chauvinistic elements, as for instance, Pavelich’s Ustasha; the
Zbor, a movement headed by Ljoteč; the MFRO (the Macedonian
fascist movement), headed by Vanca Mihajlovič; and organized
them as terrorist organizations with headquarters in Berlin. On
the other hand, acting through their agents, Prince Paul,
Stojadinovič, Cvetkovič, and Ćincar-Marcovič, they attracted the
pan-Serbian centralists and turned them into a terrorist group
which, from the vantage points of governmental authority, was
‘peacefully’ to deliver Yugoslavia into slavery by adhering to
the Tripartite Pact.”
Further, the report emphasizes the fact that, while organizing numerous
branches of the Fifth Column, the Hitlerites continually gave newer and
more perfidious assurances about their ostensibly friendly intentions
with regard to Yugoslavia. This is discussed in Paragraph 3 on Page 5 of
the Russian text; our Document Number USSR-36. You will find this
passage, Your Honors, on Page 357 of the document book:
“3. At the time when both the Hitlerite Government and the Party
were so thoroughly and with such versatility preparing their
conspiracy to invade and occupy Yugoslavia, Hitler seized every
opportunity to declare to the whole world, on behalf of the same
Government, the same Party, and the whole of Germany, that
Yugoslavia could count on them as devoted friends.”
On 17 January 1938, that is, some weeks before the occupation of
Austria, Hitler had a meeting with the then Prime Minister of Yugoslavia
at which the Defendants Göring and Von Neurath were present. The
original document from which I shall quote certain passages was
submitted to the Tribunal as Document Number TC-92. The extract which I
shall quote further on as documentary evidence, is dated 4 December
1945. You will find it on Page 411 of the document book.
On 4 December 1945 a printed collection of German documents dealing with
the conflict with Yugoslavia and Greece was offered to you in evidence.
In the listing of documentary evidence it is referred to as Document
Number TC-92.
On Page 68—and you will find it as I have already stated on Page 411 in
your document book, as Document Number 28 of that collection—we have a
transcript of the conversations which took place during the conference
of 17 January 1938. I consider there is no need to read the entire
document into the record. I shall limit myself to the following three
remarks made by Hitler on that occasion, “As regards Yugoslavia, Germany
is highly interested in the existence of a strong Yugoslavia.” Somewhat
later in the course of the same conversation Hitler spoke the second
sentence, “Whatever may happen there, Yugoslavia’s present boundary will
remain as inviolable as the border on the Brenner is today.” In addition
Hitler, at this meeting, made the following statement, “. . . the German
nationality group in Yugoslavia was loyal to the Yugoslav
Government. . . .”
On 30 January 1939, some weeks before the occupation of the Czechoslovak
Republic, Hitler made the following declaration about Yugoslavia in his
speech before the Reichstag—this quotation is to be found on Page 412
in your document book:
“. . . a state which since the Great War has more and more
attracted the attention of our people, in Yugoslavia. The
respect which the German soldier felt for that valiant people in
the past, has grown ever stronger and developed into sincere
friendship. . . .”
The fascist conspirators considered it useful to include this speech as
Document Number 32 in the book from which I just have quoted and
presented to the Tribunal as Document Number TC-92.
On 1 June 1939, that is, before the fascist attack on Poland, Prince
Paul of Yugoslavia, whom the official report of the Yugoslav Government
calls a Hitlerite agent, paid a visit to Hitler. On this occasion,
Hitler stated in Berlin—you will find the passage on Page 413 in your
document book:
“. . . Germany’s friendship with the Yugoslav nation did not
spring up suddenly. It was deepened and strengthened by the
tragic complications of the World War.”
Then, after having made a few more statements which are of no interest
to the Tribunal, he continued:
“I am all the more confident that now when, as a result of the
historic events, we have become neighbors with common frontiers
established forever, the friendly relations between Germany and
Yugoslavia, trustful and steadfast, will not only secure lasting
peace between both our peoples and countries, but moreover will
serve as a calming element for our nervous, excitable
continent.”
I repeat once more that I quote from the book, Document Number TC-92.
In his next customary speech after the defeat of Poland, before the
Reichstag on 6 October, Hitler reassured Yugoslavia of his love of peace
and of his friendly attitude in the following words:
“. . . after the annexation had taken place, I assured
Yugoslavia in the same manner that her frontier with this
country shall be regarded as inviolable by Germany from this
moment on, and that we want to live in peace and friendship with
her. . . .”
I am now going to read into the record a few paragraphs from
Subparagraph 2 on the first section of the report of the Yugoslav State
Commission for the investigation of the crimes perpetrated by the
aggressors. The excerpts in question begin with Paragraph 3, on Page 6
of Exhibit Number USSR-36 (Document Number USSR-36). In your document
book it is Volume I, Section I.
Thus, Hitler regularly gave assurances about friendly relations with
Yugoslavia and about the inviolability of her boundaries while, at the
same time, his band of conspirators and enslavers were already
tightening the ring of war around Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia was
completely surrounded by Hitler’s Panzer divisions, and when the
government of the Centralist Fifth Column of Prince Paul, Cvetovič, and
Maček was ready to join the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941, that is,
10 days before the attack on Yugoslavia, the Defendant Ribbentrop stated
as follows—on Page 413 of your document book you will find it, in
Document Number 2450-PS:
“Germany herself—and I solemnly state this—has neither
territorial nor political interests in this region.”
The Tribunal has already been handed a certified extract from Document
Number 72 of the above-mentioned German book.
An official note from the Reich Government of the same date reads as
follows—you will find this on Page 415 of the document book:
“Mr. Prime Minister: On behalf and on the direction of the
German Government, I have the honor to report to Your Excellency
as follows:
“In connection with today’s adherence of Yugoslavia to the
Tripartite Pact, the German Government affirms its resolution to
respect at all times the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Yugoslavia. . . .
“Signed, Joachim von Ribbentrop.”
The culminating point in the execution of the breach of faith so
cunningly prepared by the fascists is the following statement made by
Hitler on 6 April 1941, that is, at the moment when the perfidious and
treacherous attack on Yugoslavia had already begun. It is under Document
Number TC-92 in your book of documents, on Page 414:
“The German people feel no hatred towards the Serbian people.
Above all, the German people see no reason to start a war
against the Croats and Slovenes; they want nothing from these
peoples.”
Certified excerpts have been handed to the Tribunal from the documents
of the German book already quoted on Pages 1 and 4.
At the same time when he was speaking in this manner, the occupation,
annexation, and dismemberment of the Yugoslav State was already taking
place. Soon after began the bombing of undefended cities, towns, and
settlements; forcible evictions; deportations to camps; punitive
expeditions; and hundreds of other acts that were a part of the planned
extermination of the Yugoslav people, which resulted in the death of
1,650,000 Yugoslav men, women, and children.
On the question of the preparation for the attack on Yugoslavia and the
individuals who directly supervised this crime, we have at our disposal
two very valuable pieces of evidence.
The first is the original affidavit of the German General Löhr. Prior to
and at the time of the aggression against Yugoslavia, he was in command
of the 4th Air Fleet. It was precisely his air units which carried out
the raids on Belgrade. He is undoubtedly a man well acquainted with the
course of operations and its leaders.
On 24 May 1945 General Löhr was taken prisoner by the Yugoslav forces.
During interrogations to which he was subjected between 24 May and 6
June 1945 he states—you will find the respective excerpts on Page 416,
as excerpts from our Document Number USSR-253 (Exhibit Number USSR-253).
We submit the originals of these excerpts to the Tribunal:
“I and my staff went on March 26 to Sofia as the campaign
against Greece was about to begin.
“On the following day, 27 March 1941, the _coup d’état_ took
place in Yugoslavia. I was called unexpectedly to Berlin, where
I received orders from Reich Marshal Göring to prepare for air
operations against Yugoslavia. . . .
“After this, preparations against Yugoslavia were begun. At my
first meeting with Göring I was not told of the date of the
beginning of the war against Yugoslavia. At Vienna, I received a
written order in which the beginning of the operations was fixed
for 6 April.”
Passing over the rest of the statement, I proceed to read into the
record excerpts from the minutes of the interrogation of the former
Field Marshal of the German Army, Friedrich Paulus. In accordance with
the wish of the Tribunal, we submit the original of this interrogation.
Friedrich Paulus was interrogated on 12 January 1946 by the Chief
Prosecutors of the U.S.S.R. His testimony is registered with us as
Exhibit Number USSR-182 (Document Number USSR-182). You will find the
passage quoted on Page 419 of your document book. My colleagues of the
Soviet Delegation will probably revert to this document when dealing
with subsequent matters. I shall therefore merely quote that part which
refers to the preparations for the attack on Yugoslavia.
“It was clear to both German and Hungarian officers that these
military preparations must have been based on the preparation of
military collaboration between Germany and Hungary.”
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal understand that the first
interrogatory to which you refer—General Löhr’s—which is contained in
Document Number USSR-253, is an official document?
COL. POKROVSKY: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The official document of your Government. The other
interrogatory to which you refer, of Field Marshal Paulus, is not an
official document, is it?
COL. POKROVSKY: The minutes of the interrogation of Field Marshal Paulus
have been compiled in compliance with all legal standards of procedure
applying to such interrogations by judicial organizations in the
U.S.S.R. He is interrogated as a witness with the warning that he must
tell the truth, in accordance with Articles 95 and 92 of our penal code.
These documents, in the U.S.S.R., are considered as absolutely official
documents, of full probative value, to be submitted to the Tribunal when
necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us where the interrogatory was made?
COL. POKROVSKY: Paulus was interrogated in person in Moscow, on 12
January 1946. This, Sir, must have been pointed out at the beginning of
the interrogation.
THE PRESIDENT: The date is on the document, but not the place. Go on,
Colonel.
COL. POKROVSKY: With your permission, I shall continue my quotation from
the minutes of the interrogation of Field Marshal Paulus, submitted to
you:
“It was clear to the Hungarians that Germany’s assistance was in
order to prepare the Hungarian Army in good time and in advance
for future combined military operations, thus incorporating an
ally into its ranks.
“With the later attack on Yugoslavia, which followed this, there
was no need for special explanations as to the object of these
military preparations.
“It was clear that armed forces were being made ready for war
with the U.S.S.R., as the attack on Yugoslavia was part of the
operational plan for the attack on the U.S.S.R.
“With the defeat of Yugoslavia, the right flank, which was to be
formed at the beginning of military operations against Russia,
was secured.”
I shall leave out one paragraph which deals with another subject, and
continue to quote:
“The preparation of the combined German-Hungarian attack on
Yugoslavia was entrusted to me. On 27 or 28 March 1941 I was
called before Hitler at the Reich Chancellery where, besides
Hitler, Keitel, Jodl, Halder, and Brauchitsch were present.
Halder met me with the following words:
“‘The Führer has decided to attack Yugoslavia in order to
eliminate the threat to the flank during the offensive against
Greece and to seize the main Belgrade-Nish railway line which
runs in a southerly direction. But the main objective of the
attack on Yugoslavia is to have our right flank secure when
later on the Plan Barbarossa shall be carried out.
“‘Your task is to go to Vienna immediately in my special train,
and to transmit the orders and explain the situation to Field
Marshal List (12th Army Group), General Von Kleist (Panzer
group), and Colonel Von Witzleben (Chief of Staff of the 2d
Army), who have been called there.
“‘From Vienna, you are to proceed to Budapest and there to
co-ordinate with the Hungarian General Staff the strategic
employment of the German forces on Hungarian territory and the
participation of the Hungarian forces in the invasion of
Yugoslavia.’”
The participation of Hitlerite generals of the very highest rank in the
treacherous attack on Yugoslavia simply does not fit, in any way at all,
into the execution of purely military tasks only.
I shall read one more document into the records, Document Number
1195-PS. You will find it in your document book on Page 423.
On 9 January 1946 four lines were read here from the second section. The
time has now come to read it in full:
“Copy. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, Operational Staff,
Section L, (IV/QU), Number 00630/41; top secret, commanders
only; Führer’s headquarters, 12. 4. 1941.
“Reference: OKW/L, (IV/QU), Number 4434/41; top secret,
commanders only, of 3 April 1941.
“Provisional Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.
“I. The Führer has issued the following directions for the
partition of Yugoslavia:
“1) Former territory of Styria and Carniola.
“The territory of the former Styria, extended to the south by a
strip of about 90 kilometers in breadth and 10 to 15 kilometers
in depth, will go to Gau Styria.
“The northern part of Carniola, with a borderline running south
only as far as the river Sava but north of Ljubljana, according
to the attached OKH map, is to become part of Carinthia.
“The High Command of the Army (OKH) is to hand over the
territory occupied by the German troops, to the competent
Gauleiter, subarea by subarea, as soon as the pacification of
the country permits.
“The handing over of the territory occupied by the Italians will
be prepared by a letter from the Führer to the Duce and carried
out under direct orders from the Foreign Office. Until that time
no measures whatever are to be taken on the German side.
(Teletype OKH-General Quartermaster, Abt. Kr. Verw., A., Ob.
Kdo. 2 I, Number 801/41, top secret, is hereby executed.)
“2) The territory beyond the River Mur (Übermur-Gebiet).
“The territory beyond the River Mur borders closely upon
Hungary, conforming with the historic boundary. A later
colonization of the German population living in the northwestern
part of this territory has been taken into consideration. The
handing over of this territory to the Hungarians will be
regulated by the High Command of the Army.
“3) Banat.
“The territory from the point where the River Drava cuts the
Hungarian boundary to the confluence of the River Tisa with the
Danube is to go to Hungary. The territory east of the Tisa will
be at first under German protection, as will the territory south
of the Danube and east of the general line: confluence of the
River Morava and the
Danube-Pozarevac-Petrovac-Boljavac-Knjazevac-Kalna. This
territory includes the Bor copper mines and the adjoining coal
district in the southeast. The above line is considered as the
basis and provisional demarcation line. At first, German
military government is to be established under the High Command
of the Army.
“4) Southern Serbia.
“The territory inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians goes to
Bulgaria, in conformity with the ethnographical boundary.
Preliminary delimitation of the frontier, from the military
viewpoint, will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the
Army, which will prepare the handing over to Bulgaria.
“5) Old Serbia.
“The territory of old Serbia will be placed under German
military administration under the High Command of the Army.
“6) Croatia.
“Croatia becomes an independent state within its ethnographical
boundaries. There will be no interference on the part of Germany
with its internal policy.
“7) Remaining territories including Bosnia and Montenegro.
“The political organization of these territories will be left to
Italy. Here also the restoration of an independent state of
Montenegro can be considered.
“II. The Demarcation of Boundaries:
“1) As far as the demarcation of boundaries has not been laid
down in Part I, it will be carried out through the Supreme
Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign
Office, the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, and the
Reich Minister of the Interior.
“The Operational Staff of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (L IV
QU) is the executive organ for the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces.
“2) The High Command of the Army will forward as soon as
possible to the Operational Staff, Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces its military recommendations relative to the drawing up
of boundaries outside the territory of the protectorate south of
the Danube, where this has not been already laid down by the
Führer.
“3) The War Economic and Armament Office of the OKW will forward
as soon as possible to the Operational Staff (Section L) its
recommendations regarding the boundaries of the territory of the
protectorate south of the Danube (Part I, Paragraph 3).
“4) As far as the Italians are concerned, the tactical
boundaries between the armies hold good in the meantime.
“Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, signed,
Keitel.”
This document, signed by the Defendant Keitel, smashes to pieces the
mendacious statement of the nonparticipation of the OKW in the political
side of the fascist plan or conspiracy. The German generals, as a body,
were not merely an obedient tool in Hitler’s hands.
The OKW, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and the Gestapo were
interwoven into one sole entity. This is also borne out by the next
document.
General Nedič, ex-Prime Minister of the quisling Yugoslav Government, in
his depositions gives some interesting information on this question.
Before reading into the record a few excerpts from his depositions, I
must say a few words concerning four Germans, whom Nedič mentions by
name. He speaks of Kraus, Turner, Kiesel, and Kronholz.
Dr. Kraus was chief of the Gestapo South East, with central offices in
Belgrade. Dr. Turner was chief of staff of the civil administration
department attached to the German Military Command in Serbia. Dr. Kiesel
was Dr. Turner’s deputy. Kronholz held no official post. He had lived in
Yugoslavia even before the war and was director of the German transport
firm Schenker A.G. Subsequently he turned out to be an important German
intelligence agent. This information is certified by the Yugoslav
Extraordinary Commission for the investigation of German atrocities.
After this explanation, I shall read into the record a short excerpt
from the evidence of the Serbian quisling, General Nedič. A true copy of
the interrogation or rather excerpts from his minutes are registered by
us as Document Number USSR-288. I am able to submit to you now, for your
perusal, the original of these minutes with Nedič’s signature.
Unfortunately I am not in a position to leave it with you in its
entirety because it refers to a case concerning Yugoslavia which has not
yet been finished, but I can hand it to you for perusal by the Tribunal,
while the certified excerpts remain with us as evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal understand that you wish
to put this document in as evidence and then to withdraw it for the
purpose of its being used in some other cases; is that right?
COL. POKROVSKY: I should like to submit to you as evidence in this case,
the excerpts from the minutes, duly certified by the Yugoslav
Extraordinary Commission, in order that the minutes now in your hands,
that is—the original minutes—may be returned to Belgrade where they
will be presented as a document needed in another case which is still
under investigation. I would therefore request you to keep a copy for
the Tribunal after you have satisfied yourselves that this copy tallies
with the original.
THE PRESIDENT: Well then, if that is so, we must ask you to deposit with
this Tribunal a photostatic copy of this document, because, of course,
all the documents or photostatic copies which are put in evidence must
be deposited with the General Secretary of this Tribunal. So, if you
will undertake to have a photostatic copy made of this document and left
with the General Secretary, I think the Tribunal is agreed that you may
do so, that you may use this document.
COL. POKROVSKY: Will the Tribunal be satisfied with the certified
photostatic copy, in addition to the certified excerpts and a
photostatic copy of the part which I am about to quote?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you.
“I came to know Kronholz during the occupation period, before I
became Prime Minister. As far as I can remember, he was brought
to me by the Chief of the Gestapo, Dr. Kraus. . . . Then
Kronholz insisted that I should accept the proposed post.
“Turner received me in the presence of Dr. Kiesel and said that
he authorized me, through General Dankelmann, the German
military commander in Serbia, to form an authoritarian
government. . . .
“Almost simultaneously with the creation of my government, the
Germans established contact with a group of Chetniks under the
command of Pečanač, who had until then been hiding in the
forests. The contact was also established through the Chief of
the Gestapo, Dr. Kraus. Shortly after this, Pečanač arrived in
Belgrade, called to see me, and offered his services. That is
how my government came to form its first armed units.”
A little farther on, in the same minutes, we find the following record
of Nedič’s testimonies:
“As soon as the formation of my government had been proclaimed
at the beginning of September 1941, a delegation with authority
from Draga Michailovič called on me to start negotiations.”
Nedič enumerates the terms, which are of no interest to us, and then
says:
“I, for my part, accepted all these terms and offers. Draga
Michailovič received money and the Germans permitted this.”
This is the end of the quotation.
Still another part of this record seems of importance to me; it concerns
Nedič’s visit to Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop. Nedič stated:
“I noticed that at the meeting with the Defendant Ribbentrop, a
demand was made that I should place all the spiritual and
material resources of Serbia at the disposal of the German Reich
for the continuation of the war.”
Speaking of this meeting with Hitler, Nedič stated:
“He shouted at me, emphasizing that the order concerning 100 for
one not only would have to be altered, but that it should have
been increased to 1000 for one. He added also that he was
prepared to exterminate the entire population if the Serbians
continued to act like rebels.”
The head of fascist Germany wished to control the Slav countries as if
they were his own patrimony. Here he was helped by generals, diplomats,
industrialists, and intelligence officers. All the acts of aggression
were prepared and realized with their direct participation.
I repeat: The German generals as a body were not merely an obedient tool
in Hitler’s hands. The Defendants Keitel, Jodl, and Göring personally
participated in the planning, preparation, and realization of crimes
against peoples and states.
Document 1195-PS added yet another proof in the establishment of this
fact. The above named defendants, together with Neurath, Frick,
Schirach, Frank, Seyss-Inquart, and Ribbentrop, are directly guilty of
the very grave crimes which I reported to the Tribunal.
National Socialism cannot be separated from the idea of war. This is
acknowledged by the Hitler slaves themselves.
In other words, Hitlerism and aggressive war are one and the same thing.
And if wars are not always planned by military leaders only, it is
always they who conduct them. The responsibility for aggression, for
aggressive war, for the death of millions, for bestialities, for the
destruction of cultural treasures and material wealth, must be borne by
all the major war criminals now sitting in the dock.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I would like to ask the Tribunal for a ruling
as to a general question of submission of evidence. The Russian
Delegation has submitted books which contain statements by generals and
statesmen, without these statements being accompanied by an official
remark by the Soviet authorities.
The documents which have been given to me today—USSR-149, 150, and
294—are only photostats of handwritten manuscripts. They contain
neither a remark which could qualify them as affidavits, nor do they
represent testimonies taken before a Soviet official or officer, nor do
they represent governmental or official declarations.
I should be grateful to the Tribunal if it would make a decision on this
question in accordance with Article 21 of the Charter. The opinion of
the Defense Counsel is that such statements have only the value of a
personal presentation by the Prosecution but no probative value.
THE PRESIDENT: May I see the documents?
[_The documents were presented to the Tribunal._]
The Tribunal have no objection to the course taken by Dr. Nelte in
drawing their attention to these documents at this stage. But they think
it will be better for them to wait until the documents are actually
offered in evidence before they consider whether or not they will admit
them. If and when the documents are offered in evidence, they will then
consider whether they will admit them or not.
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal, I wish to present
Major General Zorya, State Councillor of Justice of the 3rd Class, who
will present the materials on the following theme of “Aggression against
the Soviet Union.”
DR. LATERNSER: I should like to point out that the decision of the
Tribunal, that every defendant’s counsel should receive, sufficiently in
advance, a copy of all documents which are to be submitted as evidence
in the course of the proceedings, has not been complied with. It is,
therefore, difficult for the Defense to follow the proceedings because
the documents submitted have not been distributed in sufficient
quantity.
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think the Tribunal have ever imposed upon the
Prosecution the duty of supplying a copy of every document to every
member of defendants’ counsel.
You no doubt have before you a copy of the Tribunal’s order upon the
subject, and I believe that the order is posted upon the board in the
defendants’ Information Center. If I remember correctly, it is that a
certain number of originals or photostatic copies shall be deposited in
the Information Center, and that a certain number of copies of the
documents shall be supplied to the defendants’ counsel, and that, for
the rest, the defendants’ counsel must rely upon the fact that every
document or part of a document which is put in evidence is read in open
court and, therefore, comes through the earphones to defendants’ counsel
and will appear in the shorthand notes. We have provided that copies of
the shorthand notes shall be supplied to defendants’ counsel as soon as
possible after the day on which the evidence is given. Beyond that we
have not thought it right to impose a duty upon the Prosecution to
supply documents to the defendants’ counsel.
Is that not in accordance with your recollection?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, the American Prosecution, the British
Prosecution, and also the French Prosecution, in the course of the
proceedings, handled this in such a way that enough copies of all
documents were made available to the Defense for each defendant’s
counsel to have one copy before him. I believe that what is possible for
the other Prosecution should also be possible for the Soviet
Prosecution, in order to facilitate the work.
THE PRESIDENT: That is a belief on your part which is not strictly in
accordance with the Tribunal’s orders. The Tribunal has not made that
order, and it may be that the United States and Great Britain have gone
beyond the Tribunal’s orders, and have supplied a copy to each
defendant’s counsel. But, as I say, the Tribunal has not as yet seen fit
to impose that duty upon the Prosecution.
I suppose you don’t really know exactly how many copies of these Soviet
documents have been deposited in the Information Center?
DR. LATERNSER: I don’t know the exact number. At any rate, there were
not enough for each defendant’s counsel to get a copy of each document,
as was the case, so far, with the other Prosecutions.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you no doubt understand the very great difficulties
of making translations and making copies. I am sure that the Soviet
prosecutors will do everything in their power to assist defendants’
counsel, but, as I say, we have not imposed upon the Prosecution the
duty of supplying one copy of a translation into German of each document
for each defendants’ counsel. I can only express the hope that the
Soviet prosecutors will do the best they can.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I remember, when the fact became known
that the press had received 250 copies of the documents, you, Mr.
President, expressed the opinion that it should then also be possible to
distribute 25 copies to the defendants’ counsel. That was, at that time,
the opinion of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal’s orders on this subject are in writing and
you will find them in the defendants’ Information Center. I have stated
my recollection of them; if I am wrong, you can bring me a copy of the
document and I will withdraw my statement.
MAJOR GENERAL N. D. ZORYA (Assistant Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): May
it please Your Honors, it is my task to present the documentary evidence
dealing with the aggression against the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, organized by the fascist war criminals now sitting in the
dock.
This charge of the crime, mentioned in Subparagraph a, Article VI of the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, was formulated in
Paragraph 6, Section 4, Count One of the Indictment in the present case,
and in Section IV of the opening statement by the Chief Prosecutor from
the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.
Among the many criminal wars which German fascism, with predatory aim,
waged against the freedom-loving nations, the attack on the Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republics occupies a place by itself.
It can be safely said that the predatory war against the Soviet Union
was the keynote of the entire fascist conspiracy against peace. The
aggressive actions on the part of German fascism committed prior to the
attack on the U.S.S.R., and in part the German aggression against
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, were, as has been demonstrated
by my colleague, Colonel Pokrovsky, merely stages on the road to the
attack on the Soviet Union.
Ukrainian wheat and coal from the Don Basin, nickel from the Kola
Peninsula, and oil from the Caucasus, the fertile steppes of the
pre-Volga region and the forests of Bielorussia all played a decisive
part in the criminal schemes of the fascist aggressors.
The war against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was also
waged by fascist Germany with the intent of enslaving and exploiting the
Soviet peoples.
In the war of fascist Germany against the Soviet Union, the animal
hatred of the Hitlerites against the Slav peoples found its full
horrifying expression.
And finally, German imperialism, appearing in its fascist edition, saw
in the seizure of the wealth of the Soviet Union and in its incalculable
resources of food and raw materials a base for the realization of their
far-reaching aggressive aims to achieve, first, ascendancy over Europe,
and, later on, ascendancy over the whole world.
The well-known formula of German imperialism, “Drang nach Osten,”
mentioned in the opening statement of the Chief Prosecutor of the
U.S.S.R., was at different times and in many different ways disguised by
the fascist criminals, but always, in all their aggressive plans, pride
of place was given to the attack on the Soviet Union.
“If new territory is desired”—wrote Hitler in his book, _Mein
Kampf_—“in substance it can be secured at the expense of
Russia. The new empire must move along the paths trodden by the
knights of old.” (Hitler, Adolf, _Mein Kampf_, Munich edition,
1930, Page 742.)
The fact that having definitely brought fascist aggression to a head in
1939, Hitler began the war in the West, did not substantially change
anything in this basic conception of fascism.
Under Document Number 789-PS the United States Prosecution submitted to
the Tribunal the transcript of the conference held on 23 November 1939
between Hitler and the members of the German Supreme Command.
At this conference, Hitler, according to his own expression, gave a
“survey of the thoughts dominating him in connection with the events to
come.”
In the course of this survey he declared—you will find the passage I am
now reading on Page 3 in the document book lying on the table of the
Tribunal, Page 2 of the Russian text:
“For a long time I hesitated whether I should not begin with an
attack in the East, and only then with the one in the West. It
came about by force of events that for the nearest future the
East dropped out of the picture.”
This statement by Hitler bore witness to the fact that the attack on the
Soviet Union remained within the plans of fascist aggression, and the
whole question was reduced only to the problem of selecting the most
favorable moment for this attack.
It should be noted that this western version of the start of fascist
aggression was not considered as the most favorable version by the
authors of the aggression.
This same Hitler, exactly 5 months prior to the above-mentioned
conference, at another conference of 23 May 1939 (Document Number L-79),
while briefing his accomplices on the present situation and political
aims, had said—the passage I am now quoting is Page 6 of the document
book, “If fate forces us into a conflict with the West, it would be
desirable that we, by that time, possess more expanse in the East.”
The vast expanses in the East, according to the aspirations of Hitler’s
conspirators, were to play a decisive part during the conflict in the
West.
Therefore, when the fascist hordes were unable to force the Channel,
stopped at its shores, and were obliged to find new ways of aggression,
the conspirators immediately began to prepare for an attack on the
Soviet Union. This attack was the basis of all their plans of
aggression, without which they could not be realized.
I believe it is not necessary to refer to documents of an earlier
period, and particularly to quote any further from Hitler’s book, _Mein
Kampf_, where questions connected with the predatory attack on the
Soviet Union were formulated long before 1939.
This book has already been presented to the Tribunal, and relevant
passages from it were quoted as evidence by our United States and
British colleagues.
The Soviet Prosecution desires to submit to the Tribunal a series of
documents which bear witness to the fact that the aggression of fascist
Germany against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was committed
with malice aforethought.
Among these documents there are files from various archives captured by
units of the advancing Red Army, statements by fascist leaders published
in the press, including those by several of the defendants, and
depositions by persons who were in possession of reliable information as
to how the preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were actually
carried out.
The documents of the Soviet Prosecution are presented under the
following sections:
1. Preparations for war in Germany itself. 2. Assuring the security of
the preparations for war by the intelligence activities. 3. The securing
by the fascist conspirators of the participation of the satellite
countries in the aggression against the Soviet Union.
I shall begin with Section 1, which I shall call, “Preparations for War
in Germany Herself.”
The statements of Hitler and his accomplices demonstrate that the idea
of a criminal attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had for
a long time been ripe in the minds of the fascist conspirators. But
apart from this fact, we are also interested in the question as to when
this intention began to take on the concrete form of direct military
preparations for the predatory war against the Soviet Union.
On 18 December 1940 the directive known to the Tribunal as directive
Number 21, Plan Barbarossa—the document of the United States
Prosecution numbered 446-PS—was put into its official form. The moment
when the signature of the Supreme Command appears on such a document is
the moment which crowns long and intensive work by all who formed the
links in the chain of military administration.
This work may not have been governed by written orders. The secrecy
camouflaging this work often made it necessary to have recourse to
verbal orders. And, on the other hand, many orders of a routine nature,
on the strength of an already existing strategic project, became
correlated, although outwardly they seemed to have no connection with
it.
It therefore appears that, with regard to establishing the actual moment
at which military plans for the attack on the Soviet Union began. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: General Zorya, the Tribunal observes that you are about
to read a deposition of General Warlimont, who, the Tribunal
understands, is in Nuremberg, and the Tribunal considers that, in
accordance with the order that it made the other day in another case, in
the case of another deposition, that if the defendants’ counsel desired,
and you wish to use this deposition, you ought to be prepared to allow
General Warlimont to be submitted to the defendants’ counsel for
cross-examination.
GEN. ZORYA: I am about to read into the record an extract from the
interrogation of General Warlimont. This interrogation was carried out
by General Alexandrov of the Soviet Prosecution, and if the Defense
desires to call General Warlimont for cross-examination here before the
Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution will do its utmost to satisfy this
request.
THE PRESIDENT: That is, of course, on the supposition that I am right to
saying that General Warlimont is in Nuremberg—available in Nuremberg.
Go on.
GEN. ZORYA: I am definitely of the opinion that it would be useful, when
establishing the actual moment of the beginning of military operations
for the attack on the Soviet Union, to resort not to documents only—for
not everything is always put down in writing—but to revert to the
testimony of people who participated directly in the realization of
these preparations.
I should now like to pass on to those depositions of Walter Warlimont
which you, Mr. President, have just mentioned. These depositions were
given by Warlimont on 13 November 1945. I am presenting them as evidence
under Document Number USSR-263.
Walter Warlimont, as is known, was the Chief of the Department of
National Defense in the OKW, and later Deputy Chief of the Operational
Staff.
I shall read into the Record that part of his deposition which touches
on the question before us. I ask you to turn to Page 2 of the Russian
text of this document, which is on Page 20 in the bundle of documents
presented by the Russian Prosecution on the question, and the answers to
questions put to Warlimont:
“Personally, I first heard of this plan”—that is Plan
Barbarossa—“on 29 July 1940. On that day General Jodl arrived
in a special train at Bad Reichenhall, where Department ‘L’ of
the Operational Staff was stationed. Hitler was in
Berchtesgaden. This struck us immediately, because General Jodl
had, till then, hardly ever, I believe, come to see us. Besides
myself, the three other senior officers were ordered to be
present.”
I now skip several lines and pass on to Page 3 of the minutes of
Warlimont’s interrogation; this will be Page 21 in the bundle of
documents:
“I cannot repeat his statements verbatim. The meaning was as
follows: Jodl said that the Führer had decided to prepare for
war against Russia. The Führer justified this by saying that war
had to come one way or another, so that it would be better to
prosecute this war in connection with the one already being
fought, and, in any case, to start the necessary preparations
for it.”
I skip several lines which are not relevant to the question we are
dealing with and continue:
“Then or at a later date Jodl declared that Hitler intended to
begin the war against the Soviet Union as early as the autumn of
1940, but later he gave up this idea. The reason was that the
deployment of the troops at that time could not yet be executed.
For this purpose the necessary conditions in Poland did not
exist; railways, quarters, and bridges were not prepared for the
advance of the tanks; communication lines and airdromes were not
organized. . . . Therefore an order was given to establish all
the conditions for the preparation and execution of such a
campaign.”
To the question put by the Prosecution as to whether this order was
issued on 9 August 1941 and called “Aufbau Ost,” Warlimont replied:
“Yes, this order was prepared by the staff leaders in accordance
with the instructions of General Jodl. . . .
“In General Jodl’s opinion, the concentration could take place
only after all the preparations indicated in this order had been
made.”
Further on in his statement, Warlimont said that Plan Barbarossa,
originally called “Fritz,” was presented to Hitler on 5 December 1940,
after which it was re-edited and issued on 18 December.
I think that the testimony of a man like Friedrich Paulus, a former
field marshal of the German Army, who, as is known, was directly
concerned both in the preparations and in the execution of Plan
Barbarossa, can give considerable help in investigating the preparation
of this plan.
I present the testimony of Friedrich Paulus, dated 9 January 1946, given
in a camp for prisoners of war, and marked Document Number USSR-156, and
request that it be accepted as evidence.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I just wanted to remark that I do not possess
a copy of the document concerning Paulus. But it seems to be the same
statement which it has not yet been possible to give to the defendants’
counsel. If the Soviet Prosecution could give me the statement now, I
would then decide if I could present my protest for decision now in the
form in which I raised it at the beginning of this session.
[_Copies of the document were submitted to Dr. Nelte._]
According to the original before me now, this is a similar statement by
Field Marshal Paulus. Paulus has expressed his opinion in a letter to
the Government of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Delegation has, I
assume, now presented the original to you. This photostat bears no
official certification by the Soviet authorities, nor is the statement
an affidavit which could be admitted as evidence.
Therefore, I ask the Tribunal in this particular case to give a general
decision on the question which I raised at the beginning of this session
as well, so that in the future the Soviet Prosecution will be familiar
with the treatment of such statements by the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you wish to make any answer to what Dr. Nelte has
said?
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I do.
In accordance with the wish of the Tribunal, as expressed in a previous
session, the Soviet Prosecution has taken the necessary measures for
originals of all the documents of the Soviet Prosecution, or else
documents certifying the authenticity of these documents to be placed at
the disposal of the Tribunal through the good offices of the General
Secretary, with indications of the places where they are to be found.
Moreover, bearing in mind that certain witnesses, whose evidence will be
presented in a forthcoming session by the Soviet Prosecution, are of
considerable interest and that it is possible that the Defense may wish
to cross-examine them, the Soviet Prosecution will take all necessary
measures to bring some of these witnesses to Nuremberg in order to hear
their verbal evidence. Special interest attaches to the deposition of
Paulus, extracts from which I propose to quote in my report, and which
must be checked no later than this evening, after which Friedrich Paulus
will be brought to the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Then I understood from what you said, General, that as
far as the photostatic copy of Field Marshal Paulus’ statement is
concerned, a certificate will be furnished—as we indicated the Tribunal
wishes—that the photostatic copy is a true copy of the original, and so
far as the question of producing witnesses of importance is concerned,
Field Marshal Paulus will be produced as a witness for the defendants’
counsel to cross-examine.
That meets your objection, I think, Dr. Nelte.
DR. NELTE: The basic principle of this question, as it appears to me,
lies in the fact that official proof should be given that the statements
contained in the documents submitted really represent what the persons
who made them meant to say. Written statements are never more than a
dubious substitute for a personal examination of a witness.
The Defense is fully aware of the difficulties encountered, particularly
by the Soviet Prosecution, in producing witnesses where, for instance,
reports are to be found. The Defense realizes the fact, but in those
cases in which the individuality of the witness and the importance of
certain questions really do matter, the personal examination of
witnesses should be preferred to any statement. Wherever this is
impossible, for reasons which we are unable to judge, it would however,
at any rate, be desirable that those people who have made these
statements should make them in the form of an affidavit or an
interrogatory.
If the Soviet Delegation should produce a certificate to the effect that
these statements are corresponding to the original statements, it would
not mean that the documents would acquire an increased value in our
eyes. We do not doubt for one moment that statements of this kind are in
the possession of the Soviet Delegation. The Defense is interested not
so much in the formal confirmation of the statements as in the
possibility of increasing the material evidence. If the Soviet
Prosecution could assist us in this respect, we should be grateful.
THE PRESIDENT: You can go on, General.
GEN. ZORYA: I repeat, I believe that the testimony of Friedrich Paulus
can be of great assistance to us in our investigation. I present the
testimony of Friedrich Paulus to which I have just referred and shall
now read into the Record that part of his testimony which refers to the
history of the preparation of Plan Barbarossa.
I request you to open the bundle of documents submitted to the Tribunal
on Page 27, and there, in the text of Paulus’ testimony, on Page 2, you
will find the passages underlined in pencil, which I now intend reading
into the Record. From 3 September. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps, General, since it is now a quarter to one you
had better not begin this document before the adjournment.
GEN. ZORYA: I obey, Mr. President.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, in pursuance of the statement made by the
Soviet Delegation, I will ask for permission to bring before the
Tribunal for direct examination the field marshal of the former German
Army, Friedrich Paulus, who will be examined by the Chief Prosecutor of
the U.S.S.R., General Rudenko.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; the witness may be brought in.
[_The witness, Paulus, took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you please tell me your name?
FRIEDRICH PAULUS (Witness): Friedrich Paulus.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the
Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will
withhold and add nothing.”
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: Would you like to sit down?
GEN. RUDENKO: Your name is Friedrich Paulus?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You were born 1898?
PAULUS: 1890.
GEN. RUDENKO: You were born in the village of Breitenau, in the district
of Kassel, in Germany?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: By nationality you are a German?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: You are field marshal of the former German Army?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Your last official position was Commander-in-Chief of the
6th Army at Stalingrad?
PAULUS: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Will you please tell us, Witness, did you on 8 January
1946, make a statement to the Government of the Soviet Socialist
Republics?
PAULUS: Yes, I did.
GEN. RUDENKO: You confirm this statement?
PAULUS: Yes, I confirm this statement.
GEN. RUDENKO: Please, tell us, Witness, what you know regarding the
preparation by the Hitlerite Government and the German High Command of
the armed attack on the Soviet Union.
PAULUS: From personal experience, I can state the following: On 3
September 1940 I took office with the High Command of the Army as Chief
Quartermaster I of the General Staff. As such I was deputy to the Chief
of the General Staff, and had in addition to carry out the instructions
of a general operational nature which he delegated to me.
When I took office I found in my sphere of work, among other things, a
still incomplete operational plan dealing with an attack on the Soviet
Union. This operational plan had been worked out by the then Major
General Marx, Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army, who for this
purpose had been temporarily transferred to the High Command of the
Army.
The Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Oberst Halder,
turned over to me the continuation of the work which was ordered by the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, on the following basis:
An investigation was to be made as to the possibilities of an attack
against the Soviet Union, with regard to the terrain, the points of the
attack, the manpower needed, and so forth. In addition it was stated
that altogether about 130 to 140 German divisions would be available for
this operation. It was furthermore to be taken into consideration that
from the beginning Romanian territory was to be utilized for the
deployment of the German southern army. On the northern flank the
participation of Finland in the war was taken into account, but was
ignored in this operational plan of the army.
Then, in addition, as a basis for the plan which was to be worked out,
the aims—the instructions of the OKW—were given: First, the
destruction of those parts of the Russian Army stationed in the west of
Russia, to prevent the units which were fit for fighting from escaping
deep into Russia; second, the reaching of a line from which the Russian
air force would be unable to attack German territory effectively, and
the final aim was the reaching of the Volga-Archangel line.
The operational plan which I just outlined was completed at the
beginning of November and was followed by two military exercises with
the command of which the General Staff of the Army entrusted me. Senior
officers of the General Staff of the Army were also assigned. The basic
strength requirements assumed in these military exercises were: The
launching of one army group south of the Pripet territory, specifically
from southern Poland and from Romanian territory, with the aim of
reaching the Dnieper-Kiev line and south of it; north of the Pripet
territory another army group, the strongest, from the area around Warsaw
and northward, with the general direction of attack being the
Minsk-Smolensk line, the intention being to direct it against Moscow
later; then a further army group, namely Army Group North, from the area
of East Prussia, with the initial direction of attack being through the
Baltic States toward Leningrad.
The conclusion which was drawn from these military exercises was at that
time that in case of actual hostilities provision should be made firstly
for reaching the general line Dnieper-Smolensk-Leningrad, and then the
operation was to be carried forward if the situation developed
favorably, supply lines, _et cetera_ being adjusted accordingly. In
connection with these military exercises and for the evaluation of the
theoretical experience gained therefrom, there was a further conference
of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the chiefs of the
general staffs of the army groups which had been planned for the East.
And further, in connection with this conference, there was a speech
about Russia by the then chief of the section Foreign Armies East,
Colonel Kinsel, describing Russia’s geographic and economic conditions,
the Red Army, _et cetera_. The most significant point here was that no
preparations whatever for an attack by the Soviet had come to our
attention.
With these military exercises and conferences that I have just described
the theoretical considerations and plans for this offensive were
concluded. Immediately thereafter, that is on 18 December 1940, the
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces issued Directive Number 21. This was
the basis for all military and economic preparations which were to be
carried out. In the Supreme Command of the Army this directive resulted
in going ahead with the drafting and working out of directions for troop
deployments for this operation. These first directions for troop
deployment were authorized on 3 February 1941 by Hitler after a report
by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army at the Obersalzberg; thereupon
they were forwarded to the troops. Later on several supplements were
issued. For the beginning of the attack the Supreme Command of the Armed
Forces had calculated the time which would make it possible for large
troop movements to be made on Russian territory. That was expected from
about the middle of May on. Preparations were made in accordance with
this. Then at the end of March this date underwent a change, when Hitler
decided, due to the development of the situation in Yugoslavia, to
attack this country. Consequently, in the orders issued at the beginning
of April 1941 this tentative date for the start of the operation. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid you are a little too fast. I think you had
better begin again where you said that at the end of March Hitler made a
change in the plan.
PAULUS: [_Continuing_] Because of his decision to attack Yugoslavia, the
date foreseen for the beginning of the attack had to be postponed by
about five weeks, that is to the last half of June. And, indeed, this
attack then did take place on 22 June 1941.
In conclusion, I confirm the fact that the preparation for this attack
on the Soviet Union, which actually took place on 22 June 1941, dated
back to the autumn of 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. Did the witness give the date? He said that
preparations for this attack had been made, and what I want to know is,
did he give the date from which it had been prepared?
[_To the witness_] Did you give the date from which the preparations
went forward?
PAULUS: I gave it at the beginning: From the time my personal
observations began, when I entered office, on 3 September 1940.
GEN. RUDENKO: In what way and under what circumstances was the
participation of the satellite states secured?
PAULUS: From personal observation, I can say the following regarding
this:
About September 1940, just at the time when I had received this
operational study for the attack on the Soviet Union there was planned
from the outset the use of Romanian territory for the deployment of the
German right or, that is to say, south wing, and that was taken into
consideration from the outset. A military mission headed by the then
Lieutenant General of Cavalry, Hansen, was sent to Romania. A whole
panzer division, the 13th, was transferred to Romania as a training
unit. To those who knew about the plans for the future it was obvious
that this step could only serve the purpose of preparing the future
partner in the war for the task intended for him.
Further, in regard to Hungary:
In December 1940 Colonel Lazslo, the chief of the operational group of
the Hungarian General Staff, came to the headquarters of the Army High
Command at Zossen. He asked for a conference regarding questions of
organization. The Hungarian Army at that time was concerned with the
question of regrouping its units, which were organized in brigades, into
divisions and also with the setting up of motorized troops and of panzer
units. The chief of the Organization Division of the General Staff of
the Army, then Major General Buhle, and myself advised Colonel Lazslo.
At the same time, several Hungarian military commissions were in Berlin,
and with them also the Hungarian Minister of War, General Von Bartha,
and they discussed armament deliveries to Hungary with German
authorities.
It was clear to all of us who were informed as to future plans that all
these measures, including the supplying of arms to other armies, were
only conceivable at that time if these weapons were to be employed in
future military projects.
Regarding Hungary there is a further point:
Due to the development of events in Yugoslavia, Hitler, at the end of
March 1941, decided to attack Yugoslavia. On 27 or 28 March I was called
to the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, where there had just been a
conference between Hitler, Keitel, and Jodl, in which the
Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff of the Army had participated,
that is, had been ordered to be present.
When I arrived I was advised by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Halder, that Hitler had decided to attack Yugoslavia in the first place
to eliminate a threat to the flank of the intended operation against
Greece, and get hold of the rail line going from Belgrade southward
through Nish, and then also with an eye to the future—to Plan
Barbarossa—to keep the right flank free from the outset.
I was instructed to go to Vienna, taking with me a number of competent
General Staff officers of the Army, to deliver and explain pertinent
orders to German commanders, and then to travel on without fail to the
Hungarian General Staff in Budapest and to reach an understanding with
it on the deployment of German troops on Hungarian territory and the
participation of Hungarian troops in the attack on Yugoslavia.
On 30 March, early in the morning, I arrived in Budapest and had a
conference with the Chief of the Hungarian General Staff, General Werth,
of the infantry and then with the chief of the operational group of the
Hungarian General Staff, Colonel Lazslo. These conferences went along in
good order and ended very quickly, and the desired result was achieved.
This result was then put down on maps. The map that I received from the
Hungarian General Staff contained not only the deployment of the troops
intended for the attack against Yugoslavia, but also forces on the
Carpatho-Ukrainian border, which were to be placed there to protect our
rear against the Soviet Union.
The fact of the creation and existence of this force is a sign that even
on the side of Hungary there was the realization that an attack by
Germany against Yugoslavia would have to be considered as an aggressive
action by the Soviet Union.
As regards the principle of calling upon Hungary in the preparation and
later in the execution of the planned operations, I learned Hitler’s
view at that time. He was of the opinion that Hungary was anxious,
through German help, to recapture and expand the areas lost in 1918; and
in addition, that she was afraid of falling behind Romania which was
allied with Germany. Hitler saw Hungary from this point of view also
with regard to his policy. But he was, as I could observe in many
instances myself, very reserved toward Hungary, and for two reasons. For
one, he did not believe Hungary could guarantee secrecy with regard to
future war plans, due to her close connections with foreign countries
hostile to Germany, and secondly, he did not want to make Hungary too
many premature promises of territory. I can cite one example: The
question of the Dragowitsch oil territory. Later, when the attack began
against Soviet Russia, the 17th German Army which was fighting at that
point had the explicit order from the Supreme Command to take the
Dragowitsch oil fields at all costs before the arrival of the
Hungarians.
Regarding this future partner, according to my observation the procedure
of Hitler was such that he counted on her certain participation and
therefore delivered the armament to her and helped with the training,
but that he kept to himself the time when he would initiate the ally
into his plans.
Thirdly, the Finnish question. In December 1940 the first visit of the
Chief of the Finnish General Staff, Lieutenant General Heinrichs, was
made to the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen.
Lieutenant General Heinrichs had a conference with the Chief of the Army
General Staff, the contents of which I no longer remember; but he made a
speech about the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-1940 before the General Staff
officers of the High Command of the Army, and the General Staff officers
of the Army groups who happened to be present at the time in connection
with the discussion of the military exercises.
This speech before these General Staff officers had its great
significance at that time because of the fact that it was delivered at
the same time that Directive Number 21 of 18 December was issued. This
speech was significant, it dealt with experiences won in the war with
the Red Army and in addition gave an insight into the value of the
Finnish troops as possible future partners in the war.
I took part in a second conference with the Chief of the Finnish General
Staff at the headquarters of the High Command of the Army in Zossen, in
the second half of May 1941. The Chief of the Finnish General Staff
arrived from Salzburg where he had had conferences with the High Command
of the Army. The subject of the subsequent conferences in Zossen with
the General Staff of the High Command of the Army was the co-operation
of the Finnish forces in the south in Plan Barbarossa—in co-operation
with Army Group North—which was to proceed from the deployment area in
East Prussia towards Leningrad. At that time the agreement was reached
that the Finnish troops in the south were to synchronize their movements
with the advance of German Army Group North and likewise that the joint
advance later against Leningrad should be subject to consultations and
agreements depending on the development of events.
Those are the personal observations which I made regarding the first
appearance and the enlistment of allies in preparations for the
aggression.
GEN. RUDENKO: How, and under what circumstances, was the armed attack on
the U.S.S.R. carried out—the attack which was prepared by the Hitlerite
Government and the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces?
PAULUS: The attack on the Soviet Union took place as I have related,
according to a plan prepared carefully and well in advance. The troops
for this attack were at first assembled in the rear of the deployment
area. By special orders they were then moved by groups into jumping-off
positions, and then took up their position along the entire long front
from Romania to East Prussia for a simultaneous attack. The Finnish
theater of war was excluded from this operation.
Just as the large-scale operational plan, as I described it at the
beginning, was to a certain extent tried out theoretically, the detailed
employment of troops was discussed during military exercises by the
staffs of army groups, corps, and divisions and drawn up in orders down
to the details long before the beginning of the war.
A large-scale diversion, which was to be organized in Norway and along
the coast of France was designed to simulate an invasion of Britain in
June 1941 and thus divert Russia’s attention.
All measures were taken not only for operational but also for tactical
surprise, as for instance, the prohibition of open reconnaissance on and
across the boundary before the beginning of the war. That meant on the
one hand, that possible losses which might be caused due to the lack of
reconnaissance had to be taken into account for the sake of surprise,
but on the other hand it meant that a surprise attack across the
boundary by the enemy was not feared.
All of these measures show that it was a question of a criminal attack.
GEN. RUDENKO: How would you define the aims pursued by Germany in
attacking Soviet Russia?
PAULUS: The aim to reach the Volga-Archangel line, which was far beyond
German strength, is in itself characteristic of Hitler’s and the
National Socialist leadership’s boundless policy of conquest. From a
strategic point of view, the achievement of these aims would have meant
the destruction of the armed forces of the Soviet Union. With the
winning of the line I have mentioned the main areas of Soviet Russia
with the capital, Moscow, would have been conquered and subjugated,
together with the leading political and economic center of the Soviet
Union. Economically, the winning of this line would have meant the
possession of important agricultural areas, the most important natural
resources, including the oil wells of the Caucasus and the main centers
of production in Russia, and also the main network of communications in
European Russia.
How much Hitler was bent on taking economic objectives in this war can
best be shown from an example out of my personal experience.
On 1 June 1942, on the occasion of a conference of commanders-in-chief
in the region of Army Group South in Poltava, Hitler declared, “If I do
not get the oil of Maikop and Grosny, then I must end this war.”
For the utilization and the administration of the territories to be
conquered, economic and administrative organizations had already been
formed and were kept in readiness long before the beginning of the war.
To summarize I should like to state that the objectives given indicate
the conquest of the Russian territories for the purpose of colonization
with the utilization and spoliation of and with the resources of which
the war in the West was to be brought to a conclusion, with the aim of
finally establishing domination over Europe.
GEN. RUDENKO: And one last question: Whom do you consider as guilty of
the criminal initiation of the war against Soviet Russia?
PAULUS: May I please have the question repeated?
GEN. RUDENKO: I repeat the question. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is about to address an observation to
General Rudenko. The Tribunal thinks that a question such as you have
just put, as to who was guilty for the aggression upon Soviet territory,
is one of the main questions which the Tribunal has to decide, and
therefore is not a question upon which the witness ought to give his
opinion.
Is that what Counsel for the Defense wish to object to?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President, that is what I want to do.
GEN. RUDENKO: Then perhaps the Tribunal will permit me to put this
question rather differently.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
GEN. RUDENKO: Who of the defendants was an active participant in the
initiation of a war of aggression against the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: Of the defendants, as far as I observed them, the top military
advisers to Hitler. They are the Chief of the Supreme Command of the
Armed Forces, Keitel; Chief of the Operations Branch, Jodl; and Göring,
in his capacity as Reich Marshal, as Commander-in-Chief of the Air
Forces and as Plenipotentiary for Armament Economy.
GEN. RUDENKO: In concluding the interrogation I shall make a summary.
Have I rightly concluded from your testimony, that long before 22 June
the Hitlerite Government and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
were planning an aggressive war against the Soviet Union for the purpose
of colonizing the territory of the Soviet Union?
PAULUS: That is beyond doubt according to all the developments as I
described them, and also in connection with all the directives issued in
the well-known Green File.
GEN. RUDENKO: I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Does any member of the French Prosecution wish to ask any
questions?
FRENCH PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The British?
BRITISH PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: The United States?
UNITED STATES PROSECUTOR: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Any member of the defendants’ counsel?
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, as Counsel for the General Staff, I ask
you to afford me the opportunity to examine the witness tomorrow
morning. The presentation of the witness by the Prosecution came as a
surprise to the defendants’ counsel, at any rate, and I think a
consultation about the questions to be asked, especially in view of the
importance of the testimony, is absolutely necessary. I therefore ask to
be permitted to conduct the cross-examination at the beginning of
tomorrow morning’s session.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if the Prosecution has no objection, the
Tribunal thinks that this application ought to be granted.
GEN. RUDENKO: If the Tribunal so wishes, the Prosecution will not
object.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. I don’t know whether any other member of
the defendants’ counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I assume that all defendants’ counsel may
conduct their cross-examination of the witness, General Paulus, tomorrow
morning?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. I was only asking whether any other
member of the defendants’ counsel would prefer to cross-examine now.
DR. NELTE: I personally would be able to put my questions after the
recess.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Then the witness can retire and the case will
go on. He will be recalled tomorrow morning and in the meantime you will
go on with your case.
[_The witness left the stand, and Major General Zorya approached the
lectern._]
THE PRESIDENT: General, you won’t, I presume, think it necessary to read
any more of Field Marshal Paulus’ statement, will you?
GEN. ZORYA: No.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on, then.
GEN. ZORYA: Referring to the explanation concerning the beginning of the
criminal attack of Fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, I should like to
remind the Tribunal that in the morning session of the Tribunal on 30
November 1945, the witness, Lahousen, was interrogated and gave evidence
of sufficient interest in our case.
Among other things, this witness, when enumerating the more intimate
members of the inner circle of Admiral Canaris, Chief of the
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the German Army,
mentioned Pieckenbrock by name.
I present to the Tribunal as Document Number USSR-228, the testimony of
the former chief of Section I of the German Military Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General of the former German
Army, Hans Pieckenbrock, former chief and colleague of Lahousen.
Pieckenbrock gave this testimony in the order prescribed by the laws of
the Soviet Union, in Moscow, on 12 December 1945.
For the moment I should like to read a few lines only into the record
from Pieckenbrock’s testimony, relating to the matter which we are now
investigating. These lines are on Page 1 of the Russian text of his
testimony and they are marked with a red pencil. This Page 1 corresponds
to Page 34 of the document book.
“I must say”—said Pieckenbrock—“that already since August and
September 1940 the Foreign Armies East of the General Staff of
the Army began to increase considerably its intelligence
assignments to the Abwehr concerning the U.S.S.R. These
assignments were unquestionably connected with the preparation
of war against Russia.
“The more precise dates for Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union
I learned in January 1941 from Canaris. I do not know what
sources Canaris used, but he told me that the attack on the
Soviet Union was fixed for 15 May.”
The Soviet Prosecution also has at its disposal the testimony of the
former chief of Department III of the German Military Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Services, Lieutenant General Franz von Bentivegni of
the former German Army, which was given by him on 28 December 1945. I
present those documents under Document Number USSR-230.
I shall at the same time also only read into the record those parts of
Bentivegni’s testimony underlined in red pencil, which have a direct
bearing on the beginning of military preparations against the Soviet
Union. These first two excerpts of the testimony are on Page 37 in the
document book which is submitted to the Military Tribunal:
“I learned first of Germany’s preparation for a military attack
on the Soviet Union in August 1940, from the head of the German
Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service, Admiral Canaris.
In an unofficial conversation which took place in Canaris’
office he told me that Hitler had started to take measures for
an Eastern campaign, which he had spoken about as early as 1938
in his speech at a meeting of Gauleiter in Berlin.
“Canaris said to me that these plans of Hitler’s had now begun
to take concrete form. This was evident from the fact that
divisions of the German Army were being forwarded in large
numbers from the West to the eastern frontiers and, in
accordance with a special order by Hitler, were taking up
positions from which to start the coming invasion of Russia.”
These are the first two paragraphs of Bentivegni’s testimony.
And finally, in order to finish with the question of the actual time of
fascist Germany’s military preparations for the treacherous attack on
the Soviet Union, I should like to dwell for a moment on the testimony
of General Müller. This testimony, dated 8 January 1946, was written in
a camp for prisoners of war. I present it to the Tribunal as Document
Number USSR-149.
All the material to which I have so far referred emanated from circles
of the highest commanding officers of the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: General, on this document of General Müller, does it
appear where that document was made and where General Müller is now?
GEN. ZORYA: The photostat bears a date written in General Müller’s hand.
This date is 8 January 1946.
THE PRESIDENT: Where?
GEN. ZORYA: If I might have a look at the photostatic copy which I have
just presented to the Tribunal, I would be able to tell you where the
date is written.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but there are many prisoners-of-war camps. We want
to know which one and where it is.
GEN. ZORYA: In a camp located near Moscow.
THE PRESIDENT: Has this document got any authenticating signature on it
at all? So far as we are concerned, isn’t it simply a photostatic copy
of a writing by somebody?
GEN. ZORYA: Mr. President, this document, like all other documents which
have been submitted so far by the Soviet Delegation, is a noncertified
photostatic copy.
Taking into consideration the wish of the Tribunal and in execution of
this wish the Soviet Prosecution took measures to ensure that only the
originals of these documents or documents whose authenticity is
certified will be presented in complete order to the General Secretary.
This will be done in the course of several days and all the material
will be given in best order to the General Secretary.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us where the writer of the document is now?
GEN. ZORYA: I am hardly in a position to say more than I have already.
If the Tribunal will permit me, I can consult my colleagues, make
inquiries, and report to the Tribunal as soon as possible on the
general’s whereabouts.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will adjourn now. That will enable you to
consult your colleagues.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, to my regret I must present the same
objections to this document submitted by the prosecutor of the Soviet
Union under USSR-149, and must submit the same request which I made this
morning. As far as I know, the High Tribunal have not yet made a
decision in regard to this question.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon, Dr. Nelte. The Tribunal has already
made a decision.
I think it would be better if, when defendants’ counsel go to the place
from which they wish to speak, they would arrange these earphones before
they speak.
I say the Tribunal has already made a decision which governs this case.
They pointed out the other day to counsel for the Soviet Union that
documents which were not identified as authentic documents, must be
identified as authentic, and the Soviet prosecutor at that time
undertook to certify that all documents which he made use of were
certified as authentic documents. And if they are not so certified, they
will be struck out of the record. That ruling applies to this document.
This document is a document which appears to be a document, a letter, or
report to the Government of the Soviet Union, but it does not contain
upon its face any certification showing that it is an authentic
document. The Counsel for the Soviet Union said before we adjourned,
that he undertook—as he had already undertaken—to produce a
certificate that the document was an authentic document; that is to say,
that it was written by the person who purported to write it, and in
those circumstances, the Tribunal accepts the document provisionally.
If no such certificate is forthcoming, then the document will be
stricken from the record.
DR. NELTE: If I understand you correctly, the Tribunal will accept a
letter written to the Soviet Government or a statement as documentary
evidence for the contents of this statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly. I have already said provided that it is
certified as an authentic document. I have said that more than once.
DR. NELTE: In this way, every letter sent to the Prosecution or the
Government of the Soviet Union or to any other Prosecution would become
documentary evidence by the certification that it has actually been
written by the person who signed it, which would make it impossible for
the Defense to cross-examine the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: That depends on where the witness is. We are dealing with
witnesses who are scattered all over the globe, and as we are informed
that it is not the practice in the Soviet Union for affidavits to be
made in such cases, the Tribunal considers such a document to fall
within Article 19—provided it is an authentic document.
We are affording the defendants’ counsel the greatest assistance in
bringing witnesses to this Court, but we cannot undertake to bring
witnesses from all over the world upon questions which are very often of
very little importance.
DR. NELTE: I quite appreciate the difficulties, and I am grateful to the
Tribunal for their willingness to assist us. Therefore I only request to
ascertain in each case where the person, who has made that statement,
has his residence, so that the Defense may try to reach him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. If the witness is in, or in the immediate vicinity
of, Nuremberg, the Tribunal would think that it was only fair, if such a
document as this were to be put in evidence, that he should be produced
for examination or cross-examination by the defendants’ counsel, but we
do understand that the man who wrote this letter is not in the vicinity
of Nuremberg. We have no reason to think he is, and I am reminding
defendants’ counsel that they can always apply, if they think right, to
issue interrogatories which would be put to any such person as this who
has written such a document as this.
DR. NELTE: Thank you.
GEN. ZORYA: I have availed myself of the recess to make inquiries about
General Müller. General Müller is in a prisoner-of-war camp, Number 27,
in Krasnogorsk, in the Moscow region.
May I continue my statement?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
GEN. ZORYA: All the material, Your Honors, which I have mentioned to
date emanated from circles of the Supreme Command of the German Armed
Forces. If I can so express myself, General Müller belonged to the
middle category of German generals. He was Chief of Staff of an army; he
commanded an army group. His testimony reflects a series of events which
may be considered worthy of attention, since they explain the
circumstances accompanying Germany’s preparations against the Soviet
Union.
I wish to refer to Page 40 of the document book. There you will find the
first page of General Müller’s statement. The first paragraph, Page 1,
of the statement is marked with red pencil. I now proceed to quote from
it:
“The preparation for the attack on the Soviet Union began as
early as July 1940. At that time I was first general staff
officer in the staff of Army Group C at Dijon in France. General
Field Marshal Von Leeb was commander-in-chief. This army group
consisted of the 1st, 2d, and 7th Armies, which were occupation
armies in France. Besides this, Army Group A (Rundstedt), whose
task was to prepare ‘Case Sea Lion’ (the invasion of England by
Army Group B—Von Bock) was also in France. The staff of Army
Group B was transferred to the East (Posen) during July and was
given the following forces, transferred from France—part of the
armies of occupation: The 12th Army Command (List), 4th Army
Command (Von Kluge), and 18th Army Command (Von Küchler), plus
several general commands and about thirty divisions. A greater
part of this number was taken from Army Group C (Von Leeb).
“Directly after the campaign in the West, the OKH gave the order
for the demobilization of 20 divisions. This order was
cancelled, and the 20 divisions were not demobilized. Instead of
this, after their return to Germany they were sent on leave, and
thus kept ready for rapid mobilization.
“Both measures, the transfer of about five hundred thousand men
to the Russian frontier and the cancellation of the order
disbanding about three hundred thousand men, show that already
in July 1940 plans existed for war operations in the East.
“The next order which gives evidence of Germany’s preparations
for attacking the Soviet Union, was the written OKH order issued
in September 1940 regarding the formation in Leipzig of a new
army command (A.O.K. 11) of several general commands and about
forty divisions and panzer divisions. The forming of these units
was carried out from September 1940 onwards by the commander of
the reserve army (Generaloberst Fromm), partly in France, but
mainly in Germany. Towards the end of September 1940 the OKH
called me to Fontainebleau. The Chief Quartermaster I in the
General Staff of the Army, then Lieutenant General (afterwards
Field Marshal) Paulus, informed me, at first orally, of the
order that my staff (Army Group C) was to be transferred to
Dresden by 1 November and that Army High Command II
(Generaloberst Weichs) which was under the command of the staff,
should be transferred at the same time to Munich. The task was
the leading of training of the above-mentioned 40 divisions
which were to be newly created.
“In accordance with this order, confirmed later by signature by
the Chief of the General Staff Halder, the transfer of these
units was carried out on time. These 40 divisions were put into
action in the invasion of the Soviet Union.”
Thus initiated, the preparation for the military attack on the Soviet
Union was carried out at a heightened tempo and with customary German
pedantry.
I would, Your Honors, remind the Tribunal that the witness, Paulus,
stated at this session that in August 1940 the elaboration of the
previous plan of attack on the Soviet Union, known as Plan Barbarossa,
was already so far advanced as to render possible the conducting of two
military exercises under the direction of Paulus.
THE PRESIDENT: General, I don’t think it is necessary to read the
statement of Field Marshal Paulus, as he has already given the evidence
in the witness box.
GEN. ZORYA: I am not reading it into the record. I am merely referring
to a circumstance which will enable me to proceed to General Müller’s
statement that this system of military exercises, which originated in
the General Staff of the German Army, eventually spread over the entire
Army and that the entire armed forces participated in the execution of
these games which, _per se_, were already a preparation for the attack
on the Soviet Union. I am reading into the record that passage of the
statement which is underlined in blue pencil, Page 41 of the bundle of
documents:
“Insofar”—General Müller states—“as in the future the Army was
to attack the Soviet Union, the first plan was to train soldiers
and general staff officers.
“Towards the end of January 1941 I received telegraphic orders
from the Chief of the General Staff Halder to attend the
military exercises of Rundstedt’s army group at St. Germain,
near Paris. The object of this military exercise was the attack
and advance from Romania and South Poland in the direction of
Kiev and southwards. The plan had in mind the intention also of
the participation of Romanian troops. In the main this military
exercise anticipated the conditions of the future order
concerning the strategic deployment of forces, to which I will
refer later.
“The director of the military exercises was the Chief of the
General Staff of the Rundstedt army group. There were present:
Rundstedt, Halder, the Chiefs of the General Staff of the 6th
Army, Colonel Heim, of the 11th Army, Colonel Wöhler, and of
Kleist’s tank group, Colonel Zwickler and several generals of
the panzer forces. The military exercises were held at the place
occupied by Rundstedt’s army group, approximately between the
31st January and 2d February 1941. The exercise demonstrated the
necessity for a strong concentration of tank forces.”
The documents I have presented to date characterize the measures of the
military command of the German Armed Forces for the preparation of the
strategic deployment of the German armies for launching an attack
against the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.
As for time, these measures embraced a considerable period of 1940 and
were put into action at least 6 months prior to the appearance on the
scene of Directive Number 21 concerning the Plan Barbarossa.
I shall now proceed to the second group of documents presented by the
Soviet Prosecution which characterize the espionage measures undertaken
by the fascist conspirators in preparation for war against the Soviet
Union.
Trend and task of espionage work in connection with Plan Barbarossa
were, as we know, determined by a directive from the Supreme Command of
the German Armed Forces, addressed to counterintelligence on 6 September
1940 and signed by the Defendant Jodl.
This document was presented by the American Prosecution under Number
1229-PS; it is to be found on Pages 46 and 47 of our document bundle. I
do not intend to quote this document again, but I do consider it
essential to remind you that in it the intelligence organizations demand
that the regrouping of armies on Germany’s Eastern front should be
camouflaged in every possible way and that the Soviet Union should
remain under the impression that action of some kind was brewing against
the Balkans.
The activities of the intelligence organizations were strictly
regulated. These activities included measures for concealing, as far as
possible, the number of German forces in the East and of giving an
impression of insignificant concentrations in the north of the Eastern
provinces, at the same time conveying the impression of very
considerable concentrations of forces in the southern part, in the
Protectorate and in Austria.
The necessity was pointed out of creating an exaggerated impression of
the number of antiaircraft units and of the insignificant extent of
roadbuilding activities.
I here take the liberty of making two pertinent observations. According
to Pieckenbrock’s testimony, the intensification of the work of this
intelligence organization against the Soviet Union began prior to the
appearance of this directive in August 1940. And this work, of course,
was not limited to the spreading of false information on the regrouping
of forces from West to East.
I beg you, Your Honors, to revert to the testimony, which I have already
presented, of the former Chief of Department III of the Intelligence and
Counterintelligence Services of the German Armed Forces, Von Bentivegni.
On Pages 1, 2, and 3 of the Russian text of Bentivegni’s deposition, it
is said—I quote the passage underlined in blue pencil—beginning at the
last paragraph, Page 1 of the document which corresponds to Page 37 of
the document book:
“In connection with this, as early as November 1940 I received
from Canaris orders to intensify the work for
counterintelligence in the localities where concentration of the
German armies on the Soviet German frontier was taking place.”
On Page 2 of the statement, Page 38 of the document book, Paragraph 1,
Bentivegni continues:
“In accordance with this order, I immediately gave a
corresponding order to the German Abwehr agencies, Danzig,
Königsberg, Posen, Kraków, Breslau, and Vienna.”
And finally, on Page 3 of the statement, which corresponds to Page 39 of
the document book, I read:
“In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives
for the preparations for the execution of the Plan Barbarossa.
“a) Preparation of all links of Abwehr III for carrying out
active counterintelligence work against the Soviet Union, as for
instance the creation of the necessary counterintelligence
groups, their distribution among various fighting units intended
for taking part in the operations on the Eastern front, and
paralyzing the activity of the Soviet intelligence and
counterintelligence organs.
“b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence
agencies, partly by creating the semblance of an improvement in
relations with the Soviet Union and of preparations for a blow
against Great Britain.
“c) Counterintelligence measures to keep secret the preparations
being made for war with the Soviet Union and to ensure that the
transfer of troops to the East be kept secret.”
The same question is touched upon in the minutes of the interrogation of
the Chief of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Department I of
the German Army, Pieckenbrock, which I have already presented in
evidence. This statement contains the following passage regarding the
activities of the intelligence service of the German Army in connection
with the preparations for the realization of Plan Barbarossa. I would
refer you to Page 35 of the document book and to Paragraph 2 from the
top. This corresponds to Page 2 of Pieckenbrock’s testimony.
Pieckenbrock states:
“In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris
and the chief of the espionage detachment (Abwehr II), Colonel
Lahousen, about measures connected with Plan Barbarossa. During
this conversation they kept referring to a written order on this
subject, which Lahousen had. I, personally, as head of Abwehr I,
beginning in February 1941 and up to 22 June 1941, more than
once had official talks with the Chief Quartermaster IV,
Lieutenant General Tippelskirch, and with the head of the
detachment Foreign Armies East, Colonel Kienzl. These
conversations dealt with the more precise definition of various
tasks assigned to Abwehr, with regard to the Soviet Union, and
in particular with the verification of old intelligence data
about the Red Army, and also details about the dislocation of
the Soviet armies during the period of preparation of the attack
on the Soviet Union.”
I now skip one paragraph of Pieckenbrock’s statement and read further:
“All Abwehrstellen which were working with the espionage against
Russia were given the task of intensifying the dispatch of
agents to the U.S.S.R. A similar task—the intensification of
espionage work against Russia—was given to all intelligence
organs existing in the armies and army groups. For the more
successful direction of all these field Abwehr organs, a special
intelligence staff was created in May 1941 under the code name
of Wally I. This staff was in the vicinity of Warsaw in the
village Sulajewek. Major Baun, as the best specialist on work
against Russia, was appointed chief of the staff of Wally I.
Later, when following our example, Abwehr II and Abwehr III had
also established staffs Wally II and Wally III, this organ
became known as a whole staff Wally, and directed the entire
intelligence, counterintelligence, and diversionary work against
the U.S.S.R. as a staff had to become active in the front line.
At the head of staff ‘Wally’ was Lieutenant Colonel
Schmalschläger.”
I now pass on to the last paragraph of Pieckenbrock’s statement on Page
36 of the document book:
“From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at
which I was also present, I know that a great amount of
preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union was carried
out by this department. In the period of February to May 1941
many conferences of the leaders of Abwehr II took place at the
quarters of Jodl’s deputy, General Warlimont. They were held in
a cavalry school in Krampnitz. One particular question settled
at these conferences in accordance with the needs of the war
with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units,
Brandenburg 800, and of distributing contingents of these units
among the individual army groups.”
In Pieckenbrock’s testimony which has just been read into the record,
special attention is drawn to his references to the special tasks with
which Lahousen’s department had been entrusted, and to special task
units known under the code name of Brandenburg 800.
Here these points are clarified by the testimony of a former colonel of
the German Army, Erwin Stolze, who was Lahousen’s deputy in Department
II, Ausland Abwehr, attached to the Supreme Command of the German Armed
Forces. Stolze was taken prisoner by the Red Army. I wish to submit to
the Tribunal as evidence Stolze’s testimony of 25 December 1945, which
was given to Lieutenant Colonel Burashnikov, of the Counterintelligence
Service of the Red Army and which I submit to the Tribunal as Document
Number USSR-231 (Exhibit Number USSR-231), which I beg you to accept as
evidence. I shall read into the record individual extracts from this
testimony which are underlined in red pencil. I begin the quotation from
Page 48 of the document book. Stolze testified as follows:
“I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a
special group under code name ‘A,’ which had to engage in the
preparation of diversionary acts and in the work of
disintegration of the Soviet rear in connection with the
intended attack on the U.S.S.R.
“At the same time, in order that I should become acquainted with
it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came
from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and which
contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive
activities in the territory of the U.S.S.R. after Germany’s
attack on the Soviet Union. This order was signed by Field
Marshal Keitel and initialed by General Jodl (or by General
Warlimont on Keitel’s instructions—I do not quite remember
which.)”
I am omitting two lines which are irrelevant to our case and read on:
“It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of
delivering a lightning blow against the Soviet Union, Abwehr II,
in conducting subversive work against Russia, with the help of a
net of V men, must use its agents for kindling national
antagonism among the people of the Soviet Union.”
I now request you to turn over the page and on Page 49 in the document
book on Page 2 of the minutes of the interrogation, and to note the
following passages in his testimony:
“In carrying out the above-mentioned instructions of Keitel and
Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian National Socialists who were in the
German Intelligence Service and other members of the nationalist
fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set
out above.
“In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the
leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, Melnik (code name ‘Consul
I’) and Bandara, to organize immediately upon Germany’s attack
on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demonstrations in the
Ukraine in order to disrupt the immediate rear of the Soviet
armies, and also to convince international public opinion of
alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear.
“We also prepared special diversionist groups by Abwehr II for
subversive activities in the Baltic republics of the Soviet
Union.”
I must again request you to turn over the page. On Page 50 in the
document book, beginning with the third line from the top you will find
Stolze’s testimony:
“Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for
subversive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty
training regiment for special tasks, Brandenburg 800, under the
immediate command of the head of Abwehr II, Lahousen. Among the
objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure
of operationally important points, such as bridges, tunnels, and
important military installations, and holding them till the
arrival of the advance units of the German Army.
“Contrary to the international rules governing the conduct of
war, the personnel of this regiment, mainly composed of Germans
from beyond the border, made extensive use of enemy uniforms and
equipment in order to camouflage their operations.
“During the course of preparations for Germany’s attack on the
U.S.S.R., the command of the Brandenburg Regiment also collected
supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment, and arms, and
organized separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the
Russian language.”
Your Honors, the testimonies of Stolze, Bentivegni, and Pieckenbrock,
which I have presented in evidence, disclose the working methods of the
German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of Plan
Barbarossa.
I shall not detain the Tribunal any further with these questions. But
before proceeding to a further presentation, I should like to point out
that the department of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner was likewise
interested in intelligence work. I shall limit myself to submitting one
document which is typical of the manner in which the Hitlerites, by
exploiting their connections, created difficulties in Iran, through
which country, as was known, the supply routes passed for the delivery
to the U.S.S.R. of motor vehicles and war material of the most varied
nature.
The document, which I intend to submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number
USSR-178 (Document Number USSR-178) was taken by us from the German
Foreign Office archives, which fell into the hands of advance units of
the Red Army. This document is the Defendant Kaltenbrunner’s letter to
the Defendant Von Ribbentrop. The letter is typed on a sheet of note
paper with the letterhead of the Chief of the Security Police and SD. In
the document book before you, you will find this document on Page 52. I
read into the record the underlined extracts from this letter:
“28 June 1943; top secret.
“To the Foreign Minister Herr Von Ribbentrop; Berlin; Object:
Elections to the Iranian Parliament.
“Most honorable Herr Reich Minister: We have made direct contact
with Iran and have received information on the possibilities of
exercising German influence on the course of the imminent
Iranian parliamentary elections.”
And a few lines further on it is stated:
“In order to exercise a decisive influence on the results of the
elections, bribery is necessary. For Teheran 400,000 tomans, and
for the rest of Iran at least 600,000 tomans are
necessary. . . . It should also be noted that nationally
oriented Iranian circles expect the intervention of Germany.
“I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to obtain one
million tomans from the Foreign Office. This money can be sent
by the people whom we are sending there by airplane.
“Heil Hitler. Yours devotedly, Kaltenbrunner, SS
Obergruppenführer.”
This document will help you to form an idea of the range of questions
which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. Such a peculiar activity of
the Foreign Office was not in the nature of a chance episode.
In the course of time, the collaboration of the German Foreign Office
and of the Reich Führer SS waxed in strength and developed more and
more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which might be
considered as an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the
organization of espionage work.
I submit this document as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document USSR-120),
and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence. This
document is on Page 53 and 55 of the document book before you. The text
of this agreement will be read into the record with a few remarks. The
text of the agreement reads:
“By the order dated 12 February 1944, the Führer has entrusted
the Reich Führer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret
Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its
purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get
information in the political, military, economic, and technical
spheres for the Reich. In addition, the Führer has established
that the direction of the Intelligence Service, insofar as
foreign countries are concerned, must be conducted in agreement
with the Foreign Minister. In this connection, the following
agreement between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reich
Führer SS had been reached:
“1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reich Führer SS
represents an important instrument for obtaining information in
the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at
the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for
this is close, comradely, and loyal co-operation between the
Foreign Office and the main office of the Reich Security
Service. The collection of information on foreign politics by
the diplomatic service is not affected by this.
“2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the main office
of the Reich Security Service the information on the situation
in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of
the Intelligence Service and the directive regarding German
foreign policy. It hands over to the main office of the Reich
Security Service its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere
of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of
the Secret Intelligence Service.
“3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics,
obtained by the Secret Intelligence Service, is placed. . . .”
THE PRESIDENT: Wouldn’t it be a sufficient summary of this document with
which you are dealing to say that it is a document signed by Himmler and
Ribbentrop and that it shows that there was a unification of the German
Secret Intelligence Service? The details of that unification are not
really a matter which very much concerns this Tribunal, and therefore,
as we are directed by the Charter to be as expeditious as possible, it
is not necessary to read all the details of this unification.
GEN. ZORYA: I summarize this document and would add that this agreement,
signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop, created such a state of affairs that
it became extremely difficult to differentiate prevailing conditions in
fascist Germany or to distinguish where Himmler’s Gestapo service ended
and the Foreign Office activities of the Defendant Ribbentrop began.
I shall now, with the permission of the Tribunal, proceed to the
presentation of the next document. The document which I have just
read—I am referring to the Himmler-Ribbentrop agreement concerning the
conduct of intelligence work abroad—also justifies the assumption that
under the name of German diplomatic representation in such countries
which maintained normal diplomatic relations with Germany, a whole
intelligence network of the Gestapo was actively functioning.
If this summary, in the opinion of the Tribunal, corresponds to the
contents of the document, I shall proceed to the following section of
the report, “The Satellites of Germany.”
When Plan Barbarossa was read into the record in Court, there was one
part of the entire case which, in my opinion, received comparatively
little attention. I refer to Part II of Plan Barbarossa, Document Number
446-PS. This part bears the name of “Presumed Allies and Their Tasks.” I
should like, here and now, to draw the attention of the Tribunal to the
questions touched on in this part. In the first place, I consider it
essential to remind you of the contents of this part by repeating it.
Document Number 446-PS, Plan Barbarossa, is on Page 14 of the bundle of
documents submitted to the Tribunal. I consider it essential to read out