THE RETREAT TO NEW YORK.
The situation at the Brooklyn lines was relieved on the 29th by the
famous retreat of our army to New York. If Howe had surprised us by an
unexpected manoeuvre on the 27th, Washington was now to surprise the
British with a different manoeuvre, conducted with greater skill. "A
fine retreat," says Jomini, "should meet with a reward equal to that
given for a great victory." History assigns such a reward to
Washington at Long Island.
This success--the extrication of the army from what was soon felt to
be a dangerous position--was not to be achieved without a previous two
days' experience of great hardship, trial, and despondency on the part
of the troops; and unceasing anxiety and watchfulness on the part of
the commander-in-chief. The night of the 27th had closed cheerlessly
on the devoted Americans. The hills had been wrested from them; many
of their best officers and soldiers were slain or prisoners; before
them stood the whole British army, flushed with success, and liable at
any hour to rush upon their works, and in their rear flowed a deep,
wide river.
Washington realized the position the moment of the retreat from the
passes, and immediately took measures to guard against further
disaster. Satisfied that Howe had his whole force with him, and that
an attack was not to be apprehended at any other point, he ordered
forward more troops to replace his losses and strengthen the lines.
Mifflin brought down from Harlem Heights the two well-drilled
Pennsylvania regiments under Colonels Magaw and Shee, with some
others; and Glover's Massachusetts was sent on from Fellows' brigade.
These all crossed to Long Island early on the morning of the 28th. At
the same time, the afternoon of the 27th, Washington sent word to
General Mercer in New Jersey to march all the forces under his command
"immediately to Powle's Hook";[160] they might be needed in New York,
they might be needed on Long Island. By the morning of the 28th, the
commander-in-chief had drawn to the Brooklyn lines all the troops that
could be spared from other points, and all with which he proposed to
resist the British if they attempted to carry his position by storm.
He had on that side the largest and best part of his army. The whole
of Greene's division was there, the whole of Spencer's, half of
Sullivan's, one third of Putnam's, and a part of Heath's--in all not
less than thirty-five regiments or detachments, which numbered
together something over nine thousand five hundred men fit for
duty.[161]
[Footnote 160: This order was sent at two o'clock through General
Wooster, then temporarily in New York, and Mercer received it in the
evening near Newark. He sent word at once to the militia at Amboy,
Woodbridge, and Elizabethtown to march to Powle's Hook. _Force_, 5th
Series, vol. ii.]
[Footnote 161: A close analysis of the returns of September 12th,
estimating all additions or reductions which should be made since the
battle, shows that this was about the number on Long Island at this
date and at the time of the retreat. The brigades now there were
Nixon's, Heard's, Parson's, Wadsworth's, Stirling's, Scott's, two
regiments of Mifflin's, one at least of McDougall's (Webb's),
Glover's, and Fellows', the Long Island militia, artillery, rangers,
and several independent companies. We know at what part of the lines
some of these troops were posted. Greene's four old regiments
doubtless occupied the forts. Varnum was at Red Hook; Little at Fort
Greene; Hitchcock at Fort Putnam, and Hand with him there and in the
redoubt on the left. Forman's New Jersey had been at Fort Box. Three
of Scott's battalions were assigned to the centre, where the
breastworks crossed the Jamaica Road. Magaw, Shee, and Glover guarded
the line from Fort Putnam to the Wallabout; Silliman was at the
"northern part" of the works, probably on the right of Fort Putnam;
Gay's was between Fort Box and the Marsh; Douglas watched the extreme
right in the woods at the mouth of Gowanus Creek; and there was a
"reserve," which perhaps included among others the remnants of
Stirling's shattered brigade. Encircling them a mile or a mile and a
half distant in the edge of the woods, lay the British army with tents
already pitched in many places. North and south of the Jamaica Road,
just below Bedford, was Howe's main column; within and west of
Prospect Park were the Hessians; and on the right, Grant's division
bivouacked along the Gowanus Road.]
Had all things been relatively equal, the Americans within the lines,
according to military experience, should have been well able to hold
that front. But there was a total inequality of conditions. The enemy
were thoroughly equipped, disciplined, and provided for. They were an
army of professional soldiers, superior to any that could be brought
against them the world over. Thus far they had carried everything
before them, and were eager to achieve still greater victories. Behind
the Brooklyn works stood a poorly armed, badly officered, and for the
most part untrained mass of men, hurriedly gathered into the semblance
of an army. The events of the previous day, moreover, had greatly
depressed their spirits. Not a few of those who had been engaged in or
witnessed the battle were badly demoralized. To make matters worse,
the very elements seemed to combine against them. The two days they
were still to remain on the island were days of "extraordinary wet."
It rained almost continuously, and much of the time heavily. No fact
is better attested than this. August 28th, writes Colonel Little,
"weather very rainy;" "29th, very rainy." Major Tallmadge speaks of
the fatigue as having been aggravated by the "heavy rain." "The heavy
rain which fell two days and nights without intermission, etc.," said
the council which voted to retreat. Pastor Shewkirk in his diary notes
the weather particularly: "Wednesday 28th," he writes, ... "in the
afternoon we had extraordinary heavy rains and thunder." The flashes
of the cannons were intermixed with flashes of lightning. On the 29th,
"in the afternoon, such heavy rain fell again as can hardly be
remembered." To all this deluge our soldiers were exposed with but
little shelter. Necessity required that they should be at the lines,
and constantly on the watch, ready to repel any attempt to storm them.
When they lay down in the trenches at brief intervals for rest, they
kept their arms from the wet as they could. Cooking was out of the
question, and the men were compelled to take up with the unaccustomed
fare of hard biscuits and raw pork. Their wretched plight is referred
to in more than one of the letters of the day. Writes General Scott:
"You may judge of our situation, subject to almost incessant rains,
without baggage or tents, and almost without victuals or drink, and in
some part of the lines the men were standing up to their middles in
water." Captain Olney puts it on record that "the rain fell in such
torrents that the water was soon ankle deep in the fort. Yet with all
these inconveniences, and a powerful enemy just without musket-shot,
our men could not be kept awake." Captain Graydon, of Shee's
Pennsylvanians, says in his well-known "Memoirs:" "We had no tents to
screen us from the pitiless pelting, nor, if we had them, would it
have comported with the incessant vigilance required to have availed
ourselves of them, as, in fact, it might be said that we lay upon our
arms during the whole of our stay upon the island. In the article of
food we were little better off." Under the circumstances could
Washington's force have withstood the shock of a determined assault by
the enemy?
In spite, however, of weather, hunger, and fatigue, there was many a
brave man in the American camp who kept up heart and obeyed all orders
with spirit. One thing is certain, the British were not permitted to
suspect the distressed condition of our army. Our pickets and
riflemen, thrown out in front of the works, put on a bold face. On the
28th there was skirmishing the greater part of the day, and in the
evening, as Washington reports, "it was pretty smart." Writing from
the trenches on the 29th, Colonel Silliman says: "Our enemy have
encamped in plain sight of our camp at the distance of about a mile
and a half. We have had no general engagement yet, but no day passes
without some smart and hot skirmishes between different parties, in
which the success is sometimes one way and sometimes another. We are
in constant expectation of a general battle; no one can be here long
without getting pretty well acquainted with the whistling of cannon
and musket shot." Scarcely any particulars of these encounters[162]
are preserved, though one of them, at least, appears to have been
quite an important affair. The enemy had determined to approach the
lines by regular siege rather than hazard an assault, and late in the
afternoon of the 28th they advanced in some force to break ground for
the first parallel. The point selected was doubtless the high ground
between Vanderbilt and Clinton avenues, on the line of De Kalb. As to
what occurred we have but the briefest account, and that is from the
pen of Colonel Little. "On the morning of the 28th," he writes, "the
enemy were encamped on the heights in front of our encampment. Firing
was kept up on both sides from the right to the left. Firing on both
sides in front of Fort Putnam. About sunset the enemy pushed to
recover the ground we had taken (about 100 rods) in front of the fort.
The fire was very hot; the enemy gave way, and our people recovered
the ground. The firing ceased, and our people retired to the fort. The
enemy took possession again, and on the morning of the 30th [29th] had
a breastwork there 60 rods long and 150 rods distant from Fort
Putnam." It was this move of the British, more than any incident since
the battle, that determined Washington's future course.
[Footnote 162: In vol. ii. of the L.I. Hist. Society's "Memoirs," the
author, Mr. Field, devotes pages 254-258 to the skirmishing of some
Connecticut soldiers on the extreme right on the other side of Gowanus
Creek, which appears to him to have been rash and foolhardy, and
strangely in contrast with what also appears to him to have been an
exhibition of cowardice on their part the day before. The narrative
from which the incidents are taken (Martin's) shows no such singular
inconsistency in the conduct of these men. This was Colonel Douglas'
regiment, and, as Martin himself says, it moved promptly under orders
from the ferry to the right to cover Stirling's retreat. "Our
officers," he writes, "pressed forward towards a creek, where a large
party of Americans and British were engaged." They very properly did
not halt to help a company of artillerymen drag their pieces along.
The skirmish on the following day was nothing remarkable in its way.
It was just such brushes as the men engaged in that Washington, on
Graydon's authority, encouraged. The regiment displayed no particular
rashness on the 28th, nor any cowardice on the 27th--that is, if
Martin is to be credited.]
During all these trying hours since the defeat on the 27th, the most
conspicuous figure to be seen, now at one point and now at another of
the threatened lines, was that of the commander-in-chief. Wherever his
inspiring presence seemed necessary, there he was to be found. He
cheered the troops night and day. All that the soldiers endured, he
endured. For forty-eight hours, or the whole of the 28th and 29th, he
took no rest whatever, and was hardly once off his horse. As he rode
among the men in the storm he spoke to some in person, and everywhere
he gave directions, while his aids were as tireless as their Chief in
assisting him.
But circumstanced as the army was, it was inevitable that the question
should come up: Can the defence of the Brooklyn front be continued
without great hazard? It could not have escaped the notice of a single
soldier on that side, that if, with the river in their rear, the enemy
should succeed in penetrating the lines, or the fleet be able to
command the crossing, they would all be lost. There was no safety but
in retreat; and for twenty-four hours from the morning of the 29th,
all the energies of the commander-in-chief were directed towards
making the retreat successful.
To few incidents of the Revolution does greater interest attach than
to this final scene in the operations on Long Island. The formal
decision to abandon this point was made by a council of war, held late
in the day of the 29th, at the house of Phillip Livingston, then
absent as a member of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia. The
mansion made historic by this event stood on the line of Hicks Street,
just south of Joralemon.[163] There were present at the council, the
commander-in-chief, Major-Generals Putnam and Spencer, and
Brigadier-Generals Mifflin, McDougall, Parsons, Scott, Wadsworth, and
Fellows. As far as known, Scott alone of these generals has left us
any thing in regard to what transpired on the occasion beyond the
final result. He preserves the interesting fact that when the
proposition to retreat was presented it took him by surprise and he as
suddenly objected to it, "from an aversion to giving the enemy a
single inch of ground." It was the soil of his own State. As a member
of the New York Convention and of the Committee of Safety, and now as
a general officer, he had spent months in uninterrupted preparations
to defend that soil, and on the first impulse of the moment the
thought of yielding any more of it to the invaders was not to be
entertained. But he was soon "convinced by unanswerable reasons," and
the vote of the council was unanimous for retreat. Eight separate
reasons were embodied in the decision. _First._ A defeat had been
sustained on the 27th, and the woods lost where it was proposed to
make "a principal stand." _Second._ The loss in officers and men had
occasioned great confusion and discouragement among the troops.
_Third._ The rain had injured the arms and much of the ammunition, and
the soldiers were so worn out, that it was feared that they could not
be kept at the lines by any order. _Fourth._ The enemy appeared to be
endeavoring to get their ships into the East River to cut off
communication with New York, but the wind as yet had not served them.
_Fifth._ There were no obstructions sunk in the Channel between Long
and Governor's Island, and the council was assured by General
McDougall, "from his own nautic experience," that small ships could
sail up by that channel; the hulks, also, sunk between Governor's
Island and the Battery were regarded as insufficient obstructions for
that passage. _Sixth._ Though the lines were fortified by several
strong redoubts, the breastworks were weak, being "abattised with
brush" only in some places, and the enemy might break through them.
_Seventh._ The divided state of the army made a defence precarious.
_Eighth._ Several British men-of-war had worked their way into
Flushing Bay from the Sound, and with their assistance the enemy could
cross a force to the mainland in Westchester County, and gain the
American rear in the vicinity of King's Bridge. In view of these
considerations a retreat was considered imperative.
[Footnote 163: See _Document_ 6, in which General Scott says: "I was
summoned to a council of war at Mr. Phillip Livingston's house on
Thursday, 29th ult., etc."]
This was the official record of the council's action as afterwards
transmitted to Congress. It is not to be inferred, however, that
retreat was not thought of, or that nothing was done to effect it
until the council met. That Washington had foreseen the necessity of
the move, that he discussed it with others, and that he had already
begun the necessary preparations, is obvious both from the record and
from all that occurred during the day. The council did no more than to
coincide in his views and confirm his judgment.[164]
[Footnote 164: ORIGIN OF THE RETREAT.--Precisely when and why
Washington came to a determination in his own mind to retreat has been
made the subject of a somewhat nice historical inquiry. Gordon gives
one story; Mr. William B. Reed, biographer of Colonel Reed, gives
another; and Mr. Bancroft, General Carrington, and others indulge in
more or less extended criticisms on the point. Gordon's account is the
most probable and the best supported.
Whatever Washington may have thought of the situation on Long Island
after the defeat, it is enough to know that he immediately reinforced
himself there, and that on the 27th and 28th he made no preparations
to withdraw to New York. It far from follows, however, that he had
concluded to stay and fight it out "on that line" at all hazards. He
was acting on the defensive, and was necessarily obliged to guide
himself largely by the movements of the enemy. On Long Island,
therefore, he could only be on the watch, and, like a prudent general,
decide according to circumstances. Up to the morning of the 29th he
was still watching--watching not only the enemy, but his own army
also. In his letter to Congress, written at "half after 4 o'clock
A.M." of this date, he gives no intimation of a retreat, but rather
leaves that body to infer that he proposed to remain where he was. He
speaks, for instance, of expecting tents during the day to make the
troops more comfortable. On the same morning Reed wrote: "We hope to
be able to make a good stand, as our lines are pretty strong;" and he
doubtless reflected the views of his Chief at the time.
The two particular dangers now to which the army was exposed were the
danger of having its communication with New York cut off by the ships,
and the danger of being approached by the enemy in front by siege
operations, which the army was not prepared to meet. The first danger
had existed ever since the arrival of the enemy, and had been provided
for. All the batteries on Governor's Island and on both sides of the
East River had been built to guard against it. In addition, ships had
been sunk in the channel. Washington accordingly must have thoroughly
canvassed the risks he ran in regard to his communications. _These
alone had not decided him to retreat._ On the morning of the 29th,
however, he first became aware of the second danger. It was not until
then that the enemy fully developed their intention of advancing by
trenches. After working all night, as Howe reports, they had thrown up
by morning, as Little reports, a parallel sixty rods long and one
hundred and fifty rods distant from Fort Putnam. Reed wrote, "They are
intrenching at a small distance." In twenty-four hours at the farthest
they would have come within very close range, and the hazardous
alternative would have been forced upon us to attempt to drive them
out of their own works. Washington well knew that, in view of the
condition of his men and the great disparity of numbers, this could
not be done. When, therefore, he became assured of Howe's intentions
he acted promptly--_he determined to retreat_; and this determination
he reached early on the morning of the 29th.
This is substantially the theory which Gordon presents as a fact, and
it is most consistent with fact. Gordon's account is this: "The
victorious army encamped in the front of the American works in the
evening; and on the 28th at night broke ground in form about 4 or 500
yards distant from a redoubt which covered the left of the Americans.
The same day Gen. Mifflin crossed over from New York with 1000 men; at
night he made an offer to Gen. Washington of going the rounds, which
was accepted. He observed the approaches of the enemy, and the
forwardness of their batteries; and was convinced that no time was to
be lost. The next morning he conversed with the General upon the
subject, and said, 'You must either fight or retreat immediately. What
is your strength?' The General answered, 'Nine thousand.' The other
replied, 'It is not sufficient, we must therefore retreat.' They were
both agreed as to the calling of a Council of war; and Gen. Mifflin
was to propose a retreat. But as he was to make that proposal, lest
his own character should suffer, he stipulated, that if a retreat
should be agreed upon, he would command the rear; and if an action the
van."
The fact that Mifflin was given the command of the rear on the
retreat, and the fact that he sent the order to Heath that morning to
send down all the boats from King's Bridge, lend the highest
probability to Gordon's version of the story. Parsons, who was one of
the members of the council, mentions this particularly as one of the
reasons for withdrawing, namely, that the enemy were "not disposed to
storm our lines, but set down to make regular approaches to us." Reed
also puts as much stress on this point as any other. Giving the
reasons for the retreat to Governor Livingston, he said: "The enemy at
the same time possessed themselves of a piece of ground very
advantageous and which they had [fortified]. We were therefore reduced
to the alternative of retiring to this place or going out with
[troops] to drive them off." Washington, too, is to be quoted. In his
letter to Trumbull, September 6th, he writes: "As the main body of the
enemy had encamped not far from our lines, and as I had reason to
believe they intended to force us from them by regular approaches,
which the nature of the ground favoured extremely, and at the same
time meant, by the ships of war, to cut off the communication between
the City and Island, and by that means keep our men divided and unable
to oppose them anywhere, by the advice of the General officers, on the
night of the 29th, I withdrew our troops from thence without any loss
of men and but little baggage."
William B. Reed's account (Reed's Life of Reed) is to the effect,
briefly, that a heavy fog settled over Long Island on the 29th, and
that during the day Colonel Reed, Colonel Grayson, and General Mifflin
rode to Red Hook inspecting the lines. While at the Hook, "a shift of
wind" cleared the fog from the harbor, enabling the officers to catch
a glimpse of the fleet at the Narrows. From certain movements of boats
they inferred that the ships would sail up with the favorable breeze
if it held until the tide turned and the fog cleared off. They
immediately hurried to Washington, informed him of the impending
danger, and induced him to call a council and order a retreat. Mr.
Bancroft, however, has shown very thoroughly that this account cannot
be accepted, because the fog did not come up until the morning of the
30th, and no change of wind occurred. Colonel Reed himself says in the
Livingston letter, written only the next morning, that the enemy's
fleet were attempting every day to get up to town with "the wind
_ahead_"--thus directly contradicting his biographer. The Reed account
has several errors of detail, one being the statement that the Red
Hook battery had been badly damaged by the guns of the Roebuck on the
27th. It would be nearer the truth to say that it was not hit at all.
The fleet could do nothing that day; as Admiral Howe reports, the
Roebuck was "the only ship that could fetch high enough to the
northward to exchange _a few random shot_ with the battery on Red
Hook."
In a word, Washington, after receiving Mifflin's report in regard to
the approaches of the enemy, and probably other reports from Grayson,
Reed, and others in regard to the general condition of the troops (for
instance, Colonel Shee's uneasiness, referred to by Graydon), found
that the moment had come for decision. That decision was to retreat
that night; and during the forenoon, several hours before the council
met, he issued secret orders for the concentration of boats at the
ferry, as described in the text.]
The first thing necessary was to provide all the transportation
available in order to accomplish the retreat in the shortest time
possible after beginning it. There were boats at the Brooklyn ferry
and across at New York, but these were too few for the purpose.
Accordingly, on the forenoon of the 29th, Washington sent an order
through Mifflin to General Heath at King's Bridge to the following
effect:
LONG ISLAND, August 29th, 1776.
DEAR GENERAL--We have many battalions from New Jersey which
are coming over to relieve others here. You will please
therefore to order every flat bottomed boat and other craft
at your post, fit for transporting troops, down to New York
as soon as possible. They must be manned by some of Colonel
Hutchinson's men and sent without the least delay. I write
by order of the General. I am Affectionately Yours
MIFFLIN.
At about the same time, Colonel Trumbull, the commissary-general, was
directed to carry a verbal order to Assistant Quartermaster Hughes at
New York, "to impress every kind of water craft from Hell Gate on the
Sound to Spuyten Duyvil Creek that could be kept afloat and that had
either sails or oars, and have them all in the east harbor of the City
by dark."[165] These two orders were carried out with great energy,
promptness, and secrecy by all who had any part in their execution.
Heath "immediately complied" with what Mifflin had written, and sent
down all his boats under Hutchinson's men from Salem, who, like
Glover's from Marblehead, were, many of them, the best of sailors. He
brooked the less delay, perhaps, because he saw at once that
Washington's "real intention" was, not to be reinforced from New
Jersey, but to retreat from Long Island.[166] Hughes, on his part, was
untiring, and rendered the greatest service. He would have been
mistaken this day rather for the master of a military school, than for
what he had been--the master of a classical one. For twenty-two hours,
as his biographer tells us, he never dismounted from his horse, but
superintended the collection of the vessels from all points, and at
evening had them ready for their purpose.[167]
[Footnote 165: Memorial of Colonel Hugh Hughes. Leake's Life of
General Lamb.]
[Footnote 166: Heath's Memoirs.]
[Footnote 167: There is an interesting letter of Washington's
preserved in the Hughes Memorial, which adds light on this point.
Eight years after the event, when Hughes needed some official
certificate showing his authority to impress all the craft he could
find, the general replied to him as follows:
"My memory is not charged with the particulars of the verbal order
which you say was delivered to you through Col. Joseph Trumbull, on
the 27th, August, 1776, 'for impressing all the sloops, boats, and
water craft from Spyhten Duyvel, in the Hudson, to Hell Gate, in the
Sound.' I recollect that it was a day which required the utmost
exertion, particularly in the Quarter-Master's department, to
accomplish the retreat which was intended, under cover of the
succeeding night; and that no delay or ceremony could be admitted in
the execution of the plan. I have no doubt, therefore, of your having
received orders to the effect, and to the extent which you have
mentioned; and you are at liberty to adduce this in testimony thereof.
It will, I presume, supply the place of a more formal certificate, and
is more consonant with my recollection of the transactions of that
day." It appears from this that Washington remembered that the _entire
day_ of the 29th was devoted to planning and preparing for the
retreat, and this fits the theory advanced in the note on the "Origin
of the Retreat." As to the delivery of the orders about boats, it is
probable that Trumbull crossed to New York with Mifflin's letter to
Heath and gave it to Hughes to forward. At the same time he gave
Hughes his instructions verbally. Hughes received them, says his
biographer, about noon. He then had eight hours to carry them out,
which gave him time to send to Heath and for Heath to comply, while he
and his assistants scoured the coast everywhere else for boats, from
Hell Gate down. Among other sloops impressed was the Middlesex,
Captain Stephen Hogeboom, while on its way to Claverack. "I was
prevented from proceeding," says the captain, "by Coll Wardsworth and
Commissary Hughes who ordered your memorialist over with the sloop to
Long Island ferry where she was used to carry off the Troops and
stores after the unfortunate retreat, &c."--_N.Y. Hist. MS._, vol. i.,
p. 620.]
The final withdrawal of the troops from the lines was effected under
the cover of a plausible general order, which was the only one known
to have been issued by the commander-in-chief while on Long
Island.[168] This order now comes to light for the first time, and is
important as serving to correct the improbable though standard theory
that the regiments were moved from their posts under the impression
that they were to make a night attack upon the enemy.[169] The order
as actually given was far more rational, and less likely to excite
suspicion as to its true intent. In the first place, the sick, "being
an encumbrance to the army" were directed to be sent to the hospital,
their arms and accoutrements taken with them, and from there to be
conveyed across to New York and reported to Surgeon-General Morgan. In
the next place, the order announced that troops under General Mercer
were expected that afternoon from New Jersey, with whom it was
proposed to relieve a proportionate number of the regiments on Long
Island, and "make a change in the situation of them." In view of the
distressed condition of most of the troops at the lines, the propriety
of such a "change" was obvious; and in all probability Washington did
originally intend to make the relief. And last, as it was apparently
undecided what regiments were to be relieved, they were all, or the
greater part of them, directed "to parade with their arms,
accoutrements, and knapsacks, at 7 o'clock, at the head of their
encampments and there wait for orders." On the evening of the 29th,
accordingly, we find the troops ready at their camps and the lines to
march off at a moment's notice, and all prepared for a retreat by the
most natural arrangement that could have been devised to conceal the
real design.[170]
[Footnote 168: _Document_ 3. "General Orders. Head-Quarters Long
Island, Aug. 29, 1776. Parole, _Sullivan_, Countersign,
_Greene_."--_Col. Douglas' Order Book._]
[Footnote 169: All our principal accounts follow Graydon, who states
that the order to attack the enemy was given "regimentally." Colonel
Hand, in his letter describing the night's incidents (Reed's Life of
Reed), makes no allusion to such an order, but on the contrary states
that he and the other colonels of the covering party were told that
they were to retreat. An order to attack would have been a poor
disguise for a retreat, for every man must have felt its utter
rashness and at once suspected some other move.]
[Footnote 170: A letter from Tilghman, Washington's aid, shows that
the troops received the impression that they were to be relieved. The
retreat, he says, "was conducted with so much Secrecy that neither
Subalterns or privates knew that the whole army was to cross back
again to N. York; they thought only a few regiments were to go
back."--_Document_ 29.]
At dark, the withdrawal began. As one regiment moved away towards the
ferry another would have its situation "changed" to fill the gap, or
extended from right to left. Every move at first was conducted busily,
yet quietly and without confusion. Colonel Little, referring to his
part this night, leaves the simple record that the general ordered
each regiment to be paraded on their own parades at seven o'clock
P.M., and wait for orders. "We received orders," he says, "to strike
our tents and march, with our baggage, to New York." Colonel Douglas
writes: "I received orders to call in my guard _all_, and march
immediately with the utmost silence." Hitchcock's Rhode Islanders
carried their baggage and camp equipage to the boats on their
shoulders "through mud and mire and not a ray of light visible." The
embarkation was made from the ferry--the present Fulton Ferry--where
General McDougall superintended the movements. Between seven and eight
o'clock the boats were manned by Glover's and Hutchinson's men, and
they went to work with sailor-like cheer and despatch. The militia and
levies were the first to cross, though there was some vexing delay in
getting them off. Unluckily, too, about nine o'clock the adverse wind
and tide and pouring rain began to make the navigation of the river
difficult. A north-easter sprang up, and Glover's men could do nothing
with the sloops and sail-boats. If the row-boats only were to be
depended upon, all the troops could not be ferried over before
morning. Discouraged at the prospect, McDougall sent Colonel Grayson,
of Washington's staff, to inform the general as to how matters stood,
but unable to find him Grayson returned, and McDougall went on with
the embarkation in spite of its difficulties. Most fortunately,
however, at eleven o'clock there was another and a favorable change in
the weather. The north-east wind died away, and soon after a gentle
breeze set in from the south-west, of which the sailors took quick
advantage, and the passage was now "direct, easy, and expeditious."
The troops were pushed across as fast as possible in every variety of
craft--row-boats, flat-boats, whale-boats, pettiaugers, sloops, and
sail-boats--some of which were loaded to within three inches of the
water, which was "as smooth as glass."
[Illustration: [signature: J.W. Glover]
COLONEL FOURTEENTH REGIMENT OF FOOT (MASS.) BRIGADIER GENERAL 1777.
Steel Engr. F. von Egloffstein N.Y.]
Meanwhile nearly a fatal blunder occurred at the lines. Early in the
evening, a force had been selected, consisting of Hand's, Smallwood's,
Haslet's, Shee's, Magaw's, and Chester's regiments, to remain at the
works to the last and cover the retreat. General Mifflin commanded the
party. Smallwood's men were stationed in Fort Putnam, part of Hand's
under Captain Miller in the redoubt on the left, and the rest at the
lines on the right of the main road; and the other regiments near
them. Brooklyn Church was to be the alarm-post, where the covering
party was to concentrate in case the enemy attacked during the night.
About two o'clock in the morning, Major Scammell, one of Sullivan's
aids now serving with Washington, mistook his orders and started
Mifflin's entire command for the ferry. All the regiments had left the
lines and were marching down the main road, when Washington, who
seemed to be everywhere during the night, met them and exclaimed in
astonishment that unless the lines were immediately re-manned "the
most disagreeable consequences" might follow, as every thing then
was in confusion at the ferry. Mifflin's party promptly faced about
and reoccupied their stations until dawn, when Providence again
"interposed in favor of the retreating army." To have attempted to
withdraw in clear daylight would have been a hazardous experiment for
these regiments, but just before dawn a heavy fog began to settle over
Long Island, and the covering party was safe. So dense was this
"heavenly messenger," as Gordon happily describes it, that it
effectually hid the American lines from the British pickets. When the
final order, therefore, came about sunrise for Mifflin's men to retire
to the ferry, they were enabled to do so under cover of the fog
without exciting any suspicion of their movements in the enemy's
camp.[171] "We kept up fires, with outposts stationed," says
Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers, "until all the rest were over. We left
the lines after it was fair day and then came off." As our soldiers
withdrew they distinctly heard the sound of pickaxe and shovel at the
British works.[172] Before seven o'clock the entire force had crossed
to New York, and among the last to leave was the commander-in-chief.
"General Washington," adds Chambers, "saw the last over himself."
[Footnote 171: Mr. Reed, the biographer, states that the fog rose on
the 29th. Dr. Stiles, in his "History of Brooklyn," says: "At midnight
a dense fog arose, which remained motionless and impenetrable over the
island during the whole of the next day [the 29th]." "A dense fog,"
writes Mr. Field, "hung over the island and river, when the morning of
the 29th dawned." Now nothing is more certain than that the fog did
not rise until shortly before dawn of the 30th, full six hours after
the retreat had begun. The 28th and 29th, as already seen, were days
of rain-storms, not mist, nor fog, but storm, "torrents," such rain at
times the like of which could "hardly be remembered." Contemporary
writers who mention the rains say nothing of fog on the 29th, whereas
they do notice its appearance the next morning. Major Tallmadge
writes: "As the dawn of the next day approached, those of us who
remained in the trenches became very anxious for our own safety, and
when the dawn appeared, there were several regiments still on duty. At
this time a very dense fog began to rise, and it seemed to settle in a
peculiar manner over both encampments. I recollect this peculiar
providential occurrence perfectly well; and so very dense was the
atmosphere that I could scarcely discern a man at six yards'
distance." This officer's regiment was one of the covering party, and
he adds that after leaving the lines by mistake, and receiving orders
to return, "Col. Chester immediately faced to the right about and
returned, where we tarried until the sun had risen, but the fog
remained as dense as ever." "At sunrise a great fog came up," says a
spectator (_Stiles' MS. Diary_). An officer or soldier of either
Shee's or Magaw's regiment, also of the covering party, wrote a few
hours after crossing: "We received orders to quit our station about
two o'clock this morning, and had made our retreat almost to the ferry
when Gen. Washington ordered us back to that part of the lines we were
first at, which was reckoned to be the most dangerous post. We got
back undiscovered by the enemy, and continued there until daylight.
Providentially for us, a great fog arose, which prevented the enemy
from seeing our retreat from their works which was not more than
musket shot from us."--_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 1233. So also,
Stedman, the British historian, referring to the events of the night
of the 29th-30th, says: "Another remarkable circumstance was, that on
Long Island hung a thick fog, which prevented the British troops from
discovering the operations of the enemy." Washington did not, as often
stated in popular accounts, take advantage of a fog to cover his
retreat. More than half the army was over before the fog appeared; but
it protected the covering party, and saved us the loss of considerable
baggage and other material.]
[Footnote 172: An English patrol under Captain Montressor discovered
the retreat of the Americans very soon after the latter left the
lines, and reported the fact at once. But for some unexplained reason
pursuit was delayed until too late. One boat with four stragglers was
taken by the enemy.]
By the army the retreat was welcomed as a great relief, a salvation
from probable calamity. Not a few appreciated its completeness and
success as a strictly military move. "This evacuation," writes one,
"is a masterpiece." "That grand retreat from the Island which will
ever reflect honour to our Generals," says another. "Considering the
difficulties," is Greene's criticism, "it was the best effected
retreat I ever read or heard of." "It was executed," says Scott, "with
unexpected success." But in the country at large it was generally
associated with the defeat of the 27th, and the skilfulness with which
it was conducted little compensated for the fact that the retreat was
forced upon us.