Part II of this case:

“1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active

participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet

Russia.

“The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces will, at the

appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed

forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German

command on their entry into the war.

“2. Romania’s task will be to tie up, in co-operation with the

group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces

facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary

services in the rear area.

“3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German

northern landing group (units of Group XXI) due to arrive from

Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will

be up to Finland to eliminate Hangö.

“4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish railways and coal

being available for the movements of the German northern group

not later than the beginning of the operation.”

In the speech of the Chief Prosecutor from the U.S.S.R., General

Rudenko, attention was drawn to the opening sentence of this section:

“On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active

participation of Romania and Finland in the war against Soviet

Russia.”

This justified the Chief Prosecutor of the U.S.S.R. in pointing out in

his speech that on 18 December 1940, the date of the Barbarossa

document, Romania and Finland were already following in the wake of the

predatory policy of the Hitlerite conspirators.

There is only one more document which was submitted by the United States

Prosecution and which mentioned Germany’s presumed allies in her

aggression against the U.S.S.R.

This document, numbered C-39, is entitled “Provisional Case Barbarossa.”

It is, as the Defendant Keitel pointed out in his covering letter, a

timetable for the preparations of Plan Barbarossa after June 1941. This

timetable was confirmed by Hitler. The text of this plan is on Page 57

of the document book. In Part II of this document, entitled

“Negotiations with Friendly Powers,” we read:

“a) A request has been sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any

large extent the units stationed for security reasons on the

Turkish frontier.

“b) The Romanians have begun, at the instigation of the

Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Romania, a partial,

camouflaged mobilization in order to be able to close their

frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.

“c) Hungarian territory will be used for the deployment of Army

Group South only insofar as it would be expedient for

introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Romanian

forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on

this subject will be made to Hungary.

“d) Two German divisions have been deployed in the eastern part

of Slovakia; the next ones will be unloaded in the area of

Prosov.

“e) Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish general staff take

place as from 25 May.”

Mr. President, in order to correlate the following documents with the

testimony given by Paulus, I shall merely refer to the fact that this

witness testified to the previous preparations for military aggression

in that fortress which was Romania, thereby proving that corresponding

measures for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, founded in the

image and pattern of the German Army, were taken in September 1940 when

a special military mission was sent to Romania. The chief of this

mission was Cavalry General Hansen. His Chief of Staff was Major General

Hauffe, his chief quartermaster Major Merk. Major General Von Rotkirch

commanded the 13th Panzer Division.

The task of this military mission was the reorganization of the Romanian

Army and its preparation for the subsequent attack on the Soviet Union

in the spirit of Plan Barbarossa. The preliminary trend of this task, as

Paulus has testified, was given to Hansen and his Chief of Staff by

Paulus and they got the last directives from the Commander-in-Chief,

Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.

General Hansen received directives from two sources: from the OKW where

his military mission was concerned, and from the OKH in all questions

dealing with the Army. Directives of a military and political nature

were received only from the OKW.

The military mission acted as liaison between the German and the

Romanian general staffs.

The form assumed by the agreement and, even more, the publication of the

true aims of high-ranking fascist leaders in the country, did not always

suit the satellites.

I now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-233 (Document Number USSR-233),

the minutes of a conversation between Ion Antonescu and the Defendant

Ribbentrop which took place on 12 February 1942. This document was taken

from the personal archives of Marshal Antonescu which were captured by

the advance units of the Red Army. This document, Your Honors, figures

on Pages 59-62 of your document book.

In connection with Ribbentrop’s speech in Budapest on the subject of

Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following annotation in the course of

this speech—last paragraph, Page 2 of the Russian text of the document,

Page 60 of the document book:

“Without hesitation, I stressed the point that as early as 6

September, when I took over the government of the country,

supported only by Monsieur Mihai Antonescu, I declared, without

asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of

adherence to the Axis powers. I said that this was the only

example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make

an open declaration and to call upon their people to follow a

policy which no doubt could only appear odious. . . .”

When making this cynical entry, Ion Antonescu could hardly have expected

it to receive such wide publicity.

Mr. President, I intend to read into the record a long document which

will take considerable time.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 12 February 1946 at 1000 hours._]

FIFTY-SEVENTH DAY

Tuesday, 12 February 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, you were going to recall the witness who

was being called yesterday, Field Marshal Paulus, were you not, so that

the defendants’ counsel may have the opportunity of questioning him?

Will you do that now?

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, according to the wish of the Tribunal the witness is

in the Palace of Justice.

[_The witness, Paulus, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Field Marshal Paulus, I want to remind you that you

should pause after the question that has been asked you before you

answer it, in order that the translation shall get through. Do you

follow what I mean?

PAULUS: I have understood.

DR. NELTE: Witness, I should like to ask several questions. On 3

September 1940, you came as Chief Quartermaster I to the High Command of

the Army; is that correct?

PAULUS: That is correct.

DR. NELTE: Who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at that time?

PAULUS: It will be very well known to you that at that time the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army was Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch.

DR. NELTE: I believe that the phraseology that you have used is not

correct because I did not put this question for any other reason than

just to explain the situation to the people who are assembled here. It

is known to us but may not be known to the Tribunal. Who was at that

time the Chief of Staff of the Army?

PAULUS: It was Generaloberst Halder.

DR. NELTE: Were you, as Chief Quartermaster I, the permanent

representative of the Chief of Staff?

PAULUS: I was the deputy of the Chief of Staff for those cases which he

told me to supervise, and as for the rest I had to execute the tasks

with which he charged me.

DR. NELTE: In this case were you especially charged with the adaptation

of the plan which we later learned to know as Plan Barbarossa?

PAULUS: Yes, to the extent of which I told you yesterday.

DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Brauchitsch, your former Commander-in-Chief and

superior, in an affidavit presented by the Prosecution has made a

statement about the treatment of military plans. With the permission of

the Tribunal, I should like to ask you to tell me whether this statement

by Field Marshal Von Brauchitsch is also your opinion. I quote:

“When Hitler decided to use military pressure or force to

achieve his political aims, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,

if he was involved, first received orally a sort of orientation

or a corresponding order.”

Is that your opinion also?

PAULUS: I have no knowledge of that.

DR. NELTE: Generaloberst Halder, your immediate superior, in an

affidavit which also has been submitted by the Prosecution, has said the

following about the handling of such military operational things:

“Special military affairs were the responsibility of those parts

of the Wehrmacht, that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force, which were

immediately under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, that is

to say, under the command of Hitler, who was at the same time

the Chief of the Reich.”

Is that your opinion likewise?

PAULUS: I ask you please to repeat this once more because I could not

understand exactly what you meant.

DR. NELTE: It is about the question: Who were the military persons

responsible to Hitler in the forming of important plans? In respect to

that, Von Brauchitsch said what you have just heard, and Halder said the

following:

“Special military affairs were the responsibility of those parts

of the Wehrmacht, that is, Army, Navy, and Air Force, which were

immediately under the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, that is

to say, under the command of Hitler, who was at the same time

the Chief of the Reich.”

Is that so?

PAULUS: We received the orders about military measures from the High

Command of the Wehrmacht. Such was the Directive Number 21. I thought

that those people held responsibility who were the first military

advisers of Hitler in the High Command of the Wehrmacht.

DR. NELTE: If you have seen Directive Number 21, then you must also know

who signed it. Who was that?

PAULUS: As far as I can remember, that was signed by Hitler; and Keitel

and Jodl initialed it.

DR. NELTE: But, at any rate, signed by Hitler, like all directives—is

that correct?

PAULUS: At any rate, most of the directives, unless they were signed by

other people in his name.

DR. NELTE: In other words, I may conclude that the man who gave the

orders was the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht, that is to say,

Hitler?

PAULUS: That is correct.

DR. NELTE: From the statements of Von Brauchitsch and Halder we can see,

in my opinion, that the General Staff of the Army with its large

machinery was to work out ideas which Hitler conceived, work them out in

detail. Do you not believe that?

PAULUS: That is correct. It had to relegate the orders which were given

it by the Supreme Command to the proper departments.

DR. NELTE: It is clear that these orders were given to the High Command,

that is, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. There was in all

planning, as I can see from your statement also, in the execution of

such aggressive plans a close collaboration between Hitler as Supreme

Commander of the Wehrmacht and the General Staff of the Army. Is that

correct?

PAULUS: This co-operation exists between the Supreme Command and all

persons who are charged to carry out the orders of the Supreme

Commander.

DR. NELTE: From your explanation I believe I can conclude that the

incomplete plan which you found on 3 September 1940—that you have

developed that, and that then, after you had achieved a certain measure

of completeness, you presented it to the Supreme Commander, Hitler,

personally, or through General Halder?

PAULUS: The detailed completion of the plan was presented by the Chief

of the General Staff or by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; then it

was either accepted or rejected.

DR. NELTE: That is, it had to be accepted by Hitler or refused?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Did I understand you correctly yesterday to say that you had

already in the fall of 1940 understood that Hitler wanted to attack the

Soviet Union?

PAULUS: I said yesterday that the preparation of that plan of operations

was the theoretical preparation for an attack.

DR. NELTE: But already at that time you thought that that was Hitler’s

intention, didn’t you?

PAULUS: From the way in which this task was started one could see that,

after the theoretical preparation, a practical application would follow.

DR. NELTE: Furthermore, you said yesterday that no news of the Abwehr

had been received which would prove that there were any intentions of

the Soviet Union to attack.

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Did anybody in the circle of the General Staff of the Army

ever speak about these matters?

PAULUS: Yes, these matters were discussed. They had serious misgivings

about them, but no reports about any visible preparations for war on the

side of the Soviet Union were ever made known to me.

DR. NELTE: So you were firmly convinced that it was a straight attack on

the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: At any rate, the indications did not exclude that.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness must speak more slowly.

DR. NELTE: The witness has said, if I understood correctly, that there

were signs which did not exclude these inferences.

PAULUS: The order for the execution of this theoretical study of the

conditions for attack was considered not only by myself but also by

other informed experts as the first step for the preparation for an

attack, that is to say, an aggressive attack on the Soviet Union.

DR. NELTE: In realizing these facts, did you or the General Staff of the

Army or the Commander-in-Chief of the Army make any protests to Hitler

about it?

PAULUS: Personally, I do not know in what form or whether the

Commander-in-Chief of the Army made any protests.

DR. NELTE: Did you, yourself, speak about having any doubts to

Generaloberst Halder or to Commander-in-Chief Von Brauchitsch?

PAULUS: If I judge correctly, then I believe that I am supposed to be

here as a witness for the events with which the defendants are charged.

I ask the Tribunal, therefore, to relieve me of the responsibility of

answering these questions which are directed against myself.

DR. NELTE: Field Marshal Paulus, you do not seem to know that you also

belong to the circle of the defendants, because you belonged to the

organization of the High Command which is indicted here as criminal.

PAULUS: And, therefore, since I believe that I am here as witness for

the events which have led to the indictment of these defendants here, I

have asked to be relieved of answering this question which concerns

myself.

DR. NELTE: I ask the Tribunal to decide.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you must answer the questions

that have been put up to date.

PAULUS: Then may I ask for a repetition of the question, please?

DR. NELTE: I have asked you whether, since you realized that there were

serious doubts, you talked to your chief, Halder, or to

Commander-in-Chief Von Brauchitsch, about these things?

PAULUS: I cannot remember having talked to the Commander-in-Chief of the

Army about it, but I did so with the Chief of the General Staff,

Generaloberst Halder, who was my superior.

DR. NELTE: Was he of the same opinion?

PAULUS: Yes, he was of the same opinion, that is to say, of the opinion

of great anxiety for such a plan.

DR. NELTE: For military or moral reasons?

PAULUS: For many reasons, both military and moral.

DR. NELTE: It is certain, then, that you and the Chief of Staff, Von

Halder, realized these facts which would have stamped the war against

Russia as a criminal attack and that you nevertheless did nothing

against it? In your statement you have said that later you became

Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army; is that right?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: With knowledge of all these facts just stated you accepted

the command of an army which was to push against Stalingrad. Did you

have any scruples about being made a tool of that attack which in your

opinion was a criminal one?

PAULUS: As the situation at that time presented itself for the soldier,

in connection also with the extraordinary propaganda which was put into

play, I had at that time, as so many others believed, to do my duty

toward my fatherland.

DR. NELTE: But you knew about the facts which were against that opinion?

PAULUS: The facts which became clear to me afterwards, due to my

experiences as Commander of the 6th Army which found their climax at

Stalingrad, those facts I did not know at that time. Also, about that

criminal attack—that knowledge came later, when I thought about all the

circumstances, because before I could only see part of the whole.

DR. NELTE: Then I have to consider your expression “criminal attack” or

any other expressions for the war mongers—I have to consider that as

something that you found out later?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. NELTE: And I may say then that in spite of your having serious

doubts and knowledge about the facts which marked the war against Russia

as a criminal action of aggression, that in spite of your knowledge, you

considered it your duty to take the command of the 6th Army and to hold

Stalingrad until the last moment?

PAULUS: I have just explained that at that time, when I took over the

command, I did not see the extent of the crime which was considered in

the beginning and execution of this war of aggression; that I did not

see the entire extent of it and could not see it, as my experiences as

Commander of the 6th Army which I was able to gather at Stalingrad have

shown to me later.

DR. NELTE: You speak of the extent, but the fact is that you knew the

causes. Maybe you were one of the few who knew them. You have not

mentioned that.

PAULUS: I did not know then. I knew the instigation of this war to be

aggression, from the attitude of the greater part of the officers’

corps. In keeping with the prevailing concept I saw nothing unusual in

the basing of the fate of a people and a nation upon power politics.

DR. NELTE: So you agreed to these ideologies?

PAULUS: Not to the tendency which appeared later, but I did not conclude

therefrom that the fate of a country could be built upon power politics.

It was a mistake that at this time, and in the 20th Century, only the

democracies and the concept of the nationality principle were the

decisive factors.

DR. NELTE: Would you grant to others also, who were not so near to the

sources, the good faith that they only wanted what was best for their

fatherland?

PAULUS: Yes, I do, of course.

DR. FRITZ SAUTER (Counsel for Defendants Von Schirach and Funk):

Witness, yesterday you mentioned that you consider the Hitler Government

as the guilty ones. Is that correct?

PAULUS: Yes, I have done so. . . .

DR. SAUTER: In your written deposition which you made on 9 January

1946—in a prisoner-of-war camp it is said—there is nothing about that;

at least, I have not found anything about it so far.

PAULUS: This letter has nothing to do with that. This is a letter to the

Soviet Government, in which I explained several questions which came up

within the 6th Army in Russia, and several of my own experiences.

DR. SAUTER: In this letter of 9 January 1946, you said explicitly—and I

quote:

“Today, when the crimes of Hitler and his helpers are being

judged, I find myself obliged to tell the Soviet Government

everything which I have known and which may serve as proof of

the guilt of the war criminals in the Nuremberg Trials.”

In spite of that, in this written declaration, which is very detailed,

there is nothing about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, if you cross-examine the witness on this

letter, you must put the letter in evidence, the whole letter.

DR. SAUTER: That is the statement which the witness has given, on

the. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I have no doubt it is; all I say is, if you cross-examine

him on the letter and put the letter to him, you must put the letter in

evidence. You have a copy of the letter?

DR. SAUTER: Yes. It is in the statement which the Soviet Prosecutor

yesterday put up to the witness and in regard to which the witness made

the statement that he considers it correct and will repeat it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I follow it. I was not sure whether it was actually

put in or not or whether it was withdrawn upon the promise to produce

the witness. Is the letter actually in?

DR. SAUTER: But the witness has said, after the Prosecutor asked him,

that he will repeat that statement.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Willey, has the letter been put in?

MR. HAROLD B. WILLEY (American Secretary): It has not been put in, no.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you can go on cross-examining about it, but

the document has got to be put in, that is all.

DR. SAUTER: [_Turning to the witness._] Now I would like to know,

Witness, what you mean by “Hitler Government”? Do you mean the leaders

of the Party or do you mean the Reich Cabinet, or what exactly do you

mean?

PAULUS: I mean everyone who is responsible.

DR. SAUTER: I would like you to answer the question more precisely.

PAULUS: In my statement yesterday I have only explained what I have seen

myself, what I have experienced myself. I did not intend to make any

statements about individual personalities in the Government because that

would not be within my knowledge.

DR. SAUTER: Yes, but you spoke about the Hitler Government, did you not?

PAULUS: I just meant the concept of the Hitlerite leadership of the

State.

DR. SAUTER: Of the Hitlerite leadership of State? That means, first, the

Reich Cabinet, does it not?

PAULUS: Yes, inasmuch as it is responsible for the directives given by

the Government.

DR. SAUTER: For this reason I would like to know the following:

The Defendant Funk, who is sitting over there, was also a member of the

Reich Cabinet and the Defendant Von Schirach is also counted as a member

of the Reich Cabinet by the Prosecution. Do you know anything as to

whether the Defendant Funk and the Defendant Von Schirach, like you, for

instance, knew anything about these plans of Hitler?

PAULUS: I do not know.

DR. SAUTER: Do you know whether, during the war, since you were at the

OKW, there were any meetings of the Cabinet at all?

PAULUS: I do not know that either.

DR. SAUTER: Do you know that Hitler, in the interests of secrecy of his

war plans, even ordered that at conferences between himself and his

military advisers the members of the Reich Cabinet, as for instance

Funk, could not be admitted?

PAULUS: I do not know about that.

DR. SAUTER: Did it not come to your knowledge, perhaps through Herr Jodl

or through Herr Keitel, that Hitler even forbade that civilian members

of the Reich Cabinet should be present at such military conferences?

PAULUS: I do not know anything about that at all.

DR. SAUTER: Another question. After Stalingrad was encircled and the

situation had become hopeless, there were several telegrams of devotion

sent to Hitler from inside the fortress. Do you know anything about

that?

PAULUS: If you speak of telegrams of devotion, I only know about the

end, when efforts were made to find a meaning for the catastrophe that

had happened there, to find a meaning for all the suffering and dying of

so many soldiers. Therefore these things had been depicted as heroism in

the telegram, to be forever remembered. I am sorry, but at that time,

due to the prevailing situation, I let that pass and did not stop it.

DR. SAUTER: These telegrams were yours, were they not?

PAULUS: I do not know to which telegrams you are referring, with the

exception of the last one.

DR. SAUTER: Several telegrams of devotion, in which there was a promise

to hold out to the last man; those telegrams about which the German

people were horrified. They are said to have your signature.

PAULUS: I request to have them presented to me, because there is nothing

known to me about them.

DR. SAUTER: Do you have any idea what was in the last telegram?

PAULUS: In the last telegram there was a short description of what the

army had done, of the achievement of the army, and it was pointed out

that it did not intend to capitulate, and that that should be an example

for the future.

DR. SAUTER: The answer was, I think, your promotion to General Field

Marshal?

PAULUS: I do not know that this was the answer.

DR. SAUTER: But you were promoted to General Field Marshal, and you

still have that title because the statement which I have submitted to

the Court is signed “Paulus, General Field Marshal.”

PAULUS: Well, I have to say. . . . Do you mean this statement?

DR. SAUTER: Yes, this statement.

PAULUS: Yes, I had to take that title which was conferred upon me.

DR. SAUTER: In this statement which I have submitted to the Court as

proof, there is the last sentence:

“I bear the responsibility for the fact that I did not give due

attention to the execution of the order of 14 January 1943 about

the surrender of the prisoners”—namely, all Russian

prisoners. . . .

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: “. . . to the Russians, and, furthermore, that I. . . .”

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. SAUTER: “. . . did not devote myself sufficiently to taking care of

the prisoners.”—That is to say, the Russian prisoners.

I would like to hear your statement about the following: In that

detailed letter why did you forget the several hundred thousands of

German soldiers who were under your command and who lost under your

command their freedom, their health, and their lives? There is no word

about that.

PAULUS: No.

DR. SAUTER: No?

PAULUS: That is not the question in this letter. This letter to the

Soviet Government was concerned with what happened to the Russian

civilian population in the area of Stalingrad and the Russian prisoners

of war. At this time I could not say anything about my soldiers, of

course not.

DR. SAUTER: Not one word?

PAULUS: No, I could not speak here, because that had to be done at a

different time. Of course, it is so that all the operational orders

which led to the terrible conditions of Stalingrad, in spite of my

objections. . . . About 20 January, as I said, I had made a report that

conditions had reached such a measure of misery and of suffering through

cold, hunger, and epidemics as to be unbearable, and that to continue

the fighting would be beyond human possibility. The answer given to me

by the Supreme Command was:

“Capitulation is impossible. The 6th Army will do its historic

duty by fighting to the utmost, in order to make the

reconstruction of the Eastern front possible.”

DR. SAUTER: And that is why you continued your efforts in the crime you

have described until the very end?

PAULUS: That is correct.

DR. SAUTER: Because, according to your own statements, everything from

the very beginning was a crime, which clearly and for a long time had

come to your mind?

PAULUS: I did not say that it was clear to me as a crime from the very

beginning, but that later I had this impression, as a result of

retrospective considerations. My knowledge comes actually from my

experience at Stalingrad.

DR. SAUTER: Then I would like to know, in closing: Was it not clear to

you from the very beginning, when you were charged with the development

of plans for the attack on Russia, as a specialist for such task—was it

not clear to you from the very beginning that this attack on Russia

could be made only under violations of international treaties, to which

Germany was bound?

PAULUS: Yes, under violation of international law, but not under those

conditions which developed later.

DR. SAUTER: No, I asked whether it was clear to you that this plan could

only be executed by violation of international treaties?

PAULUS: It was clear to me that an attack of that kind could only be

made under violation of the treaty which had existed with Russia since

the fall of ’39.

DR. SAUTER: I have no more questions. Thank you.

[_Dr. Exner approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I have already told the witness, and

defendants’ counsel have been told over and over again, that it is of

the utmost importance that they should ask their questions slowly, that

they ask one question at a time, and that they should pause between the

question and the answer and between the answer and the next question.

Will you try to observe that rule, please?

PROFESSOR DR. FRANZ EXNER (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Witness, in

September of 1940 at the OKW you were charged with the execution of an

operational study against Russia, that is, to continue work on a plan

which existed already. Do you know about how strong the German forces in

the East were at that time?

PAULUS: I can only clarify, in the OKH I have. . . .

DR. EXNER: Yes, we have the OKH in mind.

PAULUS: I do not know any longer how strong the forces in the East were

at that time. It was at a time shortly after the end of the campaign

against France.

DR. EXNER: You do not know about how many divisions were in the East at

that time for the protection of the German border?

PAULUS: No, I cannot remember that.

DR. EXNER: In February of 1941 our transports to the East began. Can you

say how strong at that time the Russian forces were, along the

German-Russian demarcation line and the Romanian-Russian border?

PAULUS: No, I cannot say that. The information which reached us about

the Soviet Union and their forces was so extraordinarily scarce and

incomplete that for a long time we had no clear picture at all.

DR. EXNER: But did not Halder at that time talk to the Führer frequently

about the strength and deployment of the Russian forces?

PAULUS: That is possible, but I cannot remember it, because I had

nothing to do with these questions after that time—with the theoretical

development of our ideas. In December the operations department of the

Army took the work over.

DR. EXNER: At this time you had theoretical war exercises?

PAULUS: That was in the beginning of December.

DR. EXNER: Then you probably used, as a basis of these exercises,

information you had about the actual strength of the enemy?

PAULUS: That was just what we assumed about the strength of the enemy.

DR. EXNER: Well, you have collaborated intensively with that operational

plan. You have tried it out by theoretical war exercises. Tell me, what

was the difference between your work and Jodl’s at that time?

PAULUS: I do not think I am able to judge that.

DR. EXNER: I do not understand. That was General Staff work, was it not?

PAULUS: Yes, it was General Staff work, with which I was charged by the

Chief of Staff.

DR. EXNER: Yes, and the activity of Jodl as Chief of the Wehrmacht

Führungsstab. . . .

PAULUS: The difference is that he had a view of the entire situation

from the point where he was, whereas I could only see a small section,

only that which I needed for my work, and that is all the information I

received.

DR. EXNER: But the activity in both cases was one of General Staff

preparation for the war?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. EXNER: I would also be interested to know something about

Stalingrad. In your written statement, or written declaration, you have

said that Keitel and Jodl were guilty with regard to the prohibition of

capitulation, which had such tragic consequences. How do you know that?

PAULUS: I just wanted to say it was the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht

who was responsible for that order. It had the responsibility, and it

makes no difference whether it was one person or another. At any rate,

the responsibility was with the office as such.

DR. EXNER: At any rate, you do not know anything about the personal

participation of any one of these two gentlemen? You only thought

of. . . .

PAULUS: The OKW, which is represented by these persons.

DR. EXNER: Why, when the situation at Stalingrad was so hopeless and

terrible—as you have indicated today—did you not, in spite of the

order by the Führer to the contrary, try to break out?

PAULUS: Because at that time it was represented to me that by holding

out with the army which I led, the fate of the German people would be

decided.

DR. EXNER: Do you know that you enjoyed the confidence of Hitler in a

special measure?

PAULUS: I do not know about that.

DR. EXNER: Do you know that he had already decided that you would become

the successor to Jodl if the Stalingrad operation would be successful,

because he did not like to work with Jodl any more?

PAULUS: I do not know about that in this form, but there was a rumor

that late in the summer or early in the fall of 1942 a change was

planned in the leadership. That was a rumor which the Chief of Staff of

the Luftwaffe told me at that time, but I did not get any official

information about that. There was other information, that I should be

relieved of the command of that army and should be used to lead a new

army group which was to be formed.

DR. EXNER: Do you remember the telegram which you sent to the Führer

when you were promoted to the rank of Field Marshal at Stalingrad?

PAULUS: I did not send a telegram then. After my promotion I did not

send a telegram.

DR. EXNER: Have you not thanked the Führer in any way?

PAULUS: No.

DR. EXNER: That is quite contrary to statements which other people have

made. Witness, you are said to be or to have been a teacher at the

Military Academy at Moscow. Is that correct?

PAULUS: That is not right, either.

DR. EXNER: Did you have another position in Moscow?

PAULUS: I was never in Russia before the war.

DR. EXNER: But now, since you became a prisoner of war?

PAULUS: I have been in a prisoner-of-war camp, like my other comrades.

DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the German Freedom Committee?

PAULUS: I was a member of a movement of German men, soldiers of all

ranks and men of all classes, who had made it their aim to warn the

German people at the last moment from the abyss, and to arouse them to

overthrow this Hitler regime which had brought all this misery to many

nations and especially to our German people. I have done that with the

proclamation of 8 August 1944.

DR. EXNER: Did you do anything about that before?

PAULUS: No, I did not.

DR. EXNER: Thank you.

DR. LATERNSER: I have only a few more questions to ask the witness.

[_Turning to the witness_] Witness, did you not know when you took over

your office as Chief Quartermaster I that these preparations which Major

General Marx already had begun, and which you then continued, were

intended only for an eventual case?

PAULUS: One could think so, of course, but very soon in the course of

the work things appeared which made it seem very probable that these

theoretical preparations were to be put to practical use. In connection

with the formulation of this plan of operations for an attack in which,

from the very beginning, we were thinking in terms of using the Romanian

area—during that very time we saw the dispatching of the first military

mission with training groups and an entire Panzer division, just into

that area for which the first theoretical preparations for an attack

were being made. Thus, gradually, the impression became intensified that

this was a plan which eventually would be executed.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, the reason for my question is this: I believe

the date which you mentioned, since which the plan was to have already

been in existence, the fall of 1940, is a little early, isn’t it?

PAULUS: The documents which I was given for that plan of offense I

explained in detail yesterday. They were submitted on 3 September, for

upon the basis of these documents everything was developed, and

everything was actually executed like that later.

DR. LATERNSER: I mean this: That first this plan was considered or

conceived for an eventual case, and then at a later date, after a

decision had been taken, it was used.

PAULUS: In retrospect, they fit together in perfect sequence, first the

theoretical preparation, and then the practical preparation and

execution.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know Directive Number 18 of 12 November 1940,

issued by the former Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht?

PAULUS: I cannot remember it.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I refer now to a document which has

already been submitted by the United States Prosecution, Number 444-PS.

[_Handing the document to the witness_] I submit it to you, Witness.

Page 8 is the one to which I am referring.

PAULUS: I cannot remember that I have ever seen this.

DR. LATERNSER: To inform the Court I am going to quote the passage—it

is very short—which I have just shown to the witness. It is Page 8 of

the Document 444-PS, this paragraph I quote: “5. Russia: Political

conferences with the aim of clarifying the attitude of Russia for the

near future have been started.”

Witness, after you have seen that passage you will have to admit that I

am right in saying that the time at which the decision was taken to

attack the Soviet Union must have been later than the time you told us

yesterday.

PAULUS: I can only say from my personal experience and my own opinion as

I look back now, following the entire development, that there was a

clear plan from the beginning, the conception of that plan on 3

September 1940, then the directive of 21 December, and then its

execution. Just at which precisely measurable date the decision was

taken, I do not know, of course.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you know that in 1939 the Soviet Union marched into

Poland with very strong forces which bore no relationship—according to

opinions of German military experts—with the military problem to be

solved at that time?

PAULUS: I only know of the fact that Soviet forces marched into Poland,

but I have never heard anything about the size of the forces, nor have I

ever heard anyone marvel at the strength of the forces that had taken

part in the invasion.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you know that before the German deployment on the

Eastern border many strong Soviet forces had been deployed along that

border, especially very strong Panzer forces in the area of Bialystok?

PAULUS: No, in that form I have never known of this.

DR. LATERNSER: Were not the first divisions from West to East

transferred only after very strong Soviet forces already were standing

along the Eastern border?

PAULUS: About the relationship of troop movements from West to East—the

practical execution of the plan—I do not know anything, because I had

nothing to do with the practical execution. First of all, in the months

of April and May, because of other duties, I was present in the High

Command of the Army for only a very short time.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you said yesterday that at the end of March 1940

there was a conference at the Reich Chancellery, and there Generaloberst

Halder gave you several points as a reason for the intended attack on

Yugoslavia. You mentioned first the elimination of danger to the flank;

second, the taking possession of the rail line to Nish, and you stressed

the fact that in case of an attack against Russia the right flank would

be free to move.

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Were the reasons for this attack not different ones? Were

not there reasons which were more important than those you mentioned?

PAULUS: I do not know of any others.

DR. LATERNSER: As to this attack upon Yugoslavia, was not that also to

be done to relieve the Italians?

PAULUS: Yes, of course. That was the initial reason why an operation

against Greece was considered, and why that menace to the flank had to

be eliminated if we were to push forward into Greece from Bulgaria.

DR. LATERNSER: Was not there at that time some concern about

co-operation between Yugoslavia and Greece, which would have put England

into the position of being able to land on the Greek coast and thereby

gain a way to reach the Romanian oil fields?

PAULUS: Yes, but it would also have been impossible to carry out the

Plan Barbarossa, which would have been menaced on its right flank and

unprotected.

DR. LATERNSER: I have received different information. In the decision to

attack Yugoslavia the Plan Barbarossa did not play the important role

which you said yesterday it did.

PAULUS: The Plan Barbarossa could not have been carried out if the area

of Greece and Serbia, after reinforcement by the British landing, would

have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we can adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: I am told that the interpreters, using the words

“question” and “answer” before the question and answer, assist the

shorthand writers and the press, and therefore the interpreters may

continue to say “question” and “answer” before the question and answer

is given. That only makes it more obvious that the real remedy for the

difficulties which arise is for the counsel and witnesses to pause after

the question has been asked and after the answer has been given, and it

seems to the Tribunal that counsel and witnesses ought to be able to

hear when the translation of the question has been given, and the

witness can then give his answer. And when the translation of the answer

has been given, which counsel can hear, he should then put a further

question. Is it clear what I mean?

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were just speaking of the attack on

Yugoslavia. If I understood you correctly, you said that this attack had

to be carried out before the Plan Barbarossa could be undertaken, as

otherwise there would have been a serious threat to the flanks. Did I

understand you correctly?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: You said yesterday that the overthrow of the government

in Yugoslavia was the cause for Hitler’s attack on Yugoslavia. Do you

know whether any plans for such an attack existed even before the

revolution in Yugoslavia?

PAULUS: That is not known to me.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you happen to know that particularly the plan of

attack against Yugoslavia came at a very inconvenient time, and that it

caused a delay of the attack against the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: That is exactly what I said yesterday. It caused a postponement

of the attack on Russia, which had originally been planned for the

middle of May, the weather permitting.

DR. LATERNSER: But then there is a sort of contradiction here, if you

say that the attack against Yugoslavia took place at that time although

it was inconvenient, as the attack against Russia was to be made.

PAULUS: I do not see any contradiction in that. As I saw the situation

then, the Yugoslavian Government had made an agreement with us which

placed the railway line from Belgrade to Nish at our disposal, and that

after that agreement was concluded, a revolution took place in

Yugoslavia which created a different policy. Therefore, this plan of

attack was believed necessary to eliminate a danger. In other words, I

do not see that the decision to attack Yugoslavia and to delay

Barbarossa form a contradiction. I merely see that one is a prerequisite

for the execution of the other.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you present at a conference of the General

Staff on the Obersalzberg on 3 February 1941?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Are you aware of the fact that at that time the strength

of the Soviet Russian deployment was estimated at 100 infantry

divisions, 25 cavalry divisions, and 30 mechanized divisions, and that

this was reported by Generaloberst Halder?

PAULUS: I cannot remember that. Nor am I sure whether Generaloberst

Halder was actually present during that conference.

DR. LATERNSER: But, witness, such a conference must have been an unusual

one?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: And I believe that that conference must at least have

given the impression that a very strong concentration of troops on the

Eastern Front was in question.

PAULUS: I myself have at least no recollection of any such impression.

DR. LATERNSER: At the beginning of that attack against the Soviet Union,

were you still Chief Quartermaster I?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: As far as I have in the meantime been informed, it is

part of the tasks of that service department to make positive

suggestions regarding military operations on land, is that correct?

PAULUS: That was once the case during a different division of tasks. At

the time when I was Chief Quartermaster I did not get that task as part

of my job. The operational department was not under my control but

immediately under the personal control of the Chief of the General

Staff. The General Staff Department, first of all, gave me the task of

running the training department and then the organization department,

and that was in autumn 1941. Therefore, it was not part of my sphere of

activities to make suggestions to the Chief of the General Staff

regarding operations which were in progress, or any other operations. I

merely had to carry out the special tasks which were given to me.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, can you give information on the subject of how

German prisoners of war were treated in the Soviet Union?

PAULUS: That question, about which such an incredible amount of

propaganda has been made, which led to the suicide of so many German

officers and enlisted personnel in the cauldron of Stalingrad, I have

obligated myself to consider in the interest of truth. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Cross-examination is questioning on questions

which are either relevant to the issues which the Tribunal has to try or

questions relevant to the credibility of the witness. Questions which

relate to the treatment of prisoners in the Soviet Union have got

nothing whatever to do with any of the issues which we have got to try,

and they are not relevant to the credibility of the witness. The

Tribunal, therefore, will not hear them.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I give a reason why I ask that

question? May I make a short statement?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: I should like to put that question for the reason that I

could ascertain how, actually, prisoners of war were treated, so that a

large number of German families, who are extremely worried on that

subject, could in that manner be given information on the subject, so

that their worries would cease.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of opinion that that is not a matter with

which the Tribunal is concerned.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions to ask the witness.

DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for Defendant Fritzsche): Witness, do you know

the Defendant Fritzsche?

PAULUS: Yes, I do.

DR. FRITZ: Are you aware of the fact that during the summer and autumn

of 1942 he was with your army?

PAULUS: Yes.

DR. FRITZ: Witness, in the course of this Trial there was a discussion

about the command of the OKW which, as I hear, was also sharply

criticized by you, according to which all the captured commissars of the

Russian Army were to be shot. Are you aware of that order?

PAULUS: Yes. It came to my knowledge.

DR. FRITZ: Do you recollect that the Defendant Fritzsche, after he had

become aware of that order in the course of his duties in the East, made

a proposal to you and your I.C. officers, according to which that order

should be cancelled as far as your army zone was concerned?

PAULUS: I cannot recollect that incident. I think it is perfectly

possible that Herr Fritzsche did discuss that question with my staff,

but when I took over that army on 20 January 1942, that order was not

carried out in my zone. As far as I know, this order, which in practice

did not become operative, was in fact cancelled later on.

DR. FRITZ: Perhaps, so as to refresh your memory, I might ask another

question: Do you recollect, perhaps, that Fritzsche suggested to you or

your I.C. officers the scattering of pamphlets with a corresponding

content over the Russian front?

PAULUS: I personally cannot recollect that, but I consider it perfectly

possible that such a discussion with the I.C. officer who was

responsible for that sort of thing took place.

DR. FRITZ: Then one last question: As far as you know the character of

the Defendant Fritzsche, would you consider it entirely possible and

probable that he made this proposal?

PAULUS: Yes, indeed I do.

DR. ROBERT SERVATIUS (Counsel for the Leadership Corps of the Nazi

Party): Witness, in your position you supported Hitler right to the very

end, despite the fact that you knew that an aggressive war was being

waged. How much could the political leaders know of this?

PAULUS: I cannot answer that question, because it is out of my

knowledge.

DR. SERVATIUS: What do you understand by political leaders?

PAULUS: May I ask another question in return? What does the defendant’s

counsel understand by political leaders, concerning whom he asks the

question?

DR. SERVATIUS: Witness, the organization of the Party does not seem to

be clear to you. There is an organization of political leaders which is

indicted in this Trial. They are to be declared criminal to this extent

that, from the Reichsleiter to the Blockleiter, they may be punished

because of their participation in the conspiracy to commit all the acts

which are being tried here. This organization of political leaders is

composed in such a way that 93 percent are local group leaders with

their staffs and all their subordinates.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you can ask this witness about this. He

does not know anything about it. He is not concerned with the charge

against the political leadership. I do not think that is proper

cross-examination at all.

DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I was going to ask him to what extent

these political leaders might have had knowledge, and then I was going

to ask a second question, whether he was aware that he, as a witness,

has contributed materially to the fact that these people, the political

leaders, supported Hitler because they believed in the facade which the

witness himself had assisted in setting up.

THE PRESIDENT: I have already answered you that he did not know to what

extent the political leaders had been informed.

DR. SERVATIUS: I am also appearing for the Defendant Sauckel, who was

responsible for the labor supply.

[_Turning to the witness_] Have you any knowledge as to whether German

prisoners of war were used in Russian armament industries?

PAULUS: I have no authentic or personal information on that subject. The

prisoners of war whom I myself have seen, in the camps where I have

been, worked for the immediate requirements of the camp or in the near

vicinity of the camp. They worked at agriculture or forestry, and I know

from the papers that some German units of workers, who had voluntarily

formed groups and were working in industry, were proud of the results of

their work. But I do not know in what branches of industry these people

worked.

DR. SERVATIUS: I have no further questions to put to this witness.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for the Reich Cabinet): A statement made by

you yesterday has already been discussed once more today, namely, how

much knowledge did individual members of the German Government have

regarding important decisions? I gathered from your reply that you did

not consider the Reich Government, regarding its personalities, one

homogeneous body. In this Trial the difficulty repeatedly arises that

normal conditions are assumed. One is especially prone to the conception

that most important political and military decisions, as is otherwise

customary, are made within a government body of important persons or

within the military supreme command; in other words, that questions are

discussed and decided within a group to which belongs a larger number of

personalities. Witness, from the knowledge you have gained in your high

military rank, could one assume this to be true of Adolf Hitler’s

Government? Has Adolf Hitler, in his personality and methods, to speak

politely, as a man of an unusual type, chiefly employed a completely

different procedure here? Did he not always make his decisions

independently or, at most, in closest consultation with a very few

assistants, and can we not derive from that that leading personalities

in political and military fields had no knowledge of impending events?

PAULUS: I must say to that that my military service in the General Staff

of the Army did not give me an insight into the methods of the

leadership of the State and of the Reich Government. My concept of a

governing body of a nation is that of a united group who, regardless of

the methods the state intends to use, have such a sense of

responsibility toward the people for the deeds of the government, that

they will not allow just anything to be done by even the head of the

state—in this case Hitler with his usual brutal and autocratic

ways—but, even if not required to do so, would themselves intervene in

time with the necessary measures, at the very latest as soon as it was

clear to the whole world that this government was being led by an insane

criminal.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, you belong to the second circle of people which

you mentioned. It is an established fact that you have not intervened,

and, surely, you would have had important reasons for that. I believe

that it would be better if, as far as other personalities are concerned,

you would not pass judgment, but would answer my questions as far as

actual facts are concerned.

My question was whether, according to your knowledge gained not only in

your military position but also in your particular and leading

position—whether they were right or wrong is unnecessary for

establishing the fact—you knew what the methods in military and

political matters were and what they were not. According to your

knowledge, were resolutions made by a large body of military and

political personalities who met and passed these resolutions, or were

decisions generally made and resolutions passed in a very much smaller

circle of people, probably sometimes only by Hitler alone?

PAULUS: How decisions of the Reich Government were made is not known to

me. Therefore, in my previous answer, I have merely given you my general

conception of this question and I believe that I have answered it

therewith. I cannot imagine that one man alone could have done

everything that was done. In order to exert his influence in a small

circle he finally needed the co-operation of his immediate assistants.

In other words, it was quite impossible for him to achieve his aims

otherwise.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: As to the co-operation of his closest assistants, do you

believe that some trained minister, a minister of labor or some other

minister who was specially trained, was ever consulted by Hitler about

his plans for aggression?

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, the witness has already said that he does not

know how the decisions of the Reich Government were arrived at. What he

may think about it is really not relevant. He does not know.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Witness, is it your impression that plans for aggression

were made by Hitler many years in advance, or are you of the opinion

that they were made to meet certain circumstances, on the basis of the

intuition which you say he always had?

PAULUS: That is entirely outside my knowledge. My observations began on

3 September 1940 and continued from that time until January 1942. What I

observed during that period is something I explained yesterday. About

the time prior to that I am not informed.

DR. MARTIN HORN (Counsel for Defendant Von Ribbentrop): Witness, you

said just now that you were a member of a body which had the aim of

saving Germany from disaster. My question is: What possibilities to

carry out these intentions were at the disposal of yourself and the

other members of that group?

PAULUS: We had the possibility of making ourselves heard and understood

by the German people, and believed it our duty to make known to the

German people our view, not only of military events but also of the

events of 20 July, and to tell them of the convictions we had since

gained. In this regard the initiative came chiefly from the ranks of the

army I had led to Stalingrad. There we experienced how, through the

orders of those military and political leaders against whom we were now

taking a stand, more than 100,000 soldiers died of hunger, cold, and

snow. There we experienced in concentrated form the horrors and terrors

of a war of conquest.

DR. HORN: Did you have any other possibility apart from propaganda?

PAULUS: Apart from the possibility of making propaganda through radio

and those newspapers which we had created, apart from that propaganda to

the German people, we had no other facilities.

THE PRESIDENT: What has the Tribunal got to do with this?

DR. HORN: I merely wanted to ascertain what conclusions I could draw on

the credibility of the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: I cannot see that it has any bearing on his credibility.

DR. HORN: It is perfectly possible that we have knowledge of other

possibilities which were available, which the witness has not mentioned.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion that what the witness

thought or did when he was a prisoner of war in Russian hands has got

nothing to do with his credibility, at least as far as the questions

that you have asked are concerned, and they will not allow the questions

to be put.

DR. HORN: May I have permission to ask the witness one more question?

THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.

DR. HORN: Did you, during the time you were a prisoner, have an

opportunity to place your military experiences in any way at the

disposal of anybody else?

PAULUS: In no way, in no case.

THE PRESIDENT: Then I understand that that concludes the

cross-examination. Does the Soviet Prosecutor wish to ask any more

questions?

GEN. RUDENKO: No, Mr. President. We consider that the questions have

been comprehensively explained.

THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Francis Biddle, Member for the United States):

General, you said that when you became Quartermaster General of the Army

on 3 September 1940, you found an unfinished plan for an attack against

the Soviet Union. Do you know how long that plan had been in preparation

before you saw it?

PAULUS: I cannot say exactly how long the period of preparation lasted,

but I would estimate that it lasted 2 to 3 weeks.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you know who had given the orders for the

preparation of the plan?

PAULUS: I assume that they originated from the same source, namely, the

OKW via the High Command of the Army. The Chief of the General Staff of

the Army had given to Major General Marx the same documents that he had

given me.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): At the conferences on the Plan Barbarossa how

many members of the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed

Forces were usually present?

PAULUS: The departments concerned, the Operational Department, the

Department for Foreign Armies, the General Quartermaster for Supplies,

and the Chief of Transportation. Those were generally the chief

departments which were involved.

THE TRIBUNAL: (Mr. Biddle): How many members of the General Staff and

High Command of the German Armed Forces were familiar with the orders

and directives as they were being signed?

PAULUS: In the course of time, that is, up to December, while the actual

marching orders were being prepared, more or less, all General Staff

officers had knowledge of the plan. Just how many had been informed

previously, in the individual periods, is something which I can no

longer say exactly.

THE TRIBUNAL (Major General I.T. Nikitchenko, Member for the U.S.S.R.):

What exactly did the General Staff of the German Army represent? Did it

deal exclusively with the elaboration of technical questions, was it the

apparatus elaborating technical problems according to instructions of

the Supreme Command, or, again, was the General Staff an organization

which prepared, elaborated, and submitted its findings to the Supreme

Command independently?

PAULUS: It was a technical executive body which had the task of carrying

out existing instructions.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Therefore the General Staff was merely

a technical apparatus?

PAULUS: That is how it was in practice. The General Staff, as such, was

an advisory organization to the Supreme Commander of the Army, and not

an executive body.

THE TRIBUNAL: (Gen. Nikitchenko): To what extent did the General Staff

conscientiously carry out the instructions received from the Supreme

Command?

PAULUS: They carried out these instructions absolutely.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did any conflict exist between the

General Staff and the Supreme Command?

PAULUS: It is a known fact that certain differences of opinion did

exist, although I am unable to explain that in detail. At any rate, I

know through my immediate superior that he had frequently had

differences of opinion with the Supreme Command of the German Armed

Forces.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Could such officers remain? Did they,

in fact, remain in the service of the General Staff if they disagreed

with the policy of the Supreme Command?

PAULUS: Political questions did not arise in that connection. Generally

speaking, political questions were not discussed in the circle of the

Army Supreme Command.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): I am not speaking of political

questions in the narrow sense of the word. I am speaking of the policy

of planning for war, of the policy of preparations and aggression. That

is what I had in mind. Was it intended, in case you know about it, to

transform that part of the Soviet Union, occupied by the German Forces?

PAULUS: I never did know what the itemized plans were. My knowledge is

restricted to a knowledge of such plans as were contained in the

so-called Green Folder for the exploitation of the country.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by exploitation?

PAULUS: The economic exploitation of the country, so that by utilizing

its resources one could bring the war in the West to a close and also to

guarantee future supremacy in Europe.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): Did the nature of the exploitation

differ from the economic exploitation applied inside Germany?

PAULUS: In that respect I have no personal impressions, since I only led

that army in Russia for three-quarters of a year; and I was captured

early, in January 1943.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What did you know of the directives

issued by Government organizations in Germany and by the Supreme

Command, concerning the treatment of the Soviet population by the Army?

PAULUS: I remember that instructions did appear, but I cannot recollect

the date at the moment. In those instructions definite rules were given

for the manner of conducting the war in the East. I believe that this

principal decree was included in that so-called Green Folder, but there

may have been separate and special orders to the effect that no

particular consideration should be shown the population.

THE TRIBUNAL (Gen. Nikitchenko): What do you mean by “not to show

particular consideration”—or perhaps the translation is not quite

correct?

PAULUS: That meant that only military necessities should be considered a

basis for all measures that were taken.

THE PRESIDENT: Were there any divisions under your command consisting

entirely of SS troops?

PAULUS: During the time I led the Army I had no SS troops at all under

my command, as I remember. Even in the cauldron at Stalingrad, where I

had 20 German infantry, armored, and motorized divisions, and two

Romanian divisions, there were no SS units.

THE PRESIDENT: I understand that the SA did not form units, did they?

The SA?

PAULUS: I have never heard of SA units, but the existence of SS units is

a known fact.

THE PRESIDENT: And did you have any branches of the Gestapo attached to

your army?

PAULUS: No, I did not have those either.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, I did ask you whether you had any

questions to ask, and you said no, I take it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand, and Gen. Zorya approached the lectern._]

THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on, General.

GEN. ZORYA: Yesterday, I stopped at the questions connected with the

relations between the fascist conspirators and the Romanian aggressors.

It seems to me that now is the most opportune moment to read into the

Record the testimony of Ion Antonescu, which the Soviet Prosecution has

at its disposal.

The interrogation of Ion Antonescu was conducted in conformance with the

laws of the Soviet Union and I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number

USSR-153 (Document Number USSR-153) the record of his deposition, which

is of exceptional importance in making clear the characteristics of the

relationship between Germany and her satellites. I consider it necessary

to read the greater part of these depositions, beginning with the second

paragraph on Page 1 of the record. It corresponds to Pages 63 and 64 of

the document book. I quote:

“Throughout the entire period during which I held office in

Romania”—testifies Ion Antonescu—“I followed the policy of

strengthening the alliance with Germany and resorted to her help

for retraining and rearming the Romanian army. For this purpose

I had several meetings with Hitler. The first meeting with

Hitler took place in November 1940, soon after I became the head

of the Romanian State. This meeting took place on my initiative,

in Berlin, at Hitler’s official residence, in the presence of

the German Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, and Hitler’s personal

interpreter, Schmidt. The conversation with Hitler lasted over 4

hours.

“I assured Hitler that Romania remained true to the previously

concluded agreement regarding Romania’s adherence to the

Tripartite Pact.

“In reply to my assurances of loyalty to the pact with Germany,

Hitler declared that the German soldiers would guarantee the

frontiers of Romania.

“At the same time, Hitler told me that the Vienna arbitration

should not be considered as final and thus gave me to understand

that Romania could count on a revision of the decision

previously taken in Vienna, on the question of Transylvania.

“Hitler and I agreed that the German Military Mission in Romania

should continue its work of reconstructing the Romanian Army on

German lines.

“In the same way I also concluded an economic agreement, in

accordance with which the Germans would at a later date supply

Romania with Messerschmidts 109, tanks, tractors, antiaircraft

and antitank guns, automatic rifles, and other armaments, while

they, in return, would receive from Romania wheat and oil for

the needs of the German armies.

“To the question put to me as to whether this, my first

conversation with Hitler, could be regarded as the beginning of

my agreement with the Germans concerning the preparations for

war against the Soviet Union—I replied in the affirmative.

There is no doubt that Hitler had this fact in mind, when he

elaborated his plans for the attack on the Soviet Union.

“In January 1941, through the offices of the German Minister in

Romania, Fabricius, I was invited to Germany and had my second

meeting with Hitler at Berchtesgaden. The following persons were

present: Ribbentrop, Fabricius, and the newly appointed German

Minister to Bucharest, Killinger. Besides these, Field Marshal

Keitel and General Jodl were also present as representing the

German Armed Forces.

“At the beginning of the conversation Hitler introduced

Killinger to me, emphasizing that the latter was one of his

closest friends. After this, Hitler described the military

situation in the Balkans and declared that Mussolini had

appealed to him for help in connection with the Italian failures

in the war against Greece, and that he, Hitler, intended to give

this help to Italy.

“While on this subject Hitler asked me to allow the German

troops concentrated on Hungarian territory to pass through

Romania, so that they could render speedy assistance to the

Italians.

“Knowing that the passage of German troops through Romania to

the Balkans would constitute an unfriendly act towards the

Soviet Union, I asked Hitler what, in his opinion, would be the

subsequent reaction of the Soviet Government.

“Hitler reminded me that at our first meeting, in November 1940,

he had already given appropriate guarantees to Romania and had

taken upon himself the obligation of protecting Romania by force

of arms.

“I expressed my fears that the passage of German troops through

Romania might serve as a pretext for military operations on the

part of the Soviet Union, and that Romania would then be in a

difficult position since the Romanian Army had not been

mobilized.

“Hitler announced that he would give orders for some of the

German troops intended for participation in the operations

against Greece to be left in Romania. Hitler also stressed that,

according to the information at his disposal, the Soviet Union

did not intend to fight either Germany or Romania.

“Satisfied with Hitler’s declaration, I agreed to the passage of

German troops through Romanian territory.

“General Jodl, who was present at this conference, described to

me the strategic situation of the German Army and stressed the

necessity for an attack against Greece launched from Bulgaria.

“My third meeting with Hitler took place in Munich in May 1941.

“At this meeting at which, in addition to ourselves, there were

present Ribbentrop and Hitler’s personal interpreter, Schmidt,

we reached a final agreement with regard to a joint attack on

the Soviet Union.

“Hitler informed me that he had decided on an armed attack on

the Soviet Union. ‘Once we have prepared this attack,’ said

Hitler, ‘we must carry it out without warning, along the entire

extent of the Soviet frontier, from the Black to the Baltic

Seas.’

“The unexpectedness of the military attack—Hitler went on to

say—would in a short time give Germany and Romania a chance to

liquidate one of our most dangerous adversaries.

“As a result of his military plans, Hitler suggested the use of

Romanian territory for concentrations of German troops, and, at

the same time, he requested me to participate directly in the

attack on the Soviet Union.

“Hitler stressed the point that Romania must not remain outside

this war, for, if she wished to have Bessarabia and North

Bukovina returned to her, she had no other alternative but to

fight on Germany’s side. At the same time he pointed out that,

in return for our assistance in the war, Romania would be

allowed to occupy and administer other Soviet territories, right

up to the River Dnieper.

“Since Hitler’s offer to initiate a joint campaign against the

U.S.S.R. corresponded to my own aggressive intentions, I

announced my agreement to participate in the attack on the

Soviet Union and pledged myself to prepare the necessary number

of Romanian troops and, at the same time, to increase deliveries

of the oil and food required by the German armies.

“Before Hitler and I took the decision to attack Russia, I asked

Hitler whether he had any understanding with Hungary regarding

her participation in the war.

“Hitler replied that the Hungarians had already given their

consent to participate in the war against the U.S.S.R. in

alliance with Germany. When, exactly, the Germans had agreed on

this joint attack with the Hungarians, Hitler did not specify.

“On my return from Munich to Bucharest I began active

preparations for the coming campaign.”

Antonescu concludes his testimony in the following manner—I refer to

Page 67 in the document book, the last paragraph of the testimony.

“After the Romanian troops under my supreme command had invaded

the Soviet territory Hitler sent me a letter in which he

expressed his gratitude to me and to the Romanian army for the

assistance given.

“Signed, Marshal Antonescu.”

The date of the beginning of Romanian preparations for war against the

U.S.S.R. can be established from the depositions furnished by the former

Vice Minister, Mihai Antonescu, who was also interrogated by the Soviet

authorities upon the request of the Soviet Prosecution: I now submit his

testimony as Exhibit Number USSR-152 (Document Number USSR-152). I shall

not quote these depositions in detail since their greater part is a

repetition of some of the facts described already in the testimony of

Ion Antonescu. I shall only refer to a few paragraphs. I would refer you

to Page 1 of the testimony which is translated into Russian, Paragraphs

1, 2, and 5. This corresponds to Page 68 of the document book:

“In November 1940 Marshal Antonescu, accompanied by the then

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince Studza, left for Germany,

where he had a meeting with Hitler.

“During the negotiations with Hitler, Marshal Antonescu signed

the agreement for Romania’s adherence to the Tripartite Pact and

received Hitler’s promise for the later revision, in favor of

Romania, of the decisions of the Vienna Arbitration Treaty.

“The first journey of Marshal Antonescu was the initial step of

a policy which subsequently led to a joint German and Romanian

attack on the Soviet Union.”

Your Honors, the evidence of the witness, Paulus, as well as the

testimonies of Ion Antonescu and Mihai Antonescu, which have just been

submitted to the Tribunal, justify the Soviet Prosecution in making the

following statement:

1. The decision to send to Romania a military mission of the German

General Staff for the reorganization of the Romanian Army, in order to

prepare for and subsequently to attack the U.S.S.R., was taken no later

than September 1940, that is, no less than 9 months prior to the attack

on the U.S.S.R. 2. In November of the same year, Romanian war

preparations had been fully developed.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps that would be a good time to break off.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, at a further stage in my statement I had

intended presenting to the Tribunal a statement of General Buschenhagen,

general of the former German Army. I do not, however, intend to do so

now, since the Soviet Prosecution has the possibility of examining this

witness in court during the session. I, on my part, request your

permission to have this witness brought to the court for examination.

THE PRESIDENT: You wish to call him now?

GEN. ZORYA: Yes, that would be convenient, in view of several technical

reasons, and would facilitate the task of the Prosecution.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

[_The witness, Buschenhagen, took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

ERICH BUSCHENHAGEN (Witness): Erich Buschenhagen.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the

Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will

withhold and add nothing.”

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

GEN. ZORYA: Witness, will you tell the Tribunal when and where you were

born?

BUSCHENHAGEN: I was born on 8 December 1895 in Strasbourg, in Alsace.

GEN. ZORYA: Will you name your last military rank, please.

BUSCHENHAGEN: I was general in the infantry in the German Army. My last

position was that of Commanding General of the 52d Army Corps.

GEN. ZORYA: Will you tell us please, did you on 26 December 1945 appeal

to us with a statement in connection with the Helsinki trials?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.

GEN. ZORYA: Do you confirm this statement now?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I do.

GEN. ZORYA: Will you please tell us what you know about the preparations

made by fascist Germany for attacking the Soviet Union?

BUSCHENHAGEN: At the end of December 1940, in my position as Chief of

the General Staff of the German forces in Norway, I was called to the

OKH, where the then Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Halder,

had a conference with the chiefs of general staffs of the army groups

and of the independent armies, one of which was mine. At this conference

we were informed of the OKW’s Directive Number 21, the Plan Barbarossa,

which was issued on 18 December 1940. We were given in lectures the

basic reasons for the intended operations against Soviet Russia.

From this directive I learned that troops of my army also would take

part in this operation. Therefore, I was especially interested in one

speech made by the Chief of Staff of the Finnish Army, Lieutenant

General Heinrichs, who was then also with the OKH. He spoke at that time

about the military actions in the winter war between Finland and the

Soviet Union. He drew a picture of the methods of warfare and the

fighting value of the Soviet Army and also of the Finnish troops.

General Heinrichs also had conferences with Generaloberst Halder at that

time, in which I did not take part myself, but I assume that they were

concerned with possible co-operation between the Finnish and German

troops in case of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union. There

existed since the fall of 1940 a military co-operation between Germany

and Finland, and the German Air Force had made arrangements with the

Finnish General Staff for through traffic from northern Norway to the

Finnish harbors in the transport of men and material. As the result of

conferences, which the German military attaché had held in Helsinki by

order of the OKW, this through traffic was extended in the winter of

1940 to a general through traffic of the German Wehrmacht from northern

Norway to the Finnish Baltic seaports. In order to carry out this

traffic, a German Army administration center was set up in the main city

of Lapland, Rovanjemi, and a German army transport unit was transferred

to the Arctic Strait of Rovanjemi and Petsamo-Rovanjemi. Furthermore,

offices for supply were installed along this Arctic Sea route and along

the railroad which led from Rovanjemi to ports on the Finnish south

coast.

In December to January 1940-41, I had, with the OKW, discussions about

details of the participation of troops from Norway together with Finnish

troops in attacks against the Soviet Union.

GEN. ZORYA: Didn’t you also have conferences with the Finnish General

Staff about joint operations against the Soviet Union?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes, I did.

GEN. ZORYA: Tell us, who instructed you to negotiate with the Finnish

Government and what course did these negotiations follow?

BUSCHENHAGEN: I had orders and authorizations from the OKW, which was

the immediate superior of myself and my army. In February 1941 I

received—after the basic facts had been cleared in regard to the

participation of the troops from Norway based in Finland—I received the

order to travel to Helsinki and to get in touch there, personally, with

the Finnish General Staff and to discuss with them these operations from

middle and northern Finland.

On 18 February 1941 I reached Helsinki and on the 2 following days, I

had conferences with the Finnish Chief of General Staff, General

Heinrichs, his deputy, General Airo, and the Chief of the Operations

Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola. In these

conferences we discussed the possibilities for operations from middle

and northern Finland, especially from the area around Kuusamo and

Rovanjemi; also from the area of Petsamo. These conferences led to an

agreement of the different opinions.

After these conferences I travelled, together with the Chief of the

Operation Detachment of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, to

middle and northern Finland in order to study the area of

Urinsalmo-Kuusamo, the area east of Rovanjemi-Petsamo, the terrain, the

possibilities for deployment and billeting, and for operations from that

sector. For these reconnaissance trips the local Finnish commanders were

present. The trip ended on 28 February in Torneo, on the Finnish-Swedish

border. In a final conference it was determined that an operation from

the area of Kuusamo and Helsinki and an operation from the area east of

Rovanjemi in the direction of Basikamo would prove successful; that, on

the other hand, the operations from Petsamo towards Rovanjemi would have

considerable difficulty with the terrain. That was the end of my first

series of conferences with the Finnish General Staff.

As a result of these discussions there was worked out by the German High

Command of Norway a plan of operations for an operation from the Finnish

areas. The operational study was presented to the OKW and found its

approval. It then received through the High Command of Norway the name

of “Blaufuchs.”

In May, that is, on 24 May, I met the Finnish Chief of Staff Heinrichs,

who had been invited to the Führer’s headquarters at Brandenburg and

flew with him to Munich, where I had with him and his chief of the

Operational Department of the Finnish General Staff, Colonel Tapola, a

discussion in preparation for another conference at Salzburg.

On the 25th there was at Salzburg a conference between the OKW, Field

Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Jodl on the one side, and on the other,

Lieutenant General Heinrichs and Colonel Tapola, at which the basic

plans for co-operation between German and Finnish troops were laid down.

After this conference I travelled, together with General Heinrichs, to

Berlin. There we had further conferences at the Economic Armament Office

of the OKW, as to the delivery of material to the Finnish Army. There

were also conferences with the General Staff of the Air Force concerning

joint questions of the air war and the reinforcement of the Finnish Air

Force with matériel. General Heinrichs, after these discussions, also

had a meeting with Generaloberst Halder, in which I did not participate.

For the third time I met the Finnish General Staff on 2 June. In my

statement of 26 December I said that this conference took place at the

end of April or the beginning of May; that was a mistake. As a matter of

fact, it took place on 2 June.

At these conferences, which again took place between General Heinrichs,

General Halder, and Colonel Tapola, the details of this collaboration

were worked out, such as the timetable, the schedule, measures of

secrecy as to the Finnish mobilization; there it was decided that the

Finnish mobilization should first take the form of reinforcement of the

border patrols, and then the form of further enlistments for the

military training of reservists and reserve officers; a decision was

also reached about the deployment and formation of German-Finnish forces

in such a way that the main Finnish forces, under the command of Field

Marshal Mannerheim in the south, should operate together with the German

Army Group North, coming from East Prussia, in the direction of

Leningrad and also towards the east of Lake Ladoga.

The other Finnish forces were to be under the command of Generaloberst

Von Falkenhorst north of the Rivers Ulo and Ulojoki. For this army of

Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst there were three directions of attack; a

southern group from the area of Kuusamo through Kerskienski against the

Murmansk railroad; the middle group east of Rovanjemi through Salla

Kandalaksha and finally, a northern group starting from around Petsamo

against Murmansk. There was complete agreement on all these questions

and also there were details discussed about exchange of information,

about the use of Finnish means of transportation and by representatives

of the Air Force about joint questions of air warfare and about the use

of Finnish airports by the German Air Force.

After these discussions I returned to Germany in order to work out their

results and put them into action on behalf of Germany. Then again, on 12

or 13 July I flew to Helsinki for the purpose of conferring with

Lieutenant General Erfurt, who was the German liaison officer with the

Finnish Armed Forces. We met General Heinrichs at Helsinki and gave him

a memorandum on the points which we had agreed upon in previous

conferences. He agreed to these points, except for a minor detail. Then

I turned over my duties as liaison officer with the Finnish General

Staff to Lieutenant General Erfurt, to take up my activities as Chief of

General Staff of the German Army in Lapland.

GEN. ZORYA: I should like to ask you a last question. If it is not too

difficult for you, will you please indicate what was the exact character

of these preparations of the OKW and the Finnish General Staff? More

especially, at the planning of these operations was the necessity of

defense taken into consideration?

BUSCHENHAGEN: All agreements between the OKW and the Finnish General

Staff had as their sole purpose from the very beginning the

participation of the Finnish Army and the German troops on Finnish

territory in the aggressive war against the Soviet Union. There was no

doubt about that. If the Finnish General Staff, to the outside world,

always pointed out that all these measures had only the character of

defense measures, that was just camouflage. There was—from the very

beginning—no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that all these

preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union,

for all the preparations that we made pointed in that same direction,

namely, the plans for mobilization; above all, the objectives for the

attack. Nobody ever reckoned with the possibility of a Russian attack on

Finland.

Since, for cogent military reasons, the operations for attack from

Finnish territory could start only 8 to 10 days after the beginning of

the attack against Russia, certain security measures were taken during

and after the attack, but the whole formation and lining-up of the

troops was for offensive and not defensive purposes. I believe you can

see sufficiently from that the aggressive character of all these

preparations.

GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions to ask.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the French prosecutor wish to ask any questions?

FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the United States Prosecution wish to ask any

questions?

UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do defendants’ counsel wish to cross-examine?

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, in this Trial a group of people are under

indictment with the purpose of declaring them criminals. Included in

this group, to state it shortly, are all the commanders-in-chief of the

several parts of the Armed Forces.

Have you ever had any knowledge before the beginning of the attack

against the Soviet Union that an order came out, according to which the

captured commissars had to be executed?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you at any time speak to your commanding general,

Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst, concerning this order?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: What opinion did Generaloberst Von Falkenhorst and

yourself hold concerning this order?

BUSCHENHAGEN: That this was a criminal order.

DR. LATERNSER: Since you had that opinion, I would like to ask you

whether, within your army, this order was carried out?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Actually it was not carried out.

DR. LATERNSER: For what reasons was it not carried out? Perhaps because

the commander and his chief and you, Witness, were of the opinion that

this order should not be carried out or because it would not have been

practicable, for, as it is known, the Soviet commissars fought until the

last and fell and, in cases where they were captured, their papers,

which showed them to be commissars, had already been destroyed?

For what reason was this order not actually carried out?

BUSCHENHAGEN: Firstly, in view of the line taken by Generaloberst Von

Falkenhorst and myself, comments were added to it before it was passed

on, in other words, we let the troops know that inwardly we were not in

agreement with it—and we found our commanding generals to show a full

understanding. Secondly, because of the reason given by you, because, as

a matter of fact, not a single commissar fell into our hands, as far as

I can remember.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know any other commanders who had the

same attitude as you had with regard to this order?

BUSCHENHAGEN: No.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you answer “no” because you did not speak to others?

BUSCHENHAGEN: I did not speak to others because in Norway I was so

isolated from other armies that I had no opportunity of speaking to

others.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, aren’t you of the opinion that the great

majority of the commanding generals had the same attitude concerning

this order as you and your commanding general?

BUSCHENHAGEN: I cannot answer that because I cannot speak the minds of

the others.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any other defendants’ counsel wish to ask questions?

General, do you wish to ask any questions in re-examination?

GEN. ZORYA: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness will retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

GEN. ZORYA: This morning I had to stop before reading the testimony of

Pantazi, Romania’s former Minister of War, which I intend to present to

the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-154 (Document Number USSR-154).

Pantazi describes in detail the preparations of Romania for war. I would

ask you to accept this testimony as evidence. You will find it on Page

71 of the document book. I shall now read such extracts of this document

as are of interest to us:

“Romania’s preparations for war against the Soviet Union began

in November 1940 when, in accordance with the agreement signed

by Marshal Antonescu in Bucharest, regarding Romania’s adherence

to the Tripartite Pact, there arrived in Bucharest German

military missions, consisting of groups of German

officer-instructors; those for the army were headed by General

Hansen, those for the Air Force by Major General Speidel.

“With the arrival of the German military missions in Romania,

the Chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, General

Joanitiu, acting on the orders of Antonescu, issued an order to

the army, regarding the admission of German officer-instructors

into units and groups, for the purpose of reorganizing and

re-educating the Romanian forces in accordance with the code of

regulations of the German Army.

“At the same time, and still acting on Marshal Antonescu’s

orders, all reserve officers of the Romanian Army were called up

for a course of 2 months of retraining and underwent instruction

under German direction.

“During the period of the retraining of officers, the General

Staff of the Romanian Army drafted a plan for calling up into

the Army 12 age groups due for mobilization in case of war, the

training of all these groups to be carried out in accordance

with the demands of the code of regulations of the German Army,

to be completed by 1 July 1941.

“The higher Romanian officers underwent similar retraining in

their respective branches of the service.

“In this way, under German leadership and prior to the beginning

of the war by Germany and Romania against the Soviet Union, the

whole of the Romanian Army and Air Force were reorganized and

retrained along German lines.”

I shall omit two paragraphs which are of no importance and I pass to the

second paragraph, which you will find on Page 72 in the document book.

These are also depositions of Pantazi.

THE PRESIDENT: General, in view of the evidence which you have already

presented to the Tribunal, the Tribunal is inclined to think you could

omit these details of the preparations made in Romania and go on to the

place where you deal with the number of German divisions who deployed on

the Romanian frontier.

GEN. ZORYA: Yes, this question is of importance. I hesitate at present

to point out the exact passage which deals with it—it must be on Page

74 in the document book:

“In this connection the following units which were already

mobilized and ready for action against the Soviet Union were, in

February 1941, on Marshal Antonescu’s orders, directed to the

frontiers of North Bukovina and Bessarabia: The 4th Alpine Rifle

Division, the 7th, 8th, and 21st Infantry Divisions, the

Infantry Division of the Guards, a cavalry corps and another

infantry division whose name I do not recall at present. In

addition, 3 German divisions, selected from the 21 German

divisions moving to Greece across Romania, were sent to the

U.S.S.R. frontier.”

I omit several paragraphs. On Page 73 of your book of documents we find

the following extract from Pantazi’s testimony, marked in pencil:

“In accordance with instructions from Marshal Antonescu in May

1941, the following divisions were likewise sent to the

frontier: The Frontier Division, the 3rd and 1st Alpine Rifle

Divisions, the 13th Infantry Division, and a Panzer division.

Concurrently with these divisions the Germans transferred to the

U.S.S.R. frontier seven German divisions.

“Consequently, prior to the beginning of the Romanian and German

attack on the Soviet Union, there were concentrated on the

frontier between Romania and the U.S.S.R. 12 Romanian and 10

German divisions, totalling up to 600,000 men.”

Thus the documents which have just been submitted to the Tribunal

justify the assertion that Romania’s preparations for aggression against

the Soviet Union on the directions received from the staff of the

fascist conspirators had begun long before they found expression on

paper in Plan Barbarossa. Having attacked the Soviet Union, Hitler’s

lackeys expected gratitude from their masters for services rendered. On

27 July 1941 Hitler sent a letter addressed to Antonescu expressing

gratitude to him and to his army.

I submit to the Tribunal this letter from Hitler, addressed to Antonescu

as Exhibit Number USSR-237 (Document Number USSR-237). Hitler writes in

this letter—Page 1 of the Russian translation of the letter, Paragraph

3, Page 74 in the document book presented to the Tribunal:

“To congratulate you wholeheartedly on this great success is for

me personally as great a happiness as it is a satisfaction easy

to understand. The winning back of Bessarabia will be the most

natural reward for your effort and those of your gallant

troops.”

The promises of the fascist bosses were not limited to Bessarabia alone.

I beg for permission to return to the conversation of 12 February 1942,

between Antonescu and the Defendant Ribbentrop. This conversation is set

forth in a document which I presented as Exhibit Number USSR-233

(Document USSR-233). I am now referring to Paragraph 3 of the Russian

translation of this document—3rd paragraph from the top of this

page—which you will find on Page 61 of the document book. It consists

of the following entry made by Antonescu:

“I reminded Herr Von Ribbentrop that, at the banquet given by

him, he raised his glass to the happiness of a great Romania, to

which I replied that we have entered into an alliance with the

Axis in order to create a ‘Great Romania.’”

What, then, was this “Great Romania” to represent, to which the

Defendant Ribbentrop had raised his glass?

This can be seen from the document which I now submit to the Tribunal as

Exhibit Number USSR-242 (Document USSR-242). This document is one of

Antonescu’s letters—a copy of a letter—to Hitler, dated 17 August

1941. I request you to read this document into the record, and I

consider it necessary to read Paragraphs 2 and 4 from it, which

correspond to Page 2 of the Russian translation in the document book in

your possession. The corresponding text is on Page 78. I quote Paragraph

2. Antonescu writes:

“In compliance with the wish of Your Excellency, I take upon

myself the responsibility for guarding the territory between the

Rivers Dniester and Dnieper, for maintaining order there, and

for its security, in which connection it will only be necessary

to delineate a boundary to this territory on the north.”

Paragraph 4 of this letter:

“In order to maintain order and to control the economic

exploitation of the occupied territory, and foreseeing the

continuation of the war, I consider it absolutely necessary that

unity of command should be established.

“I therefore beg Your Excellency to give precise instructions

defining my rights and responsibilities for the administration

and economic exploitation of the territory between the Rivers

Dniester and Bug, as well as for the guarding, the maintenance

of order and the security of the whole territory between the

Rivers Dniester and Dnieper.

“I beg you, Your Excellency, to accept the best assurances from

your devoted Marshal Antonescu.”

Two days after this letter was written Antonescu appointed a governor of

the occupied regions of the Soviet Union, to which he gave the name of

the “Transnistrian” regions.

I present to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-295 (Document Number

USSR-295), the testimony of this “governor,” George Alexianu, who was

taken prisoner by the Red Army, and beg you to accept it as evidence.

Alexianu, giving details of his nomination, testifies as follows—Page

2, Paragraph 2, of the Russian text, Page 79 in the document book which

is in your possession. I quote:

“Antonescu said that, in connection with the successful advance

of the German Army, Hitler wrote him a personal letter in which

he offered to annex to Romania the Soviet territories extending

from the Dniester to the Dnieper which had been captured by the

German troops and to establish there their own occupational

authorities.”

On Page 80 of the document book at the top of Page 3 of the Russian text

of the testimony, Alexianu states that in the summer of 1942 he was

present at the Council of Romanian Ministers at which Marshal Antonescu,

referring to the successes of the German and the Romanian armies on the

Eastern Front, stated:

“It is now evident for us all that I acted rightly when, as

early as November 1940 I came to an agreement with Hitler on the

joint attack against the Soviet Union.”

However, the generosity of the fascist Führer, who gave Soviet

territories away, right and left, to his vassals, diminished noticeably

in the course of the war as the Red Army successes grew.

I have here before me one of Hitler’s letters to Ion Antonescu, dated 25

October 1943. I beg the Tribunal to accept it as evidence as Exhibit

Number USSR-240 (Document Number USSR-240). Something like 2 years and 3

months had passed since the moment when Hitler complimented his Romanian

satrap on the seizure of Bessarabia. Quite recently, Antonescu had still

been worrying over the question of organizing a “unified” administration

in Transnistria. Circumstances and conditions had altered. Hitler now

writes—I quote the second paragraph from the top of Page 1, which you

will find on Pages 82-83 of your document book:

“My further request concerns the essential exploitation of

Transnistria, that as a rear theater of operations for Army

Groups A and South it should not be hampered by any formal

juridical or economic considerations and difficulties. I must

further request you to put at the disposal of the German

authorities the entire network of the Transnistrian

railways. . . .”

As a poor consolation Hitler adds—Page 82 of the document book:

“All military measures . . . have, as their final aim, the

preservation of Transnistria for Romania.”

Then even Antonescu, who had so many times subserviently assured Hitler

of his submissiveness, reached the end of his endurance. On 15 November

1943 he wrote a lengthy reply to Hitler. In this letter Antonescu wrote

unrestrainedly how he fulfilled the will of his master at the expense of

his people.

I present Antonescu’s letter to Hitler as Exhibit Number USSR-239

(Document Number USSR-239). His letter is dated Bucharest, 15 November

1943. I quote, beginning with Paragraph 2 of this letter, towards the

end of Page 5 of the Russian text. It is on Page 88 of the document

book:

“As to the regime in Transnistria we agree with your Excellency

that it is neither opportune nor timely to examine in the spirit

of a banker the problem of this territory as a military zone, a

zone of supply, _et cetera_.

“I should like to begin by explaining the causes of my anxiety.

“I do not know whether the truth about the Romanian

participation in the war, from 1941 to the present moment, has

always been told you: That this war has cost Romania 300,000

million lei; that during this period we gave Germany more than 8

million tons of oil, thus threatening our own national stocks,

as well as the deposits themselves; that we are bearing heavy

expenses incurred in supporting the families of 250,000 men who

lost their lives in battle.”

Here I omit four paragraphs which have no bearing in the gist of the

matter and continue to read on Page 89 of the document book.

“Of course, the arrival of troops on the Transnistrian territory

is, as you say, a shield on the gates of Romania. Our only

desire is that all be in good order and utilized in the most

advantageous manner possible. . . .

“As regards the transfer of the Transnistrian railways into

German hands for the purpose of increasing transportation, I beg

Your Excellency to reconsider this question. In our opinion this

transfer is not necessary.

“Transnistrian railways, from 1941 to the present day,

functioned well under Romanian administration. They always

satisfied German demands and their management was always highly

appreciated.”

I request you to turn one page of the document book. I now read an

extract from Page 90 of the book:

“If the traffic capacity of the Transnistrian railways cannot

still be further increased in pursuance to the generally

established joint plan, we cannot bear any responsibility for

that fact. Here too we kept our obligations.”

And two paragraphs further on, the same page, the following statement is

made:

“I am sure that our railway administration could carry out the

measures necessary in order to increase the traffic capacity and

to improve the organization.

“As I personally was in charge of the organization of the

administration and economics of this region, it would be a great

mortification to me if the administration of the railways were

to pass to German hands, since one would justly say that our

incapacity in this respect was the reason for such measure.”

There came a moment in the relations between the two aggressors when the

former harmony, based on the seizure of foreign lands and wealth, gave

place to arguments on the question as to who should bear the great

financial responsibility for the losses suffered as a result of the

criminal adventure embarked upon by both partners.

This is revealed by the following document, captured from the personal

archives of Antonescu and which I intend to present to the honorable

Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-245 (Document Number USSR-245). I should

like to read a quotation from this document, which is lengthy but which

is very important in enabling us to realize the relationship between

fascist Germany and her satellites. This document is entitled, “General

Hansen’s Meeting with Marshal Antonescu on 7 July 1943.”

As Your Honors will no doubt remember, General Hansen was the head of

the German Military Mission of the German General Staff in Romania. I

shall read into the record excerpts from this document, underlined in

red pencil, on Pages 92 and 93 of the document book. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be possible for you to summarize these

documents with reference to Romania? Because you have already drawn our

attention to a considerable amount of evidence with reference to

Romania’s participation, General Antonescu’s statements and other

evidence of that sort. Possibly you would be able to go on then to the

question of the Hungarian participation—in Document Number USSR-294.

What you are reading us now really shows the extent, no doubt, of the

Romanian participation, but it is all after the aggression. I thought,

from looking at it, that you could possibly go on to USSR-294.

GEN. ZORYA: If the Tribunal wishes, I shall certainly do so.

THE PRESIDENT: I think it would save time and would not detract from the

case at all.

GEN. ZORYA: I shall summarize this document in a few sentences, and I

shall then pass on to the next document.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.