Lord, for Thou wast angry with me: Thy wrath is turned away, and
Thou hast comforted me. Behold, God is my Saviour. I will deal
confidently, and will not fear: because the Lord is my strength,
and my praise, and He is become my salvation. You shall draw
waters with joy out of the Saviour's fountains: And you shall
say in that day: Praise ye the Lord, and call upon His Name:
make His works known among the people: remember that His Name is
high. Sing ye to the Lord, for He hath done great things: shew
this forth in all the earth. Rejoice, and praise, O thou
habitation of Sion: for great is He that is in the midst of
thee, the holy One of Israel."[406]
FOOTNOTES:
[316] _Moralia in Job_, vi. 18.
[317] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[318] _Metaphysics_, ii. 3.
[319] _Moralia in Job_, vi. 18; and _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[320] _On Ezechiel, loc. cit._
[321] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[322] Isa. xxxiii. 13-17.
[323] Ps. xli. 1-6.
[324] _Moralia in Job_, vi. 18.
[325] _Ethics_, II., iv. 3.
[326] _Ibid._, X., viii. 1.
[327] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[328] Rom. xiii. 10.
[329] S. Matt. v. 8.
[330] Heb. xii. 14.
[331] Isa. xxxii. 17.
[332] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[333] Gen. xxix. 17.
[334] _De Officiis_, i. 43, 45, 46.
[335] Wisd. viii. 2.
[336] _Soliloquies_, i. 10.
[337] Jer. xiv. 8, 9.
[338] _Of the Divine Names_, vii. 2.
[339] _On Contemplation_, i. 3 and 4.
[340] _De Trinitate_, xiv. 7.
[341] _De Consideratione_, ii. 2.
[342] _De Anima_, II., i. 2.
[343] _Loc. cit._, i. 4.
[344] 2 Cor. iii. 18.
[345] _De Trinitate_, xv. 8.
[346] _De Consideratione_, v. 14.
[347] _De Fide Orthodoxa_, ii. 15.
[348] S. Luke x. 39.
[349] Wisd. vii. 7.
[350] 2 Cor. v. 6-7.
[351] Hab. ii. 4.
[352] Ps. cxliii. 15.
[353] 1 Tim. i. 5.
[354] Ps. lxxii. 21-28.
[355] _Moralia in Job_, vi. 28.
[356] _On the Trinity_, i. 8.
[357] _Ethics_, X., vii. 2.
[358] Rom. i. 20.
[359] _De Vera Religione_, xxix.
[360] Ps. cxlii. 5, 6.
[361] _De Consideratione_, v. 14.
[362] _Of Contemplation_, i. 6.
[363] 1 John iii. 2.
[364] Ps. xxvi. 4.
[365] Ps. xxxv. 9, 10.
[366] Phil. iv. 7; Rom. viii. 26.
[367] Isa. xxv. 8, 9.
[368] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[369] _De Genesi ad Litt._, xii. 27.
[370] Gen. xxxii. 30.
[371] _Epistola I., to Caius the Monk._
[372] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[373] The _Glossa Ordinaria_, taken from S. Gregory's _Moralia in Job_,
xxiv. 5.
[374] _Moralia_, vi. 27.
[375] _De Anima_, III., vii. 3.
[376] _Dialogues_, ii. 35.
[377] Isa. xxvi. 3, 4, 8, 9.
[378] _Of the Divine Names_, IV., i. 7.
[379] _De Anima_, III., vii. 1 and 2.
[380] _Physica_, VIII., vii. 2.
[381] viii. 16.
[382] _Of Contemplation_, i. 5.
[383] Job xvi. 20, 23.
[384] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[385] Ps. xxxiii. 9.
[386] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[387] _Ibid._
[388] _Conf._, viii. 3.
[389] Wisd. ix. 15.
[390] Rom. vii. 24.
[391] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[392] _Ethics_, X., iv. 6.
[393] 1 Cor. xiii, 12.
[394] Ps. xxxv. 9.
[395] _De Partibus Animalium_, i. 5.
[396] xxxii. 30-32.
[397] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[398] Ps. xxxiii. 9.
[399] S. Luke x. 42.
[400] _Topics_, I., xiii. 5.
[401] _Ethics_, X., vii. 2.
[402] 1 Cor. xiii. 8.
[403] _Conf._, x. 40.
[404] _Of the Divine Names_, IV., i. 7; and _Of the Heavenly Hierarchy_,
iii.
[405] _Ethics_, X., vii. 8.
[406] Isa. xii. 1-6.
QUESTION CLXXXI
OF THE ACTIVE LIFE
I. Do all Acts of the Moral Virtues come under the Active Life?
II. Does Prudence pertain to the Active Life?
III. Does Teaching belong to the Active or to the Contemplative
Life?
IV. Does the Active Life continue after this Life?
I
Do all Acts of the Moral Virtues come under the Active Life?
S. Isidore says[407]: "In the active life all the vices are first of all
to be removed by the practice of good works, so that in the
contemplative life a man may, with now purified mental gaze, pass to the
contemplation of the Divine Light." But all the vices can only be
removed by the acts of the moral virtues. Consequently the acts of the
moral virtues belong to the active life.
As we have said already,[408] the active and the contemplative lives are
distinguished by the different occupations of men who are aiming at
different ends, one being the consideration of Truth--the goal of the
contemplative life; the other external works with which the active life
is occupied. But it is clear that the moral virtues are not especially
concerned with the contemplation of truth but with action; thus the
Philosopher says[409]: "For virtue, knowledge is of little or no avail."
It is therefore manifest that the moral virtues essentially belong to
the active life; and in accordance with this the Philosopher[410] refers
the moral virtues to active happiness.
Some, however, maintain that all the acts of the moral virtues do not
belong to the active life, thus:
1. The active life seems to consist solely in those things which have to
do with our neighbour; for S. Gregory says[411]: "The active life means
breaking bread to the hungry;" and at the close, after enumerating many
things which have to do with our neighbour, he adds: "And to provide for
each according as they have need." But not by all the acts of the moral
virtues are we brought into contact with others, but only by justice and
its divisions. Consequently all the acts of the moral virtues do not
belong to the active life.
But the chief of the moral virtues is justice, and by it a man
is brought into contact with his neighbour, as the Philosopher
proves.[412] We describe, then, the active life by those things
by means of which we are brought into contact with our
neighbour; yet we do not thereby mean that the active life
consists solely in these things, but chiefly in them.
2. Again, S. Gregory says[413]: "By Lia, who was blear-eyed but
fruitful, is signified the active life which sees less clearly, since
occupied with works; but when, now by word, now by example, it arouses
its neighbour to imitation, it brings forth many children in good
works." But all this seems rather to come under charity, by which we
love our neighbour, than under the moral virtues. Consequently the acts
of the moral virtues seem not to belong to the active life.
But a man can, by acts of all the moral virtues, lead his
neighbour to good works by his example; and this S. Gregory here
attributes to the active life.
3. Lastly, the moral virtues dispose us to the contemplative life. But
disposition to a thing and the perfect attainment of that thing come
under the same head. Consequently the moral virtues do not belong to the
active life.
But just as a virtue which is directed towards the end of
another virtue passes over, in some sort, into the species of
that latter virtue, so also when a man uses those things which
belong to the active life precisely as disposing him to
contemplation, then those things which he so uses are comprised
under the contemplative life. But for those who devote
themselves to the works of the moral virtues as being good in
themselves and not as dispositive towards the contemplative
life, the moral virtues belong to the active life. Although at
the same time it might be said that the active life is a
disposition to the contemplative life.
"O death, how bitter is the remembrance of thee to a man that
hath peace in his possessions, to a man that is at rest, and
whose ways are prosperous in all things, and that is yet able to
take meat! O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is
in need, and to him whose strength faileth, who is in a decrepit
age, and that is in care about all things, and to the
distrustful that loseth patience! Fear not the sentence of
death. Remember what things have been before thee, and what
shall come after thee: this sentence is from the Lord upon all
flesh. And what shall come upon thee by the good pleasure of the
Most High whether ten, or a hundred, or a thousand years."[414]
II
Does Prudence pertain to the Active Life?
The Philosopher says[415] that prudence pertains to active happiness,
and to this pertain the moral virtues.
As we have said above, when one thing is directed towards the attainment
of another thing as its end, it--and this especially holds good in
morals--is, so to speak, drawn into the species of that towards which it
is thus directed, thus: "He who commits adultery in order to steal" says
the Philosopher,[416] "is rather a thief than an adulterer." Now it is
clear that that knowledge which is prudence is directed to the acts of
the moral virtues as its end, for prudence is "the right mode of
procedure in our actions;"[417] hence, too, the ends of the moral
virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher also says in
the same work.[418] In the same way, then, as we said above that in the
case of a man who directs them to the repose of contemplation, the moral
virtues pertain to the contemplative life, so also the knowledge which
is prudence, and which is by its very nature directed to the operations
of the moral virtues, directly pertains to the active life--that is, of
course, on the supposition that prudence is understood in the strict
sense in which the Philosopher speaks of it.
If, however, prudence be understood in a broad sense--namely, as
embracing all kinds of human knowledge--then prudence pertains, at least
in certain of its aspects, to the contemplative life; thus Cicero
says[419]: "The man who can see a truth the most clearly and quickly,
and explain the reason of it, is rightly regarded as most prudent and
most wise."
But some maintain that prudence does not pertain to the active life,
thus:
1. Just as the contemplative life pertains to the cognoscitive powers,
so does the active life pertain to the appetitive powers. But prudence
does not pertain to the appetitive powers but rather to the
cognoscitive. Consequently it does not pertain to the active life.
But moral acts derive their character from the end towards which
they are directed; consequently to the contemplative life
belongs that kind of knowledge which makes its end consist in
the very knowledge of truth. But the knowledge which is
prudence, and which is rather directed to the acts of the
appetitive powers, pertains to the active life.
2. Again, S. Gregory says[420] "The active life, occupied as it is with
works, sees less clearly," and hence is typified by Lia, who was
blear-eyed. But prudence demands clear vision, so that a man may judge
what is to be done. Whence it would seem that prudence does not pertain
to the active life.
But occupation with external things only makes a man see less
clearly those intelligible truths which are not connected with
the things of sense; the external occupations of the active
life, however, make a man see more clearly in his judgment on a
course of action--and this is a question of prudence--for he has
experience, and his mind is attentive: "When you are attentive,"
says Sallust,[421] "then mental acumen avails."
3. Lastly, prudence comes midway betwixt the moral and the intellectual
virtues. But just as the moral virtues pertain to the active life, so do
the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative. Hence it would
seem that prudence belongs neither to the active nor to the
contemplative life, but, as S. Augustine says, to a kind of life which
is betwixt and between.[422]
But prudence is said to come betwixt the intellectual and the
moral virtues in the sense that, whereas it has the same subject
as the intellectual virtues, it yet coincides as regards its
object with the moral virtues. And that third species of life
comes betwixt and between the active and the contemplative life
as regards the things with which it is concerned, for at one
time it is occupied with the contemplation of truth, at another
time with external matters.
"For what shall I do when God shall rise to judge? and when He
shall examine, what shall I answer Him? For I have always feared
God as waves swelling over me, and His weight I was not able to
bear."[423]
III
Does Teaching Belong to the Active or to the Contemplative Life?
S. Gregory says[424]: "The active life means breaking bread to the
hungry; teaching words of wisdom to them that know them not."
The act of teaching has a twofold object: for teaching is by speaking,
and speaking is the audible sign of an interior mental concept. One
object, therefore, of our teaching is the matter to be taught, the
object, that is, of our interior concepts; and in this sense teaching
sometimes belongs to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It
belongs to the active life if a man forms interiorly some concept of a
truth with a view to thus directing his external acts; but it belongs to
the contemplative life if a man interiorly conceives some intelligible
truth and delights in the thought of it and the love of it. Whence S.
Augustine says[425]: "Let them choose for themselves the better
part--that, namely, of the contemplative life; let them devote
themselves to the Word of God; let them yearn for the sweetness of
teaching; let them occupy themselves with the knowledge that leads to
salvation"--where he clearly says that teaching belongs to the
contemplative life.
The second object of teaching arises from the fact that teaching is
given through the medium of audible speech and thus the hearer himself
is the object of the teaching; and from this point of view all teaching
belongs to the active life to which pertain all external actions.
Some, however, regard teaching as rather belonging to the contemplative
than to the active life, thus:
1. S. Gregory says[426]: "Perfect men declare to their brethren those
good things of Heaven which they themselves have been able to
contemplate at least 'through a glass,' and they thus kindle in their
hearts the love of that hidden beauty." Yet what is this but teaching?
To teach, therefore, is an act of the contemplative life.
But S. Gregory expressly speaks here of teaching from the point
of view of the matter that is presented--that is, of teaching as
it is concerned with the consideration of and love of the truth.
2. Again, acts and habits seem to belong to the same kind of life. But
to teach is an act of wisdom, for the Philosopher says: "The proof that
a man knows is that he is able to teach."[427] Since, then, wisdom--that
is, knowledge--pertains to the contemplative life, it would seem that
teaching also must pertain to the contemplative life.
But habits and acts agree in their object, and consequently the
argument just given is based upon the material of the interior
concept. For the capacity for teaching is possessed by a wise or
learned man just in proportion as he can express in outward
words the concepts of his mind and so be able to bring home a
truth to someone else.
3. Lastly, prayer is an act of the contemplative life just in the same
way as is contemplation itself. But prayer, even when one man prays for
another, belongs to the contemplative life. Hence it would seem that
when one man brings to the knowledge of another some truth upon which he
has meditated, such an act pertains to the contemplative life.
But he who prays for another in no way acts upon him for whom he
prays; his acts are directed towards God alone, the Intelligible
Truth. But he who teaches another does act upon him by some
external action. Hence there is no parallel between the two
cases.
IV
Does the Active Life continue after this Life?
S. Gregory says[428]: "The active life passes away with this present
world; the contemplative life begins here so as to be perfected in our
heavenly home."
As already said, the active life makes its end consist in external
actions, and these, if they are directed towards the repose of
contemplation, already belong to the contemplative life. But in the
future life of the blessed all occupation with external things will
cease; or if there are any external acts they will be directed towards
that end which is contemplation. Hence S. Augustine says, at the close
of his _Of the City of God_: "There we shall be at rest from toil, we
shall gaze, we shall love, we shall praise." And he had just previously
said: "There will God be seen unendingly, be loved without wearying, be
praised without fatigue; this duty, this disposition of soul, this act,
will be the lot of all."[429]
Some, however, maintain that the active life will be continued after
this life, thus:
1. To the active life belong the acts of the moral virtues. But the
moral virtues remain after death, as S. Augustine says.[430]
But the acts of the moral virtues which are concerned with the
means to the end will not remain after death, but only those
which have to do with the end itself. Yet it is precisely these
latter which go to form the repose of contemplation to which S.
Augustine alludes in the above-quoted passage where he speaks of
being "at rest from toil"; and this "rest" is not to be
understood of freedom from merely external disturbances, but
also from the internal conflict of the passions.
2. Again, to teach others pertains to the active life. But in the next
life--where we shall be as the Angels--there can be teaching; for we see
it in the case of the Angels of whom one illumines, clarifies, and
perfects another, all of which refer to their reception of knowledge, as
is clear from Denis the Areopagite.[431] Hence it seems that the active
life is to be continued after this life.
But the contemplative life especially consists in the
contemplation of God; and as regards this no Angel teaches
another, for it is said of the Angels of _the little
ones_[432]--Angels who are of an inferior choir--that _they
always see the face of the Father_. And similarly in the future
life: there no man will teach another about God, for we shall
all _see Him as He is_.[433] And this agrees with the words of
Jeremias[434]: _And they shall teach no more every man his
neighbour ... saying: Know the Lord; for all shall know Me from
the least of them even to the greatest._
But when it is question of dispensing the mysteries of God, then
one Angel can teach another by clarifying, illumining, and
perfecting. And in this sense the Angels do in some sort share
in the active life as long as this world lasts, for they are
occupied with ministering to the inferior creation. This is what
was signified by Jacob's vision of the Angels ascending the
ladder--whereby was meant the contemplative life--and descending
the ladder--whereby was meant the active life. At the same time,
as S. Gregory says[435]: "Not that they so went out from the
Divine Vision as to be deprived of the joys of contemplation."
And thus in their case the active life is not distinguished from
the contemplative as it is in us who find the works of the
active life an impediment to the contemplative life. Moreover,
we are not promised a likeness to the Angels in their work of
administering to the inferior creation, for this does not belong
to us according to our nature, as is the case with the Angels,
but according to our vision of God.
3. Lastly, the more durable a thing is the more capable it seems of
lasting after this life. But the active life is more durable than the
contemplative, for S. Gregory says[436]: "We can remain steadfast in the
active life, but in nowise can we maintain the mind's fixed gaze in the
contemplative life." Consequently the active life is much more capable
of continuing after death than is the contemplative life.
But in our present state the durability of the active life as
compared with the contemplative life does not arise from any
feature of either of these kinds of life considered in
themselves, but from a defect on our part; for we are dragged
down from the heights of contemplation by the body's burden. And
thus S. Gregory goes on to say that, "thrust back by its very
weakness from those vast heights, the soul relapses into
itself."
"O bless our God, ye Gentiles: and make the voice of His praise
to be heard. Who hath set my soul to live: and hath not suffered
my feet to be moved. For Thou, O God, hast proved us; Thou hast
tried us by fire, as silver is tried. Thou hast brought us into
a net, Thou hast laid afflictions on our back; Thou hast set men
over our heads. We have passed through fire and water, and Thou
hast brought us out into a refreshment."[437]
FOOTNOTES:
[407] _Of the Supreme Good_, III., xv.
[408] _Qu._ CLXXIX. 1.
[409] _Ethics_, II., iv. 3.
[410] _Ibid._, X., viii. 1.
[411] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[412] _Ethics_, V., i. 15.
[413] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[414] Ecclus. xli. 1-6.
[415] _Ethics._, X., viii. 2.
[416] _Ibid._, V., ii. 4.
[417] _Ethics_, VI., v. 4.
[418] _Ibid._, X., viii. 2.
[419] _De Officiis_, I., v.
[420] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[421] _Conjuratio Catilinae_, li.
[422] _Of the City of God_, xix. 2, 3, and 19.
[423] Job xxxi. 14, 23.
[424] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[425] _On the Words of the Lord, Sermon_ civ., _alias_ xxvii. 1.
[426] _Hom._ V., _On Ezechiel_.
[427] _Metaphysics_, I., i. 9.
[428] _Hom._ XIV., _On Ezechiel_.
[429] xxii. 30.
[430] _On the Trinity_, xiv. 9.
[431] _Of the Heavenly Hierarchy_, vii.
[432] S. Matt. xviii. 10.
[433] 1 John iii. 2.
[434] xxxi. 34.
[435] _Moralia in Job_, ii. 2.
[436] _Hom._ V., _On Ezechiel_.
[437] Ps. lxv. 8-12.
QUESTION CLXXXII
OF THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ACTIVE AND THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE
I. Is the Active Life preferable to the Contemplative?
Cardinal Cajetan, On Preparation for the Contemplative Life
S. Augustine, _Confessions_, X., xliii. 70
" _On Psalm_ xxvi.
II. Is the Active Life more Meritorious than the Contemplative?
III. Is the Active Life a Hindrance to the Contemplative Life?
Cardinal Cajetan, On the True Interior Life
S. Augustine, _Sermon_, CCLVI., v. 6
IV. Does the Active Life precede the Contemplative?
I
Is the Active Life preferable to the Contemplative?
The Lord said: _Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken
away from her._[438] And by Mary is signified the contemplative life,
which is consequently to be preferred to the active.
There is no reason why one thing should not be in itself more excellent
than another while yet this latter is, for certain reasons, preferable
to it. Absolutely speaking, then, the contemplative life is better than
the active. And the Philosopher[439] alleges eight proofs of this.
Firstly, that the contemplative life pertains to that which is best in a
man, namely his intellect and its proper objects, _i.e._ intelligible
truths, whereas the active life is concerned with external things. Hence
Rachel, who typifies the contemplative life, is interpreted as meaning
"the Beginning seen"; while Lia, who was blear-eyed, typifies, according
to S. Gregory, the active life.[440]
Secondly, because the contemplative life can be more continuous, even
though we cannot maintain our contemplation at its highest pitch; thus
Mary, who is typical of the contemplative life, is depicted as sitting
ever at the Lord's feet.
Thirdly, because the delights of the contemplative life surpass those of
the active life; whence S. Augustine says[441]: "Martha was troubled,
but Mary feasted."
Fourthly, because in the contemplative life a man is more independent,
since for this kind of life he needs less; whence we read: _Martha,
Martha, thou art careful, and art troubled about many things._[442]
Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved rather for its own
sake, whereas the active life is directed towards an end other than
itself; whence it is said in Ps. xxvi. 4: _One thing I have asked of the
Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord
all the days of my life._
Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in a certain stillness
and repose, as is said in Ps. xlv. 11: _Be still, and see that I am
God._
Seventhly, because the contemplative life is occupied with Divine things
whereas the active life is occupied with human things; whence S.
Augustine says[443]: "In the beginning was the Word: see What Mary
heard! The Word was made Flesh; see to What Martha ministered!"