LOSS OF NEW YORK--KIP'S BAY AFFAIR--BATTLE OF HARLEM HEIGHTS.
Long Island surrendered, could New York be held? Columbia Heights,
where Fort Stirling stood, had been regarded by Lee as the "capital
point," the key of the position. Greene called the Brooklyn front "the
pass," on the possession of which depended the security of the city.
Both pass and heights were now in the enemy's hands, and New York was
at their mercy. "We are in hourly expectation," wrote Commissary
Trumbull, September 1st, "that the town will be bombarded." Lieutenant
Jasper Ewing, of Hand's riflemen, saw that the British could reduce
the place to "a heap of ashes" in a day's time. Colonel Douglas looked
for an immediate cannonade from Fort Stirling, "which," he says, "I
have the mortification to think I helped build myself." But the enemy
kept their guns quiet, as they wished neither to injure the city nor
drive our army away. They contented themselves at first with
stretching their troops along the water front from Red Hook to Hell
Gate, Newtown, and Flushing on Long Island, and threatening to land at
any point on Manhattan Island from the Battery to Harlem, or beyond on
the Westchester shore.
As for Washington, the successful retreat had not in the least
relieved him from care or anxiety. He had escaped one trap: it was of
the utmost consequence now to see that he did not fall into another.
What he feared most was a sudden move upon his rear in Westchester
County, for in that case he would be hopelessly hemmed in on Manhattan
Island. "The enemy," continued Trumbull on the 1st, "are drawing their
men to the eastward on Long Island, as if they intended to throw a
strong party over on this island, near Hell Gate, so as to get on the
back of the city. We are preparing to meet them." Haslet wrote August
31st: "I expect every moment orders to march off to Kingsbridge to
prevent the enemy crossing the East River and confining us on another
nook.... If they can coop us up in N. York by intrenching from river
to river, horrid will be the consequences from their command of the
rivers." General Heath pressed the matter of watching the Westchester
coast, and Washington, concurring with him "as to the probability of
the enemy's endeavoring to land their forces at Hunt's Point," above
Hell Gate, wrote him on the 31st: "In order to prevent such an attempt
from being carried into execution I have sent up General Mifflin with
the troops he brought from your quarters, strengthened by
reinforcements. With this assistance I hope you will be able to defeat
their intentions. I beg you will exert yourself to the utmost of your
abilities on this momentous occasion." Several days passing without
any demonstration by the enemy, Washington's suspense was only
protracted, and on September 5th he wrote again to Heath as follows:
"As everything in a manner depends upon obtaining
intelligence of the enemy's motions, I do most earnestly
entreat you and General Clinton to exert yourselves to
accomplish this most desirable end. Leave no stone
unturned, nor do not stick at expense to bring this to pass,
as I never was more uneasy than on account of my want of
knowledge on this score.
"Keep, besides this precaution, constant lookouts (with good
glasses) on some commanding heights that look well on to the
other shore (and especially into the bays, where boats can
be concealed), that they may observe, more particularly in
the evening, if there be any uncommon movements. Much will
depend upon early intelligence, and meeting the enemy before
they can intrench. I should much approve of small harassing
parties, stealing, as it were, over in the night, as they
might keep the enemy alarmed, and more than probably bring
off a prisoner, from whom some valuable intelligence may be
obtained."[173]
[Footnote 173: "The Heath Correspondence," Mass. Hist. Soc. Coll.,
1878.]
To add to his burdens, the commander-in-chief found the condition of
his army growing worse instead of improving. The experiences on Long
Island had disheartened many of the troops, and their escape had not
revived their spirits.[174] The militia became impatient and went home
in groups and whole companies, and indeed in such numbers as to
materially diminish the strength of the army. To restore order and
confidence, Washington exerted himself to the utmost. Tilghman, one of
his aids, speaks of "the vast hurry of business" in which the general
was engaged at this time. "He is obliged," he writes, "to see into,
and in a manner fill every department, which is too much for one man."
To Rodney, Haslet wrote: "I fear Genl Washington has too heavy a
task, assisted mostly by beardless boys."[175] But fortunately for the
country the general's shoulders were broad enough for these great
duties, and his faith and resolution remained unshaken.
[Footnote 174: Pastor Shewkirk notes in his diary that immediately
after the retreat "a general damp" seemed to spread over the army.
"The merry tones on drums and fifes had ceased, and they were hardly
heard for a couple of days." The wet clothes, accoutrements, and tents
were lying about in front of the houses and in the streets, and every
thing was in confusion. But this was to be expected. General Scott,
referring evidently to expressions heard among his own men, says that
some declared that they had been "sold out," and others longed to have
Lee back from the South.--_Scott's MS. Letter_, September 6th, 1776.]
[Footnote 175: Washington's aids were most of them quite young men.]
As soon as possible the army was reorganized and stationed to meet the
new phase of the situation. Several changes were made in the brigades,
and the whole divided into three grand divisions, under Putnam,
Spencer, and Heath. Putnam's, consisting of five brigades, remained in
the city and guarded the East River above as far as Fifteenth Street;
Spencer's, of six brigades, took up the line from that point to Horn's
Hook and Harlem; and Heath with two brigades watched King's Bridge and
the Westchester shore. Greene had not sufficiently recovered from his
illness, and his old troops, under Nixon and Heard, were temporarily
doing duty with Spencer's command.[176] This disposition was effected
by the 2d of September, and by it our army again occupied an extended
line, endeavoring to protect every point on the east side from the
battery to King's Bridge, or the entire length of the island, a
distance of fourteen and a half miles.
[Footnote 176: A large number of changes were made in the organization
of the army after the retreat. The Connecticut militia were divided up
and formed into brigades with the levies under General Wadsworth,
Colonel Silliman, Colonel Douglas, and Colonel Chester. A brigade was
given also to Colonel Sargent, of Massachusetts. Putnam's division
included Parsons', Scott's, James Clinton's (Glover's), Fellows', and
Silliman's brigades; Spencer's and Greene's divisions included
Nixon's, Heard's, McDougall's, Wadsworth's, Douglas', Chester's and
Sargent's brigades; while Heath had his former brigades, with a change
of some regiments, under Mifflin and George Clinton.]
The question of abandoning New York and all that part of the island
below Harlem Heights was, meanwhile, under consideration. The city
would obviously be untenable under a bombardment, and the island
equally so if the British crossed into Westchester County. Yet
Washington, strangely, we may say, expressed the conviction that he
could hold both provided his troops could be depended upon.[177] Among
his generals, Greene earnestly opposed any such attempt, and advocated
the evacuation and destruction of the place. "The City and Island of
New York," he wrote to his chief, September 5th, "are no objects for
us; we are not to bring them into competition with the general
interests of America.... The sacrifice of the vast property of New
York and the suburbs, I hope has no influence on your Excellency's
measures. Remember the King of France. When Charles the Fifth, Emperor
of Germany, invaded his Kingdom, he laid whole Provinces waste; and by
that policy he starved and ruined Charles's army, and defeated him
without fighting a battle. Two-thirds of the property of the City of
New York and the suburbs belong to the tories. We have no very great
reason to run any considerable risk for its defence.... I would give
it as my opinion that a general and speedy retreat is absolutely
necessary, and that the honour and interest of America require it. I
would burn the city." John Jay before this also proposed its
destruction. Scott urged abandonment of the place for sound military
reasons, though the move would ruin him. Washington, however, on the
2d, presented the whole question to Congress. Also convinced by the
condition of the army, that the city must be evacuated, he asked, "If
we should be obliged to abandon the town, ought it to stand as winter
quarters for the enemy?" Congress voted, in reply, that "it should in
no event be damaged, for they had no doubt of being able to recover
it, even though the enemy should obtain possession of it for a time."
On the 7th, a council of war, inferring that Congress wished the place
to be held, decided to retain five thousand troops in the city and
concentrate the rest around and above Harlem; but on the 12th the
matter was reconsidered, and a second council voted to evacuate the
city and retire to Harlem Heights. The removal of stores and the sick
had already commenced; and on the 14th, when the enemy appeared to be
on the point of crossing from Montressor's, now Randall's, Island to
the mainland, all the teams and wagons that could be found were
impressed by the quartermasters to remove the remaining stores. In one
day more the removal would have been complete and the troops all
withdrawn to the heights. In the evening of the 14th Washington left
the city, and established his headquarters at the Morris Mansion, at
One Hundred and Sixty-first Street, overlooking Harlem River and the
plains.[178]
[Footnote 177: "Till of late I had no doubt in my own mind of
defending this place, nor should I have yet, if the men would do their
duty, but this I despair of. It is painful, and extremely grating to
me, to give such unfavorable accounts; but it would be criminal to
conceal the truth at so critical a juncture."--_Washington to
Congress_, September 2d, 1776.]
[Footnote 178: Colonel Reed, the adjutant-general, wrote to his wife,
September 14th, from New York: "My baggage is all at King's bridge. We
expect to remove thither this evening. I mean our headquarters."--_Reed's
Reed._ Washington, writing of the events of the 15th, says: "I had
gone the night before to the main body of the army which was posted on
the plains and heights of Harlem." These references fail to confirm
the common statement that Washington made the Murray House on
Thirty-sixth Street his quarters for a short time after leaving the
city.]
* * * * *
The enemy made no advance from Long Island until more than two weeks
after the battle. Howe's preparations were delayed because dependent
upon the co-operation of the fleet. On the night of the 3d of
September, the frigate Rose, of thirty-two guns, sailed up the East
River convoying thirty boats, and running through the fire of our guns
at the Grand Battery, the ship-yards, and Corlears Hook, anchored
close into Wallabout Bay, where on the 5th our artillerists "briskly
cannonaded" her. After dark on the 12th, thirty-six additional boats
passed our batteries to Bushwick Creek, and the night after forty more
followed. Then towards sunset on the 14th, the frigates Roebuck,
Phoenix, Orpheus, and Carysfort, with six transports, joined the
Rose without receiving material injury from the heavy fire poured upon
them by our gunners.
On the following morning, the 15th, the British moved against
Manhattan Island, and in the afternoon New York City fell into their
possession. What occurred beforehand during the day is known as the
"Kip's Bay affair."[179]
[Footnote 179: According to the Hessian major, Baurmeister, the 13th
had been first named as the date for the attack. "On this day," he
writes, "General Howe wished to land upon the island of New York,
because 18 years ago on this day General Wulff [Wolfe] had conquered
at Quebec, but also lost his life. The watchword for this end was
'Quebec' and the countersign 'Wulff,' but the frigates were too late
for this attack as they only sailed out of the fleet at five o'clock
on the evening of the 14th."
The sailing up of these ships is described as follows by the Hon.
Joshua Babcock, one of the Rhode Island Committee who had come down to
consult with Washington in regard to military matters: "Just after
Dinner 3 Frigates and a 40 Gun Ship (as if they meant to attack the
city) sail'd up the East River under a gentle Breeze towards
Hell-Gate, & kept up an incessant Fire assisted with the Cannon at
Governrs Island: The Batteries from the City return'd the Ships the
like Salutation: 3 Men agape, idle Spectators had the misfortune of
being killed by one Cannon-Ball, the other mischief suffered on our
Side was inconsiderable Saving the making a few Holes in some of the
Buildings; one shot struck within 6 Foot of Genl Washington, as He
was on Horseback riding into the Fort."--_MS. Letter in R.I. Public
Archives._ Also in _Force_.
Baurmeister preserves the incident that Washington was often to be
seen at the East River batteries in New York, and on one occasion
"provoked the Hessian artillery Captain Krug [on the Long Island side]
to fire off 2 Cannon at him and his suite." "A third shot too would
not have been wanting, if the horses of the enemy had been pleased to
stay," adds the major.]
Kip's Bay was the large cove which then set in from the East River at
about the foot of Thirty-fourth Street. It took its name from the old
Kip family, who owned the adjacent estate. From this point breastworks
had been thrown up along the river's bank, wherever a landing could be
made, down as far as Corlears Hook or Grand Street. Five brigades had
been distributed at this front to watch the enemy. Silliman's was in
the city; at Corlears Hook was Parsons' brigade, to which Prescott's
Massachusetts men had now been added; beyond, in the vicinity of
Fifteenth Street, on the Stuyvesant estate, Scott's New York brigade
took post; above him, at about Twenty-third Street, was Wadsworth's
command, consisting of Sage's, Selden's, and Gay's Connecticut levies;
and further along near Kip's Bay was Colonel Douglas, with his brigade
of three Connecticut militia regiments under Cooke, Pettibone, and
Talcott, and his own battalion of levies.[180] Up the river a chain of
sentinels communicated with the troops at Horn's Hook, and every half
hour they passed the watchword to each other, "All is well."
[Footnote 180: We know the position of the troops from the statements
of their officers. Douglas says: "I lay with my brigade a little below
Turtle [Kips] Bay where we hove up lines for more than one mile in
length. Gen'l Wadsworth managed the lines on the right and I on the
left." Brigade-Major Fish says of Scott's brigade that they were
"marched to the lines back of Stuyvesant's," about the foot of
Fifteenth Street. Parsons was below at Corlears Hook as appears from
_Document_ 32. Silliman himself says that he was in the city. Consult
map of New York, Part II., where the position at the time of the
British attack is given.]
Very early on the morning of the 15th, which was Sunday, the five
British frigates which had anchored under the Long Island shore sailed
up and took position close within musket-shot of our lines at Kip's
Bay, somewhat to the left of Douglas. This officer immediately moved
his brigade abreast of them. The ships were so near, says Martin, one
of Douglas' soldiers, that he could distinctly read the name of the
Phoenix, which was lying "a little quartering." Meanwhile, on the
opposite shore, in Newtown Creek, the British embarked their light
infantry and reserves, and Donop's grenadiers and yagers, all under
Clinton and Cornwallis, in eighty-four boats, and drew up in regular
order on the water ready to cross to the New York side.[181] The
soldier just quoted remembered that they looked like "a large clover
field in full bloom." All along the line our soldiers were watching
these movements with anxious curiosity--that night they would have
been withdrawn from the position--when suddenly between ten and eleven
o'clock the five frigates opened a sweeping fire from their seventy or
eighty guns upon the breastworks where Douglas and his brigade were
drawn up. It came like "a peal of thunder," and the militiamen could
do nothing but keep well under cover. The enemy fired at them at their
pleasure, from "their tops and everywhere," until our men soon found
it impossible to stay in that position. "We kept the lines," says
Martin, "till they were almost levelled upon us, when our officers,
seeing we could make no resistance, and no orders coming from any
superior officer, and that we must soon be entirely exposed to the
rake of the guns, gave the order to leave." At the same time the
flotilla crossed the river, and getting under cover of the smoke of
the ships' guns, struck off to the left of Douglas, where the troops
effected a landing without difficulty. Howe says: "The fire of the
shipping being so well directed and so incessant, the enemy could not
remain in their works, and the descent was made without the least
opposition." The ordeal the militia were subjected to was something
which in similar circumstances veteran troops have been unable to
withstand.[182] Retreating from the lines, Douglas's men scattered to
the rear towards the Post Road, and the enemy who landed and formed
rapidly were soon after them. Douglas himself, who was an excellent
officer, was the last to leave, and all but escaped capture.[183]
There was no collecting the brigade, however, in any new position in
the field, for the thought of being intercepted had created a panic
among the militia, and they fled in confusion.
[Footnote 181: "The first landing was of 84 boats with English
infantry and Hessian grenadiers under command of Lieut-General
Clinton. Commodore Hotham conducted this landing, under cover of 5
frigates anchored close before Kaaps [Kip's] Bay above Cron Point, and
maintained a 3 hours cannonade on the enemy's advanced posts in the
great wood. The signal of the red flag denoted the departure of the
boats, the blue on the contrary the stoppage of the passage, and if a
retreat should become necessary, a yellow flag would be
shown."--_Baurmeister._ "Sunday morning at break of day, five ships
weighed anchor and fell in close within a musket shot of our lines
quite to the left of me. I then moved my brigade abreast of them. They
lay very quiet until 10 o'clock and by that time they had about 80 of
their boats from under Long Island shore full with men which contained
about five or six thousand and four transports full ready to come in
the second boats."--_Col. Douglas._
Major Fish wrote September 19th that the enemy's ships of war were
drawn up "in line of Battle parallel to the shore, the Troops to the
amount of about 4000 being embarked in flat bottom Boats, and the
Boats paraded."--_Hist. Mag._]
[Footnote 182: All accounts agree that it was next to impossible to
remain under the fire of the men-of-war. Major Fish says that "a
Cannonade from the ships began, which far exceeded my Ideas, and which
seemed to infuse a Panic thro' the whole of our Troops, &c." Silliman
speaks of the "incessant fire on our lines" with grapeshot as being
"so hot" that the militia were compelled to retreat. Douglas's
description is as quaint as it is expressive: "They very suddenly
began as heavy a cannonade perhaps as ever was from no more ships, as
they had nothing to molest them." Martin thought his head would "go
with the sound." Lieutenant John Heinrichs, of the Hessian yagers,
writes: "Last Sunday we landed under the thundering rattle of 5
men-of-war."]
[Footnote 183: The enemy's boats, says Douglas, "got under cover of
the smoke of the shipping and then struck to the left of my lines in
order to cut me off from a retreat. My left wing gave way which was
formed of the militia. I lay myself on the right wing waiting for the
boats until Capt. Prentice came to me and told me, if I meant to save
myself to leave the lines, for that was the orders on the left and
that they had left the lines. I then told my men to make the best of
their way as I found I had but about ten left with me. They soon moved
out and I then made the best of my way out."--See further in
_Documents_, Part II., p. 71.]
When the cannonade at Kip's Bay began, Washington was four miles
distant, at Harlem. At the first sound of the guns he mounted his
horse and rode with all possible despatch to the scene. At about the
same time, General Parsons, probably by Putnam's order, directed
Prescott's, Tyler's, and the remnant of Huntington's regiment, not
over eighty strong, to march immediately to the assistance of the
troops where the enemy were landing.[184] Fellows' brigade was also
ordered along for the same purpose.
[Footnote 184: _Document_ 32.]
At about the corner of the present Thirty-sixth Street and Fourth
Avenue stood at that time the residence of Robert Murray, the Quaker
merchant, on what was known as "Inclenberg" heights, now Murray Hill.
His grounds extended to the Post Road, which there ran along the line
of Lexington Avenue. Just above him a cross-road connected the Post
and Bloomingdale roads, which is represented to-day by the line of
Forty-second and Forty-third streets. On the south side of the
cross-road where it intersected the Post Road was a large corn-field
adjoining or belonging to Murray's estate. When Washington reached
this vicinity he found the militia retreating in disorder along both
the cross and the Post roads, and Fellows' brigade just coming on to
the field. The general, with Putnam and others, was then on the rising
ground in the vicinity of the present Forty-second Street reservoir.
In a very short time Parsons and his regiments arrived by the
Bloomingdale Road, and Washington in person directed them to form
along the line of the Post Road in front of the enemy, who were
rapidly advancing from Kip's Bay. "Take the walls!" "Take the
corn-field!" he shouted; and Parsons' men quickly ran to the walls and
the field, but in a confused and disordered manner. Their general did
his best to get them into line on the ground, but found it impossible,
they were so dispersed, and, moreover, they were now beginning to
retreat. The panic which had seized the Connecticut militia was
communicated to Fellows' Massachusetts men, who were also militia; and
now it was to sweep up Parsons' Continentals, including Prescott's men
of Bunker Hill. The latter brigade had been brought on to the ground
in bad shape through the fugitive militiamen, and when the British
light infantry appeared they broke and retreated with the rest.
To Washington all this confusion and rout seemed wholly unnecessary
and unreasonable, and dashing in among the flying crowds he endeavored
to convince them that there was no danger, and used his utmost
exertions to bring them into some order. He was roused to more than
indignation at the sight, and in his letter to Congress on the
following day denounced the conduct of these troops as "disgraceful
and dastardly."[185] Putnam, Parsons, Fellows, and others were
equally active in attempting to stop the flight, but it was to no
purpose. "The very demons of fear and disorder," says Martin, "seemed
to take full possession of all and everything on that day." Nothing
remained but to continue the retreat by the Bloomingdale Road to
Harlem Heights.
[Footnote 185: Washington's account of the panic is as follows:
"As soon as I heard the firing, I rode with all possible despatch
towards the place of landing, where to my great surprise and
mortification I found the troops that had been posted in the lines
retreating with the utmost precipitation and those ordered to support
them (Parsons' and Fellows' brigades) flying in every direction, and
in the greatest confusion, notwithstanding the exertions of their
generals to form them. I used every means in my power to rally and to
get them into some order; but my attempts were fruitless and
ineffectual; and on the appearance of a small party of the enemy, not
more than sixty or seventy, their disorder increased, and they ran
away in the greatest confusion, without firing a single shot."
There were several stories current after the affair which cannot be
traced to any responsible source. One was that the Commander-in-Chief
was so "distressed and enraged" at the conduct of the troops that "he
drew his sword and snapped his pistols to check them;" and that one of
his suite was obliged to seize his horse's reins and take him out of
danger from the enemy. Another account represents that he threw his
hat on the ground and exclaimed whether such were the troops with
which he was to defend America; another states that he sought "death
rather than life." Mr. Bancroft has shown how far these statements are
to be accepted.]
During these scenes, Wadsworth's and Scott's brigades, which were
below Douglas on the river lines, saw that their only safety lay,
also, in immediate retreat, and falling back, they joined the other
brigades above, though not without suffering some loss. The parties
now in the greatest danger were Silliman's brigade and Knox with
detachments of the artillery, who were still in the city three miles
below. When Putnam, to whose division they belonged, found that no
stand could be made at Kip's Bay or Murray's Hill, he galloped down
through Wadsworth's and Scott's retreating troops, to extricate
Silliman and the others.[186] Not a moment's time was to be lost, for
should the British stretch out their troops west of the Bloomingdale
Road to the North River, escape would be impossible. Silliman,
meanwhile, had taken post with Knox in and to the right of Bayard's
Hill Fort, from the top of which they could see the enemy occupying
the island above them. At this juncture, Major Aaron Burr, Putnam's
aid, rode up to the fort with orders to retreat. He was told that
retreat was out of the question. Knox said that he should defend the
fort to the last. But Burr, who knew the ground thoroughly, declared
that he could pilot them safely to the upper end of the island, and
Silliman's men set out for the attempt.[187] Putnam also had called in
other guards, and the entire force then took to the woods above
Greenwich, on the west side, and keeping under cover wherever it was
possible, made their way along without opposition. But it proved to be
a most trying and hazardous march. The day was "insupportably hot;"
more than one soldier died at the spring or brook where he drank; any
moment the enemy, who at some points were not half a mile away, might
be upon them. Officers rode in advance and to the right to reconnoitre
and see that the way was clear. Putnam, Silliman, Burr, and others
were conspicuous in their exertions. Silliman was "sometimes in the
front, sometimes in the centre, and sometimes in the rear." The men
extended along in the woods for two miles, and the greatest
precautions were necessary to keep them out of sight of the main
road.[188] Putnam encouraged them continually by flying on his horse,
covered with foam, wherever his presence was most necessary. "Without
his extraordinary exertions," says Colonel Humphreys, who frequently
saw Putnam that day, "the guards must have been inevitably lost, and
it is probable the entire corps would have been cut in pieces." Much,
too, of the success of the march was due to Burr's skill and
knowledge. Near Bloomingdale, the command fell in with a party of the
British, when Silliman formed three hundred of his men and beat them
off. After making a winding march of at least "twelve miles," these
greatly distressed troops finally reached Harlem Heights after dark,
to the surprise and relief of the other brigades, who had given them
up for lost.
[Footnote 186: Hezekiah Munsell, a soldier of Gay's regiment in
Wadsworth's brigade, says: "We soon reached the main road which our
troops were travelling, and the first conspicuous person I met was
Gen. Putnam. He was making his way towards New York when all were
going from it. Where he was going I could not conjecture, though I
afterwards learned he was going after a small garrison of men in a
crescent fortification which he brought off safe."--_Hist. of Ancient
Windsor_, p. 715.]
[Footnote 187: Affidavits in Davis' "Life of Burr," vol. i.]
[Footnote 188: The line of Putnam's retreat appears to have been from
Bayard's Hill Fort on Grand Street across the country to Monument Lane
(now Greenwich Avenue), which led to the obelisk erected in honor of
General Wolf and others at a point on Fifteenth Street, a little west
of Eighth Avenue. (See Montressor's Map of New York in 1775,
"Valentine's Manual.") The lane there joined with an irregular road
running on the line of Eighth Avenue, known afterwards as the Abington
or Fitz Roy road, as far as Forty-second or Third Street. There
Putnam, under Burr's guidance probably, pushed through the woods,
keeping west of the Bloomingdale Road, and finally taking the latter
at some point above Seventieth Street, and so on to Harlem Heights.
(See Map of New York, Part II.)]
Although skilfully conducted, this escape is to be referred, in
reality, to Howe's supineness and the hospitality of Mrs. Robert
Murray, at whose house the British generals stopped for rest and
refreshment after driving back our troops. Instead of continuing a
vigorous pursuit or making any effort to intercept other parties, they
spent a valuable interval at the board of their entertaining hostess,
whose American sympathies added flavor and piquancy to the
conversation. "Mrs. Murray," says Dr. Thacher in his military journal,
"treated them with cake and wine, and they were induced to tarry two
hours or more, Governor Tryon frequently joking her about her American
friends. By this happy incident, General Putnam, by continuing his
march, escaped a rencounter with a greatly superior force, which must
have proved fatal to his whole party. Ten minutes, it is said, would
have been sufficient for the enemy to have secured the road at the
turn and entirely cut off General Putnam's retreat. It has since
become almost a common saying among our officers, that Mrs. Murray
saved this part of the American army."
* * * * *
Of the Kip's Bay affair there is but one criticism to be made--it was
an ungovernable panic. Beginning with a retreat from the water-line,
it grew into a fright and a run for safer ground. Panics are often
inexplicable. The best troops as well as the poorest have been known
to fly from the merest shadow of danger. In this case, so far as the
_beginning_ of the rout is concerned, probably the militiamen did no
worse than Washington's best men would have done. A retreat from the
ship's fire could not have been avoided, though, with better troops,
the subsequent rout could have been checked and the enemy retarded.
The incident was especially unfortunate at that time, as it served to
increase existing jealousies between the troops from the different
States, and so far impair the morale of the army. It excites a smile
to-day to read that men from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland
charged New Englanders generally with provincialism and cowardice, and
that the charge was resented; but such was the fact. The feeling
between them grew to such an extent that Washington was obliged to
issue orders condemning its indulgence. The Kip's Bay panic offered a
favorable opportunity for emphasizing these charges, and the
Connecticut and Massachusetts runaways came in for their full share of
uncomplimentary epithets. The Connecticut men were remembered
particularly, "dastards" and "cowards" being the terms which greeted
their ears. All this of course could not but be ruinous to the
discipline of the army, and it was an alarming fact to be dealt
with.[189] The men south of New England were not without reason in
making their harsh criticisms, for many of the New England regiments,
the militia in particular, came upon the ground with an inferior
military organization. They were miserably officered in many cases,
and the men, never expecting to become soldiers as such, were
indifferent to discipline. But in another view the criticisms were
unfair, because the Pennsylvanians and others, in making comparisons,
compared their best troops with New England's poorest. As two thirds
of the army were from New England--more than one third from
Connecticut--men from this section were necessarily represented
largely in every duty or piece of fighting, and whenever any
misconduct of a few occurred, it was made to reflect discredit upon
the whole. There was no difference between the better drilled and
officered regiments from the several States, just as there was little
difference between their hastily gathered militia. Thus it may be
mentioned as a notable and somewhat humorous coincidence that at the
very moment the Connecticut militia were flying from the bombardment
of the ships at Kip's Bay, New Jersey and Pennsylvania militia were
flying with equal haste from the bombardment of other ships at Powle's
Hook as they sailed up the North River to Bloomingdale on the same
morning; and that while Reed, Tilghman, Smallwood, and others, were
denouncing the Kip's Bay fugitives in unmeasured terms, the indignant
Mercer was likewise denouncing the "scandalous" behavior of the
fugitives in his own command.[190]
[Footnote 189: This jealousy disappeared when the army was reorganized
and the troops became proficient in discipline. The American soldier
was then found to be equal to any that could be brought against him,
regardless of the locality from which he hailed. But in the present
campaign the sectional feeling referred to came near working mischief,
especially as it was kept alive by so prominent an officer as Colonel
Reed, the Adjutant-general. New England officers protested against the
"rancor" and "malice" of his assertions, and represented their
injurious influence to members of Congress. Washington, finding that
the matter was becoming serious, took the occasion to send a special
invitation to Colonels Silliman and Douglas to dine with him in the
latter part of September, when he "disavowed and absolutely
disapproved every such piece of conduct" which had been a grievance to
these and other Eastern officers.--_Silliman's MS. Letter._ See also
extracts in Gordon's history as to the condition of the army at this
time.]
[Footnote 190: "The militia of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, stationed
on Bergen and at Paulus-Hook, have behaved in a scandalous manner,
running off from their posts on the first cannonade from the ships of
the enemy. At all the posts we find it difficult to keep the militia
to their duty." (_Mercer to Washington_, Sept. 17th, 1776.) "I don't
know whether the New Engd troops will stand there [at Harlem
Heights], but I am sure they will not upon open ground,"
etc.--_Tilghman._ _Document_ 29.]
The events of the 15th naturally and justly roused the wrath of both
Washington and Mercer, and their denunciations become a part of the
record of the time. But in recording them it belongs to those who
write a century later to explain and qualify. Justice to the men who
figured in these scenes requires that the terms of reproach should not
be perpetuated as a final stigma upon their character as soldiers of
the Revolution. All military experience proves that troops who have
once given way in a panic are not therefore or necessarily poor
troops; and the experience at Kip's Bay and Powle's Hook was only an
illustration in the proof. These men had their revenge. If the records
of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were to be thoroughly examined, they
would doubtless show that large numbers of Mercer's militia re-entered
the service and acquitted themselves well. This is certainly true of
many of the routed crowd whom Washington found it impossible to rally
on Murray's Hill and in Murray's corn-field. Some of those who ran
from the Light Infantry on the 15th assisted in driving the same Light
Infantry on the 16th. Prescott's men a few weeks later successfully
defended a crossing in Westchester County and thwarted the enemy's
designs. Not a few of the militia in Douglas's brigade were the
identical men with whom Oliver Wolcott marched up to meet Burgoyne a
year later, and who, under Colonels Cook and Latimer, "threw away
their lives" in the decisive action of that campaign, suffering a
greater loss than any other two regiments on the field. Fellows, also,
was there to co-operate in forcing the British surrender. In Parsons'
brigade were young officers and soldiers who formed part of the select
corps that stormed Stony Point, and among Wadsworth's troops were
others who, five years later, charged upon the Yorktown redoubt with
the leading American Light Infantry battalion.[191]
[Footnote 191: The Major of this battalion (Gimat's) was John
Palsgrave Wyllys, of Hartford, who, as Wadsworth's Brigade-Major, was
taken prisoner at Kip's Bay. Alexander Hamilton and Brigade-Major
Fish, of New York, who were swept along in this retreat, also figured
prominently at Yorktown. Two young ensigns in the Connecticut
"levies," Stephen Betts and James Morris, were captains of Light
Infantry in that affair. Lieutenant Stephen Olney, of Rhode Island,
who barely escaped capture on Long Island by Cornwallis's grenadiers,
led Gimat's battalion as captain, and was severely wounded while
clambering into the redoubt; and there were probably a considerable
number of others, officers and men, who were chased by this British
general in the present campaign, who finally had the satisfaction of
cornering him in Virginia in 1781. Scammell, Huntington, Tilghman,
Humphreys, and others, could be named.]
* * * * *
When Washington found that the enemy had made their principal landing
at Thirty-fourth Street, and that a retreat was necessary, he sent
back word to have Harlem Heights well secured by the troops there,
while at the same time a considerable force under Mifflin marched
down to the strong ground near McGowan's to cover the escape of troops
that might take the King's Bridge road. Chester and Sargent evacuated
Horn's Hook and came in with Mifflin. Upon the landing of more troops
at Kip's Bay, Howe sent a column towards McGowan's, and in the evening
the Light Infantry reached Apthorpe's just after Silliman's retreat.
Washington had waited on the Bloomingdale Road until the last, and
retired from the Apthorpe Mansion but a short time before the British
occupied it. Here at Bloomingdale the enemy encamped their left wing
for the night, while their right occupied Horn's Hook, their outposts
not being advanced on the left beyond One Hundredth Street. The
Americans slept on Harlem Heights, not quite a mile and a half above
them.
"That night," says Humphreys, "our soldiers, excessively fatigued by
the sultry march of the day, their clothes wet by a severe shower of
rain that succeeded towards the evening, their blood chilled by the
cold wind that produced a sudden change in the temperature of the air,
and their hearts sunk within them by the loss of baggage, artillery,
and works, in which they had been taught to put great confidence, lay
upon their arms, covered only by the clouds of an uncomfortable
sky."[192]
[Footnote 192: The American loss in prisoners in the Kip's Bay affair
was seventeen officers and about three hundred and fifty men, nearly
all from Connecticut and New York. A very few were killed and wounded,
Major Chapman, of Tyler's regiment, being among the former.
The officer of highest rank among the prisoners was Colonel Samuel
Selden, of Hadlyme, Conn., mentioned on page 121. (See biographical
sketches, Part II.) One of his officers was Captain Eliphalet Holmes,
afterwards of the Continental line, a neighbor of the Colonel's. Being
a man of great strength he knocked down two Hessians, who attempted to
capture him, and escaped.]
During the day, meantime, the British occupied the city. After the
departure of the last troops under Silliman (Knox with others escaping
to Powle's Hook by boats) a white flag was displayed on Bayard's Hill
Redoubt by citizens, and in the afternoon a detachment from the fleet
first took possession.[193] In the evening a brigade from Howe's force
encamped along the outer line of works. The next forenoon, the 16th,
"the first of the English troops came to town," under General
Robertson, and were drawn up in two lines on Broadway. Governor Tryon
was present with officers of rank and a great concourse of people.
"Joy and gladness seemed to appear in all countenances;" while the
first act of the victors was to identify and confiscate every house
owned and deserted by the rebels. "And thus," says the now happy
loyalist pastor Shewkirk, "the city was delivered from those Usurpers
who had oppressed it so long."
[Footnote 193: _Baurmeister's Narrative._ _Shewkirk's Diary._]
* * * * *
Fortunately, the demoralizing effect of the panic of the 15th was to
be merely temporary. Indeed, before the details of the affair had time
to circulate through the camps and work further discouragement or
depression, there occurred another encounter with the enemy on the
following morning, which neutralized the disgrace of the previous day
and revived the spirits of our army to an astonishing degree. So much
importance was attached to it at the time as being a greatly needed
stimulant for the American soldier that it becomes of interest to
follow its particulars. It has passed into our history as the affair
or
BATTLE OF HARLEM HEIGHTS.[194]
Never for a moment relaxing his watch over the enemy's movements,
Washington, before daylight on the morning of the 16th, ordered a
reconnoitring party out to ascertain the exact position of the
British. The party consisted of the detachment of "Rangers,"[195] or
volunteers from the New England regiments, which had been organized
for scouting service since the battle of Long Island, and placed under
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Knowlton, of Connecticut. No
better man could have been found in the army to head such a corps, for
he had proved his courage at Bunker Hill, and on more than one
occasion since had shown his capacity for leadership. The detachment
started out, not more than one hundred and twenty strong, and passing
over to the Bloomingdale heights, marched for the Bloomingdale Road,
where the enemy were last seen the night before.
[Footnote 194: The centennial anniversary of this battle was
celebrated in 1876, under the auspices of the New York Historical
Society. The oration delivered on the occasion by the Hon. John Jay
has been published by the Society, with an appendix containing a large
number of documents bearing upon the affair, the whole making a
valuable contribution to our Revolutionary history.]
[Footnote 195: THE RANGERS.--The small corps known by this name
consisted, first, as already stated, of about one hundred men of
Durkee's Connecticut Regiment (Twentieth Continentals), who appear to
have accompanied Lieutenant-Colonel Knowlton, of that regiment, when
he went on any special service. These he took with him to Long Island.
After the battle there the Rangers were formally organized as a
separate body, composed of volunteer officers and men from several of
the New England regiments. These were borne on their respective
regimental rolls as detached "on command." For captains, Knowlton had
at least three excellent officers, men from his own region, whom he
knew and could trust--Nathan Hale, of Charles Webb's regiment, and
Stephen Brown and Thomas Grosvenor, of his own. The rolls in _Force_
show that there were officers and men in the Rangers from Durkee's,
Webb's, Chester's, Wyllys', and Tyler's Connecticut; Ward's and
Sargent's Massachusetts; and Varnum's Rhode Island. For a time they
received orders directly from Washington and then from Putnam, and
were of great service to the army in watching the enemy along the
Harlem front. They distinguished themselves on the 16th, and later in
the season, when Colonel Magaw was in command of Fort Washington, he
begged to have the Rangers remain with him, as he declared that they
were the only safe protection to the lines. (Greene to Washington.)
They remained and were taken prisoners at the surrender of the fort,
November 16th. Though probably not over one hundred and fifty strong,
their losses seem to have been heavy. Knowlton fell at Harlem Heights;
Major Coburn, who succeeded him, was severely wounded a few weeks
later; Captain Nathan Hale was executed as a spy; and Captain Brown, a
man as cool as Knowlton, was killed at the defence of Fort Mifflin
near Philadelphia, in 1777, a cannon-ball severing his head from his
body. Grosvenor served through the war, retiring as Lieutenant-Colonel
commanding the Fifth of the Connecticut line. These facts are gathered
from MS. Order Books, documents in _Force_ and _Hist. Mag._, and from
MS. letter of the late Judge Oliver Burnham, of Cornwall, Conn., a
soldier in Wyllys' regiment and one of the Rangers, in which he says:
"Soon after the retreat from Long Island, Colonel Knowlton was ordered
to raise a battalion of troops from the different regiments called the
Rangers, to reconnoitre along our shores and between the armies. Being
invited by a favorite officer, I volunteered, and on the day the enemy
took New York we were at Harlem and had no share in the events of that
day."]
The ground which Knowlton reconnoitred and which became the scene of
the action remains to-day unchanged in its principal features. What
was then known as Harlem Heights is that section of the island which
rises prominently from the plain west of Eighth Avenue and north of
One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Street. Its southern face extended from
an abrupt point, called "Point of Rocks," at One Hundred and
Twenty-sixth Street, east of Ninth Avenue, northwesterly to the
Hudson, a distance of three quarters of a mile. At the foot of these
heights lay a vale or "hollow way," through the centre of which now
runs Manhattan Street, and opposite, at distances varying from a
quarter to a third of a mile, rose another line of bluffs and slopes
parallel to Harlem Heights. This lower elevation stood mainly in the
Bloomingdale division of the city's out-ward, and is generally known
to-day as Bloomingdale Heights. In 1776 there were two farms on these
heights, owned and occupied by Adrian Hogeland and Benjamin
Vandewater, which were partly cultivated, but mainly covered with
woods. The Bloomingdale Road, as stated in a previous chapter,
terminated at Hogeland's lands about One Hundred and Eighth or Tenth
streets, and from there a lane or road ran easterly by Vandewater's
and joined the King's Bridge road near One Hundred and Twentieth
Street. East of the Bloomingdale and south of Harlem Heights stretched
the tract of level land called Harlem Plains.
After the retreat of the 15th, Washington's army encamped on Harlem
Heights, with their pickets lining the southern slope from Point of
Rocks to the Hudson. The British, as we have seen, lay at Bloomingdale
and across the upper part of Central Park to Horn's Hook. An enemy,
posted at the lower boundary of Harlem Plains, around McGowan's Pass,
where the ground again rises at the northern end of the Park, might be
easily observed from the Point of Rocks, and any advance from that
quarter could be reported at once. Nothing, however, could be seen of
movements made on the Bloomingdale Road or Heights, and it was in that
direction that the "Rangers" now proceeded to reconnoitre at dawn on
the 16th.
Knowlton, marching under cover of the woods, soon came upon the
enemy's pickets, somewhere, it would appear, between Hogeland's and
Apthorpe's houses on the Bloomingdale Road, more than a mile below the
American lines. This was the encampment of the Light Infantry, and
their Second and Third Battalions, supported by the Forty-second
Highlanders, were immediately pushed forward to drive back this party
of rebels who had dared to attack them on their own ground.
Anticipating some such move, Knowlton had already posted his men
behind a stone wall, and when the British advanced he met them with a
vigorous fire. His men fired eight or nine rounds a piece with good
effect, when the enemy threatened to turn his flanks, and he ordered a
retreat, which was well conducted. In this brief encounter the Rangers
lost about ten of their number, and believed that they inflicted much
more than this loss upon the Infantry.[196]
[Footnote 196: The Rangers were thus engaged in a distinct skirmish
before the main action of the day. Washington wrote to Congress early
on the 16th: "I have sent some reconnoitring parties to gain
intelligence, if possible, of the disposition of the enemy." A letter
in the _Connecticut Gazette_, reprinted in Mr. Jay's documents, and
which was probably written by Captain Brown, says: "On Monday morning
the General ordered us to go and take the enemy's advanced guard;
accordingly we set out just before day and found where they were; at
day-brake we were discovered by the enemy, who were 400 strong, and we
were 120. They marched up within six rods of us and there formed to
give us Battle, which we were ready for; and Colonel Knowlton gave
orders to fire, which we did, and stood theirs till we perceived they
were getting their flank-guards round us. After giving them eight
rounds apiece the Colonel gave orders for retreating, which we
performed very well, without the loss of a man while retreating,
though we lost about 10 while in action." Judge Burnham says
substantially the same: "Colonel Knowlton marched close to the enemy
as they lay on one of the Harlem Heights, and discharged a few rounds,
and then retreated over the hill out of sight of the enemy and
concealed us behind a low stone wall. The Colonel marked a place about
eight or ten rods from the wall, and charged us not to rise or fire a
gun until the enemy reached that place. The British followed in solid
column, and soon were on the ground designated when we gave them nine
rounds and retreated.... Our number engaged was only about 120."]
At his headquarters in the Morris Mansion, Washington, meantime, was
writing his despatches to Congress. The unwelcome duty fell to him to
report the scenes of the previous day which had so deeply stirred his
indignation. He made a plain statement of the facts, described the
retreat from New York, acknowledged the loss of baggage and cannon,
and despondently expressed his misgivings as to the soldierly
qualities of a majority of his troops. "We are now," he wrote,
"encamped with the main body of the army on the Heights of Harlem,
where I should hope the enemy would meet with a defeat in case of an
attack, if the generality of our troops would behave with tolerable
bravery. But experience, to my extreme affliction, has convinced me
that this is rather to be wished for than expected. However, I trust
that there are many who will act like men, and show themselves worthy
of the blessings of freedom." Not unfounded was this trust, for at the
very time the commander-in-chief was writing the words, the Rangers
were bravely fighting in the Bloomingdale Woods, and many others soon
after, including one of the very regiments which fled from Kip's Bay
twenty-four hours before, were likewise to act "like men" and prove
their real worth in the open field. Just as the letters were sent off
word came in to headquarters that the enemy had appeared in several
large bodies upon the plains, and Washington rode down to the
picket-posts to make the necessary dispositions in case of an attack.
Adjutant-General Reed and Lieutenant Tilghman, who had also been
writing private letters describing Sunday's panic, and other members
of the staff, went to the front about the same time. Knowlton's men
had not yet come in, and their fire was distinctly heard from the
Point of Rocks, where the commander-in-chief was now surveying the
situation. Anxious to learn whether the British were approaching in
force on the Bloomingdale Heights, no attack being threatened from the
plains, Colonel Reed received permission to go "down to our most
advanced guard," namely, to the Rangers, whom he found making a
momentary halt on their retreat. The enemy soon came up again in
large numbers, and the Rangers continued to retire. Colonel Reed,
describing his experience at this point, states that the British
advanced so rapidly that he had not quitted a house (which may have
been Vandewater's) five minutes before they were in possession of it.
"Finding how things were going," to use Reed's words, he returned to
Washington "to get some support for the brave fellows who had behaved
so well." Knowlton, however, fell back to our lines, and the enemy
halted in their pursuit on the north-east edge of Bloomingdale
Heights, opposite the Point of Rocks, where a part of them appeared in
open sight, and "in the most insulting manner" sounded their
bugle-horns as if on a fox chase. "I never felt such a sensation
before," says Reed; "it seemed to crown our disgrace." But the chase
was not yet over.
Learning from Knowlton that the British Infantry who had followed him
in were about three hundred strong, and knowing that they were some
distance from their main army, Washington determined, if possible, to
effect their capture. Knowlton's men, who had done nobly, were ready
for another brush, and there were troops at hand who could be depended
upon to behave well under any circumstances. The opportunity for a
brisk and successful skirmish presented itself, and the general
proposed to improve it. Accordingly he formed the plan of engaging the
enemy's attention in their front, while a flanking party should
attempt to get into their rear and cut off their escape. The troops
that were stationed nearest to the Point of Rocks at this time appear
to have been Nixon's brigade, of Greene's division, Weedon's newly
arrived regiment of Virginians, General Beall's Marylanders, Colonel
Sargent's eastern brigade, Clinton's and Scott's brigades, and other
regiments belonging to Putnam's and Spencer's divisions. For the
flanking detachment, the general selected Knowlton's Rangers, to whom
he added a reinforcement of three of the Virginia companies, about one
hundred and twenty men, under Major Andrew Leitch. These were directed
to make their way or "steal around" to the rear of the enemy by their
right flank. To make a demonstration against the enemy in their front,
while the flanking party effected its object, a detachment of
volunteers was organized from Nixon's brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel
Archibald Crary, of Varnum's Rhode Islanders,[197] who marched down
into the "hollow way" directly towards the British on the opposite
ridge. As Washington hoped, this move had the desired effect. The
British, seeing so small a party coming out against them, immediately
ran down the rocky hill into an open field, where they took post
behind some bushes and a rail fence that extended from the hill to the
post road about four hundred yards in front of the Point of
Rocks.[198] This field was part of the old Kortwright farm, lying
just west of the present Harlem Lane, above One Hundred and Eighteenth
Street, in which the line of that fence had been established for more
than half a century before this engagement, and where it remained the
same for more than half a century after. It is possible to-day to fix
its exact position, for the march of modern improvements has not yet
disturbed the site.
[Footnote 197: Captain John Gooch, of Varnum's regiment, wrote
September 23d: "On the 16th the enemy advanced and took possession of
a hight on our right flank about half a mile Distance with about 3000
[300?] men; a party from our brigade of 150 men, who turned out as
volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Crary, of the
regmt I belong to, were ordered out if possible to dispossess
them."--_Document_ 30.]
[Footnote 198: Tilghman's reference to these movements is as follows:
"The General rode down to our farthest lines, and when he came near
them heard a firing, which he was informed was between our scouts and
the outguards of the enemy. When our men [Knowlton's] came in they
informed the General that there was a party of about 300 behind a
woody hill, tho' they only showed a very small party to us. Upon this
the General laid a plan for attacking them in the rear and cutting off
their retreat, which was to be effected in the following manner: Major
Leitch, with three companies of Colo Weedon's Virginia regiment,
and Colo Knowlton with his Rangers, were to steal round while a
party [Crary's] were to march towards them and seem as if they
intended to attack in front, but not to make any real attack till they
saw our men fairly in their rear. The bait took as to one part; as
soon as they saw our party in front the enemy ran down the hill and
took possession of some fences and bushes and began to fire at them,
but at too great distance to do much execution," etc.--_Document_ 29.
See also Washington's letter to Congress, Sept. 18th, 1776.]
In order to keep the enemy engaged at that point, Crary's party opened
fire at long range, to which the British replied, but not much
execution was done on either side. Meanwhile Knowlton and Leitch moved
out to get in the rear. Colonel Reed accompanied the party, and as he
had been over the ground he undertook the lead, with the Virginians in
advance. It was probably his intention to march down under cover of
the bushes, cross the Kortwright farm unobserved some little distance
below the enemy, and reach the top of the Bloomingdale ridge before
they were discovered. Once there, the British would be effectually
hemmed in. Unfortunately, however, some "inferior officers," as it
would appear, gave unauthorized directions to the flanking party; or
the party forming the "feint" in front pushed on too soon, in
consequence of which Leitch and Knowlton made their attack rather on
the British flank than in their rear.[199] The latter now finding a
retreat necessary, left the fence and started back up the hill which
they had descended. Our men quickly followed, Crary in front, Knowlton
and Leitch on the left, and with the Virginians leading, joined in the
pursuit with splendid spirit and animation. They rushed up the slope,
on about the line of One Hundred and Twentieth Street, and, climbing
over the rocks, poured in their volleys upon the running Light
Infantry.
[Footnote 199: It is quite clear that Knowlton and Leitch did not form
two parties, as some accounts state, one moving against the right
flank of the enemy and the other against the left. They acted as one
body, the Virginians marching in front, having been ordered on to
"reinforce" Knowlton. Thus Captain Brown writes that after retreating
they "sent off for a reinforcement," which they soon received; and
Colonel Reed confirms this in his testimony at the court-martial of a
soldier who acted a cowardly part in the fight. "On Monday forenoon,"
he says, "I left Colonel Knowlton with a design to send him a
reinforcement. I had accordingly ordered up Major Leitch, and was
going up to where the firing was," etc. (_Force_, 5th Series, vol. ii.
p. 500.) Reed's letters to his wife show that Leitch and Knowlton fell
near him, within a few minutes of each other, which could not have
been the case had they been on opposite flanks. The accounts of
Tilghman, Marshall, the soldier Martin, and others, leave no doubt as
to this point that there was but one flanking party, and that Knowlton
commanded it.]
It was right here, now, just on the crest of the ridge, and when our
gallant advance was turning the tide against the enemy, that we
suffered the loss of those two noble leaders whose memory is linked
with this day's action. In a very short time after the first rush,
Leitch was severely wounded not far from Reed, having received three
balls in his side in as many minutes; and in less than ten minutes
after a bullet pierced Knowlton's body, and he too fell mortally
wounded. We can identify the spot where the fall of these brave
officers occurred as on the summit of the Bloomingdale Heights below
One Hundred and Nineteenth Street, and about half way between the line
of Ninth and Tenth Avenues. The site is included within the limits of
the proposed "Morningside Park," which will thus have added to its
natural attractiveness a never-fading historical association.[200]
[Footnote 200: Judge Burnham refers to the flank attack briefly as
follows: "Passing over we met the enemy's right flank which had been
posted out of our sight on lower ground. They fired and killed Colonel
Knowlton and nearly all that had reached the top of the height." This
reference to the _top of the height_, taken in connection with Reed's
statement that "our brave fellows mounted up the rocks and attacked
them as they ran in turn," goes to confirm the selection of the spot
where Leitch and Knowlton fell. Burnham states that he was within a
few feet of the latter when he was shot.]
Leitch was borne to the rear to be tenderly cared for until his death
at a later day. In after years the Government remembered his services
by granting his widow a generous pension. Knowlton met his fate with a
soldier's fortitude and a patriot's devotion. "My poor Colonel,"
writes an officer of the Rangers, who without doubt was Captain
Stephen Brown, next in rank to Knowlton, "my poor Colonel, in the
second attack, was shot just by my side. The ball entered the small of
his back. I took hold of him, asked him if he was badly wounded? He
told me he was; but says he, 'I do not value my life if we do but get
the day.' I then ordered two men to carry him off. He desired me by
all means to keep up this flank. He seemed as unconcerned and calm as
tho' nothing had happened to him." Reed, on whose horse the colonel
was carried to the lines, wrote to his wife on the following day: "Our
loss is also considerable. The Virginia Major (Leitch) who went up
first with me was wounded with three shot in less than three minutes;
but our greatest loss was a brave officer from Connecticut, whose name
and spirit ought to be immortalized--one Colonel Knowlton. I assisted
him off, and when gasping in the agonies of death, all his inquiry was
if we had drove the enemy." Washington spoke of him in his letters and
orders as "a valuable and gallant officer," who would have been "an
honor to any country."
Meanwhile the Rangers and Virginians kept up their attack under their
captains, and Washington, finding that the entire party needed
support, sent forward three of the Maryland Independent companies,
under Major Price, and parts of Griffith's and Richardson's Maryland
Flying Camp.[201] At the same time, as Washington reports, some
detachments from the Eastern regiments who were nearest the place of
action, which included most of Nixon's and Sargent's brigades, Colonel
Douglas's Connecticut levies, and a few others, were ordered into the
field. Our total force engaged at this time, now about noon, was not
far from eighteen hundred strong, and very soon a considerable battle
was in progress. Besides Reed and other members of Washington's staff,
Generals Putnam, Greene, and George Clinton accompanied the
detachments, and encouraged the men by individual examples of
bravery.[202] The troops now "charged the enemy with great
intrepidity," and drove them from the crest of the heights back in a
south-westerly direction through a piece of woods to a buckwheat
field, about four hundred paces, as General Clinton describes it, from
the ridge, or just east of the present Bloomingdale Asylum, where the
Light Infantry, now reinforced by the Forty-second Highlanders,
finally made a stand. The distance the latter troops had advanced and
the sound of the firing had evidently warned Howe, at his headquarters
at Apthorpe's, that they needed immediate assistance, and he promptly
ordered forward the reserve with two field-pieces, together with the
Yagers and Linsingen's grenadiers of Donop's corps. The field-pieces
and Yagers came into action at the buckwheat field, and here a
stubborn contest ensued for about an hour and a half.[203] But our
troops pressed the enemy so hard at this point, and the Highlanders
and Yagers having fired away their ammunition, the latter all again
fell back, and the Americans pursued them vigorously to an orchard a
short distance below, in the direction of the Bloomingdale Road. Here
had been hard fighting in the open field, and the best British troops
were beaten! At the orchard the result was the same, the enemy making
little resistance, their fire "being silenced in a great measure," and
the chase continued down one of the slight hills on Hogeland's lands
and up another, near or quite to the terminus of the Bloomingdale
Road. Beyond this third position our troops were not allowed to follow
the enemy, whose main encampment was not far distant. The Fifth
Regiment of Foot had been trotted up "about three miles without a halt
to draw breath," reaching the ground at the close of the action.
Linsingen's grenadiers appeared about the same time, while Block's and
Minegerode's men were sent to McGowan's Pass, which had not yet been
occupied. A large body of the enemy were put under arms, and within
their camp every preparation was made for a general engagement; but
this, above all things, Washington wished to avoid, and, quite content
with the brilliant success of his troops thus far, he despatched
Lieutenant Tilghman to the front to bring them off. Before turning
from the field they had won so gloriously, they answered the bugle
blast of the morning with a cheer of victory, and marched back in good
order.[204]
[Footnote 201: There appear to have been nine companies of Maryland
troops engaged, three under Major Price, three under Major Mantz, and
three others of Richardson's regiment. Among these were one or more
companies of Colonel Ewing's as yet incomplete battalion. One of his
officers, Captain Lowe, was wounded.--_Force_, 5th Series, vol. ii. p.
1024. Also Capt. Beatty's letter in Mr. Jay's Documents.]
[Footnote 202: Greene wrote at a latter date: "Gen. Putnam and the
Adj. Gen. were in the action and behaved nobly." "I was in the latter
part, indeed almost the whole of the action."--_Gen. Geo. Clinton._
(See his two letters in Jay's documents.) "Gen. Putnam and Gen. Greene
commanded in the Action with about 15 to eighteen hundred
men."--_Stiles's MS. Diary._]
[Footnote 203: "A very smart action ensued in the true Bush-fighting
way in which our Troops behaved in a manner that does them the highest
honor."--_Letter from Col. Griffith, of Maryland._ Lossing's
_Historical Record_, vol. ii., p. 260.]
[Footnote 204: "The General fearing (as we afterwards found) that a
large body was coming up to support them, sent me over to bring our
men off. They gave a Hurra and left the field in good order."--_Tilghman's
Letters_, Doc. 29.
THE BATTLE-FIELD.--Recently gathered material seems to settle all
doubts as to the several points occupied by the British and Americans
during the action. Where did it begin and where did it end? As to the
first skirmish, it began near the British encampment at Bloomingdale.
Here was Howe's left, and, as Howe reports, Knowlton approached his
advanced posts under cover of the woods "by way of Vandewater's
Height." This was what we call Bloomingdale Heights. The original
proprietor of the greater part of this site was Thomas De Key. From
him all or a large part of it passed to Harman Vandewater and Adrian
Hogeland, as the deeds on record show. In 1784 the property was
purchased by Nicholas De Peyster. The position of Hogeland's and
Vandewater's houses as given on the accompanying map is taken from old
surveys which mark the location and give the names. The Bloomingdale
Road at that time stopped at these farms. That part of it above One
Hundred and Tenth Street, running through Manhattanville and
continuing until recently to the King's Bridge Road at One Hundred and
Forty-sixth Street, did not exist during the Revolution, but was
opened a few years later. (Hoffman's _Est. and Rights of the
Corporation of New York_, vol. ii.) A lane or road running from
Hogeland's by Vandewater's connected the Bloomingdale with the King's
Bridge road at One Hundred and Nineteenth Street. Washington himself
gives us the general line. Before the battle of Long Island he ordered
Heath to have troops ready to march to New York as soon as called for,
and he describes the proper route thus: "There is a road out of the
Haerlem flat lands that leads up to the hills, and continues down the
North River by Bloomingdale, Delancy's, &c., which road I would have
them march, as they will keep the river in sight, and pass a tolerable
landing-place for troops in the neighborhood of Bloomingdale." (_Heath
Correspondence_, Mass. Hist. Coll. for 1878.) From this topography and
the records the position becomes clear: Howe camped around
Bloomingdale with his advance posts along the Bloomingdale Road,
perhaps as far as its terminus near Hogeland's. They were last seen in
this vicinity the night before. Knowlton, next morning, marches out
from Harlem Heights, reconnoitres "by way of Vandewater's," and comes
upon the British posts on and along the line of the Bloomingdale Road.
Then he falls back under cover of the woods and over fences towards
the Point of Rocks, the enemy following him.
As to succeeding movements, if we can fix Washington's station and the
hill which all agree that the British descended, there is no
difficulty in following them after. Point of Rocks was the extreme
limit of Harlem Heights. There were our advanced posts overlooking the
country south. Washington states that he rode down to "our advanced
posts" to direct matters. Where better could he do so than at Point of
Rocks? And in a sketch of the field preserved in the Stiles Diary, and
reproduced among Mr. Jay's documents, Washington is given just that
station where an earthwork had been thrown up. To confirm this and
also to locate the next point, we have a letter from Major Lewis
Morris (Jay documents), in which he says: "Colonel Knowlton's regiment
was attacked by the enemy upon a height a little to the south-west of
Days's Tavern, and after opposing them bravely and being overpowered
by their numbers they were forced to retreat, and the enemy advanced
upon the top of the hill opposite to that which lies before Days's
door, with a confidence of success, and after rallying their men by a
bugle horn and resting themselves a little while, they descended the
hill," etc. In one of Christopher Colles's road maps (published in the
N.Y. Corporation Manual for 1870, p. 778), Days's tavern is put
directly opposite Point of Rocks on the King's Bridge Road, which
fixes the hill occupied by the enemy as the north-east bluff of
Bloomingdale Heights, or about One Hundred and Twenty-third Street,
between Ninth and Tenth avenues. They ran down this bluff to fences
and bushes at the edge of "a clear field." This was part of the
Kortwright farm, and the farm lines of 1812 show the same northern
boundary that surveys show in 1711. This northerly fence line is given
in the accompanying map, and it will be noticed that it would be the
natural line for the British Infantry to take in opposing Crary's
party. The soldier Martin speaks of their taking a post and rail fence
with a field in their rear. General George Clinton, who gives a clear
description of the fighting from this point, also mentions this field
and fence, but appears to have been mistaken in stating that the enemy
were driven back to that position. They ran down the hill and took up
that position. Then, when driven back, they retreated in the general
direction of their first advance--that is, towards their camp, passing
through a buckwheat field, and orchard to the Bloomingdale Road, and
not, as generally stated, to the high ground in Central Park east of
Eighth Avenue. General Clinton says they fell back from the orchard
"across a hollow and up another hill not far distant from their own
lines," which doubtless refers to undulations on Hogeland's place, and
possibly to the then hilly ground about One Hundred and Seventh Street
and Eleventh Avenue. One of the Hessian accounts states that the
Yagers who were sent to support the Light Infantry came into "a hot
contest on Hoyland's Hill"--a reference clearly to Hogeland's lands;
and this with the fact that the Yagers and Grenadiers afterwards
bivouacked "in the wood not far from Bloomingdale," and that the
British "encamped in two lines" at the same place, indicates the point
where the action terminated--namely, near Bloomingdale, between
Hogeland's and Apthorpe's.
In regard to the beginning of the action, General Clinton, in his
account, starts with a locality called "Martje Davits Fly," and
estimates distances from it. This name, more properly "Marritje
David's Vly," strictly described the round piece of meadow at the
western end of the Hollow Way close to the Hudson. It formed part of
Harlem Cove. Old deeds, acts, and surveys give the name and site
exactly. Clinton speaks of the "Point of Martje David's Fly" as if he
had reference to a point of land in its vicinity, possibly the Point
of Rocks, and from which he gives his distances.
The name of the battle appears perhaps most frequently in modern
accounts as that of Harlem _Plains_. Greene and others speak of it as
the action of Harlem _Heights_ or the heights of Harlem. As the
movements were directed by Washington from the Heights, and as the
fighting was done practically in defence of the Heights, this seems to
be the proper name to adopt. Heath says the fighting took place "on
the Heights west of Harlem Plains," and Washington, Clinton, and
others make similar references to the high ground, showing that the
affair was not associated with the Plains.]
[Illustration: FIELD of the HARLEM HEIGHTS "AFFAIR" Sept 16, 1776.
Topography from RANDALL'S MAP OF NEW YORK and old Surveys.
J. Bien Photo. Lith. N.Y.]
This affair, as Washington wrote to Schuyler, "inspirited our troops
prodigiously." The next day the general most heartily thanked the men
"commanded by Major Leitch, who first advanced upon the enemy, and the
others who so resolutely supported them;" and once more he called upon
all to act up to the noble cause in which they were engaged.
The British loss, according to Howe, was fourteen killed and about
seventy wounded, but Baurmeister puts it much higher--seventy killed
and two hundred wounded. The Americans lost not far from eighty, of
whom at least twenty-five were killed or mortally wounded. The loss
in officers, besides Knowlton and Leitch, included Captain Gleason, of
Nixon's Massachusetts, and Lieutenant Noel Allen, of Varnum's Rhode
Island, both of whom were killed. Captain Lowe, of Ewing's
Marylanders, was wounded, also Captain Gooch, of Varnum's, slightly.
The heaviest loss fell upon Nixon's and Sargent's brigades, namely:
Nixon's regiment, four killed; Varnum's, four; Hitchcock's, four;
Sargent's, one; Bailey's, five, and two mortally wounded. Colonel
Douglas lost three killed. Among the Marylanders there were twelve
wounded and three missing. The loss in the Virginia detachment and
the Rangers does not appear. General Clinton on the next day buried
seventeen of our men on the field, and reported over fifty wounded.
Lieutenant-Colonel Henshaw, of Little's regiment, simply writes to his
wife in regard to the action, "I was there," and adds that our loss
was one hundred. He puts the casualties in his brigade alone [Nixon's]
at seventy-five. All the troops behaved well. Greene speaks with pride
of the conduct of his Rhode Islanders, Varnum's and Hitchcock's.
Captain Gooch wrote to a friend enthusiastically, "The New England men
have gained the first Laurells;" while Tilghman wrote with equal
enthusiasm, "The Virginia and Maryland troops bear the Palm." In
reality, palm and laurel belonged to both alike.
Knowlton, on the 17th, was buried with the honors of war near the road
on the hill slope, not far from the line of One Hundred and
Forty-third Street, west of Ninth Avenue. Leitch died on the 1st of
October, and is said to have been buried by Knowlton's side, where
Major Thomas Henly, a Massachusetts officer, killed on Montressor's
Island on September 23d, was also buried.[205] On the 22d, Captain
Nathan Hale, "the martyr-spy," was executed in New York. Finding
Washington anxious to have information of the enemy's numbers and
designs, Hale volunteered to enter their camp in disguise. Captured at
the last moment as he was on the point of escape, he frankly avowed
his mission, and just before his execution, on the Rutgers farm, he
told the spectators around him that he only regretted he had but one
life to give for his country. The war saw no more courageous or
unselfish sacrifice. Few worthier of a monument than he!
[Footnote 205: Heath states that Henley was buried by Knowlton's side,
and the spot is indicated in the orders of September 24th: "Thomas
Henley will be buried this P.M. from the quarters of Maj. David Henley
below the hill where the redoubt is thrown up on the road." During the
action of the 16th, troops were throwing up intrenchments across the
island at about One Hundred and Forty-fifth Street. This was the first
and most southerly of the three lines constructed on the Heights.
Sauthier's map, the authority in the case, shows this line with a
battery across the King's Bridge Road, just at the top of what is
known as Breakneck Hill. It was on the slope of this hill that
Knowlton and Henley were buried. Mr. Lossing puts his grave in one of
the redoubts on the second line, afterwards included in Trinity
Cemetery; but that line had not been thrown up when Knowlton died.
(Silliman's letter of September 17th, P.M. Part II., page 55.) Mr. Jay
and others have suggested the erection of a monument to Knowlton and
Leitch. No finer site could be found than the spot where they fell in
Morningside Park.
Respecting Major Henley, spoken of by Washington as "another of our
best officers," see Glover's letter, _Document_ 35.]
The battle of the 16th was followed by inactivity on the part of the
British, and Washington securely established himself on Harlem
Heights. The chief excitement was the occurrence of the great fire on
the night of the 21st of September, which broke out near Whitehall
Slip, in New York, and destroyed a fourth of the city. In addition to
accounts of the calamity already published and generally familiar, the
experiences of Pastor Shewkirk, as given in his diary in the present
work, will be read with interest.