THE EASTERN QUESTION
(1876-1878)
In January, 1876, the gradual spread of the insurrection in Turkey
led to the concoction by the three Imperial Powers of the so-called
'Andrassy Note,' and the great question was whether England would
consent to take part in its presentation, in view of her traditional
attitude towards Turkey. Lord Derby, in a letter to Lord Lyons, stated
that Bismarck was very anxious that we should do so, and explained that
although 'one can trust none of these Governments, it is as well to give
them credit for acting honestly until the reverse is proved,' and he was
therefore in favour of such a course himself. In a letter[17] addressed
to Mr. Disraeli, asking for his views on the subject, Lord Derby
remarked that: "It is too late to stand on the dignity and independence
of the Sultan; a Sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home, nor
pay his debts, must expect to submit to some disagreeable consequences."
Lord Lyons, on being consulted, concurred with Lord Derby's views.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, Jan. 14, 1876.
I hardly see how England is to avoid supporting the Andrassy
Note. If we stand aloof we shall stand alone. If our secession
produces no effect and the Turks still accept, we shall be in
the same foolish position France was in 1840; with this serious
inconvenience, that if the Andrassy plan fails in pacifying the
Herzegovina, we shall be blamed for the failure, as having caused
it by breaking up the unanimity of Europe. If the Turks do not
accept, they will be ready enough to throw the responsibility upon
us, and to call upon us to get them out of the scrape into which
they will get with the other Powers. I think that by consenting we
should leave the Powers least excuse for attacking Turkey, or at
all events, least excuse for pushing on without consulting us. I
should not be for qualifying our support too much, for, if we do,
the failure of the plan, which is in my opinion more than probable,
will still be attributed to us, and a support, given as it were
against our will, and restricted to the least possible amount, will
be treated very much as opposition. I say all this because you ask
me to tell you what I think: but there are two important elements
for forming an opinion which I lack. I mean a knowledge of public
opinion in England, and a knowledge of the real feelings of the
three Empires towards each other.
The despatch from Odo Russell looks as if Bismarck was
preparing for the possibility of a quarrel with Russia. Ever since
1870 he has been very naturally trying to turn every opportunity
of dividing England from France to account. But since you joined
Russia in insisting upon peace last year, and still more since
the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, he has no doubt formed a
higher opinion of England, and conceived the idea that she still
has the will and the means to play a foremost part in European
politics. Like everybody else, he feels sure that if there is a
quarrel between Russia and Germany, France will side with Russia.
In order to prevent his enemy being all powerful at sea, he must
have the English fleet not merely neutral, but on his side. The
only advantage he can offer to England is support on the Eastern
Question, and it is on this question that he would have the best
chance of embroiling her with Russia. What part he means Austria to
play, I find it more difficult to guess. That he intends some day,
and by some means, to annex German Austria to the German Empire I
make no doubt, but I suppose he is in no hurry to add so large a
Roman Catholic and Southern population to the electors of the Diet
of the Empire.
The worst service we could render France at present would
be to set up a separate understanding with her in opposition to
Germany.
The French Government was desperately anxious that England should not
separate herself from the other Powers, partly from fear that such
action would cause European complications, and partly because it was
particularly desirous of getting credit with Russia for having brought
English opinion round to Russian views. Her Majesty's Government finally
decided to join in the Andrassy Note, although it would appear from Lord
Derby's language, that the Cabinet were not unanimous on the question.
Meanwhile French internal politics remained in the same confused and
unsatisfactory state which had prevailed for so long. The divisions
amongst the Conservatives had made Monarchical Government in any form
impossible, and yet they refused to acquiesce, even temporarily, in the
moderate form of Republic which had been established, and seemed bent
upon doing all they could to exchange their King Log for a King Stork
in the shape of a Red Republic. The elections which took place in the
beginning of the year 1876 resulted in large Republican majorities both
in the Senate and in the Chamber, and in the case of the former, this
result was singularly unfortunate for Marshal MacMahon, as it deprived
him of the power of forcing a dissolution. A letter from Lord Lyons to
the Prince of Wales, who was on his way back from India, summarizes the
French internal situation.
* * * * *
Paris, March 7, 1876.
I cannot give your Royal Highness a very satisfactory
account of French politics, although I do not take so gloomy a
view of them as many Frenchmen do. The large number of advanced
Republicans in the new Chamber of Deputies, the not inconsiderable
number of Ultra-Radicals, and the complete defeat of the Moderate
Conservatives in the Elections not unnaturally frighten the upper
classes of Frenchmen. But in fact so many of the members are quite
new men, that one cannot foresee how parties will group themselves.
The Chambers meet to-morrow, and in about a month's time it will
be possible to form an opinion as to how things are likely to go.
So long as Marshal MacMahon is at the head of the State and of the
army, there can be no fear of any serious disturbance of material
order; and if he is at the same time firm and conciliatory with the
new Chamber, and willing to take a Ministry from the more moderate
members of the majority, he will very probably be rewarded by
finding how tame demagogues can become in office. I understand the
Marshal insists upon having Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs
whom he knows and in whom he has confidence, but that he is willing
to let the other Departments be filled by men taken in the ordinary
way from the majority.
So far we have not this year been disturbed, as we were
last spring, by rumours of war, and agriculture and commerce are
flourishing in France, and the revenue goes on increasing.
Of the Egyptian Financial Question Your Royal Highness
will learn all particulars on the spot. Neither that, nor the
Herzegovina question are settled at this moment, but we must hope
that they are on the eve of being settled.
One of the new features in the French political situation was the
recovery by Gambetta of his former influence, and as he was now a person
of considerable influence, Sheffield was utilized for the purpose of
eliciting his views. The late Mr. George Sheffield, who acted as Lord
Lyons's private secretary for over twenty years, was a well-known
figure in the political and social world of Paris, and included in
his acquaintance most people both there and in London who were worth
knowing. Not only did he enjoy much personal popularity, but as he was
known to be completely in Lord Lyons's confidence, he was the recipient
of much confidential information, and generally believed to be a model
of discretion. One of his peculiarities was that, in spite of much
practice, he spoke very imperfect French with an atrocious accent, but
this circumstance never appeared to prejudice him in any way, and it
may incidentally be noted that the possession of what is called a good
French accent is a much overrated accomplishment in France itself.
Frenchmen rarely wish to listen; they desire to talk themselves and
to be listened to; to them, as a rule, a foreigner is a foreigner and
nothing more, and whether he speaks French well or ill, they seldom
notice and rarely care.
Gambetta, having secured a listener in the person of Sheffield, was no
doubt delighted to expound his views on the situation. First of all,
speaking on the subject of Bonapartist successes at the elections, he
said that Bonapartism would die out as soon as it was realized that a
moderate Republic was firmly established. He expressed great delight at
the fall of Thiers (Thiers had once described him as a _fou furieux_),
and said that under him no real self-acting Republic could ever have
been formed, that it would have fallen to pieces at his death, and
indeed that the best thing Thiers could do for the Republic would be to
die. For Marshal MacMahon's entourage he had a great dislike, but for
the Marshal himself much respect, and he aspired to be Prime Minister
under him--a post to which he considered that he was fully entitled,
but which the Décazes, Broglie, the Marshal's secretaries and the
Maréchale and her friends would do their best to prevent him obtaining.
He professed confidence in being able to keep the extreme Radicals in
order; said that the Red Flag was as obnoxious to him as the White Flag;
that he was not inclined to grant a general amnesty to the Communists,
and that he would not agree to the re-establishment of the National
Guard. He also professed himself to be in favour of Free Trade, and
asserted that the commercial Treaty concluded by Napoleon III. accounted
for many of the Bonapartist successes.
Gambetta's aspiration of serving under the Marshal was never fulfilled,
the above-mentioned entourage being presumably too strong for him; but
the upper classes in France continued to look forward to the future
with undiminished apprehension. French capital, reversing the present
process, began to pour steadily into England, and it was stated that the
rich Radicals were not the last in sending their money abroad.
'Marshal MacMahon's position,' wrote Lord Lyons at the end
of March, 'does not improve. He has so little political knowledge
or ability that, as events have shown, he exercises little or no
personal influence in politics. There is also a jealousy springing
up with regard to Emmanuel d'Harcourt and other people about him
who are supposed to direct his political conduct. The officers
now at the head of the army would follow the Marshal very far in
any Conservative direction, but it may be questioned whether they
would submit patiently to being placed under a Radical Minister
of War--Gambetta for instance. It is the Marshal's political
intelligence that is doubted. No one has a word to say against his
disinterestedness, his honour, or his courage.'
Marshal MacMahon, a simple and amiable soldier, who knew nothing about
politics, was credited with an overwhelming admiration for the capacity
of his private secretary, Emmanuel d'Harcourt. Upon one occasion, the
question of applying for the extradition of a criminal who had fled to
America was being discussed in his presence. 'Well,' said the Marshal,
'we must telegraph at once to San Francisco.' 'Pardon, M. le Maréchal,'
interposed d'Harcourt, 'Washington, not San Francisco, is the capital of
the United States.' The Marshal was so astounded at the profundity of
his private secretary's knowledge that he was only able to ejaculate:
'_Ce diable d'Harcourt! il sait tout!_'
Many stories were told of his engaging simplicity of character, of
which the following will serve as an instance. Upon one occasion he was
inspecting a military academy, and was informed that there was present
a young Arab chieftain of distinguished lineage to whom it would be
desirable to address some words of encouragement. The young man was
brought up, whereupon the following brief colloquy ensued:--
Marshal: '_Ah! c'est vous qui êtes le nègre?_'
Arab Chief: '_Oui, M. le Maréchal._'
Marshal: '_Eh bien, mon garçon, continuez!_'
By a curious combination of circumstances, Marshal MacMahon, with his
inadequate political and intellectual equipment, was still able for some
time to fill the place of a constitutional sovereign, and virtually the
French were living under a constitutional Monarchy, with an Executive
possessing large powers, rather than under a Republic. This state of
things, however, could not last for long, and it seemed as if the choice
lay between the youthful Prince Imperial and the establishment of a
really Radical Republic.
In one respect the French had every reason to congratulate themselves,
namely, upon the re-organization of their army, and some of the
political consequences which were likely to result from this increased
and increasing military strength are pointed out in the following letter.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, Sept. 26, 1876.
As soon as General Conolly finishes his visits to the Autumn
Manoeuvres and makes his reports, it may perhaps be desirable for
me to send you some observations on the political consequences of
the great progress the French Army is making. All the officers of
Foreign Armies and the English officers especially who have been
out with the French troops this autumn, seem to agree in regarding
the improvement as being undoubted and very considerable. In short,
it may not unreasonably be expected that in about three years from
this time, the French Army will be in such a state, that France
will count for as much or nearly as much, in the balance of power
in Europe, as she did before 1870.
The different phases of public opinion since the peace of
1871 may be described as follows. At first, rage and mortification
produced a wild and unreasoning cry for revenge. This was followed
by a depression almost amounting to despair. In this state of
things the rumours of an intended attack by Germany in 1875
produced nearly a panic. Since that time hope and confidence have
gradually returned. The general sentiment now is that France is
safely 'biding her time.'
Under the influence of this sentiment, the French acquiesce
patiently in the present apparent eclipse of French power; they
disapprove of any attempt on the part of the Government to put
itself prominently forward in European politics; they desire to
preserve peace and tranquillity in Europe at almost any price; they
wish to disarm suspicion, and to be allowed three or four years
more to recruit their strength. Their policy consequently is to
adjourn as far as possible all questions.
Their ultimate object in all they do, is to recover their lost
Provinces; but however confident they may be of recovering in a
few years their old position in the world, I do not believe that
they contemplate, as the immediate result, an attack upon Germany.
I do not think that they at all foresee a time at which they could
run the risk of making such an attack singlehanded. What they do
intend, is to put forward with vigour their own views with regard
to the numerous questions they now leave more or less in abeyance,
and to contract if possible foreign alliances on equal terms.
One of the questions with regard to which they will be
disposed to change their tone very considerably will be that of
Egypt.
Another may possibly be that of the Newfoundland Fisheries, if
we do not succeed in effecting some sort of settlement of it in the
meantime.
A third may be the extension of their possessions in Cochin
China, and of their protectorate of Annam.
With regard to alliances, that which they will first seek
will no doubt be the alliance of Russia, and in a case of great
emergency, they would make great sacrifices of Western interests to
obtain it.
They will desire to keep on good terms with England, so far
at all events as to avoid throwing her into the arms of Germany,
but as they are not likely to conceive hopes of obtaining effectual
assistance from England towards recovering Alsace and Lorraine,
they will not be so eager for an English as a Russian alliance.
Another contingency to be kept in view is that a new President
or a new Dynasty, desirous of consolidating themselves by a little
military glory, may be led to direct an attack upon whatever
quarter it may be easiest to do so.
I will not however go on with mere speculations of this kind.
Of the truth of the conclusions to which I have come, I entertain
very little doubt. In two or three years France will not be in the
same accommodating frame of mind in which she is now, and will
have very much more powerful means than she has now of enforcing
attention to her wishes. All questions therefore in which the
influence of France is hostile, should be settled as quickly as
possible. The restoration of the strength of France may be found
useful in redressing the balance of power, but, anyhow, it should
be taken into account in all political calculations.
It was not long before these anticipations were justified, but for the
present, relations between England and France remained on a friendly
footing, no doubt much to Bismarck's displeasure, who, at this period,
was continually urging us to take Egypt and not to do anything else.
As a matter of fact, if we had seized Egypt in 1876, it would not have
had the immediate effect of embroiling us with France. On the contrary,
all those who had a pecuniary interest in Egypt thought that they would
gain by our taking possession of the county, while the great majority
of Frenchmen looked upon the thing as inevitable, and thought it better
to put a good face upon the matter. Any contradiction of the supposed
English designs upon Egypt, however sincere and positive, met with no
credence at all.
There is an instructive extract on the subject, contained in a letter of
Lord Derby of December 6, 1876.
It is evidently useless to say that we don't want Egypt and
don't intend to take it: we must leave our friends to be convinced
by the event. I have no doubt that everybody out of France would
be glad that we should seize the country. Russia would like it, as
making us an accomplice in her plans. Germany would like it still
more, as ensuring our being on uncomfortable terms with France
for some years to come. Italy would see in it a precedent and a
justification for seizing Tunis; Spain, the same, in regard to
Morocco. But you may be assured that we have no such designs and
are not going to run into adventures of this kind.
There can be no possible doubt as to Lord Derby's sincerity; indeed,
he was so constitutionally averse from an adventurous foreign policy,
that a year or two later, Lord Salisbury said of his ex-colleague
that he could never have brought himself to annex the Isle of Man. It
is interesting to note that, in the above forecast of international
brigandage, Tunis and not Tripoli was allotted to Italy, the designs of
France in the former direction not apparently being suspected.
Before the end of 1876 the experiment of trying to work the institutions
of a Constitutional Monarchy in France under an elective chief
magistrate had very nearly come to a deadlock. The Left were determined
to get real power into their hands and not to allow themselves to be
thwarted by the conservative tendencies of the Marshal and his personal
friends. On the one hand, the Marshal stoutly maintained that he would
have Ministers of his own choice in the Departments of War and Foreign
Affairs, whereas the Left, so long as they had a majority in the
Chamber of Deputies, were, under Constitutional Government, clearly
entitled to decide the matter. But the question was complicated, because
the Marshal, as well as the Ministers, was in a position to resort
to resignation of office, and a severe Ministerial crisis ensued.
Ultimately, the Marshal succeeded in keeping his Minister of War and
his Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he was forced to accept, as Prime
Minister, M. Jules Simon. The latter, although an able and conciliatory
man, had been a member of the Revolutionary Government of National
Defence, and having been forced to yield so far to his opponents, it
seemed not improbable that the Marshal before long would be obliged to
have recourse to Gambetta himself. Gambetta, as has been shown, had
lately become much more moderate in his views, but in the opinion of
many people he still represented the Red Spectre, and it was believed
that his assumption of office would mean Communism, Socialism, equal
division of property, judges appointed by election for short periods,
the prohibition of marriage, and the suppression of religion. The
desire of the Bonapartists was that the Government should fall into
the hands of the extreme Left, in the hope that the people, from fear
of the above contingencies, would clamour for the Empire; but what
was more remarkable was, that many Orleanists as well as moderate and
timid Conservatives wished to drive the Marshal to a dissolution in
the hope of a reaction. There could have been no better proof of their
short-sightedness and incapacity, for the mass of the electors were not
in the least likely to make fine distinctions, and if really afraid of
the Republic would certainly vote for nothing short of the Empire.
The Conference which had assembled at Constantinople in the autumn in
the hope of settling the Eastern Question, with Lord Salisbury as one of
the British representatives, broke up in January, 1877, and it became
clear that war between Russia and Turkey was unavoidable. Lord Derby,
who was the reverse of sanguine by temperament, had never entertained
any hopes of its success, and was quite determined that, whatever
happened, there should be no British intervention. 'I am amused,' he
wrote to Lord Odo Russell,[18] 'by your description of the Russo-German
suspicions entertained against us; these fellows make us act as they
would act in our place. They can neither deal straightforwardly
themselves, nor give anybody else credit for doing so.
'If you are asked what steps England is going to take next, your true
answer should be "none." We shall wait, say little, and pledge ourselves
to nothing.'
The break up of the Conference filled the French with alarm.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, Feb. 5, 1877.
It is believed here that Bismarck is determined to produce at
least such a scare as he did two years ago, if not to do more. The
idea provokes some anger, but more fear. Nevertheless, the danger
is greater now than it was last time; for although France is very
far from being ready for even a defensive war, she does feel so
much stronger than she did in 1875, as not to be willing to bear
quite as much from Germany as she would have borne then.
The impressions prevalent here are:
That Bismarck is very much disappointed by the result of the
Constantinople Conference, which he had hoped would have ended by
setting all Europe by the ears.
That he is very much irritated by the cordiality which existed
between the English, French, and Russian Plenipotentiaries, and by
the considerable part taken by Chaudordy in the proceedings.
That he is very much annoyed by the number of Socialist votes
given in the recent German elections, and is eager to destroy Paris
as the hotbed of socialism.
That he wants a cry to make the Germans pay their taxes
willingly.
That he looks with an evil eye upon the material prosperity of
France.
That he considers the Exhibition of 1878 as a sort of defiance
of Germany, and is ready to go great lengths to prevent its taking
place.
These are French views, not mine; but I do agree with the
conclusion which the greater and the wiser part of the French
nation draw from them: namely that it behoves France to be more
than ever prudent and cautious, and more than ever careful not to
give Germany any pretext for a quarrel.
France is certainly not at all likely to oppose Russia in
anything that country may undertake in the East; but she is still
less likely to give her any military assistance there. She might
not be able to resist the bait, if Russia held it out, of an
offensive and defensive alliance against Germany, but in that
case she would more than ever want her own forces on this side of
Germany. This contingency, however, is too improbable to be worth
considering.
It is quite true that France has a large force on her Eastern
Frontier, and that she is hard at work there, but considering the
difficulty of guarding that frontier, such as it has been left by
the Treaty of 1871, her objects may well be supposed to be purely
defensive.
Lord Salisbury is to arrive this evening and to go on to
London without stopping.
It is interesting to note that Lord Salisbury, while at Constantinople,
formed a very poor opinion of the capacity of Sultan Abdul Hamid--an
opinion which he must have had occasion to revise later on. 'Salisbury
reports ill of the new Sultan; calls him a poor weak creature, from whom
no help is to be expected. But his judgment is the result of a single
interview.' So wrote Lord Derby to Lord Odo Russell.
The French representative, Chaudordy, had been very active; his zeal
had alarmed his own countrymen, and was supposed to have aroused
the indignation of Bismarck, but one of the singular features of
the Constantinople Conference seems to have been the action of the
representatives of the small Powers such as Spain, Belgium, and Holland,
who did their utmost, and not entirely without effect, to spirit the
Turks up to resistance. In March there was much coming and going at
Paris on the part of Ignatieff and Schouvaloff, who were thought to be
endeavouring to secure what Russia wanted without war, and the former
proceeded on a special mission to London, but the negotiations with the
Turks broke down, and war was declared before the end of April. Letters
from Lord Derby describing the state of feeling in England dwell upon
the action of Gladstone, who, according to Schouvaloff, 'was much more
Russian than the Russian Government,' and whose language was, 'only
suited to a Panslavonic Society.'
The outbreak of the war between Russia and Turkey was extremely
distasteful to the French for various reasons. They were convinced that
it had been instigated by Bismarck, and that it would result in the
overwhelming preponderance of Germany on the continent, and were equally
convinced that it would lead to a great extension of English influence
in the Mediterranean including an occupation of Egypt; consequently,
Décazes, who was anything but a straightforward politician, and anxious
beyond everything to hunt with the Russian hounds, and run with the
English hare, was constantly expressing fears that if an English
force was sent to the East, the opportunity would at once be seized
by Bismarck for falling upon France. A congenial opportunity for this
intriguer arose over the question whether Egypt should be called upon to
render pecuniary and military assistance to Turkey, and an unsuccessful
attempt was made to persuade the Khedive that if he refused to comply,
he would be protected. By these means Décazes would have secured the
treble advantage of making himself agreeable to Russia, of pleasing the
French bondholders, and, to a certain degree, of thwarting England in
Egypt. Unluckily for him, the scheme miscarried; but in spite of ardent
professions of neutrality, he contrived to render services to Russia
which were of some considerable service.
He used his influence to obtain a loan for her in Paris; his agents in
Egypt supported the Russian threats to blockade the Suez Canal, and
the effect of the Franco-Russian understanding was to force Germany to
make greater sacrifices in order to retain the friendship of Russia by
furthering Russian policy in the East. One of the methods by which the
Germans sought to ingratiate themselves with Russia took the remarkable
form of insisting (as the British Ambassador at Constantinople pointed
out) that Russian subjects who remained in Turkey during the war, should
not only be entitled to remain there undisturbed, but permitted to enjoy
all the privileges of the capitulations, this being apparently the
German conception of neutrality.
The double game which Décazes was playing was not, however, popular in
France. It was felt that his intrigues with Russia tended to throw
England into the arms of Germany, and his enemies asserted that he
was too fond of speculation to be a thoroughly satisfactory Minister.
However, an internal political crisis of an exceptionally important
nature in May diverted French attention from all foreign questions for
the time being.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, May 16, 1877.
The Marshal has been getting more and more uncomfortable about
M. Jules Simon's giving way in the Chamber of Deputies to the more
advanced Left, and now, as you will have learnt from my telegrams,
he has turned him out. It is believed that if matters came to
extremities, the Marshal will bring out a thoroughly reactionary
Ministry which he has _in petto_. The Duc de Broglie, Prime
Minister, General Ducrot, Minister of War, and so on. This would
necessitate a dissolution, for which the consent of the Senate
would be necessary. But it is very doubtful whether the country is
ripe for anything of the kind, and whether the result might not be
the return of a still more radical Chamber than the present; and
then either the Marshal must retire and hand the Government over to
Gambetta or some one still more advanced in opinion, or make a real
_coup d'état_ by means of the army.
However he will no doubt try to form a Ministry rather more
Conservative than the last and still able to get on somehow with
the present Chamber of Deputies; but this will be difficult.
One of the Marshal's grounds of dissatisfaction with M. Jules
Simon was that he would not, or could not, get from the Chamber
powers which would enable the Government to restrain the press from
attacking Germany in the dangerous manner in which it has written
against that country lately.
The action of the Marshal in turning out Jules Simon, who was supported
by a majority in a recently elected Chamber, and replacing him by the
Duc de Broglie, who was extremely unpopular, might well be described
as a very strong measure. Décazes, who was supposed to be in the plot,
remained in office, and there was therefore not much probability of a
change in foreign policy; but it was evident that there were now only
two real parties in France--the Republicans and the Bonapartists. The
possible restoration of the Empire filled with dismay Lord Derby, who
considered that the last six years had witnessed a great purification
both of public and private life in France, and that if the French were
going back to a 'Government of adventurers, adventuresses, and priests,'
it would be a grave misfortune for Europe; and he was most anxious to
let it be known that there was no sympathy in England for Bonapartist
intrigues.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, May 18, 1877.
There are of course among the Right, many who, wisely or
unwisely, rejoice that Marshal MacMahon has broken with the Left,
but there is hardly any one who does not think the moment ill
chosen, the reasons assigned insufficient, and the mode adopted
unskilful. Décazes is represented, or misrepresented, as having
been at the bottom of the whole thing.
He came up to me last night, and asked if I had not something
to say to him about the sentiments he had expressed to me with
regard to the dangers to English interests in Western Europe. He
also expressed anxiety to know how the question of the wine duties
was getting on in England. He is, I suppose, anxious to have
something to show that he is successful in cultivating intimate
relations with England.
While he seems so desirous of frightening us about Holland,
he shows no inclination to admit that we have any interests at
all in the East. In fact his plan seems to be to involve us in a
quarrel with Germany, while he keeps safely aloof: to curry favour
with Russia by taking to himself the credit of keeping our forces
out of the East; to prevent any increase of our power in the
Mediterranean, and to be well with us, but, if possible, better
still with Russia. Still, on the whole, I am glad he remains in.
I should not have been sorry to have Broglie himself as Minister
for Foreign Affairs, but we might have a much more embarrassing
Minister than Décazes, and he is easy going and conciliatory in
most matters. Only we must not be surprised if he repeats to
Russia, and Russia repeats to Germany, anything likely to impair
our relations with Germany.
The other Ministers would almost seem to have been chosen
for the express purpose of defying the majority of the Chamber.
Broglie, of whom I have a high opinion, is especially unpopular.
I suppose the notion has been to put as far as possible
representatives of all shades of the Right into the Cabinet, in
order to be able to form a coalition strong enough to obtain a vote
in the Senate for dissolution. It is not certain that such a vote
could be carried, the Conservative majority in the Senate being
only 2 or 3 on ordinary occasions.
Décazes took advantage of the occasion actually to suggest a secret
alliance with England for the protection of Holland and Belgium, and
stated that if it were ever signed, he should communicate to no single
person except the Marshal himself. It is hardly credible that he could
have been in earnest in making this suggestion, for not only are Foreign
Secretaries not in the habit of making secret treaties unknown to their
chiefs and colleagues, but Lord Derby was the last person who would be
likely to enter into an enterprise of this description. In the meanwhile
Bismarck, as an impartial friend, was warning Lord Odo Russell that
Décazes was only waiting for an opportunity to throw England over, in
order to prove his devotion to Russia, and there was little doubt as to
which alliance he would prefer if he could have his choice.
Exercising his right, Marshal MacMahon prorogued the Chambers, and it
being foreseen that there would be a general election in the autumn, his
Government set to work at once in preparing for the fight by getting
rid of as many Republican functionaries as possible, in accordance with
well-established custom.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, May 25, 1877.
Neither the private history of the dismissal of Jules Simon,
nor the attitude of the successful party, is calculated to give one
good hope for the future.
The Marshal is supposed to have been mainly influenced by M.
de St. Paul, a Bonapartist and intimate friend of his, of whom
he sees a great deal; by Monsignor Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans;
by the aides-de-camp and people about him, and (it is whispered)
by Madame la Maréchale. Fourtou may have been in the plot, but I
believe Broglie was taken by surprise. Décazes wanted to get rid
of Jules Simon and Martel, but to put temporarily in their places
some members of the Left, who would have got on for a time with
the Chamber. Jules Simon had proved a complete failure as Prime
Minister; he had neither the confidence of the Marshal nor even
that of the Cabinet, and he had lost all influence in the Chamber.
He would very soon have fallen of himself if he had been left alone.
The language of the Right tends to accredit the supposition
which will be most fatal to them in the country. They speak and
act as if the question was one between the aristocracy and the
canaille. In fact they wound the sentiment of equality which is
the strongest political and social sentiment in France, and
consequently the present crisis is beginning to be looked upon as
the last struggle of the old society against the new.
As regards the great question as to what is to be done when
the Marshal finds himself finally defeated by the Chamber, the
party now triumphant talk of the use of military force. The Marshal
has often declared to his friends that nothing shall induce him to
resort to an extralegal use of force, but the wilder spirits of the
party say that if the Marshal will not use the army, a general will
be found with less scruple, and they hint at Ducrot. But this would
be falling into the most fatal of all systems, that of military
_pronunciamentos_. The Marshal himself might do a great deal with
the army, and would probably keep it together, but it does not
by any means follow that any one general seizing power in Paris
would be submitted to by the rest. It is believed that even now,
General Berthaut, the Minister of War, was with difficulty induced
to remain in office, and yielded only to the Marshal's special
request, on condition that he should be relieved in the autumn.
It is however to be hoped that all this talk about military
_coups d'état_ is simply talk; and that we shall get out of this
difficulty quietly at last. In the meantime the upper ten thousand
in Paris are indulging themselves in all sorts of illusions, and
the Paris shopkeepers are dreaming of the restoration of a Court
and of a great expenditure on luxuries.
The Chambers met again in June, and although the country was perfectly
quiet, the scenes which took place in the Chamber of Deputies were a
sufficient indication of the fury with which the politicians regarded
each other. The violent and disorderly conduct was chiefly on the side
of the Right, there being a certain number of Bonapartists who provoked
disturbances with the object of discrediting Parliamentary Government as
much as possible.
On the other hand even the moderate men on the Left began to talk
of revolutionary measures to be adopted when they got back into
power again, such as the suspension of the irremovability of judges,
the impeachment of Ministers, and the dissolution of religious
congregations. On June 22, the dissolution was voted by the Senate
by a majority of twenty. It was decided that the elections should be
held in three months' time, and both parties made their preparations
for an uncompromising fight, Marshal MacMahon beginning the campaign
with an order of the day to the army which smacked disagreeably of a
_coup d'état_, not to say a _pronunciamento_. Subsequently, having been
assured of the support of the Comte de Chambord--a somewhat questionable
advantage--he proceeded on an electoral tour in the South.
The general election took place in October, and resulted in the crushing
defeat of the Marshal and his Ministers in spite of the labours of
prefects, magistrates, mayors, policemen, and priests, who had all been
temporarily converted into electioneering agents. The exasperation of
parties reached an almost unprecedented point, and Décazes admitted
that the country was in a state of moral civil war. The partisans of
the Government talked of a second dissolution, of proclaiming a state
of siege during the new elections and conducting them with even more
administrative vigour than the last. The Republicans announced their
determination to annul the elections of all the official candidates and
to impeach the Ministers and even the Marshal himself, if he did not
retire or name a Ministry having their confidence. As for the Marshal
himself, he found little support at this crisis from the monarchical
parties, except on the part of the Orleanists, who saw that he must
be kept in at all hazards; but the Orleanists had recognized that
France, for the moment at least, was Republican, and their press owned
openly that to persist in Personal Government instead of reverting to
Constitutional Government was to march to certain disaster. The Marshal,
in fact, found himself confronted with two alternatives: either he must
accept Gambetta's demand to submit or resign; or he must run the risk of
getting rid of his difficulties by means of a _coup d'état_.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, Oct. 26, 1877.
The prospect does not grow clearer, though I see, or at all
events like to fancy I see, a cooling down of the fury which
prevailed a week ago.
The Marshal is supposed to be a man of one idea, and his one
idea at the present moment is said to be that he is bound to remain
at his post.
This idea might lead him to name a Ministry from the majority,
but then he would have to dismiss all the Fourtou prefects, whom he
solemnly promised to stand by.
On the other hand, the idea might carry him on to a _coup
d'état_.
The plan devised by his opponents, and indeed by some of his
friends, for getting him out of the scrape, is that the Senate
should refuse to support him in extreme measures, and that he
should then declare (which would indeed be true) that he had never
promised to stay in opposition to both branches of the Legislature.
Communications which have been going on between the Elysée
and the Duc d'Audiffret Pasquier, the President of the Senate, are
said to have shown that the Senate cannot be depended upon either
to vote a second dissolution, or to carry on the Government in
conjunction with the Marshal, and without the Chamber of Deputies.
I register as rumours, strongly requiring confirmation, that
the Marshal has summoned the Chasseurs d'Afrique to reinforce the
garrison of Paris; that in consequence of disagreements between
Grévy and Gambetta, the Republicans offer the Presidency of the
Republic to General Chanzy, the Governor-General of Algeria; that
the more moderate Liberals have hopes of bringing in the Duc
d'Aumale as President, if MacMahon should actually retire.
As the population is disarmed and there is no National Guard,
there can be no need to increase the numbers of the garrison of
Paris. If any fresh troops were really brought up, it would be from
mistrust of the spirit of those already here.
Gambetta must have departed very far from his usual political
tact, if he has set up claims in opposition to Grévy. Grévy would
be quite alarming enough, and to establish the doctrine that the
President must be a general would bring France to the level of a
South American Republic.
It would be a curious result of an election, in which the
Orleans or Right Centre Party has met with a signal defeat, that an
Orleans Prince should be placed at the head of the State.
The proper course for the Marshal to have adopted was to have accepted
the position of a Constitutional President; to have appointed a
Ministry which would have obtained a majority in the Chamber; and to
have restrained it from excesses by the exercise of his legitimate
authority, and by means of the power of the Senate. Instead of this,
however, he first attempted to form a Ministry of the same colour as
the old one; then tried to meet the Chamber with his old Ministers, and
finally fell back upon perfectly unknown people who carried no weight
at all, and who professed to represent no party. To this Ministry the
Chamber refused to pay any attention, and after many threats in the
Elysée organs to violate all laws; to collect and spend money without
the sanction of Parliament, to suppress newspapers, and to proclaim
a state of siege, the Marshal surrendered ignominiously in December,
and accepted a Ministry in which M. Dufaure was President of the
Council, and M. Waddington, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thus, what
should have been a natural and proper consequence of the elections was
converted into an humiliating defeat, and there had been such a series
of solemn declarations, none of them adhered to, that all confidence
in the Marshal had disappeared. Of the more important members of the
new Government, M. Dufaure was a lawyer with Conservative leanings. M.
Waddington, who had been educated at Rugby and Cambridge, was intimate
with Lord Lyons and the Embassy generally, but it was doubtful whether
his connection with England would prove an advantage, as he might
find it necessary to demonstrate that he was not too English. M. Léon
Say, the Minister of Finance, was supposed to be a Free Trader; and
M. de Freycinet, who was destined to take part in many subsequent
administrations, had been Gambetta's Under-Secretary of State for War,
and was looked upon as Gambetta's representative in the Cabinet.
On December 17, MacMahon gave Lord Lyons his version of the history of
the crisis.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Dec. 18, 1877.
I went to the weekly evening party at the Elysée last
Saturday. The Marshal took me aside, saying: 'I want to tell you
why I did it.' He proceeded to tell me that he had been led to
remain in office and make a Parliamentary Ministry, by a warning he
had received from abroad that if he retired, or if he established
a clerical Ministry, war would be the inevitable consequence.
So far the Marshal: what follows may be mere gossip.
On the afternoon of December 12, the Marshal had quite
determined _d'aller jusqu'au bout_; either to obtain from the
Senate a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, or to give in his
resignation. He was in consultation with General Rochebouet, who
was at the time Prime Minister, about drawing up a message in this
sense, when a letter was brought in, the bearer of which sent in
a message begging that the Marshal would receive him at once. The
letter was either written by the German Emperor, or at all events
it convinced the Marshal that the bearer was sent to give him a
message direct from His Imperial Majesty. The Marshal accordingly
received him alone, and he said he was a Prussian officer who had
been sent by the Emperor to entreat the Marshal to remain at the
head of the Republic, at all risks, and on any conditions; and
not to establish a Government which could be represented as being
clerical. The message is said to have represented that the Emperor
himself was most anxious for peace, but that he should not be able
to restrain 'other people,' if a clerical or a radical Government
were allowed to be established in France.
This sounds so like gossip that I should hardly have thought
it worth while to repeat it, if it had not tallied rather curiously
with the statement the Marshal himself volunteered to make to me
about his motives.
The 'other people' are supposed to be neither more nor
less than one other person--Prince Bismarck--and the message is
represented as having been sent by the Emperor William without the
knowledge of the Chancellor, or of the German Ambassador here.
Prince Bismarck's enemies, and they are of course numerous
enough here, like to argue from appearances that he has quite lost
the confidence of the Emperor, and some of them, who profess to
have peculiar means of obtaining information, say that he made
three conditions with the Emperor, as those on which alone he could
continue to serve him. 1st, that he should have _carte blanche_ in
the Government; 2nd, that the Empress should reside at Coblentz
or Baden rather than at Berlin; and 3rd, that certain people, of
whom he gave a list, should be removed from Court. As a natural
consequence, Bismarck's illness is attributed to his not having
obtained the consent of his Imperial Master to his conditions; and
it is said that he will not recover until his terms are complied
with. This story of the conditions appears to me to be a very
outrageous one, and I am quite unable to say whether there is any
admixture of truth in it. Those who recount it, love to draw from
it prognostications of the fall of the Great Chancellor.
Whether the story of the Marshal's mysterious visitor was true or not,
his defeat marked a decisive epoch in French internal politics; the
Republic was now firmly established and cannot be said to have been in
any dangers since, unless the vagaries of the impostor Boulanger be
excepted.
Ever since the beginning of the war between Russia and Turkey, Lord
Derby had continually asserted that it was practically no concern
of ours, and that he was quite determined not to be drawn into any
intervention whatsoever. But as the Turkish resistance collapsed, and
as it became more and more evident that there was nothing to prevent
the Russians from exacting any terms they chose, unless some form of
intervention took place, Her Majesty's Government decided to call
Parliament together. Lord Derby was anxious to explain that this action
had no sinister significance.
* * * * *
_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._
Dec. 21, 1877.
You are not unlikely to be asked the meaning of Parliament
being called together earlier than usual. The explanation is
simple. We see a growing excitement on the question of the war; we
are menaced by an agitation friendly but troublesome, having for
object to drive us into war, and with a counter movement on the
other side. We think that much useless talk will be stopped; the
real opinion of the country be tested, and the Ministry relieved
from the annoyance of perpetual criticism which it cannot reply
to, if every peer and M.P. can say what he has got to say at
Westminster, rather than at a county dinner or borough meeting.
Those who have confidence in us will not be sorry to hear our
views explained by ourselves; those who have not, will have no
further opportunity of talking mysteriously about the country being
committed to this, that, or the other, without Parliament having a
voice in the matter. For it is clear that if we meant to act on our
own responsibility, and leave Parliament no choice except to ratify
or to condemn what we had done, we should not shorten by one-half
the interval that remains during which only such action is possible.
It is possible that there may be in France some renewal of
suspicions as to English designs on Egypt. If so, you may dispel
them by the most decided language you can use. We want nothing and
will take nothing from Egypt except what we have already, and what
other Powers share equally with us. We shall continue to work in
harmony with the French, and hope and expect the same from them.
Lord Derby was the most cautious and unenterprising of men, and he
already perhaps felt some suspicions as to the soundness of his
colleagues in the Cabinet; but the assurance to be given to the French
Government with regard to Egypt seems, on the face of it, somewhat
gratuitous, if not rash. The situation in Turkey might have resulted in
our being forced to go to Egypt at short notice, and only five years
later he, Lord Derby, found himself a member of a Liberal Government
which had been forced to adopt that very course.
When the British Parliament met in January, the war was already
practically ended, and the commissioners were treating for an armistice
and for the preliminaries of peace. The Queen's Speech announced that
although neither the Russians nor the Turks had infringed the conditions
on which the neutrality of England depended, it might be necessary
to ask for money and to take precautions, and on January 23, the
Mediterranean fleet was ordered to pass the Dardanelles and to proceed
to Constantinople. This action brought about the resignation of both
Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon, but upon the countermanding of the order
to the fleet, Lord Derby resumed office. On January 28, the basis of the
peace negotiations having been communicated, the Government asked for
a vote of six millions, and in consequence of alarming intelligence,
received from Mr. Layard the British Ambassador at Constantinople, the
fleet was again ordered definitely to proceed to that city. Political
excitement reached its climax, and light-hearted Jingoes, quite
incapable of realizing the inadequacy of British military resources,
proclaimed their readiness to fight any possible adversary.
If it eventually became necessary for England to take active steps to
secure her interests in the East, it was quite clear that no assistance
whatever could be expected from France. M. Waddington took an early
opportunity to assure Lord Lyons most emphatically that France wanted
nothing for herself, and that she desired no acquisition of territory
either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere; but whilst he disclaimed any
desire of this nature, he showed in a most unmistakeable manner that
an occupation of Egypt by England would create a bitter feeling in
France which would long impair the friendly relations between the two
countries. Speaking most confidentially, M. Waddington said that it was
all important to France that England and Russia should not be involved
in hostilities, and that France should not be left _tête-à-tête_ with
Prince Bismarck, whether the latter played the part of an enemy or a
tempter. In fact, the French Government, like its predecessor, was
disquieted by a notion that Bismarck intended to propose to France
some arrangement respecting Belgium and Holland, which would dismember
those States, assigning of course to Germany the lion's share of the
spoils, and it seemed to be apprehended that France would be called
upon to choose between acquiescing in such an arrangement or incurring
the active enmity of Germany. The fear of the French that they might
become involved was so strong that Waddington was alarmed even at the
idea of committing his Government to the British declaration as to
the invalidity of treaties concluded without the participation of the
Powers; but, in spite of this timorous spirit, and although the Treaty
of San Stefano was not signed until March 3, Lord Derby informed Lord
Lyons on February 2, that, the support of Austria having been obtained,
Her Majesty's Government were determined to secure a Conference, and
it was hoped that Italy and France would also exercise at least a
benevolent neutrality. The uncertainty of the position was shown in Lord
Derby's language with regard to Constantinople. 'I hardly know what will
happen if the Russians insist on showing themselves at Constantinople.
It is not a case we could make a _casus belli_ of, but I think it would
in that case be desirable that the Neutral Powers should be present
too--that is their fleets--both as a demonstration, and to keep order
if necessary. The war being over, such a proceeding could not be
misconstrued, as it certainly would have been before. All this, however,
is uncertain.'
Judging by subsequent experiences, Lord Derby would have spent a
long time in securing the presence of the International fleets at
Constantinople, and would have experienced still more trouble in
persuading them to take any action. The Russians fortunately stopped
short of Constantinople, and a Conference being now a practical
certainty, Lord Lyons was invited to act as the British representative.
* * * * *
_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._
February 6, 1878.
The Conference will probably come off, and it may come off
soon, though there is a chance of delay from differences as to the
place of meeting.
I find the feeling of the Cabinet unanimous, and I fully share
it, that you are the fittest person to attend the Conference on
our behalf. Indeed, I know of no one in whom I should have equal
confidence for a duty of that kind. Nothing has been said to the
Queen, but I have no doubt of Her Majesty's consent.
May I ask you if, considering the importance and difficulty
of the work, you will be prepared to sacrifice your personal
convenience so far as to accept the office if offered? I fear the
sacrifice will be considerable, but let up hope that the result
will repay your trouble.
To most people, an invitation of this character, conveyed in so
flattering a manner, would have had an irresistible attraction; but Lord
Lyons was one of those persons to whom notoriety was indifferent, if not
obnoxious, and who much preferred to confine himself to doing his own
business in a practical and unostentatious spirit. He, however, felt it
his duty to accept, hoping vainly all the time that the Conference would
never take place at all.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, Feb. 8, 1878.
I wish to offer you my best thanks for your letter of the day
before yesterday. Your proposal to appoint me to represent England
at the Conference is very flattering in itself, and nothing could
be more gratifying than the terms in which it is made.
You were so kind as to speak of the sacrifice of my personal
convenience, but that consideration I will set entirely aside.
There are feelings of much greater weight which make me shrink from
the task, and it appears to me to be a task peculiarly difficult,
and one of which the result is, to say the least, extremely
doubtful. I may say, too, without any affectation of modesty, that
I do not think myself well qualified for it.
Still these are after all personal considerations which I
ought not to allow to interfere with any public duty which I may be
called upon to discharge. If therefore the Queen and the Government
should determine upon entrusting this mission to me, I should
undertake it heartily and zealously, and do my best to justify
their confidence.
Of course nothing can be settled until we know the rank and
number of the Plenipotentiaries of other Powers, the place of
meeting, and other particulars, which may have a material influence
in the selection of the Representative or Representatives of Her
Majesty.
If however the progress of events should ultimately lead to my
being chosen, I should be very grateful if you would allow me the
opportunity of conferring with you upon various matters, before any
definite arrangements are made. There is one to which I attach so
much importance that I will mention it at once. I trust that you
will allow me to choose myself the staff to accompany me on the
occasion. My efficiency and comfort would depend mainly on this.
Apart from a disinclination to leave his own work, Lord Lyons probably
considered that the outlook for England at a Conference was by no
means reassuring. The issue of the Conference really depended upon the
military position in which England and Austria would apparently stand,
should the Conference itself break up _rê infectâ_, and at the end of
February the English position looked to be none too favourable, for
it depended upon the fleet having access to the Black Sea. If we were
able to stop the Russian communications by sea, the Russians would be
at the mercy of Austria by land, supposing Andrassy's boasts to be
well founded; but we had no absolute security against the Russians
occupying Gallipoli at any moment, and no semblance of a security of
their not occupying the Black Sea exit of the Bosphorus, for the Turks
were at their mercy, and, as pointed out by Mr. Layard, they were quite
capable of making any arrangement with Russia, since they considered
that they had been betrayed and abandoned by England. Neither, it might
be added, was there any security that Austria would stand firm, for
there was always the chance of her being bought off with Bosnia and the
Herzegovina.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, Feb. 26, 1878.
As to the Conference itself all seems more than ever in doubt.
Unless the Austrians are determined to go to war and are visibly
ready, and unless we are equally determined and equally ready on
our side, and unless the Russians are convinced of this, there can
be no chance of their making any concessions. Then, what will the
Austrians want? To bolster up the Turks, to waste energy in trying
to place under them again this or that district delivered by the
Russians, would be a very losing game. There must, I suppose,
be some new Principality or Principalities. If anything like a
national feeling and a national Government can be established in
them, their danger will be from Russia, and Russia will become
their natural enemy, unless they are thrown into her arms by a
hostility on the part of Austria, which will make them feel that
Russia alone is their defence against Turkey. Then there are the
Straits, and the difficulty of placing the Turks, or whoever is
to hold them, in a position to guard them against a Russian _coup
de main_ at least. Ignatieff seems to be already working the
connection between Egypt and the Porte, with a view to getting
money out of Egypt for Russia. I am inclined to think that the more
radically Egypt is severed from the Porte, and the less our free
action with regard to it is hampered by collective guarantees or
collective Protectorates the safer we shall be.
The correctness of these views has since been amply demonstrated by the
history of the Balkan States. The opinion about Egypt, however, was
probably not at all to the taste of Lord Derby, who appeared to rejoice
in divided responsibility.
Lord Lyons himself was summoned to London early in March in order to
confer with the Government respecting his procedure at Berlin, and
judging from his letters to various correspondents, the course which Her
Majesty's Government proposed to adopt was in a state of considerable
uncertainty. It was, however, a source of much satisfaction to him that
he would have the co-operation of Lord Odo Russell, who was an intimate
friend, and in whose judgment he felt complete confidence. He also got
his way about his staff, which was to include amongst others, Malet,
Sheffield, and Mr. (now Sir William) Barrington.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Odo Russell._
London, March 13, 1878.
My only comfort about this awful Congress or Conference is
that you will be my partner in it. I hope, if it does come off
after all, that we may get over it without doing harm to our
country or to ourselves. I wanted them to set me aside and take
advantage of the transfer to Berlin to put it into your hands;
and I still think this would be the best plan; but they say that
after their announcement of my appointment to Parliament, they
cannot cancel it. Sir Robert Peel has moved a resolution that I am
not a fit person to represent England at the Conference. I shall
console myself if he carries it. He grounds his motion upon 'my
well-known opinions.' I suppose he takes my opinions from a wholly
unauthorized and incorrect account of them which appeared in a
letter in the _Daily Telegraph_ yesterday. Some people suppose he
wrote the letter himself in order to have a peg to hang his motion
on. I don't think your difficulties at the Conference will arise
from strong preconceived opinions of mine. I shall try and get our
instructions made as precise as possible. Could you give me some
hints as to the particular points which should be decided before we
begin? You will know how far certain solutions in our sense will be
feasible or not. It is worse than useless that we should be told to
aim at impossibilities, and have to yield: though there may be of
course conditions, which if not admitted, will render it necessary
for us to retire from the Conference altogether.
I am sure you will be the greatest help and comfort to me, and
I hope I may be a help to you. Please tell me anything you wish me
to do or say here.
Lord Odo Russell appears to have been equally in the dark as to the
intended policy of Her Majesty's Government.
* * * * *
_Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._
Berlin, March 16, 1878.
The feelings you express concerning the Conference are so
entirely my own that I need say no more, and only hope that Lord
Derby will give you a better qualified assistant than I can be with
regard to Oriental Affairs, of which I do not really know enough to
be of any use to you or to the country, beside such authorities as
Ignatieff, Lobanoff, Calice, Radowitz, Busch, etc., etc.
You ask if I could give you some hints as to the particular
points which should be decided before you begin.
I would do so with the greatest pleasure, if I only knew what
the policy of Her Majesty's Government is likely to be in Congress.
All I know about it at present is contained in Lord Derby's
despatch of May 6, and as far as Constantinople and the Straits are
concerned, I fancy Russia will be conciliatory.
You ask further how far certain solutions in our sense will be
feasible or not.
I wish I could answer your question, but can only beg of
you to tell me first whether we accept the consequences of our
neutrality, or whether we contest them: whether we are going
to reject the Turko-Russian Treaty, as we rejected the Berlin
Memorandum, or whether we are going to accept now what we refused
then.
Russia is now in possession of Turkey. Germany supports Russia.
France and Italy have no wish to quarrel with Russia or
Germany, and will not offer any serious opposition to the
Turko-Russian Treaty.
Austria may object to two things: the proposed limits of
Bulgaria, and the prolonged occupation of Russian troops.
If Russia is well disposed, she will consent to a smaller
Bulgaria and to a shorter occupation.
If she doesn't, Austria must choose between a diplomatic
defeat, a compromise, or war to turn Russia out of Bulgaria.
Bismarck will exert all his personal influence in favour of a
compromise to keep the three Emperors' Alliance together before
Europe in Conference assembled.
The annexation of Armenia and the war indemnity are questions
which Russia will scarcely consent to submit to the Congress at all.
What then is our attitude to be? Please let me know as soon as
you can, and I will do my best to answer your questions.
If we go in for Greek interests we shall have the cordial
support of Germany and Austria, I think--but Greek interests are
in direct opposition to Turkish interests, if I am not greatly
mistaken.
On hearing of your appointment I wrote to you to congratulate
myself and to beg of you to grant us the happiness of taking up
your quarters at the Embassy, and also to advise you to bring a
numerous and efficient staff, as I have not hands enough at Berlin
for an emergency.
The letters of Lord Odo Russell at this period show that he was
completely in the dark as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government,
and that he was quite unable to get any answer as to what was to be
their policy with regard to the Treaty of San Stefano. He himself was
convinced that the three Empires had already settled what the result of
the Congress was to be, and that they simply intended to communicate it
to Greece, Roumania, and other Powers for whom they wished to manifest
their contempt, such as France and England, _à prendre ou à laisser_.
Under these circumstances, it became doubtful whether it was worth
while for England to go into a Conference at all and court unnecessary
humiliation, serious as the responsibility would be if such a course
were decided upon.
There can be no doubt that much of the prevailing uncertainty was due to
Lord Derby, who with great difficulty had contrived to keep pace with
his more enterprising colleagues, and whose over-cautious temperament
had prevented the adoption of any really definite policy. But Lord
Derby, unable to stand the shock of seeing a few thousand Indian troops
sent to the Mediterranean, resigned office on March 28, and the advent
of Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office marked a new departure in
British Foreign Policy.
Lord Salisbury's circular of April 1, 1878, was intended to show that
the Treaty of San Stefano threatened the interests of Europe, and
that the whole, and not parts of it, as proposed by Russia, should be
submitted to the Congress. It pointed out that the creation of a big
Bulgaria, stretching over the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula,
and with ports on the Black Sea and the Ægean, would give Russia a
predominant influence; that the proposed annexations in Asia Minor would
give Russia control over political and commercial conditions in that
region, and that the exaction of an indemnity which it was impossible
for Turkey to provide, would enable Russia either to exact further
cessions of territory or to impose any other conditions which might be
thought advisable. The logic was sound, and at all events Lord Salisbury
succeeded in producing a definite British policy, which his predecessor
had signally failed to do.
When Lord Lyons returned to Paris at the beginning of April the question
of whether there was to be a Congress or not was still in suspense.
French opinion was rather more in favour of England on the Eastern
Question than had been expected, but there was no sign of anything more
than passive sympathy, and Waddington, who was particularly sensitive
on the subject, intimated, not obscurely, that the good will of France
depended upon England not acting independently of her in Egypt. It
looked, in fact, as if England would be left to bell the cat, although
Lord Salisbury's circular, as was generally admitted, had immensely
raised British prestige on the continent. The suspicion felt in France
as to Russian intentions was shown by the failure of agents of the
Russian Government to negotiate a loan at Paris for thirty millions
sterling, and Lord Salisbury's letters in the early part of April show
that, while there were symptoms of yielding in Europe, there appeared to
be no prospect of those concessions with regard to Asia Minor to which
Her Majesty's Government attached great importance.
On the whole, the French Government was apparently anxious to act as
far as possible with England, without committing itself too much, since
the idea of a Russian naval station in the Mediterranean was highly
obnoxious; but Waddington was hampered, amongst other causes, by the
proceedings of Gambetta, who was disporting himself in some of the
European capitals with the object of forming, or appearing to form,
relations with foreign statesmen, which would enable him to put forward
a claim to become eventually Minister for Foreign Affairs. Waddington
always in private repudiated responsibility for what Gambetta said
or did, but the latter was now so important a personage that it was
necessary to keep on good terms with him and to submit to a patronage
which must have been irksome to French Ministers.
* * * * *
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, April 24, 1878.
The negotiations for the simultaneous withdrawal of the fleet
and army from Constantinople proceed very slowly. We are making
no difficulties, but the Russians cannot make up their minds about
details, and are probably trying to screw some concessions out of
the luckless Turks. I shall be very glad to see the arrangement
succeed, because our fleet is doing no possible good there at this
moment. Whatever value it had, disappeared as soon as the peace was
signed. But as the Russians seem to be afraid of it, we must make
the most of it. Possibly, in their secret hearts, they entertain
very much the same opinion as to the position of their armies.
The general negotiations do not improve. Russia gives me the
impression of a Government desperately anxious for peace, and
driven on by some fate towards war. Andrassy undoubtedly means to
have Bosnia; but whether he will be satisfied with that I am not
so certain. It is a possible policy for him to throw the Danube
over altogether; to secure an outlet for his produce by a railway
to Salonika, and to accept a simultaneous extension southward in
parallel lines of Austrian and Russian possession--whether in the
form of actual territory, or of vassal states. In that case, he
will throw us over, and his course will be easy enough if he can
square the Hungarians. But that may be a difficulty. Do you gather
any information about his objects?
Is it your impression--as it is mine--that the French are
supremely anxious to push us into war?
Lord Lyons's reply to these inquiries gives the reasons why the French
views with regard to an Anglo-Russian conflict had undergone an
alteration.
* * * * *
Paris, April 26, 1878.
I owe you many thanks for your letter of the day before
yesterday.
You ask me whether it is my impression that the French are
extremely anxious to push us into war.
Confidence in their returning military strength, and the
apparent success of their endeavours to conciliate Germany have
calmed their fears of Bismarck. They are no longer nervously
desirous that the forces of England should be kept in the west,
as a necessary check upon the great Chancellor's supposed designs
upon Holland, upon Belgium, or upon France herself. On the other
hand, they have given up counting upon Russia as an ally against
Germany, and have abandoned Décazes's policy of courting her and
espousing her interests. The result of all this is that they are
willing enough that the main force of England should be employed at
a distance from home.
They have been reassured about Egypt, and they think that if
England is engaged in hostilities with Russia, she will be less
disposed and less able to interfere with France or to separate from
her in Egyptian affairs. They have lost their great fear, which was
that England, instead of opposing Russia, would seek a compensation
for herself in the annexation of Egypt. Thus another of the reasons
which made them desire that England should abstain from all action
has disappeared.
There are, moreover, the patriots, who look far ahead, who do
positively desire that England should go to war with Russia. Their
calculation is that Austria and Italy would sooner or later be
drawn into the war on the English side, and that then, Germany and
Russia being isolated, France might join the rest of Europe against
them, and recover Alsace and Lorraine. These are said to be the
views of Gambetta and his friends.
There is, however, one feeling which pervades the great
mass of Frenchmen. They wish England to take the chestnuts out
of the fire for them. They are quite determined not to go to war
themselves for anything less than Alsace and Lorraine, but they do
wish to exclude Russia from the Mediterranean, and they are very
willing that the danger and the burthen of effecting this should be
incurred by England.
With these views their newspapers go on patting us on the
back, and may continue to do so, as long as we seem to be ready to
act alone; but they would change their note, if they saw any risk
of France being drawn into the war with us, until _after_ Austria
and Italy had joined us.
I know of nothing to confirm Odo Russell's information that
in return for the consent of Germany and Russia to exclude Egypt,
etc., from the deliberations of the Congress, Waddington engaged to
support Germany and Russia in everything else. What appeared on the
surface was that this exclusion was made openly by France a _sine
qua non_ of her attending the Congress, that she communicated the
condition simultaneously to all the Powers, and did not at all ask
for the assent to it as a concession. If there is only Bismarckian
authority for the bargain stated to have been made by Waddington
with Germany and Russia, I think it _mérite confirmation_. The one
object of Bismarck seems always to be to sow dissensions between
France and any other Power that she may seem to be approaching.
Notwithstanding the Comte de St. Vallier's assertion to Odo
Russell, Mr. Adams is quite certain that it was M. de St. Vallier
himself who reported to Mr. Waddington that Odo had communicated
to the Emperor William, Prince Bismarck, etc., a telegram from Mr.
Adams on the subject of the sympathies of France with England.
In fact Mr. Waddington who is an old schoolfellow and friend of
Mr. Adams, read to him parts of the private letter from M. de St.
Vallier in which the report was contained, and indeed one of the
phrases he cited from the letter was _le telegramme Adams_ as the
source of the communication made by Odo Russell.
The Prince of Wales arrived this morning and I have been all
the afternoon at the Exhibition with him, which obliges me to write
in such haste, that I cannot be brief.
I have just seen Hobart Pasha, who goes on to England
to-morrow morning and will try to see you.
I doubt whether Waddington or the Austrian Ambassador here get
any information about Andrassy's real views and objects.
The Russians seem to be hard at work trying to make the
execution of the Treaty of San Stefano a _fait accompli_. _Beati
possidentes._
Lord Salisbury's suspicions as to the pressure being put upon the
unfortunate Turks by the Russians were confirmed by an interesting
letter from Mr. Layard to Lord Lyons, in which the much-denounced Abdul
Hamid appears in quite a new light.
* * * * *
Constantinople, May 1, 1878.
I am not surprised that Waddington should care nothing about
Armenia. The question is a purely English one, but to us a vital
one. The Treaty of San Stefano puts the whole of Asia Minor
virtually at the mercy of Russia and insures her influence over
Mesopotamia and perhaps ultimately over Syria, which would probably
not be pleasant to the French. This immense addition to the power
of Russia in Asia, and the command that she obtains, if the Treaty
be carried out, of routes to India and Central Asia, is a matter
of serious import to England. But probably there is no European
Power which does not envy us the possession of India, and would
not secretly rejoice at the prospect of our losing it. I believe
this feeling to be particularly strong with Frenchmen. But if we
intend to preserve our Empire as it now is, we must be prepared to
deal with this question of Russian aggrandisement in Asia Minor and
drive them back. Our only way of doing so, is by making use of the
Mussulman population. The idea of an autonomous Christian Armenia
to form a barrier to Russian advance is one of those absurdities
which are cropping up daily amongst our sentimental politicians,
who know nothing of the matters upon which they pretend to lay down
the law.
The Grand Duke Nicholas, before going, made an ultimate
attempt to bully the Sultan into surrendering Shumla, Varna and
Batoum; but His Majesty held firm and His Imperial Highness failed
to get a promise out of him on the subject. It is curious that
whilst our ignorant and unscrupulous newspaper correspondents are
systematically writing down the Sultan and denouncing him as a poor
weak creature incapable of having an opinion of his own, he has
shown far more firmness than any of his Ministers. Had it not been
for him, it is highly probable that the ironclads would have been
given over to the Russians, and more than probable that the Grand
Duke would have been allowed to occupy Buyuk Dere and the entrance
to the Bosphorus. The Russians threaten to seize Varna, Shumla
and Batoum by force, but I much doubt whether they will venture
to do so, as right is not on their side. Shumla and Varna are not
to be given up to Russia, but to the Bulgarian Principality when
constituted: and the arrangements for the final settlement of the
Russian frontier in Asia are to be made within six months of the
conclusion of the 'definitive' not the 'preliminary' Treaty.
I am anxiously waiting to hear whether the simultaneous
withdrawal of our fleet and the Russian forces can be arranged. It
is of the utmost importance to the Turks to get the Russians away
from San Stefano, but I cannot understand how the Russians could
consent to give up so advantageous a position, unless they found
that if they remained there they would be exposed to considerable
danger from a joint attack by the English fleet and the Turkish
forces.
Layard, who was a fighting diplomatist, and possessed the rare quality
of knowing what he wanted, had long chafed at the irresolute action
of the British Government, and was all in favour of making a resolute
stand against Russian aggression. Throughout the war, he had continually
complained of the apathy and indecision of the British Cabinet, and
attributed these deficiencies to divided counsels and to the advanced
age of Lord Beaconsfield. Now, with Lord Salisbury installed at the
Foreign Office, he plucked up hope again.
'Salisbury,' he wrote to Lord Lyons, 'seems to know what he
wants--which is a great contrast to his predecessor. If he is firm,
we shall, I think, triumph in the end, and remove a great danger
from Europe and ourselves. Were it not for that double-dealing,
untrustworthy fellow Andrassy, we might perhaps accomplish all
that we require without war. Andrassy's proceedings give rise to a
strong suspicion that the secret understanding between the three
Emperors still exists. The Sultan is persuaded of it, and I have
found that his instinct in such matters is usually right.'
On May 11, Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Lyons saying that Count Münster
(German Ambassador in London) had assured him that the object upon
which the French were bent in the Mediterranean was Tunis. 'Do you
hear anything of the sort?' he asked Lord Lyons, and added the highly
important statement: 'It is of course an extension of French territory
and influence of which we should not have the slightest jealousy or
fear. But I am not assuming in any way that the Porte would wish to give
it up. I should only like to have your opinion how far France would wish
to have it.'
To this Lord Lyons replied:--
Ever since I can remember, the Italians have suspected the
French, and the French have suspected the Italians of designs upon
Tunis. Bismarck's mention of it at this moment is probably only
one of his usual devices to sow distrust of France. I have never
found that the acquisition of Tunis recommended itself to French
imagination, and I don't believe it would be taken as anything like
a set-off against English acquisitions in Egypt or Syria. I believe
our principal interest in Tunis arises from its being a source
of supply of provisions to Malta. When Décazes wished to set us
against the supposed Italian designs upon it, he used to talk of
its being dangerous to us to have Malta in a vice between Sicily
and an Italian Tunis, but it never seemed to me that the peril was
very clear.
* * * * *
England is very popular here at this moment, and the Prince of
Wales's visit has been a principal cause of this, but the French
have no intention to fight with us or for us. They back us up in
asserting the sanctity of Treaties, and they certainly desire that
the _status quo_ may be maintained in the Mediterranean, until
France is a little stronger.
It will be remembered that only a few years earlier the German
Government had informed the French Government through Count Arnim that
it would not tolerate the establishment of anything in the nature of
a French Protectorate in Tunis; so that if the French were now really
entertaining any designs of that nature, it was pretty obvious that it
could only be the result of a hint from Berlin. The question of Tunis,
however, was shortly overshadowed by greater issues. On May 16, Lord
Salisbury transmitted to Paris a long document which formed the basis
of the so-called Anglo-Turkish Convention. The proposals embodied
subsequently in the convention were contained in a private letter to
Mr. Layard, dated May 10, and the latter was directed not to proceed
with the negotiations until further instructions were received, as the
necessity for the convention depended upon the nature of the reply which
Count Schouvaloff was to bring back from St. Petersburg. Whatever may
have been said at the time in denunciation of the occupation of Cyprus
and the Asia Minor Protectorate, it can hardly be denied that Lord
Salisbury had a good case logically, as is shown by the following letter.
* * * * *
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._
May 22, 1878.
Until I see Schouvaloff to-morrow I shall know little of the
probabilities of our acting on that private letter to Layard of
last week, of which I sent you a copy. If, however, we do so, it
seems to me that we have a very good logical case--Is logic any use
in diplomacy?--against any objections the French may raise.
By the Tripartite Treaty of April 25, 1856, we had a right to
call on them to help us in restraining Russia from appropriating
Turkish territory. They have loudly and constantly asserted that
no military action is to be expected on their part. In Europe we
can meet the consequences of that desertion by the help of Austria,
Greece, the Rhodope mountaineers and others. But in Asia we are
abandoned wholly to ourselves. The French have left us to face and
guard against the consequences of that Russian encroachment which
they undertook to join with us in resisting. Does it lie in their
mouth, if we say that such encroachments, if persisted in, require
special precautions? that we cannot turn the Russians out by
ourselves, and that abandoned by our ally, who should have made the
task easy to us, we have no choice except to mount guard over the
endangered territory and take up the positions requisite for doing
so with effect? I do not see what answer the French would have.
But you will probably reply that my reasoning is idle trouble,
because logic is of _no_ use in diplomacy.
The French would have had no real cause for complaint if they had
discovered the contents of the proposed Anglo-Turkish Convention, for
as Lord Salisbury had already pointed out, he had been careful 'to turn
the eyes of desire away from Syria,' the only portion of Asia Minor in
which France was interested; but Waddington had been making declarations
against any of the Powers helping themselves to Turkish territory, and
although these declarations were meant only to apply to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, he would probably have used much the same language if he
had learnt that England was thinking of occupying any portion of the
Turkish Empire. Logic may not be of much use in diplomacy, but it is
of still less use in influencing public opinion, and an appeal to the
Tripartite Treaty, after it had been set aside so long, would have come
rather late in the day. As, however, the necessity for providing for
British interests and British safety in Asia was indisputable, Lord
Salisbury was justified in contending that those Powers who disliked the
only methods which were within our reach, should give us such help as
would enable us to dispense with them.
Upon the return of Schouvaloff from St. Petersburg, it turned out,
as Lord Salisbury had anticipated, that Russia was prepared to make
concessions in Europe, but scarcely any in Asia. Layard was, therefore,
directed to negotiate the Anglo-Turkish Convention.
* * * * *
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, May 29, 1878.
I send you two memoranda, or rather two separate versions
of the same paper, which will explain fully the nature of the
propositions which Schouvaloff brought back to me, and the extent
to which we have been able to accept his proposals. The upshot of
the matter has been that the Czar yields substantially all we want
in Bulgaria and as to the Greek provinces, but sticks to his text
as to Montenegro, Bessarabia, and the Armenian conquests, except
Bayazid.
I have informed Schouvaloff that against these Asiatic
acquisitions it will be necessary for us to take precautions; and
while taking from him a formal engagement that Russia will not
extend her position in Turkey in Asia, we shall ourselves give to
Turkey a guarantee to the same effect. We shall accept these terms
as soon as he receives from St. Petersburg authority to take them
in the redaction on which we have ultimately agreed. At the same
time we have taken our measures to secure ourselves against the
consequences of the Asiatic advance. Layard received on Saturday
telegraphic directions in the sense of the private letter which I
addressed to him a fortnight ago, and of which I sent you a copy,
and with great vigour and skill he procured the signature of an
agreement on Sunday last. We do not intend that this fact shall be
made public until the Congress, as the agreement is made wholly
conditional on the retention of Batoum and Kars. But whether we
shall succeed in these good intentions remains to be seen. Our past
performances in that line do not justify any very sanguine hope.
As there seems no chance of the Porte ceding Bosnia, and as
it is necessary to keep Austria with us in the Congress, we have
offered to support her in any proposal she makes in Congress on the
subject of Bosnia, if she will support us in questions concerning
the limits of occupation and organization of Bulgaria. It is not
necessary to tell Waddington this, but, as we have advanced a step
since he last asked us the question, it is important to avoid
language inconsistent with it.
One cannot help suspecting Lord Salisbury's sense of humour as being
responsible for the stipulation, that, if the Russians abandoned to the
Turks their conquests from them in Asia Minor, the occupation of Cyprus
should come to an end and the Anglo-Turkish Convention become null
and void. On the following day (May 30), the so-called Anglo-Russian
agreement was signed, and the enterprising Mr. Marvin, who had been
temporarily employed at the Foreign Office on the cheap, handed it over
to the _Globe_ newspaper, thus creating a political sensation of the
first order.
The agreement with Russia being now completed, and an invitation to the
Congress in suitable terms having been accepted, Lord Beaconsfield and
Lord Salisbury decided to go to Berlin themselves, instead of sending
Lord Lyons.
* * * * *
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._
June 5, 1878.
I feel that I owe you many apologies for my rudeness in not
writing to you on Saturday night to announce to you the decision
of the Cabinet--and to thank you for the very kind and cordial
way you had placed yourself at our disposition in the spring to
perform what was a very ugly duty. The Cabinet was rushed to the
decision which it took, partly by the consideration to which you
advert, that the threads of the last two months' negociations were
more completely in our hands than by any process of communication
they could be in yours--but also by the fact that we have dangerous
questions looming at Paris--and we cannot afford to have you absent
from your post.
My excuse for my negligence is the prosaic one that I had
not a moment of time. The agonies of a man who has to finish a
difficult negociation, and at the same time to entertain four
royalties in a country house can be better imagined than described.
The Convention at Constantinople has been signed with
expression of lively gratitude on the Sultan's part. I am sorry
that your impressions of the mood in which the French are likely
to receive the news when published, are still so gloomy. However,
we must hope for the best. We have assembled a powerful fleet at
Portsmouth and we shall have six or seven first-rate ironclads to
do what may be necessary in the Mediterranean, besides smaller
ships. And our relations with Bismarck are particularly good. So I
hope our friends at Paris will confine themselves to epigram.
If we can, we shall keep the matter secret till we get at
Congress to the part of the Treaty of San Stefano (Art. XIX) which
concerns the Asiatic annexations. I do not know whether d'Harcourt
has any inkling, but ever since his return from Paris his manner
has changed.
Lord Lyons hailed the decision of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury as a
'deliverance from a nightmare which had weighed upon him since March,'
and found a sympathizer in Lord Odo Russell, who had never expected
much good from the Congress if the Three Emperors' League was revived,
and who doubted whether the British public would be contented with an
amended San Stefano Treaty. The probable action of Waddington, who
was to be the French representative at Berlin, is foreshadowed in the
following letter.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._
Paris, June 4, 1878.
I am very glad that you and Lord Beaconsfield have determined
to go yourselves to the Congress. The matters to be treated are too
grave to be left to subordinates, and they could hardly be treated
properly by any one who had not had a minute acquaintance day by
day with the recent communications with Russia and Austria.
Waddington will, I think, be a satisfactory colleague in some
respects, but in others I am afraid you will have difficulties with
him. His English blood and his English education tell both ways.
On the one hand, he is more straightforward than most Frenchmen;
he understands and shares many English feelings, and he sees the
force of English arguments, or perhaps I should rather say, of
arguments put forward in an English way. But, on the other hand, he
feels strongly the necessity of guarding against the tendency in
France to suspect him of an English bias. He will be disposed to
join in resistance to exaggerated Russian pretensions with regard
to Roumelia and the Danube. His personal sentiments are strongly
in favour of Greece. He has a certain sympathy with Christian as
against Mussulman, but he does not carry this to an immoderate or
unpractical extent. There is, however, one point on which you may
find him very stiff. He is most strongly opposed to any change in
the relative position of the Great Powers in the Mediterranean,
and he would, I am afraid, be quite as unwilling to see England
extend her influence in that sea, as he would be to see Russia do
so. It is in order to prevent any alteration in the _statu quo_ in
the Mediterranean, more than from any other reason, that he has
made the participation of France in the Congress conditional on
the exclusion of all questions not directly arising out of the war
between Russia and Turkey, and has positively mentioned Syria and
Egypt as countries to be excluded from the discussion. He would
not perhaps be disinclined to let these questions come up, if he
thought he should obtain the support of other Powers in resisting
any change made outside of the Congress.
At any rate, public feeling in France would probably be too
strong to allow him to acquiesce in any redistribution of territory
or influence in favour of England. But I expressed my opinion on
this point so fully to you and Lord Beaconsfield in the interview I
had with you just before I left England, that I have nothing more
to say about it. The horrible event[19] which took place at Berlin
the day before yesterday has, however, thrown so strong a light
upon one phase of French opinion, that I feel bound to direct your
attention to it. It seems very shocking that while the Emperor
William is suffering from the wounds so wickedly inflicted, people
here should be speculating upon the consequences of their being
fatal, but so it is. The French believe that the maintenance of
the present military system in Germany depends upon the Emperor
William, and that even if His Majesty's successor had the same
determination as His Majesty himself to keep it up, public opinion
in the country would make it impossible for him to do so. What
foundation there may be for this supposition, I do not pretend to
determine; but that it influences the French is certain. Anything
which makes them believe the life of the Emperor to be precarious,
diminishes the restraint which the fear of Germany imposes upon
them, and renders them more stiff in asserting their own views and
pretensions, and less averse from contemplating the possibility of
supporting them by more than words.
There are, in my opinion, strong arguments to be brought in
favour of our taking measures to be in a position to resist Russia
by our own means, if other Powers will give us no help in doing
so; but as you said in a former letter, logic is perhaps not of
much use in diplomacy, and seems to me to be of still less use
in influencing public opinion. I doubt our logic doing much to
reconcile the French to our exercising a separate protection over
Turkey in Asia, or occupying a Turkish island in the Mediterranean.
I am afraid you will think I have become more nervous than
ever, and more prone to the common error among diplomatists of
exaggerating the importance of the country in which they are
themselves stationed, but anyhow I have not seen any reason to
change my views as to the feelings prevalent in France.
The Parliamentary session at Versailles is about to close.
Thanks to the Exhibition, it has been a very tranquil one, but we
must be on the look-out for squalls when the Chamber meets again
in the autumn. Gambetta has hitherto restrained his followers from
opposing the Ministry, and from proposing radical measures, but it
is doubtful whether he will be able, even if willing, to restrain
them after the end of the Exhibition. Some unexpected incident
might even produce a crisis before. At any rate the elections of
a portion of the Senate, which will take place early next year,
may remove the check which the Conservative majority in that House
has hitherto put upon the Chamber of Deputies. The Marshal does
not talk of making any more attempts at resisting the will of the
majority, but I understand that he does not talk very seriously of
retiring as soon as the election is over.
It may perhaps be worth while to mention that Waddington finds
the influence of Gambetta over the Government very irksome, and is
not fond of having it alluded to.
The Congress met at Berlin in the middle of June, and the awkward
question of whether Waddington should be informed of the Anglo-Turkish
Convention or not was debated. Lord Lyons knew perfectly well that the
French would be furious when they heard of it, and that the greater the
surprise, the greater would be their indignation. The lines laid down
for Waddington's guidance at the Congress were that France desired:
1. Peace.
2. Neutrality.
3. The necessity of the consent of all the Powers to any modifications
of the Treaties.
4. The exclusion of Egypt, Syria, the Holy Places, and other topics
foreign to the Russo-Turkish War.
These points were certainly not favourable to England receiving any
support from France in defending her menaced interests in Asia Minor,
as the absolute neutrality of France was the point most insisted upon.
In fact France was so obviously anxious to stand aloof, that one
suggestion was made that she should be asked to co-operate with us in
Asia Minor on the assumption that such co-operation was sure to be
refused. This, however, was considered to be too hazardous a course,
and it was eventually decided to say nothing to Waddington for the time
being, lest he should make the Anglo-Turkish Convention an excuse for
not attending the Congress at all. The secret, unlike the Anglo-Russian
agreement, seems to have been well kept, and cannot have been known to
the Russians, or they would have utilized it for the purpose of sowing
discord between the British and French representatives. Finally, on July
6, Lord Salisbury told the whole story to Waddington in a private letter.
In this letter Lord Salisbury pointed out that, as far as the Russian
annexations in Asia Minor were concerned, we were in a completely
isolated condition, since Austria was only willing to take part in
restoring the Porte to a certain independence in Europe, while France
had clearly intimated that she had no intention of engaging in war for
the purpose of maintaining the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856. The
result was that England was compelled to act alone, as her interests
were too great to allow the _status quo_ in Asia Minor to be completely
destroyed, and consequently the onerous obligation of a defensive
alliance with Turkey had been undertaken in order to provide against
future Russian annexations beyond the frontier assigned under the
present negotiations at Berlin. As this engagement could not be carried
out from such a distance as Malta, the Sultan had made over Cyprus to
England during such period as the defensive alliance might last. The
conditional nature of the Convention, and the restraint shown by Her
Majesty's Government in rejecting more tempting and advantageous offers
are dealt with in the following passages.
We have entered into an agreement which is now embodied in a
formal Convention at Constantinople, that whenever the Russians
shall, for whatever reason, return to their Asiatic frontier as
it existed before the last war, we will immediately evacuate
the island; and that intermediately we will annually pay the
Sultan whatever is ascertained to be the surplus of revenue over
expenditure.
I am telling Your Excellency no secret when I say that we have
been very earnestly pressed, by advisers of no mean authority, to
occupy Egypt--or at least to take the borders of the Suez Canal.
Such an operation might have been very suitable for our interests
and would have presented no material difficulties.
No policy of this kind however was entertained by Her
Majesty's Government. We had received an intimation from the French
Government that any such proceeding would be very unwelcome to the
French people, and we could not but feel the reasonableness of
their objection under existing circumstances.
We have therefore turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that
kind.
We have been likewise recommended to occupy some port on the
coast of Syria, such as Alexandretta, but we felt that, however
carefully guarded, such a proceeding might, in the present
condition of opinion with respect to the Ottoman Empire, be
construed as indicating an intention to acquire territory on the
mainland of Western Asia; and we did not desire to be suspected
of designs which will be wholly absent from our thoughts. We have
therefore preferred to accept from the Sultan the provisional
occupation of a position less advantageous indeed, but still
sufficient for the purpose, and not exposed to the inconveniences
I have mentioned. How long we shall stay there I cannot tell. But
I think there is just ground of hope that the Russians will find
in a short time that the territory they have acquired is costly
and unproductive; that the chances of making it a stepping-stone
to further conquests is cut off, and that they will abandon it as
a useless acquisition. In that case our _raison d'être_ at Cyprus
will be gone and we shall retire.
I have adopted this form of conveying the matter to you, as
the Convention being entirely within the Treaty competence of
the two Powers, requires no official communication. But it would
have been inconsistent with the feelings of friendship existing
between our two countries, and with my gratitude for your courteous
procedure towards me personally, to have allowed you to hear it
first from any other source.
There can be little doubt as to the identity of the 'advisers of no
mean authority,' for Bismarck had been urging upon England for some
time the occupation of Egypt, obviously with the main intention of
creating discord with France, and Her Majesty's Government deserved all
the credit claimed by Lord Salisbury for resisting these overtures. It
is, however, somewhat difficult to follow Lord Salisbury's reasonings
for preferring Cyprus to Alexandretta. It was plain that the occupation
of either of these places would cause irritation, and as subsequent
events have shown, Cyprus has never been of much use to us, and besides
being crushed under the burden of the tribute annually paid to the
Turkish Government, is inhabited chiefly by Greeks who do not appear to
thoroughly appreciate British rule. Alexandretta, on the other hand,
might, under our control, have developed into a highly important seaport
and become the starting-place for the Bagdad railway; whereas, as a
matter of fact, it has now practically passed into the hands of the
Germans.
M. Waddington did not remain long in sole possession of his exclusive
information, for on July 8, the Anglo-Turkish Convention was made
known to the world, and the general impression produced was that Lords
Beaconsfield and Salisbury had effected a brilliant _coup_. In France,
however, the news caused quite unjustifiable indignation, and the
prudent Lord Lyons telegraphed to Lord Salisbury on July 10, advising
him to get the final acts of the Congress signed as quickly as possible,
lest Waddington should be directed to come away without putting his name
to anything.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._
Paris, July 12, 1878.
Your telegram of last night was a great relief to me, but I
shall not feel quite happy till I hear that all is actually signed.
I am happy to find that Gambetta and the Ministerial Parties, who
are violent on the subject of the Convention, are not having things
all their own way in the press. No newspaper can be said to defend
England altogether, but the more sensible papers are against any
active opposition on the part of France. Gambetta and Waddington
are not friends, and Gambetta will no doubt attack Waddington and
try to upset him. This may lead to serious difficulties in France.
It is no use to shut one's eyes to the fact that at this
moment, there is a great and general irritation in France against
England. It is too soon to foresee what turn public opinion will
take eventually, but at the present moment, we must not forget to
take this irritation into account in our dealings with this country.
The general feeling was so unsatisfactory, that he felt compelled to
write to Mr. Knollys[20] urging that the Prince of Wales, who was acting
as President of the British Section of the International Exhibition,
should postpone a contemplated visit to Paris, and enclosing articles
in the press of an abominable character directed against His Royal
Highness. Irritation over the Anglo-Turkish Convention was not confined
to one party, but existed in every class from the _haute société_
downwards. The Conservatives and their press utilized it as a means
of attacking the Republic, complained of the effacement of France,
and asserted that she had been duped by her former ally, while the
Republican opposition, headed by Gambetta, charged Waddington with
having made a shameful surrender to England.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._
Paris, July 16, 1878.
The first explosion of French wrath, on the appearance of
the Convention of the 4th of June, was even more violent than I
anticipated. It was well that you had the Minister for Foreign
Affairs under _your_ influence, and at a distance from that of
the excited spirits here. Now the first force of the eruption is
spent and the lava cooled down. I am afraid only on the surface,
but any way, it must be the surface which cools first. At all
events the strong language is in great measure abandoned. In the
first place, as no one now recommends any immediate action on the
part of France, the French are beginning to see that they cut a
sorry figure by barking without biting. In the second place, they
conceive that the alliance of the Three Empires is as close as
ever, and they think that if they quarrel with England, they will
be giving a triumph to Bismarck and find themselves face to face
with him without any friend on their side. Lastly, I would fain
hope that some of them are beginning to take a really reasonable
view of things, and to see that we had absolutely nothing left for
it, but to act for ourselves, as they would not or could not help
us.
Still we shall have some trouble with them, and shall probably
find them for some time suspicious, jealous, and hard to deal with.
Egypt may be our first difficulty. With or without a hint
from home, French agents there will be seeking to trip us up. It
seems to me that our task there will be a delicate one. On the one
hand, it will no doubt be desirable to soothe French vanity as far
as possible; but, on the other hand, anything like a defeat or a
retreat in Egypt, might very much impair the prestige which the
position which we have taken with regard to Asia has given us.
I wish Rivers Wilson had already been installed as Minister of
Finance when the Convention of the 4th June was made public.
Another ticklish question is that of the Newfoundland
Fisheries. I am very anxious to know what, if anything, passed
between you and Waddington on the subject at Berlin. The present
moment does not seem a very happy one for resuming negotiations,
and at all events it might be well to keep the matter, if possible,
in the calm atmosphere of London, and at a distance from the heat
of the political weather here.
I have been indirectly in communication with Gambetta, and
have reason to hope he is being brought, or is coming of himself,
round about the Convention. What I am immediately afraid of is
his nevertheless trying to upset Waddington. I should regret
Waddington's fall on all grounds, and it would be extremely awkward
to have a successor in the office brought in on the pretext that
Waddington had not been stiff enough with regard to England. The
candidates for his place are said to be Freycinet, the present
Minister of Public Works, who was Gambetta's Sub-Minister for War
in 1870 and 1871; M. Duclerc, one of the Vice-Presidents of the
Senate, who passes for a moderate man, but who has no knowledge of
foreign affairs, and Gambetta himself. I suppose, however, Gambetta
would be an impossibility with the Marshal, and that he himself
would feel that he was compromising his prospect of greater things
hereafter, by taking a subordinate office now.
M. Waddington, upon his return from Berlin, realizing doubtless that his
position had been shaken, though from no fault of his own, intimated
his intention of writing a despatch in which Her Majesty's Government
would be called upon to give to the French certain assurances with
regard to Egypt and Tunis. As it was desirable that this request should
not be made in too peremptory a manner, he was exhorted to make his
communication in such a way as would make it easy for Her Majesty's
Government to return a cordial answer. The difficulty about giving the
assurances was pointed out by Lord Salisbury.
* * * * *
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, July 20, 1878.
What M. Waddington said to you is very much what he said to me
at Berlin, though the lurid touches about war have been filled in
afterwards.
The precise answer to be given to his promised despatch must
of course depend very much on the terms in which it is framed. But
he may be certain that we shall answer it not only with the desire
of cultivating to the utmost possible extent our good relations
with France, but also with the aim of making his own personal task
more easy, as far as it is in our power to contribute to that
result.
The matter to which he has called your attention, as he did
ours at Berlin, was difficult to make the subject of binding
assurances, because the contingencies under which those assurances
would receive a practical application are difficult to foresee.
If France occupied Tunis to-morrow, we should not even
remonstrate. But to promise that publicly would be a little
difficult, because we must avoid giving away other people's
property without their consent, and also because it is no business
of ours to pronounce beforehand on the considerations which Italy
would probably advance upon that subject. In the same way, with
respect to Egypt, we have stated distinctly more than once that we
do not entertain any intention of occupying it; and that statement
we are perfectly willing to renew. But, having done that, and
having expressed our anxiety to work with France in Egypt, we
have said as much as would be seemly or possible. We can hardly
pledge the Khedive as to what he means to do, without in reality
assuming a voice in his concerns which we do not, according to any
international right, possess.
These considerations make me rather anxious that M. Waddington
in his proposed despatch should avoid putting categorical questions
which we might not be able to answer precisely as he wishes,
and yet which we could not avoid answering without seeming to
exhibit precisely that coolness which he very properly and justly
deprecates, and any appearance of which we are as anxious as he is
to avoid. I think that his despatch--if I might suggest it--would
more properly take the form of a statement, in general terms, of
the territorial points on the African coast in which France takes
an interest, leaving us to make such assurances as we think we can
properly give, and which we will certainly make as cordial as we
can.
To French influence in Egypt we do not offer any objection;
and we have never taken any step calculated to oust it. But any
detailed engagements as to questions of administration could
not be taken without imprudence; for each step must be taken as
the necessity for it arises. The two great points are to keep
the Khedive on the throne, and to get the financial obligations
satisfied. For these objects, the two countries will, I hope,
co-operate heartily.
I am a little anxious as to the form he gives his despatch,
for if he makes it too peremptory, he may produce that very
appearance of estrangement which it is our common object to avoid.
I will write to you more fully about the Newfoundland
Fisheries when I have had time to study the papers. My
conversations with him have put me fully in possession of the
French case. I am not so certain that I know all the points of the
English case.
An opportunity fortunately occurred of conciliating one personage who
might have given a great deal of trouble, and afforded an instance of
the influence which can occasionally be brought to bear upon advanced
democrats when judiciously applied.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._
Paris, July 21, 1878.
The Prince of Wales leaves Paris for London to-night. As his
arrival at Paris to attend the English concerts at the Exhibition
had been publicly announced, I did not think that it would be
advisable that it should be postponed, but I have been a little
nervous about it. So far however there has been no contretemps, and
the visit has been politically useful.
The Prince invited Gambetta to breakfast with him yesterday.
It was His Royal Highness's own idea, but I thought it judicious.
I have not the least doubt that if the Prince of Wales had not
been civil to Gambetta, the Russian Embassy would have asked any
Grand Duke who came here to show him particular attention, in order
to bring him over to Russia. The success of such a manoeuvre has I
think been effectually guarded against.
Gambetta appears to have spoken to the Prince strongly in
favour of an alliance between France and England--to have declared
himself more or less reconciled to the Convention of June 4th--and
to have spoken in the most disparaging terms, not so much of the
Foreign Policy of Russia, as of the institutions, the Government,
and the administration of that country. I hear from other quarters
that Gambetta was extremely pleased with the interview. I am
assured also that the Prince of Wales acquitted himself with great
skill. The Prince thought, and so did I, that it was better that
I should not be at the breakfast. The Embassy was represented by
Sheffield. The occasion of the invitation to Gambetta was his
having been very obliging and useful in matters connected with the
Exhibition.
To-day Waddington met the Prince of Wales at luncheon at the
Embassy.
So far, then, things look well, but I am assured the calm
does not extend far below the surface. Gambetta has the southern
temperament, and his language is a good deal influenced by the
impression of the moment. He has postponed, but he has not really
given up, his attack on Waddington. He will still, if he continues
in his present mood, try to turn him out in October, when the
Chambers reassemble.
The thing which would have most effect in reconciling the
French to our acquisition and protectorate, would be to make them
practically advantageous to the holders of Turkish and Egyptian
Bonds.
When M. Waddington eventually presented his despatch, or rather
despatches, for there were two, they were apparently found
unobjectionable in tone; but on the ground that the one referring to
Tunis was not 'couched in more diplomatic language,' it was suggested to
him that he should rewrite it in language more suitable for publication
subsequently; this he declined to do, but promised not to publish it at
all. The chief object presumably of these communications was: in the
first place to obtain assurances from England with regard to Egypt,
and in the second place to make Lord Salisbury's statement about Tunis
appear as an invitation to the French to appropriate that country. M.
Waddington, quite naturally, did not wish it to be thought that he had
come back empty handed from Berlin at a time when the Great Christian
Powers were helping themselves liberally at the Turk's expense.
* * * * *
_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._
July 24, 1878.
Waddington's two despatches were left with me yesterday. They
are very friendly in tone and will not, I think, be difficult to
answer. The answers however must be delayed some days, as the
Cabinet does not meet till Saturday.
Intermediately, I demur a little to the quotations that he
makes from my conversation. The general tenor is quite accurate,
but his vivacious French by no means renders the tone of my
communication, and what is of more importance, to the rights and
claims of other Powers, Turkey and Italy especially. What I told
him was that if a state of things should arise in which there was
no other obstacle to his occupying Tunis but our objection, that
objection would not be made. I made the observation for the purpose
of showing him that we had no Mediterranean aspirations--and did
not desire to disturb the balance of power in that sea. Our eyes
were bent wholly on the East. But he makes me talk of Tunis and
Carthage as if they had been my own personal property and I was
making him a liberal wedding present.
I do not know whether he will be inclined to put his
quotations from my conversations into a more general form. I think
it will save the possibility of misunderstanding later; and will
also dispense with the necessity of a correction on my part, as he
has reported the general drift and terms of my observations with
perfect fidelity.
The reception of the Anglo-Turkish Convention in France may be said to
have been the first of a series of difficulties which unfortunately
impaired the relations between France and England during many years,
but which have now happily almost entirely disappeared. The irritation
aroused in France was completely unjustified, and almost incapable of
explanation, unless the secrecy which surrounded the negotiation of the
Convention may be considered an adequate cause. No French interests were
prejudicially affected; and the maintenance of secrecy really relieved
France from a considerable difficulty, for a premature disclosure might
have prevented the participation of France in the Congress; but oddly
enough, the Anglo-Turkish Convention appeared to be the only matter
relating to the Congress in which the French took any interest, and
so much indignation did some patriots show that it was even seriously
suggested that by way of inflicting a surprise upon England, France
should seize Chios, or Rhodes, or Crete. In fact, at one time, Crete
appeared to possess considerably greater attractions than Tunis, in
spite of the latter's proximity to Algeria.
Probably the real explanation of this display of temper was that the
French felt their strength to be returning, and were in no mood to
put up with what they erroneously considered to be a slight, whether
intentional or unintentional.
One frantic jeremiad from Constantinople over the Treaty of Berlin may
be quoted before the subject is dismissed. Layard, who had been already
greatly scandalized by the publication of the Anglo-Russian agreement,
wrote:--
What do you think of the Treaty of Berlin? It appears to
me that if ever an apple of discord was thrown amongst nations,
this is the one. I see in it the elements of future wars and
disorders without number, and an upsetting of all the principles
of justice and right which have hitherto governed the relations
and intercourse of states. Force and fraud have triumphed, and
when Turkey has been completely destroyed and cut up under the new
system, it will probably be applied with similar successful results
to other countries. Russia has gained, with the assistance of
Germany, all and more than she wanted, and the interests of England
and of other Powers were sacrificed in order to enable Bismarck
to recruit his beery stomach by drinking some mineral waters.
It is all very well to sit round a green table and to cut up an
Empire on a map. It is a very different thing to put what has been
so easily settled into execution. I anticipate no end of trouble
and bloodshed for years to come in this unhappy country. We have
not yet recovered here from the effect of the publication of the
unfortunate memorandum which so completely destroyed the great and
commanding position that we had acquired.
There is not much here about Peace with Honour.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 17: Jan. 7, 1876.]
[Footnote 18: Jan. 24, 1877.]
[Footnote 19: Nobiling's attempt to assassinate the German Emperor.]
[Footnote 20: Now Viscount Knollys.]