THE REVIVAL OF FRANCE
(1880-1881)
The General Election in England which took place in March, 1880,
resulted not only in the rout of the Conservative Party, but in the
reversal of the Foreign Policy of Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury,
and necessitated the withdrawal of Sir Henry Layard from Constantinople,
while Lord Lytton, whose Afghan policy had been furiously denounced by
the Liberal Party, sent in his resignation. It is worthy of note that
Lord Lyons, whom no one could accuse of Jingo tendencies, and whose
opinion was certainly a very much better one than that of most of Lord
Lytton's critics, was emphatically in favour of the latter's Afghan
policy. Writing to Lady Lytton on January 8, 1879, he had expressed
himself as follows:--
I have never had the least misgiving about Lytton's policy
with regard to Afghanistan, and I was always sure it would be
wisely carried into execution. I am only too thankful that we
have a spirited Viceroy. You can hardly form an idea of the
advantage our reputation has derived, all over Europe, from the
Afghan campaign, and you have seen enough of diplomacy to know how
much success in all questions of Foreign Policy depends upon the
prestige of the country one represents.
Sir Henry Layard had incurred even greater execration than Lord Lytton
in the eyes of the Liberal Party, because he was considered to have
been deeply committed to what was described as the Pro-Turkish policy
of the Conservative Government, although his inexpiable offence
seems to have consisted chiefly in strenuous and unavailing efforts
to induce the Turks to put their house in order. During his stay at
Constantinople he had been greatly hampered by the consistent opposition
of his French colleague, M. Fournier, whose great object it appeared
to be to thwart English action whenever opportunity occurred. The
French Government, which professed great anxiety to act in harmony with
England, upon ascertaining that Sir Henry Layard was to be replaced by
Mr. Goschen,[29] withdrew Fournier and appointed M. Tissot in his place.
A change in the French Embassy in London was also imminent, and the
circumstances attending the appointment of a new Ambassador were not
devoid of humour.
Admiral Pothuau, the Ambassador under the Waddington régime, had been
forced to retire, probably much against his inclination, and it was
considered that M. Léon Say would make an excellent representative, more
especially as he passed as that _rara avis_, a French Free Trader; but
M. Say shortly after accepting the appointment was elected President
of the Senate, and therefore forced to resign. To find a satisfactory
successor was apparently not so simple a matter as might have been
assumed. Nothing could have been more correct than M. de Freycinet's
ideal of a French Ambassador in London: 'a man possessing the full
confidence and sharing the sentiments of his Government; not so much of
a politician as to be thinking more of establishing his own political
position at home than of following his instructions: a man who would
stay long at the post, and desire to stay there; who would form personal
friendships with English Statesmen, and improve good relations and
soften asperities by personal influence. A man calculated to take a part
in a society like that of London, and who would not be out of place at a
Court--a man who would have a wife with the same qualities--finally, a
man not unaccustomed to diplomatic business and diligent and accurate in
transacting it.' When, however, the question passed from the abstract to
the concrete, M. de Freycinet's ideas ceased to flow so freely, and he
seemed utterly at a loss to find the ideal being which his imagination
had sketched, although he mentioned M. Challemel Lacour--as a man who
would not do. In spite, however, of M. Challemel Lacour being in M.
de Freycinet's opinion a man 'who would not do,' it was evident that
he had a powerful backing, for an emissary from the French Foreign
Office shortly made his appearance at the Embassy and intimated in
so many words that the appointment of M. Challemel Lacour would be
agreeable to Gambetta. That no doubt was a considerable advantage, but
M. Challemel Lacour by no means corresponded to M. de Freycinet's ideal
representative, being a man of unconciliatory character and particularly
notorious on account of a speech which he had once made, in which,
alluding to political opponents, he had used the words _Fusillez moi ces
gens là!_ an expression which was continually being quoted against him.
In the meanwhile, however, M. de Freycinet had had an inspiration, and
sent for Lord Lyons to tell him that he had discovered just the right
man for the place. Unfortunately, this personage was married to a lady
whose antecedents were not considered to be satisfactory, and it became
necessary to intimate that under the circumstances the appointment would
not be favourably received in England.
'Freycinet was dreadfully put out,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'when he
found that the appointment was impossible. He complained chiefly
of Léon Say for having brought him into the difficulty, by first
accepting the London Embassy and then standing for the Presidency
of the Senate.
'Léon Say's picture of the lady is about as much like what she
was when I last saw her a few years ago, as Challemel Lacour is
like Freycinet's ideal of a French Ambassador in London.'
The appointment of M. Challemel Lacour was persisted in, and gave rise
to some very disagreeable discussions in the House of Commons. Doubtless
much of the abuse of M. Challemel Lacour was undeserved, but whatever
his political capacity, he was not remarkable for urbanity.
On the occasion of a big official dinner at the Paris Embassy, when
requested to take in the absolutely unexceptionable and agreeable wife
of one of his principal ministerial colleagues, he replied with an
emphatic '_Jamais!_' which precluded any further discussion.
The question of diplomatic appointments recalls the fact that it was
about this time that my connection with Lord Lyons first began, through
becoming a member of his staff, and that it may be appropriate to say
something about his habits and personal characteristics.
Lord Lyons, who was then more than sixty years of age, was a big,
heavily built man, whose appearance in no respect suggested the
diplomatist of fiction, and who rather resembled the conventional
British squire as depicted by Leech; and the chief characteristic of his
somewhat homely features was a small piercing eye which nothing seemed
to escape, from the most unimportant clerical error to a minute detail
in a lady's dress. As compared with the ordinary English diplomatist,
his knowledge of foreign languages, without being exceptional, was
thoroughly adequate. He, of course, spoke French with perfect facility,
and it is probable that he wrote it with greater correctness than many
Frenchmen, having a complete mastery both of the grammar and of all
the complicated expressions which are made use of in correspondence.
He was also equally at home in Italian; had a knowledge of German,
and was well acquainted with modern Greek. In addition, he was a fair
classical scholar, and a peculiarly retentive memory enabled him,
unlike most people, to remember much of what he had read. His manner,
at first sight, seemed somewhat alarming, and he was altogether a
person with whom no one would have felt disposed to take a liberty,
but the alarming impression, which was solely due to shyness, wore off
with closer acquaintance as the natural kindliness of his disposition
revealed itself, and one of the excellent traits in his character was,
that he never formed a favourable or unfavourable opinion of any one
in a hurry, but invariably waited for the test of time. The result
was, in almost every case, that the more he saw of people the more
he liked them and the more reluctant he became to part with men who
had been associated with him for any length of time. The position
which he occupied in British diplomacy during the twenty years which
he spent at Paris may, without exaggeration be described as unique.
No other man stood on quite the same footing, though it would be idle
to deny that there were some who were perhaps more brilliant. But the
implicit confidence which successive Foreign Secretaries placed in Lord
Lyons's judgment was based upon the knowledge that his opinions were
sound, unprejudiced, disinterested, and only formed after the most
conscientious investigations. 'I never volunteer advice,' he used to
remark, and it was perhaps for that very reason that his opinion was
so frequently sought by the Foreign Office. In fact so much importance
was attached to his views that he was occasionally asked to give his
opinion upon subjects of which he had no knowledge whatever, ranging
from the defence of Canada to the minimum dress allowance required
by the wife of a British Ambassador at Paris. As he had no intention
of seeking a consort himself, and as he had no intention, either, of
resigning his post, the latter inquiry (which was made in 1870) appears
somewhat superfluous; but, it may be worth noting, that as the result of
conscientious researches, he reported that £1000 a year was considered
to be necessary.
As to his merits as a chief, every one who had ever been associated
with him was of the same opinion, and it was generally held at the
Foreign Office that service under him at the Paris Embassy was a
liberal education in itself. It may be doubted, however, whether his
capacity and love of work were not to some extent a disadvantage to
his subordinates, since his industry was so great that it left them
comparatively little responsible work to do. At the Paris Embassy the
ordinary routine work is probably greater than at any other Embassy
with the exception of Constantinople, but there was scarcely anything,
however trivial, which he did not attend to himself. It is believed
in some quarters that an Ambassador leads a dignified, luxurious and
comparatively unoccupied life, but that was emphatically not the case
with Lord Lyons. He rose early and began the day by carefully studying
the more serious French newspapers; the whole of the time up to luncheon
was spent in writing or reading despatches, or attending to the various
small questions which were continually occurring. In the afternoon he
worked again until about 3 or 4 p.m., and then usually went to see
the French Foreign Minister or paid official calls in connection with
current business. Upon his return he worked again until dinner unless
interrupted by visitors, who were often of a tedious and uninteresting
type, and it not infrequently happened that telegrams would arrive at a
comparatively late hour of the night which it was necessary to deal with
immediately. All correspondence which arrived at the Embassy, no matter
from how insignificant a source, was attended to by him personally,
and elaborate directions given with regard to the replies, which were
invariably sent with the least possible delay. His industry was only
equalled by an almost preternatural caution, which showed itself in
a variety of ways. The reluctance to give advice has already been
noticed, but his excessive caution showed itself not only in writing,
but in conversation, and even amongst intimates he rarely expressed
opinions on men or things which it would have been unsafe to quote in
public, although his conversation was marked by much dry and original
humour of that elusive character which cannot be described on paper. It
was practically impossible to catch him napping. 'The Juarez (Mexican
Revolutionary) Minister having left his card upon me without any
official designation, I have returned a card also without an official
designation,' he wrote from Washington in 1859. His reticence during the
prolonged _Trent_ crisis has already been commented upon. 'I received
by the last mail,' he wrote to Sir Henry Elliot in 1867, 'a letter from
Hussein Khan, containing nothing but complimentary expressions. Not
wishing to be outdone in civility, I have written a reply in the same
strain. It has, however, occurred to me as just possible that Hussein
Khan may desire to appear to be in correspondence with me for some
particular object, and that there may be something which has occurred
since I saw him, which might render it advisable that he should not be
in correspondence with me. Accordingly I send my letter herewith open
to you. If you see any reason, however slight, for not forwarding it,
please destroy it, and take an opportunity of telling Hussein Khan that
I asked you to thank him for his letter to me.' It will be remembered
that even Queen Victoria was unable to draw him successfully on the
subject of the Treaty of Berlin. Similar instances might be quoted
indefinitely, and as an illustration of his caution in private life it
may be mentioned that he never stirred a yard outside the house without
a passport. A man of this temperament was not likely to make mistakes,
and it is a remarkable fact that throughout a correspondence extending
over something like forty years, there is not to be found a single
expression in any official communication addressed to him which could by
any stretch of the imagination be described as a censure or even as a
criticism of his proceedings.
As for the pleasures of the world, they hardly seemed to exist for him,
but the ordinary human weaknesses, which were chiefly non-existent in
his case, he regarded with an indulgent and even benevolent eye. He
used to repeat with much glee that the chief entry upon his _dossier_
at the Paris Préfecture de Police consisted of the words: _On ne lui
connait pas de vice_, and this concise statement may be said to have
been literally true. He had never been in debt, never gambled, never
quarrelled, never, as far as was known, ever been in love, although it
was a mistake to suppose that the opposite sex possessed no attractions
for him. Nor did he possess the resources available to the ordinary man,
for he cared nothing for sport, had probably never played a game in his
life, and detested exercise and outdoor life. The surprising thing was
that he contrived to keep his health, as although a total abstainer,
he was a large eater, and never took the slightest exercise. In fact,
during the last five or six years of his life he probably never walked
further than the English Church in the Rue d'Aguesseau, which was within
a hundred yards of the Embassy. 'Abstinence and exercise,' he used to
say, 'were the only two things that disagreed with him.'
The natural shyness of his disposition prevented him from deriving much
real enjoyment from what is generally described as society, but all the
social duties of an Ambassador were discharged in a manner which evoked
universal approval. The entertainments at the Embassy consisted chiefly
of dinners, which were remarkable for their excellence, and invitations
to which were highly prized by all sections of French society. Nothing,
in fact, could exceed the dignity or the faultless taste of the Embassy
arrangements, and not only were Lord Lyons's entertainments renowned,
but his horses and carriages were, even in Paris, noticeably amongst
the very best, it being one of his strongest convictions that the
British representative should always make an imposing appearance. But
his hospitality was no matter of mere show; every night the unmarried
secretaries were asked to dine with him unless otherwise engaged; and it
was upon these occasions that he used to appear at his best; obviously
finding more pleasure in their society than in that of any one else with
the exception of his own relatives. Affection, indeed, for his relatives
was one of his most marked characteristics, and it is highly probable
that his devotion to his sister, the Duchess of Norfolk, and to her sons
and daughters, was one of the causes of his not marrying; anyhow there
was no further question of marrying after the failure of the determined
attempt made upon him by an exalted personage, which has already been
mentioned.
His temper was singularly equable, and during his long stay in Paris
it was said that upon two occasions only was he known to have broken
out; once, when at a review at Longchamps, the Diplomatic Corps were
allotted an inferior position, and once upon an occasion when his
coachman appeared wearing trousers instead of top boots and breeches.
These ebullitions were due to the fact that he attached enormous
importance to all the outward signs of official representation, and
strongly resented anything which bore in any degree the nature of a
slight. In his capacity as a private individual he was the most modest
and unostentatious of men, and it is recorded, as an instance of his
shyness, that he once passed a week at Woburn without ever leaving the
precincts of the garden, because he was so much embarrassed by the
salutations of an adjacent lodge keeper.
It might have been supposed that a man of this unimaginative and
eminently judicial character would have failed to secure the regard
of his subordinates, however highly he might be esteemed by Cabinets
and Foreign Secretaries. As a matter of fact, probably no chief ever
enjoyed greater popularity, which was due to a variety of causes. He
was essentially a kind-hearted man, his correspondence abounds with
instances of help given to persons who had been in his employment in
any capacity, however humble; of opportune assistance rendered to
other persons who had been unlucky in their public careers, and of
recommendations of men whose services appeared to deserve recognition.
And in spite of his apparently detached nature, he took the warmest
interest in all those who were connected with him officially, and
invariably showed the utmost consideration, not only for their feelings,
but for their personal convenience. Thus, unlike some distinguished
diplomatists, one of his great objects was to save his staff unnecessary
work; he never put obstacles in the way of persons desiring leave, and
every afternoon at the earliest possible moment, in order to release
the Chancery, he used to send across the welcome written message: 'I
have nothing more for to-day,' although that by no means signified that
his own labours were concluded. Hardworking himself, he expected his
secretaries and attachés to do their share, and it was only when they
conspicuously failed, that he showed any sign of severity. During his
long career it fell to his lot to administer many reprimands, but these
were invariably so just and unavoidable, that the culprits seldom,
if ever, felt any sense of resentment, and he always made a point of
obliterating as soon as possible, any disagreeable incident of this
nature. The consequence was that he had no enemies, and no one who was
ever associated with him, has, so far as is known, ever had anything
but good to say of him. Another excellent feature in his character was
that he always made the best of his subordinates instead of searching
for their weak points; however unpromising the material, he generally
succeeded in effecting a marked improvement, and whenever any one who
had been with him left for another post, he never failed to draw special
attention to such good qualities as he appeared to possess with the view
of assisting him in his future career. Perhaps I may be pardoned for
interposing a personal testimonial, upon the occasion of a temporary
transfer to Berne, which may serve as an example amongst many others.
* * * * *
Paris, May 15, 1883.
MY DEAR ADAMS,[30]
I have settled that Legh is to be at Berne on the 28th, and I
hope you will like him. He is clever and well informed, though some
people think he does not look it.
It need scarcely be added that many of the communications of this
nature are of a more elaborate character, and refer to persons who now
occupy distinguished positions in the British Diplomatic Service. As
Lord Lyons grew older he became more and more reluctant to part with men
whom he knew well, and it was pathetic to witness the obvious sorrow
which he felt at their departure.
Paris has always been the most coveted post on the Continent, and in
addition to the social attractions of the place, the Embassy enjoyed
the reputation of carrying on its business in an efficient manner
chiefly owing to the qualities of the Ambassador. The reputation was
well deserved, and I can only recall one serious _lâche_, not devoid,
however, of humour, as to which I was unjustly alleged to be the
culprit. At a moment when critical negotiations respecting intervention
in Egypt were proceeding with the French Government, a member of the
Embassy had an extremely confidential conversation with an important
French Cabinet Minister, in the course of which the Minister criticized
in very uncomplimentary terms his Ministerial colleagues, and the
conversation was immediately embodied in a confidential despatch to
the British Foreign Office. The following morning a much agitated
Chef de Cabinet appeared at the Chancery, bearing the despatch, and
announced that he 'thought that some mistake had occurred, as the
despatch had been received by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.'
To the general consternation, it now became evident that the despatch,
instead of being placed in the Foreign Office bag, had found its way
into a lithographed envelope addressed to the _Ministre des Affaires
Etrangères_, and the whole horrid mystery was laid bare. The question
arose whether Lord Lyons should be told or not; the arguments of fear
prevailed; the French Minister behaved in an honourable manner and kept
silence, and Lord Lyons, fortunately for all concerned, never heard
of an incident which he would have looked upon as little short of a
calamity.
The only possible criticism that could be brought against Lord Lyons
as an Ambassador would be that he led too narrow a life, and moved in
too restricted a circle. Day after day and week after week he led the
same existence; even his holidays were laid out on the same mechanical
principle; every year he left his post, much about the same date, took
the waters at some spa, and then proceeded on a round of visits in
England, chiefly at the country houses of the governing families, such
as Knowsley, Chatsworth, Woburn, and Hatfield, but always including
a prolonged stay with his relatives at Arundel. He was essentially a
diplomatist of the old type, consorting entirely in Paris with the
official classes, the Faubourg, and the Haute Finance; keeping the
press at arm's length, avoiding everything which did not come within
the scope of his duties, and confining himself strictly to his own
business. The modern developments of diplomacy; the use of the press,
the hasty missions of amateur diplomatists, the gushing speeches which
are apparently now considered to be obligatory upon the professional
diplomatist--all this would have been hateful and perhaps impossible to
a man who could boast that he had spent five years in America without
making a speech or taking a drink. But in an impartial survey of the
twenty-eight years which Lord Lyons spent at Washington, Constantinople,
and Paris, it would be rash to assert that any other man would, under
similar circumstances, have retained to an equal extent the confidence
of successive British Governments and the esteem and friendship of
the long series of Foreign Ministers with whom he was called upon to
negotiate questions often of the most vital importance.[31]
The main interest in foreign politics in the summer of 1880 lay in
the Balkan Peninsula. Mr. Goschen had been sent out to Constantinople
in the place of Sir Henry Layard, and Her Majesty's Government were
endeavouring energetically to force the Porte to carry out the
provisions of the Treaty of Berlin with regard to the rectification of
the Montenegrin and Greek frontiers. The Greek Frontier Question made
little way, and the Gladstone Government in their diplomatic campaign on
behalf of the Greeks met with little encouragement or support from the
other Powers, not even excepting France, who had always been the leading
advocate of Greek claims. When M. de Freycinet was asked what he was
prepared to do if the Turks resolved to defy the Conference which was
then sitting, nothing more satisfactory could be got out of him than:
_nous marcherons avec vous_, or _nous ne marcherons pas sans vous_, and
to the question whether he would go far if necessary, he only made the
cryptic reply, _peut-être bien_. The British Government were hankering
after a naval demonstration, and it was disheartening to work with so
pusillanimous a comrade.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, June 21, 1880.
In answer to your private and personal letter of the day
before yesterday, I may say that I am not much afraid of the
French not being willing to go as far as we are willing to go in
coercing the Turks, if they set Europe at defiance about the Greek
Frontier. Freycinet seems to shrink from the idea that actual
coercion may be required, but his only distinct limit to the action
of France is that she will not do more than England.
I myself very much doubt whether the Turks will yield anything
to naval or other demonstrations, unless they are quite sure that
these demonstrations are the prelude to the actual use of force,
and it will not be easy to get them to believe this, unless we are
ourselves quite sure that that is what we mean.
Supposing we pushed demonstrations to the point of forcing
the Dardanelles, and sending the allied fleets to Constantinople,
we might produce a revolution, without obtaining the cession of
the territory to Greece. If the populations are in parts really
unwilling, the central government may be truly unable to compel
them to give in.
Supposing the Greek troops (_par impossible_) be defeated
either by the Turkish troops or by recalcitrant Albanians, the
ships of the Powers might not be able to do much to get them out of
the scrape.
I am very far from meaning to say, in answer to your question
as to the mildest and safest form of coercion, that it would
consist in moving troops to occupy the territory. To do so would
be neither mild nor safe, nor easy to arrange. But I am afraid
we shall find that in the end the treatment must be topical, and
that if the Greeks cannot take possession for themselves, we shall
hardly be able to obtain it for them by pressure exercised at
Constantinople only.
A rendezvous of the fleets at Corfu might have a good effect
on the Albanians, and perhaps increase the chance of the Greeks not
being seriously resisted.
I see Goschen suggests that the decision of the Conference
should be announced to the Porte by an identic note. I think a
collective note would have more effect and be more appropriate.
The Turks, however dense they may be in other respects, are usually
intelligent enough to perceive whether the Powers are in earnest or not,
and as no Government except the British felt much enthusiasm for either
the Greek or the Montenegrin cause, they showed no signs of giving way.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, July 2, 1880.
I am afraid it does not look as if the Turks were going to
yield to the moral force of United Europe. Léon Say and Montebello
seem to hold even less resolute language to you than Freycinet
does to me. Did the King of Greece understand Gambetta to say
that France, with or without the co-operation of other Powers,
would support Greece with troops? Freycinet will no doubt do
whatever Gambetta tells him, but one of the inconveniences of the
power behind the Government greater than the Government, is that
Gambetta does not talk as cautiously as he would if he felt direct
responsibility. No power except Russia seems to be willing to bell
the cat. France seems to be the only one that has in abundance the
three elements--men, ships, and money. Freycinet always says he
will do anything with us, but nothing alone, and does not seem much
more willing than Austria to look the chance of having to use force
in the face.
I do not see much prospect of an immediate diplomatic lull,
and I very much want one because it is of importance to my health
(at least the doctors say so) to get away, but I conclude that I
ought not to shrink from going through the national Festival of the
14th July, and that I should do what is to be done at least as well
as any of my colleagues.
Reviews, it may be said, were functions which he abhorred beyond all
others.
The King of Greece was in Paris at the time, vainly trying to stir up
Gambetta to come to his assistance, although Gambetta in conversation
with Sheffield expressed strong opinions as to the desirability
of France and England acting energetically in concert, and even
professed himself in favour of their making a joint demonstration
at Constantinople, and landing troops there if necessary. Upon the
same occasion he betrayed his gross ignorance of English politics by
lamenting that Lord Beaconsfield had not postponed the dissolution until
the autumn, 'when he would have been certain of success.'
Freycinet, however, remained deaf to Lord Granville's appeals, even when
the latter reproached him with the humiliating position in which France
would be placed by abandoning a question which she had made her own, and
when the British Government proposed a naval demonstration in favour of
the Prince of Montenegro, made all sorts of excuses for evading it if
possible.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, July 13, 1880.
I was more displeased than disappointed by the refusal of
the French to join in the naval demonstration in favour of the
Prince of Montenegro. They always try to act with Germany and
have a horror of sending away a ship or a man unless Germany does
the same: such is their confidence in the friendship they profess
to believe in, that they want always to be ready at the shortest
notice to attack their friend or to defend themselves from him.
They are also, no doubt, jealous of any separate help to Montenegro
which does not explicitly pledge the Powers to action in the Greek
Question also.
I quite agree with you that separate threats from the
French to the Porte about Greece (however incorrect their acting
separately may be) are more likely to do good than harm. One Power
in earnest would frighten the Porte more than the six, if the
Porte were convinced that the five others would not restrain the
energetic one.
During the next three months the Sultan, single handed, conducted a
campaign against the six Great Powers, which, as will be seen, nearly
ended in success; and it must, in fairness, be admitted that there was
a good deal to be said from the Turkish point of view. The Powers were
engaged in endeavouring to force the Porte to comply with conditions
directly or indirectly resulting from the provisions of the Treaty of
Berlin. But no steps whatever were taken, or ever have been taken, to
force other States to comply with stipulations which appeared to be
disagreeable to them. The right of the Sultan, which had been secured to
him under the Treaty, to occupy Eastern Roumelia, remained in reality
an empty phrase: the Bulgarian fortresses which were to have been
demolished, remained untouched, the tribute due from Bulgaria remained
unpaid, and there was no indication of an intention to reinstate the
unfortunate Mussulmans who, as the result of the war, had been driven
away from their homes, and had been despoiled of their property by
their new Christian masters. Neither could it be justly maintained
that, in agreeing to a rectification of the Greek frontier at Berlin,
the Turks had recognized the right of the Greeks to annex a territory
equal in extent to half of the Greek Kingdom. Added to this, were the
difficulty and the humiliation involved in surrendering against their
will, a large number of Mussulman subjects. The difficulty had in fact
proved insurmountable in the case of Montenegro, and the Albanians
who were in the first instance allotted to Montenegro offered so
successful a resistance that the original plan was abandoned, and after
much negotiation, the Porte accepted 'in principle' the cession of the
Dulcigno district as an alternative. But the concession of anything 'in
principle' by the Turks, usually means something quite different from
the usual interpretation of that expression, and the Sultan succeeded
in organizing a highly successful so-called Albanian League, and ably
supported by a resourceful local Pasha, contrived by various expedients
to delay the surrender of Dulcigno for so long that it began to look
as if it would never take place at all. Finally, the resources of
diplomacy becoming exhausted, a policy of coercion was decided upon, and
an international fleet assembled off the coast of Albania in the month
of September, under the command of Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour.[32]
Each power signed a declaration of disinterestedness and a pledge not to
acquire territory, but the hollow nature of this imposing manifestation
was betrayed by a provision that no troops were to be landed, and the
Sultan, who probably had some inkling of the situation, still refused
to give way. A bombardment of Dulcigno would presumably have left him
philosophically indifferent.
As the Dulcigno demonstration did not appear likely to produce any
satisfactory result, the British Government decided upon the hazardous
step of proposing the seizure of Smyrna, that being considered the most
efficacious means of coercing the Turks and of preventing the concert of
the Great Powers from becoming the laughing stock of Europe. This step
was evidently taken chiefly at the instigation of Mr. Gladstone, and the
letters of Lord Granville bear witness to the extreme anxiety which
he felt as to the result. No encouragement whatever was received from
France; the timorous Freycinet having in the meanwhile been succeeded at
the Foreign Office by the equally timorous Barthélemy St. Hilaire, an
aged survival of the Louis Philippe period.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Oct. 4, 1880.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire's answer about the Greek Frontier does
not look as if we should receive any energetic help from France
towards obtaining the settlement of that or any other question
in the East. The answer was all ready cut and dried, and the
declaration as to France sticking to the Concert, but not taking
any initiative, had been made before to my colleagues. A more
experienced diplomatist would have acknowledged more elaborately
your courtesy in offering to communicate first with France, before
addressing the other cabinets on the Greek Frontier affair.
The fact is that the present Cabinet is still more frightened
than the last by the disapproval which has been manifested by
all parties in France of even the little that has already been
done. With regard to this, M. St. Hilaire made a remark to me
yesterday which seems to be true enough. France, he said, has quite
recovered her financial strength, and in great measure her military
strength, but the _moral_ of the people is not yet _relevé_.
They are horribly afraid of another war and consequently utterly
averse from anything like a risky or energetic policy. Another
popular sentiment, which is extremely inconvenient just now, is the
feeling that France made the Crimean War _pour les beaux yeux de
l'Angleterre_ and had better not repeat the experiment. Altogether
I am afraid France will be a trouble, not a help to us, and I am a
good deal put out about it.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire talked to me a long time about
Gambetta, with whom he described himself as very intimate. He
described Gambetta as having a naturally generous nature, as being
somewhat impulsive and incautious, but at the same time somewhat
'Genoese.' He said that if I took opportunities of associating with
him, I should find his character an interesting study. The study
will not be a new one to me, and I am not sure that too apparent an
intimacy between me and Gambetta would be viewed without jealousy.
M. Jules Ferry, the new Prime Minister, was no more amenable than his
colleague.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Oct. 8, 1880.
As to the French agreeing to the Smyrna proposal, I cannot
prognosticate favourably. I had a long conversation yesterday
with Jules Ferry, the Prime Minister. I seemed to make some
impression by urging that to break up the European Concert now
would be to keep the questions open, with all their inconveniences
and all their dangers, for an indefinite time. He also admitted
the many advantages of the Smyrna plan, and was quite unable to
suggest any other course of action so likely to bring the Sultan
to reason without inconvenient consequences. But he perpetually
reverted to the argument that it would be going too near war to be
admissible under the French Constitution, and that the Chambers
on that account would call the Ministers severely to task. The
argument from the Constitution seems to me almost absurd, but it
is constantly used already in the press, and will no doubt be used
hereafter in the Chambers. The fact is that Jules Ferry and his
colleagues are horribly afraid of the effect which they believe any
action on their part would produce on public opinion and on the
Chamber.
I have seen B. St. Hilaire this afternoon. I went over with
him the same ground I had gone over with Jules Ferry yesterday, but
with much the same result. He told me that the question had been
discussed in the Cabinet this morning and was to be discussed in
another Cabinet to-morrow. Perhaps they would not like to stay out
in the cold if Germany and Austria came in, but I am afraid they
will certainly not say 'yes,' though they may say 'no' before those
Powers have given their answer. They seem to argue from the delay
of the German Government, that Bismarck is against the proposal.
Orloff, my Russian colleague, tells me that he is strongly urging
the French to agree. Beust and Radowitz (the German) talk as if
they themselves thought well of the Smyrna plan, but say they have
heard nothing from their Governments.
I spoke to B. St. Hilaire about your reasons for communicating
first with him about the Greek Question, and he sent with effusion
the message of thanks which he ought to have sent at first.
Choiseul is applying with vigour the _épuration_ system to
the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service. He seems to have
dismissed some very good men in both. Des Michels is one of his
victims, and to-day he has decapitated the head of the Commercial
Department.
I think it better not to communicate at present the draft
instructions to the Admiral. They would, I think, be seized upon as
arguments that the occupation of Smyrna would be an act of war.
Her Majesty's Government were in effect in a very bad mess. The Smyrna
proposal had received no real support from any Power. Bismarck had
announced that the so-called Eastern Question was not worth the bones
of a Pomeranian Grenadier, and nothing was to be expected from him.
The same thing applied to Austria; neither Italy nor Russia were to be
relied upon, and France was unwilling and unenterprising. No wonder
that Lord Granville felt singularly uncomfortable: the Concert of
Europe, as he expressed it, had 'gone to the devil,' no one was going to
help him, and unless within a few days the Turks yielded, the British
Government would be confronted with the alternatives of seizing Smyrna
single handed or of confessing defeat and abandoning the contest. Lord
Granville himself was in favour of the latter course, as being logical,
and the natural consequence of the action of the other Powers, who would
neither agree to the English proposals nor propose anything themselves.
Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, was apparently all for going on and
acting as the mandatory of Europe, and as he usually got his way, it
is possible that this dangerous course might have been adopted; but in
the very nick of time, just at the moment when the situation looked
to be at its worst, the Sultan suddenly gave way and announced that
Dulcigno should be handed over to the Montenegrins. What brought about
this sudden decision has always remained more or less of a mystery, but
there is no proof that the proposed seizure of Smyrna (which would have
probably inconvenienced European interests quite as much as the Sultan)
was the deciding factor. According to the late Lord Goschen, who was in
as good a position to know the real facts as any one else, the sudden
surrender of the Sultan was caused by a Havas Agency telegram from
Paris; but the contents of this communication have never been divulged,
and Lord Goschen himself never ascertained what they were. The surrender
of Dulcigno, which took place in November, terminated the crisis and
enabled the Gladstone Government to claim a striking if lucky success
for their own particular sample of spirited Foreign Policy.
In the year 1880 the relations between the Liberal Government and
the Irish Nationalists were the reverse of cordial, and a good many
inquiries used to come from the Foreign Office respecting alleged Irish
plots and conspiracies at Paris with requests that the French police
authorities should be asked to give their assistance. These requests
Lord Lyons was in the habit of discouraging as much as possible,
partly from an ingrained dislike to being involved in any secret and
equivocal transactions, and partly because he knew that if the French
police gave their assistance in tracking down Irish conspirators, they
would certainly expect reciprocity in regard to Bonapartists and other
opponents of the existing system of Government at that time residing
in England. For these reasons he always urged that the English police
authorities should communicate direct with the French police authorities
without using the Embassy as an intermediary. But the efforts of the
Gladstone Government were not confined to endeavouring to check Irish
plot by means of the police, and an attempt was made to restrain the
turbulent bishops and priests engaged in the Home Rule agitation by
applying pressure upon them from Rome. The credit of this expedient
seems to have been chiefly due to the active and enterprising cleric,
Monsignor Czacki, who was acting as Nuncio at Paris, and who appears
to have conceived the idea that if the Pope could be persuaded to
intervene on the side of the British Government, it might be possible
to re-establish regular diplomatic relations between England and the
Papacy. As far back as December, 1879, Monsignor Czacki had made certain
overtures, but they met with no attention from Lord Salisbury.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, June 18, 1880.
Last October a very quiet, not to say dull, old Italian
prelate was succeeded here as Papal Nuncio by a very active,
talkative and agreeable Pole, Monsignor Czacki.
At the beginning of December Monsignor Czacki came to me and
told me that he had received a letter from Ireland accompanied by,
or referring to, letters from very important people, among which
was, he said, one from you. He had in consequence written to the
Pope, and the Pope had written to the Irish Bishops to exhort them
to do all in their power to restrain their flocks from taking
part in violent or seditious proceedings. Monsignor Czacki asked
me whether the state of affairs in Ireland was at the moment so
serious as to render it advisable that the Pope should repeat these
exhortations to the Irish Bishops. I made a somewhat banal answer
to the effect that though there were no grounds for feeling alarm
as to the ultimate issue of what was going on, there was good
reason that those who possessed influence there should use it for
the prevention of crime and outrage, and also of turbulence and
disorder.
I reported what has passed in a private letter to Lord
Salisbury, but I received no answer from him, and I heard no more
of the matter till yesterday.
Yesterday, however, Monsignor Czacki came to see me and
showed me a letter he had received a few days before from Lord
Emly. The letter said that previous intervention had produced the
best results, that several Bishops had denounced the agitation in
the strongest terms, but that unfortunately the Socialists were
publicly supported by various Bishops. It mentioned that the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Meath, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Cashel had manifested their sympathy with Mr. Parnell, and that the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Kilmore had himself recommended Mr. Biggar
to the electors as a candidate. The letter begged Monsignor Czacki
to intervene again, but it made the request only from Lord Emly
himself, without any allusion to you or to any other person, as
being cognizant of it.
Monsignor Czacki said that he entirely sympathized with the
views of the writer and intended to send the letter to Rome; and he
proceeded to ask me whether I would authorize him to say that he
had shown it to me and that he sent it with my approval.
It seemed to me that this would be bringing the thing much too
near Her Majesty's Government for it to be right for me to assent
to it without knowing your wishes.
I confess this mode of communicating with the Vatican does
not commend itself to my judgment, and that it seems to me that it
might lead to awkwardness and interfere with better means you have
of communicating with the Pope, if you wish to communicate with
His Holiness at all. At the same time I was not absolutely sure
that you might not think there might be some convenience in having
this channel open. I did not therefore rebuff Monsignor Czacki, but
without giving any hint that I should refer to you, said simply
that I would think about what he had said.
He is very fond of enlarging academically upon the advantages
England would derive from entering into regular diplomatic
relations with the Holy See, or if that were impossible, from
re-establishing an unofficial agent at Rome.
You will gather from all this that Monsignor Czacki is not
altogether disinclined to be busy.
The energetic Nuncio returned to the subject at the close of the year.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Dec. 31, 1880.
You may remember that in June last I gave you in a private
letter a long account of a conversation which Monsignor Czacki, the
Papal Nuncio here, had volunteered to have with me on Irish affairs.
Monsignor Czacki came to see me three days ago, and enlarged
on the great advantage to the cause of order and tranquillity in
Ireland it would be for the Pope to pronounce an authoritative
condemnation of the wicked acts perpetrated in that country. He
hinted that the Pope had been misled by some of the Irish Bishops
who had recently been at Rome, and he dwelt on the inconvenience
which arose from the British Government's having no channel of its
own through which to communicate direct with His Holiness.
On the last occasion Monsignor Czacki offered to be himself
a channel of communication. He did not repeat this offer, but
his object in what he had said appeared to be to lead up again
to the question of the establishment of regular diplomatic
relations between England and the Vatican, or if that could not be
immediately, then to the return to Rome of an unofficial agent, in
the same position that was occupied by Odo Russell, and before him,
by me. He told me he spoke entirely of his own accord, but that he
was sure that Pope Leo XIII. would most willingly receive even an
unofficial agent.
Monsignor Czacki is a very great talker, which makes it easy
to say very little in answer to him, and I took full advantage of
the facility for being conveniently silent which this afforded me.
The impression he left upon me was that for some reason or
other the authorities at the Vatican decidedly wish to have some
sort of agent there, from whom they could receive information
respecting the views of the British Government upon the accuracy of
which they could fully rely.
I don't think that if it had depended on me I should have
discontinued the unofficial agent, awkward as the position had been
made by the presence of the Italian Government and of a regular
British Embassy. But to establish one now would be a question of
far greater difficulty than to have kept one going.
Whether influenced by Monsignor Czacki or not, Her Majesty's Government
sent Mr. Errington, a Liberal Member of Parliament, to Rome in an
ambiguous capacity which was loudly denounced in the House of Commons
both by Home Rulers and by fervent Protestants, and in the course
of one of the discussions on the subject, Mr. Gladstone informed an
astonished audience that there was all the difference in the world
between an Agent and an 'Agente.'
The French Municipal Elections which took place in January, 1881,
produced a reassuring impression throughout the country, as both the
extreme parties were decisively defeated, and the effect was largely
to increase the power and influence of Gambetta, who was now in the
enviable position of being able to make or unmake Ministries, and who
at the opening of the Chambers made a kind of 'speech from the throne'
which considerably perturbed the uninspiring President Grévy.
Everything that Gambetta now said was of importance, and his views on
the European situation were ascertained in the usual manner through
Sheffield.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Feb. 8, 1881.
Gambetta asked Sheffield to breakfast on Saturday, and as
usual talked freely to him.
He appeared to think that the three Emperors had come to
an understanding with each other, and that whatever might be
their plans, it was certain that they would not be beneficial
to French interests. According to him, it was with the Emperors
not a question of the position of their Empires, but of their
own individual positions. They were opposed to liberal views and
liberal institutions. They were intent upon doing whatever would be
most hurtful to the prestige and success of the Republic in France.
They were, in fact, reconstituting the Holy Alliance.
At this moment France was unfortunately powerless. Until the
General Election had taken place, her destinies must be at the
mercy of any old women who were employed as stopgaps in ephemeral
ministries. Since Barthélemy St. Hilaire had been in office he had
only seen him once. He knew nothing or next to nothing of what went
on at the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, and what little he did
know, he disapproved. 'Que voulez vous,' he said: 'nobody will do
anything to commit himself in any way, pending the uncertainty of
the elections.'
He seemed well informed about Egyptian affairs. He praised
Malet and said de Ring was entirely in the wrong in his quarrel
with de Blignières, which was very injurious to the calm direction
of Egyptian affairs. He expressed an intention to urge the
immediate recall of de Ring.
I mark this letter private because we should get into a great
scrape and close a very convenient channel of communication if
Gambetta found that he was quoted or that his sayings transpired in
any way.
The interest of the year 1881 lies in the fact that it makes a fresh
departure in French foreign policy and the abandonment of the retiring
and timorous attitude which had prevailed ever since the war with
Germany. The first State to experience the inconvenience of this new
development was Tunis, and early in the year it became evident that
a very acute Tunis question was imminent. The trouble began over a
large property known as the Enfida Estate. This property was sold to
an important French financial association, but upon the sale becoming
known, a certain Mr. Levy, a Maltese British subject, put in a claim of
pre-emption under Tunisian Law, and it was believed by the French that
he had been instigated by the Italians, and was merely utilized by them
as a convenient means of obstructing French enterprise. The dispute over
the Enfida Estate rose to such proportions that a French ironclad, the
_Friedland_, was sent to Tunis in February, and the British Government,
who were bound to make a show of defending the interests of Mr. Levy,
in spite of his dubious position, followed suit with H.M.S. _Thunderer_.
Both vessels were soon withdrawn, but before long it was generally
believed that a French invasion of the country was contemplated.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Feb. 25, 1881.
The French public are getting very cross about Tunis.
Reasonable people see that we cannot allow our own subject to be
bullied, but the French in general do not distinguish between
the Enfida case and the Tunisian questions regarding predominant
influence, Italy, and so forth. Drummond Wolff's question last
night was very mischievous. It was his own party which gave the
assurances at Berlin which have made Tunis so very delicate a
matter between the French and us, and which dispose the French to
allege that the present Government is less friendly to them about
that country than the late. Anyhow, Tunis is the point on which
above all others the French are susceptible and irritable; and
the Italians, and, however unconsciously, our own Consul too, I
am afraid, are always stirring up awkward questions on the spot.
I should be heartily glad to be rid of the Enfida question in any
creditable manner. I so strongly suspect that Levy is simply put
forward by the Tunisians for their own gain, and supported by the
local enemies of goodwill between France and England, in order
to make mischief, that I only wish we could wash our hands of
the whole affair. There seems to me to be no evidence that he is
a _bona fide_ purchaser on his own account. Tunis is the really
ticklish point in our relations with France.
The Enfida Estate case was not only unsatisfactory on account of Mr.
Levy not being a very desirable _protégé_, but because it enabled
the French to manufacture a grievance against the Bey, and gave the
Italians an opportunity to encourage that unfortunate potentate in the
belief that he would receive foreign support in the event of French
aggression.
The intentions of the French Government were disclosed before long.
Shortly after the wretched Bey had protested against a memorial
containing a long list of alleged French grievances against the
Government of Tunis, M. Jules Ferry, on the ever convenient plea of the
necessity of chastising hostile frontier tribes, asked for votes of
credit for both the army and the navy, which were unanimously agreed to.
Before the expedition actually started, the French agent at Tunis, M.
Roustan, visited the Bey and informed him that the French preparations
were intended to protect him against the Sultan of Turkey, who desired
to convert Tunis into a Turkish Pashalic, and that, under these
circumstances, it was very desirable that Tunis should be placed under
a French Protectorate. It was quite in vain that the unhappy Bey urged
that he had no reason to suspect the Sultan of any such intention and
that he had not the slightest desire for a French Protectorate; he was
informed that he was not the best judge of his own interest, and that
French troops would shortly enter his country to chastise the Kroumirs,
a race of whom nobody had yet heard, but who apparently constituted a
serious menace to the French Republic.
The obvious design of the French drew from Lord Granville an opinion
that they could not be allowed to seize upon Tunis without the consent
of Turkey, and the permission of other Powers; but to this opinion not
much attention seems to have been paid.
* * * * *
_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._
April 5, 1881.
I have thought it necessary to instruct you to inquire into
the state of affairs at Tunis. You are not likely to do so in an
unnecessarily offensive manner.
I am told that the French are determined to establish their
Protectorate. This will be very awkward at the moment.
Pray look as mysterious as you can, as to what might be our
attitude.
We do not wish to follow the example of the foolish opposition
made to Algiers, but the French cannot be allowed to seize Tunis
without the consent of Turkey and communication with the rest of
Europe.
The Italians wish us to move vigorously in the matter; the
Italian Government seems alarmed at the excitement of their chamber.
It was all very well to say that the 'French cannot be allowed to seize
Tunis,' but when a big European Power decides to pounce upon a weak and
decaying Oriental State, it is not of the slightest use to employ such
language if merely moral suasion is contemplated. The recent action
of the Italian Government with regard to Tripoli[33] was the exact
repetition of French action with regard to Tunis, and remonstrances were
of no more avail in one case than in the other. The Bey sent piteous
protests and appeals for justice to all the Great Powers, but as Italy,
the only Power which really objected, was not prepared to fight, his
lamentations fell upon deaf ears. Meanwhile, in an attempt to justify
their bare-faced aggression, the French Government apparently handed to
M. Blowitz, the _Times_ correspondent at Paris, a despatch from Lord
Salisbury written in 1878, which it had been agreed should be treated as
confidential, and it was intimated in the press that further private
and confidential communications would appear in a forthcoming Yellow
Book. This produced a very justifiable remonstrance from Lord Salisbury.
* * * * *
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._
Hatfield, April 24, 1881.
I am not sure that I am not irregular in addressing to you any
communication on public affairs. But I think I have been told that
a certain license is accorded to disembodied Foreign Secretaries,
of haunting the scenes of their former misdeeds.
My cause of writing is this. My eye caught a statement in one
or two English papers that St. Hilaire intended to print in the
forthcoming Yellow Book, Waddington's first despatch to d'Harcourt
on coming back from Berlin. I had a dim recollection that it was
undiplomatically phrased and had been withdrawn: but I could
remember no more.
Is it not rather a strong measure for a Government to withdraw
a despatch to which objection is taken at the time, when it might
be answered, and then to publish it three years later, when the
materials for answering it no longer exist? However, perhaps I am
wrong in assuming that the newspaper report is correct.
Lord Salisbury was quite correct in his recollection, and the intention
of publishing the despatch referred to was not carried out, but various
attempts were made to fix upon him the responsibility for French action
in Tunis.
Lord Granville, although he confessed to disliking the process, had to
content himself with ineffectual barking.
* * * * *
_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._
April 22, 1881.
You will not like a despatch I send you, and I am rather sorry
to send it. But I do not see how we are to give France _carte
blanche_.
I dislike barking without biting, but if the result of not
barking (in contradistinction to all that was done under Louis
Philippe and Napoleon, when English remonstrances certainly stopped
the French) is the annexation of Tunis, or the creation of the
great port of Bizerta impregnable by naval force and neutralizing
Malta, we should look rather foolish.
Notwithstanding the present Chauvinism about Tunis, it would
not be a sweetmeat for the French to have England, Italy and the
Arabs inside and outside Algeria against her.
It is as well that she should not imagine that this is
perfectly impossible.
But, of course, I wish to ruffle her as little as possible,
and nobody will wrap up the warning of our doctrine as to the
Ottoman Empire better than you will.
Undeterred by Lord Granville's just remonstrances and equally undeterred
by the Sultan's assertion of his suzerainty claims, the French entered
Tunis and occupied the capital on May 11, after little more than a
mere promenade. On the following day the Treaty of the Bardo, which
practically established a French Protectorate over the country, was
extorted from the Bey, and declarations by the French Government made it
clear that no intervention, direct or indirect, would be tolerated.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, May 13, 1881.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire certainly foreshadowed the Tunisian
Treaty accurately when he said that it would very much resemble a
Protectorate. It is so like one that it would be difficult to point
out a difference. The guaranteeing the execution of the Treaties of
the European Powers is sufficiently impertinent. As in all these
French expeditions, there is a vast amount of dirty pecuniary
stockjobbing interests at the bottom, which have been the real
motive power.
The whole affair is of very bad augury. It will inspire the
French Public with a love of resorting to high-handed proceedings
which can be indulged in without any real risk. Gambetta said to
Dilke that his Cherbourg speech was the first glass of wine given
to the Convalescent France, good for her but somewhat startling to
her system. This Tunis expedition is the second. The patient has
swallowed it so complacently that she may soon wish for another,
and perhaps a stronger stimulant. They got Bismarck's leave for
this, and it will perhaps be a long time before they do anything
of the kind without his leave. But then he will be sure to push
them on to any undertakings which will occupy their minds and their
forces, and tend to put them on bad terms with other Powers. And
this is disquieting, for there are not wanting all over the globe
places and questions in which the French might make themselves very
inconvenient and disagreeable to us, and might, if encouraged by
Bismarck, come at last to a downright quarrel with us.
Add to this the state of feeling in the English manufacturing
districts which is likely to be produced by the Commercial
proceedings of the French, and their virulent Protectionism, and
the prospect looks gloomy enough.
The actual proceedings of the French in Tunis were in reality of less
importance as regards England than the spirit which they betrayed, for
their reception by the French public indicated a state of feeling which
might have dangerous consequences. The preparations for the expedition
were not considered by impartial critics as particularly creditable
to the skill or efficiency of the French military administration, and
there had been nothing like serious fighting in the short campaign. The
question had simply been one of bullying a defenceless ruler, and of
carrying on a high-handed policy in the face of Europe. Nevertheless
the whole affair was hailed with almost unanimous delight by the French
people. Nor, apparently, was this delight diminished by the reflection
that the expedition had not been undertaken without the approval and
encouragement of the German Government, and that the favour had been
acknowledged with almost humiliating gratitude.
Gambetta had represented that his object was to emancipate France
from the humiliation of having to consult Bismarck confidentially
beforehand upon every step she took, but this humiliating precaution was
certainly not neglected in the case of Tunis, and if there had been the
slightest suspicion that the expedition would have involved France in
any difficulty with Germany, public opinion would at once have declared
against it. From the German point of view this was satisfactory enough,
but scarcely reassuring as far as other Powers were concerned.
The French had shown that they rejoiced in any high-handed proceedings
which did not bring them into collision with Germany, and whilst it was
not improbable that their rulers would seek popularity by gratifying
this feeling, it seemed not unlikely that the policy pursued by
Germany with regard to the Tunis expedition would be persevered in. To
disseminate the forces of France and to divert the minds of the French
from Alsace and Lorraine by encouraging them to undertake distant
enterprises for the gratification of their vanity, was an obvious means
of increasing the safety of Germany, and the more such enterprises
tended to alienate from France the sympathies of other Powers, the more
they would contribute to the security of Germany. Unfortunately there
were scattered over the globe, numerous islands and other territories,
the annexation of which by France might be prejudicial to English
material interests or objectionable to English feeling; and there were,
moreover, various countries in which the undue extension of French
influence might be dangerous to England, and where France, if tempted
or encouraged to resort to arbitrary proceedings, might, without
deliberately intending it, become involved in a downright quarrel with
England. These considerations made it desirable that especial caution
should be exercised in the case of Egypt. The effect of the Tunis
expedition upon Egypt had been twofold. On the one hand, it increased
Egyptian suspicions of the insincerity and rapacity of European Powers;
on the other hand, it increased the reputation of France in Egypt at the
expense of the other Powers and of England in particular, and diminished
any confidence in being effectively protected from French encroachments.
The lesson of the Tunis expedition was obvious; it would clearly be
folly, either by withholding the tribute or by any other step to weaken
the connexion of Egypt with the Porte, for the French Government had
taken elaborate pains to show that in dealing with Tunis it was dealing
with an independent Power. This contention had naturally been resisted
by the Porte, and there was little difficulty in proving that suzerainty
had been effectually established by a Firman of 1871. But the Sultan of
Turkey, who in the past had enjoyed the possession of more suzerainties
than any other potentate, had seldom derived anything but embarrassment
from this particular attribute, and in the case of Tunis it proved
to be singularly inconvenient. Encountering no opposition from other
Powers, the French flouted the claims of Abdul Hamid, and in order to
signify their new position, announced that the French representative
would thenceforth take charge of all foreign questions. In spite,
however, of the flexibility of the European conscience with regard to
the general principle of the Sultan's suzerainty, it was recognized
that under certain circumstances that principle must be conscientiously
upheld; and it was, therefore, intimated, more or less directly to the
French Government, that although the Sultan's suzerainty in Tunis was a
negligible quantity, the situation in Tripoli was quite different, and
so, in a far greater degree, was that of Egypt.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, June 17, 1881.
It is most true that the danger of bad relations between us
and the French arises from their proceedings not ours, and that
this makes the great difficulty in meeting it.
The change of their position with regard to Bismarck is
another great difficulty. A little while ago dread of Germany
made them unwilling to send a regiment or a ship to a distance
from France, but since the Tunis affair, they have gone into the
trap he has set for them with their eyes open. They feel sure of
his support and encouragement in any distant enterprises, and the
surer of it in proportion to the hostility which such enterprises
may provoke in England and Italy. They thus find a cheap way of
gratifying their vanity, and of advancing some of their apparent
interests. This coquetting with Bismarck does, moreover, divert
their thoughts from Alsace and Lorraine.
I don't think it would be prudent to make any special advances
to Gambetta at this moment. We might not please him and we should
very probably offend Grévy and Barthélémy St. Hilaire, and so
interfere with the practical treatment of present questions, such
as the Commercial Treaty, the West Coast of Africa, Newfoundland,
etc.
The anomalous position of the French in Tunis, and the
proceedings of Roustan[34] there, will keep up irritation in
England and Italy--and I suppose the French, annuente Bismarck,
will cut the Gordian knot, sooner or later, by annexing it. They
ought in consequence to acquiesce in some improvement of the
position of England in Egypt, but this is dangerous ground.
The overbearing attitude of the French officials in Tunis caused
considerable irritation in England, and something akin to exasperation
in Italy. The Italians, had they felt strong enough to do so, would have
resisted the French pretensions by force, but being without an ally at
the time, had to content themselves with violent ebullitions in the
press. The ill-feeling between the two countries was marked by serious
riots at Marseilles and other towns in the South of France.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, June 24, 1881.
I did my best to impress upon B. St. Hilaire yesterday that
there was real bitterness of feeling among the public in England,
and that if the French Government and its agents persisted in a
series of irritating measures, the consequences might be very
inconvenient. The French had got all they could want, I said, and
I could not help wondering that it did not strike them that their
policy should now be to let the new system settle down quietly,
to avoid occasions of controversy about it, and in short, to let
Tunis be as little heard of as possible at present. It was an ill
return, I observed, for the great patience and friendliness shown
by our Government, to be perpetually springing upon them surprises
unpalatable to English public opinion. He professed to _abonder
dans mon sens_. I entreated him to keep his subordinates in order.
The French seem to have an unpleasant business in Western
Algeria, and there is beginning to be an outcry against the
military and civil management of the troubles there.
Good feeling between French and Italians will not be promoted
by late events at Marseilles. The feelings of the French towards
the Italians there are like those of the American workman towards
the Chinese at San Francisco, or of the Irish towards the negroes
at New York. There are said to be more than 50,000 Italians at
Marseilles, and they are apt to use their knives.
There are symptoms of a growing antagonism between Jules Ferry
and Gambetta, signs of the feeling between the Elysée and the
Palais Bourbon.
After all, the Tunis expedition turned out to be a rather more
troublesome affair than had appeared probable at first. At the end of
June insurrections broke out at Sfax and other places, necessitating the
recall of French troops who had been sent back to France; bombardments,
and other severe measures of repression. The insurrection spread into
Algiers on the western side, and on the eastern side the disturbances
created the possibility of a violation of the frontier of Tripoli by the
French troops.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, July 5, 1881.
Retribution has come quickly upon the French for their
hypocritical seizure of Tunis. The Arabs seem to be upon them
in all directions. Although this serves them right, it is, I
think, much to be regretted for political reasons, independently
of the suffering it causes to un-offending Europeans of various
nationalities in Africa.
If the French have to send a large force to Tunis, they will
very probably, formally as well as virtually, annex the Regency.
Tripoli will then stand exactly in the same relation to them
that Tunis did before the assumption of the Protectorate. After
Tripoli would come Egypt; but happily there is, I believe, a very
impracticable desert tract between them.
How great must be the complacency of those who desire to
occupy French troops in distant countries, and to involve France in
difficulties with other Powers.
If the action of the French in seizing Tunis was hypocritical, the
contention that the case of Tripoli stood on an entirely different
footing was equally unconvincing. The real truth, of course, was that,
with the exception of the Italians, no one really objected to the French
going to Tunis. They went there, under distinctly false professions,
announcing that the expedition was intended solely to punish refractory
tribes, and that the occupation was merely temporary. The disclosure
of their real objects naturally caused irritation in England as well
as in Italy, but all hostile criticism was met by the assertion of the
Liberal Government that Lord Salisbury had himself invited the French
to take Tunis at the time of the Berlin Congress. The French themselves
were careful to represent that they had only followed Lord Salisbury's
advice, and Lord Granville, in defence of his own policy, always
maintained that the phrase attributed to Lord Salisbury, _Carthage ne
doit pas rester aux barbares_, had cut the ground from beneath his
feet, and rendered remonstrance useless. But to make Lord Salisbury
responsible for this act of flagrant immorality seems, in the face of
such evidence as is available, unjustifiable. All that he had done was
to intimate that he had heard that the French were extremely anxious
to go to Tunis; that if they did so, British interests would not be
endangered, and that he should consequently look on with indifference.
When M. Waddington, in 1878, construed this opinion as an invitation to
France to appropriate Tunis, Lord Salisbury felt bound to remonstrate,
and he wrote to Lord Lyons, as has been already shown. 'He (Waddington)
makes me talk of Tunis and Carthage as if they had been my own personal
property, and I was making him a liberal wedding present.' The real
instigator of the Tunis expedition was not Lord Salisbury, but Bismarck.
The latter, who was omnipotent in Europe at the time, could have stopped
French action at any moment he pleased, but instead of doing so, he
naturally encouraged an enterprise which was certain to lead eventually
to difficulties between France, Italy, and England.
While, however, it was convenient to overlook any French illegality
with reference to Tunis and to its connection with the Turkish Empire,
it would have been, as has already been shown, manifestly imprudent
to allow Tripoli, which stood in a precisely similar position, to be
menaced with a similar fate: besides which, Italy had already marked
Tripoli down as her own prey. Accordingly the French Government were
informed that 'in view of the unquestioned incorporation of Tripoli in
the Turkish Empire, as well as its proximity to Egypt, Her Majesty's
Government could not regard interference of whatever description on
the part of the French Government in that province in the same manner
as they viewed the recent occurrences at Tunis. That Her Majesty's
Government should take this view of the question of Tripoli cannot, they
feel assured, be a source of surprise to that of France, since they
have, on all occasions when the question of the extension of French
influence in the direction of Egypt has been under discussion, been
perfectly frank in their explanations with the French Government on the
subject.' In his reply to this communication, M. B. St. Hilaire (who
had previously announced that to annex Tunis would be a great mistake),
effusively stated that the French Government looked upon Tripoli as
an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, over which it did not pretend
to exercise a predominant or exclusive influence, and gave a formal
denial to all rumours which attributed to France any designs upon that
country. The British Government professed itself quite satisfied with
these assurances, and the Porte, for once in a way, showed sufficient
intelligence to make its suzerainty quite clear, by despatching troops
to garrison the country, and by other precautionary measures. In
consequence of these steps Tripoli remained immune from attack for
another thirty-two years, and when, in 1912, the Italians, following
the French example of 1881, fell suddenly upon it without any serious
attempt at justification, they did not allege that they were attacking a
semi or wholly-independent State, but declared war upon Turkey itself,
and incidentally brought about the destruction of Turkish power in
Europe. The future of Tripoli under Italian rule is still obscure, while
the numerous prophecies of failure which attended the seizure of Tunis
by the French have not been fulfilled, but in either case it would be
difficult to justify the morality of the enterprise or to defend the
policy of these two Great Christian Powers.
The year 1881 witnessed the renewal of negotiations for a new Commercial
Treaty between France and England, and in consequence of opinions
expressed by M. Tirard, the French Minister of Commerce, it was
determined to take the negotiations out of the hands of diplomatists.
M. Tirard had declared that he believed that an understanding could be
effected if the question could be freed from diplomatic dilatoriness,
and that if he were brought face to face with a 'competent and
well-disposed man,' the whole matter would be settled within a week
by making a few mutual concessions. To meet these views, the late Sir
Charles Dilke, M.P., was appointed principal British Commissioner with
the late Sir Joseph Crowe, Sir Alfred Bateman, and other distinguished
experts as his colleagues or assistants, but M. Tirard's prognostication
turned out to be entirely incorrect. In spite of the great ability
and indefatigable industry of Sir Charles Dilke and the other British
Commissioners, the negotiations made a very unsatisfactory start,
were constantly broken off, and were not even concluded by the end
of the year, so that it must have been impressed upon M. Tirard that
dilatoriness was not necessarily due to diplomacy. From the first, the
negotiations were unpromising, for Free Trade had continually receded in
France since the Empire, and the necessity of cultivating good political
relations with England was evidently less in 1881 than it had been upon
the last occasion.
The representatives of the two nations met in London in June, and an
inauspicious beginning was made by the French Commissioners repudiating
the bases signed in 1880 by Lord Granville and M. Léon Say. By the
middle of the month the breaking off of the negotiations was already
being considered.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Sir C. Dilke, M.P._
Paris, June 14, 1881.
I received last evening your letter of the day before, asking
me whether I had anything to say on the policy of breaking off the
commercial negotiations when you get to work.
I don't think we should lose sight of the fact that there will
in all probability be a thorough change of Government in France in
the autumn. We might _perhaps_ get a decent treaty from the new
Government if they found the negotiations in progress. It might
not be so easy to get negotiations reopened if they had once been
broken off, and the French had become accustomed to the idea of
having the general tariff applied to British goods.
Politically, it would, I think, be a great pity to begin
ill with the new Government, and I don't think we could possibly
begin well, in the state of feeling which would be produced in
this country, and still more I suppose in England, by a commercial
rupture.
The majority of the French would be very glad that the general
tariff, or still higher duties, should be enforced against English
goods, but they would none the less be irritated by our breaking
with them.
I confess, too, that I am alarmed, perhaps without sufficient
reason, at the effect which may be produced both at home and abroad
by the cry in England for retaliation.
My own plan would be, for the present, to pursue the
negotiation as seriously and as steadily as is compatible with
not committing ourselves to any decidedly objectionable duties so
definitely as to be hampered in subsequent negotiations if we find
the new Government more fairly disposed towards us.
If there was ever any possibility of concluding a Treaty in
time for it to be passed by the Chambers this Session, there is
certainly none now. Gambetta wanted to get the question out of the
way before the elections; but even if the Treaty were signed, I
don't think the Chambers could be induced to consider it under
present circumstances. Nor would they, I should think, pass a bill
to prolong the existing Treaties.
To my mind, our most prudent course would be to let the new
Chambers find the negotiations going on when they meet in the
autumn. I don't of course mean that you should go on sitting every
week from this time to the autumn: it would suffice that there
should not be any adjournment _sine die_, and that we should not
give any ground for an assertion that we are not really willing to
conclude even a moderately fair treaty.
Lord Lyons, as has already been stated, was, like almost every British
official of the time, a firm and almost bigoted Free Trader; and it
is possible that his alarm at the prospect of retaliation was caused
by the appearance of the Fair Trade League; that harbinger of Tariff
Reform to which somewhat inadequate justice has been rendered by its
imitators. But it is surprising to learn of these qualms, when he is
found predicting that the smaller countries who were willing and able to
retaliate on French goods, would obtain better terms than England. The
very different spirit in which the smaller States approached commercial
questions with France is shown in the following instructive account of
the views of the Swiss Minister at Paris, M. Kern.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Sir C. Dilke._
Paris, June 25, 1881.
Last evening, after my letter to you of yesterday had gone, I
met Kern, who told me that in the course of the day he had had an
interview with M. Tirard, and also one with M. Gambetta. He had,
he said, declared most distinctly to both, first, that Switzerland
would not sign a Treaty placing her in a less advantageous
commercial position than that now existing; and secondly, that
if the general tariff were applied to Swiss goods, French goods
would be forthwith subjected to duties of precisely the same amount
in Switzerland. He had, he said, somewhat surprised M. Tirard by
informing him that the Swiss Government had power to impose such
duties at once, without waiting for legislative sanction.
The impression left upon Kern's mind by the two interviews
was, that as hard a bargain as possible would be driven by France,
but that in the end they would rather make moderate treaties than
no treaties at all, if they saw that this was the only alternative.
He is going to Berne to confer with his Government, and he
says that he is sure they will approve and confirm his language to
Tirard and Gambetta.
After these interviews, Kern was very positive that the French
Government were making a great fight to justify themselves to the
Chambers, but that if the Powers, and particularly England, were
firm, the French would yield rather than incur the political and
other inconveniences of not making any treaty at all.
I am not so sure as he seemed to be of this, but I think that
the French are alive to the political inconveniences of breaking
with England altogether; and it might therefore be worthy of your
consideration, whether, when you go back to the Articles you
reserved in the Tariff, you should not make a last effort to see
whether the French cannot be brought to consent to a Treaty which
would be better commercially than no Tariff Treaty at all. It might
interfere with whatever chance of success such an effort might
have, for the French to feel beforehand that they could get out of
the political difficulty by signing a simple Most Favoured Nation
Treaty.
Nevertheless I am not shaken in my opinion that it would be
advisable for you to sign a Most Favoured Nation Treaty, if better
may not be, before you break up the Commission, or adjourn it for
any long time.
Commercially we had better make sure at once of sharing the
concessions which may be made to other Powers under threats of
retaliation.
Politically we should, I think, find it most disadvantageous
to have even the appearance of being on bad terms with France.
The British Government apparently still entertained the illusion
that there were real French Free Traders. M. Challemel Lacour was
the chief French Commissioner and Lord Granville welcomed him as a
brother Free Trader. His brother Free Trader said it was true that he
was _Libre-Echangiste_, but he was _Libre-Echangiste Français_, and
recognized the necessity of paying due consideration to the interests of
native industries. To this chilling response, Lord Granville was forced
to retort that he must venture to doubt whether a _Libre-Echangiste
Français_, in His Excellency's acceptation of the term, was not what
in England was called a Protectionist. M. Waddington had once stated
that he was a Free Trader 'bar cotton,' and whenever the French Radical
Parliamentary candidates, who were then perambulating the country in
view of an approaching general election, were asked whether they were
Free Traders or not, they replied in the affirmative, but qualified by
a reserve in favour of French industries which would be ruined by Free
Trade. As a matter of fact, the spirit of Protection was becoming more
and more ingrained in the French people, and the best chance of getting
a reasonable Commercial Treaty lay in the hope that an election would
bring Gambetta into power.
The London negotiations which had been temporarily suspended were
resumed at Paris in the autumn, and continued during the remainder of
the year; but interest was diverted from commercial matters to the
events which were occurring in Egypt and their probable effect upon
Anglo-French relations.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 29: Subsequently Viscount Goschen.]
[Footnote 30: Sir Francis Adams, Minister at Berne.]
[Footnote 31: See Appendix by Mrs. Wilfrid Ward, "Lord Lyons in Private
Life."]
[Footnote 32: Afterwards Lord Alcester.]
[Footnote 33: 1911.]
[Footnote 34: French Consul-General at Tunis.]