CHAPTER XIII

M. GRÉVY'S PRESIDENCY

(1878-1879)

The event in 1878 which aroused more interest in France than the Berlin

Congress or anything else, was the holding of the great Exhibition

in Paris, which not only demonstrated to the world the recovery of

France from the disasters of 1870-71, but had the beneficial effect

of improving Anglo-French relations. It was universally acknowledged

that nothing had contributed more to the success of the Exhibition

than the hearty co-operation given from first to last by England, and

in this connection the services rendered by the Prince of Wales were

of conspicuous value. His Royal Highness had come to Paris early in

the year to press forward the preparations of the British section; he

was present at each important phase of the Exhibition; he attended

unremittingly at the office of the British Royal Commission, and was

assiduous in transacting business there with the French Exhibition

authorities as well as with the British and Colonial Commissioners and

exhibitors. These visible proofs of the Prince's interest in their great

undertaking were by no means lost upon the French, and the judgment and

tact which he displayed, whenever opportunities arose for impressing

upon the French people the cordial feeling entertained by himself and

by his country towards France, produced an excellent political effect.

The Exhibition naturally threw upon the Embassy an immense amount of

extra labour, consisting largely of social work, and one of the most

brilliant social functions of the year was a ball at the British Embassy

attended by the Prince and Princess of Wales, at which the various

hostile sections of the French political world met, on that occasion

only, in temporary harmony.

The general success of the Exhibition and the prominence of English

participation inspired Queen Victoria with the desire to pay a very

private visit to Paris, accompanied by Princess Beatrice and a small

suite, towards the beginning of August. So anxious was she to maintain

secrecy that the only person in England to whom her intention was

confided, was Lord Beaconsfield, and Lord Lyons was enjoined not to say

a word about it to any one, but to inform her confidentially whether she

could visit the Exhibition without being mobbed; whether the heat was

likely to be intense; and whether there was any danger to be apprehended

from Socialists--the term Socialist doubtless including, in the Royal

vocabulary, Anarchists, Terrorists, and Revolutionaries in general.

Incidentally, too, she expressed a wish to hear the Ambassador's opinion

of the Treaty of Berlin.

Lord Lyons answered the first queries satisfactorily, but it was

characteristic of him that, even to his sovereign, he declined to commit

himself to an opinion on the policy of his official chief. 'Lord Lyons

was always of opinion that Your Majesty's Representative at the Congress

should be a Cabinet Minister, and he rejoiced very much when he heard

that Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury had been appointed. He has no

detailed or authentic information of the proceedings of the Congress,

but so far as he can judge at present, he has every hope that the

results will be satisfactory to Your Majesty.'

A long series of letters followed, and after much hesitation, the

Queen finally abandoned her intention, the prospect of hot weather

apparently proving to be too great a deterrent. One singular incident in

the correspondence, which was conducted with much secrecy, was that a

letter from Lord Lyons went all the way to New York before reaching its

destination at Balmoral--an error for which some one presumably suffered.

During the autumn and winter of 1878, constant discussions took

place between the English and French Governments on the subject of

questions connected with Egypt and Tunis, and it was again thought

at one time that a French _coup_ was in contemplation as a reply to

the Anglo-Turkish Convention. The New Year was signalized by the

denunciation of the Commercial Treaty. In announcing this intelligence,

Lord Lyons said that his only surprise was that the existing Treaty had

lasted so long, and that he did not consider it advisable to make any

attempt to conceal annoyance about it. The treaty of 1860 had been made

from political motives, and our best chance of being decently treated

commercially lay in the dislike of the French to placing themselves on

bad terms with us. 'This is the policy Gambetta avows. As for any Free

Trade feeling in France, that is absolutely a broken reed for us to lean

upon.'

In January, 1879, senatorial elections took place which resulted in

large Republican gains, and it seemed probable that the existing

Moderate Ministry might not last much longer. It was generally expected

that when the Chambers met, there would be a great struggle on the

part of the advanced Left for all the lucrative and important posts,

and there were the usual fears of mob rule which prevailed whenever

a partial or entire change of Ministry was imminent. The prospect

of losing Waddington as Foreign Minister drew from Lord Salisbury a

characteristic expression of regret: 'I suppose M. Waddington is likely

to be a transitory phenomenon, if the papers are to be believed. I am

sorry for it; for he suits us much better than some converted Legitimist

with an historic name, whose policy I suppose will be a compound of

Louis XIV. and 1791.'

Waddington was not to go yet, however, and Lord Lyons complained that

he made his life a burden to him in connection with the proceedings

of the British Consul General at Tunis--an aged official who did not

view the spirited French policy there with any friendly eye, and whose

removal the French Government ardently desired. As a general massacre of

aged official innocents was contemplated shortly by the British Foreign

Office, a somewhat ignominious compromise was offered in the shape of

an early retirement of this particular official under an age limit. The

French intentions with regard to Tunis had by this time become quite

evident, and the unfortunate Bey found it extremely difficult to prevent

excuses being found for active intervention in the shape of naval

demonstrations and so forth; it being well known that Marshal MacMahon

and other military men were extremely eager to annex the country at the

first opportunity.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Jan. 14, 1879.

I should be very sorry to do anything disagreeable to the

French with regard to Tunis. It is the place about which they are

most susceptible at this moment, and the irritation they would feel

at any interference with them there, would overpower, at all events

for the time, all considerations of the general advantages of being

well with England.

When I said that I saw no reason for hiding any displeasure we

might feel at the denunciation of the Commercial Treaties and at

the manner in which it was done, I meant that we should not abstain

from direct expressions of dissatisfaction at the thing itself.

My notion is that if we take it too quietly, the

Protectionists will be able to make the Chambers believe that they

can do what they like about the Tariff, and need not fear any

resentment from England. I think that if it can be managed, it

will be advisable to put it out of the power of the ministers to

say that the denunciation has been well received by the English

Government, and has produced no bad impression upon it. In order to

effect this, I should be glad that something unmistakable on the

point should be said in a written communication. If, as I suppose,

Montebello's[21] answer to your note declares that the intention

is to denounce the Treaties one and all, then the rejoinder which

you must make in order to _prendre acte_ of the denunciation

would afford a natural opportunity of expressing annoyance and

apprehension. This is what was in my mind when I wrote.

There are many members in the Chamber who would deprecate

anything likely to produce coolness between France and England,

and it is not desirable to leave the Protectionists the means

of asserting that there is no danger that a restrictive tariff

would do this. But the feeling is a vague one, and it would be

weakened by endeavours to define it sharply, or to appeal to it too

pointedly.

Gambetta holds that the true policy of France is to cultivate

the friendship of England and not to loosen the tie of France upon

her by instructions injurious to her commerce. He is in particular

very much afraid of the feeling in favour of the Empire which would

be revived in the wine-growing districts, if under the Republic the

English wine duties became less favourable to French wines.

The game of the Protectionists is to put the duties in the

general tariff as high as they dare, without provoking retaliation;

and the general tariff once passed, to declare that it is the

latest expression of the will of the country, and that the

Government has no right to relax it by treaty, unless by way of

barter, in return for great concessions made to France.

In the mean time matters may possibly in some measure

be modified, as regards commercial policy by changes in the

Government, but the modification in this respect would scarcely be

very great.

The 'groups,' as they are called, of the Left have been

endeavouring to get the ministers to negotiate with them before

the Chambers met. They want, now the Chambers have met, to reduce

the Ministers to absolute dependence on Parliamentary Committees.

The Ministers are acting properly and constitutionally. They

decline to be dictated to by groups and committees, and they intend

to announce their programme from the Tribune, and to call for a

vote of confidence or want of confidence, from both Chambers.

Waddington, when I saw him yesterday, was very confident of

success. They have found it necessary to sacrifice the Minister

of War, who, among other defects was entirely inefficient in the

Tribune, but Waddington did not anticipate any other changes in the

Cabinet. He said that Gambetta had promised the Government his full

and cordial support.

To pass from Paris, or rather from Versailles to

Constantinople, I will give you for what it may be worth, a story

which has been brought to the Embassy by a person who has sometimes

shown himself to be well informed with regard to what is passing

at the Porte. He affirms that a compact has been made between

Khaireddin and Osman Pashas to dethrone Sultan Abdul Hamid and set

aside the Othman family altogether as effete and half insane. This

being done, a member of a family established at Konia is, according

to my informant, to be declared Sultan.

I have often heard of the Konia family as having a sort of

pretention to the throne, as descending from Seljuk Sultans or some

other dynasty overthrown by Othman or his successors.

Abdul Hamid does not generally leave his Grand Viziers in

office long enough for them to be able to mature a 'conspiracy

against him.'

In January a prolonged struggle took place between the Ministry and the

Left, chiefly over the burning question of Government officials, and

the alleged unwillingness to introduce really Republican measures; and

before the end of the month Marshal MacMahon and his Prime Minister,

M. Dufaure tendered their resignations. It was well known that the

Marshal was anxious to take this course, and he followed the advice of

his friends in choosing, as his reason for resigning, his inability

to concur in a measure which deprived some officers of high rank of

their military commands. When, therefore, he was confronted with the

alternative of signing the decree removing his old companions in arms,

or of resigning himself, he replied that Ministers would have to look

out for another President, and M. Grévy, a comparatively moderate

Liberal, was elected in his place by a large majority. The 'transitory

phenomenon,' M. Waddington, however, remained in office and indeed

became head of a new Administration, but it was felt that this

arrangement was merely temporary. Power had really passed into the hands

of Gambetta, and although he contented himself, for the time being, with

the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, there was nothing to prevent

him from establishing himself in office, whenever he should think that

the opportune moment had arrived; since, unlike the Speakership in

England, the Presidency of the Chamber is looked upon in France as the

road to the highest Ministerial rank.

In consequence of the election of a new President of the Republic in

the person of M. Grévy, the question arose as to whether the Foreign

Representatives should receive fresh credentials, and the action of

Prince Bismarck in this connection caused fresh discord amongst leading

French politicians. When M. Waddington was at Berlin, he had made a

very favourable impression upon the Chancellor, and as he himself

subsequently informed me, Bismarck had taken great pains to be civil

to him, and to manifest that especial confidence which takes the form

of abusing other people--notably Prince Gortschakoff. He now took the

opportunity to inform M. Waddington that he entertained such remarkable

esteem for him, that he had advised the Emperor to dispense with any new

letter of credence, a proceeding which infuriated Gambetta and disposed

him to upset Waddington at an early date. 'Altogether there seems an

impression,' wrote Lord Lyons, 'that the new Ministry will not last

long. Gambetta does not like either Grévy or Waddington. Waddington has

yet to show that he has the staff of a Prime Minister in him. He has

not hitherto been a very ready or a very effective speaker. He is

even said to have a slight English accent in speaking French. I don't

believe any one ever perceived this who did not know beforehand that he

had had an English education. But this English education certainly has

had the effect of preventing him having exactly French modes of thought

and French ways, and thus he is not always completely in tune with the

feelings of his hearers in Parliament.'

[Illustration: _J Russell & Sons, Phot._

_William Henry Waddington_

LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD]

It was a common charge made against the late M. Waddington by his

opponents that he spoke French with an English, and English with a

French accent. As a matter of fact, he was a perfect specimen of a

bilinguist, and would have passed as a native of either nation.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Feb. 11, 1879.

Fournier's[22] vagaries are becoming very dangerous, but we

are in a state of anarchy here. The Ministry is composed in general

of men of respectable character and respectable abilities; but

there is no one of them who has hitherto obtained any great hold

on the Chambers or on the country. Their proper game would be to

try and form a Liberal-Conservative party of the Centre Gauche,

the Centre Droit, and the Gauche Républicaine, with whose support

and that of the country at large, they might keep the Ultra Reds

in check. Hitherto they have not shown that there is stuff enough

in them for this, but then they have hardly had a chance. They

have made a weak compromise on the Amnesty Question, but if they

get a good majority on that question, they might start afresh and

show what is in them. So far they are looked upon by most people

as warming pans for Gambetta and his followers: and I have been

assured that some of the French Representatives abroad do not

hesitate to communicate with Gambetta behind Waddington's back.

I must confess that, contrary to my wont, I am rather gloomy

about the state of things here. The relaxation of the efficiency

of the police is undeniable. This was one of the symptoms of the

decay of the Empire. The Gendarmerie is being tampered with. Recent

measures seem to increase the opportunities for disturbances, and

diminish the means of dealing with them. I do not see where, in

the present Government, resistance to disorder is to come from in

an emergency. But I will not croak. Waddington and his colleagues

may steady themselves in office and restore authority yet, but they

have not much time to lose.

Waddington would be the safest Minister we could have in

Eastern Affairs, if he made his subordinates abroad obey him.

Gambetta might be more friendly in commercial matters and more

ready to be an active ally in the East, but he would expect a

recompense in the West, and might be a dangerous friend who would

require careful 'watching.'

Poor M. Waddington's prospects were not improved by a trivial but

untoward incident in the Chamber. In the course of one of his first

speeches as Prime Minister 'a great deal of laughter is said to have

been produced by his dropping some of the sheets of his written speech

over the edge of the Tribune, and having to wait till they were picked

up'--an incident which serves to show the more generous spirit of the

British politician, since a recent Prime Minister was in the habit of

delivering soul-stirring orations by the same method, without evoking

any disrespectful criticism on the part of his opponents.

Towards the end of February a crisis in Egypt rendered it necessary for

the British and French Governments to have recourse to joint action for

the purpose of protecting their interests.

As the result of a Commission of Inquiry in 1878, the Khedive Ismail,

who had long boasted that Egypt was practically a European state,

accepted the position of a Constitutional Ruler, with Nubar Pasha as

his Prime Minister, Mr. Rivers Wilson[23] as Minister of Finance, and a

Frenchman, M. de Blignières, as Minister of Public Works. It was in the

highest degree improbable that a man of his intriguing and ambitious

character would submit permanently to any such restraint, and before

long he succeeded in working upon the disaffection of those persons

whose privileges were threatened or affected by European control, to

such an extent that, by organizing a military riot, he was able to force

Nubar Pasha to resign on February 20, 1879. At the same time he demanded

much greater powers for himself, including the right to preside over the

Cabinet, and to have all measures submitted to his approval--demands

which were strongly resisted by his European Ministers, who invoked the

support of their Governments.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Feb. 21, 1879.

I have just received your telegram announcing your concurrence

in Waddington's draft instructions to Cairo, and I shall

communicate it to him forthwith.

Waddington seemed quite firm on the point of not allowing

the Khedive to resume his personal power, and would no doubt be

ready to join in any practical steps for that purpose; but in

the meantime it may be feared that His Highness is consolidating

his resumption of power. Waddington looks upon the whole affair

as a simple manoevre of the Khedive to upset the new system of

government. It does not in fact seem likely that so arrant a

coward would have risked his own precious person, if he had not

had a pretty good understanding with the rioters. Public opinion

in France would, I think, support Waddington in taking strong

measures. There does not seem to be any one but Nubar of position

enough to be a Prime Minister of any independence; Waddington

seemed fully aware that if the Khedive is present at the council of

Ministers, no Egyptian Minister will open his lips.

Godeaux telegraphed last night that order having been

restored, the presence of a ship of war at Alexandria might not be

necessary, but Waddington thought on the contrary that it would

be 'essential in order to produce a salutary impression on the

Khedive, and keep him in some check.'

Nubar Pasha was regarded as English and anti-French, and his fall was,

therefore, received at Paris with some degree of complacency; but the

feeling was not sufficiently strong to make the Government hold out

against his restoration to office, should that be considered necessary

for the purpose of checking the Khedive, and the tendency was to make

no suggestions and to wait for the lead of England, it being understood

that both Governments were resolved not to consent to any change of the

political system in Egypt.

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

March 1, 1879.

* * * * *

As to Egypt, I gather from your telegram to-day that

Waddington looks on our message to Vivian[24] as in the nature of

an ultimatum, and he is puzzled what we are to do next if it should

be rejected. We do not in the least look on it as an ultimatum, and

it is not so phrased. We may well receive either from the Khedive

or the Agents some alternative proposal which may be discussed,

and perhaps hammered into an acceptable arrangement at least for

a time. But in any case our position cannot be worse here than if

we had acquiesced at once in the results of the conspiracy against

Nubar; while the chances are that it will enable us to arrive at

some plan for partially curbing the Khedive, which at all events

shall partially disguise the check we have undoubtedly received.

The causes are obscure. It is evident there has been imprudence. I

wish I could be quite satisfied there has been perfect loyalty.

Writing a day or two later, Lord Salisbury explained that he was in some

difficulty, as Mr. Vivian and Mr. Rivers Wilson held different opinions.

The former wanted to conciliate the Khedive by not forcing upon him the

restoration of Nubar, while Mr. Rivers Wilson strongly insisted upon his

return. Lord Salisbury himself was inclined to the latter course because

'otherwise the Khedive will be like a horse who has succeeded in beating

his rider, and will never be safe for that rider to mount again,' but

eventually decided against it. From the following letter it looks as

if the retirement of the hapless British Representative at Tunis was

intended as a peace offering to the cause of Anglo-French joint action

in Egypt.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

March 6, 1879.

It is better always to get the credit of one's good actions,

which are naturally few. Will you kindly tell M. Waddington in the

most unofficial way in the world that----having returned himself as

67 years of age (he entered the service 55 years ago, and therefore

must have begun his public labours at a precocious age) we have

suppressed the Consulate General of Tunis, and that there will

henceforth be a man on reduced salary, a consul or agent, after the

close of this month.

I think the French will find difficulties enough with Italy if

they ever try to increase their influence in Tunis; but that is no

affair of ours. We have hot water enough elsewhere without desiring

to boil any in Tunis.

One good turn deserves another, and I hope Waddington will

feel himself bound to keep his agents from Anglophobia in Turkey.

The Egyptian compromise will do very well for the time. It

seems doubtful whether Nubar is worth anything now. An Oriental

does not easily pluck up a spirit when he has once been beaten, and

Nubar is reported to have told friends in England that he knew that

whenever the Khedive had done with him there was a cup of coffee

waiting for him.

The compromise referred to took the form of a new Egyptian Ministry

containing the two English and French representatives, and nominally

presided over by the Khedive's eldest son, Prince Tewfik. The

experiment, however, of trying to keep a Ministry in office in spite of

the opposition of the chief of the State did not last long, for in April

the irrepressible Khedive dismissed his Ministers and installed Cherif

Pasha as Prime Minister. This spirited action caused M. Waddington

much perplexity, as he did not believe that French public opinion

would allow him to take a slap in the face quietly from the Khedive.

The French bondholders were too influential to think of throwing them

over, and then there was the Crédit Foncier, a more or less Government

establishment, which no French Government could allow to come to grief.

There was a keen desire to maintain the concert between England and

France on Egyptian affairs, but if the bondholders suspected that

England was likely to be lukewarm on their behalf, there was a strong

probability that the French Government might be forced to act alone

in the enforcement of French claims. Lord Salisbury on his side was

naturally reluctant to be identified with the bondholders' cause.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

April 10, 1879.

I see by your telegrams which have arrived to-day that M.

Waddington suggests as a means of coercion against the Khedive that

MM. Rothschild should refuse to pay him the balance of the loan.

Mr. Rivers Wilson had made the same suggestion to the Baron. But

the latter, in a message sent yesterday through his son, repudiated

any idea of such a proceeding as dishonourable, and attributed the

suggestion to momentary excitement.

With respect to the second idea, the only question is whether

the Sultan will ever summon up courage to take such a step, and

if he does, whether he can enforce it. If it can be done quite

smoothly, _perhaps_ it would be the best course; but I speak with

some doubt.

It may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to the French

Government to go into partnership with the bondholders; or rather

to act as sheriffs' officer for them. But to us it is a new and

very embarrassing sensation. Egypt never can prosper so long as

some 25 per cent. of her revenue goes in paying interest on her

debt. We have no wish to part company with France: still less do we

mean that France should acquire in Egypt any special ascendency;

but subject to these two considerations I should be glad to be free

of the companionship of the bondholders.

M. Waddington's 'second idea' evidently referred to the deposing of the

Khedive by means of the Sultan; but his difficulty lay in the old French

jealousy of the Porte exercising influence over the internal affairs

of Egypt, and during the reign of Sultan Abdul Aziz the consequence of

that influence had certainly been a constant drain of money from Cairo

to Constantinople. One suggestion was that the Sultan should summon the

Khedive to come to Constantinople to do homage, a ceremony which he

had never yet performed, and a refusal to obey would have made him a

rebel in the Sultan's eyes; but the objection to this course was that

the Khedive might, if he went, take large sums of money with him and so

propitiate his suzerain.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

April 16, 1879.

Waddington's policy is not very intelligible. I suppose it

is a compromise between a sense of the danger of doing anything

strong, and of the necessity of satisfying the Crédit Foncier.

In the despatch which you will receive we have done our best to

accommodate ourselves to Waddington's view, without taking up a

wholly untenable position.

There is one thing which it is necessary not to forget, though

I could not mention it in the despatch. We have very different

audiences to please; and though we may agree upon the actual

intimation to be given to the Khedive and the Sultan respectively,

the argument leading up to those communications cannot in both

cases be precisely the same. We must lay stress on separate points,

and the argument derived from the Khedive's application for a

European Minister must be treated differently by the two Powers,

as the circumstances were not similar. We should therefore avoid

identic notes, though we may make a concerted representation.

The communication to the Porte had better be indiscreetly

communicated to the Khedive's agent there, who is an intelligent

man. It may only result in producing a very heavy payment to the

Porte. But that, under existing circumstances, will itself be of

advantage.

I suppose that Waddington means to upset the Ottoman Bank

project as a retort for the failure of Tocqueville's.

What does he think of Martino's share in the recent Egyptian

crisis? Italy is likely to be a plague to all of us.

In France there was a violent party, more or less supported by Gambetta,

which desired to send some energetic Agent to Egypt who would bully

the Khedive successfully. Unfortunately, such energetic agents were

extremely likely to quarrel with their British colleagues, whereas M.

Waddington, who was peaceably disposed, wished to appoint quiet and

unobtrusive representatives who would work harmoniously, and implicitly

follow their instructions. There was, however, some excuse for the men

of action, as a very well-founded suspicion prevailed in Paris that the

Russians, and even the Germans, were busy at Rome inciting the Italians

to make trouble for England and France at Cairo. Moreover, Gambetta and

his friends believed, probably with reason, that the Khedive would never

have gone so far in defying England and France if he had not felt that

he was backed up by other Powers, as well as by Italy.

Mr. Vivian, the British agent in Cairo, who had been summoned to London,

returned to his post at the end of April bearing a note, the gist of

which was, that the two Governments, in view of the iniquities of the

Khedive, 'reserved to themselves an entire liberty of appreciation

and action in defending their interests in Egypt, and in seeking

the arrangements best calculated to secure the good government and

prosperity of the country.' In other words, the Khedive was warned that

he had better be careful; but there was, so far, no hint of deposition.

In Lord Salisbury's letter to Lord Lyons, enclosing a copy of the above

note, there is an interesting personal opinion on the question of

governing Orientals by Europeans. 'With all these Oriental populations I

suspect that the _rôle_ of Europeans should in the main be confined to

positions of criticism and control. They can only govern after absolute

conquest, and then expensively. The difficulty of governing without

conquest is, of course, enormously increased when two nationalities have

to be provided for, and two Governments to be consulted.'

The period following the return of Mr. Vivian to his post was marked

by a violent and entirely unreasonable campaign against England in the

French press, it being thought, for some unknown reason, that France had

been abandoned, and M. Waddington took the somewhat unusual course of

sending a message to Lord Salisbury through Mr. Rivers Wilson, instead

of communicating in the ordinary manner.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

May 21, 1879.

On Monday Rivers Wilson sent me word that he had a message

to deliver to me from Waddington. Accordingly I asked him to come

and see me yesterday to deliver it. It was to the effect that

Waddington was willing and anxious to move the Porte to dethrone

the Khedive, if England would join in this step. I represented

that there were three difficulties. The Sultan might not assent:

if he did, the Khedive might not yield. If the latter did yield,

the successor might be either feeble or bad, and we should be

called upon to support him in one case, and replace him in the

other. To the first objection Wilson replied that Waddington had no

apprehensions as to the Sultan's consent; to the second he (Wilson)

and every person who knew Egypt well, did not doubt that the moment

a Firman was issued, the Khedive would fall; as to the third, he

could only say that Prince Tewfik was a compendium of the cardinal

virtues.

If Waddington did not communicate his proposal to you, I am

obliged to consider what possible motive he could have had for

taking this circuitous route, unless he meant to disavow the offer

later on. If he says nothing to you about it, it may be worth while

to sound him.

If there were no France in the way, I should be disposed to

give no reply to the Khedive's note we received by the last mail,

or at least only to say that since the dismissal of the English

Minister, the Khedive's finance had become so hopelessly tangled,

partly owing to his extravagance, partly to the conflict with

other Powers into which the decree of April 22nd has brought him,

that we must reserve our judgment with respect to all questions

of financial control till the position of affairs had become

more intelligible. I think that on some such plea as that we

might stand by and look on for a few months till the Khedive

has knocked himself to pieces, which he inevitably will do. The

fiscal condition is now so hopeless that I am rather grateful to

the Khedive for refusing to put it into the hands of an English

Minister. I doubt whether any European can now undertake it

without discredit, until the country has gone into liquidation.

The disproportion between the debt and the revenue--joined to

the difficulties which have now been raised by the action of the

courts and the attitude of the other Powers, makes effective or

even humane government hopeless till there has been a bankruptcy.

But then that would not suit a purely Bourse policy like that of

France. We must take notice of this difference of the French view,

and we may have to modify our policy accordingly; for we cannot

allow France to go on alone, and we will not part company with her

if we can possibly help it. But in this state of our relative views

and wishes, it is already for us to wait, and for her to propose.

If left alone, our disposition would be to find an excuse for

waiting, and if we move it will be because France is urging us. We

should therefore naturally wait till France made a proposal to us,

and should be inclined to cross-examine her as to what will be

her next move after that, in the various contingencies which may

result from the course they propose. I think, however, you might

open communications by mentioning, quite unofficially, how much

pain the articles in the _République Française_ and the _Débuts_

have given us. To ordinary papers we should of course have paid no

attention; but one of them is, or was till very recently, edited

by a gentleman in the French Foreign Office; the other is in part

the property of a Minister. We are utterly unable to understand on

what foundation the reproaches rest that we have shown reserves

and hesitations in the pursuit of the joint Egyptian policy. On

the contrary, if we had occupied towards France the position which

Servia occupies towards Russia, our compliance could hardly have

been more exact. But this outbreak of causeless wrath justifies us

in asking what France wants, and what she complains of.

You will of course say as much of this, or as much more as

you may think wise. But it may be as well to show that we are

not insensible to this attempt to work Parliament against us

by revelations or communications on matters which the French

Government themselves have charged us to treat as confidential.

The attacks on England in the French press were not inspired, as Lord

Salisbury supposed, by the French Foreign Office, but by Gambetta, who

desired a strong policy in Egypt and seized the opportunity to fall upon

Waddington. The latter, however, by this time had made up his mind as to

what should be done.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, May 22, 1879.

As you will have seen by my telegram, what Waddington said

to me yesterday was, that there appeared to him to be only two

alternatives with regard to the Egyptian question--to depose the

Khedive or to establish a Control. He talked a good deal more

about the Control than the deposition; but when I asked him if

this meant that the Control was the alternative he preferred, he

declined to express any preference for the one or the other. If we

are to wait until he has devised measures (and this is what he told

me he was about) for establishing an efficacious control we need

not fear being called upon to act in a hurry. I quite agree with

you that we cannot let France go on alone in Egypt; for if we do,

she may go lengths which will produce something a great deal more

dangerous than a mere coolness between us. French power and French

feeling are very different from what they were some years ago,

when the French would have let us do almost anything we chose in

Egypt, if we would have taken care of the interests of the French

bondholders.

Nothing can be plainer than Lord Salisbury's desire to act in concert

with France, and to have regard to French interests in Egypt, but the

constant attacks made upon British policy and the persistent hostility

of French agents, not only in Egypt, but elsewhere, rendered the task

anything but easy. Gambetta's hostility was partly due to the fact that

he was an enthusiastic Phil-Hellene, and considered that not enough was

being done for Greece in the way of procuring for her accessions of

territory at the expense of Turkey. It is as well to point out that,

whereas the Turks had been compelled to cede territory to States with

which they had been at war, they were at this time being pressed to cede

territory to Greece because that Power had remained at peace.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

June 6, 1879.

The recent course of the French newspapers which have the

credit of being inspired by Gambetta and Léon Say is certainly a

puzzle. Looking over the course of negotiations between us and

Waddington on Egypt, I should find it very difficult to say which

of the two Governments had pulled the other on, and which had

dragged the other back. As far as any important negotiations go,

I should say that we had been a shade more in favour of active

measures than the other side. The two newspapers in question

are evidently well informed; and therefore their assumption

that we have prevented the French from acting must be put on

for a purpose; what purpose it is difficult to say. The most

obvious solution--bearing in mind the English friendships of the

two statesmen concerned--is that the whole movement is meant

to operate on English internal politics, and not on European

politics at all: and this view is supported by the use which has

actually been made of the controversy here. The incident is common

enough in diplomatic history: but it has always been bitterly

resented by the Government which is the subject of that species

of attack. But in this case there is some doubt as to how far

Waddington is implicated. Nothing is more difficult to deal with

than a 'Marionette Government,' because the marionettes are not

responsible, and you cannot get at the man who pulls the strings.

There is one spot in the diplomatic battlefield--almost the only

one--where we have been exposed to risk, and have consequently

been anxious--the Balkan Peninsula: and on this we have been

systematically opposed by France. Ring, Coutouly and Fournier have

played us every kind of trick. But all the time, nothing could

have been more unexceptionable than Waddington's language and

instructions. So it is with this newspaper warfare. The secondary

agents, who are popularly supposed to act from inspiration are

undisguisedly hostile. Waddington's demeanour all the time is

imperturbably friendly. Is it helplessness, or bad faith? The

question is one of considerable practical importance: for if we are

to measure the co-operation of France by the action of Fournier and

Gambetta, we shall do wisely to retire, gently but effectually,

from a perilous partnership. And it is impossible to ignore this

aspect of the case in considering the precise line to be pursued in

the two pending questions of Greece and Egypt.

Our object in Egypt, ever since we promised some four years

ago not to take it, is to see that our own interests are not

injured and that French interests receive adequate, but not

excessive consideration. If, however, Gambetta means mischief, it

may be wise for us to seek the protection of English interests

only, and leave the French to take care of themselves. This would

be done by pushing forward the other Powers. Their interference

would be fatal to Egyptian solvency, and consequently to

French bondholders. But it would be as fatal a bar to French

preponderance as the plan of duplicating all appointments, and

as none of these great Powers are naval, we could look after

the Canal just as easily if they were masters in Egypt, as

under the present Anglo-French system. If the French are really

friends, the Anglo-French system may be maintained in spite of

many inconveniences in order to cement that friendship. But if

Gambetta and Fournier are to be taken as the directing force in

French politics, the Anglo-French system is merely a make-believe,

and will only draw us into a succession of crises in which we

shall probably be outwitted. This dilemma merits very careful

consideration. Greece is a less important and more transitory

affair. In order to avoid division in the Congress we went rather

further than we thought quite wise; and we have no wish to go

further still. Of course, abstractedly, it would be much better

that all the Hellenic populations should be under a Hellenic ruler.

But Turkey is still a fact of which account must be taken; and the

danger of Turkey resisting is very serious. The fact that Greece

has not won this territory as prize of war, nor earned it as the

consideration of any service done, but is to gain it merely by her

skill in singing diplomatic dithyrambics, appears to irritate the

Turks intensely. It is not our present policy to adopt a course

which shall induce the Sultan to listen to the Russian proposals

which are so freely placed before him. We would not therefore,

in any case, take a leading part in pressing the cession on him.

But we doubt extremely the wisdom of exciting anew the Moslem

fanaticism, by demanding a town to which the Albanians attach so

much importance as Janina. However, in this question we should

have been a good deal influenced by the wishes of France, if we

could have thought that by exalting the influence of Fournier we

were strengthening a friend. But can we do so?

There was, in reality, no foundation for Lord Salisbury's suspicions

that Gambetta and his allies were seeking to interfere in British

internal politics. The objectionable articles were written under an

erroneous impression that France had been outwitted, and that Mr.

Vivian, in pursuance of secret instructions from his Government, was

working for the failure of the joint Anglo-French administration in

Egypt and for the establishment of exclusive British influence. But as

the attacks in the French press mainly took the form of abusing England

for not agreeing to energetic proposals made by the French Government,

it was a legitimate grievance against M. Waddington that he never took

any steps whatever to contradict this perfectly baseless accusation.

As for the conduct of French agents who were continually intriguing

against their English colleagues, it is probable that M. Waddington was

able to exercise little or no control over them, and it has already

been mentioned that some of them were in the habit of corresponding

directly with Gambetta behind the back of their official chief. Lord

Lyons, who naturally was anxious to make things as easy for the French

as possible, recommended that the vanity and susceptibility of French

diplomatists abroad and of the public at home, should be studied as

much as possible, since there was a universal feeling that France was

now too strong to play a secondary part anywhere, and that sacrifices

on our part were preferable to allowing her to throw herself into the

arms of Russia. Lord Salisbury therefore persevered in the difficult

task of endeavouring to co-operate cordially with the French Government,

and M. Waddington applied himself to elaborating the scheme of Dual

Control which was eventually adopted. Meanwhile it had become apparent

that, in order to obtain anything like a successful result, the Khedive

Ismail must be got rid of somehow, a course which was urged not only by

Gambetta, but by the French Agent at Cairo. Joint efforts were made by

the French and British Agents to induce him to abdicate in favour of

Prince Tewfik, which were seconded by the representations of Germany

and Austria; but these were of no avail, and the Gordian knot was

not cut until the Sultan suddenly intervened on June 26. On that day

a telegram arrived from Constantinople, deposing Ismail by Imperial

Iradé, and conferring the Government of Egypt upon his eldest son Prince

Tewfik, who was at once proclaimed Khedive without any disturbance of

tranquillity.

The action of the Sultan was not only sudden but unexpected, and Lord

Salisbury at once took steps to assure the French Government that it was

not due to the instigation of Her Majesty's Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

June 26, 1879.

Pray assure M. Waddington that the Turkish move reported

to-day does not proceed in any way from our suggestion. We have

only urged in the very strongest terms that the Sultan should not

interfere with what we were doing in Cairo. But the Sultan seems to

have been perfectly resolved to have a finger in the pie; and as he

was not allowed to interfere to save the Khedive, he indemnified

himself by interfering to upset him.

I am not specially in love with the Firman of 1873, which

I see the Sultan has revoked. But I am afraid it will annoy

Waddington, and therefore I am anxious he should be well convinced

we had no hand in it.

Now it is done, the wisest course we can take is to accept it,

and devote our energies to procuring any new Firman that may be

necessary to the present state of Egyptian finances. I don't think

it will be any great evil if their power of raising armaments is

limited. But on all this I should like to have Waddington's opinion.

M. Waddington was a sensible man, and therefore there was no difficulty

in convincing him that England was not responsible for the Sultan's

action; but French opinion generally was incredulous, and it was

believed that the deposition of Ismail was the result of the rivalry at

Constantinople between the French and British Ambassadors. The latter

was unjustly suspected of a desire to reduce Egypt to the condition

of a Turkish Pashalic, and it was obvious that the revocation of the

Firman indicated the intention of the Sultan to reassert his influence

over Egypt in a manner which French policy had consistently opposed.

Although, therefore, the Sultan's action had delivered both England

and France from a highly embarrassing situation, and had been taken

at a most opportune moment, it was considered advisable, instead of

expressing gratitude, to criticise adversely the form of the Imperial

Iradé, and to insist upon the issue of another.

What was, however, of really more essential importance than the somewhat

remote fear of Turkish interference was the question of how the Dual

Control was to be effectively established.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 7, 1879.

Our perplexity as to the effect of the Firman has received

a rather comical solution. No such Firman exists. An 'Iradé' is

merely the Sultan's signature; and that was only given to the

telegraphic message deposing Ismail. So that the revocation of the

Firman of 1873 has not taken place, and the discussion as to the

exact meaning of such a revocation seems to be premature. All that

we now have to do is to prevent, if we can, any Firman at all being

issued to Tewfik, and then every one will be happy.

Tewfik is resolved to begin the Liquidation at once; and if

it be true that interest is rolling up at the rate of £80,000 a

month, there is good cause for his desire to hurry it. But the

Controllers will hardly be enough. We want to have some hold over

the government of Egypt, though we do not want to assume any

overt responsibility. The great object seems to me to be to have

representatives inside the offices who shall be able to report

what the Government are doing to the Agents, and shall be able to

give advice to the Government in accordance with the instructions

of the Agents. If you have a European Minister, the Agent must

be suppressed. I despair of making two talented Englishmen work

side by side, without subordinating one to the other; and if we

must choose between Agent and Minister as a vehicle of English

influence, the former seems to me the easier to work with. He is

not quasi-independent, and therefore will obey orders. He occupies

a recognized and traditional position and therefore excites no

jealousy either among Moslems or other Christian Powers; and he

cannot be dismissed; and if his advice is not taken, or applied

badly, the country he serves is not in the eyes of the world

primarily responsible. The case on the other side is that the

European Minister has more power. But has he? What power did Wilson

enjoy? The only power Europeans can enjoy at Cairo rests on the

fear which their Governments may happen to inspire, and this fear

will operate as strongly through an Agent as through a Minister.

We do not put European Ministers even into the Governments of

dependent Indian Provinces: and there we have, what we cannot have

in Egypt for a long time, 'bayonets to sit upon.'

We have made the mistake in Egypt and elsewhere, of

underrating the vitality of the Moslem feeling. I am afraid M.

Waddington is doing so with respect to Greece.

Another letter deals further with the question of Control, and contains

some interesting reflections on moral influence.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 15, 1879.

I am very much of the opinion that the Control should take

the form of inspection. It is the only form of Control likely to

be effective. Actual authority we cannot exercise. We tried to do

it through the European Ministers, but when the stress came, the

disbanded officers proved to us that two pairs of arms are not much

use against two thousand. The only form of Control we have is that

which is called moral influence--which in practice is a combination

of menace, objurgation, and worry. In this we are still supreme

and have many modes of applying it--diplomatic notes, consular

interviews, newspapers, blue books. We must devote ourselves to the

perfecting of this weapon. And, obviously, the first condition of

its use is complete knowledge of what is going in.

The exchange, therefore, of nominal authority for real

inspectionship is a step in the right direction. It is facing

facts. We must exert ourselves to open to these inspectors every

avenue of information; and we must have a certain number of

sub-inspectors paid by Egypt, who shall travel about, collecting

information. It is essential, of course, that these last should

know the language.

The division of the jurisdiction of the two inspectors is

a serious puzzle. Upper and Lower Egypt certainly will not do,

unless we have Lower Egypt. I had thought of a North and South

division--the Nile--starting at Damietta. But I know Vivian does

not like this; moreover I see difficulties about handing over

Alexandria to the French.

Waddington's proposal for a rotatory jurisdiction sounds odd.

What would he think of it as applied to any other department of

life--Ambassadors, Bishops, or Ministers? I suppose the frequency

of what they call a 'Prefectoral Movement' in France has put it

into his head.

Would it be possible to fuse them into a board, giving them

a native colleague to be chosen by themselves, and then decide

by majority? I have spoken to Baring[25] about the Commission of

Liquidation. I doubt his accepting the Control, though I think he

would the Liquidation.

As to the Firman, we are agreed as to the limitation of

armaments. I should be glad to see loans forbidden altogether.

To an Oriental ruler they are like firewater to the Red Indians.

I should be glad to see a declaration that the Powers would not

recognize or encourage the payment of any loan contracted by the

Egyptian Government after this date. They are not wanted to meet

any present stress; but the fellaheen are already loaded with quite

as heavy a weight as they can bear.

The question of appointing the Controllers and deciding what their

functions were to be, gave rise to more difficulties, caused by the

obvious desire of many Frenchmen to get the Egyptian finances entirely

into French hands. Ultimately Major Baring and M. de Blignières

were appointed, but their powers were not formally defined until

November. By the decree of November 15, 1879, it was laid down that

the Controllers should have full rights of inquiring into all branches

of the administration; the rank of Ministers and seats in the Cabinet,

although restricted to making suggestions; the power of appointing and

dismissing subordinate officials; and it was further enacted that they

were irremovable without the consent of their respective Governments. By

this action the British and the French Governments practically assumed

the responsibility of Government, and for some time to come Egypt ceased

to give trouble.

In the month of June, 1879, an event had occurred which was of profound

importance to all political parties in France. The Prince Imperial

had perished in Zululand, and with him had vanished the hopes of a

resuscitated Empire. The tragedy of the Prince's death is heightened

by the fact that it was only owing to an unfortunate misunderstanding

that he was ever allowed to accompany the expedition. On March 1,

Lord Salisbury writing to Lord Lyons stated that the departure of the

Prince Imperial was: _'a mal entendu_ which we are unable to understand

even here. The Government had very distinctly negatived it, but in

consequence of some misapprehensions, our orders were not attended to

by the military men, and he received encouragement which could not

afterwards be withdrawn. If you think Waddington is at all sore on the

matter, you are authorized to explain this fully to him. But I rather

expect to hear from you that no importance is attached by the French

Government to what has taken place.'

Two days later he again wrote:--

I am very sorry to hear that so painful an impression was

created in Paris. We have never been able to discover exactly

how it was done, or why our already clearly expressed objection

was disregarded. He was of course at liberty to go, and people

who ought to have known better were at liberty to write private

letters and go to railway stations. Of course nothing official has

been done, but the border line between official and private has

been very closely trenched upon. However, all we can do now is to

express our sincere regret.

At Lord Lyons's next interview with M. Waddington, the latter asked (not

in a complaining manner) how the Prince's expedition to Zululand had

been brought about, and was told in reply that the Prince had settled it

himself through personal friends and that Her Majesty's Government had

by no means approved of it. President Grévy alluded to the matter in the

course of a conversation with the Prince of Wales, who happened to be in

Paris, and also expressed no disapproval; in fact, he went so far as to

remark: _qu'il avait très bien fait_. Thus the principal personages in

France evidently did not consider the matter of much importance; but,

on the other hand, the Republican press showed considerable irritation,

which, under the circumstances, was perhaps not entirely unnatural, as

it did not seem credible that the Prince could have started without the

approval of the British Government. When the news of his death arrived,

it was felt that, for the time being at all events, Bonapartism had been

practically crushed out of existence.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, June 20, 1879.

In hearing of the sad end of the short life of the Prince

Imperial, one's first thought is for the Empress, whose bitter cup

of sorrows is now full.

The immediate political result is the utter disorganization

of the Imperial Party. It was far from strong, but still it was

the most efficacious element of opposition to the Republicans, and

they will now have things still more their own way. The Fleurys,

Rouhers, and the old Imperial following can never hope to live to

recover from the blow. I suppose Prince Napoleon will hardly put

himself forward in the position of a pretender to the Imperial

Crown, and he would have no party with him if he did. In the

more remote future his eldest son may prove a more formidable

candidate than poor Prince Louis could have been. He is said to be

a remarkably clever, attractive youth, and a thorough Bonaparte

in appearance. No hereditary responsibility for Sedan can be cast

upon him; he is undoubtedly of the Bonaparte race, and he has been

brought up in France. For the present, however, Prince Louis's

melancholy death is a decided accession to Republican strength.

The death of the Prince excited the sympathies of all classes in France

with the stricken Empress, but when in July, preparations were being

made for the funeral in England, the bitterness of French party politics

displayed itself in that hostility which, carried beyond the grave, it

is the least possible to condone.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 10, 1879.

The susceptibility the French Government is showing about

the funeral of the Prince Imperial is neither wise nor dignified.

If ever there was an occasion on which political animosities

might be left in abeyance, surely this is one. The death of the

Prince Imperial has put an end to many hopes and aspirations,

and has inclined numerous adherents of the family to acquiesce

in the present state of things. It is certainly not politic to

require of people in this frame of mind an overt manifestation

of heartlessness and ingratitude to the dynasty which has had so

mournful an end. The ceremony so manifestly relates to the past

and not to the future that there can be no reasonable objection

to allowing the old adherents of the family, whether Marshals and

Generals, or merely civilians to go over to attend it. I fancy

that Grévy himself and the Republicans _de la vieille_ cannot get

over, even on such an occasion as this, their old hostility to the

Empire.

These almost incredibly vindictive feelings again manifested themselves

when a proposal was made that a monument to the unfortunate Prince

should be placed in Westminster Abbey. M. Waddington, who must have

been heartily ashamed of the part he was forced to play, remonstrated

privately against the project, and intimated to Lord Lyons that he

thought of writing to Dean Stanley, whom he happened to know, and of

urging him not to consent to it.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 22, 1879.

I think, on the whole, I had better not answer your despatch

officially about the Prince Imperial's statue; but you can tell

Waddington unofficially as much of the following as you may

think useful. As soon as I got it, I communicated with the Prime

Minister, who sent to the Dean of Westminster. The Dean, when the

message reached him, had already forwarded to all the newspapers

a letter which you have read in the issues of this morning. On

reading it we came to the conclusion that the matter had gone too

far to be recalled.

On historical considerations the Dean proposes to put the

monument into Henry the Seventh's chapel, and for that purpose,

undoubtedly, the Queen's permission must be obtained. But as

regards the Abbey in general he is absolutely supreme. He might

put up a statue of Nana Sahib, if he chose. So we must decline to

accept any responsibility for his proceedings. As he has publicly

made the announcement that it is his intention, if not interfered

with, to give the requisite permission, it is clearly impossible

for us to 'apply pressure' to induce him to give way. The motive

for doing so would have to be confessed and would cause much

misapprehension.

I have expressed a wish to see the inscription before it is

put up, and I have no doubt I shall be allowed to do so. I think I

can assure M. Waddington that there is not the slightest danger of

anything about Napoleon IV. being contained in it.

* * * * *

The monument was never erected, the project meeting with much opposition

in Parliament as calculated to offend the susceptibilities of the French

Government.

It must be admitted that the circumstances surrounding the death of this

unfortunate Prince reflect discredit, though in an unequal degree, upon

both the French and the British Governments. If the French Government

showed a petty and vindictive spirit totally unworthy of a great and

powerful nation, the misunderstanding which enabled the Prince to go

to South Africa; his vague and indefinite status with respect to the

expeditionary force; the equally vague conditions attaching to his

relations with Captain Carey, which were partly responsible for his

death; the unhappy suggestion of the Abbey monument; the helpless

attitude of the Government in the face of an enterprising ecclesiastic;

and the subsequent unseemly discussion in the House of Commons, are

eloquent of slipshod and careless methods which are discreditable to

British administration and constitute a somewhat humiliating page in the

national history.

The autumn of 1879 was marked by the conclusion of the Austro-German

alliance, hailed at the time by Lord Salisbury as 'glad tidings of

great joy,' and destined profoundly to influence European politics for

many years to come. In spite of assurances given by Bismarck himself,

by Andrassy, and by Haymerle, this new grouping of two first-class

military Powers caused much perturbation at Paris, which was certainly

not allayed by Lord Salisbury's benediction, and provided convenient

material for an attack upon the tottering Waddington administration.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Nov. 14, 1879.

* * * * *

As to French internal politics, the most striking feature is

the somewhat vague but almost universal feeling of uneasiness about

the future which pervades France. It is impossible not to see that

this feeling has increased even during the few weeks that have

elapsed since I went away on leave in August. I suppose that the

immediate fear is that the Waddington Ministry will be succeeded by

one more Radical, and that thus, step by step, the Ultra-Reds will

get the Government into their hands.

When I first saw Waddington on my return, he was in good

spirits, thinking that the threatened attacks upon him about

the amnesty, the Government, and especially the diplomatic

appointments, had blown over. Now, however, he is menaced with

an interpellation on the Austro-German understanding. This

understanding is, of course, extremely unpalatable to the French,

and among them the general belief is that it binds Austria to

assist Germany, in case of need, to defend Alsace and Lorraine

against France. Waddington has the most positive assurances from

Bismarck, Andrassy and Haymerle that there is nothing against

France in it, but this is not enough to reassure the cavillers.

The intention seems to be to reproach Waddington with this

understanding generally, as indicating the failure of his Foreign

Policy, and in particular to blame him for having an Ambassador at

Vienna who neither prevented, nor found it out, and an Ambassador

in London who did not make the French policy on the subject

properly understood by the English Government. It seems that

it is intended to argue that you would not have spoken of the

understanding in the terms you used at Manchester, if you had

known the painful impression it had made in France.

There are two opinions in France on the Foreign Policy to be

now adopted. Perhaps the general, unreflecting public are inclined

to throw themselves into the arms of Russia. The wise heads (and

there is some reason to hope that Gambetta may be among them) look

rather to England, and are willing to conciliate her by supporting

her views in the East. It may be worth while to take this feeling

into account, and perhaps with that view rather to put forward the

reinstatement of Khaireddin and Midhat as the objects in view, than

exclusively English appointments.

It seems to be a more or less established rule that when an English

Foreign Secretary makes a speech, Ambassadors should write and expatiate

upon the admirable effect which has been produced abroad, and Lord

Lyons's comment upon Lord Salisbury's Manchester speech approaches more

nearly to criticism than appears elsewhere in his correspondence. The

charge of ignorance brought against the French Ambassador at Vienna

was probably quite correct, but the British Embassy at Vienna must

have been in the same case, for the existence of the Austro-German

alliance was first discovered by that extremely able public servant,

the late Sir Joseph Crowe, K.C.M.G.[26] As for the alleged inaction of

the French Ambassador at London, that official was a retired admiral,

whom apparently Waddington seldom seems to have consulted, and over

whose unconscious head business was habitually transacted by the French

Foreign Office.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Nov. 21, 1879.

We are within a week of the opening of the session, but the

situation has not become more clear. Gambetta and Waddington have

a personal dislike to each other, and no doubt Gambetta would be

glad to oust Waddington, and to put in his place some new Minister

for Foreign Affairs, such as the Marquis de Noailles, with some

creature of his own, such as Spüller as adlatus or Under Secretary

of State. But then Gambetta would find it difficult to do this

without bringing about such a break up of the Ministry as would

raise the question of his own taking office. But if those who ought

to know him well judge aright, he does not wish to come into power

until he sees his way to doing something very great--in fact to

getting back Alsace and Lorraine.

Gambetta professes to be strongly in favour of the English

Alliance, and for that and for other reasons, to make a liberal

treaty of commerce with us. I do not, however, imagine that his

ideas of a liberal treaty go beyond maintaining, or nearly so, the

tariffs as they stand in the existing Anglo-French Treaties.

I imagine he has thought of going to England himself whenever

he has a good opportunity, not with a view to putting himself into

the hands of Sir Charles Dilke and taking part in any Ultra-Radical

demonstration, but rather with a desire of conciliating the

moderate public opinion in England, and showing that he has no

desire to promote a Republican Propaganda abroad. He seems to have

a decidedly friendly feeling towards the present English Ministry.

I have heard that the Russian Grand Dukes had been led by

General Chanzy to expect a much more warm and cordial reception at

Paris than they actually met with, and that consequently they were

by no means pleased.

Waddington seems to be as little prepared to go into the

Newfoundland question as he was two months ago. The impression

he makes upon me is the same that he made upon you. The Navy

Department keep him in awe of them and prevent his acting upon the

reasonable views he expressed to you at Berlin.

The various difficulties in all parts of the world which were before

long to trouble Anglo-French relations for many years, had now

begun to manifest themselves in such places as Newfoundland, Tahiti,

Réunion, the Gambia, and elsewhere. All these troublesome questions

fell under the Marine Department, and their accumulation was productive

of an irritation which hampered M. Waddington, whose position was

also weakened by a rabid demand made upon the Ministry for Government

appointments. In fact it was difficult to see how any French Ministry

could last, if the American system of a fresh division of the spoils

was to take place whenever a change occurred. In America the Executive

is safe for four years, but in France, directly the places had been

distributed, the disappointed combined to overthrow the unhappy

Ministers responsible for the distribution.

Meanwhile his most formidable opponent, the ex-Democrat, Gambetta, had

assumed the _rôle_ of a grand seigneur, and gave sumptuous Parliamentary

banquets which were pronounced by the highest gastronomic authorities to

be exquisite in every respect. He contemplated a visit to London, and it

is somewhat surprising to learn that the Democrat showed a very obvious

prepossession in favour of the English Conservative Party.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Dec. 12, 1879.

Gambetta has heard with very great satisfaction that you and

Lord Beaconsfield would be very glad of the opportunity of seeing

him, which will be afforded if he carries into effect his idea

of going to England. He feels that it would be essential that

he should not make himself the guest or place himself under the

special guidance of any political person on one side or the other.

He would probably go to an hotel. As to the time of his visit,

he does not seem to have formed any definite plan. It seems to be

connected in his mind with the Treaty of Commerce, and he seems

inclined to secure himself a good reception by contributing first

to making a favourable Treaty of Commerce. I suppose he and his

countrymen would consider a Treaty simply renewing the arrangements

of 1860 as very favourable to us. He absolutely repudiates all

notion of anything like Republican propagandism. He has a strong

bias in favour of the Conservatives in England. His sympathies are

with an active Foreign Policy, and he has a grudge against the

Liberals because they did not come to the assistance of France in

the Franco-German war. He seems to follow English home politics

very carefully. He wishes England and France to act together in

the East, but considers that things have got into a horrid mess at

Constantinople, and expresses regret that the French and English

Embassies there do not pull more together.

I think one of his objects in going to England would be to

show people in France that he is considered a person of sufficient

importance to be admitted into the society of people of rank and

station in aristocratic England.

He has also no doubt the higher object of making France and

himself popular in England, so as to avert all risk of England's

joining the Austro-German Alliance to the detriment of France.

The danger would be that he would form too great expectations

of obtaining a positive alliance with England, and that if we did

not come up to his expectations in this respect, he might in his

disappointment, turn to Russia. But from this point of view, the

most dangerous thing would be to _froisser_ his susceptibility by

showing any coldness beforehand about his visit.

He undertakes to let us know whenever he comes to any

resolution about going to England.

From the above letter it will be seen how much importance was attached

to Gambetta's views, and how desirable it was considered to secure his

goodwill; but apparently the visit to London from which so much was

expected, never took place--perhaps because his English Conservative

friends were shortly afterwards turned out of office.

The threatened attack upon the Waddington administration took the

form of a vote of want of confidence which was moved in the month of

December, but successfully rejected. The Ministerial success, however,

was of a somewhat fictitious nature, as the Left Groups when united,

outnumbered the Right, and the Government was, therefore, liable

to be turned out by a combination. M. Waddington himself professed

satisfaction, and affirmed with pride that he had been congratulated

upon his majority by the British Government; while from Berlin, Vienna,

and even from St. Petersburg, where he was not in favour, assurances had

been received of the satisfaction felt at the prospect of his continuing

in office. The result, too, of the vote enabled him to carry out an

intention he had long had in his mind, of abandoning the Presidency of

the Council, and of retaining the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

His own wish was to see M. Léon Say Prime Minister, but as that was out

of the question, he favoured the appointment of M. de Freycinet, who, in

addition to other qualifications, possessed the confidence of Gambetta,

and would therefore render it difficult for the latter to attack the

Government. The proposed transformation of the Ministry, however, was

found difficult to effect, chiefly owing to the animosity of Gambetta

against Waddington; the former being credited with the intention of

upsetting any Ministry in which the latter remained. Gambetta was in

fact pursuing a systematic dog-in-the-manger policy which was little

to his credit, for while continually attacking and threatening the

Government he was unwilling to take office himself, with the Chamber

then in existence, since he realized that the Ultra-Radicals were trying

to force him into a position in which he would have either to accept

responsibility or to abandon the leadership of the Republican Party.

The object, in short, of Clémenceau and the extreme party was to use

Gambetta up in order to make room eventually for themselves. Neither

President Grévy or Freycinet showed any accommodating spirit with

regard to Waddington's plans, and when Freycinet laid down conditions

which were unacceptable, the President tried to persuade Waddington to

remain on as Prime Minister; but Waddington's position had been further

impaired by imprudent representation on the part of President Grévy

and others, that he was highly acceptable to Bismarck as a Minister,

and Waddington admitted openly himself that he was wanting in the

qualifications of a French Parliamentary leader. Consequently the upshot

of it all was that he resigned, and Freycinet was allowed to form a new

administration on his own terms. 'I part with Waddington with great

regret,' wrote Lord Lyons. 'He had the greatest of all recommendations,

that you could believe him, and feel sure of him.' These regrets were

shared by Lord Salisbury. 'I am very sorry for the loss of Waddington.

It was a luxury to have a French Minister who worked on principles

intelligible to the English mind.'

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Dec. 30, 1879.

With the new Ministry I suppose Gambetta's reign is to begin.

The Cabinet was almost ostensibly formed by him. He did not, and

probably could not, put in any of the chief men of his own party.

They are kept, or keep themselves, in reserve to come into power

with Gambetta himself. The present Ministers are personally to a

certain extent Moderate, and altogether, so far as they are known,

mediocre. Freycinet is said to have some inclination to assert

independence, but he has not hitherto rebelled against his old

master Gambetta.

The man who appears to have lost most reputation in the affair

is President Grévy. He knows well enough that it is Gambetta's

intention to supplant him, but he has allowed himself to be

circumvented with his eyes open, from lack of resolution and lack

of energy, and has apparently let his rival obtain complete control

of the Government.

I do not suppose that we shall see at present any marked

change in the Foreign Policy of the French Government. Freycinet

knows nothing whatever of Foreign Affairs. Gambetta has strong

general notions, but seems more inclined to insist upon disposing

of the patronage of the Foreign Office than to go into the details

of the business. At home I suppose the first measure will be a

wholesale redistribution of places. _Aux situations nouvelles,

il faut des hommes nouveaux_, was the principle proclaimed by

Clémenceau. Beust[27] turns the phrase round and says: _Aux hommes

nouveaux il faut des situations._

At all events the centre Gauche is dead, and with it the

Thiers' policy, which was to preserve as far as possible the

institutions, the laws and the administrative system in France,

with the simple change of having an elective President, instead

of an hereditary sovereign at the head. The policy could not last

long unless it was directed by a really able energetic President.

France is now about to try real democratic and republican

government, and it will be a dangerous experiment in a country like

this. It would be a still more dangerous experiment if the old

warlike spirit had survived in the people. Happily for peace, they

are more intent upon making and enjoying money than upon obtaining

military glory, or even upon recovering their lost provinces.

Gambetta will try for the recovery of the Provinces if he preserves

his energies and fortune seems to give him a chance.

I have just seen Pothuau[28] who seems very indignant at his

place in London having been offered to Waddington, and declares

that he has no intention of giving it up.

Lord Lyons was destined to witness many more changes of Government in

France before his final departure; most of them accurately described by

the hackneyed phrase: _Plus cela change, plus c'est la même chose._

A letter from Major Baring written at the close of the year is worth

quoting as evidence of the improved and hopeful condition of Egypt,

and also of the harmony prevailing at the time between the English and

French Controllers.

* * * * *

_Major Baring to Lord Lyons_.

Cairo, Dec. 29, 1879.

You may like to hear what I think of the state of things here,

so I venture to write this line.

There is a very decided improvement. Since I have been

connected with Egyptian affairs I never remember matters going so

smoothly. I like what I see of the Khedive, and I see a great deal

of him, for he frequently presides at the Council, and besides this

I often go to see him on business. Riaz's head is rather turned by

the decorations he has received, but he is very well disposed and

will always follow our advice, if we insist. He is oppressed with

the fear that Nubar will return to office; as, without doubt, he

will sooner or later; but it is not at all to be desired that he

should return just yet. What we want is _time_. If we can get along

for six months, or better, a year, without any considerable change

I really believe that the financial crisis which has now lasted so

long may be brought to a close.

Cherif and the Turks made overtures to Nubar the other day,

but he was wise enough to decline so unnatural a coalition.

Before long our financial scheme will be ready to launch, and

if, as I hope, it is accepted, the Commission of Liquidation will

no longer be necessary. This is perhaps the best solution of the

matter.

We shall reduce Unified to 4 per cent, and leave Preference

alone.

Blignières is behaving most loyally in everything which

concerns English interests. The Khedive and his Ministers have, I

think, got over the prejudice they entertained against him.

M. de Freycinet took over the Foreign Office as well as the Presidency

of the Council; as has already been stated, he was quite ignorant of

all foreign questions, and was also looked upon as less reliable than

M. Waddington. The first official interview with him, however, produced

a favourable impression, all the more because he did not let out a

flood of common-places about devotion to England, and so forth; but the

important question was to know what line Gambetta was inclined to take

in Foreign Policy, and Sheffield was deputed to find out.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, Jan. 17, 1880.

Gambetta has expressed confidentially to Sheffield to-day his

views as to the Foreign Policy of France; with the intention of

course that they should be communicated to me only in the strictest

privacy.

He considered that the Austro-German Alliance had been made

against France; that it entered into Prince Bismarck's calculations

that it might throw France into the arms of Russia, but that His

Highness thought that there would be more than a compensation for

this if in consequence of it England were completely detached from

France. Gambetta declared that France had not fallen into this trap

and would not fall into it--that she would never make an alliance

with Russia, but that if Russia were attacked by Germany, France

would have to take care of her own safety. He had information which

convinced him that there was no foundation for the assertions that

Russian troops were being massed on the frontier of Germany, and

he believed that these rumours were spread from Berlin to afford a

pretext for an attack on Russia, to be made so suddenly as to be

successful at once and to enable Germany to turn towards France

without any fear of Russia in her rear.

In order to disconcert this plan Gambetta thought it highly

important that a good understanding should be established between

England and Russia both with regard to Turkey and to India. He

held that it was the interest of France to urge in every way the

Russian Government to come to such an understanding with England.

He looked upon the state of things at Constantinople as very

bad, and attributed it to the disagreements between the French

and English Ambassadors; while in order to promote the accord

which he wished to see between England and Russia he desired that

the best feeling should exist between the French and English

Representatives at Constantinople. It was evident, however, from

what he said that any complaint against Fournier by England would

be met by counter-complaints on the part of France against Layard.

If Fournier resigned, Tissot the French Minister at Athens would be

Gambetta's candidate for the Embassy in Turkey.

Gambetta denied most positively that there was any truth

whatever in the rumours that he had been in communication with

Bismarck about the restoration of Lorraine to France or anything

of the kind. As to the insinuation that it was proposed that

while Lorraine should be restored, France should receive a slice

of Belgium in compensation for Alsace, Gambetta said that it

was plain that this could only have been put about to produce

ill-will between England and France. After the Benedetti affair, no

Frenchman in his senses would enter into secret arrangements with

Bismarck about Belgium, and the French Republic had certainly no

desire under any circumstances to despoil its neighbours.

Gambetta expressed a desire that a liberal Treaty of Commerce

should be made with England and he was eloquent on the importance

of a close and cordial union between the two countries.

Gambetta impressed upon Sheffield that he was speaking to him

simply as a friend, and quite privately. I think it is interesting

and important to know what sentiments he expresses in this way:

but, of course, if he was quoted, or if what he said was allowed to

transpire, he would feel bitterly towards us and at once put an end

to all communications of the kind. His tone appears to have been

quite that of a man who felt that he would have the power to carry

into effect the policy he recommended in this country.

Freycinet has just been to see me, but I did not find him

equally communicative on the general Foreign Policy of France.

As Freycinet was occupied at that moment, _more Gallico_, in clearing

the old officials out of the Foreign Office, and as he admittedly

possessed little knowledge himself, his reticence under the

circumstances was not surprising; but, so far as could be gathered, it

was the intention of the new Ministry to follow the prudent course of

their predecessors, a profession of faith evidently intended especially

for Berlin. As regards the so-called Eastern Question, interest had

temporarily shifted from Egypt to Greece, and the various Powers were

endeavouring without much success to negotiate the cession of Turkish

territory to that country. The usual spring war scare had taken a

different shape, and, without any foundation whatever, Bismarck was

credited with the extraordinary intention of suddenly falling upon

Russia, while a coolness had sprung up between the French and Russian

Governments owing to the refusal of the former to surrender the Nihilist

Hartmann, who was implicated in an attempt to wreck a train in which the

Russian Emperor was travelling.

This refusal annoyed the Emperor so much that he withdrew his

Ambassador, Prince Orloff, from Paris, the French consoling themselves

with the thought that if they lost the favour of the Russian Emperor

they would, on the other hand, ingratiate themselves with Bismarck.

Upon the Greek Frontier question, which in consequence of an English

proposal had been referred to an International Commission, there was,

for some unknown reason, a disposition to blame the British Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Sir H. Layard._

Paris, March 19, 1880.

The withdrawal of Orloff, on account of the refusal of the

French Government to give up Hartmann, is of course the topic of

the day here. The form adopted is that which was used when normal

relations between Russia and the Pope were suspended some years

ago. The Emperor Alexander is, I understand, very angry; but I do

not know how long this _mouvement d'humeur_ will hold out against

the obvious political interest which both Russia and France have in

not being on bad terms with each other. There was a strong feeling

on the Left of the Chamber against giving Hartmann up, and as to

foreign relations, I suppose the French set pleasing Bismarck

against displeasing the European Alexander.

Freycinet is decidedly against the admission of Turkey to the

Greek Frontier Commission. It might have been politic to admit her,

though I don't see how she could have been asked to engage to be

bound by the votes of the majority.

I think things in the East are indeed looking serious. How

Turkey is to be kept going, in spite of herself, much longer,

passes my comprehension. I should be sorry to make a fourth in an

alliance between France, Russia and Turkey. If France and Russia

did unite for any serious purpose, I should think the last thing

they would wish would be to tie such a clog as Turkey to their

wheels. If there is any truth in the proverb, _Quem deus vult

perdere si_, etc., I am afraid that there can be very little doubt

that the ruin of Abdul Hamid is in the hands of Allah.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 21: French Secretary of Embassy at London.]

[Footnote 22: French Ambassador at Constantinople.]

[Footnote 23: Sir Charles Rivers Wilson, G.C.M.G.]

[Footnote 24: H.B.M. Agent and Consul General at Cairo.]

[Footnote 25: Now Earl of Cromer.]

[Footnote 26: At that period British Consul-General at Düsseldorf.]

[Footnote 27: Austrian Ambassador at Paris.]

[Footnote 28: French Ambassador at London.]