reveals the shameless bargaining which went on between Hansen and
Antonescu. The objects of this bargaining were money, war supplies, and
human lives. Antonescu, who was beginning to feel the disadvantage of
the absence of any kind of proper agreement with Germany, insisted that
all subsequent dealings, whether of a material or any other nature, be
subjected to appropriate official agreements. He demanded from Germany
the delivery of various war supplies either of a technical or, in last
analysis, of a monetary nature. And when General Hansen said that
Germany had no lei, Antonescu replied, “If you have no lei, give us at
least arms and equipment.” That is how the document describes the policy
pursued by fascist Germany for extracting the most varied resources from
her vassals.
Now, I should like to touch briefly upon certain methods of foreign
policy which the Hitlerites used in dealing with their vassals. I should
like to dwell on the policy pursued by the Hitlerite conspirators in
regard to the question of Transylvania. Holding out the question of
Transylvania as bait, the Hitlerite conspirators forced their Hungarian
and Romanian vassals to work out their own promotion.
I submit, as Document Number USSR-294, the depositions of
Ruszkiczay-Ruediger, a former Generaloberst of the Hungarian Army.
Prior to May 1941, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger held important posts in the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Subsequently, prior to September 1942 he
commanded an army corps, after which he became Deputy War Minister of
Hungary.
Now, I should like to read the deposition of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger,
concerning the Transylvanian question. The passages which I should like
to read into the record are on Page 3 and on the top of Page 4 of the
Russian text, which corresponds to Pages 102 and 103 of the document
book:
“The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty assumed the form of a
decision which was of little profit to Hungary. The district of
Megyes-Kissármés, where natural oil could be obtained, was
reserved for Romania. In Hungarian political and military
circles this was interpreted in such a way that in the Second
Vienna Arbitration Treaty Hitler thought himself in alliance
with Romania in the war against Soviet Russia. The fact that
Hitler considered Romania a more important ally than Hungary was
explained on the grounds that in an eventual war with the Soviet
Union, Germany would undoubtedly need Romania’s southern wing
which extends to the Black Sea.
“In an official conversation which took place towards November
1940 the Chief of the Operational Group of the Hungarian General
Staff, Colonel Laszlo, told me the following:
“‘The second Vienna Arbitration Treaty has aroused bitter envy
of Romania in Hungary, and it is up to us to obtain advantages
from Hitler.’”
I would remind you that Antonescu, in his testimony, presented to the
Tribunal earlier in the day, said, when speaking of his negotiations
with Hitler:
“In November 1941 Hitler told me that the final word had not
been spoken in the Vienna Arbitration Treaty, thereby giving me
to understand that Romania could still count upon a revision of
the decision previously adopted on the question of
Transylvania.”
However, soon after, while visiting Budapest, the Defendant Ribbentrop
expressed an entirely opposite point of view.
I shall present to the Tribunal three documents which illustrate the
attitude of Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Göring under these circumstances. I
submit in evidence Exhibit Number USSR-235 (Document Number USSR-235),
containing the minutes of one of the subsequent conversations between
Antonescu and Hitler, which took place on 3 April 1942. This document
will be found on Pages 113-116 of the document book. I shall read some
excerpts from this document, on Page 3 of the Russian translation, which
corresponds to Page 113 in the document book. I quote:
“I”—Antonescu—“reminded him”—Hitler—“that the Hungarian
statesmen did not hesitate to declare openly in Parliament and
in the press after Ribbentrop’s visit to Budapest that should
they intervene”—that is, should they send their
troops—“Transylvania is to remain Hungarian; such rumors
circulate, and they greatly demoralize the Romanians. Hitler
gave me his word of honor that such promises had not been made
and could not have been made, and that this does not correspond
to actual facts.”
In this way Hitler juggled with promises to encourage his satellites.
THE PRESIDENT: Shall we adjourn now for 10 minutes?
[_A recess was taken._]
GEN. ZORYA: The next document, which I am submitting to the Tribunal as
Exhibit Number USSR-183 (Document Number USSR-183), concerns the
Transylvanian question and the Defendant Ribbentrop. It is the record of
a conference between Antonescu and Von Dörnberg, Chief of Protocol of
the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which took place at the
frontier on 10 February 1942. I am asking the Tribunal to accept this
record as evidence. This document, taken from the personal archives of
Marshal Antonescu, was captured by the advancing Red Army. I do not
consider it necessary to read the entire document into the record, and I
shall merely confine myself to a few excerpts. Will you please open your
document book on Page 116, where there is a record of the conference
between Antonescu and Von Dörnberg of 10 February 1942. I quote:
“He openly introduced the subject of the Order of Charles the
First which Herr Von Ribbentrop was claiming for himself through
various German official channels in our country, as well as
through the Romanian officials accredited to the German
Government.”
I pass to the next page, Page 117 of the document book. I quote:
“I told Herr Von Dörnberg that I would not be able to grant this
award until Herr Von Ribbentrop, at the very first opportunity,
made a public declaration also to Romania, a declaration which
would bolster up the faith of the Romanian people in their
struggle for the cause of justice and for their legitimate
claims in the Europe of the future. I would, therefore, grant
him this award on condition that it be made public only after he
had made this declaration.
“Herr Von Dörnberg asked for time to reflect on the matter.
“Next day, before entering the railway coach, he asked me to
hand him the decoration, telling me that Von Ribbentrop wanted
it and requesting me not to divulge our conversation to
Ribbentrop, since he now promised to make the award public only
upon the fulfillment of my conditions. On this condition I gave
him the decoration, without the appropriate certificate.”
Thus Ribbentrop was prepared to disclaim his Budapest statement on
receipt of the Romanian order.
I have also at my disposal a record of a conference between Antonescu
and Göring. Will you kindly turn to Page 118 of the document book.
Unfortunately, this document, discovered together with other documents
in Antonescu’s personal files, previously mentioned by me, is undated.
We submit this document as found. I present it as Exhibit Number
USSR-238 (Document USSR-238), and I am reading one excerpt only. I
quote:
“During the conversation at Karinhall, Marshal Göring was very
reticent on the problem of Transylvania. On the way, in the car,
he said to the Marshal”—that is to Antonescu:
“‘After all, why do you quarrel with Hungary about Transylvania,
which is actually more German than Romanian or Hungarian.’”
We may, presumably, agree that on this occasion Göring had expressed the
viewpoint of the fascist conspirators on the problem of Transylvania
with a sufficient degree of truthfulness.
With a view to concluding the clarification of Germany’s mutual
relations with her vassal, Romania, I should like to emphasize the
subject of crude oil. In this field, Romania was one of Germany’s
principal suppliers.
Both before and during the war the Hitlerites extracted oil from Romania
by all possible means. Antonescu, by the way, refers to this in one of
his letters which has already been read into the record. I shall now
submit two documents which sufficiently prove how important this
question was to Germany, and how significant it was considered by the
Hitlerites themselves. As Exhibit Number USSR-244 (Document Number
USSR-244), I present an urgent telegram from the Defendant Keitel,
addressed to Marshal Antonescu and received by the latter on 31 October
1942. I shall not explain in detail how this document was taken from the
personal archives of Antonescu, in the same way as the previous one. I
now read this telegram into the record and would ask you to accept it as
evidence—to be found on Page 119 of the document book:
“Telegram to the German Mission for direct transmission to
Marshal Antonescu.
“Herr Marshal! In the name of the Führer I approach Your
Excellency with a request for your personal intervention in the
matter of accelerating, as far as possible, the delivery of the
maximum possible quantity of fuel to the Italian Fleet, which is
absolutely essential to the latter for the continuance of
military operations in the Mediterranean.
“The absence and lack of all means of transport for further
operations have resulted in a critical situation in North
Africa, and the transport of supplies depends entirely on the
delivery of adequate quantities of fuel.
“I beg Your Excellency to increase to the maximum degree those
deliveries of fuel to Italy, which are exclusively reserved for
supplying the fleet called upon to maintain important positions
in the Mediterranean for the purpose of the joint warfare.
“I have chosen this method of direct appeal to you because I am
sure that your personal intervention will result in the
assistance required.
“Yours in comradely esteem, signed Keitel, Field Marshal.”
Allow me now to submit the telegram which Antonescu sent in reply to
Keitel. Please turn to Page 120 of the document book, Exhibit Number
USSR-244(a), (Document Number USSR-244(a)).
THE PRESIDENT: Could you summarize the contents of this document.
GEN. ZORYA: I can summarize the contents of that telegram in two
sentences. In reply to the Defendant Keitel’s tearful appeal to increase
to the maximum degree the fuel supplies, Antonescu replied, in a wire
addressed to Keitel, that he would meet his engagements in full, but
that the supplies previously requested by the German officials had
already been delivered and that it was impossible to send any more. If
something could eventually be saved from the quantities used inside
Romania then perhaps, somehow or other, Romania might be able to help
her allies. On the whole, Antonescu begged General Keitel to accept his
expressions of regard and high esteem, but would not give him any more
oil.
Allow me to remind you, Your Honors, that in October and November 1942
Rommel’s fate was being decided in North Africa, and that at the same
time the Red Army was barring Germany’s advance on the Grozny and Baku
oil fields on the borders of Mozdok. It is obvious that the Germans
lacked sufficient quantities of crude oil.
I shall read one extract from the minutes of a conversation which took
place on 12 February 1942, between Antonescu and the Defendant
Ribbentrop, which has not, as yet, been read into the record. I have
previously submitted to the Tribunal the record of this conversation as
Exhibit Number USSR-233. I ask you to turn to the end of Page 51 and to
Page 52 of the document book, which corresponds to Page 4 of the Russian
text. There you will find the following lines. In reply to Ribbentrop’s
question on the subject of crude oil, Antonescu stated:
“As for crude oil, Romania has contributed the maximum which it
was in her power to contribute; she can give no more. The only
way out of the situation would be to seize territories rich in
oil.”
We should note here that Antonescu was not at all original in his idea
of seizing other people’s territories, rich in oil.
I am asking Your Honors to refer to Pages 121-129 of the document book.
There is one document taken from the private office of the Defendant
Rosenberg, which is entitled, “About the Organization of the Caucasus.”
I submit this document to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-58
(Document Number USSR-58), and I would ask you to accept it as evidence.
In July 1941 the Defendant Rosenberg formulated the German opinion on
this question—Page 122 of the document book as follows:
“Germany is interested in creating a stable position in the
entire Caucasus in order to secure the safety of continental
Europe, that is, to safeguard for herself the link with the Near
East. It is only this link with the oil fields that can make
Germany and the rest of Europe independent, in the future, of
any coalition of maritime powers. The aim of German policy is to
control the Caucasus and the adjoining lands to the south, both
politically and militarily.”
Will you please turn to Page 124 of the document book as well as to Page
4 of the Russian text of the document from which I am quoting. The same
idea is formulated there by the Defendant Rosenberg with extreme
clarity. I quote, “Economically, the German Reich must take all oil into
its hands.”
Your Honors, I shall not dwell in detail on the relations between the
fascist conspirators and their other satellite, Finland, inasmuch as the
witness, Buschenhagen, offered sufficiently conclusive evidence on this
question; and the Tribunal has probably already got some definite ideas
on the subject. I just want to remind the Tribunal that according to
Paragraph 3, Section 2, of Plan Barbarossa, Finland was to cover the
advance of the German landing of Group North, consisting of units of the
21st Group, which was due to arrive from Norway, and then to operate
jointly with that group. According to Plan Barbarossa, the liquidation
of the Russian forces at Hangö was also assigned to Finland.
I would also like to remind the Tribunal that Section 2 of the temporary
Plan Barbarossa, which has been presented to the Tribunal by the
American Prosecution as Document Number C-39, mentions Finland’s
participation in the war; as I have already reported to the Tribunal,
the following sentence is to be found in this section, which corresponds
to Page 52 of the document book. “The preliminary negotiations with the
Finnish General Staff have been under way since 25 May.”
I should also like to invite your attention to the following paragraph
of the same document, Page 58 of the document book:
“Provision has been made for transportation from the Reich to
Norway of one security division and 18 artillery battalions, and
for transportation to Finland of one reinforced infantry
division complete with army corps units. Of the units, one
infantry division, two mountain divisions and the SS Group North
are designated for Case Silver Fox.
“It has been planned, on the outbreak of military operations, to
bring by rail, through Sweden, a further division for the attack
on Hangö.”
I consider that I am now justified in stating that the date of 25 May
1941, indicated in the temporary Plan Barbarossa as the date on which
the negotiations with the Finnish General Staff were opened, was
incorrect. The indication of this date, which did not correspond to
reality, was an attempt to disguise the preparations for aggression,
presenting them to the outside world as preparations for a so-called
preventive war.
In addition to the testimony of the witness, Buschenhagen, already given
to the Tribunal, I shall now present, as Exhibit Number USSR-229
(Document Number USSR-229), the depositions of a former colonel of the
German Army, Kitchmann, which I beg you to accept as evidence.
Kitchmann held the office of military attaché in the German Embassy at
Helsinki since 1 October 1941. You will find this testimony on Page 130
of the document book. I shall read a very short extract therefrom into
the record:
“A long time before 22 June 1941, the German Government and the
High Command of the German Armed Forces jointly carried out
secret negotiations with the Finnish Government and the General
Staff of the Finnish Army and prepared the attack on the Soviet
Union. I learned about the preparation for the attack on the
Soviet Union by the German and Finnish Armies under the
following circumstances: On my arrival at Helsinki in October
1941, as acting German military attaché, I had numerous
conversations with Major Von Albedill, the aide of the German
military attaché who formerly served in the Military Attaché’s
Department in the OKH, General Staff of the Army.
“Albedill acquainted me with the situation in Finland and its
military and political background, since Major General Rössing,
the military attaché, was seriously ill and receiving treatment
at the health resort of Merano in the Tyrol. In the course of
these conversations Albedill told me that already in September
1940, Major General Rössing, acting on an order of Hitler and of
the German General Staff, had organized the visit of Major
General Taloela, Plenipotentiary of Marshal Mannerheim, to the
Führer’s headquarters in Berlin. During this visit an agreement
was reached between the German and Finnish General Staffs for
joint preparations for the attack and for warfare against the
Soviet Union.
“In this connection General Taloela told me, during a conference
at his staff headquarters in Aunus in November 1941, that he,
acting on Marshal Mannerheim’s personal orders, had—as far back
as September 1940—been one of the first to contact the German
High Command with a view to joint preparation for a German and
Finnish attack on the Soviet Union.”
I ask your permission to conclude herewith the presentation of the
documents concerning the relations between fascist Germany and her
satellite, Finland, since—I repeat—Buschenhagen’s testimony has
relieved me of this necessity.
I should like to make one brief résumé:
Buschenhagen’s testimony disposes of all attempts to assert that the war
waged by Finland was a separate war and was disassociated from the war
aims of fascist Germany. Finland’s entry into the war had been envisaged
in the war plans of the fascist conspirators and corresponded to the
aggressive intentions of the Finnish rulers. The Finns, like the other
satellites of Germany, waged war in the hope of gaining whole regions
and republics of the Soviet Union.
At the conference of 16 July 1941 Hitler spoke of the Finnish claims to
Eastern Karelia, the Leningrad region, and the city of Leningrad. In
proof of this fact I refer to Document Number L-221 presented by the
United States Prosecution. The extracts quoted from this document will
be found on the corresponding page of the document book, Page 141.
Romania and Finland were two German satellites discussed in full detail
in Plan Barbarossa. The part these countries played in the plans of
German fascism was determined not only by the desire to utilize their
war potential—which without doubt was of some importance—but also by
their geographical position as operational bases on the flanks of the
Soviet Union.
The documents presented to the Tribunal bear witness to the fact that
the inclusion of these countries in the preparation for attack against
the U.S.S.R. had been carefully plotted by the fascist conspirators, in
the same way as were all the preparations connected with Plan
Barbarossa.
The third satellite of Germany, Hungary, is not mentioned at all in Plan
Barbarossa. However, this certainly cannot be taken to mean that the
participation of Hungary in the aggression against the Soviet Union had
not been planned by the fascist conspirators.
I ask permission to refer to the testimony of Paulus—although he has
already testified before the Tribunal—which formulates very
clearly. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: You aren’t going to give us Paulus’ affidavit over again,
are you? We have already had Paulus’ evidence in full.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I have already mentioned that this is on Page 182. It
is the record of the interrogation of Paulus by General Rudenko. A copy
of this record may be produced before the Tribunal now and, furthermore,
it is on Page 143 of the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: We have got his actual oral evidence; we don’t want his
interrogation.
GEN. ZORYA: But I really need one particular paragraph of his testimony
in order to show the connection between the subsequent documents
relating to Hungary and the contents of my statement. It is just a few
lines.
THE PRESIDENT: It must surely be cumulative, is it not?
GEN. ZORYA: That which was presented to the Tribunal, I could express in
my own words, in two sentences.
THE PRESIDENT: Is it in any way different from what Paulus has already
said?
GEN. ZORYA: Yes. Do forgive me! I have just been told that Colonel
Pokrovsky has already read that extract into the record. I shall
therefore merely give a very brief summary of the extract and then pass
on to a further subject and shall not repeat myself.
I have in mind, on the one hand, those paragraphs of Paulus’ affidavit
which state that the leading factor of Hungary’s policy was the full
recognition of Germany’s leading rule and that it was determined by two
basic factors, that is, the aspiration to territorial conquests with the
help of Germany and the fear of the growing power of Romania as
Germany’s ally; and, on the other hand, I have in mind that passage
where Paulus states that Hitler was far more prudent in disclosing his
plans to Hungary than to the other satellites, because he considered the
Hungarians as garrulous. It is true that Paulus immediately adds, on
Page 2 of his affidavit, that:
“The essential reason was Hitler’s unwillingness to give Hungary
a chance of seizing the oil fields in the Russian oil district
of Dragovitch.”
Following the opening of the offensive against the Soviet Union, the
Supreme Command of the Army, the OKH, issued an order to the 17th Army
to seize Dragovitch prior to the arrival of the Hungarians.
Further, Paulus describes the circumstances of his negotiations with the
Hungarians regarding armament supplies. This—all this—has already been
mentioned by Colonel Pokrovsky. I wish only to refer to the fact that
this testimony of Paulus’ has undoubtedly lifted a corner of the veil of
mystery shrouding the mutual relations between the German and Hungarian
aggressors.
In this connection, I consider it imperative to return to the
depositions by Ruszkiczay-Ruediger which are already at the disposal of
the Tribunal. This document has been presented as Exhibit Number
USSR-294.
Touching on the occupation by Hungary of the Transcarpathian Ukraine in
1939, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger testified—see Page 2, Paragraph 3 of the
Russian text of the depositions which can be found on Page 101 of the
document book. I quote the following—the quotation is underlined:
“This took place not long before the outbreak of the
German-Polish war. It then appeared as if economic advantages
and a new liberation from the Trianon Treaty were, for Hungary,
the primary objectives.
“But from the time when the region of the Transcarpathian
Ukraine acquired a common boundary with Soviet Russia, we began
to attach a perfectly different significance to this region by
military preparations concerning this area. It was clear to us,
the high-ranking officers, that the political leadership both of
Germany and Hungary also considered this region strategically
important for future military operations against Soviet Russia.”
On Page 9, Paragraph 2 from the bottom, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger tells us of
a conference which took place at the end of March 1941, in the course of
which the Hungarian Minister of War, Bartha, outlined the objectives of
the war with Yugoslavia. Among these objectives Bartha pointed directly
to the necessity of eliminating Yugoslavia as a possible ally of the
Soviet Union.
However, a more complete picture of Germano-Hungarian relations, which
were determined by the preparation of an attack against the Soviet
Union, is contained in the statement by the Hungarian Major General,
Esteban Ujszaszy. From 1 May 1939 to 1 July 1942, Ujszaszy was Chief of
the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services of the Hungarian
General Staff. In his official capacity during these years, he had
inside information on the secrets which shrouded this preparation. Some
of the things which he knew, he communicated to us in the document which
I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-155 (Document Number
USSR-155). I ask you to accept this document as evidence.
I will read into the record that part of Ujszaszy’s statement which may
clarify the question at issue. Beginning from Page 2 of the Russian
text—this corresponds to Page 149 of the document book—we find Section
2 entitled, “Preparation of Germany and Hungary for War against Soviet
Russia.” Paragraph 1 of this section is devoted to “Halder’s letters.” I
quote:
“In November 1940 the German military attaché in Budapest,
Colonel Günther Krappe of the German General Staff, was received
in audience by the Chief of the Royal Hungarian General Staff,
Henry Werth. Krappe brought a letter from the Chief of the
General Staff of the German Army, Generaloberst Halder.
“In that letter Halder informed Werth that in the spring of
1941, ‘Yugoslavia would have to be compelled, if necessary by
force of arms, to adopt a definite position in order to exclude,
at a later date, the menace of a Russian attack from the rear.
In this preventive war, possibly against Yugoslavia and
definitely against Soviet Russia, Hungary would have to
participate if only in her own interests.’”
Werth replied that he agreed with Halder’s concept but drew attention to
the lack of equipment in the Hungarian Army, which, at that time, was
not ready for war against Soviet Russia. His request, on the whole, was
for the completion, by Germany, of Hungary’s armaments. He was informed
of Halder’s letter and Werth’s reply thereto, by General Werth in
person. After that a Hungarian armament commission was invited to
Berlin. It consisted of officer-specialists from the Main Ordinance
Supply Division of the Royal Hungarian Ministry of Defense, and in
December 1940 the commission left for Berlin. The Hungarian requests
were as follows. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: General, couldn’t you pass on to December 1940, where
Field Marshal Keitel invites the Hungarian Minister of Defense to come
to Berlin. It is just a few sentences down.
GEN. ZORYA: Yes, I am passing on to this paragraph:
“In December 1940, the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed
forces (OKW), Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, invited the
Hungarian Minister of Home Defense, General Carl Bartha, to come
to Berlin in order to: a) discuss personally the problem of
armaments; b) elaborate a plan of military and political
collaboration between Germany and Hungary for the spring of
1941.
“This invitation was transmitted to Budapest through the Royal
Hungarian Military Attaché in Berlin, Colonel in the General
Staff Alexander Homlok. At the same time, I received a similar
invitation from Admiral Canaris, Chief of the Foreign and
Defense Sections of the OKW.”
I omit a long list given by Ujszaszy of persons who accompanied Bartha
on his trip, and I read further from Page 151 of the document book:
“The information which we received follows:
“In the spring of 1941 the position of Yugoslavia will be
clarified, the menace of a Russian Soviet attack in the rear
eliminated. . . . For this purpose the Hungarian Honved Army,
reinforced by the delivery of 10-centimeter field howitzers and
with up-to-date tanks for a ‘Mobile Brigade’ will be ready for
action. For the war against Russia, Hungary must make available
15 operational units (including 3 mobilized, cavalry, and Panzer
units); she must also complete, by 1 June 1941, the erection of
fortifications in Transcarpathian Russia, assist the advance of
the German troops in the area adjacent to the Hungarian-Yugoslav
and the Hungarian-Soviet frontiers and facilitate the deployment
and the passage of supplies for the troops through Hungary. The
details for the operational preparation will be determined later
by representatives of the German General Staff about to be sent
to Hungary. As a political compensation for her participation,
Hungary will receive territory in Yugoslavia and in Soviet
Russia (the ancient Principality of Halicz) and the land at the
foot of the Carpathian Mountains, up to the River Dniester.”
In March 1941 Eberhard Kienzl, a colonel of the German General Staff,
visited Budapest. The purpose of this visit was to make final
arrangements about the question of attack on Yugoslavia.
This is what Ujszaszy has to say on the matter—Page 5 of the Russian
text, Paragraph 3, from the bottom of Page 152 of the document book:
“The Colonel of the German General Staff, Eberhard Kienzl,
detachment Foreign Armies East in the OKH (High Command of the
Army), arrived in Budapest in March 1941 bringing with him a
letter from Generaloberst Halder to Generaloberst Werth. This
letter contained an insistent request on the part of Germany
that Hungary should participate in the possible war against
Yugoslavia by mobilizing the following army corps: I. Budapest,
II. Szekesfeherwar, III. Szombathely, IV. Pecs, V. Szeged, and
in the war against Soviet Russia by mobilizing 15 operational
units, including 1 cavalry division, 2 mechanized brigades, and
1 mountain (rifle) brigade.
“The letter announced the imminent arrival in Budapest of a
German delegation, headed by Lieutenant General Paulus, for
discussing combined operations and the deployment of German
troops against Yugoslavia through Hungarian territory.
“In reply to this letter General Werth issued an invitation to
the German commission, held out prospects of Hungary’s
participation in the war against Yugoslavia and of producing,
for this purpose, 3 army corps, that is, the 1st, 4th, and 5th.
“Concerning the war against Soviet Russia, he agreed in
principle, promising at least to mobilize the 8th Army Corps
(Kressikosice) as well as the mechanized operation units
demanded by Halder.
“I was informed personally about this exchange of correspondence
by Colonel of the German General Staff, Kienzl.”
THE PRESIDENT: General, speaking for myself, I cannot see that it makes
the slightest difference to this Tribunal whether Hungary was going to
put one army corps, or two army corps, or three army corps against the
Russians. It was absolutely clear from what you have already read, if we
are to believe it, that Field Marshal Keitel, in December 1940, was
demanding that Hungary should put at Germany’s disposal, for the war
against Russia, certain units. What does it matter if subsequent
negotiations alter the number of units?
It seems to me that this evidence which is given is entirely cumulative.
It doesn’t add anything in the least to what you have already given us,
and you could go on to the next document, which is Number USSR-150
(Exhibit Number USSR-150). Everything up to there is simply the
negotiations between members of the German and Hungarian General Staffs
as to exactly what units of the Hungarian Army were to be used.
GEN. ZORYA: I quite agree with the President that the presentation of
the documents on this question should be restricted.
THE PRESIDENT: The next one is 150?
GEN. ZORYA: The Ujszaszy document contains certain information
pertaining not only to the number of units pledged by Hungary to Germany
in case of war with the Soviet Union; but there is, for example, an
indication as to what methods in the preparation for war were being used
by the fascist clique in Hungary, in agreement with the Hitlerite
conspirators. I consider it imperative to dwell on these methods, and
that is why I request your permission to quote certain passages in this
document.
What I now have in mind, for instance, is the falsification of the
information regarding the number of Soviet units concentrated on the
Hungarian-Russian border.
THE PRESIDENT: Please, go on.
GEN. ZORYA: Page 155 of the document book reads as follows:
“My immediate superior, General Laszlo, as chief of the
operational group ordered the second section of the General
Staff to prepare a situation report according to which 14 Soviet
Russian operational units were concentrated on the Hungarian
border, including 8 motorized units. This situation report was
prepared by Colonel Cornel Hidai, of Intelligence.
“I should like to point out that according to subsequent
explanations supplied by the second section of the Royal
Hungarian General Staff, there were only four Soviet operational
units actually concentrated on the Hungarian border. This
circumstance I truthfully reported to Generaloberst Werth and
General Laszlo, but the latter altered my truthful, objective
report in accordance with his wishes.”
Further, Ujszaszy speaks of plans for provocation drawn up by the
militarist clique in Hungary for the purpose of creating incidents
abroad to justify an attack on the Soviet Union. Ujszaszy states—Page
10, Line 4 from the top of the document, Page 157 of the document book:
“These plans emanated from Lieutenant General Fütterer, from his
assistant Lieutenant Colonel Frimond, and from General Laszlo.
They proposed that, if necessary, German aircraft, camouflaged
as Russian planes, should bomb the eastern border districts of
Hungary, with bombs of Soviet Russian origin.”
And finally, Ujszaszy describes the events of the few days preceding the
attack on the Soviet Union—this is Page 11 of the document, Page 158 of
the document book:
“On 24 June 1941 (if I remember correctly), at 12:30 noon, I was
informed that Soviet Russian planes were bombing Raho in
Carpathian Russia and firing on trains in the vicinity with
machine gun fire. On the same afternoon news reached us that
Soviet Russian planes were bombing Kassá (Košice). The Crown
Council, with the Regent in the chair, met on the same evening
and, on the strength of Soviet Russia’s provocation, decided to
declare war on that country. I am convinced that the bombarding
was carried out by German planes with Russian markings. My
conclusion was based on the following facts:
“a) Lieutenant General Fütterer and the German propaganda
machine publicized this bombing on a very vast scale.
“b) Lieutenant General Laszlo immediately gave me orders,
through the Propaganda Subsection of Section 2 of the Royal
Hungarian General Staff, to obtain photographs of such fragments
of the ‘Soviet Russian bombs’ as could still be found and to
publish these photographs in the press of the fascist countries.
“c) Lieutenant General Fütterer, General Laszlo, and Lieutenant
General Frimond spread, by a whispering campaign, the rumor that
Slovakian pilots in Russian service had bombed Kassá (Košice).
The excellence of the hits was explained by the fact that these
pilots were well acquainted with the terrain.”
This happened, according to Ujszaszy, on 24 June 1941, at 12:30 p.m. We
have a document that establishes the fact that long before this date the
participation of Hungary in the war against the Soviet Union had been
decided. The document presented to the Tribunal and which contains the
depositions of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger explains the reasons for the
Hungarian assault on the Soviet Union. It may be that
Ruszkiczay-Ruediger’s viewpoint is not shared by everybody, but still,
as it is the testimony of the Hungarian Deputy Minister of War, this
statement can, of course, not be devoid of interest.
On Page 10 of the Russian text of his testimony, Ruszkiczay-Ruediger
states that towards the end of May 1941 he received an order to supply,
first of all, the troops concentrated in the Transcarpathian Ukraine; 2
days afterwards a secret meeting of the army corps commanders took place
at the headquarters of General Werth, Chief of the General Staff, at
which the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union was announced.
I quote from the testimony of Ruszkiczay-Ruediger—Page 108 of the
document book and Page 9 of the document itself. I am only quoting the
passages underlined, in order to save time. I quote:
“. . . General of the Infantry Werth gave us an account of the
military and political situation.
“It appears that an attack against the Soviet Union by Germany
is forthcoming, in which Romania and Hungary will take an active
part on the side of Germany.”
Ruszkiczay-Ruediger further points out that:
“The decision to declare war was taken by the Council of
Ministers, after Premier Bardossy and Minister Bartha had made
their reports, and was ratified by the Crown Council. The
question was not submitted to Parliament. “These decisions of
the Council of Ministers and the Crown Council caused no
surprise at all, and were the result of the voluntary military
collaboration with Germany which had actually existed for many
years past.
“The Hungarian General Staff and the political leaders of
Hungary as from the beginning of the aggression against
Czechoslovakia, considered Germany as their mainstay in their
plans of revision. Afterwards followed the occupation of
Transcarpathian Ukraine and the strategic organization of this
region as a military base in preparation for an attack on Soviet
Russia.”
Ujszaszy, in his report, mentioned the German military attaché in
Budapest, Krappe. The former Lieutenant General of the German Army,
Günther Krappe, was the German military attaché in Budapest from
November 1939 to 30 April 1941. After that, Krappe commanded the 10th
Corps of SS troops of the Army Group “Vistula,” and was captured by Red
Army units.
I request the Tribunal to accept in evidence a statement made by Krappe
in January of this year and presented as Exhibit Number USSR-150
(Document Number USSR-150). It should be noted that the main
circumstances mentioned in Krappe’s statement coincide with those on
Ujszaszy’s report. I shall therefore read only a few excerpts from Page
4 of Krappe’s document, corresponding to Page 165 of the document book:
“In October 1940 I was ordered by the OKH to report on the
conditions of fortifications in the region bordering Russia,
that is, in the Carpathian Ukraine. The Chief of the Operations
Section, Colonel Laszlo, informed me that, so far, there were
only simple antitank obstacles in existence, varying in depth
from 1 to 2 kilometers and that the construction of barracks for
quartering troops had just begun. The necessary surveys for
building concrete pillboxes along the border and the highways
would be made during the winter and in the spring of 1941 it
would be possible to proceed with the actual construction. It
appeared to be a question of raising some 6 million pengö.
“General Werth gave me permission to make an automobile trip
through Munkac to Urzok Pass. . . .
“I communicated the results of the inspection trip and of the
information obtained from Colonel Laszlo to Berlin. Some time
later Colonel Laszlo informed me that the necessary sums for the
building of these fortifications had already been allotted.”
In order to save time, Your Honors, I shall briefly expose the remaining
part of Krappe’s testimony. An agreement was reached with the War
Minister, Von Bartha, to organize war communications and war transports
of the German Army in Hungary. In connection with this a special
organization therefore arrived which was entrusted with these
transports. At the same time, Your Honors, permission was received to
establish jointly with the postal services, a special communication
system for military needs, and, furthermore, a number of German officers
were attached to the Hungarian Army for the interchange of experiences
and instruction of the troops. Krappe states that as from December 1940,
Hungarian industry was reorganized and worked for the increase of the
German military potential. General Leeb, the Chief of the Armament
Department, was in charge.
In concluding the presentation of documents concerning the setting up of
an aggressive bloc against the Soviet Union by the fascist war
criminals, I consider it necessary to make a few comments of a general
nature as derived from these documents.
The fascist conspirators began to adopt immediate measures for securing
the participation of Romania, Finland, and Hungary in the preparation
for the predatory attack on the Soviet Union at least as early as
September 1940, when a military mission was sent to Romania.
The negotiations concerning the military preparations for aggression
against the Soviet Union, in each of these countries, were mainly
concluded during the period September-December 1940. The negotiations
were conducted by the general staffs of the German and the satellite
armies. The subject of the negotiations in each case was of a purely
military character, such as the retraining of the troops, the
transportation of military units, the coordination of strategic plans,
the deciding on the number of divisions needed to attack the Soviet
Union, _et cetera_.
Such character of negotiations testifies to the fact that there existed
between the fascist Government of Germany and the Governments of
Romania, Finland, and Hungary, a preliminary agreement with regard to
aggression against the Soviet Union even before the negotiations began.
And, finally, the documents submitted reveal that to each of these
countries, one way or the other, the fascist conspirators had promised
some territory belonging to the Soviet Union.
I should like to point out one more circumstance.
In order fully to grasp the consequences of the predatory fascist attack
on the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, it is not enough to
confine ourselves to Plan Barbarossa. This is a strategic plan, a plan
for military attack, a plan for the beginning of aggression.
And close on the heels of the attack followed, as it is well known, the
so-called “assimilation” and “organization” of the occupied territories.
The plans for the “assimilation” and “organization,” which were plans
for the extermination of the peaceful civilian population and the
plundering of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union, were also
prepared in advance, in the same way as Plan Barbarossa.
The Soviet Prosecution declares that the documents at the disposal of
the Tribunal, and especially such documents as the directive of 13 March
1941 (Document Number 447-PS), signed by the Defendant Keitel; the order
for the application of military jurisdiction, dated 15 May 1941
(Document Number C-50), also signed by Keitel; the propaganda directive
for Plan Barbarossa (Document Number C-26); and others, testify to the
destruction not only of legal but of all moral standards of behavior by
the hordes of the fascist usurpers on the temporarily occupied Soviet
territories, this destruction having been premeditated and planned long
before the attack on the Soviet Union.
Even before the attack on the Soviet Union, the Hitlerites had decided
and outlined in appropriate paragraphs of these instructions,
directions, and orders, the terroristic methods for dealing with the
civilian population and the measures and means for plundering the land
of the Soviet Union and reducing it to a colony of the Third Reich. And
when war did break out and the whole secret was laid bare, the fascists
did not hesitate to publish all these plans in their press.
I submit to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-59 (Document Number
USSR-59), an article, published on 20 August 1942, in _Das Schwarze
Korps_, an SS paper and organ of the Reich Führer of the SS. This
article, entitled, “Should We Germanize?”—Page 180 of the document
book—states openly:
“The Reich Führer of the SS chose the following slogan for one
of the editions of the newspaper _Deutsche Arbeit_, devoted to
the problems of resettlement in the East:
“Our duty in the East is not Germanization in the former sense
of the term, that is, imposing the German language and the
German laws upon the population, but to ensure that only people
of pure German blood should inhabit the East.”
This negation of Germanization is not new. However, falling from the
lips of the Reich Führer of the SS, acting as Reich Commissioner for the
strengthening of the Volkstum, it becomes an order. Such is the exact
meaning of these words.
The rejection of the idea of germanizing the population of the occupied
territories, and the assertion that the East should be inhabited only by
people of pure German blood, signified, in practice, the mass
extermination of Soviet citizens, their spoliation and their deportation
to slave labor, the annihilation of centuries of Russian culture, and
the destruction of our cities and villages. I shall confine myself to
what I have just said, as the same theme, or rather themes, have already
been elaborated and will be presented to the Tribunal by my colleagues.
On 22 June 1941, after prolonged preparations, the German fascist hordes
hurled themselves on the Soviet Union. One hundred and seventy
divisions, concentrated on the borders of the Soviet Union from the
Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea, started the invasion.
The military problems connected with the attack were formulated in Plan
Barbarossa:
“The German Army should be ready, even prior to the end of the
war with England, to defeat Soviet Russia by operating with
lightning speed.
“To this end the Army will have to utilize all units at its
disposal, with the sole reservation that the territories
occupied must be adequately protected against all unexpected
eventualities.”
Plan Barbarossa foresaw the necessity of annihilating the Red Army, of
cutting off the possible retreat towards the interior of all Red Army
units still fit for battle and of permitting the German fascist invaders
speedily to reach a line of combat which would place the land of Germany
beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force.
As an ultimate aim, Plan Barbarossa provided for the strengthening of
the Astrakhan-Archangel line, the destruction by bombardment of the Ural
industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt, and finally, the
capture of Moscow.
THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a good time to break off?
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 13 February 1946 at 1000 hours._]
FIFTY-EIGHTH DAY
Wednesday, 13 February 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: Please continue.
GEN. ZORYA: Your Honors, yesterday afternoon I dwelt on the fact that
Plan Barbarossa had foreseen the necessity of annihilating the Red Army,
of excluding the possibility of a retreat into the interior of such Red
Army units as were still capable of fighting, and of obtaining, by rapid
action, a combat line for the German-fascist invaders which would place
the regions of Germany beyond the range of the Soviet Air Force. The
final aim, according to Plan Barbarossa, was fortification of the
Astrakhan-Archangel Line, the destruction from the air of the Ural
industries, the seizure of Leningrad and Kronstadt and, as a decisive
finale, the capture of Moscow.
The political aims which determined the military plans were formulated
by the Hitlerites in the many documents which were read into the record
in this courtroom. But these aims were stated particularly clearly at
the meeting in Hitler’s headquarters on 16 July 1941. This document was
presented by the United States Prosecution as Document Number L-221. You
will find it on Page 141 of the document book. At this meeting Hitler,
Göring, Rosenberg, Keitel, and other fascist conspirators were deciding,
as they thought, the subsequent fortunes of the Soviet Union.
The Crimea, together with the adjoining regions of the Ukraine, the
Baltic regions, the Bialystok Forests and the Kola Peninsula, were
declared as “annexed” to Germany. The Volga colonies were also to become
a part of the Reich. The Baku area was envisaged as a German military
colony. Bessarabia and Odessa were to be handed over to Romania, while
Finland was to acquire Eastern Karelia, Leningrad, and the Leningrad
region.
As you well know, Your Honors, the Hitlerites always strove to prevent
their real piratical aims from receiving publicity. At the same meeting
at general headquarters, on 16 July 1941, Hitler, for instance, said
that it was most important not to reveal their aims to the whole world,
not to complicate their path by unnecessary declarations, and, when
offering reasons for their actions, to ascribe them primarily to
tactical intentions.
The Defendant Rosenberg stated, 20 June 1941, at a conference on the
Eastern question—a record of which was presented by the United States
Prosecution as Document Number 1058-PS—that tactics were very important
and that political aims would be determined as the occasion arose, when
one slogan or another could be given publicity. This particular excerpt
from Rosenberg’s declaration you will find on Page 17 of the Russian
text of the document, which corresponds to Page 201 in the document
book.
Taking this circumstance into consideration, Your Honors, it appears of
value for our investigation to refer to some statements by the fascist
war criminals which refer to the period when they considered it possible
to make public some of their political aims. In 1941-42 the fascist
hordes broke through territories of the Soviet Union on an extensive
scale and approached Moscow. Battles were waged on the banks of the
Volga. The specter of a “Greater Germany” ruling the world appeared as a
beacon before the eyes of the Hitlerite conspirators. It would appear
that the opportunity had arrived about which Defendant Rosenberg spoke
when, from the standpoint of the fascist criminals, it was possible that
“certain political slogans could be made public.”
I presented to the Tribunal, under Exhibit Number USSR-58 (Document
Number USSR-58), a document from the archives of the Defendant
Rosenberg’s office relating to questions of German policy in the
occupied regions of the Caucasus. Once again I ask you to refer to this
document. I turn to Page 203 in the document book and Page 9 of the
Russian text, which is the translation of this document.
Rosenberg, on 27 July 1942, solved the Eastern problem in this fashion,
and I quote:
“The Eastern problem consists in bringing the Baltic peoples
under the influence of German culture and in preparing widely
conceived military frontiers for Germany. The Ukrainian problem
consists in securing food supplies for Germany and Europe and
supplies of raw materials for the Continent.
“The problem of the Caucasus is primarily a political task, and
its solution means the expansion of continental Europe, under
German leadership, from the Caucasian isthmus to the Near East.”
On 27 November 1941 the Defendant Ribbentrop made a report on the
international situation. The text of this report was published in Number
329-A of the _Hamburger Fremdenblatt_. I present this report as Exhibit
Number USSR-347 (Document Number USSR-347).
Ribbentrop said in this report:
“I should like to summarize the consequences of this defeat of
Soviet Russia and of the occupation of the far greater part of
European Russia in 1941, as follows:
“First, from a military point of view, England’s last ally on
the Continent has thereby ceased to exist as a significant
factor. Germany and Italy, with their allies, thus become
unassailable in Europe. And powerful forces will be released.
“Second, in the economic field the Axis powers, together with
their friends, which means the whole of Europe, have achieved
independence from countries overseas. Europe has once and for
all been freed from the threat of blockade. The grain and raw
materials of European Russia can fully cover the needs of
Europe. Its war production will serve Germany’s war economy and
that of her allies, as a result of which Europe’s war potential
will increase, and increase more powerfully. The organization of
this gigantic area is already in full swing.
“Thus, the last two decisive prerequisites for the victory of
the Axis and its allies over England have been created.”
I shall take the liberty of presenting another document on this same
subject. It is Goebbels’ speech in Munich, published on 19 October 1942
in the main organ of the Nazi Party, the _Völkischer Beobachter_, South
German edition. The text of this speech is presented to the Military
Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-250 (Document Number USSR-250). That is
on Page 205 in the document book. In his address Goebbels said:
“Over and above that, we have captured the most important grain,
coal, and iron ore producing regions of the Soviet Union. What
the enemy has lost we now possess. And since what the enemy
lacks has come to us, it is, according to Adam Riese, of double
value. While in the past we were a people without space, this is
today no longer the case. Today we have only to give a shape to
this space conquered by our soldiers, to organize it, and render
it useful to us; and this requires a certain period of time. But
if the English were to contend that we have lost the war because
we have lost time, then this contention will only prove how
completely they have misunderstood the entire situation. Time
only works against those who have no space and no raw materials.
If we make use of our time to organize the space we have
conquered, then time will work not against us, but for us.”
Your Honors, that which Goebbels, the Defendants Ribbentrop, and
Rosenberg said about exploiting the space captured by the soldiers, took
on, at the OKW, the shape of plans for further aggression.
In this respect the following document—which I now submit to the
Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-336 (Document Number USSR-336)—is of
interest and I ask you to accept this as evidence. This document is a
letter from the Staff of the German Navy to the commanding generals of
Groups West, North, and South. This document was discovered in German
archives by the Allied troops. The letter, which you will find on Page
209 in the document book, is entitled, “Objectives for the Further
Conduct of War upon the Termination of the Campaign in the East.” It is
numbered 1385/41 and is dated 8 August 1941.
In those days the fascist conspirators considered that victory over the
Soviet Union was really only a question of time; and they, therefore,
planned for further aggression. This letter which I am about to quote
begins with the following words:
“The Naval Operations Staff has just received the draft about
further intentions on termination of the campaign in the East.
“The following declarations describe these intentions in broad
lines and are only intended for the personal information of the
commanding generals and the Chiefs of Staff.”
There follows Part 2, Paragraph P, the eight subparagraphs of which
detail the plans to be carried out on the termination of the campaign in
the East.
I omit, Your Honors, the first two subparagraphs dealing with the tasks
of the so-called pacification of the Occupied Eastern Territories and
with the assignment to other fronts of troops which had become
available.
Subparagraph 3 details the intentions of the fascist conspirators in
North Africa. I quote:
“Strengthening of the Armed Forces in North Africa with a view
to rendering possible the capture of Tobruk. In order to
guarantee the passage of necessary transports according to plan,
attacks by the German Air Force on Malta should be resumed.
“Provided that weather conditions cause no delay and the service
of transports is assured as planned, it can be assumed that the
campaign against Tobruk will begin in mid-September.”
In August 1941 the Hitlerites intended, with the aid of fascist Spain,
to seize Gibraltar during the same year. Subparagraph 4 of Part 2 of the
letter just submitted to you envisaged that:
“Plan Felix, that is, the seizure of Gibraltar with the active
participation of Spain, must be executed in 1941.”
The Hitlerites planned the execution of an attack against Syria and
Palestine in the direction of Egypt. Subparagraph 5 of the
above-mentioned letter states as follows:
“If, once the termination of the campaign in the East has been
made known, we succeed in bringing Turkey to our side, an attack
on Syria and Palestine in the direction of Egypt is foreseen
after a minimum period of 85 days for the preparation of the
necessary forces and a preliminary securing of the Chersonese
passes and an improvement of Anatolian transportation routes
through Turkey, with German help.”
Two subparagraphs later, we find, in the same letter, in Subparagraph 8,
a possible variation of this plan:
“If, even after the defeat of Soviet Russia, it would still
prove impossible to bring Turkey over to our side, a southward
thrust through Anatolia would have to be carried out against her
will.”
Your Honors, in the plans of fascist aggression Egypt played a large
part. It is mentioned in Subparagraphs 6 and 7 of Part 2 of the letter
quoted. Subparagraph 6 mentions—I quote word for word:
“An attack on Egypt from Cyrenaica, after the fall of Tobruk
could probably not be carried out before the end of 1941 or the
beginning of 1942.”
Subparagraph 7 stated:
“If the collapse of Soviet Russia creates the necessary
conditions, an advance by a motorized expeditionary force
through Transcaucasia, in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and
in the direction of Iraq, Syria, and Egypt is envisaged.
“Because of weather conditions, this attack will only become
possible at the beginning of 1942.”
This document, which I have just presented to the Tribunal, shows the
turn of events intended by the fascist conspirators had the Red Army not
put an end to their aggression. The fascist aggressors hoped to destroy
the Soviet Union in a lightning war, to seize her wealth, to subjugate
the Soviet people, and, by these means, to open for themselves the road
to world domination.
Now, Your Honors, I have come to the end of my presentation. In
concluding the presentation of documentary evidence regarding the
aggression of the fascist conspirators against the Soviet Union, may I
ask the Tribunal’s permission to sum up briefly as follows:
1. The criminal intent of attacking the U.S.S.R. for the purpose of
plundering the Soviet Union and exploiting its riches for purposes of
further German aggression was conceived by the fascist conspirators long
before the actual launching of the attack.
2. The military preparations for the attack on the Soviet Union were
conducted by the fascist criminals for at least a year and embraced not
only Germany, but also satellite countries, particularly Romania,
Finland, and Hungary.
3. The execution of the criminal designs of the fascist aggression
consisting of the extermination of the peaceful population, the plunder
of the Soviet Union, and the wresting of its territories, was planned
long before the attack on the Soviet Union.
Fortunately for all freedom-loving nations in the world, the Union of
the Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet people, and their Red Army
completely overthrew all the fiendish plans of the fascist aggressors.
The Red Army not only withstood and stopped the fascist aggression; but,
together with the armies of its allies, brought Hitler Germany to
complete catastrophe and the fascist war criminals to the dock.
I thus end my presentation, Your Honors.
COL. POKROVSKY: Your Honors, my task today is to present to you material
on the “Criminal Violation of the Laws and Customs of War in the
Treatment of Prisoners of War.”
Before beginning the presentation of evidence relative to the
overwhelming guilt of the defendants in regard to the persons who were
captured by the German Army, I consider it essential to make a few brief
remarks.
As early as the end of the last century, the Hague Convention of 1899
established certain rules regulating the rights and responsibilities of
belligerents in regard to prisoners of war. In pursuance of the
provisions of the 1899 Convention, a number of states drew up the
necessary instructions concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. I
would like to cite three or four sentences taken from such instructions:
“The exclusive aim of the prisonership is to prevent the further
participation of prisoners in the war.
“A State may do everything necessary for the holding of
prisoners, but nothing more. . . .
“Prisoners of war may be employed to perform moderate work in
conformity with their social position. . . .
“In any case, such work must not be detrimental to health and
must not be of a humiliating nature. It must not contribute
directly to military operations against the native country of
the prisoners. . . .
“Prisoners of war lose their freedom but retain their rights. In
other words, military confinement is not an act of mercy on the
part of the captor, but the right of disarmed persons.”
It may surprise you to learn that the instructions cited are those
issued by the German General Staff in Volume 18 of the circular
published in 1902. The principle of humane treatment of prisoners and
wounded servicemen was further developed in the Hague Convention of 1907
and the Geneva Convention of 1929.
Germany’s adherence to these conventions was definitely reflected in the
German law regarding wartime courts-martial. I have in mind,
particularly, the German law of 17 August 1938, and, in particular, Part
“e”, Articles 73 and 75, which contain direct reference to the
Convention of 1929. That was at a time when Hitlerite Germany had
already begun the execution of her aggressive plans.
As the Tribunal will remember, the 23rd Article of the Hague Convention
of 1907 states, “. . . it is forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy
who, having laid down his arms and possessing no means of defense, has
unconditionally surrendered.”
It cannot be said that the brief code of the laws of war, which was, in
fact, drawn up at The Hague and Geneva, encompassed the whole range of
questions relating to the laws of war. The authors of these documents
had, therefore, inserted the following proviso, and I will cite this
excerpt:
“Until the opportunity presents itself of issuing a more
complete code of the laws of war, the High Contracting
Parties”—and I would remind the Tribunal that Germany was one
of those contracting parties—“consider it appropriate to affirm
that, in cases not provided for in the rules established by
them, the population and the belligerents remain safeguarded by
the principles of international law insofar as these principles
ensue from the customs, laws of humanity, and dictates of public
conscience in force between civilized nations.”
I should like to emphasize that in the appendix to the Convention on the
Laws and Customs of Land War (Second Peace Conference, 1907), Article 4
of Chapter 2, concerning prisoners of war, states as follows—and you,
Sir, will find the quotation on Page 4 of the document book, where it is
underlined with red pencil:
“Prisoners of war remain in the custody of the enemy government
and not of the individuals or troops which had captured them.
“They must be treated humanely.
“All their personal belongings except arms, horses, and military
papers, will remain in their possession.”
It may, therefore, be considered definitely established that the
governments of a number of states, including Germany, had
unconditionally recognized their obligations to insure conditions under
which prisoners of war should not suffer from arbitrary actions on the
part of members of the Armed Forces of any state. The natural conclusion
presents itself that in cases of violations of this obligation, the
responsibility for any crime against a prisoner of war and especially
for a definite system of crimes against the dignity, person, health, and
life of prisoners of war, must fall on the government of the country
which had signed the Convention.
In the light of the facts which I shall submit to you, on the basis of
irrefutable documents, Germany’s solemn undertakings in regard to
prisoners of war will appear to be nothing but unparalleled and cynical
mockery of the very conception of treaties, laws, culture, and humanity.
I present to the Court, as our Exhibit Number USSR-51 (Document Number
USSR-51), a note submitted by Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s
Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., dated 25 November 1941,
concerning the outrageous atrocities committed by the German authorities
against Soviet prisoners of war; and I quote several extracts from this
note, which you will find on Page 5 of the document presented to you:
“The Soviet Government is in possession of numerous facts
testifying to the systematic outrages and atrocities committed
by the German authorities against Red Army soldiers and against
commanders of the Red Army. Lately these facts have become
particularly numerous and have positively cried to high heaven,
thereby revealing once again the German war machine and the
German Government as a gang of bandits who utterly ignored all
codes of international law and all laws of human ethics.
“The Soviet Military Command is aware of numerous cases of the
subjection of captured Red Army men, the majority of them
wounded, to savage torture, ill-usage, and murder at the hands
of the German Military Command and German military units.
Captured Red Army men are tortured with bars of red-hot iron;
their eyes are gouged out, their feet, hands, fingers, ears, and
noses are hacked off, their stomachs ripped open, and they are
tied to tanks and torn asunder. Enormities and shameful crimes
of this sort are committed by German fascist officers and men
along the whole front, wherever they may be and wherever men and
commanders of the Red Army fall into their hands.
“For example, in the Ukrainian S.S.R., on the Island of
Khortitsa, on the Dnieper, after the German troops were forced
to retreat by the Red Army, the bodies of captured Red Army
soldiers who had been tortured by the Germans were found. The
prisoners’ hands had been cut off, their eyes gouged out, their
stomachs ripped open. In a southwesterly direction, in the
village of Repki in the Ukraine, after the Germans had retreated
from the positions they had occupied, the bodies of Battalion
Commander Bobrov, Political Officer Pyatigorsky, and two
privates were found. Their arms and legs had been nailed to
stakes, and on their bodies five-pointed stars had been cut with
red-hot knives. The faces of the dead men were cut and burnt.
Near these bodies was found the body of a Red Army man whom the
Germans had captured the previous day. His feet were burnt and
his ears were cut off. When our units captured the village of
Kholmy, on the Northwestern front, the mutilated bodies of Red
Army men were found. One of these had been thrown into a
bonfire. This was Private Adrei Ossipov of the Kazak S.S.R. At
Greigovo Station (Ukrainian S.S.R.), German units captured a
small group of Red Army men and kept them without food or drink
for several days. A number of the prisoners had their ears
slashed off, eyes gouged out, and hands cut off, after which
they had been run through with bayonets. In July of this year,
at Schumilino Station, German units captured a group of severely
wounded Red Army men and put them to death on the spot. In the
same month, in the vicinity of the town of Borisov,
(Bielorussian S.S.R.), the Hitlerites captured 70 severely
wounded Red Army men and poisoned them all with arsenic. In
August, near the township of Zabolotye, the Germans captured 17
severely wounded Red Army men on the battlefield. For 3 days
they gave them no food. The 17 men, their wounds still bleeding,
were then tied to telegraph posts, as a result of which three of
them died. The remaining 14 were saved from certain death by the
timely arrival of a Soviet tank unit commanded by Senior
Lieutenant Rybin. In the village of Lagutino, in the vicinity of
Bryansk, the Germans tied a Red Army man to two tanks and tore
him to pieces. At a point west of Bryansk, not far from the
Collective Farm, ‘Red October,’ 11 charred bodies of men and
officers of the Red Army captured by the fascists were found.
The arms and back of one of these Red Army men bore traces of
torture with a red-hot iron rod.
“There are a number of cases on record where the German Command
has driven captured Red Army men in front of their advancing
columns, during an attack, on pain of shooting. Such cases in
particular have been registered in the vicinity of the Vybor
State Farm, in the Leningrad region; in the vicinity of Yelna,
in the Smolensk region; in the Gomel region of the Bielorussian
S.S.R.; in the Poltava region of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and in a
number of other places.
“Wounded and sick Red Army men in hospitals which fell into the
hands of the German invaders were also systematically subjected
to outrageous indignities, torture, and savage ill-usage. On
innumerable occasions defenseless sick and wounded Red Army men
in hospitals have been bayonetted or shot by the fascist fiends
on the spot. Thus, at Malaya Rudnya, in the Smolensk Region,
fascist German units captured a Soviet field hospital and shot
the wounded Red Army men, and the male and female hospital
attendants. Among the victims were Privates Shalamov and Asimov
and Lieutenant Dileyev, who were wounded, and Verya Boiko, a 17
year-old hospital attendant, and others.
“There have been numerous cases of the abuse and violation of
woman’s honor when female hospital nurses and hospital workers
fell into the hands of the Hitlerite invaders.”
There are many similar facts in the same note. Then it continues:
“Marauding is rife among the men and officers of the Hitler
army. When the cold winter weather sets in, marauding assumes a
mass character, the Hitlerite robbers stopping at nothing in
their quest of war clothing. They not only strip warm clothes
and boots from the dead bodies of Soviet soldiers; but divest
wounded men of literally all their warm clothing—felt boots,
boots, socks, jerseys, quilted jackets, and warm caps—leaving
them stark naked. They did not even stop at taking the women’s
warm clothing from killed or wounded hospital nurses.
“Red Army prisoners were starved to death; they were left
without food for weeks or issued infinitesimal rations of moldy
bread or rotten potatoes. Depriving the Soviet prisoners of war
of food, the Hitlerites compelled them to rake the garbage cans
for remnants of food which the German soldiers had thrown out
or, as happened in a number of camps, including the camp at the
hamlet of Malaya Korma (Bielorussian S.S.R.), they fling the
carcasses of horses over the barbed wire fence to the Soviet
prisoners of war. In the Vitebsk camp, in Bielorussia, the Red
Army prisoners received almost no food at all for 4 months. When
a group of Red Army prisoners sent to the German Command a
written request for food to keep them alive, a German officer
inquired as to who wrote the statement. Five Red Army men who
affirmed that they had written it were shot on the spot.
“Similar cases of unbridled tyranny and brutality are to be
observed in other camps, Shitkiv, Demyan, and others.
“The German authorities and the German Government have
established a savage regime in the camps for Soviet prisoners of
war, with the object of mass extermination of Soviet prisoners
of war. The German High Command and the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture have issued a regulation establishing a food ration
for Soviet prisoners of war far inferior in quantity and quality
to that for prisoners of war of other countries. For instance,
this ration consists of 6,000 grams of bread and 400 grams of
meat per month, which dooms the Soviet prisoners of war to a
painful death from starvation.
“While enforcing this disgraceful and obviously unlawful regime
for Soviet prisoners of war with inhuman cruelty, the German
Government is doing its utmost to conceal from the public the
regulation it issued on this question. Thus, in reply to an
inquiry made by the Soviet Government, the Swedish Government
stated that the information concerning the aforesaid regulation
of the German Government published in the European and American
press was correct, but that the text of this regulation had not
been published and was therefore not available.”
The regulation which had not been available for the Swedish Government
in the autumn of 1941 has now become available for the International
Military Tribunal.
I assume that a very important circumstance is that these regulations
were distributed through two channels: The High Command and the Nazi
Party. In such a way, the extermination by starvation of the Soviet
prisoners of war captured by the Germans had been planned and carried
out both by the German High Command and by the Nazi Party.
I present to the Court these documents which were not available some
time ago, as a heavy load on the scale of the Prosecution. On Page 17,
Your Honors, you will find the document which has been cited by me. It
bears the Document Number D-225 (Exhibit Number USSR-349):
“High Command of the Army, Army Equipment and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Replacement Training Army.
“Berlin, 6 August 1941.
“Subject: Food ration of Soviet prisoners of war.
“The Soviet Union did not subscribe to the agreement of 27 July
1929, concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. Consequently
we are not obliged to supply Soviet prisoners of war with food
corresponding in quantity or quality to the requirements of this
regulation. Taking the general food situation into
consideration, the following rations for Soviet prisoners of war
were established, which rations were considered adequate
according to medical findings:
“The ration in the camps for the prisoners of war (not employed
on essential work) amounted to:
“1. Bread, 6 kilograms; meat, 400 grams; fat, 440 grams; sugar,
600 grams, for 28 days.
“2. For prisoners doing special work: Bread, 9 kilograms; meat,
600 grams; fat, 520 grams; sugar, 900 grams, for 28 days.”
A similar regulation, headed, “Food Ration for Soviet Prisoners of War,”
was sent as secret information by the Chancellery of the Nazi Party on
17 December 1941. I shall quote only one sentence from that Party
directive, which you will find on Page 18 of the document book:
“An open discussion of the question regarding the food supply of
the prisoners of war either orally or in writing is forbidden
because of the possibility of enemy propaganda.”
Furthermore, the authors of the document emphasize that there is no
danger of any substantial deterioration of the food supply of “our
German people.” I consider that the hint is sufficiently clear. The
document was distributed to the High Command of the Army, to the
commands of corps areas, to the military authorities in Bohemia and
Moravia, and to military commissioners in a number of cities.
The fascist conspirators established particularly low rations for men of
the Red Army. On the basis of their own estimates the monthly ration for
Soviet prisoners of war was 42 percent in regard to fats, 66 percent in
regard to sugar and bread and 0 percent in regard to meat, as compared
with the amount of food provided for prisoners of war from other armies
fighting against Germany. Moreover, there was a special note in the
directive itself. You will find the special note on Page 19 of the
document book:
“If the ration for non-Soviet prisoners of war is reduced, the
ration for Soviet prisoners of war must be lowered accordingly.”
But even these starvation rations, which could not sustain the life of
an adult person, more often than not existed only on paper.
I present another document to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-177
(Document Number USSR-177). . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I do not think it matters very much,
but when you said “0 percent” in regard to meat, when you were dealing
with the percentage, was that correct? Because in setting out the amount
of food which they were allowed, or were supposed to be allowed, there
was 400 grams of meat for ordinary men and 600 grams of meat for other
men doing special work, and I do not see how 400 grams can be 0 percent
of the ration allowed to other non-Soviet prisoners.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are quite right, Sir. I have the same figures here,
but there is no contradiction here at all. I am reporting to the
Tribunal now that there were several directives, and the first one
appears to be the best for the Soviet prisoners of war. It states that
400 grams of meat was the ration. The next directive, which established
the percentage of food supply for the Soviet prisoners of war and
others, shows 0 percent. As far as I understand it, if there was not
meat for all of the prisoners of war, the Soviet prisoners would not
receive any meat at all.
THE PRESIDENT: I see. Then you say that the words “on the basis of their
own estimates” are referring to some estimates other than the estimate
which you give. It does not matter about that, but I understand you to
say that there are other estimates which show they did not give them
anything. Please proceed.
COL. POKROVSKY: You are quite right, Sir.
I present to the Tribunal one more document dealing with the same
question. That is Exhibit Number USSR-177. You will find it on Page 21
of your document book. This is a record of a conference of the Reich
Ministry of Food (REM) under the direction of State Secretary Backe and
Ministerial Director Moritz. The document is dated 24 November 1941,
1630 hours. Among those who took part in the conference were
representatives of various departments, in particular General
Reinecke—probably the Tribunal will remember that it was Reinecke who
headed that particular phase of the work dealing with the prisoners of
war—and Ministerial Director Mansfeld. The subject under discussion was
the supply of food to Russian prisoners of war and civilian workers. I
quote—Page 21 of your document book:
“1. Types of food.
“Attempts to produce a special Russian bread have proved that a
useful mixture consists of 50 percent rye bran, 20 percent
residue of sugar beet, 20 percent cellulose flour and 10 percent
flour made of straw or leaves.
“Meat not usually employed for human consumption can never
sufficiently satisfy a demand for meat. Russians must,
therefore, be fed entirely on horse flesh and on the meat of
animals which had not been adequately slaughtered and which, at
present, is issued in double quantities on the ration cards.
“With the present technique of fat production, inferior fats no
longer exist; the Russian will, therefore, receive good edible
fats.”
These derisive words can scarcely pass unnoticed. Russian prisoners of
war, who had been receiving “meat not usually employed for human
consumption,” were now receiving on their starvation rations only “meat
which is today issued in double quantities on ration cards”; and instead
of fats they were to get certain substances which can only be used for
food because of “the present technique of the fat production.” And these
products are called “good edible fats.”
The second part of the document is entitled “Rations.” I quote; the part
being cited by me is on Pages 21 and 22 in your document book:
“Since there is a great discrepancy among the estimates of the
present experts of the Health Administration, the Reich Office
of Public Health, and the Army Medical Inspectorate as to the
necessary caloric requirements, a final decision concerning the
ration will be made in the course of the week by a smaller
circle of experts. Seven days of flour soup as a transition diet
and cancellation of the words ‘without work’ are from now on
decreed for such Russians as are at present in German camps.
“III. The number of Russians whom the Reich Ministry of Supply
can supply with food.”
I should note here that this sentence means, “The number of Russians
whom the Reich Ministry of Food (REM) can provide has now been
established.”
“State Secretary Backe was noncommittal in answer to persistent
questioning by General Reinecke and Ministerial Director
Mansfeld.”
It seems to me useful to point out that there is on the document a note
in pencil to the effect that:
“It is requested to follow up the matter of the rations because
State Secretary Backe is, apparently, beginning to lose his
nerve.”
The signature is illegible.
It seems to me that this note vividly discloses the arguments that were
going on over establishing a norm. Not by accident does it speak here of
the wide discrepancy in the estimates concerning necessary caloric
requirements of the experts of the Reich Health Administration and the
Army Medical Inspectorate. As the Tribunal will remember, the witness
Blaha testified in reply to my questions that almost all prisoners of
war who died of starvation in the Dachau Camp were men of the Red Army.
I shall submit evidence showing that the Dachau Camp was not an
exception in that respect.
On 27 April 1942 the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R. was forced to submit a new note. I present this note in our
exhibit under Number USSR-51 (Document Number USSR-51). You will find
the place I am referring to on Page 13 in your document book where it is
marked in red pencil for your convenience. I quote:
“The Soviet Government now has at its disposal many hundreds of
new documents confirming the bloody crimes committed against
Soviet prisoners of war, dealt with in the note of the
Government of the U.S.S.R. dated 25 November 1941.
“It has been incontrovertibly established that the German
Command, desiring to take revenge for the defeats inflicted on
its army in the last few months, has everywhere introduced the
practice of physical extermination of Soviet prisoners of war.
“Along the entire length of the front, from the Arctic to the
Black Sea, bodies of slain Soviet war prisoners and tortured war
prisoners have been discovered. In almost every case these
corpses bear traces of the horrible torture which precedes
murder. In dugouts from which Red Army troops have driven the
Germans, in fortifications, and also in populated centers,
bodies of Soviet prisoners are found who have been murdered
after savage torture. Facts like the following, recorded in
affidavits signed by eye-witnesses, are being uncovered with
increasing frequency.
“On 2 and 6 March 1942, on the Crimean front, in the Lilly
region at 66.3, village of Jantora, the bodies of nine Red Army
men who had been taken prisoner were found so brutally tortured
by the fascists that only two of the corpses could be
identified. The nails had been drawn from the fingers of the
tortured prisoners of war, their eyes had been gouged out and
the right breast of one corpse had been completely cut out;
there were traces of torture by fire, numerous knife wounds, and
broken jaws.
“In Theodosia scores of bodies of tortured Azerbaijanian Red
Army men were found. Among them were Ismail-Zadch Jafarov, whose
eyes had been gouged out and ears slashed off by the Hitlerites;
Kuli-Zadch Alibekov, whose arms had been dislocated by the
Hitlerites, after which he had been bayonetted; Corporal Ali
Ogly Islom-Mahmed, whose stomach had been ripped open by the
Hitlerites; Mustafa Ogly Asherov, who had been bound to a post
with wire and died of his wounds in this position.”
And then, in the same note, is cited:
“In the village of Krasnaperovo, (Smolensk region) attacking
units of the Red Army found 29 dead and two naked bodies of
captured Red Army men and officers, none of whom had a single
bullet wound. All the prisoners had been knifed to death. In the
same district, in the village of Babaevo, the Hitlerites placed
58 captive Red Army men and two women ambulance workers in a
haystack and then set fire to the hay. When the people who had
been doomed to death attempted to escape from the flames, the
Germans shot them.
“In the village of Kuleshovka, the Germans captured 16 severely
wounded men and officers, stripped the prisoners, tore the
dressings from their wounds, tormented them with hunger, stabbed
them with bayonets, broke their arms, tore open their wounds,
and subjected them to other tortures, after which those who were
still alive were locked up in a house, which was then set on
fire.
“In the village of Strenevo of the Kalinin region, the Germans
locked 50 wounded captive Red Army men in a school building and
burnt them to death.
“In the town of Volokolamsk the invaders forbade Red Army men
who had been locked on the fifth floor of house Number 3/6
Proleterskaja Street to leave the house when a fire broke out.
Those who attempted to leave or to jump from the windows were
shot. Sixty prisoners perished in the flames or were killed by
bullets.
“In the village of Popovka (Tula region), the Germans drove 140
captive Red Army men into a barn and set fire to it. Ninety five
perished in the flames. Six kilometers from Pegostye Station, in
the Leningrad region, the Germans, in the course of their
retreat, under pressure of the Red Army troops, used explosive
bullets to kill over 150 Soviet war prisoners after frightful
beatings and savage torture. On most of the bodies the ears had
been slashed off, the eyes gouged out, and the fingers chopped
off, while several had had one or both hands hacked off and
their tongues torn out. Stars had been cut out on the backs of
three Red Army men. Not long before the liberation of the town
of Kondrovo, Smolensk region, by units of the Red Army in
December 1941, the Germans executed over 200 Red Army prisoners
of war whom they had taken through the city, naked and barefoot,
to the outskirts, shooting on the spot those who were exhausted
and unable to walk any further, as well as those local citizens
who gave them bread on their way through the city.”
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now for 10 minutes.
[_A recess was taken._]
COL. POKROVSKY: In their desire to exterminate as many Soviet prisoners
of war as possible, the Nazi conspirators excelled themselves by
inventing newer and ever newer methods of extermination. The note
states:
“Of late a number of new cases have been established in which
the German Command made use of Soviet war prisoners for clearing
mine fields and for other hazardous work. Thus, in the district
of the villages of Bolshaja and Malaja Vloya, for 4 days the
Germans drove scores of prisoners lined up in close ranks, back
and forth over a mine field. Every day several prisoners were
blown to pieces by mines. Provision is made for this method of
killing prisoners in the orders of the German Command. Order
Number 109 to the 203rd Infantry Regiment states:
“‘General Field Marshal Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, has ordered that apart from military operations, the
search for mines and the clearing of mine fields be done by
Russian prisoners, with a view to sparing German blood. This
also refers to German mines.’”
The marauding mentioned in the previous note is regarded not only as
something possible, but is proclaimed as obligatory to all the soldiers
of the German Army. The People’s Commissar refers to the following
documents issued by the German Command, in stressing the fact that this
marauding, done in wintertime, doomed the Red Army men to freeze to
death:
“An order of the Staff of the 88th Regiment of the 34th German
Infantry Division, headed ‘Situation with Respect to Clothing,’
imposed: ‘Boots should be removed from Russian prisoners of war
without hesitation.’
“That this order is not an accidental one is seen from the fact
that even before the perfidious attack on the U.S.S.R., the
German Command provided for recourse to this system of supplying
its troops.
“Among the documents of the 234th Infantry Regiment of the 56th
Division, a circular was found numbered 121/4 and dated 6 June
1941, bearing the heading, ‘On the Principles of Supply in the
Eastern Areas.’ This circular states on Page 8:
“‘You must not count on being furnished clothing. Therefore it
is particularly important to remove serviceable boots from
prisoners of war and to make immediate use of all suitable
clothing, underwear, socks, et cetera.’”
The note points out:
“The Germans, with a view to exterminating Soviet prisoners of
war, deprived them of food, condemned them to slow starvation
and in some cases used a bad quality food. Soviet authorities
have in their possession Order Number 202 of the Staff of the
above mentioned 88th Regiment, which states:
“‘Carcasses of horses will serve as food for Russian prisoners
of war. Such points where carcasses of horses have been dumped
are designated by signs. They can be found along the highways in
Malo-Yaroslavets and in the villages of Romanovo and
Beloussovo.’
“Order Number 166/41 to the 60th Motorized Infantry Division is
quite outspoken in demanding the mass murder of Soviet prisoners
of war. This order states:
“‘Russian soldiers and noncommissioned officers are extremely
courageous in battle. Even small isolated units are always ready
to attack. Therefore no humane attitude towards the prisoners is
permissible. The destruction of the enemy by fire or by cold
steel must be continued until he is rendered completely
harmless. . . .’
“The regulations issued by the German Command on the treatment
of Soviet war prisoners, under Number 1/3058, contain the
following instructions:
“‘At the slightest sign of insubordination energetic and direct
action must be taken. Arms must be used ruthlessly. Bludgeons,
canes, and whips must not be used. Leniency, even towards
obedient and hard-working prisoners only indicates weakness and
must not be indulged in.’”—from Point 2.
“‘At work the distance to the prisoner must always be such as to
permit of immediate recourse to arms.’”—from Point 3.
“All this proved to be insufficient. The Order of the High
Command of the German Army, dated 14 January 1942 and issued in
the name of Hitler as Commander-in-Chief, states”—Paragraph 2:
“‘All clemency or humaneness towards prisoners of war is
strictly condemned. A German soldier must always make his
prisoner feel his superiority. . . . Every delay in resorting to
arms against a war prisoner harbors danger. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Army hopes that these directions will
be fully carried out.’
“The Soviet Government continues to receive reliable information
on the condition of captive Red Army men in the German-occupied
territories of the U.S.S.R. as well as in the German rear, and
in the German-occupied European countries. This information
testifies to the further deterioration of the regime instituted
for captive Red Army men, and that they are particularly bad off
in comparison with the war prisoners of other countries. It
further testifies to the mass dying of Soviet prisoners of war
from starvation and illness, from foul indignities and bloody
cruelty systematically applied to the Red Army men by the
Hitlerite authorities who have long since violated the most
elementary requirements of international law and human ethics.”
The note specially stresses the fact that the inhuman atrocities and the
cruelty perpetrated by the German fascist gangsters against the Soviet
war prisoners exceed the atrocities of Genghis Dhenghis-Khan, Baty, and
Mamay.
In spite of that the note, which you will find on Page 14 of the
document book, states:
“. . . In spite of all that, the Soviet Government, true to the
principles of humanity and respect for its international
obligations, has no intention, even in the given circumstances,
of applying retaliatory repressive measures against German
prisoners of war, and continues, as heretofore, to observe the
obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union with regard to the
regime for war prisoners specified by the Hague Convention of
1907, which was likewise signed but so perfidiously violated in
every one of its points by Germany.”
Later I shall quote a document written by a group of German prisoners of
war. The authors of the document, on one hand, by a series of new facts,
have added to the number of atrocities committed by the conspirators
against the Soviet war prisoners; and on the other hand, they have
confirmed that the Soviet Command is true to the principle of humanity
in its attitude towards the German captives.
The military victory of the democratic powers opened the innermost
secrets of Hitler’s archives. Along with a large number of documents
that raise the curtain on the criminal plans of the conspirators, we
have also obtained a wide opportunity of interrogating living witnesses.
A whole series of questions become finally clear as, and when, the
witnesses’ depositions are being cross-checked with the documentary
archives. Much new evidence has also been received by us on the subject
of the crimes against the prisoners of war.
Some information with regard to the criminal Hitlerite practice of
exterminating the Soviet prisoners of war appeared as of 27 April 1942,
in the official communication of V. M. Molotov, People’s Commissar for
Foreign Affairs in the U.S.S.R.
I shall here prove that this crime was part of the general conspiracy
and was planned in advance of the aggressive war against the Soviet
Union. The Tribunal will see that the regime for war prisoners was
really the sum total of diverse methods for their extermination. Let us
turn to the testimony of the witnesses.
The former Chief of Staff of the OKH, Franz Halder, interrogated on 31
October 1945, testified—I submit to the Tribunal an excerpt from this
document, Exhibit Number USSR-341 (Document Number USSR-341):
“Witness: ‘Prior to the attack on Russia, the Führer called a
conference of all the commanders and persons connected with the
Supreme Command on the question of the forthcoming attack on
Russia. I cannot recall the exact date of this conference. I no
longer know whether it took place before or after the invasion
of Yugoslavia. At this conference the Führer stated that the
methods used in the war against the Russians will have to be
different from those used in the war against the West.’”
I beg your pardon, I have forgotten to tell you that the place which I
quoted from was on Page 24 of your document book.
“Investigating Officer: ‘What else did he say?’
“Witness: ‘He said that the struggle between Russia and Germany
is a Russian struggle. He stated that since the Russians were
not signatories to the Hague Convention, the treatment of their
prisoners of war does not have to follow the articles of the
Convention.’”
DR. NELTE: Your Honor, Generaloberst Halder is in the military prison
here at Nuremberg, and he is a very important witness not only to the
testimony at hand but also in general. And I believe, according to our
principles, which have been formulated by the High Tribunal in
connection with Article 21 of the Charter, it might be important to hear
this witness personally rather than use written testimony; and I ask the
Tribunal to decide this question.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, did you wish to make any answer to Dr.
Nelte’s request?
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Tribunal, I will submit to
him my consideration in this case.
The testimony of Halder is of importance to us in one respect only,
namely, that he states the fact of a special conference called by Hitler
before the war; a conference at which the question of the treatment of
Russian prisoners of war attracted particular attention. This fact also
finds confirmation in other testimonies which were submitted by us to
this Tribunal; and, therefore, I think that there is no reason and no
need for examining this witness, since this interrogation may cause
further delay as it will refer to this question only and the German
Defense Counsel may ask unnecessary questions. In case the German
Defense Counsel would consider it advisable to request the Tribunal to
bring witness Halder here for cross-examination, it should be proper for
the Defense to submit to the Tribunal, in accordance with established
procedure, an application and explain for what reason it wants to
cross-examine Witness Halder. The Tribunal would then have occasion to
discuss this application and to grant it should they deem it proper to
do so.
That is all I wanted to point out concerning this question.
[_There was a pause in the proceedings while the Judges conferred._]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that if the interrogation of
General Halder is to be used, and it has been used, that General Halder
must be brought for cross-examination, provided it is true that he is in
Nuremberg.
When a witness is called he is liable to cross-examination and the only
reason for allowing interrogations to be used is on account of the
difficulty of bringing witnesses to Nuremberg. Therefore, if an
interrogation is allowed to be used and the witness is in Nuremberg, the
witness must be produced for cross-examination. I mean, of course, at a
time which is convenient to Counsel.
Colonel Pokrovsky, if this witness, General Halder, is in Nuremberg, you
will have him brought here at a time which is convenient to you during
the presentation of your case.
COL. POKROVSKY: With the permission of the Court, we will finally find
out where Halder is at the present time and, if he is really in
Nuremberg, he will be produced as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: We must here note a common fascist lie. Hitler was
intentionally misrepresenting facts. That the Soviet Union had pledged
to follow the statutes of the Hague Convention is generally known. Even
the criminal code of the Soviet Union provides for the defense of the
rights of prisoners of war, in accordance with international law, and
those guilty of violations are considered criminally responsible. The
note of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the U.S.S.R., Mr.
V. M. Molotov, on 27 April 1942, once again mentions the obligations of
the Hague Convention which the Soviet Union had pledged to follow. To
that note I have already referred.
Continuing, I shall again quote from Halder’s deposition concerning
Hitler’s speech. You will find it on Page 24:
“Furthermore, he”—Hitler—“said that in view of the political
level of the Russian troops”—at this point several dots follow
in the original—“to be brief—he said that the so-called
commissars should not be considered prisoners of war.”
It is impossible not to remark here that, owing to the superior
political consciousness of the Red Army soldiers, the Hitlerites saw a
commissar or a communist in almost every prisoner of war. Then there is
recorded the following question of the investigating officer and the
reply to it:
“Investigating Officer: ‘Did the Führer say anything about an
order which should be issued on the subject?’
“Witness: ‘What I have just said was his order. He said that he
wanted it carried out even if no written order followed.’”
After Halder’s deposition, in the document book on your table, there is
an extract from the deposition of the former Deputy Chief of the
Operations Section of OKW headquarters, General Warlimont, dated 12
November 1945. He was testifying on oath before Lieutenant Colonel
Hinkel of the American Army. This document is the result of work
accomplished by our American colleagues. The American Prosecution has
kindly placed this document at our disposal, which we in turn submit to
the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-263(a) (Document Number
USSR-263(a)). I think the Defense Counsel wishes to submit another
request to the Tribunal. I therefore cede my place.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President! Regarding General Warlimont, we have the same
reasons which I just mentioned regarding Generaloberst Halder. General
Warlimont is also present in Nuremberg and is at your disposal for
examination in the court. Concerning the importance. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: What do you want to request now?
DR. NELTE: My application consists in the request to disallow the use of
the document which the Soviet Prosecutor has just wished to read out
loud, and to direct that the witness, Warlimont, now present in
Nuremberg, be called as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has just ruled that the interrogation of
General Halder may be used, but if it is used—and it is being used—he
must be submitted for cross-examination by counsel for the defendants.
What more do you want?
DR. NELTE: I am not speaking about Generaloberst Halder but about
General Warlimont.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought we had already ruled upon General Warlimont;
that he had to be called—that is, only yesterday or the day before.
DR. NELTE: I believe that this ruling has escaped the memory of the
Soviet Prosecutor, otherwise he would not be reading this document out
loud but would be introducing General Warlimont to the Court in person.
THE PRESIDENT: I think the ruling of the Tribunal was that the
Prosecutor should be entitled to use the interrogation, but if he did
so, he must submit the witness for cross-examination. Therefore, the
Soviet Prosecutor is entitled to read the interrogation and General
Warlimont will then be produced for the purpose of cross-examination.
DR. NELTE: Is he obliged to do this or may he use his own discretion?
THE PRESIDENT: I suppose he might use his own discretion and call the
witness if he wanted to and not put in the interrogation.
You see, Dr. Nelte, the position of the Tribunal is this. If the
prosecuting counsel chooses to call the witness and not to use the
interrogation, of course, he calls the witness, examines the witness,
and the witness is liable to cross-examination by Defense Counsel. If,
on the other hand, the prosecuting counsel wishes to use the
interrogation, which he already has, he can do so; but if the witness is
available in or near Nuremberg, he must still be produced for
cross-examination.
The discretion which Counsel for the Prosecution has is as to whether
they use an interrogation which they already have or call the witness.
But in either case, the witness, if he is here, must be produced for
cross-examination.
DR. NELTE: The witnesses, Generaloberst Halder and General Warlimont,
are both in Nuremberg and at our disposal. I merely wish to know whether
the date when he is to be presented depends on the discretion of the
Chief Prosecutor. We are interested in the possibility of holding the
cross-examination when the Prosecution has read out the written
statement.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought that was a matter you might settle with the
prosecuting counsel as to whether you wish to cross-examine him directly
after the interrogation has been presented or after a short delay. If I
were to say that he is to be cross-examined immediately after the
interrogation has been put in probably Defense Counsel would say he
wanted time to consider the interrogation. But you can surely settle
that with Colonel Pokrovsky.
DR. NELTE: Then I will deal with Colonel Pokrovsky on this matter. Thank
you.
COL. POKROVSKY: I take the liberty of starting from the point where I
broke off. We now present to the Tribunal Exhibit Number USSR-263(a),
consisting of the minutes of the interrogation, under oath, of the
witness, Warlimont, given to Lieutenant Colonel Hinkel of the American
Army. I do not intend to read this document into the record in full.
Warlimont, in many cases, repeats Halder. The important thing is that he
confirms two facts in their entirety:
(1) That it was Hitler who conducted the meeting of which we were
informed by Halder’s testimony. (2) That, even before the war, Hitler
had issued a directive to shoot prisoners of war; pointing out that
special units were to be created for this purpose and that the SD would
follow the Army.
Warlimont further testified—I quote, and Your Honors will find the
excerpt which I quote on Page 26:
“He”—that is Hitler—“further said that he did not expect the
officer corps to understand his orders, but he demanded that
they obey his orders unconditionally.”
We have some more testimonies, those of Lieutenant General of the German
Army, Kurt von Österreich. He was the former Commander of the Prisoner
of War Section of the Danzig Military District. He personally handed his
testimonies to the representatives of the Red Army on 29 December 1945.
His testimonies, registered as Exhibit Number USSR-151 (Document Number
USSR-151), are contained in your document book. I shall read certain
excerpts into the record:
“I began my work as Commander of the Prisoner of War Section at
the headquarters of Military District XX (Danzig) on 1 February
1941.
“Prior to that I was the commanding officer of the 207th
Infantry Division, located in France.
“It was towards March 1941 that I was summoned to Berlin to
attend a secret meeting at the headquarters of the OKW. This
conference was conducted by Lieutenant General Reinecke, then
Chief of Headquarters’ Prisoner of War Section.
“Over 20 chiefs of the district prisoner of war sections from
various regions attended this conference, as well as several
staff officers of the headquarters. I cannot, at present,
remember the names of these officers.
“General Reinecke told us, as a great secret, that a tentative
invasion of the Soviet territory had been planned for the
beginning of summer 1941 and that in this connection the OKW had
elaborated essential measures, including the preparation of
camps for Russian prisoners of war expected after the beginning
of operations on the Eastern front.”
I omit 3 paragraphs and shall go on to several details of greater
importance:
“On this occasion he ordered us to construct open air camps
surrounded only by barbed wire in such cases where there would
be no time to construct roofed-in barracks for the Russian
prisoners.
“Moreover, Reinecke gave us instructions as to the treatment of
Russian prisoners of war, directing us to shoot without any
warning those prisoners who might attempt to escape.”
In my opinion, the next two long paragraphs can be omitted in order to
save time.
“After some time”—I pass on to Page 28 of your document
book—“I received a directive from the headquarters of the OKW
confirming Reinecke’s instructions to shoot without any warning
all Russian prisoners attempting to escape. I do not now
remember who signed this directive.”
The witness further testifies how he was called, either towards the end
of 1941 or the beginning of 1942 to a conference in Berlin of the
military district chiefs on prisoner-of-war affairs. The conference was
conducted by Major General Von Graevenitz. The question under discussion
was what to do with those Russian prisoners of war who were unable to
work as the result of wounds or exhaustion. I think it might be useful
to quote a few lines. They are on Page 29 in your document book:
“On the proposal of General Von Graevenitz this question was
discussed by several officers present, including doctors, who
stated that such prisoners of war unable to work should be
concentrated in one place—either in camp or in hospital—and
killed by poisoning. As a result of this discussion General Von
Graevenitz ordered us to murder war prisoners incapable of work,
using for this purpose the camp medical personnel.”
The witness asserts that when he arrived on duty in the Ukraine in the
summer of 1942, he learned there, as he says—you will find these two
lines on Page 29, “A method of murdering Russian prisoners of war by
poisoning is already adopted there.”
The witness quotes actual figures, actual facts connected with this
crime. I think it important to note a reference to this fact quoted on
the fourth page of the Russian text, third paragraph from the top, on
Page 29 of your document book:
“When I was in the Ukraine I received from headquarters a
top-secret order signed by Himmler, directing that, as from
August 1942, Russian war prisoners must be branded with a
special mark.
“Russian war prisoners were kept in concentration camps under
severe conditions, were poorly fed, subjected to moral outrages,
and died of hunger and disease.”
Österreich names facts which confirm this testimony. The following
episode is revealingly characteristic. I quote the second paragraph of
the fifth page; it is on Page 31 in your document book:
“In the beginning of 1942 when an echelon of Russian war
prisoners was being moved from the Ukraine to the city of Torun,
approximately 75 people died there, the corpses of whom were not
taken away but left in the railway car together with the
living. . . . About 100 prisoners of war who could not bear
these conditions and tried to escape were shot.”
These and similar cases are known to the witness. He enumerates them,
but I do not think it is necessary to cite all of them to the Tribunal.
They are all alike.
THE PRESIDENT: Please, proceed.
COL. POKROVSKY: Thank you. I thought the members of the Tribunal were
deliberating. I, therefore, interrupted my report. Thank you.
Österreich also speaks about directives which provide for the shooting
of all political commissars of the Red Army, Communists, and Jews. Such
an arrangement practically opened the way for the extermination of any
Soviet prisoner of war under the pretext that he was suspected of
belonging to the Communist Party or if he looked like a Jew.
In rounding up General Österreich’s testimony it is necessary to quote a
sentence mentioned, as I believe, by the Commander-in-Chief, General
Field Marshal Von Reichenau, in “The Conduct of the Army in the East.” I
submit this document to the Tribunal as our Exhibit Number USSR-12
(Document Number USSR-12). This quotation is on Page 33 in your document
book, “Supplying the civilian population and the prisoners of war with
food is a misunderstood humanitarian act as well as . . .” I submit to
the Military Tribunal this despicable directive of Hitler’s Field
Marshal and request it be accepted as evidence. This document is
registered under Number USSR-12.
Three of Hitler’s high-ranking officers confirmed that even at the
beginning of the war, at a special conference. . . .
THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us if this order was issued by Field
Marshal Von Reichenau? By the general himself?
COL. POKROVSKY: The order is signed by General Field Marshal Von
Reichenau.
THE PRESIDENT: Was it captured or what?
COL. POKROVSKY: This document was one of the trophies captured by the
Russian Army.
THE PRESIDENT: By the Russian Army?
COL. POKROVSKY: By the Russian Army.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
COL. POKROVSKY: Three of Hitler’s high-ranking officers have confirmed
that already at the beginning of the war the question of exterminating
Soviet prisoners of war was settled during a special conference.
They—the witnesses—differ slightly in detail, but the fact itself has
been quite definitely established. The sentence which I quoted from the
directive of Field Marshal Reichenau also confirms that even the supply
of food to the soldiers of the Red Army taken prisoner by the Germans
was considered as “unnecessary humanity.”
It is useful perhaps to submit to you Document Number 884-PS (Exhibit
USSR-351). It bears the signature of Warlimont and a postscript by the
Defendant Jodl. The document was drawn up at the Führer’s headquarters
on 12 May 1941. It said, “OKH had submitted the draft of a directive
dealing with the treatment of responsible political workers and similar
persons.” You have this quotation on Page 35 in the document book, as
well as the two following excerpts which I am going to quote.
The draft foresaw the “removal” of persons of this category. The
decision whether a prisoner of war falls into the group “to be removed”
is up to the officer. The document states; “By an officer with authority
to impose punishment for breach of discipline.” Thus, any junior officer
was endowed with powers of life and death over any captured Red Army
soldier, regardless of his rank or service. Paragraph 3 of this document
states:
“Political commissars of the army are not recognized as
prisoners of war and are to be liquidated, at the latest, in the
transient prisoner-of-war camps. No evacuation to the rear
areas.”
The Defendant Jodl added the, for him, characteristic postscript—you
will find it on Page 37 of the document book:
“We must reckon with possible reprisals against German airmen.
It would, therefore, be better to consider all these measures in
the nature of reprisals.”
General Österreich’s testimony concerning the existence of the order to
brand Soviet prisoners of war is fully confirmed. I submit to the
Tribunal, as Exhibit Number USSR-15 (Document Number USSR-15), Order
Number 14-802/42, given by the Chief of Gendarmerie of the Vice Governor
in the Region of Styria. It is stated in the order that it is a question
of disclosing the order of the Chief of Police. The first paragraph of
the order of the chief of the regular police states—the paragraph
quoted is on Page 38 of the document book:
“1. Soviet prisoners of war are to be branded with a special and
lasting mark.
“2. The brand is to consist of an acute angle of about 45
degrees with a 1-centimeter length of side, pointing downwards
on the left buttock, at about a hand’s width from the rectum.
This brand is to be made with the lancets available in all
military units. Indian ink is to be used as coloring matter.”
The third paragraph underlines that, “Branding is not a sanitary
precaution.”
It is stated in Paragraph 5 that, together with all Soviet prisoners of
war now entering the regions of the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and the
province of the Governor General commanded by the German Armed Forces,
all the remaining prisoners of war in the area of the Supreme Army
Command (OKW) up to September 1942 are to be subjected to branding.
The same directive was issued to the presidents of the regional labor
offices and the Reich Inspectors for Allocation of Labor. In this
Document Number 1191-PS, Page 40 of the document book, it is stated that
the order of the OKW, dated 10 July 1942, was brought to the attention
of the presidents of regional labor offices and to the Reich Inspectors
for Allocation of Labor.
Our documents numbered USSR-121, 122, and 123 are excerpts taken from
orders issued by the German military authorities, such as regimental and
divisional commanders, and confirm that the prisoners of war, in order
to “spare German blood,” were forced to clear mine fields and carry on
work which endangered their lives. Order Number 16641 of the 60th German
Infantry Division states, in explanation of the bestial treatment of the
Soviet warriors:
“Russian soldiers and noncommissioned officers are very brave in
battle. Even a small isolated unit will always attack. In this
connection a humane attitude towards the prisoners is not
permissible.”
This quotation is on Page 44 in the document book.
THE PRESIDENT: We have had that already, have we not, or an almost
identical one?
COL. POKROVSKY: You are right, Sir, I quoted this excerpt as a part of
the note of the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Molotov; and now I quote
it as part of a special German document. I consider that it is an
unprecedented event in history when, instead of respecting an enemy for
his military valor, the senior officers of Hitler’s army, in reply to
such military valor, ordered their subordinates to treat this same enemy
ruthlessly and inhumanly.