CHAPTER XV

ARABI'S REBELLION

(1881-1882)

In September, 1881, the long-drawn-out Egyptian crisis culminated in the

military _coup d'état_ of Arabi and the colonels, which resulted in the

dismissal of the Ministry and the practical establishment in Egypt of a

military dictatorship. From that moment European intervention, in some

form, became inevitable, and it was the object of the British Government

to continue to adhere honestly and consistently to the policy of working

in conjunction with France, and to avoid carefully as long as possible

any action which might necessitate the employment of force.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Sept. 30, 1881.

The article in the _Times_ has produced an anti-English

explosion on the subject of Egypt, and was certainly well

calculated to do so.

For my part, I think the best thing to be done is to take an

opportunity of distinctly manifesting at Cairo the continuance of

the Anglo-French understanding.

If we let either the Egyptians or Foreign Powers suppose they

can upset that, we shall not be able to maintain the English and

French Controllers, and if they disappear, the financial prosperity

will disappear with them, and we shall have the bondholders,

French and English, on our backs again.

If we let in other Foreign Powers, and at the same time try

to establish English predominance, we shall have those Powers

coalescing with France against us.

A split with us would very probably lead to France throwing

herself into the arms of Bismarck, and he would encourage all

her ambitious aims out of Europe, and, in particular, those

the prosecution of which would widen the breach between her

and England: or, in other words, be especially annoying and

inconvenient to us.

I hope things are so far calming down in Egypt, that we may

not be called upon to take any special measures this time; and

the best hope of avoiding them in future seems to be in making it

understood that England and France united will resist attempts to

overthrow the existing system.

I am all against letting the Turks thrust the smallest finger

into the pie. At this moment the French would never consent, and

would consider our bringing in the Turks a specially unfriendly

act, with a view to their Tunisian affairs. The less they merit any

consideration from us, the more sore they will be at not receiving

it. Besides which, where the Turkish hoof has trod, no grass grows,

and woe to the finances of any country with which the Turk can

meddle.

Of course, in what I have said about Egypt I have confined

myself to the present and the immediate future.

The chances of being able to avoid active intervention were in reality

non-existent; for temporizing measures taken in conjunction with France

could not put off for ever the day when, moral pressure having been

found insufficient, armed force would necessarily have to be employed.

When that day arrived, the probability was that France would want to

send troops in conjunction with ours, and our consent to that course

might involve us in war with France in a very short time. If we had the

courage to tell the French that our interests were paramount in Egypt,

and that therefore all other European Powers must be kept out, then we

must be prepared to back our words with force, and everything therefore

pointed to the naval superiority of England in the Mediterranean as

being our paramount necessity. With real naval superiority in the

Mediterranean we were practically able to make the French do our

bidding, if we chose. We had the power to shut up their navy in French

ports, to stop their communications with Africa, to render powerless

two millions of French soldiers, and to demolish Bismarck's schemes

of elbowing us out of the Mediterranean. Such was the happy position

which we enjoyed in 1881, and it was a great contrast to that which

we occupy at the present day; but it did not tend towards promoting

goodwill between the two nations, and Lord Lyons constantly urged

that some joint understanding should be arrived at, in the event of

another military outbreak in Egypt. The situation had been complicated

by the despatch of a Turkish mission, and the general impression in

France was that Arabi and the colonels would shortly be engaged in a

conspiracy to dethrone the Khedive and to restore something like the old

_régime_ in the country. A positive declaration from the English and

French Governments that they would not tolerate the overthrow of the

Khedive and the established system might have effected much if it was

felt that the two Governments would interfere by force, if necessary,

rather than permit it; but this would not be felt or believed unless

the two Governments had really come to an understanding and had agreed

upon details; and when it came to discussing details the question

at once presented difficulties. These difficulties were not lessened

by a French Ministerial crisis in the autumn, as a crisis usually

produced a fit of petty Chauvinism, such an encouragement to Consuls

in the East to _porter haut le drapeau de la France_, the bullying of

local authorities, and a demand for the extortion of monopolies and

concessions for French speculators.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 4, 1881.

The Treaty of Commerce and Egypt will probably be the two

first questions we shall have to discuss with the new Government.

The Commercial negotiations seem to me to have been brought

exactly to the right point. Having obtained the three months

prolongation, we have resumed the negotiation on the day fixed, and

have continued it _bona fide_; and it now stands over in a manner

which will enable us to see in due time whether or no we can make a

treaty with the new Government.

As regards Egypt, the opinion gains ground here that at the

bottom of the agitation there is (or soon will be) a plot to

dethrone Tewfik and put Halim in his place as a 'National': _i.e._

anti-European, anti-French, and anti-English Control, Khedive. I

understand that de Blignières represented strongly to Gambetta that

the only way to produce quiet in Egypt and counteract intrigues

in favour of Halim at Yildiz Kiosk is for England and France to

declare positively at Cairo and Constantinople that they will not

stand it, but will resolutely support Tewfik and the existing state

of things. I do not know how far Gambetta assented to this, but I

am told he did not dissent from it.

The result of much political manoeuvring was that in November, 1881,

Gambetta was forced to take office and to exchange the irresponsible

power which he had hitherto wielded in the background for Ministerial

responsibility. As frequently occurs in similar cases, when the great

mystery man was dragged out into the light of open day, his appearance

was somewhat disappointing. His Administration, with one exception

only, was composed entirely of men belonging to his own immediate

following, and contained no one of any weight beside himself. Gambetta

took the Foreign Office as well as the Presidency of the Council, and

on the principle that _il vaut toujours mieux avoir affaire à Dieu qu'à

ses anges_, this was an advantage, although it was believed that he

entertained so great an admiration for Bismarck, that, following the

latter's example, he would probably hand over the foreign diplomatist to

an under secretary. The first impressions produced by the new Ministry

were not favourable.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 18, 1881.

I don't think the present Ministry is so far at all a success.

Among other inconveniences arising from the appointment of men of

so little personal importance is that there is no one in Gambetta's

party who does not think that he ought to have been a Minister;

or, in other words, who acquiesces in the superiority of any of

those chosen. The fact that Léon Say and Freycinet were offered

portfolios, but would not accept them on Gambetta's terms, tells

against the selection ultimately made. Gambetta's personal genius

must make up for all deficiencies. He appears to have a talent

in particular for parliamentary tactics, especially for making

the right move on the spur of the moment. I doubt his having

deep-matured plans. So far as I can see, he lives _au jour le jour_

like ordinary men.

I had a long visit yesterday from Spüller, but we did not get

much beyond generalities. Gambetta and I have exchanged visits, but

have not met.

I do not hazard conjectures on commercial matters, as Dilke

will ascertain to-morrow exactly how the land lies. ... As a

diplomatist, I cannot but feel that there is convenience in being a

bachelor just now.

The last sentence does not refer to the fact that he had just been

created a Viscount, but to the somewhat peculiar domestic circumstances

attaching to certain members of the new Government.

It had been assumed that Gambetta's accession to office would be

marked by a more vigorous foreign policy, especially in the direction

of acquiring fresh territories in distant regions; but this was not

justified by his own language or bearing, and at his first interview

with the Ambassador he abstained from pompous common-places about

preferring England to all the rest of the world, and desiring peace at

any price, which was looked upon as a good sign. At the same time, there

was, in his speeches about Tunis and the Mediterranean, a slight flavour

of Chauvinism which would not have excited remark before 1870, but which

would not have appeared in 1880, and would certainly not have been

applauded in 1881, unless it had become generally known that Bismarck

had sanctioned and encouraged French enterprises away from the continent

of Europe.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 6, 1881.

Gambetta gave the Diplomatic Body an excellent dinner last

Saturday, and played his part as host very successfully.

What may be at the bottom of his heart, nothing has yet shown.

The change which has come over the relations between France

and Germany opens to him the door for a comparatively safe yet

ambitious Foreign Policy. Will he resist the temptation?

During the years which immediately followed the war, the

feeling of France towards Germany was composed of furious hatred

and of mortal dread. The line taken, consciously or unconsciously,

by Germany tended to add bitterness to this feeling. She interfered

dictatorially with France even in internal matters. Her object

seemed to be not only to impede the restoration of French strength

and wealth, but to prevent the French recovering even prestige

anywhere. She was, or affected to be, convinced that a war of

revenge on the part of France was imminent. She was believed by

the French to be angry at their showing so much vitality and to be

preparing to give them the _coup de grâce_.

At this moment, however, neither France nor Germany appears

to apprehend an attack or to be prepared to make one. Each appears

to consider the other too strong to be attacked with impunity.

Certainly Gambetta would not find the nation in heart to follow him

in defying Germany. If therefore his policy or his passions incline

him to do something striking to flatter the national vanity, how

is he to find the means? The Tunis affair has given Bismarck an

opportunity of showing him. It has enabled the Chancellor to

convince the French that they will have the countenance of Germany

in any enterprise in which they may engage out of Europe.

How far this may be part of a great plan of Bismarck's

to secure German supremacy in Europe by pushing Austria into

the Levant, Russia into Asia, and France into Africa and the

Mediterranean, and by shutting up England in her own islands, we

need not inquire. In any case it must suit Prince Bismarck to see

France making acquisitions of territory or influence, which weaken

her military force in Europe, throw burthens on her finances, and

make ill blood between her and other Powers.

Unhappily if Gambetta is so short-sighted as to give in to

temptation of this kind, difficult questions are, more than with

any other Power, likely to arise with England, who is in contact

with France all over the world and especially in the Mediterranean.

I hope better things, and I am not at all willing to despair

of a thorough good understanding between France and England which

would avert danger from both, and enable both to do good to all the

world. Still one cannot but be anxious at this moment. Egypt may be

the ticklish point.

The Parliamentary skill of Gambetta was seen to advantage during the

short winter session, and compared favourably with the want of tact and

vigour which had been displayed by his predecessors. He even obtained a

success in the Senate, where he had not expected to find any sympathy

at all, and some of the more sensible Conservatives became disposed to

support him, more from fear of what might result if he fell than from

personal attachment. Some of his appointments, however, aroused alarm,

and he perturbed Lord Lyons by bestowing upon a journalist a most

important post in the Foreign Office.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 30, 1881.

I will not despair, but I am feeling very great anxiety

about the Commercial Treaty. I am afraid that on this side of the

Channel, much more than in England, the failure of the negotiations

would have a most undesirable political effect. In France and on

the Continent generally, it would be taken as a sure indication of

a coolness between the two Governments. Gambetta would be taunted

by the Opposition with having alienated England (Italy having been

alienated before). Gambetta's supporters in the press and elsewhere

would try to throw the blame upon England, the English press would

retort upon France, and a very unpleasant state of feeling would be

the result.

Gambetta has astounded people by appointing a flashy newspaper

writer, of no particular principles, to the post of Political

Director in the Foreign Office. The Political Director is almost

the most important person in the office, as he drafts all the

political despatches and notes. I hope the communications to the

foreign ambassadors are not to be in the style of 'smart' newspaper

articles. I confess that when I saw the appointment in the _Journal

Officiel_, it did not occur to me that the man could be the same

Weiss who had been writing in the _Figaro_.

The friendly disposition of Gambetta towards England has already been

noted, and beyond a certain tendency in his speeches towards Chauvinism,

there was nothing in his conduct calculated to arouse alarm, but

nevertheless a critical moment in Anglo-French relations appeared to

be approaching at the beginning of 1882. The Government of France had

passed into the hands of a Minister far more influential, more able,

and more ambitious than any man who had taken part in public affairs

since the retirement of Thiers, and the time was at hand when that

Minister must decide on the line of policy to be followed with regard

to Foreign Powers. The character and temperament of Gambetta naturally

disposed him to endeavour to make his Foreign Policy more vigorous,

more successful and more striking than that of his predecessors, and

with that object he would probably take one of two courses. Either

he would aim at emancipating France from her existing confidential

servility towards Germany; or, despairing of that, he would continue the

existing relations with Bismarck, and thus ensure the latter's willing

acquiescence in aggressive proceedings on the part of France beyond the

limits of Europe.

In order to shake off the German yoke, Gambetta evidently considered

it essential that he should be able to place himself on distinctly

friendly and intimate terms with England, and if he failed in this, the

probability was that he would be obliged to revert to the patronage

which was felt to be so irksome. But the change which had come over

the relations between France and Germany opened the door to a foreign

policy which was comparatively safe and easy, and yet did not present

the disadvantage of being unambitious. The period which immediately

followed the war of 1870, was, as has already been pointed out, marked

by a feeling in France towards Germany of fierce hatred combined with

extreme fear, and German policy, whether consciously or unconsciously,

tended to embitter this feeling. Germany interfered dictatorially and

ostentatiously even in French internal affairs, and the object seemed

to be not only to crush the reviving strength of France, but to prevent

her recovering anywhere, or in any matter, the smallest portion of her

lost _prestige_. The German Government professed to believe that a war

of revenge was meditated, and was credited with the intention of finally

destroying France before the latter should be sufficiently recuperated

to resume the struggle.

But with the lapse of time, a change of policy, and, to a certain

extent, a change of feeling had taken place on both sides. Neither

country was in any immediate apprehension of an attack from the other. A

somewhat ostentatious interchange of courtesy had been substituted for

their former reserve, and Bismarck had seized the opportunity of the

invasion of Tunis to let the French understand that they would have the

countenance of Germany in enterprises undertaken by them out of Europe.

Apart from all far-reaching schemes for securing German supremacy in

Europe, it was obviously in the interests of Germany that France should

engage in enterprises and make acquisitions which dispersed her armies,

disorganized her finances and created ill feeling with other Powers.

Gambetta was much too intelligent a man not to see through this policy,

but the temptation to direct the energies of France into the Colonial,

rather than the continental direction, might prove too strong for him

if he despaired of gaining credit for his Government in another way.

Unhappily, in such a case, with no Power were difficulties so likely to

arise as with England, which was more or less in contact with France in

all parts of the world, and especially in the Mediterranean. Nor could

it be forgotten that in the speeches lately delivered on the subject of

Tunis, Gambetta had made strong appeals to national pride with regard to

French possessions and interests beyond the seas.

Still there was no reason to suppose that the so-called Colonial Policy

was Gambetta's first choice. He was known to chafe under the practical

subservience of France to Germany, and to feel deeply humiliated by it.

At the bottom of his heart he cherished an ardent desire to recover

the lost provinces, but he knew that neither the military strength of

France nor the spirit of the people would warrant his attempting this

within any assignable period. He did, however, aim at freeing the French

Government from the sort of occult control which Germany had recently

exercised over it, and at improving the position of France as a Great

Power. He desired to present the Government over which he presided

to France and to Europe as taking a dignified and important part in

international questions, and feeling that these objects could best be

attained by a real and visible friendship with England, he was evidently

disposed to treat pending questions with a view to maintaining and

manifesting a cordial understanding.

The two most important questions of the moment were, of course, Egypt

and the Commercial Treaty.

As regards Egypt, there was so far complete unity between the two

Governments--the strain having not yet arrived--but the conclusion of

a Commercial Treaty appeared to be a more arduous affair. Gambetta

was apparently ready to go as far towards making an acceptable Treaty

as was possible without risking a defeat in the Chambers. But if the

negotiations were to fail, he would probably despair of keeping up good

feeling towards England in France. He would conceive that the failure

would discredit him in the eyes of France and of Europe; that it would

convey to foreign Governments an impression, which he could not remove,

of there being a coolness between France and England, and that it would

oblige him to seek for his Foreign Policy some other basis than union

with England.

Perhaps the fear that unsuccessful commercial negotiations would convert

Gambetta into a foe was partly due to a communication from Sir Charles

Dilke announcing that a commercial ultimatum was about to be hurled at

the French Government. This communication is extremely instructive from

the English Parliamentary point of view, for it recommended that in

despatches the word 'bargain' should be carefully avoided, 'as it would

strengthen the reciprocity argument.' In other words, although wine

duties were to be utilized for the purpose of bargaining, the fact was

not to be disclosed lest it might be construed as a departure from the

sacred principles of Free Trade.

Attention was, however, quickly diverted from the Commercial Treaty

to Egypt. On January 8, the British and French Governments presented

the so-called Dual Note, in which they declared their intention of

'warding off by their united efforts all causes of external or internal

complications, which might menace the _régime_ established in Egypt.'

The Dual Note was by no means as successful as had been hoped, and it is

clear that Gambetta was in favour of more decided and independent action

than the British Cabinet. Within a few days Lord Granville was already

writing to Lord Lyons and asking him whether it would not be advisable

for England and France to ask permission from the Powers to appear as

mandatories of Europe.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Jan. 17, 1882.

The news from Egypt is certainly not reassuring, and the

_mauvais quart d'heure_ may arrive at any moment.

M. Gambetta would probably desire joint intervention; the

objections to this are immense: I need not recapitulate them all to

you.

Single occupation, by England or by France, still more so.

I am not quite sure that Turkish occupation under proper

conditions and control by France and England, although a great

evil, would not be less bad than the three alternatives I have

mentioned. But it is not only bad in itself, but it would be

strongly opposed by the French, although it would be supported

by the German Powers. In these circumstances, an observation of

Malet's struck me as having some force. Talking of the intentions

of some of the other Powers to have their part in the question, he

said it would not be so objectionable, if they consented to allow

the English and French to be the mandatories.

The idea seemed to me to be worth considering, and I spoke to

Tenterden and Rivers Wilson (but to no one else) and requested them

to draw up a memorandum as to how this could be carried out. I send

you an extract, and I should like to have your opinion on it before

I submit it even to Gladstone as a possibility.

Gambetta of course would not like it. But his difficulty is as

great as ours if he were to understand that we will not agree to

joint occupation. There would be nothing humiliating to France if

the proposal was freely consented to by both countries and jointly

offered to Egypt.

For us it would only be acting on the Concert of Europe

principle, about which we have been making such a fuss.

This somewhat half-hearted proposal met with no approval from Lord

Lyons, who expressed his objections in more decisive terms than were

usual with him.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Jan. 19, 1882.

In your letter of the day before yesterday you ask me for

my opinion on a suggestion as to admitting other Powers to take

part in the Egyptian Question, on the supposition that France and

England should be their mandatories.

This would, _ipso facto_, be the abandonment of the

exceptional position which England and France have taken up in

Egypt. Whether this position can be, or ought to be, maintained for

a long time, is a question which I will not stop to examine.

That a proposal to abandon it, at this moment, would have a

very bad effect on our relations with France, does not, I think,

admit of a doubt. It would be taken as an abandonment of our

intention to give up, in the face of Europe, all special intimacy

with the French Government. It would give rise to suspicions

that we were trying to use the other Powers for the purpose of

ousting France from Egypt. The union of England and France on the

Egyptian Question is the principal symbol of there being a good

understanding between them, and to this symbol the French attach no

little importance.

I don't know that the designation of mandatories of Europe

would mend the matter. The other Powers would not commission

England and France to decide by themselves what measures should

be recommended for Egypt. They might depute England and France

to enforce the decisions of Europe, but this would only bring us

back to the joint intervention of the two Powers in a particularly

awkward and unmanageable form.

Practically, it would, I think, be found much more difficult

for us to keep well with France, if the other Powers were also to

have a voice in details. Hitherto England and France have managed

to come to an agreement with each other on the questions that have

arisen. It might be made more difficult for them invariably to side

with each other against other Powers. Political considerations as

to affairs distinct from Egypt might come into play. Setting aside

a natural and not improper jealousy on the part of each, lest its

associate should obtain separate and undue influence, the interests

of England and France in Egypt are very much the same. The main

interest of some Governments, and in particular that of the Porte,

might be antagonistic to cordiality between the two Western Powers.

A Commission appointed now to deal with questions relating to

the government and administration of Egypt would be a different

matter from the Commissions of 1878 and 1880.

In the first place, it seems probable that the Sultan would

protest strongly against it, and that he would do so whether or

no there were Turkish members of it appointed by him. His Majesty

might possibly acquiesce under strong pressure from all the Powers,

but would all the Powers put such pressure on him? In all matters

bearing upon the relations between the Porte and Egypt, it must, I

am afraid, be taken into consideration that neither France singly,

nor England singly, nor the two acting together, are likely at the

present time to exercise predominant influence at Constantinople;

and that, on the other hand, the Power which does exercise

predominant influence there shows no disposition to jeopardize that

influence by giving unpalatable advice, and is not supposed to have

any desire to promote cordiality between England and France.

Moreover, we have to consider not only the Sultan and the

Khedive, but the mutinous officers and the so-called National Party

in Egypt. From a telegram which Gambetta showed me yesterday,

it would appear that Arabi had expressed some idea of appealing

against England and France to the Great Powers collectively. But

would he and his party, whose watchword seems to be 'Egypt for

the Egyptians,' submit passively to the installation of a Foreign

Commission to settle all the important national questions? Would

they acquiesce in the subsequent enforcement of the decision of the

Commission?

The Commission might certainly sit at Alexandria, and it

might perhaps have the support afforded by the presence of an

Anglo-French squadron, or an International squadron. In either

case, would the squadron be provided with men to be landed in

case of need, and would the Commission be authorized to call for

the assistance and protection of a force to be put on shore? If

this were so, it might be merely a small beginning which might

ultimately render intervention in arms on a larger scale inevitable.

On the other hand, if the presence of the squadron were to

be merely a naval demonstration, would the fact of its being more

or less representative of all the Great Powers give it much more

weight than if it were made on behalf of England and France alone?

Would it, in either case, be safe to trust to the moral effect

of its being sufficient, and to its not rendering further action

imperative?

Gambetta seems to hope that firm and decided language, used

collectively now by France and England, may ward off a crisis.

If there be any chance of warding off a necessity for action, it

no doubt lies in this; but I suppose that with Gambetta the wish

is father to the thought. On the one hand, in face of the present

unpopularity of the Tunis expedition, it would be very awkward for

him to have to send another French force to Africa at the present

moment. But, on the other hand, he could not confront the mass of

enraged bondholders if he abandoned their interests; and public

opinion here, which is very sensitive about Egypt, would not

tolerate his letting France be openly set at naught in that country.

It is needless to add that the French Government would

bitterly resent it, if any hint were given to a third Power,

without their having been previously consulted, if there is any

idea on our part of withdrawing from our separate understanding

with them, and merging Egypt in the general Eastern Question. If

they were ever brought to consent to calling in the other Powers,

they would not readily forgive having their hands forced in the

matter.

For my own part, I would certainly, as regards Egypt, rather

have to deal with France only than with four or five more Powers.

There can be no shadow of doubt that Lord Lyons's view was the correct

one, but Lord Granville and Mr. Gladstone (no other member of the

Cabinet is mentioned) seem to have hankered after the Concert of Europe,

probably in consequence of the stroke of luck at Dulcigno.

'Your very powerful letter,' Lord Granville wrote on January

21, 'is gone to Gladstone. It is not easy to find an answer to all

your arguments. The question is whether there are not stronger

arguments against any other course. I think it is likely that I

shall write to you to ask you to speak to Gambetta.

'On the imminence of the crisis: the importance of perfect

union between England and France: our strong objection to intervene

alone--giving as reasons:--opposition of Egyptians; of Turkey;

jealousy of Europe; responsibility of governing a country of

Orientals without adequate means and under adverse circumstances;

presumption that France would object as much to our sole occupation

as we should object to theirs.

'Have carefully considered joint occupation; some of the

objections to sole occupation lessened, but others most seriously

aggravated.

'Deprecate Turkish intervention, but think it a lesser evil

than the two to which I have alluded, giving some reasons.

'Then propose the European element, as sketched out in my

private letter.

'Any concessions to Europe after any demonstrations on the

part of the German powers and Italy would place us in a false

position; but if made spontaneously and jointly by France and

England, would not have that inconvenience.

'Please reflect upon the way such arguments might best be put,

but let me have all your opinions upon it.

'Such able letters as your last are very valuable.'

Another letter written on the same day asks for advice as to what should

be done 'if the crisis arrives, as is probable, in a week.' It was very

evident that the Cabinet had no definite plan of their own, and were

only too glad of the opportunity of consulting some one whose opinion

was worth having.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, January 22, 1882.

I have received this morning your two letters of yesterday

about Egypt; and I have reconsidered the letters from me of the

19th to which they are answers.

There exists at this moment one new difficulty, the

uncertainty whether Gambetta will still be in office this day week.

I do not, however, find in this circumstance any reason to

modify the views expressed in my long letter.

Whoever may be in office here at the time, if we proposed to

call in the other Powers, we should be held (to use Commercial

Treaty slang) to have 'denounced' our good understanding with

France. We should be reproached with deserting our comrade at the

critical moment, and I am seriously afraid that for a long time

the feeling in France towards England would be bitter, and the

relations of the French Government towards the English Government

more than cold.

In my communication to the French Government respecting Egypt,

there are some topics in particular which would require delicate

handling.

First of these, I should mention Turkish intervention. This

has been a subject of difference between France and England for

half a century, and the French have a traditional feeling on

the subject at all times. But at this moment they (rightly or

wrongly) think it a matter of vital importance to them with regard

to Algeria and Tunis, and they would go very great lengths to

resist the introduction of the Turkish Troops into Egypt, or the

increase of Turkish influence there. They always suspect us of

hankering after Turkish support against them, not reflecting that

our influence at Constantinople is not so predominant as when they

supported Mehemet Ali against the Porte and England.

Another topic on which the French might be sensitive would be

the question of governing a country of Orientals. This is a matter

on which I feel strongly myself, but it would need to be dealt with

very cautiously, or the French would see in it a sneer against

their own shortcomings in Tunis and even in Algeria.

The objections to joint dual occupation are strong, but almost

any statement of them would apply with equal force, or more, to

joint sextuple occupation, or to the occupation by two Powers as

mandatories of the rest.

Malet, I see, telegraphs that the Chamber would, he thinks,

listen to the united Great Powers, but would not listen to England

and France alone.

Admitting that Malet is right (and he generally is right),

there always remains the difficulty as to putting this cumbersome

six-wheeled waggon into motion in any reasonable time.

And this brings me to the question in your second letter, what

course should I recommend, if the crisis, as is probable, arises in

a week.

It seems to me that in that case either things must be let

'slide,' or England and France must take some step together,

without waiting for the other Powers.

All the anxious speculations which had taken place with regard to

Gambetta's future foreign policy turned out to be quite unnecessary, for

on January 27, after little more than two months of office, he resigned,

having been defeated, like any ordinary political mediocrity, on a

question of domestic interest. His place was taken by M. de Freycinet,

who succeeded in forming a respectable Ministry, but whose policy with

regard to Egypt was as vague and undecided as that of the British

Government, and whose views with regard to a Commercial Treaty were

supposed to be identical with those of his predecessor.

Advantage was taken of the change by Lord Granville to again urge the

substitution of the Concert of Europe for purely Anglo-French control in

Egypt, and Freycinet showed himself much more amenable than Gambetta.

As far as can be gathered, the attitude of both Governments was the

reverse of heroic; the British Government was anxious to hand over its

responsibility to other parties, and the French Government was not

disposed to take any initiative at all. The French were, in fact,

waiting for England to make a suggestion, and while perhaps ready to act

in conjunction, wished that the responsibility of whatever proceedings

were adopted in common, should rest primarily, if not exclusively, upon

England. The Tunis enterprise had proved to be so much more troublesome

and expensive than had been expected, that the Government shrank from

becoming involved in anything of the same nature in Egypt. But the

condition of affairs in Egypt was such that even the timid Freycinet

Government might find its hand forced. An insult to a French functionary

might produce an outbreak of Chauvinism which would force the Government

to send a force to avenge it, and Gambetta would certainly have had a

force ready for a contingency of this kind.

Nubar Pasha was in Paris at the time, and his views on the Egyptian

situation were not without interest.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 7, 1882.

I do not find the least diminution of the French opposition to

Turkish intervention in Egypt, even if it were only moral.

Nubar has been here for some months, and often comes to see

me. His first object in life seems to be to get Blignières out

of Egypt, and his second to get Tewfik deposed. I conclude that

he thinks that both are obstacles to his own return to power.

His language is, that the dictation of the English and French

Controllers in Egypt was more than any country could bear; that the

present state of things is much better; office and power being in

the same hands; that Arabi Bey and his compeers will do very well

if they are properly managed, and that two quiet, conciliatory

(perhaps we should read imbecile) Controllers would keep everything

straight. I think he inclines to the moral intervention of the

Sultan. He seems to be intriguing with Germany. He had an interview

with Freycinet, to whom, according to his own account, he held the

language I have described above. He talks more ably than any one

else about Egypt, but always with a view to his own interests.

Any one who ever conversed with the late Nubar Pasha could not fail to

be impressed with his ability, but like many other able Orientals, he

was a consummate intriguer, and probably the predominant feeling in his

mind was a desire to be reinstated in power. It should be explained

that, at this time, Arabi was already practically at the head of the

Government, although only occupying the post of Minister of War, and

that M. de Blignières was still French Controller. M. de Blignières,

however, resigned his post on March 12, and an open letter[35] from him

to M. Clémenceau threw a lurid light on the tortuous and inexplicable

course of French policy in Egypt.

'Lorsqu'il (Cherif Pasha) a du quitter le pouvoir; lorsque j'ai

compris que les chefs du parti militaire, qui l'avaient renversé,

pouvaient compter sur la bienveillance de notre gouvernement,

ce jour-là, ne me faisant aucune illusion sur les conséquences

nécessaires de cette politique nouvelle, j'ai résigné mes

fonctions.'

If, therefore, M. de Blignières was correct, the French were playing

a double game; ostensibly acting in concert with England against the

Nationalist agitation in Egypt, while secretly encouraging Arabi and his

friends to persevere in their efforts. In one respect, however, they

were consistent, namely in their opposition to Turkish intervention, and

the traditional French opposition to Turkish influence in Egypt was

accentuated in consequence of the recent events in Tunis and Algeria.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, April 4, 1882.

You will have seen by the despatches I sent you by post

yesterday that Freycinet has at last put the dots on his i's, and

distinctly proposed that Tewfik shall be deposed and Halim put

in his place. I cannot say I take to the idea. As you said to

Tissot, there might be some good in it if Halim had great moral and

intellectual qualities. But I don't see that we have any reason

to suppose he has such qualities. Nor indeed, if he had, do I see

how his mere appointment would at once set things straight in

Egypt. The removal of Ismail was a great blow to the prestige of

the Khediviate, and it would require a genius to re-establish its

authority, if another deposition takes place in so short a time.

I do not understand how Freycinet reconciles his present idea

with his objection to Turkish interference. If the Khedive is in

daily fear of being deposed by the Sultan, there will be abject

submission to Yildiz Kiosk and a constant flow of backsheesh to the

Porte.

Halim no doubt promises the French that he will be their man,

and if he becomes so, they may go great lengths to support him; but

how will this suit us? And how long will it be before it leads to

something very like armed intervention of the French in support of

him?

Then it seems to me that to depose Tewfik would be something

very like treachery, after the dual declaration made to him in

January.

It seems to me that the things to aim at should be: to keep

Tewfik; to give him some strength against military dictation, and

to preserve the Anglo-French Control, which means a reasonable

financial administration, and gives us at any rate some means of

knowing what the Egyptians (perhaps I ought to add) what the French

are about.

The immoral proposal to depose Tewfik met with no encouragement from

Her Majesty's Government, as was only to be expected, and the only

conclusion to be drawn from the equivocal language of M. de Freycinet

was that he felt armed intervention to be inevitable, but wanted the

proposal to come from England. He tried to persuade Lord Lyons to

propose a plan of his own which should be put forward privately, but

this met with no approval at all. '"Private and between ourselves

conversations," between Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers generally

cause mischief.'

As the situation in Egypt continued to get worse, the British Government

was forced to take some action, and accordingly suggested that three

generals, French, English, and Turkish, should be sent to Egypt 'to

restore discipline to the Egyptian army.' As it was not proposed that

these generals should employ anything but moral force, it is difficult

to see how they could have succeeded, but Lord Granville appears to have

considered that it would obviate armed interference, and the French

Government having no plan of their own were presumably ready to accept

almost anything, but caused considerable embarrassment by asking for a

pledge that Turkish intervention by force of arms, in any circumstances,

would not be tolerated. What Freycinet wanted, in fact, was to be able

to declare to the Chamber that England and France were agreed not to

allow armed Ottoman intervention.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 5, 1882.

Freycinet asked me just now to let him speak to me 'privately

and academically' about intervention in Egypt. He said his great

objection to Turkish intervention was that as matters now stand,

it would take place for a vague and indefinite object: that thus

it would be impossible to fix the exact time at which that object

would be accomplished, and that thus the Turks would have pretexts

for prolonging it indefinitely, for mixing themselves up in the

administration, for laying their hands on the Treasury, and what

not.

If the intervention was simply for installing a new Khedive,

his objections would be less. This would be a single definite

sovereign act of the Sultan. It might be accomplished in a week or

ten days, and the Ottoman troops would have no pretext for staying,

or for interfering in the administration. He should not object to a

Turkish, French, and English fleet going to Egypt to support some

single definite act of this kind, nor even, speaking solely for

himself personally, to Turkish troops being landed.

After some questioning from me, he said that, for a single

definite object, he personally might even prefer a Turkish

intervention, but that for any such vague purpose as supporting

Tewfik and restoring order, he thought Turkish intervention

absolutely inadmissible. If anything of that kind was to be

attempted, Anglo-French seemed to him the least open to objection.

Italian seemed to him to be worse than Turkish.

His idea was that we should set on foot some Government that

could stand by itself. Under Tewfik no such Government would in his

opinion be ever possible. He had no predilection for any particular

individual as Khedive: all he wanted was to have some reasonably

efficient man at the head of the Government.

He begged me to consider all this as strictly confidential,

personal, private, and academic; and he said that except in a

conversation of this character, he could not even have mentioned

the possibility of France consenting under any conceivable

circumstances to Turkish intervention; for he was by no means sure

that it would ever be agreed to by his colleagues or borne by

public opinion.

The 'confidential, personal, private, and academic' character of M. de

Freycinet's conversation was, of course, merely intended to conceal

his own vacillation and fear of having to communicate to the Chambers

any announcement that he had sanctioned Turkish intervention in any

shape whatever. A little later, however, he nerved himself to make a

proposal that there should be a joint Anglo-French Naval Demonstration

off Alexandria. An allied squadron consequently proceeded to that

port, and its appearance produced a temporary panic in the ranks of

the Nationalists; the latter, however, speedily recovered when it was

realized that there were no troops on board, and that the Sultan, far

from approving of the demonstration, had protested against it. The

ultimatum of the allies was practically rejected, and Arabi, who had

been compelled to resign, was reinstated in office nominally as Minister

of War, in reality as dictator. To make Freycinet's position still

worse, he got into difficulties in the Chamber.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, May 26, 1882.

The explosion has come, and if the irritation that prevails

in Paris to-day continues, Freycinet will be out of office, or

will, _per fas et nefas_, back out of his proposal that Turkish

intervention may be resorted to in Egypt. His Chauvin speech in the

Chamber about French preponderance, and what not, is now of course

turned against him.

There is an impression here that in order to keep Gambetta out

of office, Bismarck may help Freycinet to eat his words.

I am afraid that now, whether Freycinet stays in or goes out,

it will be next to impossible to have any comfortable understanding

with France about intervention in Egypt.

Even supposing all the other Powers cordially united with

us, to repeat the experiment of 1840 would be dangerous, and would

produce a scarcely ever to be remedied coldness (to call it by a

mild name) between us and France.

Then I share all Dufferin's misgivings as to the possibility

of either controlling the Turks if they set foot in Egypt, or of

ever getting them out. I have also a very strong fear of my own as

to the mischief they would do to the country. Even if they went

with the acquiescence of France, I think we should be constantly in

hot water with the French as long as they stayed.

If Gambetta comes in he will no doubt again propose joint

Anglo-French intervention. Unless the Porte is backed up very

strongly indeed, he will very likely make its intervention in Egypt

something like a _casus belli_ with Turkey--or in fact do as the

French did with regard to Tunis--declare that he will oppose by

force the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt.

The Anglo-French Naval Demonstration had been intended as a compromise

between the two Governments over the question of Turkish intervention,

but when it was seen to be useless, it was agreed that the Sultan should

be asked to send a Special Commission to Cairo, and communications were

made to the other Powers with a view to convoking a European Conference

on Egypt; M. de Freycinet, who had for three months opposed the English

proposal for Turkish intervention, suddenly discovering that there was

no danger about it, if requested jointly by England and France. The

Turkish Commission which proceeded to Egypt was not more successful in

restoring order than the Anglo-French Naval Demonstration. It consisted

of three persons; one of whom, Dervish Pasha, was instructed to support

the Khedive and to threaten the Nationalist leaders; the second

Commissioner was instructed to support Arabi and his associates; and

the duty of the third Commissioner was to spy upon his two colleagues.

In order to make everything quite safe, the latter was accompanied by a

fourth official, whose duty it was to spy upon him, and it was perhaps

owing to these over-elaborated precautions that the mission proved to be

a complete failure.

On June 11, the massacre at Alexandria took place, and armed

intervention became more and more inevitable, but some Governments still

entertained the hope that diplomacy might yet be successful, and the

Conference assembled at Constantinople towards the end of the month.

The chief advantage of the Conference was that it disclosed the views

of the various Great Powers, and the conditions which were to govern

the despatch of Turkish troops to Egypt were of so engrossing a nature

that they were still being discussed when the battle of Tel-el-Kebir

was fought two months subsequently, and the victorious British troops

entered Cairo.

The vacillations and dilatoriness of M. de Freycinet irritated even the

easy-going Lord Granville, who complained of having twice been put in

a hole by him, and was justifiably anxious as to how he could defend

his Egyptian policy successfully in Parliament if the French Government

could not be relied upon for any consistent line of action. But while

admitting that nearly everything had gone wrong up till now, and that

the failure of the Sultan's Special Mission made the outlook still more

gloomy, he consoled himself with the reflection (which was shortly

afterwards shown in one respect to be quite erroneous) that, 'we have

avoided a rupture with France, a rupture with Europe, and a possible

war.' Within a few weeks, the error of this last assumption was to be

conclusively established.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, June 20, 1882.

I do not hope much from the Conference: certainly I have very

little expectation of its forwarding the strong measures which the

Alexandria massacres seem to me to call for imperatively.

I think Germany will be very little inclined to urge the

despatch of Turkish troops. Bismarck's great object appears to be

to keep Freycinet in, and he fears, not without some reason, that

when the first Turkish soldier sets his foot in Egypt, Freycinet

will fall at Paris.

The Freycinet Ministry would probably be succeeded by a

Cabinet in which Gambetta would not actually have a seat, but

over which he would exercise very great influence. Bismarck very

probably exaggerates the strength of that influence and looks for

more direct hostility to Germany than it would really provoke. But

he is perhaps right in thinking that, under Gambetta's influence,

France would coquet with the Anti-German party in Russia, and would

lose no opportunity of fostering enmity to Germany whenever she

could find an opening for doing so. At all events, it would be

impossible for Germany to feel as much at her ease as she does now,

if Gambetta were the virtual director of French policy.

Freycinet's strength lies partly in the disinclination of the

nation for anything like what it calls adventures, but mainly in

the dread which the present Chamber has of Gambetta, the Scrutin de

Liste and a dissolution.

Meanwhile general dissatisfaction with the whole state of

things, and despondency do not diminish. People who looked to

Gambetta as the man to set things straight are directing their eyes

to other quarters, and there is even a sort of revival of Orleanism.

* * * * *

A few hours after this letter reaches you, you will in

all probability receive from me by telegraph the French answer to

the proposal to them to concert measures with us for the protection

of the Suez Canal. I don't think Freycinet likes the idea of

anything which may tend towards sending French troops to Egypt.

He seems to me to want to lean on the Conference in the hope that

by so doing, he may be able to stand quite still. Strange to say,

the Chamber and the public seem to be in the same mood. They like

to think that it is more upon England than upon them that the

discredit of putting up with the Alexandria massacre and the recent

patch up in Egypt would fall. Their present pusillanimity seems so

unnatural that I cannot think it will last. Gambetta will rouse

them from it, if he has the chance.

They are full of suspicions of designs on our part to seize the Suez

Canal with or without the assistance or connivance of Turkey. You will

see by a telegram I have just sent, that Freycinet has asked me a

question about this. I imagine the French would object very much less to

our acting entirely alone than to our acting in any way with the Porte.

The Sultan seems to tell de Noailles all kinds of stories against

England and Dufferin. It is not, however, from Freycinet that I hear

this.

In Lord Lyons's opinion, the French, at this stage, were quite prepared

for England acting alone in Egypt, but he considered that it was most

important to be very frank with them, to afford them every opportunity

of joining us, but to do it in such a way that other Powers should not

be given too much time in which to raise objections.

It was not apparently until June 27, 1882, that the British Government

seriously considered the probability of having to employ 'material

force' in Egypt, whether alone or in concert with other Powers; but

in consequence of the danger of the situation and of the necessity of

acting quickly, they then applied to the War Office for information as

to what forces were available for an expedition. In view of our alleged

military capacity at the present time, it is of interest to learn what

the War Office was prepared to do thirty-one years ago. The military

authorities stated that they were prepared to embark within twenty-four

hours, 3500 infantry, and 500 garrison artillerymen, with a small siege

train, from Malta and Gibraltar, with necessary camp equipage and

reserves of food and ammunition. These troops could be conveyed in the

ships of the Channel Squadron now in the Mediterranean. A force of about

12,000 fighting men, complete in infantry, cavalry, and field artillery,

with forty-eight field guns, was also available, to embark from England.

The first 5000 of the infantry could sail within a week, and the whole

force could leave England in a fortnight from the date of the order,

with complete supplies for an army in the field. The force from England

would be made up partially by the First Class Army Reserve, and a

Brigade was also available to be sent from Bombay to Suez. Such was the

purport of a most confidential communication to Lord Granville from the

War Office, dated June 27, 1882.

On July 11, the bombardment of Alexandria by the British fleet took

place; the departure of the French ships marking, in an unmistakeable

form, the refusal of the French Government to incur further

responsibility, and foreshadowing the permanent renunciation of the old

French position in Egypt.

The news of the Alexandria bombardment, which, owing to the absence

of troops for landing, could hardly be described as a very effective

operation, was received without much excitement in Paris, and Freycinet

stated that the Chamber would certainly not have sanctioned the

co-operation of the French fleet. The main point on which sensitiveness

was shown was the Suez Canal. The French seemed disposed to resent any

landing of English troops alone at Port Said, and to insist, if not

on joining with us, on sending a 'lateral' expedition of their own.

It was important, therefore, that they should be given a _bona fide_

invitation to join in anything we might determine to do, and the French

were accordingly invited by Lord Granville to concert measures at once

for the protection of the canal; questions of detail being left to

the Conference at Constantinople. Upon the whole the bombardment of

Alexandria had tended to improve rather than to impair Anglo-French

relations, and the chief danger seemed to lie in the projected Turkish

intervention, which would alienate public opinion and provoke strong

opposition from Gambetta and his followers. Extraordinary French Naval

Credits were voted and Lord Granville appears to have thought that joint

action was secured after all, at least as far as the Canal was concerned.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

July 19, 1882.

I wish you and ourselves joy of the renewed _entente

cordiale_. It will not be popular in many quarters here, but it is

an immense national advantage, and ought to relieve us from many

dangers.

I am not in the least jealous of the dual action in the Canal,

though I should prefer its being triangular. But I own I dread it,

if we are obliged, as is probable, to intervene in Egypt itself.

I hope they do not think we are pressing them too fast. I

believe the Cabinet will settle to send 15,000 men to Malta. If so,

I will let you know.

Remember I am always grateful for suggestions and criticisms.

I hear Bismarck is really ill and cannot sleep at night. The

preparation of his own financial measures does not act as an

anodyne.

I am told that the debate in the Commons last night did us

good and not harm. I suppose we shall have a more formidable one in

the Lords.

It is rumoured that the Peers will pass the Second Reading of

the Arrears Bill, and mutilate it in Committee.

The voting of the extraordinary French Naval Credits, which had caused

it to be supposed that the French Government intended to take some

decided action, was soon shown to mean nothing at all. Freycinet, whose

position had been much shaken, was in the uncomfortable situation of

being blamed by the Chamber for doing too much and denounced in the

Senate for not doing enough. On July 19, an important debate took place

in the Chamber, during which Gambetta, with his accustomed eloquence,

adjured the Government to adhere to the English alliance at all costs,

and urged that to quarrel with England would be the most fatal of

mistakes. The Credits asked for were agreed to, and the Government

obtained a large majority; but when Freycinet appeared in support of his

modest proposals before the Senate, he was obliged to admit that the

Conference at Constantinople had refused to entrust France and England

with a Mandate, and that in consequence of this refusal the French

Government would leave England to act alone, and would confine their own

action to the protection of the Suez Canal. A fresh credit amounting to

about £350,000 was asked for with this object, but met with formidable

opposition.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 26, 1882.

When I saw Freycinet this afternoon he seemed in absolute

despair. There are two modes of escape which are supposed to be

still open.

Though the majority of the Chamber are strongly opposed to

military intervention in Egypt, they may still hesitate to turn

Freycinet out, lest by showing it to be impossible to make their

own existence compatible with anything like a stable Government in

France, they may bring about a dissolution.

It is said that they are casting about for some means of

refusing the Credit and yet not turning out Freycinet; and the

second device, which might enable Freycinet to stay in, is the

singularly undignified one of his playing into their hand, by

declaring that he does not make the Credit a Cabinet question, and

that if it be refused, he will bow to the will of the Chamber and

withdraw from the protection of the Canal.

So long as it is undeniable that we have _bona fide_ invited

and pressed France to take part in all our operations in Egypt, I

shall not break my heart if she chooses to decline to do so.

I believe that Freycinet would have been in a better plight

if he had taken a decided course either way; if he had distinctly

refused all intervention, or if he had boldly joined England in all

her operations.

On July 29, the question of voting the fresh Credit was brought forward

in the Chamber and made one of confidence in the Ministry. Every one

by this time was much alarmed at the prospect of France being dragged

into some vague and desperate adventure; the Credit was refused by an

overwhelming majority; Freycinet resigned office, and France definitely

retired from the scene of action.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 30, 1882.

Among the innumerable Ministerial crises which I have seen

here, I do not recollect one in which there has been so much

uncertainty as to who would be the new Prime Minister.

Grévy, in conformity with his own views, and with those of

the great majority of the Chamber and indeed of the country, is

trying to form an absolutely non-intervention Cabinet. But such a

Cabinet might have difficulties with the Senate. Léon Say and Jules

Ferry, the most able members of the late Ministry, were for full

intervention and the English Alliance.

Freycinet very unwisely began with a perfectly idle dispute

with Gambetta as to whether the English Government would, or would

not, have consented to armed intervention with France only, if

Gambetta had remained in power. Gambetta did not speak yesterday,

but he and his followers voted against Freycinet.

Hohenlohe seemed, I hear, dreadfully put out by the result of

the division yesterday. It was Bismarck's communication which gave

Freycinet the _coup de grâce_. Hohenlohe had evidently hoped that

it would save him, by giving him an excuse for withdrawing the Bill.

I was very much disappointed to hear from Freycinet that

Russia had gone back to the Conference. I hoped her retirement

would have given us a good opportunity of freeing ourselves from

that cumbrous clog.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Aug. 1, 1882.

All is still uncertain as to who the new French Ministers

will be. Grévy is doing his best to keep Freycinet, and Hohenlohe

is working in the same direction, which is not wise. Hitherto

Freycinet has positively declined, but he is a man who sometimes

changes his mind. He will be in an extraordinarily false position

if he does come back. Grévy may, perhaps, manage to appoint a

warming-pan sort of Ministry, just to keep the offices warm during

the recess and to make room for something more serious in October.

The French are in very good disposition towards us at this

moment. The way to keep them so will be to endeavour to make their

present position comfortable to them, without being humiliating,

and, above all, not to crow over them, as part of our press seems

too much inclined to do. Their fleet, next to our own, is the most

important factor in the Mediterranean question. We can do as well

or better, without any aid from France or other countries, but we

ought to have the field to ourselves.

I wish we were well rid of that dangerous Conference. I had

a sort of hope that just now it might have a sort of use, as a

means of letting the other Powers talk while we were acting. But in

fact, as worked by Bismarck and by the Turks under his direction,

it seems merely to supply the machinery for formally placing us in

opposition to the so-called European Concert, and for embarrassing

France. I think the French would be glad to be delivered from it.

Public opinion in France is at this moment friendly to us, but

it is in a very susceptible state.

A new Ministry was in course of time formed under M. Duclerc, one of

the many uninteresting mediocrities who have governed France during the

last forty years, and a sort of formula was agreed upon that there was

no 'solution of continuity in the Entente,' which was not intended to

commit the French to anything in particular.

A vast amount has been written respecting the events in Egypt in 1882;

much of it by persons who occupied responsible and important positions

at the time; but the reasons for the inaction and eventual retirement

of the French have never been clearly explained. Probably the French

themselves would be unable to give a satisfactory explanation, and

would attribute their inglorious attitude to the Freycinet Government,

which did not know its own mind. But it may be assumed that a variety

of reasons were responsible for the French refusal of co-operation with

England. Had the invitation been received some months earlier, it would

probably have been accepted with enthusiasm; but the Tunis expedition,

which had opened with so much success and enthusiasm, had proved a much

more troublesome and unsatisfactory business than had been anticipated,

and had created a decided disinclination for further enterprises in

North Africa. In the second place, the difficulties of an Egyptian

campaign were greatly over-estimated; the French calculation was that

no less than 60,000 men would be necessary, and the ordinary French

Minister would not venture to allow so many men to leave the country.

Lastly, the French were quite unable, rightly or wrongly, to get it out

of their minds that they were being deliberately led into a trap by

Bismarck, and this by itself was sufficient to daunt a Government of the

Freycinet type.

France having now definitely declined, the British invitation was

transferred to Italy.

'We have asked the Italians to join us,' Lord Granville wrote

on July 27, 'but we have not pressed them. They also will try to

_se faire prier_, and will be too late. I told Menabrea I could not

delay operations.

'I hope they will decline, but I myself was not very hot for

even the offer. But the balance of argument seemed to be in favour

of it, and you did not raise any objection to it.

'Please explain that the _Times_ is entirely off the track as

to our wish for a protectorate.'

The refusal of the Italians was welcome and not unexpected, and as

no other Power was in the least inclined to co-operate, the British

Government was able to set about the task of smashing Arabi with a clear

conscience, in its own way, and unhampered by allies; for the Turks, who

had agreed to send troops, protracted the negotiations with regard to

their employment to such an extent, that the campaign was finished long

before an agreement was arrived at.

Lord Cromer in his well-known work 'Modern Egypt,' has exposed with

much skill and lucidity the futile nature of many of the proposals

put forward by the British and French Governments during the period

that they were acting together. But the really remarkable fact is,

that each Government succeeded in bringing about the result which it

least desired. The policy of the British Government was governed by a

sincere, if mistaken, determination not to be dragged into assuming

sole responsibility for Egypt, and in particular to avoid the necessity

of military occupation. The efforts of the French Government were

chiefly directed towards the prevention of Turkey or any other Power

establishing its predominant influence in Egypt, and that French policy

should have unconsciously and involuntarily thrust England into this

unsought and unwelcome position is one of the real ironies of recent

history.

Perhaps the most fortunate event for England during the crisis which

preceded the Egyptian expedition was the fall of Gambetta early in the

year. Had that statesman remained in office he would certainly have

never consented to remain a supine and indifferent spectator; he would

undoubtedly have insisted on France taking an active part: a joint

expedition would have taken place, and the sequel might have followed

the Schleswig-Holstein precedent.

It was hardly to be expected that the skill and rapidity with which the

campaign against Arabi was conducted would evoke much enthusiasm in

France, nor could the French reasonably expect that upon the restoration

of peace and order the old state of things would be renewed. Before the

end of October Lord Granville informed the French Ambassador in London

that the Control would not be restored; and when the French Government

objected, on the ground that such an alteration must be submitted to the

Powers, it was pointed out the matter was one for the Khedive to decide

himself. In order to soothe wounded French feelings various compromises

in the shape of posts in the Egyptian administration were offered in

vain.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 3, 1882.

I thought it simpler and better to let Duclerc have a copy of

your despatch, as you had no objection to my doing so. He has not

yet given any sign of life since he received it.

The argument that the Financial Adviser will have only a small

position in Egypt, or at all events a less important position than

the Controllers, cuts both ways here. Duclerc's line is to say that

we are making a distinction without any real difference: that in

practice the adviser will have all and more than all the powers of

the Controllers; and that thus virtually France is to be deprived

of her share in the Control without receiving, even nominally, any

compensation.

A complaint of a very different kind is made by the 'Haute

Finance.' They say that the only real compensation which could be

given to France, if she is to be ousted from the Control, would

be the establishment, under the auspices and responsibility of

England, of such a strong practical supervision of the Egyptian

Administration as would make the regular payment of the Debt

and the maintenance of the commercial and other interests of

foreigners secure. They pretend that the proposed establishment

of the Financial Adviser is in form injurious to the dignity of

France, while in substance it does not sufficiently provide for the

control by any one of the Egyptian Government. These seem to be the

opinions of a very influential body here. It is quite consistent

with them that Dufferin's mission should be looked on with favour

by those who hold them.

Clémenceau's views seem to be confined to himself.

The thing most favourable to our coming to an understanding

with France, is the very general belief among Frenchmen that

Bismarck is egging indirectly both England and France on to a

quarrel.

In the meantime the alarm caused by the anarchists is enough

to keep the minds of the great majority of the French fixed

on their own internal affairs. People are sending away their

securities and other valuables to foreign countries. I suppose an

absolute outbreak in force enough to resist the Government, if the

Government be resolute, is not to be expected. But there may be

explosions of dynamite here and there, and the employment of the

other new-fangled means of creating panic which the French seem to

be inclined to adopt from the Russians.

The competition of America and other causes are producing

a curious change in the French peasantry, and a change not

favourable to peace and order. The tenacity with which the very

small proprietors have hitherto clung to their land is visibly

diminishing. They now offer their land for sale to an extent

hitherto quite unprecedented. They say that they can get better

interest by putting the price of the land into the funds or other

speculations, and can thus lead a pleasant life, instead of

slaving from morning to night to get a bare subsistence out of

their fields. The tendency of all this is to reduce the numbers

of the hitherto ultra-Conservative laborious class, and to fill

the towns more and more with idle and very often disappointed and

discontented speculators, who form a material ready to the hand of

anarchists.

The letters from Lord Granville show that although the British

Government had embarked most unwillingly upon the Egyptian enterprise,

and viewed additional responsibility with so much horror that some

members of the Cabinet were even opposed to the office of Financial

Adviser to the Egyptian Government being given to an Englishman, yet

that the Cabinet was at all events unanimously against the maintenance

of the Control, and of the old dual arrangements. The French Government,

with an entire absence of logic and common sense, was quite indisposed

to recognize the complete change in the situation which had taken place,

and continued to claim that England and France should remain on an

equality as regarded themselves, and in a superior position as far as

the other Powers were concerned. The difficulty lay in discovering some

means of satisfying French vanity without yielding on the essential

point of equality, and efforts to ascertain what would be considered

satisfactory did not meet with much success.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 14, 1882.

I tried to make Duclerc see yesterday that the practical way

towards obtaining some satisfaction for French _amour-propre_ was

to enter upon the discussion of details as to the Boards in Egypt.

I went as far as I could without running the risk of provoking

lofty language, which might have been an obstacle to moderate

arrangements hereafter.

However, at the moment Duclerc did not go back from his old

grounds. He does not insist upon a literal re-establishment of

the Control, but he does claim a virtual return to the _status quo

ante_, and he interprets that status as equality between England

and France and superiority of the two jointly over other Powers.

The single Financial Councillor pleases no one here. As

he must of course be an Englishman, the sticklers for French

_gloriole_ declare that whether his functions be great or small,

he will simply be a symbol of English supremacy and French

decadency. To the _haute_ and _petite finance_, the mode of his

appointment and the smallness of his powers seem an additional

cause of complaint, as not giving sufficient security for a proper

administration of the finances of Egypt. I shall be very anxious to

hear how it all strikes Dufferin.

In fact, at the present moment, the French are too uneasy

about their internal affairs to pay much attention to Egypt. But

they may fire up if any special event comes to irritate them. It

is more, however, future lasting ill will than violence at the

moment which I apprehend. If we leave them bitterly discontented

with arrangements in Egypt, I hardly see when we shall be able to

withdraw our troops and still maintain the influence which is a

necessity to us.

The idea that the British occupation of Egypt was anything more than

a temporary expedient does not seem to have been considered a serious

possibility by any English Minister so far. Partly by luck, partly

by the skill of Sir Garnet Wolseley and Lord Dufferin, we had found

ourselves in possession of Egypt, unhampered by association with any

European Power or with the Turks; but for a time it looked as if the

brilliant results achieved were to be thrown away because the British

Government had no clear idea what its policy was to be. Fortunately for

all concerned, the step was taken of sending Lord Dufferin on a special

mission to Cairo, and unlike most special missions of more recent date,

the experiment proved a complete success, and quickly destroyed the

mischievous delusion entertained by a section of English politicians

that an evacuation of Egypt was possible at any early date. This

delusion had never been shared by the French, who naturally judged the

action of others in the light in which they themselves would have acted

under similar circumstances, and who made little effort to conceal their

annoyance.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 1, 1882.

I don't succeed in making Duclerc _coulant_ about Egypt. He

rather implied that it was not from Tissot that he had heard that

you were going to send him a favourable communication, and that you

were thinking of sending an expert to discuss details. He did not,

however, say who it was that told him. Perhaps d'Aunay may have had

something to do with it. Duclerc went on to hint at there being two

currents in the English Cabinet, one more favourable to the French

than the other, but I declined to listen to this. He talked as if

he had some special source of information as to your intentions and

sentiments. He seemed to take to the idea of a discussion between

experts.

He was amiable about Madagascar, but we shall see what

his written answer will be. He represented himself as having

overwhelmed the Ambassadors with kindness, and then as having

broken off the negotiation on the point of the leases being for 99

years.

In the meantime prospects at home do not brighten. Railroads

and other public works have been begun, with very little system, in

all kinds of places to please Deputies and their constituents. The

Government dare not stop them for fear of what the workmen would do

if large numbers of them found themselves out of work. To go on,

is ruinous to the finances. There must be a limit to the floating

debt. The Government are again negotiating with the railway

companies. People are beginning to talk of Saviours of Society.

The names most mentioned are those of General Chanzy and the Duc

d'Aumale. Gambetta would have been everybody's man, if he had never

been Minister. However, I don't think that we are very near any

violent change.

Grévy is certainly not brisk, but he may grow old without

things coming to an early catastrophe.

There is a not unaccredited rumour that it was in wresting

the revolver from a female hand that Gambetta got wounded. The

bulletins at the office of the _République Française_ are that he

is going on as well as possible.

The last paragraph refers to the wounding of Gambetta by a pistol shot.

The accident (which terminated fatally) occurred at his villa outside

Paris, and was surrounded by a mystery which has never been dispelled,

but it may be assumed that a lady really was involved.

The allusion to Madagascar relates to the mission despatched by the

Queen of the Hovas to Europe in the autumn in the vain hope of coming to

some agreement with the French Government, which had raised questions

ominously resembling those which had, in the previous year, formed

the prelude to the Tunis expedition. The Hovas, like the Kroumirs,

constituted 'a serious danger' to the French Republic, and demands were

put forward which involved general French rights over the whole of

Madagascar, and a protectorate over the northwest coast. The unhappy

Hova envoys proceeded from Paris to London, but met with little

encouragement there, and before long a semi-official announcement

was made in which the stereotyped statement, with which small and

defenceless states are so painfully familiar, appeared: 'The Cabinet is

resolved to enforce the respect of the rights and interests of France

in Madagascar, and orders in conformity with the situation have,

therefore, been sent to the Commander of the French naval station.'

Signs of the same ominous activity were also beginning to manifest

themselves in Tonquin; and the only compensating factor was that

Madagascar and Tonquin served to distract a certain amount of French

attention from Egypt, although the tone of the press, and especially of

the _République Française_, the organ of Gambetta, became increasingly

hostile to England.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 19, 1882.

There are reports afloat that Gambetta's cure is not going

on as steadily as it ought. At all events there is no change for

the better in the tone of the _République Française_ respecting

England in Egypt. I don't like the idea of having the French there

in bitter opposition to all we do. It may make it very difficult

for us with safety to ourselves to give any large measure of

independence to the Egyptian Government. At all events, the less we

are able to sacrifice to satisfy French _amour-propre_, the more we

must do to give security to legitimate French material interests by

providing for a really good honest financial administration. If the

French take the protection of their material interests exclusively

into their own hands, they may go very great lengths indeed to

protect them, if they are seriously threatened; and, besides, the

pretext that the credit, property or persons of Frenchmen are

threatened, will always be at hand to sanction interference.

At present it looks as if the Duclerc Government would be

glad to back out of its expeditions to Tonquin, etc., etc. The

proceedings of the Hova Ambassadors and their supporters in England

may make it difficult for the French Government to be as reasonable

as it might otherwise wish to be about Madagascar.

The prevalent feeling of depression and uneasiness about

the general condition of France does not seem to diminish. There

seems to be a profound distrust of the abilities, if not of the

intentions, of the men who so rapidly succeed one another in

office, and no one seems to know where to turn for something better.

It was somewhat unfortunate that French aggression in Tonquin and

Madagascar was unconsciously stimulated by the English press. 'The

English press is driving the French public wild on the subject of

Tonquin, Madagascar, and other beyond sea questions, which the

Government would probably have been glad enough to back out of if they

had been let alone.'[36]

Until the end of the year private negotiations continued between Lord

Granville and the French Government with reference to the abolition of

the Control with completely unsuccessful results.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 26, 1882.

I hear, not from himself, that Duclerc's present intention

is to make a very strong protest if we abolish Control without

coming to a previous understanding with France; and that our making

our own Control, or that of Europe in general, over the Egyptian

finances weak, would not mollify him. On the contrary, he would try

to make a point of what he would call our abandonment of French

material interests--and deduce from it an argument that France is

bound to protect them herself. While we are absolutely at two with

France, we shall find it very difficult to relax our material hold

on Egypt. Egypt for the Egyptians is only too likely to become

Egypt for the French.

Gambetta's illness seems to have rather strengthened his

position. The anxiety of his opponents in the press to make out

that he is worse than is really the case and the disgusting

statements they have in consequence put forward, have served to

impress on friends and foes his importance. According to the best

information I have been able to get, he is not at this moment

seriously ill, though his recovery is too slow to be satisfactory.

Confidence and tranquillity do not appear to revive in France,

and the disappearance of Gambetta would increase uneasiness. People

do not exactly know what they are afraid of, but there is a general

vague uneasiness. Perhaps the most definite cause of fears or hopes

is the intrigue in which certain officers of the army are said to

be engaged with a view of putting the Duc d'Aumale at the head of

the state.

The childish frame of mind in which the French Government of the day

considered the question of the Control may be judged from the fact that

Duclerc in private conversation had admitted in the autumn that, if

for form's sake, the _status quo ante_ could be restored for only five

minutes, he would agree subsequently to its immediate abolition. In

December, however, he was in a more intractable mood, and, at the end

of the year, Lord Granville found it necessary to break off all private

negotiations on the subject, observing that it was very painful and

disadvantageous to be on bad terms with the French, but that it was, at

the least, equally disadvantageous to them.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 35: 'Egypt and the Egyptian Question,' Sir D. Mackenzie

Wallace.]

[Footnote 36: Lyons to Granville.]