exist without recourse to the imagination, for it is in
accordance with man's nature that he should see intelligible
forms through the medium of pictures in the imagination, as also
the Philosopher teaches.[375] Yet intellectual knowledge does
not consist in such images, rather does the intellect
contemplate in them the purity of intelligible truth; and this
is not merely the case in natural knowledge, but also in those
things which we know by revelation. For S. Denis says: "The
Divine Light manifests to us the Angelic hierarchies by means of
symbolical figures by force of which we are restored to the
simple ray," that is, to the simple knowledge of intelligible
truth. It is thus that we ought to understand S. Gregory's words
when he says: "In contemplation men do not carry with them the
shadows of things corporeal," for their contemplation does not
abide in these things but rather in the consideration of
intelligible truth.
3. Lastly, S. Gregory says[376]: "To the soul that looks upon its
Creator all created things are but narrow. Consequently the man of
God--namely, the Blessed Benedict--who saw in a tower a fiery globe and
the Angels mounting up to Heaven, was doubtless only able to see these
things by the light of God." But the Blessed Benedict was then still in
this life. Consequently contemplation, even in this present life, can
attain to the vision of the Essence of God.
But we are not to understand from S. Gregory's words that the
Blessed Benedict saw the Essence of God in that vision; S.
Gregory wishes to show that since "to him who looks upon his
Creator all created things are but as nothing," it follows that
certain things can easily be seen by the illumination afforded
by the Divine Light. Hence he adds: "For, however little of the
Creator's Light he sees, all created things become of small
account."
Veni Sancte Spiritus
Et emitte coelitus
Lucis Tuae radium!
O Lux Beatissima
Reple cordis intima
Tuorum fidelium!
_S. Augustine:_ And thus, the remaining burden of this mortal life being
laid aside at death, man's happiness will, in God's own time, be
perfected from every point of view--that happiness which is begun in
this life, and to the attainment and securing of which at some future
time our every effort must now tend (_Of the Sermon on the Mount_, II.,
ix. 35).
"The old error is passed away; Thou wilt keep peace: peace,
because we have hoped in Thee. You have hoped in the Lord for
evermore, in the Lord God mighty for ever. And in the way of Thy
judgments, O Lord, we have patiently waited for Thee: Thy Name,
and Thy remembrance are the desire of the soul. My soul hath
desired Thee in the night: yea, and with my spirit within me in
the morning early I will watch to Thee."[377]
VI
Is the Act of Contemplation Rightly Distinguished According to the Three
Kinds of Motion--Circular, Direct, and Oblique?
S. Denis the Areopagite[378] does so distinguish the acts of
contemplation.
The operation of the intellect in which contemplation essentially
consists is termed "motion" in the sense that motion is the act of a
perfect thing, according to the Philosopher.[379] And since we arrive at
a knowledge of intelligible things through the medium of the things of
sense, and the operations of the senses do not take place without
motion, it follows that the operations also of the intellect are
correctly described as a species of motion, and are differentiated
according to the analogy of divers motions. But the more perfect and the
chiefest of bodily motions are local motions, as is proved by the
Philosopher.[380] Consequently the chief intellectual motions are
described according to the analogy of these latter.
Now, there are three species of local motion: one is circular, according
as a thing is moved uniformly about the same centre; another is direct,
according as a thing proceeds from one point to another; and a third is
oblique, compounded as it were from the two foregoing.
Hence in intelligible operations, that which simply has uniformity is
attributed to circular motion; that intellectual motion by which a man
proceeds from one thing to another is attributed to direct motion; while
that intellectual operation which has a certain uniformity combined with
progress towards different points, is attributed to oblique motion.
All, however, do not agree with this division, thus:
1. Contemplation means a state of repose, as is said in _Wisdom_[381]:
_When I go into my house I shall repose myself with Her._ And motion is
opposed to repose. Consequently the operations of the contemplative life
cannot be designated according to these different species of motion.
But whereas external bodily movements are opposed to that repose
of contemplation which is understood to be rest from external
occupations, the motion of intellectual operations belongs
precisely to the repose of contemplation.
2. Again, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the intellect
wherein man is at one with the Angels. But S. Denis does not apply these
motions to the Angels in the same way as he does to the soul; for he
says that the _circular_ motion of the Angels "corresponds to the
illumination of the beautiful and the good." But of the _circular_
motion of the soul he gives several definitions, of which the first is
"the return of the soul upon itself as opposed to external things"; the
second is "a certain wrapping together of the powers of the soul whereby
it is freed from error and from external occupation"; and the third is
"the union of the soul with things superior to it." Similarly, he speaks
in different terms of the _direct_ motion of the soul as compared with
that of the Angels. For he says that the _direct_ motion of an Angel is
"according as he proceeds to the care of the things subject to him";
while the _direct_ motion of the soul is made to consist in two things:
first of all "that it proceeds to those things which are around it";
secondly, that "from external things it is uplifted to simple
contemplation." And lastly, he explains the _oblique_ motion differently
in each case. For he makes the _oblique_ motion of the Angels consist in
this that, "while providing for those that have less than themselves,
they remain in the same attitude towards God"; but the _oblique_ motion
of the soul he explains as meaning that "the soul is illumined by Divine
knowledge rationally and diffusely."
Consequently it does not appear that the operations of contemplation are
fittingly distinguished according to the aforesaid species of motion.
But while man's intellect is generally the same with that of the
Angels, the intellectual powers of the latter are far higher
than in man. It was therefore necessary to assign the aforesaid
motions to human souls and to the Angels in different fashion in
proportion as their intellectual powers are not uniform. For the
Angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects:
firstly, because the Angels do not acquire intelligible truth
from the variety of compound things; and secondly, because they
do not understand intelligible truth discursively, but by simple
intuition. Whereas the intellect of the human soul, on the
contrary, acquires intelligible truth from the things of sense,
and understands it by the discursive action of the reason.
Hence S. Denis assigns to the Angels circular motion in that
they uniformly and unceasingly, without beginning or end, gaze
upon God; just as circular motion, which has neither beginning
nor end, is uniformly maintained round the same central point.
But in the case of the human soul, its twofold lack of
uniformity must be removed before it can attain to the
above-mentioned uniformity. For there must first be removed that
lack of uniformity which arises from the diversity of external
things: that is, the soul must quit external things. And this S.
Denis expresses first of all in his definition of the circular
motion of the soul when he speaks of "the return of the soul
upon itself as opposed to external things." And there must be
removed in the second place that second lack of uniformity which
arises from the discursive action of the reason. And this takes
place when all the operations of the soul are reduced to the
simple contemplation of intelligible truth. This forms the
second part of S. Denis's definition of this circular
motion--namely, when he speaks of the necessity of "a certain
wrapping together of the powers of the soul," with the result
that, when discursive action thus ceases, the soul's gaze is
fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. And in this
operation of the soul there is no room for error, just as there
is no room for error in our understanding of first principles
which we know by simple intuition.
Then, when these first two steps have been taken, S. Denis puts
in the third place that uniformity, like to that of the Angels,
by which the soul, laying aside all else, persists in the simple
contemplation of God. And this he expresses when he says: "Then,
as now made uniform, it, as a whole"--that is, as conformed (to
God)--"is, with all its powers unified, led by the hand to the
Beautiful and the Good."
But the _direct_ motion in the Angels cannot be understood in
the sense that, by considering, they proceed from one point to
another; but solely according to the order of their providential
care for others--according, namely, as the superior Angels
illumine the inferior through those who stand between. And this
is what S. Denis means when he says that the _direct_ motion of
an Angel is "according as he proceeds to the care of the things
subject to him, taking in his course all things that are direct"
following--that is, those things which are disposed in direct
order. But to the human soul S. Denis assigns _direct_ motion in
the sense that it proceeds from the exterior things of sense to
the knowledge of intelligible things.
And he assigns _oblique_ motion to the Angels--a motion, that
is, compounded of the _direct_ and the _circular_--inasmuch as
an Angel, according to his contemplation of God, provides for
those inferior to him. To the human soul, on the contrary, he
assigns this same _oblique_ motion, similarly compounded of the
_direct_ and the _circular_ motions, inasmuch as in its
reasonings it makes use of the Divine illuminations.
3. Lastly, Richard of S. Victor[382] gives many other and different
kinds of motion. For, following the analogy of the birds of the air, he
says of these latter that "some at one time ascend on high, at another
swoop down to earth, and they do this again and again; others turn now
to the right, now to the left, and this repeatedly; others go in
advance, others fall behind; some sail round and round in circles, now
narrower and now wider; while others again remain almost immovably
suspended in one place." From all which it would seem that there are not
merely three movements in contemplation.
But all these diversities of motion which are expressed by, up
and down, to right and left, backwards and forwards, and in
varying circles, are reducible either to _direct_ or to
_oblique_ motion, for they all signify the discursive action of
the reason. For if this discursive action be from the genus to
the species or from the whole to the part, it will be, as
Richard of S. Victor himself explains, motion upwards and
downwards. If, again, it means argumentation from one thing to
its opposite, it will come under motion to right and left. Or if
it be deduction from cause to effect, then it will be motion
backwards and forwards. And finally, if it mean arguing from the
accidents which surround a thing, whether nearly or remotely, it
will be circuitous motion. But the discursive action of the
reason arguing from the things of sense to intelligible things
according to the orderly progress of the natural reason, belongs
to _direct_ motion. When, however, it arises from Divine
illuminations, it comes under _oblique_ motion, as we have
already said (in the reply to the second argument). Lastly, only
the immobility which he mentions will come under _circular_
motion.
Whence it appears that S. Denis has quite sufficiently, and with
exceeding subtlety, described the movements of contemplation.
"For behold my witness is in Heaven, and He that knoweth my
conscience is on high. For behold short years pass away, and I
am walking in a path by which I shall not return."[383]
VII
Has Contemplation its Joys?
In Wisdom viii. 16 we read: _Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor
Her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness._ And S. Gregory
says[384]: "The contemplative life means a truly lovable sweetness."
There are two sources of pleasure in contemplation; for, firstly, there
is the very act of contemplating, and everyone finds a certain pleasure
in the performance of acts which are appropriate to his nature or to his
habits. And the contemplation of truth is natural to man as a rational
animal; hence it is that "all men naturally desire to know," and
consequently find a pleasure in the knowledge of truth. And this
pleasure is enhanced according as a man has habits of wisdom and
knowledge which enable him to indulge in contemplation without
difficulty.
Secondly, contemplation is pleasurable owing to the object which we
contemplate, as when a man looks at something which he loves. And this
holds good of even bodily vision, for not only is the mere exercise of
the visual faculties pleasurable, but the seeing people whom we love is
pleasurable.
Since, then, the contemplative life especially consists in the
contemplation of God, to which contemplation we are moved by charity, it
follows that the contemplative life is not merely pleasurable by reason
of the simple act of contemplating, but also by reason of Divine Love
Itself. And in both these respects the delights of contemplation exceed
all other human delights. For on the one hand spiritual delights are
superior to carnal delights; and on the other hand, the love of Divine
charity wherewith we love God exceeds all other love; whence it is said
in the Psalm: _Taste and see that the Lord is sweet._[385]
Some maintain, however, that contemplation is not pleasurable, thus:
1. Pleasure belongs to the appetitive powers, whereas contemplation is
mainly in the intellect.
But while the contemplative life mainly consists in the
intellect, it derives its principle from the affective powers,
since a man is moved to contemplation by love of God. And since
the end corresponds to the principle, it follows that the goal
and term of the contemplative life is in the affective powers,
in the sense, namely, that a man finds a pleasure in the sight
of a thing which he loves, and this very pleasure stirs up in
him a yet greater love. Hence S. Gregory says[386]: "When a man
sees one whom he loves his love is yet more enkindled." And in
this lies the full perfection of the contemplative life: that
the Divine Truth should not only be seen but loved.
2. Again, strife and contention hinder delight. But in contemplation
there is strife and contention, for S. Gregory says[387]: "The soul,
when it strives after the contemplation of God, finds itself engaged in
a species of combat; at one time it seems to prevail, for by
understanding and by feeling it tastes somewhat of the Infinite Light;
at other times it is overwhelmed, for when it has tasted it faints."
It is true indeed that contest and strife arising from the
opposition presented by external things prevent us from finding
pleasure in those same things. For no man finds a pleasure in
the things against which he fights. But he does find a pleasure,
other things being equal, in the actual attainment of a thing
for which he has striven; thus S. Augustine says[388]: "The
greater the danger in the battle, the greater the joy in the
triumph." And in contemplation the strife and the combat do not
arise from any opposition on the part of the truth which we
contemplate, but from our deficient understanding and from the
corruptible nature of our bodies which ever draw us down to
things beneath us: _The corruptible body is a load upon the
soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that
museth upon many things._[389] Hence it is that when a man
attains to the contemplation of truth he loves it still more
ardently; but at the same time he more than ever hates his own
defects and the sluggishness of his corruptible body, so that
with the Apostle he cries out: _Unhappy man that I am! Who shall
deliver me from the body of this death?_[390] Hence, too, S.
Gregory says: "When God is known by our desires and our
understanding, He causes all pleasures of the flesh to wither up
within us."[391]
3. But again, delight follows upon a perfect work.[392] But
contemplation on this earth is imperfect, according to the words of the
Apostle: _We see now through a glass in a dark manner._[393] Hence it
would seem that the contemplative life does not afford delight.
It is indeed true that the contemplation of God during this life
is imperfect compared with our contemplation of Him in our
eternal home; and in the same way it is true that the delights
of contemplation here on earth are imperfect compared with the
delights of contemplation in that home, of which latter joys the
Psalmist says: _Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy
pleasure._[394] Yet, none the less, the contemplation of Divine
things here on earth is, although imperfect, far more perfect
than any other subject of contemplation howsoever perfect it may
be, and this by reason of the excellence of what we contemplate.
Whence the Philosopher says[395]: "It may indeed be the case
that with regard to such noble existences and Divine substances
we have to be content with insignificant theories, yet even
though we but barely touch upon them, none the less so ennobling
is such knowledge that it affords us greater delight than any
other which is accessible to us." Hence, too, S. Gregory says:
"The contemplative life has its most desirable sweetness which
uplifts the soul above itself, opens the way to heavenly things,
and makes spiritual things plain to the eyes of the soul."
4. Lastly, bodily injuries are a hindrance to delight. But contemplation
is productive of bodily injuries, for we read in Genesis[396] that
Jacob, after saying _I have seen God face to face, ... halted on his
foot ... because He touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank_.
Whence it would seem that the contemplative life is not pleasurable.
But after that contemplation Jacob halted on one foot because,
as S. Gregory says, "it must needs be that as the love of this
world grows weaker, so a man grows stronger in his love of God,"
and consequently, "when once we have known the sweetness of God,
one of our feet remains sound while the other halts; for a man
who halts with one foot leans only on the one that is
sound."[397]
"Tu esto nostrum gaudium
Qui es futurus Praemium.
Sit nostra in Te gloria
Per cuncta semper saecula!"
* * * * *
_S. Gregory:_ Between the delights of the body and those of the heart
there is ever this difference that the delights of the body are wont,
when we have them not, to beget a keen yearning for them; but when we
have them and eat our fill, they straightway beget disgust for them, for
we are sated therewith. Spiritual joys, on the contrary, when we have
them not are a weariness, but when we have them we desire them still
more, and the more we feed upon them the more we hunger after them. In
the case of the former, the yearning for them was a pleasure, trial of
them brought disgust. In the case of the latter, in desire we held them
cheap, trial of them proved a source of pleasure. For spiritual joys
increase the soul's desire of them even while they sate us, for the more
their savour is perceived, the more we know what it is we ought eagerly
to love. Whence it comes to pass that when we have them not we cannot
love them, for their savour is unknown to us. For how can a man love
what he is ignorant of? Wherefore the Psalmist admonishes us, saying: _O
taste and see that the Lord is sweet!_[398] As though he would say to us
in plain terms: You know not His sweetness if ye have never tasted it;
touch, then, the Food of Life with the palate of your soul that so,
making proof of Its sweetness, ye may be able to love It.
These joys man lost when he sinned in Paradise; he went out when he
closed his mouth to the Food of Eternal Sweetness. Whence we too, who
are born amidst the toils of this pilgrimage, come without relish to
this Food; we know not what we ought to desire, and the sickness of our
disgust grows the more the further our souls keep away from feeding upon
that Sweetness; and less and less does our soul desire those interior
joys the longer it has grown accustomed to do without them. We sicken,
then, by reason of our very disgust, and we are wearied by the
long-drawn sickness of our hunger (_Hom._ XXXVI., _On the Gospels_).
VIII
Is the Contemplative Life lasting?
The Lord said _Mary hath chosen the best part which shall not be taken
away from her_[399] because, as S. Gregory says: "Contemplation begins
here below that it may be perfected in our heavenly home."
A thing may be termed "lasting" in two ways: from its very nature, or as
far as we are concerned. As far as its nature is concerned, the
contemplative life is lasting in two ways: for first of all it is
concerned with incorruptible and unchangeable things, and in the second
place there is nothing which is its contrary: for, as Aristotle
says[400]: "To the pleasure which is derived from thought there is no
contrary."
And also as far as we are concerned the contemplative life is lasting;
and this both because it comes under the action of the incorruptible
portion of our soul--namely, our intellect--and so can last after this
life; and also because in the work of the contemplative life there is no
bodily toil, and we can consequently apply ourselves more continuously
to such work, as also the Philosopher remarks.[401]
Some, however, argue that the contemplative life is not lasting, thus:
1. The contemplative life essentially concerns the intellect. But all
the intellectual perfections of this life will be _made void_, as we
read: _Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or
knowledge shall be destroyed._[402]
But the fashion of contemplation here and in our Father's home
is not the same; and the contemplative life is said "to last" by
reason of charity, which is both its principle and its end;
wherefore S. Gregory says: "The contemplative life begins here
below that it may be perfected in our heavenly home, for the
fire of love which begins to burn here below, when it sees Him
Whom it loves, burns yet more strongly with love of Him."
2. Again, men but taste the sweetness of contemplation here, snatching
at it, as it were, and in passing: whence S. Augustine says: "Thou
introducest me to a most unwonted affection within me, to an unspeakable
sweetness; yet I fall back again as though dragged down by a grievous
weight!"[403] And S. Gregory, expounding those words of Job, _When a
spirit passed before me_, says: "The mind does not long remain
steadfastly occupied with the sweetness of intimate contemplation, for
it is recalled to itself, stricken back by the immensity of that Light."
The contemplative life, then, is not lasting.
It is true indeed that no action can remain long at the pitch of
its intensity. And the goal of contemplation is to attain to the
uniformity of Divine contemplation, as Denis the Areopagite
says.[404] Hence, although in this sense contemplation cannot
last long, yet it can last long as regards its other acts.
3. Lastly, what is not natural to a man cannot be lasting. "But the
contemplative life," as the Philosopher says, "is beyond man."[405]
But the Philosopher says that the contemplative life is "beyond
man" in the sense that it belongs to us according to what is
Divine in us--namely, our intellect; for our intellect is
incorruptible and impassible in itself, and consequently its
action can be more lasting.
* * * * *
_S. Augustine:_ This day sets before us the great mystery of our eternal
beatitude. For that life which this day signifies will not pass away as
to-day is to pass away. Wherefore, brethren, we exhort and beseech you
by the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ by Whom our sins are forgiven, by
Him Who willed that His Blood should be our ransom, by Him Who has
deigned that we who are not deserving to be called His slaves should yet
be called His brethren--we beseech you that your entire aim, that which
gives you your very name of "Christian," and by reason of which you bear
His Name upon your foreheads and in your hearts, may be directed solely
to that life which we are to share with the Angels; that life where is
to be unending repose, everlasting joy, unfailing happiness, rest
without disturbance, joy without sadness, no death. What that life is
none can know save those who have made trial of it; and none can make
trial of it save those who have faith (_Sermon_, CCLIX., _On Low
Sunday_).