Transcriber’s Note: Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Superscripts
are represented in the forms ^Y or ^{TH}. Additional notes will be
found near the end of this ebook.
[Illustration:
ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE OF SCAPA, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.
]
THE GRAND FLEET
1914–1916
ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT AND WORK
BY
ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE
OF SCAPA
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS
[Illustration]
NEW YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
COPYRIGHT, 1919,
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO MY COMRADES
OF THE GRAND FLEET
PREFACE
In the following pages the work of the Grand Fleet, from the outbreak
of war until the end of November, 1916, is described.
The writing of this record of the work of the Grand Fleet, of which
little has been heard by the nation hitherto, has helped to fill in
days of leisure. The manuscript was finished by the autumn of 1918,
but publication was deferred for obvious reasons. When the armistice
had been signed and the German Navy had, for all practical purposes,
ceased to exist, I felt free to issue the book. The final revision has
been done hastily owing to my early departure for the Dominions, and
in the circumstances I hope I may rely on the indulgence of readers if
any clerical errors have escaped me. In order to minimise the chances
of such errors Mr. Archibald Hurd has kindly read the proofs, and I am
much indebted to him.
The narrative necessarily includes an account of the gradual
organisation and development of the Grand Fleet, and its bases, by
successive steps, after the hoisting of my flag on the outbreak of
hostilities; and the manner in which the changing conditions of naval
warfare were met is also dealt with.
Admiral Mahan, amongst others, has truly said that whilst the
_principles_ of naval strategy are unchangeable, experience in war and
changes in the weapons with which war is waged may profoundly affect
the _application_ of those principles.
The truth of this statement was shown in the Russo-Japanese war; in the
short interval between 1904 and 1914 further great advances took place
in the technique of warfare; these produced a striking influence on
strategy and tactics during the late war.
The reasons which made it necessary, during the war, to hide from
public view the work of the Grand Fleet no longer exist, and it
will no doubt be of interest to the nation to learn something of
its operations, especially as, for various justifiable reasons,
few despatches were issued dealing with its activities. So far as
the Battle Fleet was concerned, the Battle of Jutland was the one
exception, and that despatch was written and published when it was
necessary to conceal a good deal from the enemy.
As is inevitable, much of the information in this volume is of a
technical character and, though interesting to seamen, may prove
less so to the general reader. Those who take this view may decide
that Chapters IV to X, inclusive, require only to be glanced at.
Confidential matter, which it is still undesirable to make public, has
been excluded from the book. Some of this may see the light in later
years.
The main portion of the book is written in narrative form, but where it
is thought that an explanation may be useful, as to the reasons which
governed any particular movement or decision, such reason is given in
order that opportunity may be afforded the reader of understanding the
purpose in view and the manner in which it was hoped to achieve it.
In some parts of the book reference is made to the Germans being
superior to us in _matériel_. There were many directions, however,
in which war experience showed the correctness of our views and the
wisdom of our pre-war policy. We did, in fact, obtain a margin of
safety in the most essential type of vessel, the capital ship, and we
did gain advantage from the heavier calibre of our guns. Naval policy
is pursued in peace conditions under inevitable disadvantages in a
democratic country, because there are many claims on the Exchequer.
Reviewing our pre-war programmes of ship construction and equipment,
and bearing in mind the unconsciousness of the nation generally as to
the imminence of war, it is matter for satisfaction that the Boards of
Admiralty from the beginning of the century were able to achieve so
much, and that when at last war became inevitable the nation had in
control of its destinies at Whitehall a First Lord and a First Sea Lord
who, accepting their responsibility, mobilised the Fleet before war was
actually declared, thus securing for us inestimable advantages, as, I
hope, I have demonstrated in my record of the Grand Fleet. The years of
strenuous work and training carried out by the officers and men of the
Fleet, which should never be forgotten, had made of it a magnificent
fighting machine, and bore ample fruit during the war.
The Germans, in creating their Fleet, followed generally the British
lead. In this book reference is made to the general efficiency of the
German Navy and of the good design and fine equipment of their ships.
These points were never questioned by British naval officers, and the
shameful surrender of the host of the German ships in 1918 did not
alter the opinions previously formed. That surrender was the result of
broken moral.
More than a hundred years after the Battle of Trafalgar, and after
a century of controversy, the Admiralty considered it desirable to
appoint a committee to decide whether that action was fought in
accordance with the original intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, as
embodied in his famous Memorandum. It is hoped that the facts recorded
in this book, and the comments accompanying them, constitute a clear
statement of the making of the Grand Fleet and the manner in which it
endeavoured, whilst under my command, to fulfil its mission.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I THE OPENING OF THE WAR 1
II GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 12
III THE GRAND FLEET AND ITS BASES 34
IV DECLARATION OF WAR 88
V THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA 115
VI INCIDENTS AT SEA--NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914 155
VII THE DOGGER BANK ACTION 187
VIII GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES 221
IX CONTROLLING THE NORTH SEA 249
X ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION 264
XI THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916 300
XII THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 304
XIII THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (_continued_) 341
XIV THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND (_continued_) 370
XV REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 390
XVI THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER’S FAREWELL 415
XVII THE SUBMARINE PERIL TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; RECALL TO THE
ADMIRALTY 445
APPENDIX I 463
APPENDIX II 490
ILLUSTRATIONS
ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE, OF SCAPA, G. C. B., O. M., G. C. V. O.
_Frontispiece_
FACING PAGE
DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM ON THE FIRST OCCASION OF A SUBMARINE
BEING REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW 28
THE FIRST OBSTRUCTION AT SCAPA FLOW 28
SMOKE SCREEN MADE BY DESTROYERS 68
A DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MARCH, 1915 68
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL
HALSEY), AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (LIEUT.-COMMANDER HERBERT
FITZHERBERT) ON BOARD H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_ 96
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND AS DEPICTED BY A GERMAN ARTIST (_colour_) 336
H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_ AND 3RD DIVISION OF THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYING
AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 342
H.M.S. _IRON DUKE_ OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 346
H.M.S. _SUPERB_ OPENING FIRE AT THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 366
PLANS AND DIAGRAMS
PLANS
PLAN FACING PAGE
1. SCAPA FLOW AND THE ORKNEYS 48
2. AREA OF OPERATIONS OF 10TH CRUISER SQUADRON 74
3. TYPICAL SWEEP, SEPTEMBER 8TH–11TH, 1914 128
4. APPROXIMATE DISPOSITIONS, OCTOBER 3RD–11TH, 1914, WHILST
CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING 138
5. MOVEMENTS OF FLEET, JANUARY 23RD–25TH, 1915 196
6. OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF, MAY 2ND–5TH, 1916 290
7. OPERATIONS OF BATTLE CRUISER FLEET, 2 P. M. TO 6.15 P. M.,
MAY 31ST, 1916 316
8. APPROXIMATE POSITION OF SHIPS OF GRAND FLEET, 6.45 P. M.,
MAY 31ST, 1916 350
9. APPROXIMATE POSITION OF SHIPS OF GRAND FLEET, 7.15 P. M.,
MAY 31ST, 1916 358
DIAGRAMS
DIAGRAM
1. BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT OF THE BATTLE FLEET, MAY 31ST, 1916.
2. SHOWING AN IMAGINARY DEPLOYMENT ON THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN.
3. BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MOVEMENTS OF BATTLE FLEET AND BATTLE CRUISERS.
4. OPERATIONS DURING THE NIGHT OF MAY 31ST–JUNE 1ST, AND ON
JUNE 1ST, 1916.
THE GRAND FLEET, 1914–1916
CHAPTER I
THE OPENING OF THE WAR
Early in 1914, whilst serving at the Admiralty as Second Sea Lord,
I had been offered and had accepted the command of the Home Fleets,
which in the ordinary course would have become vacant in the following
December on the expiration of Admiral Sir George Callaghan’s term of
command, and public announcement was made of the intended appointment.
Sir George Callaghan was my senior by seven years, and he and I had
served together in China fourteen years before, when I was Flag Captain
to Admiral--afterwards Admiral of the Fleet--Sir Edward Seymour. He
had since had what is probably a unique period of sea service, passing
from one appointment to another without an interval of half pay. Soon
after his promotion to flag rank he had become Rear-Admiral in the old
Channel Fleet; thence he had gone on to the 5th Cruiser Squadron in
1907; two years later he became second in command in the Mediterranean,
and on the expiration of his term there, in 1910, he returned to take
up the appointment of Vice-Admiral commanding the Second Division of
the Home Fleets, succeeding to the position of Commander-in-Chief in
1910. The usual period for which the Commander-in-Chief of the Home
Fleet was supposed to fly his flag was two years, but in 1913 the
Admiralty, accurately interpreting the sentiment of the whole Service,
extended Sir George Callaghan’s appointment. And it was the approaching
termination of this further period of command--to the regret of the
Admiralty, for which I can speak from personal knowledge, and to the
regret also of the officers and men of the Home Fleets--which led to my
nomination in the spring of that year.
In the latter part of July, when the situation in Europe had assumed
a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First Lord, informed me that
in the event of hostilities occurring involving this country, it was
considered necessary that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets
should have the assistance of a second in command, and he added that I
had been selected for the appointment, and it was desired that I should
arrange with Sir George as to the ship in which I should fly my flag.
Sir George Callaghan visited the Admiralty very shortly afterwards,
and it was decided between us that the battleship _Centurion_ should
be my flagship. We discussed the slight reorganisation that this
would involve in the Fleet, and I selected my staff, which comprised:
Captain R. W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff; Lieut. H. Fitzherbert as
Flag Lieutenant; Lieut.-Commander E. Hardman Jones as Signal Officer;
Lieut.-Commander R. L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander
(N.) A. F. B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, and Fleet Paymaster H. H.
Share as Secretary.
On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events, I was present at
a dinner party given by Lord Morley at the United Services Club. The
party was interesting, as it comprised Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener,
Mr. Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Bryce, and others who figured later
prominently in the War.
During the two following days conferences took place at the Admiralty
as to the disposition of the Fleet, etc., and, in view of the
threatening political situation, the work of demobilisation after the
King’s inspection at Spithead and the subsequent short fleet exercises
were suspended, pending further developments. I met Lord Kitchener, who
was about to return to Egypt, on one or two occasions at the Admiralty
during these days.
On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second Sea Lord, which I
had discharged since December, 1912, to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick
Hamilton, K.C.B., and made my final preparations for joining the Fleet
as second in command.
I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following day, and during
a conversation with Mr. Churchill and the Marquis of Milford Haven,
the then First Sea Lord, it was intimated to me that, in certain
circumstances, I might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to
Sir George Callaghan.
This intimation came upon me as a great surprise, and I protested
against such an appointment being made on what might possibly be on
the very eve of war. Nothing definite was settled. I left, however,
with the impression that the change was not one that had been finally
decided upon, but that it might take place. I left London the same
night by the mail train for Wick, the Commander-in-Chief having
informed me that he would send a vessel to meet me there.
The idea that the change might be made occupied my thoughts during the
journey to the North. As I thought over the possibility of a transfer
of command at such a moment, the stronger appeared the objections.
During the ensuing forty-eight hours I sent several telegrams to
both the First Lord and the First Sea Lord on the subject. I dwelt
strongly upon the danger of substituting, at such a juncture and at
such short notice, an admiral who was not in touch with the Fleet,
for a Commander-in-Chief with long experience of the Command. I
mentioned, also, the strong feeling of admiration and loyalty to the
Commander-in-Chief that existed, and suggested as an alternative that I
should act as his assistant on board the Fleet-Flagship. I had in mind
that I might act somewhat in the capacity of his Chief of the Staff.
In spite of the First Lord’s reiterated opinion, my views remained
unaltered, although it did not occur to me that some anxiety might be
felt that Sir George Callaghan’s health would not stand the strain of
commanding the Fleet in the event of war. That, however, was a matter
on which the Admiralty would be better informed than myself, and I
had no hesitation in urging the opinions expressed in my successive
telegrams.
A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the _Boadicea_, the ship in which I
made the passage to Scapa Flow, was not able to leave until late in the
forenoon of August 2nd, and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon.
When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief, the knowledge of
the event which was apparently impending made the interview both
embarrassing and painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of
the possibility of his leaving the Fleet, and obviously I could not
tell him.
We discussed various arrangements, including the question of the
defence of Scapa Flow, for which temporary but naturally inadequate
measures were being energetically taken with the limited resources at
the disposal of the Fleet.
At about 4 A.M. on August 4th, I received Admiralty orders to open
a secret envelope which had been handed to me in the train as I was
leaving London, by an officer from the Admiralty. This envelope
contained my appointment as “Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet”--a
new designation which must be explained later.
On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded on board the _Iron
Duke_ and found that the Commander-in-Chief had received orders to turn
over the command to me.
Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in-Chief during my command
of the 2nd Battle Squadron. He was, in addition, a personal friend,
and I, like all those with whom he had been in contact, had the most
profound respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over his
command at _the_ moment of his life naturally caused me feelings of
the greatest pain, and, moreover, it was impossible to dismiss the
fear that the Fleet might conclude that I had been in some measure
responsible for the change. This possibility had, of course, been
present in my mind from the moment I left London, and it appeared to
add to the objections to a change of command at such a juncture, since
any idea of this nature prevalent in the Fleet must affect the feeling
of loyalty to me as the new Commander-in-Chief.
It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot close this
portion of my narrative without paying a warm tribute to the manner
in which Sir George accepted the Admiralty decision, which obviously
came as a great shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant
officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make the position easy
for me, in entire disregard of his own feelings.
It was decided that I should take over the Command on the following
day, but a telegram having been received from the Admiralty ordering
the Fleet to proceed to sea at once, I returned to the _Iron Duke_, and
Sir George Callaghan arranged to leave the Fleet in the _Sappho_ before
its departure at 8.30 in the morning.
At that hour I took over the Command from Sir George Callaghan, who
then struck his flag.
The following ten or fourteen days were a period of great strain and
anxiety. To assume so heavy a responsibility as the command of the
Grand Fleet at such short notice on the eve of war was in itself a
matter not to be taken lightly; it became necessary to gather together
the strings of the whole organisation, to ascertain the dispositions
already made and those immediately required, and the whole problem was
largely complicated by the fact that the port on which the Fleet was
based was open to attack both by destroyers and by submarines, the only
obstacle to such attack being the navigational difficulties of the
Pentland Firth. Though considerable, these were by no means insuperable.
Added to this was my feeling of deep regret at superseding a valued
chief and friend at such a moment. The one thing that helped me through
this period was the great and most loyal assistance rendered to me by
the staff of Sir George Callaghan, who, notwithstanding their intense
personal regret at his departure, gave me their very warm support,
and concealed from me any trace of the feelings which they must have
experienced at my presence amongst them under such exceptional and
trying conditions. They behaved as naval officers always behave--in a
true spirit of comradeship. The same may be said of the flag officers
and captains in the Fleet, and indeed of every officer and man.
Sir George Callaghan left his whole staff with me, with the exception
of his flag lieutenant, who accompanied him to London. This staff
included: Commodore A. F. Everett, C.B., Captain of the Fleet; Captain
R. N. Lawson, Flag Captain; Commander Roger Backhouse, C.B., Flag
Commander; Fleet Paymaster C. F. Pollard, C.B., Secretary; Commander
the Hon. Matthew Best, War Staff Officer; Commander R. W. Woods,
Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander J. S. Salmond, Wireless Officer;
Lieut.-Commander R. M. Bellairs, War Staff Officer; Lieut. W. D.
Phipps, Signal Officer.[A]
[A] Later, Commodore L. Halsey, C.M.G., became Captain of the
Fleet, Captain F. C. Dreyer, C.B., Flag-Captain; Commander
C. M. Forbes, Flag-Commander, and Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T.
Weekes, Additional Secretary.
When it became certain that I was to take command of the Fleet, I asked
the Admiralty to appoint Rear-Admiral Charles Madden as Chief of the
Staff; and I was thus able to transfer Captain R. W. Bentinck to act
as Chief of the Staff to Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, the next
senior flag officer in the Fleet.
The composition of the Grand Fleet was:
Fleet-Flagship--H.M.S. _Iron Duke_.
Attached Ships--H.M.S. _Sappho_, H.M.S. _Oak_.
BATTLE FLEET
_1st Battle Squadron_:
Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B. (in command).
Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas (2nd in command).
Battleships _Marlborough_ (Flag), _St. Vincent_ (Rear Flag),
_Colossus_, _Hercules_, _Neptune_, _Vanguard_, _Collingwood_,
_Superb_, _Bellona_ (attached Light Cruiser), _Cyclops_ (repair
ship)
_2nd Battle Squadron_:
Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., K.C.B.
(in command).
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart. (2nd in command).
Battleships _King George V._ (Flag), _Orion_ (Rear Flag), _Ajax_,
_Audacious_, _Centurion_, _Conqueror_, _Monarch_, _Thunderer_,
_Boadicea_ (attached Light Cruiser), _Assistance_ (repair ship).
_4th Battle Squadron_:
Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, K.C.V.O. (in command).
Battleships _Dreadnought_ (Flag), _Temeraire_, _Bellerophon_,
_Blonde_ (attached Light Cruiser).
_3rd Battle Squadron_:
Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O. (in command).
Rear-Admiral M. E. Browning (2nd in command).
Battleships _King Edward VII._ (Flag), _Hibernia_ (Rear Flag),
_Commonwealth_, _Zealandia_, _Dominion_, _Africa_, _Britannia_,
_Hindustan_, _Blanche_ (attached Light Cruiser).
_1st Battle Cruiser Squadron_:
Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty (in command).
Battleships _Lion_ (Flag), _Princess Royal_, _Queen Mary_, New
_Zealand_.
_2nd Cruiser Squadron_:
Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. Gough-Calthorpe (in command).
Cruisers _Shannon_ (Flag), _Achilles_, _Cochrane_, _Natal_.
_3rd Cruiser Squadron_:
Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B. (in command).
Cruisers _Antrim_ (Flag), _Argyll_, _Devonshire_, _Roxburgh_.
_1st Light Cruiser Squadron_:
Commodore W. E. Goodenough (in command).
Light Cruisers _Southampton_ (Flag), _Birmingham_, _Lowestoft_,
_Nottingham_.
DESTROYER FLOTILLAS
_Second Flotilla_:
Captain J. R. P. Hawkesley (in command in _Active_).
Destroyers _Acorn_, _Alarm_, _Brisk_, _Cameleon_, _Comet_, _Fury_,
_Goldfinch_, _Hope_, _Larne_, _Lyra_, _Martin_, _Minstrel_,
_Nemesis_, _Nereide_, _Nymphe_, _Redpole_, _Rifleman_, _Ruby_,
_Sheldrake_, _Staunch_.
_Fourth Flotilla_:
Captain C. J. Wintour (in command in _Swift_).
Destroyers _Acasta_, _Achates_, _Ambuscade_, _Ardent_, _Christopher_,
_Cockatrice_, _Contest_, _Fortune_, _Garland_, _Hardy_, _Lynx_,
_Midge_, _Owl_, _Paragon_, _Porpoise_, _Shark_, _Sparrowhawk_,
_Spitfire_, _Unity_, _Victor_.
_Mine-Sweeping Gunboats_:
Commander L. G. Preston (in command).
H.M. Ships _Skipjack_ (S.O. Ship) (absent at first), _Circe_,
_Gossamer_, _Leda_, _Speedwell_, _Jason_, _Seagull_.
Shetland Patrol Force: _Forward_ (Scout) and four destroyers of the
River class.
The above vessels formed the Fleet under the immediate command of
the Commander-in-Chief at the outbreak of hostilities. In addition,
there were in southern waters, and also under the command of the
Commander-in-Chief, the following vessels:
THE HARWICH FORCE
This force, although an integral portion of the Grand Fleet, was based
on Harwich. It was intended that it should join the Grand Fleet at
sea, if possible, in the event of a fleet action being imminent, and
for this reason it was included in the organisation of the Fleet for
battle; but the force did not, in actual fact, ever so join the Fleet,
nor did I expect that it would be able to do so. At the outbreak of war
it was commanded by Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt in H.M.C. _Amethyst_ and
comprised:
_1st Flotilla_
Commanded by Captain W. Blunt in _Fearless_ with 20 destroyers.
_3rd Flotilla_
Commanded by Captain C. H. Fox in _Amphion_ with 15 destroyers.
Included also in the organisation of the Home Fleets, which Sir George
Callaghan had commanded-in-chief, were the Second and Third Fleets:
SECOND FLEET
(under command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.).
Fleet-Flagship _Lord Nelson_, Rear-Admirals Stuart-Nicholson and
Bernard Currey (commanding Battle Squadrons).
_5th Battle Squadron_:
_Prince of Wales_ (Flag), _Agamemnon_, _Bulwark_, _Formidable_,
_Implacable_, _Irresistible_, _London_, _Queen_, _Venerable_.
_6th Battle Squadron_:
_Russell_ (Flag), _Cornwallis_, _Albemarle_, _Duncan_, _Exmouth_,
_Vengeance_.
_5th Cruiser Squadron_:
Rear-Admiral A. P. Stoddart (in command).
_Carnarvon_ (Flag), _Falmouth_, _Liverpool_.
_6th Cruiser Squadron_:
Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant (in command).
_Drake_, _Good Hope_, _King Alfred_, _Leviathan_.
(These last two Cruiser Squadrons were, however, broken up immediately,
and the ships transferred to other duties.)
_Minelayer Squadron_, commanded by Captain M. H. Cobbe.
H.M. Ships _Naiad_ (S.O.’s ship), _Andromache_, _Apollo_,
_Intrepid_, _Iphigenia_, _Latona_, _Thetis_.
THIRD FLEET
This Fleet comprised the 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons, consisting of
our oldest battleships, and the 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Cruiser
Squadrons, comprising our oldest cruisers.
But the only vessels of this Fleet which were ever associated with the
Grand Fleet were the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which, under
the command of Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, joined the Grand Fleet
shortly after the outbreak of war, the Squadron being employed mainly
on blockading duties. It was composed as follows:
_Crescent_ (Flag), _Edgar_, _Endymion_, _Gibraltar_, _Grafton_,
_Hawke_, _Royal Arthur_, _Theseus_.
All submarines, except those of the B and C classes which were detached
for the protection of our coast and ports from Rosyth southwards, were
worked, in accordance with Admiralty policy, from Harwich, and were
not, therefore, under my command. The C class submarines were unfit
for oversea work, and our operations in enemy waters were therefore
confined to boats of the D and E classes, of which we possessed a total
of 8 D’s and 9 E’s, as against the German total of 28 boats of the U
class.