MARSHAL MACMAHON'S PRESIDENCY
(1873-1875)
The new French Government had been received with great favour by
the upper classes, while the remainder of the population remained
indifferent, but the Marshal was credited with the wish to place the
Comte de Chambord on the throne, and the language of his entourage was
strongly Legitimist, auguries being drawn from a frequent remark of the
Maréchale, who was supposed to dislike her position: _nous ne sommes pas
à notre place!_
As the confused political situation began to clear, it became evident
that everything depended upon the Comte de Chambord himself, and if he
could be brought to adopt anything like a reasonable attitude, it was
generally felt that there would be a large majority in his favour in the
Assembly. The historic White Flag manifesto issued from Salzburg at the
end of October effectually ruined the Legitimist cause.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Oct. 31, 1873.
The Royalists were counting up new adhesions and expecting a
letter from the Comte de Chambord which was to be read from the
tribune at the last moment and rally the waiters upon Providence
and the waverers to them, when, to their utter consternation,
the actual letter arrived, and fell like a shell with a violent
explosion in the midst of them.
I don't know what they are to do. All plans for making the
Comte de Paris or the Duc d'Aumale Regent will be voted against
by the present Legitimists, unless the Comte de Chambord approves
them. It is very doubtful whether any explanation could do away
with the impression the letter will have produced throughout the
country, which was already averse from the idea of the Legitimist
King.
The maintenance of MacMahon and the present Ministry seems the
best mode of postponing trouble, but it cannot do much more than
postpone.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Nov. 3, 1873.
If the Chamber met to-morrow, I suppose it would vote the
prolongation of MacMahon's powers; and though no one can answer
for what a day or an hour may bring forth, I suppose this is what
must be done. It is said that the Marshal himself insists upon a
term of six years, if not ten. This is rather hard to understand,
if, as I believed, he really wished to be out of the thing, and I
doubt its adding practically to the stability of his Government.
On the other hand, the Conservatives want to have the prolongation
voted in such a way as to make it apparent that MacMahon is _their_
President. It would not suit them that he should be elected
unanimously, or nearly so, as he perhaps might be. This would put
him, they think, in a position too like that which Thiers held. The
preposterous notion of making a Lieutenant General of the Kingdom
to govern in the name of a King of full age and in possession of
all his faculties, who would undoubtedly repudiate and denounce
his representative, has been put an end to by the refusal of the
Princes of Orleans, one and all, it is affirmed, to accept the post.
Thiers told me the day before yesterday that he did not
intend to oppose the Government this session, and that we might
count on a quiet winter. We shall see.
The Legitimists are furious with their King, as well they
may be. How long this may last, one cannot say, but the numbers
of those who adore him _quand même_, as a sort of fetish, have
certainly fallen off.
MacMahon had been as much disappointed with the Chambord manifesto as
the ultra-Legitimists themselves, and had looked forward to retiring
from a position which he found distasteful; but as no king was
available, and he was looked upon as the only guarantee for order,
obviously the best course was to secure the prolongation of his powers
for as long a period as possible. After many long and stormy discussions
MacMahon was declared President of the Republic for seven years, and a
committee of thirty was appointed to consider the Constitutional Laws.
This result was so far satisfactory to the Right, that it enabled them
to retire from the dangerous position in which they were placed by
the attempt to put the Comte de Chambord on the throne, but it failed
to establish a durable Government, and the whole period of MacMahon's
Presidency was marked by a ceaseless struggle with his Republican
opponents, which only terminated with his fall four years later.
The anxieties of French Ministers were, however, not confined to
internal difficulties. Although the fact was concealed as much as
possible, the anti-Ultramontane campaign of Bismarck created serious
alarm in the beginning of 1874, and in that year may be said to have
originated the long series of panics, well or ill founded, which have
prevailed in France ever since. MacMahon in conversation did not scruple
to express his fear of a country which, according to him, could
place 800,000 men on the Rhine in less than seventeen days, and made
the interesting confession that the French military authorities had
never credited the famous reports of Colonel Stoffel[7] as to Prussian
military efficiency. The Foreign Minister, the Duc Décazes, expressed
the strongest apprehensions.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._
Paris, Jan. 17, 1874.
The fall of France has never, I think, been brought so
forcibly home to me, as when I listened yesterday to the humble
deprecation which Décazes was obliged to make with regard to
Bismarck's threats, in the same room in which I had so often heard
the high language with which the Imperial Minister used to speak of
the affairs of Europe. One can only hope that Odo may be right in
thinking that Bismarck's menaces may subside, when he has carried
his Army Bill at home. But may not his eagerness in his contest
with the Ultramontanes continue and carry him on to language and
even to measures against France from which it may be difficult for
him to draw back? and of course there is a limit to the submission
of the French Government, however disastrous it may know the
consequences of resistance to be. It is difficult to persecute
any religion in these days, but it is impossible for the French
Government to set itself in violent opposition to the predominant
religion in France. I do not know what means we may have of getting
pacific and moderate counsels listened to at Berlin, but I do
not think the weakness of France a sufficient safeguard to other
countries against the perils of the present state of things to the
peace of Europe. It may be very easy to bully and to crush France,
but will it be possible to do this without raising a storm in other
quarters?
What Bismarck wanted was that the French Government should attack the
French bishops; and in order to conciliate him, a circular was issued
by the Minister of the Interior remonstrating with them on the nature
of the language in which their pastoral addresses were couched. The
well-known clerical newspaper the _Univers_ was suppressed, and although
every effort was made to disguise the various acts of subserviency
resorted to, it was perfectly well known to what cause they were due,
and it was not surprising that the French writhed under the necessity
of submitting to such dictation. In view of the military weakness
of France, however, it was useless to think of resistance, the Duc
d'Aumale, who commanded the most vulnerable district, having reported
confidentially that there were neither fortresses nor an army which
would have any chance of repelling a German invasion; added to which,
owing to considerations of economy, the conscription was six months in
arrear.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Odo Russell._
Paris, Feb. 3, 1874.
The French want above all things to keep the peace, or, to put
it otherwise, to escape being attacked by Germany in their present
defenceless state. What, in your opinion, should they do? Of course
the temptation to the unprincipled war party in Germany to attack
them while they are unable to defend themselves, is very great;
and that party must know that a war this year would be much less
hazardous than one next year, and so on, as each year passes.
The next question I want your advice upon is what, if
anything, can other Powers, and particularly England, do to help to
preserve peace? This is a question peculiarly within your province,
as the one thing to be considered in answering it, is the effect
that anything we do may have at Berlin.
I am not very hopeful, but I think the chances of peace will
be very much increased if we can tide over this year 1874.
I can see no consolation for a fresh war. I suppose Bismarck
would be ready to buy the neutrality of Russia with Constantinople,
and that France will give Russia _anything_ even for a little help.
The Emperor Alexander has told General Le Flô[8] at St.
Petersburg that there will not be war. Do you attach much
importance to this?
You will call this a _questionnaire_ rather than a letter, but
if you have anything to catechise me upon in return, I will answer
to the best of my ability.
The Lyttons' are, as you may suppose, a very great pleasure to
me, and they have had a great success here.
No one was better fitted than Lord Odo Russell, who was a _persona
grata_ with Bismarck, to answer these queries. The Emperor Alexander had
been very emphatic in assuring General Le Flô on several occasions that
there would be no war, but Lord Odo was in all probability quite correct
in his opinion that this was no real safeguard.
* * * * *
_Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._
Berlin, Feb. 20, 1874.
I was glad after a long interval to see your handwriting
again, and doubly glad to find you inclined to renew our
correspondence. You ask: _Firstly_, What in my opinion should the
French do to escape being attacked by Germany in their present
defenceless state?
In my opinion nothing can save them _if_ Bismarck is
determined to fight them again; but then, is it France or is it
Austria he is preparing to annihilate? In Bismarck's opinion,
France, to avoid a conflict with him, should gag her press,
imprison her bishops, quarrel with Rome, refrain from making
an army or from seeking alliances with other Powers all out of
deference to Germany.
_Secondly._ What can other Powers, and particularly England,
do to help to preserve peace?
A Coalition is impossible; advice or interference adds to
Bismarck's excuses for going to war, so the only course Governments
can follow is to let him do as he pleases and submit to the
consequences, until he dies.
_Thirdly._ Do I attach any importance to the Emperor of
Russia's pacific assurances?
None whatever, because Bismarck is prepared to buy his
co-operation with anything he pleases in the East.
Bismarck is now master of the situation at home and abroad.
The Emperor, the Ministers, the Army, the Press, and the National
majority in Parliament are instruments in his hands, whilst abroad
he can so bribe the great Powers as to prevent a coalition and make
them subservient to his policy. Now, his policy, as you know, is
to mediatize the minor States of Germany and to annex the German
Provinces of Austria, so as to make one great centralized Power
of the German-speaking portions of Europe. To accomplish this he
may require another war, but it may be with Austria and not with
France, which he now puts forward to keep up the war spirit of the
Germans and to remind Europe of his powers. Besides which he has to
pass the unpopular Army Bill and War Budget which he failed in last
summer.
His anti-Roman policy will serve him to pick a quarrel with
any Power he pleases by declaring that he has discovered an
anti-German conspiracy among the clergy of the country he wishes to
fight.
Such is the situation, but it does not follow that we shall
have war before another year or two are over or more, nor need we
have war _if_ Bismarck can carry out his plans without it.
At present the tone of Bismarck and Bülow is quite pacific,
and I notice a great desire for the co-operation of England in
maintaining the peace of Europe generally.
Lord Lyons's own opinions were in exact agreement with Lord Odo
Russell's, and the general uncertainty as to Bismarck's intentions
continued to preoccupy both the French and the English Governments,
although the Emperor of Russia persisted in assuring General Le Flô that
there would be no war, and it was assumed in some quarters that the
German Emperor disapproved of the Bismarckian policy.
The general election in England at the beginning of 1874, resulting in
the return of the Conservative party to power, placed Lord Derby again
at the Foreign Office in the room of Lord Granville, and the long letter
which follows was presumably intended to enlighten him on the subject of
French politics generally. It is, at all events, a concise review of the
situation.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Feb. 24, 1874.
I thank you cordially for your letter of yesterday, and I
resume with very peculiar satisfaction my diplomatic correspondence
with you. I wish the subject of it was as pleasant to me as is the
fact of its renewal; but I cannot help being more than usually
anxious about the prospects of Europe and of France in particular.
This spring and summer are the especially critical seasons for
France. She will be for a long time to come far too weak to indulge
in aggression, except indeed as a secondary ally of some stronger
Power, but even next year, she will not be in the absolutely
helpless condition which is at this moment so strong a temptation
to national hatreds, and to the military thirst for gold and glory
which prevails with a party in Germany. I am afraid the peace of
Europe depends entirely upon the view Bismarck may take of the
easiest means of bringing all German-speaking nations under one
rule. The wolf can always find reasons for quarrelling with the
lamb, and as Bismarck himself told Odo Russell, he has had a good
deal of experience of this kind of thing. The French lamb will not
be skittish, and indeed will hardly venture to bleat, for some
time. For my own part, I am constantly on the watch to forestall
questions which may make difficulties between France and any other
country; for if Bismarck wants war, it would suit him to be able to
appear to be only taking his part in a quarrel already made.
Italy is the most dangerous neighbour from this point of
view, and the presence of the _Orénoque_ at Civita Vecchia is the
ticklish point. It is a very delicate matter to touch; for if the
question came very prominently into notice, it might raise one of
the storms in the press of all countries, which are so often the
precursors of evil times. The ship is supposed to be at Civita
Vecchia to give the Pope the means of leaving Italy, if he wishes
to do so; and I suppose the Vatican might relieve the French of
embarrassment by saying that she is not wanted. In fact, if the
Italian Government intended to prevent the Pope's going away, they
would of course stop him before he got to Civita Vecchia, and if
they abstained (as would no doubt be the case) from interfering
with his movements, he could get a ship to depart in, whenever he
pleased.
I do not know that there is any ill-feeling in Switzerland
towards France, but the Ultramontane disputes give Bismarck a lever
to work with.
I believe the French Government have completely drawn in their
horns about the Armenian Patriarch question and the Protectorate of
the Latin Christians in the East, since Bismarck appeared on the
field at Constantinople.
In looking out for small beginnings of troubles, I have
thought of Tunis. I suppose we may lay aside all apprehension of
attempts of France to change the frontier or to bring the Regency
into more complete dependency upon her, at the present moment. I
find by a despatch from Mr. Wood, that the German commodore, in his
conversation with the Bey, insisted particularly upon the interests
of German subjects being put upon as good a footing as those of the
subjects of any other country.
I think Décazes takes the humiliating position in which
France, and he as her Foreign Minister, are placed, with more
equanimity and temper than most Frenchmen would; and so long as
the present, or any other Government, not absolutely unreasonable,
is at the head of affairs, France will be prudent in her foreign
relations.
Of Marshal MacMahon's seven years' lease of power, only three
months have elapsed; a time too short to give much foundation for
conjecture as to its probable duration. Both he himself and his
Ministers take opportunities of declaring that its continuance
is above discussion, and that they will maintain it against all
comers. There are two things against it. First, the extreme
difficulty of giving it anything like the appearance of permanence
and stability which would rally to it that great majority of
Frenchmen who are ready at all times to worship the powers that
be, if only they look as if they were likely to continue to be.
Secondly, there is the character of the Marshal himself. He is
honest and a brave soldier, but he does not take such a part in
affairs as would increase his personal prestige. The danger,
in fact, is that by degrees he may come to be looked upon as a
_nullité!_
The Imperialists are agitating themselves and spending money,
as if they were meditating an immediate coup. The wiser heads
counsel patience, but the old horses, who sorely miss the pampering
they had under the Empire, are getting very hungry, and are afraid
that they themselves may die before the grass has grown.
The fear of an Imperialist attempt has in some degree brought
back to the Government the support of the Legitimists, and in fact
the Comte de Chambord has quarrelled with his own party. The Fusion
has put an end to the Orleanist Party, as a party for placing
the Comte de Paris on the throne; but the question of appointing
the Duc d'Aumale Vice-President, in order to have some one ready
to succeed MacMahon in case of need, is seriously considered. I
suppose, however, that MacMahon would look upon this as destructive
of the arrangements between him and the Assembly. And then the
whole system depends upon the maintenance by hook or by crook of
a majority, which has not yet ceased to melt away, as seats become
vacant and new elections take place.
The Duc de Bisaccia, the new French Ambassador in London, even at his
first interview with Lord Derby, did not scruple to avow that he felt
quite certain that the Republican form of government would not last, and
he went on to assert that Bismarck's head had been turned by success,
and that he aimed at nothing less than the conquest of Europe, being
quite indifferent either to the views of his Imperial Master, or of the
Crown Prince. Whatever the prospects of the Republic, the prospects of
Bisaccia's own party (Legitimist) were indisputably gloomy, for the
prevailing sentiment in France at the time was hostility to the White
Flag and to the clerical and aristocratic influences of which it was
held to be the emblem. The great majority of the people were Republican,
and the most numerous party after the Republican was the Imperial, but
the Presidency of Marshal MacMahon was acquiesced in, for the moment,
by all parties, because it was believed to be capable of preserving
order, because it left the question of the definitive government of the
country still undecided, and because no party saw its way to securing
the pre-dominence of its own ideas.
The existing state of things was accounted for by the history of the
establishment of the seven-years Presidency.
When the Orleans Princes tendered their allegiance to the Comte de
Chambord in the previous autumn, the fusion, so long talked of, was
complete, and it was supposed that a Parliamentary Monarchy with the
Tricolour Flag, might be established under the legitimate head of
the Bourbons; but the Comte de Chambord struck a fatal blow to these
hopes by his celebrated letter, and the Conservatives felt that there
was no time to be lost in setting up a Government having some sort of
stability. The plan which they adopted was that of conferring power
upon Marshal MacMahon for a fixed and long period. Had a short period
been proposed, it would have been agreed to almost unanimously; but
this was not their object. They wished it to be apparent to the country
that the Marshal was specially the President of the Conservative
majority: they asked for a term of ten years: obtained seven, and
secured from the Marshal a declaration of adherence to their views. The
slight modification of the Ministry which ensued, resulted in placing
the Government more completely in the hands of the party pledged to a
monarchical form of Government, and the Ministry thus reconstituted, set
itself to the task of resisting the progress of Radicalism and Communism
in the country.
But the suspicion of favouring the White Flag clung to the Government,
and although the latter, following the example of the Empire, had
installed their partisans in office, as mayors, etc., by thousands
throughout the country, the candidates supported by the Government had,
in almost every instance, found themselves at the bottom of the poll
when elections took place; and the results showed that a large accession
of votes had been received by the Republican and Imperialist parties. Of
these the former had gained most, but the latter possessed a backing in
the country which was inadequately represented by their numbers in the
Assembly.
It should, however, be added that there did not appear on any side a
disposition to embarrass the Government by factious or bitter opposition
with regard to the three departments, Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs,
in which the practical interests of the country were most deeply
involved. The financial policy of M. Magne[9] was generally supported;
and with regard to votes for the Army and Navy, the Government had
rather to resist a pressure to increase the expenditure on these heads,
than to urge the necessity of considerable supplies.
In the conduct of foreign affairs, the defenceless state of France had
made the avoidance of an attack from Germany the one overwhelming care
of the Government. To effect this object, to give Germany no pretext for
a quarrel, and to make submission to the behests of Bismarck as little
galling and in appearance as little humiliating as possible, had been
the constant occupation of the Foreign Minister. In this effort he was
seconded by the Assembly, and indeed every one in and out of that body,
except a few clerical and Legitimist bigots, felt it to be a patriotic
duty to abstain from embarrassing the Government in its relations with
foreign Powers. Another reassuring feature in the situation was, that
there were no symptoms of attempts to resist by force the authority of
the Assembly, as no party seemed likely to venture to oppose by force
a Government which disposed of the army; and the army in 1874 showed
no prediction for any particular candidate for the throne sufficiently
strong to overcome its habitual obedience to the Constitutional
Government, whatever that Government might be.
As an instance of the dictation practised by Bismarck towards France in
foreign affairs, it may be mentioned that in January, 1874,[10] Count
Arnim formally announced to the Duc Décazes that the German Government
would not tolerate the assumption by France of the suzerainty of Tunis,
or of a Protectorate over that country. To this Décazes humbly replied
that there had never been the least question of anything of the kind--a
statement which can scarcely be described as accurate.
Whether Bismarck entertained any designs with regard to Tunis is not
known, but it was in this year that Germany began to show some signs
of interest in the Philippines and other places supposed to be of
some colonial value. The following extract from a letter written on
the subject by the late Lord Lytton, who was at the time Secretary
of Embassy at Paris, is a striking instance of rare and remarkable
political prescience.
* * * * *
_Lord Lytton to Lord Lyons._
Paris, Oct. 27, 1874.
* * * * *
Odo's impression (communicated to you) that Bismarck does
not want colonies rather surprises me. It seems to me a perfectly
natural and quite inevitable ambition on the part of a Power so
strong as Germany not to remain an inland state a moment longer
than it can help, but to get to the sea, and to extend its seaboard
in all possible directions. Is there any case on record of an
inland state suddenly attaining to the military supremacy of Europe
without endeavouring by means of its military strength and prestige
to develop its maritime power? But you can't be a Maritime Power
without colonies, for if you have ships you must have places to
send them to, work for them to do, and a marine Exercier-Platz
for training seamen. That is why I have always thought that the
English school of politicians which advocates getting rid of our
colonies as profitless encumbrances, ought (to be consistent) to
advocate the simultaneous suppression of our navy. Lord Derby says
that though Germany may probably cherish such an ambition, she
will have as much seaboard as she can practically want as long
as she retains possession of the Duchies. But that is not a very
convenient commercial seaboard, and I confess I can't help doubting
the absence of all desire for more and better outlets to the
sea, so long as her military power and prestige remain unbroken.
Anyhow, there seems to be now a pretty general instinct throughout
Europe, and even in America, that a policy of maritime and colonial
development must be the natural result of Germany's present
position: and such instincts, being those of self-preservation, are
generally, I think, what Dizzy calls 'unerring' ones.
A letter from Lord Odo Russell written about this period throws a
curious light upon Bismarck's imaginary grievances, and the difficulties
which he was prepared to raise upon the slightest provocation. Probably
no Minister of modern times ever uttered so many complaints, threatened
so often to resign, and yet wielded such absolute power.
* * * * *
_Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._
Berlin, Nov. 9, 1874.
I found Prince Bismarck in one of his confidential moods
the other day, and he indulged me in a long talk about his own
interests, past, present, and prospective.
Among many other things, he said that his life had been
strangely divided into phases or periods of twelve years each.
Born in 1815, he had left home when he was twelve years old to
begin his studies. At 24 he inherited his small patrimony and his
father's debts, and entered upon the life and duties of a country
gentleman. At 36 (1851) his diplomatic career began, and he was
sent to Frankfort, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Paris. At 48 (1863)
he was recalled to form the present Administration, which in twelve
years had carried on three wars and made the German Empire. He was
now 60 and worn out with the responsibilities and anxieties of
office, and he was resolved to enter upon a new phase (of 12 years
he hoped) by resigning and retiring into private life--a resolution
he begged I would keep to myself for the present.
I said I could well understand his wish for rest, but I did
not believe the Emperor or the country would allow him to indulge
in it, as he was well enough and strong enough to govern Germany
for many years to come.
He replied that he felt quite strong enough to govern Germany,
but not to be governed himself any longer by the Emperor, whose
obstinacy and narrow mindedness were more than he could bear.
I said I had often heard him complain of his Court duties
before, but it appeared to me that he always carried his points,
and that after some resistance the Emperor gave way in the end and
followed his advice.
He replied that it was that very struggle with his Imperial
Master that had worn him out and that he no longer felt strong
enough to carry on after sixty. He then related to me a series of
very curious anecdotes illustrating his struggles with the Crown,
and what he called the want of confidence and ingratitude of the
Emperor.
I asked him whether anything had lately occurred calculated to
increase his wish for rest.
He said that his present difference with the Emperor related
to the new army organization. The Emperor and his generals thought
the sole object of the German Empire was to turn the nation into an
army for the greater glory of the House of Hohenzollern; whilst he
held that there must be some limit to the heavy strain of military
obligations the Crown was ever anxious to impose on the people.
I asked whether he was alluding to the Landsturm Bill, which
placed every German from the age of 16 to 42 at the disposal of the
War Department.
He replied that he did not exactly allude to that, but there
were other measures in contemplation, elaborated in the Emperor's
military Cabinet, he could not give his sanction to, and which
would consequently lead to another painful struggle. He considered
that his great task had been completed in 1870 to 1872, and that he
could now retire and leave the internal organization of Germany to
other hands. The Crown Prince, he thought, might possibly govern
on more Constitutional principles than his father, who, born
in the last century, had not yet been able to realize what the
duties of a Constitutional Sovereign were, and thought himself as
King of Prussia above the Constitution, as the Emperor Sigismund
thought himself above grammar when he wrote bad Latin. A danger
to which the Crown Prince would be exposed as Sovereign was his
love for intrigue and backstairs influence--'some one or other
always concealed behind the door or curtain.' The Prince was not as
straightforward as he appeared, and he suffered from the weakness
of obstinacy and the obstinacy of weakness due to unbounded conceit
and self-confidence--but at the same time he meant well.
After a good deal more talk about his family, his property,
and his longing for country life and pursuits, we parted.
Without attaching undue importance to Prince Bismarck's
oft-repeated threat of resignation, I do not suppose he would go
out of his way to tell me and others so, without intention. My
impression is that he wants to obtain something or other from the
Emperor which he can make conditional on remaining in office, well
knowing that His Majesty cannot do without him. Besides which,
his retirement from office would have the appearance of a defeat,
consequent on his failure to coerce the Pope and his legions. He is
not the man to admit a defeat while he lives. Time will show what
more he wants to satisfy his gigantic ambition.
The fear of war with Germany had died away temporarily in the summer,
and the various political parties in France were free to continue their
struggles and to reduce the situation to almost unexampled confusion.
The motives of the Comte de Chambord and his followers were too remote
for ordinary human understanding, and their object appeared to be to
bring about a crisis and a dissolution of the Assembly on the most
disadvantageous terms to themselves. Moderate Republicans were looking
to the Duc d'Aumale as a safeguard against the Imperialists on the one
hand, and the Reds on the other. Republicans of various shades, and the
Reds in particular, were coquetting with Prince Napoleon, and he with
them. Most men and most parties appeared to have particular objects,
which they hated with a hatred more intense than their love for the
object of their affections. Thiers, it was believed, would have rather
seen anything, even a restoration of the Empire, than have the Duc de
Broglie and the Orleanists in power. Notwithstanding the fusion, the
Legitimists would have probably preferred Gambetta (or some one still
more extreme) than an Orleans Prince--and so on.
'I cannot make head or tail of French internal politics,' Lord Derby
wrote, at the end of the year, 'and presume that most Frenchmen are in
the same condition. It looks as if nobody could see their way till the
present Assembly is dissolved and a new one elected.'
The beginning of the new year was signalized in Paris by the appearance
of the Lord Mayor of London, who had been invited to attend the opening
of the new Opera House. That functionary has always been invested in
French popular opinion with semi-fabulous attributes, and he seems to
have risen to the level of the occasion. 'The Lord Mayor,' wrote the
unimpressionable Lord Lyons, 'is astonishing the Parisians with his
sword, mace, trumpeters, and State coaches. So far, however, I think the
disposition here is to be pleased with it all, and I keep no countenance
and do what I have to do with becoming gravity.' A little later,
however, he was constrained to add:--
I am afraid the Lord Mayor's head has been turned by the
fuss which was made with him here, for he seems to have made a
very foolish speech on his return to England. Strange to say the
Parisians continued to be amused and pleased with his pomps and
vanities to the end, although the narrow limits between the sublime
and the ridiculous were always on the point of being over passed.
I abstained from going to the banquets given to him, or by him,
except a private dinner at the Elysée; but I had him to dinner
here, and, I think, sent him away pleased with the Embassy, which
it is always as well to do, and if so, I have reaped the reward of
my diplomatic command over my risible muscles.
It was not perhaps surprising that the Lord Mayor should have been
thrown off his intellectual balance, for the honours accorded to him
far surpassed those paid to ordinary mortals and resembled rather those
habitually reserved for crowned heads. When he visited the opera the
ex-Imperial box was reserved for his use; the audience rose at his
entry, and the orchestra played the English National Anthem. Twice he
dined with the President of the Republic; the Prefect of the Seine gave
a banquet in his honour; so did the authorities at Boulogne; and to
crown all, the Tribunal of Commerce struck a medal in commemoration of
his visit.
The one thing that was fairly clear in French politics, besides
abhorrence of the White Flag, was the gradual progress of Bonapartism
which was beginning to frighten Conservatives as well as Republicans,
and the Bonapartists themselves were inclined to regret having helped
to turn Thiers out of office, because the army was becoming more and
more anti-Republican, and it would be much easier to turn it against a
civilian than against its natural head, a Marshal of France.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Jan. 26, 1875.
Bonapartism is still in the ascendant, and certainly the
Assembly is doing everything to give weight to the assertion that
France is unfit for Parliamentary Government. No one believes in
a moderate Republic, as a self-supporting institution unconnected
with some particular individual. The 'Conservative Republic'
was devised for M. Thiers. The Septennate Republic, if it be a
Republic, would be scouted if MacMahon were not at the head of
it. The Comte de Chambord is impossible. The Orleanists have cast
in their lot with his, and besides, the Government they represent
being constitutional or Parliamentary, is exactly what is most
out of favour, with the exception of the White Flag. As I have
said all along, the dispute is between a very advanced Republic
and the Empire, and _confugiendum est ad imperium_ is becoming
more and more the cry of those who dread Communism. Those who have
personal reasons for fearing the Empire are already taking their
precautions. Friends of the Orleans Princes are believed to have
seriously conferred (not with the knowledge or consent of the
Princes themselves, so far as I have heard) with the Bonaparte
leaders, in order to ascertain what the Orleans family would
have to expect if the Prince Imperial returned. At any rate the
Bonapartist papers have been insinuating that they would be allowed
to stay in France and keep their property; and these insinuations
are of course intended to relieve tender Orleanist consciences of
scruples in coming round to the Imperial cause.
The officers in the army are becoming more and more averse
from all idea of a permanent Republic. They would willingly wait to
the end of MacMahon's time, but they are beginning to talk of the
possibility of his being so much disgusted by the way in which he
is worried by the Assembly, as to throw the Presidency up.
In short France is at this moment in a fear of Bonapartism.
It may, and very probably will, subside this time, but it differs
from most intermittent fevers in this, that the attacks recur at
shorter and shorter intervals, and increase instead of diminish in
intensity.
Fear of the Imperialists drove Conservatives into voting with Gambetta
and other advanced Republicans; a ministerial crisis took place; the
Assembly gave contradictory decisions and generally discredited itself,
and the confusion grew so great that it seemed impossible to unravel it.
'I have spent three afternoons at Versailles,' wrote Lord
Lyons on February 26th, 'and have seen a Constitution made there.
I have seen also such a confusion of parties and principles as I
hope never to witness again. I found Décazes, Broglie, and a great
number of Right Centre deputies at the MacMahons' last evening.
They all, and particularly Décazes, looked to me very unhappy,
and indeed they did not affect to be at all satisfied with the
occurrences in the Assembly. Like the horse in the fable who
invited the man to get on his back, the Right Centre have let the
Left get on their backs to attack Bonapartism, and don't know how
to shake them off again.'
The ceaseless struggles between the various political parties in France,
which were of little interest to the outside world, were temporarily
interrupted in the spring of 1875 by the war scare which so greatly
agitated Europe at the time, but which subsequently became an almost
annual phenomenon. Unfortunately, Lord Lyons was in England during
the greater portion of this critical period, and there are wanting,
consequently, documents which might have thrown light upon what has
always been a somewhat mysterious episode, but it would appear that the
symptoms of alarm on the part of the French first showed themselves
about March 11. On that day the Duc Décazes drew the attention of the
British Ambassador to three incidents which ought to engage the serious
attention of those Governments who were desirous of maintaining peace
in Europe. These were the threatening representation made by the German
Minister at Brussels to the Belgian Government respecting the language
and conduct of the Ultramontane Party in that country; the pointed
communication to the French Government of this representation; and the
prohibition of the export of horses from Germany. Prince Bismarck,
said Décazes, seemed to become more and more inclined to revive old
grievances and to require of foreign countries the exercise of an
unreasonable and impossible control over the prelates and even over
the lay members of the Roman Catholic Church, and as for the decree
forbidding the export of horses, it was so inexplicable that it could
only add to uneasiness. It might be easy for England, and for some other
nations, to regard these things calmly, but to France they constituted
a serious and immediate peril. In spite of the steps taken during the
past year to conciliate Germany on the subject of the Bishop's charges,
the German Government had never officially intimated that it considered
the question to be closed, and Count Arnim had used the significant
expression to him, that it was only closed 'so far as any question
between you and us can ever be looked upon as closed.' He believed that
it was only owing to the influence of other Powers, and of England in
particular, that the danger had been averted in 1874; and he now hoped
that the same influence would be exerted in the same way. Décazes added
a somewhat surprising piece of information which had been imparted to
him in January, 1874, by Prince Orloff, the Russian Ambassador, viz.
that in that month an order to occupy Nancy had absolutely been issued
by the German Government to its troops, and that there were strong
grounds for believing that this order has been rescinded chiefly owing
to influence exerted at Berlin by Russia. So far as is known, there is
no corroboration of this story, and it would appear that Prince Orloff
was so anxious to convince France of the goodwill of Russia that he
thought it advisable to drag England into the question, but it was not
surprising that France should be sensitively alive to the danger she
incurred, if Bismarck, irritated by his Ultramontane difficulties,
should choose to throw the blame upon the Roman Catholics of other
countries, or should resort to quarrels with foreign nations as a means
of diverting public opinion in Germany from inconvenient questions at
home.
Prince Hohenlohe, the new German Ambassador, who also saw Lord Lyons on
the same day, volunteered no opinion upon the representation to Belgium
which had excited so much perturbation, but remarked with regard to the
exportation of horses that the 'agriculturists might have been alarmed
by the prospect of a drain of horses for foreign countries. He had no
reason to suppose that purchases of horses had been made in Germany by
the French Government for military purposes; but he had heard that a
considerable number had lately been brought there for the Paris fiacres.'
It will not have escaped notice that the German Government--or rather
Bismarck--was fortunate in always having excellent reasons available,
either for not complying with inconvenient requests, or for explaining
away disquieting symptoms; thus, in 1870, the insuperable difficulty to
disarmament was the King of Prussia; during the peace negotiations, all
harsh conditions were due to _les militaires_, and in 1875 the German
agriculturists and the Paris cabs were responsible for any uneasiness
that might be felt temporarily.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._
Paris, March 16, 1875.
I saw Décazes last night and found him in a greater state of
alarm about the intentions of Germany than anything specific he
told me seemed to warrant. The retirement of Bismarck to Varzin
will not reassure the French, because they remember that he was
there when the war broke out in 1870.
There is observable here, and not least among the Russians, a
sort of impression that there is to be a movement of some kind in
the East.
In short, there is a great deal of vague uneasiness and fear
that peace is in danger.
The German Embassy here has certainly been taking great pains
to put it about that the prohibition to export horses has been
decreed solely from economical, and not from military motives.
That Embassy keeps up very close relations with the _Times_
correspondent[11] here, and his subordinates. Of course the trouble
it has taken has increased instead of allaying alarm. Décazes
constantly harps on the string of the influence of England at
Berlin, and the consolation it affords him to feel sure that it is
exercised quietly on the side of peace. The position is a painful
one. Without particular friendships and alliances, France is
absolutely at the mercy of Germany, and if she tries to form such
friendships and alliances, she may bring the wrath of the great
Chancellor down upon her instantly.
* * * * *
_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, March 16, 1875.
I do not know and cannot conjecture the cause of Décazes's
anxiety. Nothing has passed or is passing in any part of Europe to
justify alarm as to an early disturbance of general peace. But I
hear of a similar feeling of uneasiness at Berlin; and the Russian
Government is credited with designs as to the nature of which no
two persons agree. Until we hear more, I shall be inclined to set
down all these rumours of wars to the time of year, and to the
absence of any exciting questions (so far as foreign relations are
concerned) to occupy men's minds.
I may tell you confidentially that Bismarck has given us
through Odo Russell a serious warning against the unfriendly
feelings of the Russian Government towards England. He may be only
trying to stir up jealousy, a game which he often plays, or he may
be sincere. I take his hint as one not to be slighted, yet not
infallibly trusted. Gortschakoff is no doubt much disgusted about
the Conference; the Czar also to some extent; and probably they
both feel that they had miscalculated the effect of the Russian
marriage on English policy. But beyond this I know no cause of
quarrel. Dead calm for the moment. I cannot conceive any reason why
you should not take your leave when you wish it. Paris is always
within reach if anything new turns up.
It is obvious from the above that neither Lord Derby nor Lord Lyons felt
any very serious apprehensions, and the latter was permitted to go home
on leave at the beginning of April. On April 10, Lord Odo Russell wrote
to Lord Derby:--
Bismarck is at his old tricks again--alarming the Germans
through the officious Press, and intimating that the French are
going to attack them, and that Austria and Italy are conspiring
in favour of the Pope, etc. Now he has succeeded in making the
Emperor and the Crown Prince believe that France is meditating an
invasion of Germany through Belgium! And, not knowing any better,
they are in despair and have ordered the War Department to make
ready for defence. This crisis will blow over like so many others,
but Bismarck's sensational policy is very wearisome at times. Half
the Diplomatic Body have been here since yesterday to tell me that
war was imminent, and when I seek to calm their nerves and disprove
their anticipations, they think that I am thoroughly bamboozled by
Bismarck.
In the middle of April there appeared in the _Berlin Post_ the
celebrated article entitled: 'Is War in Sight?' and as it was well known
that such articles were not written except under official inspiration,
something akin to a real panic took place, more especially when other
German papers began to write in a similar strain. Letters from Mr.
Adams, who had been left as Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, show the
pitiable condition of terror to which the French Government was reduced,
and the efforts made by Décazes to obtain British support. Décazes urged
that England ought to take an active part in protesting against the
new theory that one nation was justified in falling upon another for
no other reason than that the latter might possibly prove troublesome
in the future. He said that he had protested to the German Ambassador
against the attitude of the German Government, after all the assurances
that it had received from the French Government, and added that if war
took place in August, as he feared, he should advise MacMahon to retire
with his army beyond the Loire without firing a shot and wait there
'until the justice of Europe should speak out in favour of France.' The
idea of openly identifying England with the French cause did not commend
itself apparently to Mr. Disraeli.
'I had a rather long conversation about French politics with
Mr. Disraeli,' Lord Lyons wrote to Mr. Adams on April 21st, 'and I
found him thoroughly well up in the subject. He wishes to encourage
confidence and goodwill on the part of France towards England,
but sees the danger to France herself of any such appearance of a
special and separate understanding as would arouse the jealousy of
Bismarck.
* * * * *
'With a little variation in the illustrations, Décazes's
language to you was just what he used to me before I left Paris.
Germany can, I suppose, overrun France whenever she pleases, a
fortnight after she determines to do so; and no one can tell how
suddenly she may come to this determination. Whether Décazes is
wise in perpetually crying "wolf" I cannot say. He is naturally
anxious to keep Europe on the alert, but I am not sure that the
repetition of these cries does not produce the contrary effect.'
During the second half of April the tension began to diminish, but Lord
Odo Russell, who was certainly no alarmist, felt convinced that, so long
as Bismarck remained in office, the peace of Europe was in jeopardy,
for his power had now become absolute, and neither the Emperor nor the
Crown Prince were capable of withstanding him. Writing on April 24, he
remarks: 'The prospect of another war fills me with horror and disgust,
and if Bismarck lives a few years longer I do not see how it can be
prevented. The Emperor's powers of resistance are over; he does what
Bismarck wishes, and the Crown Prince, peace-loving as he is, has not
sufficient independence of character to resist Bismarck's all-powerful
mind and will.'
A few days later the Belgian Minister at Berlin reported to Lord Odo
Russell an alarming communication made to him by Count Moltke.
* * * * *
_Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._
Berlin, May 1, 1875.
Since writing to you to-day, at this late hour my Belgian
colleague Baron Nothomb has called to tell me that he had a long
conversation with Moltke yesterday fully confirming what is said
in my despatch. Moltke added that, much as he hated war, he did
not see how Germany could avoid it _next year_, unless the Great
Powers 'coalesced' to persuade France to reduce her armaments to a
reasonable peace establishment.
Then Nothomb told me that Bismarck had sent Bülow to him with
the following confidential message: 'Tell your King to get his army
ready for defence, because Belgium may be invaded by France sooner
than we expect.'
This message Nothomb writes to Brussels to-day. He is under
an impression that in the event of war, Bismarck intends to occupy
Belgium, as Frederick the Great occupied Saxony when he suspected
Maria Theresa of wanting to take her revenge for the loss of
Silesia. This is curious, and you will probably hear more about it
from Brussels. I write in haste for the Messenger.
The evident desire of Bismarck to fasten a quarrel upon France aroused
the indignation of Lord Derby, who realized that the intervention of
Russia was the best method of preventing it.
* * * * *
_Lord Derby to Lord O. Russell._
Foreign Office, May 3, 1875.
You seem reassured as to the immediate prospect, and the panic
in Paris has subsided, but great uneasiness remains. Lumley[12]
writes to me that the state of things seems to him most critical,
and the language which you report as held by Moltke is unpleasant
enough. Münster[13] has not called for the last few days: when last
I saw him, his language about French armaments tallied exactly
with that which you and others report as being held by German
representatives throughout Europe.
Is there no hope of Russian interference to maintain peace?
It cannot be the interest of Russia to have France destroyed and
Germany omnipotent. If the Czar were to say that a new war must not
take place, and that he would not allow it, Bismarck would hardly
undertake to fight Russia and France combined. I see little other
prospect of averting mischief, and if it begins, where is it to end?
Even here, and notwithstanding the sympathy felt in the
main for the Protestant German Empire, the outrageous injustice
of picking a quarrel with France, because she does not choose to
remain disarmed, would produce its effect. There would be a great
revulsion of feeling; not unlike that which took place when the
first Napoleon had begun to show his real character and objects.
The English public knows little about foreign concerns, but it does
understand that hitting a man when he is down is not fair play, and
I think in the rest of Europe fear and jealousy of the predominant
Power would give France many adherents.
I do what I can to point this out in a quiet and friendly way;
but without being sanguine.
* * * * *
May 4. The conversation about Belgium in the House of Lords
last night led to no result. I think I see a growing feeling,
indicated by the language of the press, that the German demands are
not necessarily unreasonable, and that we should at least hear more
of the case before pronouncing judgment.
To judge by the reports which Nothomb sends to his own
Government, he has been thoroughly frightened, and is ready to
advise unconditional acceptance of German proposals. Is he disposed
to be an alarmist? Or has Bismarck established a personal hold over
him?
We are quiet at this office, busy in Parliament; the Session
threatens to be long, but it will not be eventful.
On May 6, Lord Odo Russell reported that Count Schouvaloff, the Russian
Ambassador in London, had just arrived at Berlin from St. Petersburg,
and was the bearer of important tidings.
The good news he brought respecting our relations with Russia
filled me with delight after the dark allusions made to me here
at Court and by the Chancellor during the winter. As regards
Germany and the war rumours, Count Schouvaloff gave me the most
satisfactory and welcome news that the Emperor of Russia is coming
to Berlin on Monday next, will insist on the maintenance of peace
in Europe, even at the cost of a rupture with Germany, and that he
can reckon on the support of Austria in doing so.
How Bismarck will meet the humiliating blow of being told by
his allies, Russia and Austria, that he must keep the peace with
France, when he has proclaimed to the world that France is ready to
take her revenge, it is difficult to foretell. But we must not be
surprised if it hastens on the outburst it is intended to prevent.
I hope not, and do not expect it, but I shall not be surprised if
it does, because Austria has really joined Russia. She has become
an obstacle in the way of German development, which Bismarck will
try to remove.
It had, of course, been the object of Bismarck to sow dissension between
England and Russia, and he had taken elaborate pains to convince
the British Government that Russia was animated by the most hostile
feelings. Consequently the extremely frank and friendly sentiments
expressed by Count Schouvaloff were in the nature of an agreeable
surprise, but the effusion of the Russian Envoy was so great that he
seems to have slightly overdone the part.
* * * * *
_Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._
Berlin, May 8, 1875.
I did not report Schouvaloff's conversation because he was
going to tell you all he had to say in great detail as soon as he
reached London. His frankness is fascinating, but on reflection it
does not inspire absolute confidence. I feel at first inclined to
believe all he says; but when I think it over, it appears too good
to be true.
If all he represents himself to have said to Bismarck about
the power of Russia to coerce Germany under certain circumstances
be strictly true, Bismarck would scarcely want him to succeed
Gortschakoff, as he does, if he did not feel that he could make a
tool of him (Schouvaloff).
According to Schouvaloff, the Czar and Gortschakoff are
to tell Bismarck next week that a new war must not take place,
and that if he does not submit and agree, Russia, with the
concurrence of Austria, is prepared to side with France to render
war impossible. In all probability, their conferences will end
in mutual assurances of peace and good will, and we shall hear
no more of war rumours and French armaments until those of
Germany are ready; and as Bismarck is a match both for the Czar
and Gortschakoff, I shall not be surprised to hear that he has
persuaded them to let him have his own way in the end. But this is
mere conjecture; we shall know more about it all a week hence.
The whole of Bismarck's policy now tends to produce a
coalition of the peaceful Powers against Germany, and his Church
policy, to produce dissensions in Germany and arrest the progress
of unification. It is therefore evident that he seeks a conflict
for purposes of his own.
I may be wrong, but I cannot but think that he wants to
mediatize the smaller German Powers and weaken Austria so as to
render her alliance useless to Russia, France, and Italy.
If I understand Schouvaloff correctly, Bismarck endeavoured to
set Russia against us, as he attempted to set us against Russia,
and he seemed to expect that Bismarck would make Gortschakoff
various offers in return for Russian co-operation or neutrality.
Indeed, he insinuated that he thought Bismarck a little out of his
mind at times.
The importance of the Czar's language and attitude at Berlin
is so great that I look forward with anxious interest to the
results of next week's conferences. For my part I have been careful
to hold the language you tell me you hold at home on these matters
in a friendly spirit to Germany and in the interest of European
Peace.
On the same date (May 8), the Emperor Alexander and Prince Gortschakoff
started on the journey to Berlin from which so much was anticipated,
and the British Government addressed a despatch to Lord Odo Russell
which was also circulated at Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and
Rome, instructing him to use all his power to put an end to the
misunderstanding which had arisen between France and Germany. It is
worthy of note that when this despatch was communicated to the Austrian
Government, that Government alone declined to instruct their Ambassador
at Berlin in the sense desired, on the ground that it would irritate
Bismarck.
The Emperor Alexander and Gortschakoff arrived at Berlin on May 10,
and the question of peace or war must have been decided with extreme
rapidity, for Lord Odo Russell dined with Bismarck on that night, and
the latter took the opportunity to express his thanks 'for the very
friendly offer, which he highly appreciated, as a proof of good will
and confidence on the part of Her Majesty's Government.' At the same
time he expressed some naïve surprise at the offer, maintaining that
all his efforts tended in the direction of peace; that the war rumours
were the work of the stockjobbers and the press, and that France and
Germany were on excellent terms! Under the circumstances, it is highly
creditable to Lord Odo Russell that he received this communication with
becoming gravity.
Gortschakoff who made his appearance after the dinner professed great
satisfaction at Bismarck's language; but in conversation with Lord
Odo Russell on the following day (May 11), Bismarck spoke with much
irritation of Gortschakoff's intervention, which he attributed to senile
vanity, and stated that he had refused Gortschakoff's request for a
categorical promise not to go to war, because such a promise would have
implied the existence of an intention which he repudiated.
On May 12, Gortschakoff sent a telegram to St. Petersburg which gave
dire offence: _La paix est assurée:_ and the Emperor of Russia requested
Lord Odo to inform Her Majesty's Government that he felt certain of the
maintenance of peace. Bismarck, secretly furious at the frustration of
his plans, outwardly betrayed no ill-humour and put a good face upon his
failure.
* * * * *
_Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby._
Berlin, May 15, 1875.
Although Bismarck is as civil, confidential, and amiable
to me as ever, I fancy that he must be frantic at our combined
action with Russia in favour of peace, which took him by surprise.
However that matters little, and he will get over it, as he wishes
to keep well with us. But he will seek an opportunity of paying
out Gortschakoff for having come the Peacemaker and Dictator over
Germany again.
For my part, I was delighted at the course pursued by Her
Majesty's Government and at the instructions you sent me, which I
feel sure will do good, both at home and abroad.
The old Emperor William, whose bodily health is wonderful, but
whose mental powers are declining, will have been surprised and
grieved at the Queen writing to the Czar instead of to himself.
Bismarck thinks it is due to an intrigue of the Empress Augusta
to spite him. His hatred and abuse of the Empress is a perfect
mania. The Crown Prince sent for me to talk the incident over. He
asked many questions, but was himself reserved, beyond deploring
Bismarck's nervous state and policy which had been the cause of
such useless alarm. He asked whether I saw any likely successor to
Bismarck if his health broke down. I said plenty would be found
in Germany when there was a demand for them, which Bismarck's
popularity at present excluded. The Prince, though reserved, was
very cordial and very anxious for information.
Your conversation with Schouvaloff is word for word what he
said to me. I note one mistake on his part. He spoke with certainty
of Austrian co-operation, which failed us at the last moment.
I was much impressed by the warmth and eloquence of the
Czar's utterances of friendship for England. He seemed really
to feel deeply what he said, and to wish with all his heart for
an alliance with us. Gortschakoff was less ardent: it is not in
his nature; but he was persuasive and consistent in his friendly
assurances. Schouvaloff's attitude and language will show whether
my impressions are correct or not.
Münster's assurances to you in regard to the German army are
quite correct, I believe; only it is better prepared for war than
any other army in the world, and at ten days' notice. But when
Bismarck tells him to lament the alarm he has created himself, and
to ascribe it to Ultramontane influences in the press, Münster must
feel rather ashamed of his master.
We may certainly reckon on peace for this year. Next year
peace must depend on the state of Bismarck's combinations for
the completion of his task--the unification of Germany--Russia
permitting. He left for Varzin this morning, which will do him
good; but he returns on the 27th instant to receive the King and
Queen of Sweden who stay three days in Berlin.
I did not mention in my official report that the Czar asked
me to tell him frankly, if I was at liberty to do so, whether I
thought Bismarck had designs on Austria. I told him what the wishes
of the National Party were, and what they expected of Bismarck
their leader, and that I believed he contemplated weakening Austria
to strengthen Germany. The Czar thanked me and said that although
suspicion had been suggested to him from many sides, he could not
get himself to believe in so much perfidy.
Such then in brief is the story of the great war scare of 1875, a tale
which has been told by many writers with embellishments suggested by
either Anglophil or Russophil proclivities. Which of the two countries,
England or Russia, contributed most towards the preservation of peace
will probably always remain a subject of discussion, but Bismarck at
all events never forgave Gortschakoff his vainglorious telegram, and
he used afterwards to maintain that, whereas the English had 'behaved
like gentlemen,' the conduct of the Russian Government came under a
distinctly opposite category. It is a remarkable fact that in spite
of the indisputable evidence furnished not only by the foregoing
correspondence, but from other sources, Bismarck subsequently had the
hardihood to assert that the war scare of 1875 was a myth invented
partly by Décazes for stockjobbing purposes and partly by the
Ultramontane press--even the English press being according to his
assertions under Ultramontane influence. In the authoritative work
'Bismarck: his Reflections and Reminiscences' it is lightly dismissed
as an elaborate fiction. 'So far was I from entertaining any such idea
at the time, or afterwards, that I would rather have resigned than
lent a hand in picking a quarrel which would have had no other motive
than preventing France from recovering her breath and her strength.'
Busch, in his better-known narrative, is also discreetly reticent on
the subject, and the only reference to it occurs in some notes dictated
to him by Bismarck in 1879. 'As far back as 1874 the threads of the
Gortschakoff-Jomini policy are to be found in the foreign press--oglings
and advances towards an intimacy between Russia and France of _la
revanche_. The rejection of these addresses is due rather to France
than to Russia. This policy does not appear to have originated with the
Emperor Alexander. It culminated in the period 1875-77, when the rumour
was circulated that Gortschakoff had saved France from us, and when he
began one of his circular despatches with the words, _Maintenant la
paix est assurée_. You remember Blowitz's report in the _Times_. Read
it again and mention the matter. His account was correct, except when
he spoke of an anti-French military party in Prussia. No such party
existed.'
It is instructive to compare with these passages the statements made in
the 'Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier.'
The crisis was definitely passed when Lord Lyons returned to Paris,
and he found the French overflowing with gratitude for the exertions
of Her Majesty's Government in favour of peace. Both Marshal MacMahon
and the Duc Décazes were profuse in their expressions, and the latter,
in particular, said that he attached immense importance to the fact
that the same sentiments in favour of peace had been expressed
simultaneously at Berlin by England and Russia. At the same time, while
much encouraged at the thought that the danger of an attack from Germany
had been averted, he affirmed very positively that he should not on
this account relax his endeavours to avoid giving umbrage to the German
Government. On its being pointed out to him that it was obvious that
the vast and increasing sums which figured in the Budget of the French
War Department had produced in Germany a very general impression that
France was preparing for an immediate retaliatory war, he gave the
somewhat unconvincing assurance that a vote for clothing the reserve
would be struck out, but would be replaced by a supplementary vote
introduced in the winter, when a vote for clothing might seem 'natural
and unimportant.' According to Décazes, both the Emperor of Russia and
Gortschakoff had, on more than one occasion, used language which showed
that they viewed with satisfaction the efforts of France to restore her
military power, and he endeavoured to impress upon the Ambassador that
Holland first, and then Belgium, were next to France most in danger from
German ambition. Finally, he pointed out with great satisfaction that
Russia had not lent an ear to the offers which had, he presumed, been
made to her at Berlin, to forward any ambitious views she might have in
the East, and he said that he considered this particularly important,
because it removed the only obstacle which might have interfered
with a cordial co-operation, on the part of the British and Russian
Governments, for the preservation of the peace of Europe. Whether any
such offers were made or refused is not known, but as the next few years
were to show, Décazes's conclusion was about as faulty a one as could
well be imagined.
'As regards public opinion in this country,' said Lord Lyons.
'I find no diminution of the conviction that at the present moment
a war with Germany would be fatal to France, and that very many
years must elapse before France will be able to undertake such
a war with any prospect of success. All Frenchmen are earnestly
desirous that their army should be as speedily as possible placed
upon such a footing as to give them some security against attack,
and some influence in the world--but few look forward to there
being a time when they can contend with Germany, unless they have a
powerful ally to fight beside them in the field.
'In the meantime I must confess that the gratitude towards
England, which I hear expressed by men of all parties, far exceeds
anything that I could have expected. On the one hand it shows
perhaps the greatness of the terror from which the French have just
been relieved; but on the other, it is, I think, an indication of a
sincere disposition to accept heartily and ungrudgingly any proof
of good will from England.'
The insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which broke out in the
summer of 1875, and the Turkish bankruptcy which followed a little
later, provided the French with fresh cause for apprehension, as it
was realized that the Eastern Question was once again reopened, and
that any differences that might arise between England and Russia would
be to the disadvantage of France. The French, who now saw the hand of
Bismarck in everything, believed that he had a plan of sending the
Austrian army into the Herzegovina, and the Russian army into some other
part of Turkey, with a view to sending the German army into France, and
much as the Government would have liked to have done something for the
French bondholders, and at the same time to have recovered some of the
influence formerly enjoyed at Constantinople, it was afraid to take any
action which might irritate the omnipotent chancellor. Perhaps this
was just as well, as far as England was concerned. The project of a
European Conference at Constantinople, which had been already mooted,
did not appear in any way to be conducive to British interests. Austria
and Russia were not in agreement as to the policy to be pursued. The
former had every reason to fear a Slav development on the frontier.
On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia could not, even if he wished
it, afford to disregard the feeling of the Russians in favour of
their fellows in race and in religion. Both Andrassy and Gortschakoff
foreseeing that neither could obtain a solution entirely acceptable to
opinion in his own country, desired apparently to throw a part of the
responsibility on a European Conference. But in such a Conference Russia
would be supreme. France and Germany would bid against each other for
her favour. Austria would be afraid to set herself against her, and if
England had any different views, she would always be outvoted.
Attention was shortly, however, diverted to another quarter. On November
17, Lord Derby learnt that it was absolutely necessary for the Khedive
to procure between three and four millions sterling before the end of
the month, and that he was preparing to sell his Suez Canal Shares.
* * * * *
_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._
10, Downing Street, Whitehall, Nov. 17, 1875.
I am not quite easy in my mind about a story I hear, to the
effect that the Khedive is negotiating with a French Company for
the sale of his interest in the Suez Canal. If the telegram has not
been sent to you officially, I will enclose it. Now his bias has
always hitherto been against the pretensions of Lesseps, and he has
been of use to us in keeping that rather irrepressible gentleman in
order. If he withdraws from the concern, and a French Company takes
his place in it, our position will be very unfavourably altered.
Have you heard anything of the negotiations in question? I really
think the matter very serious, and it is one of which the English
public will fully understand the importance.
I think I am not violating any confidence in enclosing to you
for your personal use only an extract from Odo Russell's letter to
me received on Monday which seems to throw light on the situation.
I can add to it nothing in the way of comment.
Your information as to the position of the French Government
is satisfactory. It looks as if the worst of their troubles were
over.
P.S.--Since I began this note I have received further details,
which I send you, and, I may add in strict confidence that we are
prepared ourselves to take over the Viceroy's interest, if it
cannot be kept out of French hands by other means.
I find Lord Odo's letter is with the Prime Minister, so the
extract I promised must wait till next messenger.
The result of Lord Lyons's inquiries, which had to be made very
discreetly, so as not to create suspicion, was the discovery that the
Khedive was actively negotiating with a French Company, but it was
believed that he wanted to mortgage, and not to sell the shares. Lord
Derby's next letter to Lord Lyons shows how reluctantly he took action.
* * * * *
Nov. 19, 1875.
From General Stanton's[14] telegrams it appears that the
Khedive has no intention of selling his interest in the Suez Canal,
though he may be obliged to mortgage it for a time. He has promised
to give us notice, if, from any cause, he should change his mind,
and to give us the option of purchase.
I sincerely hope we may not be driven to that expedient. The
acquisition would be a bad one financially, and the affair might
involve us in disagreeable correspondence both with France and
the Porte. But there is a strong feeling here about not letting
the Canal go still more exclusively into French hands, and as we
contribute nearly four-fifths of the traffic, it cannot be said
that this jealousy is unreasonable. There are intrigues of all
sorts going on at Cairo, but I think we may reckon on the Khedive
being true to us, if not tempted too strongly. I rely on you to
tell me all you hear on the subject.
The memorandum of Lord Odo Russell referred to by Lord Derby is a lucid
exposition of the European situation at the time and of Bismarck's
attitude with regard to the other Powers, more especially Russia.
* * * * *
Berlin, Nov. 12, 1875.
Bülow is loquacious and straightforward on most subjects; but
his reticence on Oriental affairs is remarkable. I have repeatedly
tried the experiment of talking over what the newspapers say, to
draw him out, but he becomes silent and embarrassed, and seeks to
change the subject, and when questioned, replies that he has not
lately received any information from Constantinople.
I have in consequence tried to find out through confidential
sources what it all means, and putting two and two together, I
make out that Bismarck feels uncertain of Russia, and does not
wish to be committed too soon. Since Gortschakoff assumed the post
of peacemaker between France and Germany, Bismarck has failed to
re-establish confidential relations with Russia. In regard to
Oriental affairs, Gortschakoff, instead of being satisfied to act
with his German and Austrian allies exclusively, has sought to
keep up an equally balanced understanding with England, France and
Italy: from which Bismarck suspects that Gortschakoff does not mean
to let him have his own way and wishes to control Germany through
the united action and agreement of the other European Powers. This
does not suit his book, and above all, he fears that Russia wishes
to keep on good terms with England and France; which would, in his
opinion, neutralize the exclusive action of the three Northern
Powers, over which he hoped to establish his own influence to the
exclusion of all other Governments. By lending his assistance to
Russia in the East, he calculated on Russian neutrality in regard
to his own plans, as was the case during the late war with France.
The joint action of Russia and England last May, in the
interest of peace, took him by surprise, destroyed his fondest
calculations, and left him isolated and disappointed to reflect
on the possibility of a peace coalition against Germany, which he
could not break up without the certainty of Russian neutrality
or assistance. He feels that Gortschakoff has abandoned him for
the time being, that he has lost the confidence of the Emperor
Alexander, and that while they live, there is but little hope of
a change of policy in Russia, favourable to his plans--viz. the
breaking up of Austria and the neutralization of the minor German
sovereignties.
Bismarck reckoned much on his friend Schouvaloff, but
Schouvaloff turned traitor last May, and is less German in England
than he was in Russia, which Bismarck cynically attributed to the
influence of wine and women.
Now Bismarck, I am told, affects honest indignation at the
manner in which Russia is deceiving and misleading Austria in
regard to Turkey; but in what that consists, I do not yet clearly
understand.
When he returns to Berlin he may possibly speak to me on these
subjects, and I should be glad to know whether there is anything in
particular which you may wish me to say, or not to say.
On the whole the present situation of affairs seems to me
favourable to the maintenance of peace.
Of course we must be prepared for an occupation of some
portions of European Turkey by Austria and Russia, but that need
not necessarily lead to war.
I have also endeavoured to find out what the views of
the National Party in regard to the East really are, and I
find that the breaking up of European Turkey would be received
with satisfaction, for the Turk has no friends in Germany. The
German provinces of Austria are looked upon as the natural and
inevitable inheritance, sooner or later, of the German Empire,
for which Austria might be compensated in Turkey, with or without
Constantinople. Some people talk wildly of giving Constantinople
to Greece, as less likely to be objected to by the Western Powers.
But even Russia might take possession of Constantinople without
objection on the part of Germany. Anything calculated to break the
influence of France in the East, which is still thought to be too
great, would be popular in Germany, and more especially if the
interests of the Latin Church could be injured by it.
England may have Egypt if she likes. Germany will graciously
not object.
Since May it has become manifest that Russia has the power
to hamper the movements of Germany and arrest her progress
effectually, and that Germany can undertake nothing new without
the passive consent of Russia. This power must be so intolerable
to Bismarck that he is sure to exercise all his skill in drawing
Russia out of the combined arms of the Great Powers, back into
his own exclusive embrace. This, a difference between Russia and
Austria about Turkey, might enable him to achieve.
Bismarck's endeavours last winter to make us suspicious of
Russia, and _vice versâ_, are now fully explained. His failure must
add to the general irritation he suffers from.
The situation will become clearer when he returns to Berlin in
the course of the winter.
Lord Odo Russell's view of the situation tallied with what Gortschakoff
had said to Décazes, Thiers, and other people at Vevey, earlier in the
year. The preservation of peace seemed, therefore, to rest largely on
Russia, and it was unfortunate that the Eastern Question presented
itself in a form which certainly favoured Bismarck's efforts to create
differences between Russia and Austria, and between Russia and England.
Further inquiries in Paris with regard to the Khedive's action seemed to
confirm the view that he was seeking to mortgage the shares, but to whom
they were to be mortgaged was unknown. On November 27, there arrived
through Lord Tenterden, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, the
intelligence that Her Majesty's Government had bought the shares.
* * * * *
_Lord Tenterden to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, Nov. 25, 1875.
Lord Derby is ill and at home. I am not sure therefore whether
he is writing to you to-night to tell you about the Suez Canal.
General Stanton telegraphed that Lesseps (supposed to be backed
by French Government) was offering four millions sterling (fr.
100,000,000) for the Khedive's shares, but that the Khedive would
sell them to England for the same sum. Thereupon he was instructed
to offer this amount, and the Khedive accepted this morning. The
contract was signed to-day, as we have just heard by telegram.
Messrs. Rothschild advance the money on the security of the shares,
£1,000,000 in December, and the rest by instalments, the Khedive
to pay 5 per cent. on the shares while they remain without bearing
interest (the interest being hypothecated for the next twenty
years).
Her Majesty's Government are to apply to Parliament to take
the bargain off the Rothschilds' hands.
Practically, therefore, subject to Parliament's assent, Her
Majesty's Government have bought the shares.
I am writing in the greatest hurry but the above is a correct
outline of the case.
I suppose the French will make an ugly face.
P.S. It has all been kept very secret so far, so pray be
supposed to be ignorant till Lord Derby tells you.
The action of Her Majesty's Government was taken none too soon, for
as Lord Lyons reported, the shares very nearly fell into the hands of
the French. On November 26 the purchase of the shares was publicly
announced, and on the following day Lord Derby had an interview with the
French Ambassador on the subject.
* * * * *
_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, Nov. 27, 1875.
I have seen d'Harcourt. He came to hear what I could tell him
about the Suez affair, and I told him the whole story exactly as it
is.
He says that there will be some soreness in France, and I am
afraid he is right. You know the facts, and I need not therefore
repeat them. The points which I dwelt on were these:
We did not wish that the Khedive would sell, nor was there on
our part the slightest desire to alter the _status quo_. But we
could not help his selling, and as he had decided on doing so, we
took the only effectual steps to prevent the possibility of the
shares falling into hands whose possession of them might not be
favourable to our interests. The suddenness of the whole affair was
not our doing. If we had delayed, other purchasers would have come
forward. We had to take the opportunity as it offered itself or
lose it altogether.
It is not in the power of the British Government to act
as Continental Governments can, through third parties--banks,
financial companies, and the like. What we do, we must do openly,
and in our own names, so that Parliament may judge of the whole
transaction. This I said in answer to a remark made by d'Harcourt,
that the act would have had less political significance if done
through some company, or otherwise, and not directly in the name of
the State.
We hold even now a minority of the canal shares. The question
for us is not one of establishing an exclusive interest, but of
preventing an exclusive interest from being established as against
us.
I have always expressed my opinion that the best arrangement
for all the world would be the placing of the Canal under an
International Commission, like that of the Danube; and I think so
still. I knew, I said, that the French Government were not prepared
to entertain any such idea, and I therefore did not put it forward;
but if France and other Governments altered their way of thinking,
I did not think any difficulties would be made by England.
M. d'Harcourt expressed some fear, or at least thought that
some would be felt, lest the Khedive should be unable to pay his
promised £200,000 a year, and we in consequence should use some
means to coerce him, which would practically establish England in
authority in Egypt. I assured him that nothing was further from our
thoughts. We wanted the passage through Egypt as free for ourselves
as for the rest of the world, and we wanted nothing more.
The purchase of the Suez Canal shares has always been surrounded
with much glamour and mystery, but in reality it seems to have been
a perfectly straightforward and business-like proceeding, to which
no reasonable objection could be taken. So far from being a profound
political _coup_ long calculated in advance, the action of Her
Majesty's Government was totally unpremeditated, and as far as Lord
Derby was concerned, it was undertaken with reluctance, and under the
conviction that England was making a bad bargain. So little confidence
did Lord Derby feel, and so averse was he from incurring any further
responsibility in Egypt, that he unhesitatingly declined a new
proposal of the Khedive that he should sell to the British Government
his contingent interest in the profits of the Suez Canal above five
per cent., and informed the French of the fact. The British public,
which warmly approved the transaction, seems to have been a better
judge of the Foreign Secretary's action than he was himself. The four
millions' worth of shares acquired by the British Government represented
nine-twentieths of the entire amount, and it is interesting to compare
these figures with the estimate put upon the value of the Canal by
Lesseps. On July 11, 1874, the latter called upon Lord Lyons and said
that two persons from England had sounded him about the sale of the
Canal; one a member of the English branch of the Rothschild family, and
the other a Baron Emile d'Erlanger, a well-known banker living in Paris.
The Rothschild was no doubt Nathaniel,[15] M.P. for Aylesbury,
who was here in the beginning of June. Lesseps said that on being
pressed by him to state a sum, for which the Canal might be
purchased, he had said a milliard (£40,000,000) and he declared
that although this sum had startled even a Rothschild, it was only
a fair one. His object with me seemed to be to give the impression
that the shareholders would not sell the Canal for any sum.[16]
Although the French could hardly be expected to approve of the action
of the British Government, which, if it had occurred some years earlier,
would have caused a storm of indignation, they were, under existing
circumstances, forced to accept it with tolerable equanimity, as it was
of no use to add a coolness with England to their other difficulties;
and, in addition, they gained a great deal by the rise which took place
in Canal shares and Egyptian securities. Lesseps professed himself to
be delighted and Bismarck sent a message to say that the policy adopted
by Her Majesty's Government had met with the support of the German
Government.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 7: French Military Attaché at Berlin before the war of 1870.]
[Footnote 8: French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.]
[Footnote 9: Finance Minister.]
[Footnote 10: Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, Jan. 16, 1874.]
[Footnote 11: Blowitz.]
[Footnote 12: British Minister at Brussels.]
[Footnote 13: German Ambassador at London.]
[Footnote 14: British Consul-General at Cairo.]
[Footnote 15: Now Lord Rothschild.]
[Footnote 16: Lord Lyons to Lord Derby, July 11, 1874.]