WHITE PLAINS--FORT WASHINGTON.
What now remains to be noticed as coming within the scope of the
present narrative are those incidents which led to the evacuation of
Harlem Heights by our army, and the subsequent capture of Fort
Washington, by which the British finally came into the possession of
the whole of New York Island.
The American position at the Heights, strong by nature, was made still
more so by defensive works. Three lines of intrenchments and redoubts
were thrown across the island between One Hundred and Forty-fifth and
One Hundred and Sixty-second streets; batteries were built around
King's Bridge, and at several points on the heights overlooking the
Harlem; and on the commanding site on the line of One Hundred and
Eighty-third Street, two hundred and thirty feet above the Hudson,
stood the powerful fortress called Fort Washington. Describing these
works more in detail, the first of the three lines, that furthest
south, was the one already referred to on which troops were digging
during the action of Harlem Heights. It extended along the line of One
Hundred and Forty-sixth Street. The second line, which was much
stronger, was laid out a short distance above at One Hundred and
Fifty-third Street. There were four redoubts in the line. Less than
half a mile above, between One Hundred and Sixtieth and One Hundred
and Sixty-second streets, and not extending east of Tenth Avenue, or
the old Post Road, was the third line. It mainly commanded the
depression in the heights which is now known as Audubon Park, and
included no redoubts. In addition to this triple line, there were
single breastworks and batteries at various points from Point of Rocks
north, along the ridge. The high and rugged bank of the Harlem
overlooking the present High Bridge was known as Laurel Hill, and at
the northern extremity, at One Hundred and Ninety-second Street, there
was an American battery, which the British afterwards named Fort
George. On the west side, at One Hundred and Ninety-sixth Street,
there was a small battery which became Fort Tryon. On the further side
of Spuyten Duyvil Creek stood Fort Independence, commanding King's
Bridge and its approaches.[206]
[Footnote 206: The position of the various works at Harlem Heights
appears on Sauthier's plan which seems to have accompanied Howe's
report of the capture of Fort Washington. Good copies of it may be
found in Stedman's history and in the _New York Revolutionary MS._,
vol. i. In 1812, when Randall surveyed the island, many of these works
were still traceable. He gives parts of the second and third lines,
Fort Washington and the others above, all of which agree with
Sauthier's locations. Some of the works remain well preserved to-day.]
Fort Washington was a large, five-sided work with bastions, strong by
virtue of its position, and important as commanding the passage of the
Hudson in connection with Fort Lee (first named Constitution),
opposite, on the summit of the Palisades on the Jersey side. Much
labor had been expended upon it, and it was generally regarded as
impregnable. The obstructions in the river consisted mainly of a line
of vessels chained together, loaded with stone, and then sunk and
anchored just below the surface of the river. It was expected that
they would resist the passage of the British ships, which would thus
be also brought to a stop under the guns from either shore, and made
to suffer heavily. Both the Continental Congress and the Provincial
Congress of New York had urged that no means or expense should be
spared to make the obstructions effectual, in view of the serious
results that would follow the enemy's possession of the river above.
Nearly a month now had elapsed since the retreat of our army to Harlem
Heights, and the British had made no further progress. They had in the
mean time thrown up a series of works across the island in front of
their main camps at Bloomingdale and McGowan's Pass, which could be
defended by a comparatively small force. On the 9th, however, they
showed indications of taking the field again by sending two frigates
up the Hudson. In spite of the sunken obstructions, the ships made
their way through without difficulty. Then, on the morning of the
12th, Howe embarked the greater part of his army in boats, and passing
through Hell Gate, under cover of a fog, landed on Throg's Neck, an
arm of the Westchester coast, about six miles above. Percy was left to
protect New York with three brigades. By this move the British general
placed himself on Washington's flank in Westchester County, and
threatened his communications. But the Neck was a poor selection for a
landing-place.[207] It was practically an island, the crossings to
the mainland being a causeway and fords, the opposite approaches of
which were fortified by the Americans. Colonel Hand's riflemen had
pulled up the planks on the bridges, and Prescott's Massachusetts were
ready behind breastworks to resist any attempt on the part of the
enemy to cross. Here the British wasted five days in collecting their
stores, while the Americans kept a sufficient force to meet them at
the causeway and vicinity. Among other regiments which relieved each
other at this point were Nixon's, Varnum's, Malcom's, Graham's, and
Ritzema's.
[Footnote 207: "Frog's Neck and Point is a kind of island; there are
two passages to the main which are fordable at low water, at both of
which we have thrown up works, which will give some annoyance should
they attempt to come off by either of these ways."--_Tilghman to
William Duer_, October 13th, 1776. _MS. Letter._ On hearing that they
had landed on the Neck, Duer replied from the Convention at Peekskill,
on the 15th: "There appears to me an actual fatality attending all
their measures. One would have naturally imagined from the Traitors
they have among them, who are capable of giving them the most minute
description of the Grounds in the county of Westchester, that they
would have landed much farther to the Eastward. Had they pushed their
imaginations to discover the worst place, they could not have
succeeded better than they have done."--_MS. Letter._]
* * * * *
During and for some time before these movements an interesting
correspondence was carried on between Washington's headquarters and a
committee of the New York Convention, a portion of which may be
introduced in this connection. It gives us a glimpse of the deep
interest and anxiety felt in the Convention in matters affecting the
protection of the State, and the internal difficulties that had to be
encountered. The correspondence was conducted mainly between
Lieutenant Tilghman for headquarters and Hon. William Duer for the
Convention.[208] Thus, on September 20th, the latter writes to
Tilghman as follows:
[Footnote 208: The Convention's Committee on Correspondence consisted
of William Duer, R.R. Livingston, Egbert Benson, and two others.
Nearly all of Tilghman's letters to the committee have been published
either in Force or in the Proceedings of the N.Y. Provincial Congress.
Of Duer's replies, however, but few are in print, the originals being
in the possession of Oswald Tilghman, Esq., of Easton, Talbot County,
Md., to whom the writer is under obligations for the favor of quoting
the extracts given in the text. (See biographical sketch of Colonel
Tilghman.)]
"I can easily imagine that Genl Howe must be both
chagrined and disappointed at the Retreat of our Army from
New York. I have no doubt but what he expected fully to have
taken them in a net; and he certainly would have succeeded
had we pertinaciously persisted in the plan of defending the
city. You observe that if the passage of the North River is
sufficiently obstructed that our lines will keep the enemy
from making any progress in front. This is certainly true;
but you must recollect that the Sound is, and must ever be,
open; and if they should succeed in landing a Body of Men in
Westchester County, they might, by drawing lines to the
North River, as effectually hem us in, as if we were in New
York. From Sutton's Neck to the North River (if I am not
mistaken) is not above twelve miles."
Again on the 2d of October, speaking of the possibility of the enemy's
getting on our flank or rear, Duer says:
"I wish they would delay this attempt till Genl. Lee
arrives, or till Mifflin comes from Philada. I am
sensible that however great General Washington's abilities
and vigilance are, he must stand in need of the assistance
of such excellent officers. Is Genl Greene with the Army,
or is he still in Jersey? If he could be spared from that
quarter his presence, I think, would be of great
consequence. I am much mistaken, if he is not possest of
that Heaven-born Genius which is necessary to constitute a
great General.--I can scarcely describe to you my feelings
at this interesting Period--what, with the situation of our
enemies in your quarter and the cursed machinations of our
Internal Foes, the fate of this State hangs on a single
battle of importance."
Again on the 8th:
"I am sorry to tell you (for the credit of this State) that
the Committee I belong to make daily fresh discoveries of
the infernal Practices of our Enemies to excite
Insurrections amongst the inhabitants of the State.
To-morrow one Company, actually enlisted in the enemy's
service, will be marched to Philadelphia, there to be
confined in jail, till the establishment of our Courts
enables us to hang the Ringleaders."
And on the following day Robert R. Livingston added on this subject:
"Tho' we are constantly employed in the detection of
treasons, yet plots multiply upon us daily, and we have
reason every moment to dread an open rebellion. We have
ordered troops to be raised but fear they will be too slow
in coming, and that we shall be under the disagreeable
necessity of asking a small and temporary aid from the
Genl; but we shall defer this till reduced to the last
extremity."
When the ships went up the river on the 9th, it was feared they had
troops on board who might make an attempt on the Highlands, whereupon
Duer wrote on the 10th:
"In this [attempt] they will undoubtedly be joined by the
villains in Westchester and Duchess County; it is therefore
of the utmost consequence that a Force should be immediately
detached from the main body of our army to occupy these
posts.... By the Influence and Artifices of the capital
tories of this State the majority of Inhabitants in those
counties are ripe for a revolt."
But with a stout heart Duer continues:
"It is our Duty, however, to struggle against the tide of
adversity, and to exert ourselves with vigour adequate to
our circumstances. This, as an Individual, I am determined
to do in the Capacity in which I am at present acting, and I
have no doubt those friends I have in the military line will
do the same. We are not to expect to purchase our Liberties
at a cheaper rate than other nations have done, or that
_our_ soldiers should be Heaven born more than those of
other nations. Experience will make us both have and win;
and in the end teach Great Britain that in attempting to
enslave us she is aiming a dagger at her own vitals."
On the 12th, before he heard of the landing at Throg's Neck, he wrote
to Tilghman:
"Notwithstanding the enemy had, agreeable to your last
advices, sent no vessels up the Sound, depend upon it, they
will endeavor to make an attack upon your Flanks by means of
Hudson's and the East River.... If General Lee is returned
from the Southward and arrived at your camp (which I suppose
to be the case) I beg my affectionate compliments to him. I
wish to Heaven I could come and see you, but I am so
embarrassed with the Committee I am engaged in that I have
not hardly an hour, much less a few days to spare. This
morning we marched off a Company of men, who had been
enlisted to join the Battalion to be raised by Major Rogers,
to the City of Philadelphia. We have an admirable clue of
their abominable conspiracies, and (however late this
undertaking has been) I hope by spirit and perseverance we
may baffle their wretched Plots of occasioning a revolt in
this State."[209]
[Footnote 209: As evidence of the estimation in which Lee was held at
this time, Duer writes on the 15th to Colonel Harrison: "I beg my
affectionate compliments to Genl Lee, whom I sincerely congratulate
on his arrival in camp--partly on account of himself as he will have
it in his [power] to reap a fresh Harvest of Laurels, and more on
account of his Country which looks to him as one of the brave
asserters of her dearest rights."--_MS. Letter._
Lee had just returned from South Carolina, and was associated by the
army with the brave defence of Charleston harbor. The honor of that
affair, however, belonged entirely to Moultrie.]
On the 13th, Tilghman wrote to Duer:
"When your favor of the 10th came to hand, I was attending
his Excellency, who was obliged to ride up to West Chester
upon the Alarm of the Enemy's Landing at Frog's Point....
From their not moving immediately forward, I imagine they
are waiting for their artillery and stores, which must be
very considerable if they seriously intend to set down in
the country upon our rear. The grounds leading from Frog's
Point towards our Post at King's bridge are as defensible as
they can be wished. The roads are all lined with stone
fences and the adjacent Fields divided off with stone
[fences] likewise, which will make it impossible for them to
advance their artillery and ammunition waggons by any other
Rout than the great roads, and I think if they are well
lined with troops, we may make a Considerable Slaughter if
not discomfit them totally. Our riflemen have directions to
attend particularly to taking down their Horses, which if
done, will impede their march effectually. Our troops are in
good spirits and seem inclined and determined to dispute
every inch of Ground."
On the 15th he wrote to Duer again as follows, after informing him
that the enemy had not moved from the Neck:
"From the number of vessels that have been continually
passing up the Sound we conclude that they are transporting
cannon and stores necessary to enable them to penetrate the
country and set down in our rear. To hinder them from
effecting this, Genl Lee, who arrived yesterday, has
taken the command in that quarter. He will be posted in such
a situation with a very considerable number of Light Troops
that, let the Enemy advance by what road they will, they
cannot elude him; if they march in one great body he can
easily draw his Divisions together; if they divide and take
different Routs, they will fall in with the different
parties. He will have the Flower of the Army with him, as
our lines in front are so strong that we can trust them to
Troops who would not stand in the field."
Duer, on the 17th, replied:
"I expect daily to hear of some grand attempt made by the
Enemy.... If one half of our army think as much of the
Importance of the approaching Contest as you do, I shall
entertain no Doubt of our success. May Heaven protect you,
and all my Friends who are venturing their Lives in so great
and good a cause."
On the same date Tilghman wrote:
"I have not time to describe the Disposition of our Army
perfectly to you, but you may depend that every step is
taken to prevent the enemy from outflanking us and at the
same time to secure our Retreat in case of need. The Enemy
have made no move from Frog's Point.... I don't know how it
is, but I believe their design to circumvent us this time
will prove as abortive as the former ones. If we can but
foil Genl Howe again, I think we knock him up for the
Campaign. You ask if Genl Lee is in Health and our people
feel bold? I answer both in the affirmative. His appearance
among us has not contributed a little to the latter. We are
sinking the ships as fast as possible; 200 men are daily
employed, but they take an immense quantity of stone for the
purpose."
To meet this move upon their flank and rear, the Americans were
obliged to abandon their strong camp at Harlem Heights. On the 16th,
while the British were still at Throg's Neck, Washington called a
council of war, when it was agreed that they could not keep their
communications open with the back country, if they remained where they
were and the British advanced. At the same it was voted to hold Fort
Washington. To be ready to counteract the next move of the enemy, a
part of the army was stationed at advantageous points in Westchester
County, the main camps being extended along the hills west of the
Bronx River. Both Valentine's Hill and Miles Square were occupied and
fortified.
On the 18th, Howe left Throg's Neck and transferred his army further
eastward to Pell's Point below New Rochelle. The Light Infantry
advanced from the coast, but were faced by Glover's brigade from
behind stone walls, and made to suffer some loss.[210] Glover and his
men were complimented for their conduct both by Washington and Lee.
The enemy again delayed in the vicinity of East Chester and New
Rochelle until the 22d.
[Footnote 210: In this skirmish Captain Evelyn, the British officer
who captured the patrol of American officers on Long Island, was
mortally wounded, and died soon after, much regretted. He is supposed
to have been buried in New York.]
Wishing exact information of the position of the enemy and of the
topography of the country, the commander-in-chief, on the morning of
the 20th, requested Colonel Reed and Colonel Putnam, his engineer, to
undertake a reconnoissance in person. Setting out from King's Bridge
with a foot-guard of twenty men, these officers proceeded to the
heights at East Chester, where they saw some of the enemy near the
church, but could obtain no intelligence. The houses in the vicinity
were deserted. From this point Reed returned to attend to his office
duties, while Putnam, disguising his appearance as an officer by
taking out his cockade, loping his hat, and concealing his sword and
pistols under his loose coat, continued on alone in the direction of
White Plains. Learning from a woman at a house that the British were
at New Rochelle, he passed on to within three or four miles of White
Plains, where he met some "friends to the cause" and ascertained the
general situation. "I found," he writes, "that the main body of the
British lay near New Rochelle, from thence to White Plains about nine
miles, good roads and in general level open country, that at White
Plains was a large quantity of stores, with only about three hundred
militia to guard them, that the British had a detachment at Mamaroneck
only six miles from White Plains, and from White Plains only five
miles to the North River, where lay five or six of the enemies ships
and sloops, tenders, etc. Having made these discoveries, I set out on
my return." Reporting this information to the commander-in-chief about
nine o'clock in the evening, Colonel Putnam retired to "refresh"
himself and horse, only to receive orders soon after to proceed
immediately to Lord Stirling's brigade,[211] now in Spencer's
division, which had already advanced on the road towards White Plains.
He reached Stirling at two o'clock that night, and at dawn the general
pushed on to White Plains, arriving there about nine o'clock on the
morning of the 21st. Washington himself and Heath's division followed
during the day, and the troops set to work throwing up lines at that
important point. By delaying near New Rochelle, Howe had missed his
opportunity. During the night of the 21st, Colonel Haslet, of
Stirling's brigade, surprised and captured some thirty men belonging
to the partisan Rogers' Scouts, and soon after Colonel Hand with his
now veteran riflemen proved himself more than a match for an equal
party of yagers encountered near Mamaroneck. In the first of these
skirmishes, Major Greene, a fine Virginia officer, was mortally
wounded.
[Footnote 211: Stirling, who with Sullivan had recently been exchanged
as prisoner, was now in command of Mifflin's brigade, Mifflin being
absent in Philadelphia.]
Washington concentrated his army at White Plains, completed two lines
of works, with his right on the river Bronx, and awaited the advance
of the British. Howe had moved from New Rochelle to Scarsdale, and on
the morning of the 28th marched against the Americans. A mile or more
from White Plains, on the main road to New York, he fell in with
General Spencer's advance parties under Colonels Silliman,
Douglas,[212] and Chester, who offered resistance and lost some men,
but they were driven back by superior numbers. On the left of the
American position, across the Bronx, rose Chatterton's Hill, which
offered a good site for the better defence of that flank. Colonel
Putnam had just arrived on the hill to throw up works when the enemy
made their appearance below.[213] According to Haslet, the Delawares
were the first troops to report on this hill, where they took post
with one of General Lincoln's Massachusetts militia regiments, under
Colonel Brooks, on their right. They were followed immediately by
McDougall's brigade, consisting of what was lately his own battalion,
which had no field officers, Ritzema's, Smallwood's, and Webb's. The
troops formed along the brow of the hill, and stood waiting for the
enemy. The two-gun battery brought up at the same time was Captain
Alexander Hamilton's.
[Footnote 212: See letters of these officers, _Documents_ 17, 22. Also
Tallmadge's account, _Document_ 26.]
[Footnote 213: "October 29th [28th] the British advanced in front of
our lines at White Plains about 10 o'clock A.M. I had just arrived on
Chatterton Hill in order to throw up some works when they hove in
sight; as soon as they discovered us they commenced a severe cannonade
but without any effect of consequence. General McDougal about this
time arriving with his brigade from Burtis's and observing the British
to be crossing the Bronx below in large bodies in order to attack us,
our troops were posted to receive them in a very advantageous
position. The British in their advance were twice repulsed; at length,
however, their numbers were increased so that they were able to turn
our right flank. We lost many men, but from information afterwards
received there was reason to believe they lost many more than we. The
rail and stone fence behind which our troops were posted proved as
fatal to the British as the rail fence and grass hung on it did at
Charlestown the 17th of June 1775."--_Colonel Rufus Putnam, Document_
43.]
The British marched up in brilliant array towards Washington's
position, but unexpectedly declined to make an attack in front,
although the centre was our weakest point. Chatterton's Hill appeared
to engage Howe's attention at once, and it became the first object of
capture. The troops assigned for this purpose were the Second British
brigade and Hessians under Donop, Rall, and Lossberg, in all about
four thousand men. They crossed the Bronx, under cover of their
artillery, and prepared to ascend the somewhat abrupt face of the hill
on the other side. McDougall's men reserved their fire until the enemy
were within short range, when they poured a destructive shower of
bullets upon them. The British recoiled, but moved up again to the
attack, while Rall came around more on the left, and after a brisk
fight, in which the militia facing Rall failed to stand their ground,
they succeeded in compelling McDougall to retreat. Had the militia
held their own, the fight might have been another Bunker Hill for the
enemy. As it was, Colonel Putnam compared it to that engagement. In
falling back, McDougall suffered some loss, but the whole force
escaped to the right of our lines, with fewer casualties than they
inflicted on the enemy. The latter lost about two hundred and thirty;
the Americans something over one hundred and forty. Colonel Smallwood
was wounded, and lost two of his captains, killed. Ritzema's New York
Continentals suffered the most, having made a brave fight.
Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel B. Webb, of Wethersfield, Ct., one of
Washington's aids, who had shown his coolness under fire on Bunker
Hill, was slightly wounded and had a horse shot under him while
carrying orders.[214]
[Footnote 214: Statement of his son, General James Watson Webb, of New
York.]
This affair on Chatterton's Hill is known as the Battle of White
Plains. On the side of the Americans, not more than sixteen hundred
troops were engaged, but the action was an important one, as it had
the effect of changing the direction of future operations.[215]
[Footnote 215: The details of the various movements in Westchester
County would fill a long and interesting chapter; but in the present
connection not more than an outline can be attempted.]
On the following day, the 29th, Howe waited for reinforcements. On the
30th, the rain postponed an intended attack. On the 31st the weather
proved fine about noon, but the British General "did not think proper
to put his former intentions in execution." The next morning, November
1st, there was a further excuse for not attacking: Washington during
the night had fallen back to the almost unassailable heights of North
Castle, in his rear. Howe was thus again baffled in his attempt to
bring the Americans to a decisive engagement, or to surround them, and
he now turned his attention to another line of campaign. Stedman, the
British historian, probably gives the correct reason why Washington
was not followed. The American position, he says, was now "so
advantageous that any attack on them must have proved unsuccessful,
for the river Croton stretched along their front, and their rear was
defended by woods and heights. Convinced that it was part of the
enemy's system studiously to avoid an action, and that their knowledge
of the country enabled them to execute this system with advantage,
General Howe resolved to cease an ineffectual pursuit, and employ
himself in the reduction of King's Bridge and Fort Washington." This
accomplished, he could then push on to Philadelphia and close the
year's operations with the occupation of that place. The capture of
two cities, the successive defeats inflicted upon the Americans, and
the good prospect of ending the rebellion in the next campaign, would
be a brilliant military record with which to gratify the home
government.
FORT WASHINGTON.
Howe broke up his camp near White Plains on November 5th, and marched
west to the Hudson at Dobb's Ferry. Knyphausen, who had lately arrived
with a second division of "foreigners," had already been despatched to
King's Bridge. After various movements and delays, the entire British
force also moved on the 12th to the immediate vicinity of the bridge,
and dispositions were made to attack and capture Fort Washington. On
the 15th, Howe sent a summons for the surrender of the fort, in which
he intimated that a refusal to comply would justify the putting of the
garrison to the sword.
The commander of Fort Washington was Colonel Robert Magaw, of
Pennsylvania. In addition to his own regiment and Colonel Shee's, now
under Lieutenant-Colonel Cadwallader, he had with him several
detachments of troops from the Pennsylvania Flying Camp, under
Colonels Baxter, Swoope, and others, together with a Maryland rifle
battalion, under Colonel Rawlings, whose major was Otho Holland
Williams, an officer distinguished later in the war. The artillery
numbered about one hundred men, under Captain Pierce, and there were
also the "Rangers," parts of Miles's and Atlee's old regiments, such
as escaped the Long Island defeat, and about two hundred and fifty
from Bradley's Connecticut levies, many of whom were to die in
captivity. The whole force under Magaw numbered about twenty-eight
hundred officers and men. The ground they were expected to hold was
that part of Harlem Heights from the first of the three lines already
described, northward to the end of Laurel Hill on the Harlem, and the
hill west on the Hudson, a distance of two miles and a half.
At the lower lines at One Hundred and Forty-sixth Street,
Cadwallader's men, the Rangers, and some others were posted; at Laurel
Hill, Colonel Baxter, and west of him, at the northern termination of
the level summit of the ridge where Fort Washington stood, was Colonel
Rawlings. Magaw remained at the fort to direct movements during the
attack. The outer defences where the troops were stationed were to be
held as long as possible, while the fort and the intrenchments
immediately surrounding it were to be the point of retreat. Magaw
believed he could hold the post against almost any force until
December, and when the summons for a surrender reached him he returned
the following spirited reply:
"15 NOVEMBER, 1776.
"SIR: If I rightly understand the purport of your message
from General Howe communicated to Colonel Swoope, this post
is to be immediately surrendered or the garrison put to the
sword. I rather think it a mistake than a settled resolution
in General Howe to act a part so unworthy of himself and the
British Nation. But give me leave to assure his Excellency
that actuated by the most glorious cause that mankind ever
fought in, I am determined to defend this post to the last
extremity.
"ROB'T MAGAW, Colonel Commanding.
"To the Adjutant-General of the British Army."
On the morning of the 16th, the enemy opened the attack from three
directions.[216] The Hessians moved forward from King's Bridge against
Rawlings' position, Rall on the right nearest to the Hudson,
Knyphausen a short distance to his left nearer the King's Bridge road.
Brigadier-General Matthews, supported by Cornwallis, came down the
Harlem from the bridge in boats, and landed at the foot of Laurel Hill
(One Hundred and Ninety-sixth Street), where Baxter was posted. These
formed the attacking columns from the north side. On the south side
Percy marched up from Harlem Plains and engaged Cadwallader at the
lower lines.
[Footnote 216: Consult "Map of New York," etc., Part II.]
At about the moment the cannonade began, Washington, Putnam, Greene,
and Mercer were putting off from the Jersey shore at Fort Lee to make
a final visit to Fort Washington, and determine whether to defend or
evacuate the post. When they reached the island they found the
threatened attack in actual progress, and evacuation then was out of
the question. They saw Percy making his dispositions, and could see
nothing to modify on their own side. All they could do was to await
the result. "There," says Greene, "we all stood in a very awkward
situation." Had they remained much longer it would have been more than
awkward. Putnam, Greene, and Mercer felt that Washington at least
ought not to be exposed in a position which might become dangerous,
and they all urged him to return to Fort Lee, while each in turn
offered to stay and conduct the defence. But the chief, who never
wished to hold the fort as an isolated post, foresaw the possible, if
not the probable, result of the British attack as clearly as his
generals, and he advised the return of the entire party. Entering
their boat they were rowed back to the Jersey side.[217]
[Footnote 217: Read the letter Greene wrote to Knox on the following
day.--_Document_ 36.]
The fighting began under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery
posted at advantageous points, both on the island and on the east side
of the Harlem River. The several columns pushed forward nearly at the
same time. Rall and Knyphausen encountered the most serious obstacles,
and met with the most obstinate resistance. Their course lay through
woods and underbrush and heavy abattis, felled by the Americans. As
they approached Rawlings, his men received them with a destructive and
determined fire, which lasted a long time. Rall's force, including the
newly arrived Waldeckers, fought desperately, and, as Cornwallis
afterwards declared, "to the admiration of the entire British
army."[218] Knyphausen led his men and tore down obstructions with his
own hands. Matthews and Cornwallis climbed up the steep hill, and
drove back Baxter's men; but not before Baxter had fallen while
fighting manfully. Percy, with whose column Lord Howe had taken his
station, held Cadwallader's attention and made some progress in that
direction, when Howe ordered a fourth column, consisting of the
Forty-second Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sterling, and two
supporting regiments, to cross Harlem River, and attempt to land
between Cadwallader and Fort Washington. This movement was
successfully conducted under difficulties. The Highlanders rushed up
the steep side of Harlem Heights just below the Morris Mansion, and
captured over one hundred and fifty of the Americans whom Cadwallader
and Magaw had detached to oppose them. Sterling's force, however,
suffered considerably in making the landing. By this attack in flank,
Cadwallader could maintain his position no longer, and his entire
party retreated rapidly towards the fort.
[Footnote 218: Testimony of Cornwallis before Parliamentary Committee
on Howe's case in 1779.]
Knyphausen and Rall, meanwhile, succeeded in driving back Rawlings,
who had made the best resistance during the day, and the former soon
reached Fort Washington, where all the Americans had now retreated.
The German general at once sent in a summons for surrender, and Magaw
finding that the fort was so crowded with his beaten troops, and that
it was impossible to attempt further resistance without great
sacrifice of life, agreed to a capitulation on favorable terms,
officers and men to be guaranteed personal safety and allowed to
retain private baggage.[219]
[Footnote 219: Washington, who with his officers watched the fighting
from Fort Lee, sent over Captain Gooch to tell Magaw to maintain
himself until night, when an effort would be made to withdraw the
garrison to New Jersey. The captain reached the fort, delivered his
message, and, running through the fire of the enemy, got to his boat
again and recrossed in safety.]
By this surrender the Americans lost in prisoners two thousand six
hundred and thirty-seven enlisted men and two hundred and twenty-one
officers,[220] the greater part from Pennsylvania, and nearly half of
them well-drilled troops. These were the men, with those taken on Long
Island and at Kip's Bay, for whose accommodation the Presbyterian and
Reformed churches in New York were turned into prisons, and who were
to perish by hundreds by slow starvation and loathsome disease, which
brutal keepers took little trouble to alleviate. The loss of the enemy
in killed and wounded was something over four hundred and fifty, about
two thirds of which fell upon the Hessians. The American casualties
were four officers and fifty privates killed, and not over one hundred
wounded.
[Footnote 220: Henshaw's copy of return of prisoners.--_Document No._
59.]
* * * * *
Upon whom the responsibility for the loss of this post should rest is
a question on which divided opinions have been expressed.[221] Greene
had urged the retention of the fort as necessary, both to command the
passage of the river, and because it would be a threatening obstacle
to the enemy's future operations. For them to advance into the country
with such a fortification in their rear would be a hazardous move.
These reasons were sound, and, as already stated, when the main army
evacuated Harlem Heights, Washington's council voted to retain Fort
Washington. But on the 7th of November, some British men-of-war again
passed the obstructions without difficulty, and Washington wrote to
Greene on the 8th from White Plains as follows:
"SIR: The late passage of the three vessels up the North
River (which we have just received advice of) is so plain a
proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions we have
thrown into it, that I cannot but think it will fully
justify a change in the disposition which has been made. If
we cannot prevent vessels passing up, and the enemy are
possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose
can it answer to attempt to hold a post from which the
expected benefit cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to
think it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at
Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, leave it to
you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as
you judge best, and so far revoking the order given to Col.
Magaw to defend it to the last."
[Footnote 221: Two weeks before the attack on the fort, Magaw's
adjutant, William Demont, deserted to the enemy. This fact has lately
been established by the recovery, by Mr. Edward F. de Lancey, of the
New York Historical Society, of Demont's own letter confessing the
desertion. It is dated London, January 16th, 1792, and is in part as
follows:
"On the 2d of Nov'r 1776 I Sacrificed all I was Worth in the World to
the Service of my King & Country and joined the then Lord Percy,
brought in with me the Plans of Fort Washington, by which Plans that
Fortress was taken by his Majesty's Troops the 16 instant, Together
with 2700 Prisoners and Stores & Ammunition to the amount of 1800
Pound. At the same time, I may with Justice affirm, from my Knowledge
of the Works, I saved the Lives of many of His Majesty's
Subjects--these Sir are facts well-known to every General Officer
which was there."
Mr. De Lancey makes this letter the text of a detailed and highly
interesting account of the fall of Fort Washington (published in the
_Magazine of American History_, February, 1877), in which the new
theory is advanced that the disaster was due in the first instance to
Demont's treason. It is quite probable, as the deserter claimed, that
his information was of some use to the British general in making his
dispositions for the attack, but beyond this the incident could hardly
have affected the situation on either side. Up to the night preceding
the assault, Howe did not know whether the Americans would remain in
the fort or not. Indeed, he gave them the opportunity to evacuate it
by allowing a whole night to intervene between the summons to
surrender and the attack. He could not, therefore, have changed his
plans, as alleged, in the confident expectation of taking a large
garrison prisoners and sending home word of another great victory.
Fort Washington was simply in his way, and he would have moved against
it under any circumstances, regardless of Demont and his treachery.]
General Greene on the following day replied that he did not think the
garrison in any danger, and that it could be drawn off at any time.
He believed, too, that the stores could be removed at the last moment,
in spite of an attack; and again he called attention to the advantage
of holding the post as an annoyance to the enemy. No further
communications passed on the subject, but Washington rode to the
Highlands, and, returning on the Jersey side of the Hudson, reached
Greene's headquarters at Fort Lee on the 14th, to find no steps taken
to withdraw men or stores from Mount Washington. Had the enemy in the
mean time invested and captured the fort, it is pertinent to inquire
whether Greene, having been acquainted with the distinct wishes of the
commander-in-chief not to hazard the post, could not have been justly
and properly charged with its loss. Washington's instructions were
discretionary only so far as related to the details or perhaps the
time of the evacuation; and to leave Greene free, he revoked the order
already given to Magaw to defend the fort to the last. Upon the
arrival of Washington at Fort Lee, however, one phase of the question
changed. By not renewing his instructions to evacuate the mount when
he found that nothing had been done in the case, or not making the
instructions peremptory, he entirely relieved Greene of the charge of
non-compliance, which could have been brought against him before. The
commander-in-chief was now present, and Greene was no longer under
instructions, discretionary or otherwise. Washington accepted the
situation as he now found it, and was reconsidering the propriety of a
total evacuation. Finding Greene, of whose military judgment he had "a
good opinion," strong in favor of holding the post, and others
agreeing with him, among whom evidently were Putnam, Mercer, and
Magaw, and knowing that Congress and the country would not easily be
reconciled to its abandonment, Washington hesitated for the moment to
enforce his own views and opinions. On the 14th and 15th, he still
delayed a final decision. So says Greene. "His Excellency General
Washington," he writes, "has been with me several days. The evacuation
or reinforcement of Fort Washington was under consideration, but
finally nothing concluded on;" and it was not until the morning of the
16th, just at the time of the attack, that they all went over to the
fort "to determine what was best to be done." This clearly settles the
fact that Greene was not under instructions at the time of the
surrender of the post.
But at the same time, upon a review of all the circumstances, it is
difficult to escape the conviction that but for General Greene's
earnest opposition to an abandonment of the fort, the disaster would
not have occurred. It was an error of judgment, an over-confidence in
the sufficiency of the preparations made for the defence, and a belief
that if matters came to the worst the garrison could be withdrawn in
spite of the enemy. That Greene himself felt that he would be held
largely accountable for the loss of the post, is evident from his own
expressions in the letter he wrote to Knox on the next day. "I feel
mad, vexed, sick, and sorry," are his words. "Never did I need the
consoling voice of a friend more than now. Happy should I be to see
you. This is a most terrible event; its consequences are justly to be
dreaded. Pray, what is said upon the occasion?"[222]
[Footnote 222: This is what Tilghman said upon the occasion: "The loss
of the post is nothing compared to the loss of men and arms, and the
damp it will strike upon the minds of many. We were in a fair way of
finishing the campaign with credit to ourselves and I think to the
disgrace of Mr. Howe, and had the General followed his own opinion the
garrison would have been withdrawn immediately upon the enemy's
falling down from Dobb's Ferry; but Gen'l Greene was positive that our
forces might at any time be drawn off under the guns of Fort Lee.
Fatal experience has evinced the contrary."--_Correspondence in
Proceedings of the N.Y. Provincial Congress_, vol. ii.]
There were those who censured Washington for not overruling Greene,
but the chief kept his counsels to himself, and it was not until
nearly three years later, in August, 1779, that he gave his version of
the affair in a private letter to Colonel Reed. In that he frankly
admits that Greene's representations and other reasons caused a
"warfare" and "hesitation" in his mind, by which the evacuation was
delayed until too late. But he indulged in no censures on Greene. His
confidence in the latter remained steadfast. The disaster was one of
those misfortunes which occur in the career of every great general,
and become, indeed, a step by which he rises to greatness. Greene,
more than any general of the Revolution, learned by experience. Every
battle, whether a defeat or victory, was for him a training-school;
and at the close of the war we find him ranking hardly second to the
commander-in-chief, in military talents, and enjoying nearly an equal
reputation for his achievements.
* * * * *
This disaster at Fort Washington, the heaviest suffered by the
Americans during the entire war, closed the campaign in the vicinity
of New York. All the western part of Long Island, New York City, and
all Manhattan Island, had fallen into the possession of the British,
and their fleet came into undisturbed control of the Hudson, the East
River, and the waters of the Sound. Every thing that Washington and
his soldiers had sought to secure and defend was wrested from their
hands. Their losses too, in men and material, were almost
irreparable. Much the greater part of their artillery had been
captured--two hundred and eighteen pieces of all calibres, according
to the enemy's report. Three hundred and twenty-nine officers and four
thousand one hundred men had been taken prisoners; nearly six hundred
had been killed or wounded; and numbers had been swept off by disease.
The enemy suffered more heavily, except in prisoners and cannon, in
which their loss was nothing; but they had recovered territory, won
victories, and they were now to find before them only a flying and
dissolving body of rebels.
The situation at this point presented a gloomy prospect for America.
But had the cause been then surrendered, we could still contemplate
this struggle around New York and Brooklyn with respect, as a noble
effort to gain an end worth fighting for. As success, however, was
finally achieved, and achieved through the experience of these events,
they challenge our deepest interest.