunfire, and, finally, for
offensive operations, were fully recognised in the Grand Fleet; but
for a considerable period the lack of suitable machines hindered
development. The first decisive step taken was the fitting out of the
_Campania_, a passenger ship of the Cunard Line, as a sea-plane carrier
to be attached to the Battle Fleet. Prior to that, the Harwich Force
and, later, the Battle Cruiser Fleet had been provided with smaller
vessels, the _Vindex_ and _Engadine_, carrying a few sea-planes. They
had been used in operations in the Heligoland Bight, but without much
success, owing to the difficulty experienced in getting sea-planes to
rise from the water except in the finest weather.
With the arrival of the _Campania_ at Scapa, we were able to
investigate the difficulties attending the use of aircraft from ships
as then fitted and to indicate the direction in which improvement was
desirable and possible. It was apparent that little improvement could
be expected so long as we were dependent on the machines rising from
the water. The first step, therefore, was to improve the arrangements
for flying off from the deck of the _Campania_. The ship returned to
Liverpool at the end of 1915 in order that the necessary alterations
might be effected; these were not completed until the late spring of
1916; during the alterations, the _Campania_ was also, at my request,
fitted to carry a kite balloon.
The advantages to be obtained from the use of kite balloons had been
demonstrated during the Dardanelles operations, and the _Menelaus_,
kite balloon ship, was sent to the Grand Fleet. But it was soon
obvious that we could not make profitable use of kite balloons in a
fleet action unless they were flown from the ships themselves, and
experiments were carried out, under the direction of Vice-Admiral
Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding the 4th Battle Squadron, having as
their object the best method of fitting and using kite balloons from
warships. Many difficulties were experienced, the principal one being
that of providing wire of sufficient strength to stand the tension of
the balloon during strong winds. The Kite Balloon Section at Roehampton
gradually solved the difficulties, and by the end of 1916 the majority
of the flagships leading divisions of the Fleet were provided with kite
balloons, and were experiencing their utility. From this beginning,
great developments took place in providing vessels of all classes,
including light cruisers, destroyers, P boats, and trawlers, with kite
balloons; the balloon was used in the case of the smaller vessels for
anti-submarine reconnaissance work, whilst in the heavy ships it was
used for observation and correction of fire.
Meanwhile, the development of the air-craft carrier had proceeded,
but not with the same rapidity. It was evident to me in 1916 that for
anti-Zeppelin work we should look towards the aeroplane flying from
the deck, rather than to the sea-plane, although it also could rise
from the deck; but I gathered the time was hardly ripe for the step,
owing to the landing difficulty, and the first efforts of the Royal
Naval Air Service lay in the direction of providing a type of sea-plane
that would fly well off the deck and climb quickly. These efforts were
fairly successful, but the development of the heavier-than-air craft
machine for use with the Fleet did not begin until the aeroplane was
adopted for the work; and this took place in 1917, when progress became
rapid, and continued until the end of the War.
There remains the question of the airship, which was also being
developed during the period 1914–16, but as this matter was not within
the province of the Fleet, it is unnecessary to touch upon it here.
V.--THE BLOCKADE
The story of the development of the Grand Fleet would be incomplete
without reference to the Blockade, and, in particular, to the work
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron. In the early days of the War, the 10th
Cruiser Squadron consisted of the ships of the “Edgar” class--vessels
at least twenty years old; and during August, 1914, the Admiralty
commissioned three armed merchant ships, the _Mantua_, _Alsatian_ and
_Oceanic_, to strengthen the squadron for blockade work; the latter
ship was lost by shipwreck in September of that year.
The Blockade in those early days was carried out by the 10th Cruiser
Squadron and by the other cruiser squadrons attached to the Grand
Fleet. During November, 1914, the ships of the “Edgar” class were
withdrawn owing to their unseaworthy condition, and the ships’
companies utilised to commission a number of additional armed merchant
cruisers. By the end of December, 1914, the squadron consisted of
eighteen ships, being raised later to a strength of twenty-four ships.
A very large proportion of the officers and men of the reconstituted
10th Cruiser Squadron belonged to the Mercantile Marine.
The advent of so large a squadron of these vessels called for a
considerable organisation for their maintenance; they were based on
Liverpool for all the heavy work of upkeep, whilst a secondary advanced
base at Swarbachs Minn, on the west coast of the Shetland Islands, was
gradually developed, and obstructed against submarine attack. The work
of organisation was carried out by Rear-Admiral de Chair, who commanded
the squadron, ably seconded by Rear-Admiral H. H. Stileman, the Senior
Naval Officer at Liverpool, to whom we were much indebted for hearty
co-operation and efficient organisation at the base.
The work of the squadron consisted in intercepting and boarding all
vessels bound into or out of the northern entrance to the North Sea,
and this work could obviously not be carried out in the face of the
German submarines without heavy risk to the ships. The danger was
greatest during the operation of boarding, as the examining vessel
was obliged to stop to lower the boarding-boat. As the number of
German submarines increased, the squadron was necessarily withdrawn
to positions further removed from the enemy submarine bases, and the
Blockade line, after the spring of 1915, ran generally from the Orkneys
and Shetlands past the Faroe Islands to Iceland, and when freedom
from ice rendered passage round the north of Iceland possible, ships
operated in that neighbourhood.
A careful organisation of the movements of the ships was necessary to
cover such an immense area of the sea, and to provide that all ships
should, as far as possible, be intercepted. Even in the case of ships
of such large coal endurance as the armed merchant steamers, it was not
possible to keep much more than one-half the number in commission on an
average on the patrol line at the same time. The remainder were either
in port refitting and refueling, or were _en route_ to and from the
bases. The distance from the middle of the patrol line to Liverpool was
some 600 miles, so that two days were occupied in the passage each way.
[Illustration: _Plan N^{o.} 2._
Chart showing in pecked lines the area in which the ships of the
10^{th.} Cruiser Squadron usually worked after about the middle of
the year 1915; the positions of the ships being constantly changed.
Prior to this the areas were in the vicinity of A.B.C.D.G.
]
When going to or from Liverpool the ships had to run the gauntlet
of enemy submarines, which were passing down the west coast of the
Hebrides and Ireland, and as no destroyers were available with which
to screen them against attack, the risk was considerable. They had
also to face the constant danger of mine-fields. Several ships of
the squadron fell victims to submarines or mines with a resultant heavy
loss of life.
Whilst the ships were on patrol, the work of the boarding parties was
very arduous. The preliminary examination could not be carried out
without boarding, and the manner in which the boats of the squadron
were handled in the very heavy weather, almost constant in northern
latitudes, was a fine tribute to the seamanship of the officers and
men. In this boarding work the fishermen of the Newfoundland Royal
Naval Reserve, hardy and experienced seamen, rendered most conspicuous
service.
The efficiency of the Blockade increased gradually from its inception,
as is well known, and after a time the percentage of vessels that
evaded the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron became so low as to
be almost negligible. The procedure adopted was to send all ships,
preliminary examination of which at sea aroused any suspicion, into
Kirkwall or Lerwick harbours, where regular examination services
were instituted. The ships were taken in under the supervision of an
armed guard, sent on board from the boarding-vessel, and these guards
underwent many unpleasant experiences. Several lost their lives in
ships which were torpedoed by German submarines, and in many cases,
particularly in badly found sailing ships, they underwent great
hardships. The guards were also the means of saving more than one such
ship from shipwreck, by working her themselves when the crew refused
to do so any longer, and in all cases great tact and discretion on
the part of the officer in charge, usually a junior officer of the
Royal Naval Reserve, were necessary in his dealings with the neutral
captains. The whole question of the efficiency of the Blockade--as
shown by the returns furnished to me from Headquarters--was constantly
under review by my Staff and myself.
The fate of the detained ship was decided in London on receipt of the
report of examination. As was perhaps natural, the sentence on many
ships’ cargoes pronounced in London was not accepted without question
from the Fleet, and a good deal of correspondence passed with reference
to individual ships. We, in the Fleet, were naturally very critical of
any suspicion of laxity in passing, into neutral countries bordering on
Germany, articles which we suspected might find their way into Germany,
and constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the Admiralty,
and, later, to the Ministry of Blockade, when that Ministry was
established. The difficulties with which the Foreign Office was faced
in regard to neutral susceptibilities were naturally not so apparent
in the Fleet as to the authorities in London, and though many of our
criticisms were perhaps somewhat unjustifiable, and some possibly
incorrect, it is certain that in the main they were of use. Indeed,
they were welcomed in London as giving the naval point of view. The
decisive effect of the Blockade did not become apparent until the end,
when the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an influence on
the result of the War this powerful weapon had exercised. Even those
who during the War had been asking what the Navy was doing, recognised
at the last how victory had been achieved, largely, as the result of
the silent pressure of Sea Power.
VI.--THE GRAND FLEET BASES
Mention has been made elsewhere of the unprotected state of the Grand
Fleet bases against submarine attack in the early part of the War. The
matter was one of supreme importance, and formed the subject of very
urgent representations to the Admiralty. Many brains were at work on
the problem at the Admiralty, at the bases, and in the Fleet itself.
The first step was that taken under the direction of Captain Donald S.
Munro, the King’s Harbour Master at Cromarty, who devised a system of
submarine obstruction which later formed the pattern for the deep-water
obstructions at most of our naval bases. Owing to his energy and
driving power, the entrance to Cromarty was rendered fairly secure by
October 26th, 1914. Whilst he was working out a defence for Cromarty
another officer, Lieutenant Bircham, R.N.V.R., under the command of
Admiral Sir Robert Lowry, the Commander-in-Chief of the coast of
Scotland, suggested a method for providing an obstruction for the
Rosyth base. This was fitted in place by the end of October, 1914, and
was also entirely successful.
As soon as the Cromarty scheme was in train, I requested that
obstructions on similar lines should be fitted to the three main
entrances to Scapa Flow, the Hoxa entrance (by far the most likely to
be attempted) being taken in hand first. Exasperating delays in the
supply of the necessary material were experienced, and the first line
of obstructions in the Hoxa entrance was not completed until December
29th, 1914, the first line in Switha Sound by January 12th, 1915, and
that in Hoy Sound by February 19th, 1915. Meanwhile officers and men
of the Fleet had improvised obstructions, first at Lough Swilly and
Loch na Keal, and later at Scapa Flow, which, while not giving thorough
security against a determined attempt at entry, had a psychological
value. These obstructions, which were kept in existence even after the
completion of the more efficient methods of dealing with the problem,
involved much labour.
Towards the end of 1915, or early in 1916, the disadvantages attendant
on basing the Fleet so far north as Scapa Flow, were discussed between
Sir Henry Jackson (then First Sea Lord) and myself. We both felt that,
with the Fleet at the northern base, the difficulties of intercepting
the High Sea Fleet during coast raids, and of dealing with landing
raids covered by the High Sea Fleet, were so considerable as to make
it eminently desirable to base the whole Fleet farther south, if this
were feasible. A discussion took place at Rosyth, and as the result I
suggested a scheme of submarine obstructions across the Firth of Forth,
which would admit not only of berthing the whole Grand Fleet in that
anchorage, but would also allow of gunnery and torpedo practices being
carried out with a considerable degree of safety in the Forth, so that
the Fleet, if based there, could keep up its fighting efficiency. Many
senior officers in the Grand Fleet were not in favour of the idea,
for two reasons: first, that the Fleet could be mined in by the enemy
with much greater ease when in the Forth than when at Scapa; and,
secondly, that practices could not be so efficiently carried out in the
Forth. There was much weight in both these objections, although the
difficulties of carrying out practices in the Forth were exaggerated;
but the strategic advantage, in my opinion, outweighed them, and the
scheme was proceeded with as proposed.
That part of the scheme which admitted of the safe carrying out of
practices was completed by December, 1916, and the whole of the new
obstructions were in place by July, 1917, nearly a year later, it is
true, than the anticipated date. The result certainly justified the
conclusion arrived at. When the conditions made it at all probable
that the High Sea Fleet might put to sea for an operation in southern
waters, the Grand Fleet assembled in the Firth of Forth, and the
undoubted disadvantages of the southern base were neutralised by
skilful dispositions on the part of the flag officers responsible.
The protection of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine attack was
only one of the many factors necessary for their development. In
pre-War days, although it had been decided that the use of northern
bases would be necessary in the event of a war with Germany, the bases
had not been prepared to meet the new situation. It is, perhaps,
desirable to remove any misunderstanding as to the causes of this
failure.
(_a_) The decision had not long been taken, and
(_b_) The necessary financial provision was lacking.
Under the first of these headings the base at Scapa Flow was affected,
and, under the second, that at Rosyth, where for some time progress in
the development of the base had been arrested.
The Admiralty had taken steps to make some preparations at Cromarty,
in so far as the provision of gun defences against attack by surface
vessels was concerned, but nothing had been done for the upkeep of a
fleet beyond a decision to transfer to Cromarty, during war, one of the
floating docks at southern yards.
In fact, the situation was that, whilst we had shifted our Fleet to
the north, all the conveniences for the maintenance of that fleet were
still in the Channel ports. The first step was the transference of the
large floating dock from Portsmouth to Invergordon, in the Cromarty
Firth, together with a staff of dockyard workmen, who were housed in
a merchant ship captured from the Germans. Workshops were fitted up
on shore under the energetic superintendence of Rear-Admiral Edmund
R. Pears and his able staff of dockyard officers. It can be said with
great emphasis that this floating dock was simply invaluable to the
Grand Fleet.
Invergordon gradually developed into a great repairing base. A second
and smaller floating dock was purchased early in 1916 at my request
and placed there, and by the middle of that year the base had attained
large proportions; work of all kinds was carried out with rapidity and
success, including the repairs of battleships after the Jutland battle,
and the great extension in armoured-deck protection fitted to ships
after the same action.
Ordinary refits of battleships had been carried out at Invergordon
since the autumn of 1914. At Scapa Flow the same possibilities as a
repairing base did not exist, although a floating dock for destroyers,
for which many requests had been made, was eventually obtained and
placed there.
But the base at Scapa Flow had extended out of all knowledge in other
directions. In August, 1914, the base organisation consisted only of
the seagoing Fleet repair ships _Cyclops_ and _Assistance_. At an
early stage the _Cyclops_ was connected to a shore telegraph cable off
the village of Scapa, and she became at the same time a floating post
office and a base for the auxiliary vessels (a few drifters) which
were first requisitioned. Rear-Admiral Francis S. Miller was appointed
to her as the Senior Naval Officer at the base. The manner in which
the great demands on her accommodation were met was a standing wonder
to me. In the early part of the War, officers on Admiral Miller’s
staff and others were obliged to make their sleeping berths, as best
they could, on the deck or on top of their writing-tables, and it was
surprising that the overcrowding in all directions did not affect
health. But the work went on very successfully in the most inconvenient
circumstances.
Towards the end of 1914 it became necessary, owing to the weather
conditions, to move the base organisations from the north to the
south-west side of Scapa Flow. The anchorage at Long Hope was selected,
whilst the Fleet itself lay off the north side of the Island of Flotta,
and the numerous larger auxiliaries, colliers, oilers, store ships,
and the ammunition ships lay between Long Hope and Hoy Sound. Prior to
this, the importance of the organisation in the Orkneys and Shetlands
had increased to such an extent that I had asked for the appointment of
a Senior Flag Officer in general command of the whole district, and of
the defences in particular.
So much of my time was being occupied in deciding and pressing forward
the work of organisation of the base and its obstructions and defences,
in dealing with the numerous questions relating to the patrol of the
coast by coast watchers, in arranging for the disposal of merchant
ships sent in for re-examination, and for guarding such vessels, in
considering questions affecting the occupation of land for the erection
of defences, in the requisitioning of trawlers and drifters, etc., that
it was becoming difficult to deal with the fast accumulating Fleet
work proper. Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, who suggested that he
should waive his seniority in order to serve as my junior officer,
was appointed Vice-Admiral Commanding the Orkneys and Shetlands. This
left Rear-Admiral Miller free to devote himself to the increasingly
heavy work of base organisation proper, relieved me of a mass of work
outside the Fleet, and was of the greatest possible benefit in every
way. Under Sir Stanley Colville’s most able direction, the completion
of the organisation for the general defences of the Islands, the work
of patrol craft and mine-sweepers, and the provision of submarine
obstructions was effected, and the work pushed forward. Captain Stanley
Dean Pitt, R.N., an officer of very wide experience, was appointed to
superintend the work of laying the submarine obstructions, and under
his able direction, in the face of the greatest difficulties due to
bad weather and strong tides, the entrances to Scapa Flow were either
blocked by sunken ships or obstructed by nets, mines, and other devices.
The gun defences at Scapa, which at the beginning of the War consisted
of 12-pounder and 3-pounder guns landed from the Fleet, were gradually
reinforced by four-inch and six-inch guns obtained from abroad, the
whole being manned by Royal Marine pensioners under Lieut.-Colonel
Gerald N. A. Harris, R.M.A. The garrison was housed in huts, erected
temporarily for the purpose, and although with the handiness which
characterises a Royal Marine in all circumstances, the officers and
men eventually made themselves comfortable even under such weather
conditions as are experienced at Scapa Flow, they endured a very
considerable amount of hardship in the early days with their accustomed
cheerfulness.
And here I cannot fail to mention the endurance and staying qualities
of the crews of the trawlers that supported the submarine obstructions,
particularly those at Scapa Flow. These trawlers were moored in
positions in which they were exposed to the whole fury of northerly
and southerly gales; in many cases they were within a few yards of a
rocky coast, heavy seas breaking over them and bringing on board tons
of water. The skippers knew that they had to stick it out for the sake
of the safety of the Fleet and the maintenance of the obstruction, and
under these conditions they did their duty in a manner which calls for
the highest praise.
Meanwhile the development of the base proper proceeded apace. One of
the earlier arrivals was the old cruiser _Impérieuse_, which was used
as a post office, depot, and general overflow ship to the _Cyclops_.
The number of trawlers and drifters, which had their home at Scapa Flow
and which were engaged on patrol or mine-sweeping work, attendance on
the Fleet, garrison, or on the mass of Fleet auxiliaries, increased
with great rapidity during the winter of 1914–15; on September 1st,
1914, the number was _nil_, and it reached a total of some four
yachts, eighty-five trawlers, and twenty-seven drifters by the summer
of 1915. These vessels all looked to the _Cyclops_, _Assistance_ and
_Impérieuse_ for refit, pay, food, and for every conceivable want.
Gradually the number of base ships was increased, culminating in the
arrival of the old battleship _Victorious_ about March 6, 1916, as the
“home” of some 500 dockyard workmen working in the Fleet, fitting the
Director System, increasing the protection to decks and magazines,
carrying out minor repairs, retubing condensers, and many other urgent
tasks.
Mention has been made of the large number of colliers, oilers, store
ships, ammunition ships, etc., that were used by the Fleet. At one time
this caused some criticism, based principally on the time spent by the
colliers at the Fleet Base. It may be as well to explain the necessity
for this. There were no facilities at the base for the storage of
coal, either in lighters or on shore. Consequently, the whole of the
coal required at the base was necessarily kept on board the colliers.
The actual number of colliers which I deemed it necessary to keep
at the base during the first two years of war was determined by the
necessity for coaling the Fleet and getting it to sea again with the
utmost possible rapidity. We could not contemplate such a situation
as the Fleet arriving short of fuel, and being delayed in completing
owing to shortage of colliers, with the possibility of information
being received simultaneously that the High Sea Fleet was at sea and
covering a landing raid on our coast! Rapidity of fuelling was of vital
importance to the Empire.
Therefore, in stating my requirements of colliers, I gave the
number necessary to enable almost the whole Fleet to be fuelled
simultaneously; in other words, the number of colliers was dependent on
the number of coal-burning ships in the Fleet. Some slight reduction
was found possible, to allow for the probable case of some ships
requiring less coal than others, thus admitting of two such ships using
one collier in succession; but, broadly speaking, the requirements were
as stated. When the cargo of colliers fell below a certain minimum,
they return to Cardiff to refill to economise tonnage.
At Rosyth the situation was eased by the transport of coal by rail
to Grangemouth and its transshipment to colliers there. As we needed
colliers as coal-storing ships, so also we required ammunition ships to
carry a proportion of the reserve ammunition for the Fleet. There were
no facilities at Scapa or Cromarty for storage on shore. The number of
ships required for this service was, however, much smaller.
Floating storage of all sorts possesses one great advantage over shore
storage; should strategic conditions necessitate a change of base, the
coal, ammunition and other auxiliaries can move with the Fleet. The
same argument applies in a lesser degree to floating docks.
A consideration of all these facts connected with the development
of fleet bases will show that this question necessarily required a
good deal of attention on the part of my Staff and myself, and was
incidental to the development of the Grand Fleet.
VII.--THE PERSONNEL AND ITS WELFARE
Another factor in the development of the Fleet, by no means the least
important, was that of the moral and spirit of the personnel. It is,
of course, impossible to exaggerate the importance of this question
as an element in the efficiency of the Fleet. In the early months of
war, when the Fleet was continually at sea, the few hours spent in
harbour were fully occupied in coaling and storing the ships; but these
conditions could not be continued indefinitely. As the months passed
with no sign of enemy vessels at sea and time in harbour increased
as compared to that spent at sea, it became necessary to find some
diversion for the minds of the officers and men.
The first step taken at Scapa Flow was carried out under the
superintendence of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, then commanding the
1st Battle Squadron. Always alive to the necessity for providing
occupation, recreation, and exercise for officers and men, he started
considerable works on Flotta Island, works of such a divergent nature
as batteries for the defence of the submarine obstructions then in
progress, football grounds for the men, a golf course for the officers,
and landing piers on the beach. These schemes grew and were eventually
divided out amongst the various squadrons. A rifle and pistol range
were also constructed, and several piers built. The whole of the work
was carried out, I may add, by means of Fleet labour. Later a “Canteen”
ship, the s.s. _Ghourko_, was fitted up by the Junior Army and Navy
Stores, and this vessel played an important part in the harbour life
of the Grand Fleet. She carried stores and provisions of all sorts,
available for use by all ships, but particularly of the smaller vessels
which could not send their mess stewards far afield in search of a
change of diet. She was provided with a stage, and theatrical and
cinema entertainments took place on board frequently. She was also
fitted with a boxing ring, and squadron boxing competitions were held
on board with great frequency. Finally, she was utilised for lectures
of all sorts, and for the Church services of Roman Catholics and
Nonconformists.
The system of lectures was encouraged to the utmost. Officers lectured
on board their ships to the ships’ companies on every subject, the War
included, and much good resulted.
Education was freely developed. The Admiralty provided, at my request,
schoolmasters in large numbers, and classes for the boys and voluntary
classes for the men in the evenings in harbour were very well attended.
And, finally, exercise of all sorts was encouraged to the utmost extent
possible. This took the form principally of football, rowing regattas,
athletic sports and boxing. The keenness displayed in all these sports
was a certain indication that the personnel was showing no sign of
staleness.
The Englishman’s love of sport helps him to tide over periods of tedium
and weariness, which are most calculated to undermine discipline.
Occupation and interest are the surest antidotes to discontent and
unrest, and never during the first two and a half years did I see
signs of either. On the contrary, the men, I believe, were thoroughly
happy and contented, treated the War as being in the day’s work, and
looked forward eagerly to the day on which their enemy would give them
the opportunity for which they were waiting, and for which they kept
themselves thoroughly efficient and fit.
In those days the officers got to know the men even better than they
had done before, and the spirit of comradeship between all ranks became
correspondingly closer. Certainly no Commander-in-Chief could ever have
desired to see in the force under his orders a finer spirit than that
which animated the officers and men of the Grand Fleet.