CHAPTER X

LORD LYONS

VOLUME II

[Illustration: _Lord Lyons, at the age of 65._

LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD.]

LORD LYONS

A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY

BY

LORD NEWTON

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOLUME II

WITH PORTRAITS

LONDON

EDWARD ARNOLD

1913

_All rights reserved_

CONTENTS OF VOL. II

CHAPTER X

THE THIRD REPUBLIC

1871-1873

PAGE

Thiers as Chief of the Executive--Negotiations respecting a new

Anglo-French Commercial Treaty--Return of the Princes--Embarrassment

caused by the Comte de Chambord--Question

of voting in the House of Lords--Thiers elected President--State

of parties in France--Irritation in Germany against Thiers--Diplomatic

incident at Constantinople--Signature of Anglo-French

Commercial Treaty--Death of the Emperor Napoleon--Lord

Odo Russell on Bismarck's policy--Fall of Thiers--Bismarck

and Arnim 1

CHAPTER XI

MARSHAL MACMAHON'S PRESIDENCY

1873-1875

MacMahon as President of the Republic--Franco-German

relations--Bismarck's confidences to Lord Odo Russell--Political

confusion in France--The war scare of 1875--Rumoured intention

of Khedive to sell his Suez Canal shares--Lord Odo Russell on

Bismarck's Foreign Policy--Purchase of Khedive's shares by H.M.

Government 47

CHAPTER XII

THE EASTERN QUESTION

1876-1878

The Powers and Turkey: England and the Andrassy Note--Gambetta

on French Politics--Simplicity of Marshal MacMahon--Political

consequences of French military re-organisation--Struggle

between the Marshal and Parliament--The Constantinople

Conference: Determination of Lord Derby to do nothing--Intrigues

of the Duc Décazes--Constitutional crisis in

France--Defeat of Marshal MacMahon: new Radical Ministry

formed under Dufaure with Waddington as Foreign Minister--Treaty

of San Stefano; nervousness of French Government--Determination

of H.M. Government to secure a Conference--Invitation

to Lord Lyons to be the British representative at

Berlin--Resignation of Lord Derby: appointment of Lord

Salisbury--Lord Salisbury's circular of April 1st, 1878--Inquiry

of Lord Salisbury respecting French desire for Tunis--The Anglo-Turkish

Convention--The Congress of Berlin--Reception in

France of the Anglo-Turkish Convention--Waddington and

Tunis--Sir H. Layard on the Treaty of Berlin 95

CHAPTER XIII

M. GRÉVY'S PRESIDENCY

1878-1879

Paris Exhibition of 1878: desire of Queen Victoria to visit it

incognito--Tunis--Resignation of MacMahon: Election of

Grévy--Waddington Prime Minister: his difficulties--Anglo-French

policy in Egypt--Question of deposing the Khedive

Ismail--Differences between British and French Governments

with regard to Egypt--Deposition of the Khedive by the Sultan--Death

of the Prince Imperial: effect in France--Proposed

visit of Gambetta to England: his bias in favour of English

Conservatives--Resignation of Waddington: Freycinet Prime

Minister--Coolness between France and Russia 161

CHAPTER XIV

THE REVIVAL OF FRANCE

1880-1881

Change of Government in England and reversal of Foreign Policy--The

French Embassy in London: Freycinet's model Ambassador--Personal

characteristics of Lord Lyons: _On ne lui connait

pas de vice_--The work at the Paris Embassy--The Eastern

Question: Mr. Goschen at Constantinople--The Dulcigno

Demonstration and the difficulties of the European Concert--Proposal

to seize Smyrna--Opportune surrender of the Sultan--H.M.

Government and the Pope: Mission of Mr. Errington,

M.P.--Gambetta on the European situation--French expedition

to Tunis--Ineffectual objections of H.M. Government--Establishment

of French Protectorate over Tunis--Irritation in England

and Italy--Distinction drawn between Tunis and Tripoli--Attempt

to negotiate a new Anglo-French Commercial

Treaty: Question of Retaliation 209

CHAPTER XV

ARABI'S REBELLION

1881-1882

Egypt: the _coup d'état_ of the Colonels: joint Anglo-French

action--Gambetta as Prime Minister--His desire to remain on good

terms with England--Egypt: the Dual Note--Gambetta in favour of

a more resolute joint policy--Fall of Gambetta after two months

of office--Ministry formed by Freycinet--French vacillation

with regard to Egypt--Decision of H.M. Government to employ

force--Bombardment of Alexandria--Decision of French Government

to take no part in expedition--Fall of Freycinet--Invitation to

Italy to join in expedition declined--Effect produced in France by

British military success in Egypt--French endeavour to re-establish

the Control in Egypt--Madagascar and Tonquin 258

CHAPTER XVI

ANGLOPHOBIA

1883-1885

Death of Gambetta--General discontent in France--Change of

Government: Jules Ferry Prime Minister--Waddington appointed

Ambassador in London--Insult to King of Spain in

Paris--Growth of French ill-will towards English influence in

Egypt--Baron de Billing and General Gordon--Establishment

of French Protectorate over Tonquin--Egyptian Conference

in London--Renewed request to Lord Lyons to vote in House

of Lords--Anti-English combination with regard to Egypt--Jules

Ferry on the necessity of delivering a _coup foudroyant_ upon

China--French reverse in Tonquin: resignation of Jules Ferry--New

Government under Freycinet--Bismarck and the persons

whom he disliked--Funeral of Victor Hugo--Return of Lord

Salisbury to the Foreign Office--Anglophobia in Paris: scurrilities

of Rochefort 305

CHAPTER XVII

THE LAST YEAR'S WORK

1886-1887

Lord Rosebery at the Foreign Office--His surprise at

ill-feeling shown by French Government--Proceedings of General

Boulanger--Princes' Exclusion Bill--Boulanger at the Review

of July 14th--Causes of his popularity--General Election

in England: Lord Salisbury Prime Minister--The Foreign

Office offered to Lord Lyons--Egyptian questions raised

by French Government--Apprehension in France of a German

attack--Embarrassment caused by Boulanger--Unofficial attempt

on behalf of French Government to establish better relations

with England--Application by Lord Lyons to be permitted to

resign--Pressed by Lord Salisbury to remain until end of the

year--Desire of French Government to get rid of Boulanger--Lord

Salisbury's complaints as to unfriendly action of the French

Government in various parts of the world--Resignation of Lord

Lyons--Created an Earl--His death 360

APPENDIX

Lord Lyons in Private Life. By MRS. WILFRID WARD 415

INDEX 429

LIST OF PLATES IN VOL. II

FACING PAGE

LORD LYONS AT THE AGE OF 65 _Frontispiece_

WILLIAM HENRY WADDINGTON 169

GENERAL BOULANGER 370

THE BRITISH EMBASSY, PARIS 420

(_Photograph by F. Contet, Paris._)

LORD LYONS

A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY

CHAPTER X

THE THIRD REPUBLIC

(1871-1873)

Strictly speaking, the existence of the National Assembly which had

been summoned to ratify the Preliminaries of Peace, had now[1] come to

an end, but under prevailing circumstances, it was more convenient to

ignore Constitutional technicalities, and the Government proceeded to

carry on the business of the country on the basis of a Republic. Thiers

had been elected Chief of the Executive, and it was astonishing how

rapidly his liking for a Republic increased since he had become the

head of one. It was now part of his task to check the too reactionary

tendencies of the Assembly and to preserve that form of government which

was supposed to divide Frenchmen the least. The feeling against the

Government of National Defence was as strong as ever, and the elections

of some of the Orleans princes gave rise to inconvenient demonstrations

on the part of their political supporters, who pressed for the repeal

of the law disqualifying that family. Thiers realized plainly enough

that the revival of this demand was premature, and would only add to

the general confusion, and had therefore induced the princes to absent

themselves from Bordeaux, but the question could no longer be avoided.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, June 6, 1871.

Thiers has been hard at work 'lobbying,' as the Americans

say, but could not come to any settlement with the Assembly,

and so begged them to postpone the question of the elections of

the Princes of Orleans till the day after to-morrow. One of the

plans proposed was that the provisional state of things should

be formally continued for two years, by conferring his present

powers on Thiers for that period. This would, it was hoped, keep

the Republicans quiet and allay the impatience of the monarchical

parties, by giving them a fixed time to look forward to. But this,

it seems, the majority in the Assembly would not promise to vote.

On the other hand, Thiers is said to be afraid of having the Duc

d'Aumale and perhaps Prince Napoleon also, speaking against him

in the Assembly, and attacking him and each other outside. Then

comes the doubt as to the extent to which the fusion between the

Comte de Chambord and the other Princes, or rather that between

their respective parties, really goes. Altogether nothing can be

less encouraging than the prospect. The Duc d'Aumale, as Lieutenant

Général du Royaume, to prepare the way for the Comte de Chambord,

is, for the moment, the favourite combination. In the meantime

Thiers has thrown a sop to the majority by putting an Orleanist

into the Home Office. The idea at Versailles yesterday was that

Thiers and the Assembly would come to a compromise on the basis

that the Orleans elections should be confirmed, but with a preamble

repeating that nothing done was to be held to prejudge the question

of the definitive government of France.

When the question came up, Thiers yielded on the point of the admission

of the Princes, and the majority were highly pleased at having extorted

this concession. Lord Lyons, dining at Thiers's house at Versailles, a

few days after the debate in the Assembly, met there the German General

von Fabrice, the Prince de Joinville, the Duc d'Aumale, and the Duc de

Chartres, and mentions the significant fact that M. and Madame Thiers

and the rest of the company treated these Princes with even more than

the usual respect shown to Royal personages. In private conversation

Thiers expressed great confidence in soon getting the Germans out of the

Paris forts, but both he and Jules Favre complained that Bismarck was a

very bad creditor, and insisted upon having his first half-milliard by

the end of the month: in fact, the Germans were so clamorous for payment

that they hardly seemed to realize how anxious the French were to get

rid of them, and that if the money was not immediately forthcoming, it

was only because it was impossible to produce it.

What was of more immediate concern to the British Government than either

the payment of the indemnity or the future of the Orleans princes,

was the prospect of a new Commercial Treaty. This was sufficiently

unpromising. Lord Lyons had pointed out during the Empire period, that

under a Constitutional _régime_ in France, we were not likely to enjoy

such favourable commercial conditions as under personal government,

and the more liberal the composition of a French Government, the

more Protectionist appeared to be its policy. Thiers himself was an

ardent Protectionist, quite unamenable to the blandishments of British

Free Traders, who always appear to hold that man was made for Free

Trade, instead of Free Trade for man, and the Finance Minister, Pouyer

Quertier, entertained the same views as his chief. But, even if the

Emperor were to come back, it was more than doubtful whether he would

venture to maintain the existing Commercial Treaty as it stood, and

there was every probability that the Bordeaux wine people and other

so-called French Free Traders would turn Protectionist as soon as they

realized that there was no prospect of British retaliation. What cut

Lord Lyons (an orthodox Free Trader) to the heart, was that, just as the

French manufacturers had got over the shock of the sudden introduction

of Free Trade under the Empire and had adapted themselves to the new

system, everything should be thrown back again. It was likely, indeed,

that there would be some opposition to Thiers's Protectionist taxes,

but he knew well enough that there were not a sufficient number of

Free Traders in the Assembly, or in the country, to make any effective

resistance to the Government. When approached on the subject, the French

Ministers asserted that all they wanted was to increase the revenue,

and that all they demanded from England was to be allowed to raise

their tariff with this view only, whereas, in their hearts, they meant

Protection pure and simple. Lord Lyons's personal view was that England

would be better off if the Treaty was reduced to little more than a

most favoured nation clause. 'The only element for negotiation with the

school of political economy now predominant here,' he sadly remarked,

'would be a threat of retaliation, and this we cannot use.' It will

be found subsequently that this was the one predominant factor in all

commercial negotiations between the two Governments.

A long conversation with Thiers, who was pressing for a definite reply

from Her Majesty's Government on the subject of a new Treaty showed

that matters from the British point of view were as unsatisfactory

as they well could be. Thiers, whose language respecting England was

courteous and friendly, made it clear that Her Majesty's Government

must choose between the proposed modifications in the tariff and the

unconditional denunciation of the whole Treaty, and that if the Treaty

were denounced, England must not expect, after its expiration, to be

placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation. He considered that

he had a right to denounce the Treaty at once, but had no wish to act

in an unfriendly spirit, and had therefore refrained from doing so, and

although he and his colleagues considered that the existing Treaty was

disadvantageous and even disastrous to France, they had never promoted

any agitation against it, and had confined themselves to proposing

modifications of the tariff, which their financial necessities and the

state of the French manufacturing interests rendered indispensable.

Coal and iron, which were articles of the greatest importance to

England, were not touched, and all that had, in fact, been asked for

was a moderate increase on the duties on textile fabrics. As for the

French Free Traders, whatever misleading views they might put forward in

London, their influence upon the Assembly would be imperceptible, and it

remained therefore for Her Majesty's Government to decide whether they

would agree to the changes he had proposed to them, or would give up

altogether the benefits which England derived from the Treaty.

Thiers's real motive was disclosed later on, when, whilst asserting

that he should always act in a friendly spirit towards England, he

admitted that 'England was a much more formidable competitor in

commerce than any other nation.' Concessions which might safely be

made to other countries might very reasonably be withheld from her.

For instance, privileges which might be safely granted to the Italian

merchant navy might, if granted to Great Britain, produce a competition

between English and French shipping very disadvantageous to France.

It would also be certainly for the interest of France that she should

furnish herself with colonial articles brought direct to her own ports

rather than resort, as at present, to the depôts of such goods in

Great Britain. Nothing could be further from his intentions than to be

influenced by any spirit of retaliation, nor, if the Treaty should be

denounced, would he, on that account, be less friendly to England in

political matters; but it was evident that, in making his financial and

commercial arrangements, the interests and necessities of France must

be paramount. In conclusion he pressed for an immediate answer from Her

Majesty's Government in order that the French Government might complete

their plans, which were of urgent importance.

To the impartial observer the opinions expressed by Thiers seem to be

logical, natural, and reasonable, unless the principle of looking after

one's own interests is unreasonable; but to the ardent devotees of Free

Trade, they must have appeared in the light of impiety. Lord Lyons, in

reporting the interview, remarked that 'nothing could have been more

unsatisfactory than Thiers's language,' and added significantly that he

himself had managed to keep his temper.

Thiers did not get his definite answer, and the wrangle continued until

in February, 1872, the French Government, with the general approval of

the nation, gave notice of the termination of the Commercial Treaty of

1860.

The Bill abrogating the proscription of the French Royal families had

been passed by the Assembly, and the elections of the Duc d'Aumale and

the Prince de Joinville consequently declared valid, but these princes

having established their rights, wisely remained in the background. Not

so another illustrious Royalist, the Comte de Chambord. This prince, who

was also included in the reversal of the disqualifying law, returned

to France and issued a proclamation from the Château of Chambord in

July which spread consternation in the Royalist camp. After explaining

that his presence was only temporary and that he desired to create no

embarrassment, he declared that he was prepared to govern on a broad

basis of administrative decentralization, but that there were certain

conditions to which he could not submit. If he were summoned to the

throne he would accept, but he should retain his principles, and above

all the White Flag which had been handed down to him by his ancestors.

This announcement seemed, to say the least, premature, and the

supporters of a Republic must have warmly congratulated themselves upon

having to encounter an enemy who played so completely into their hands.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, July 11, 1871.

The Comte de Chambord seems to have upset the Legitimist

coach. The Legitimist Deputies have been obliged to repudiate

the White Flag, being sure that they could never be elected to a

new Chamber under that Banner, and of course fusion between the

Orleans Princes and their cousin is now out of the question.

Thiers said to me last night that he did not regard the

Comte de Chambord's declaration in favour of the White Flag as

irrevocable--and that it looked as if it had been made in a moment

of ill-temper. According to Thiers, both the Comte de Chambord and

the Comte de Paris eagerly desire to be kings--most people doubt,

however, whether the Comte de Chambord does really wish it. All

that has occurred tends to strengthen and prolong Thiers's hold on

power, and he is rejoicing accordingly. Indeed, there is hardly a

Frenchman who professes to doubt that Thiers's Government is the

only Government possible at the moment.

Gambetta is not considered by Thiers to be dangerous; he

declares that he will only maintain a constitutional or legal

opposition so long as the Government is Republican, and if he and

his supporters stick to this, Thiers will certainly have no great

cause to dread them. If Rouher had been elected he would have been

a formidable opponent, though he has been too much accustomed

to lead an applauding and acquiescing majority to be good at

speaking to a hostile audience. Thiers says that the rejection of

Rouher will be a good thing for his own health and repose, as he

should have found it very fatiguing to have to answer the great

Imperialist orator.

The hurry with which the new duties were rushed through

the Assembly on Saturday is disquieting. Thiers and Jules Favre

protest, however, that they are determined to do nothing irregular

regarding the Commercial Treaties. The Swiss Minister tells me his

Government is determined to insist upon the strict execution of

the Swiss Treaty, without admitting any alteration of the tariffs,

but then the Swiss Treaty does not expire for five or six years. I

take care to give no opinion as to what we shall or shall not do.

Thiers talked again last night of conferring with me soon about the

details of the changes. I am not very anxious that he should do so,

as confusion is much more likely than anything else to arise from

carrying on the discussion in both places at once.

Half my time is taken up with the affairs of the unfortunate

English prisoners. It is necessary to be cautious, for the French

Authorities are extremely touchy on the subject. There does not

appear to be any danger of their being executed, as fortunately

they are a very insignificant and unimportant set of insurgents,

if insurgents they were; but they are kept a long time without

examination, and some do run the risk of being shipped off to New

Caledonia.

The Comte de Chambord, having effectually destroyed the chances of

his own party for the time being, now disappeared from the scene, and

nothing more was heard of him or his White Flag for a considerable

period.

The summer of 1871 did not pass without the old question of voting in

the House of Lords cropping up again. In July, Lord Lyons received

an intimation from the Liberal Whip that his vote was wanted on the

following day, accompanied by a letter from Lord Granville in the same

sense. He declined to come, on the same ground as formerly, viz. that

he considered it advisable that a diplomatist should keep aloof from

home politics, and also because he was extremely reluctant to give

votes on questions of which he had little knowledge. The particular

question involved was presumably a vote of censure on the Government in

connection with the Army Purchase Bill, and he seems to have taken it

for granted that Lord Granville would make no objection. A letter from

the latter showed that he was mistaken.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, July 17, 1871.

I cannot agree with the principle you lay down--Lord Stuart,

my father, the late Lord Cowley, and Lord Normanby when Ambassador

at Paris used to vote when specially summoned. So did Lord Cowley,

although he served under successive Governments. So did Lord

Westmoreland and others. I find no recommendation of your principle

in the report of the Committee of the House of Commons, and

although Lord Derby may have given evidence in favour of it, his

father gave practical proof in several instances that he entirely

disagreed with it.

A Foreign Government can hardly believe in the confidential

relations of this Government and her Ambassador, if the latter

being a Peer abstains from supporting them when a vote of want of

confidence, or one amounting to it, is proposed against them.

Clarendon brought before the Cabinet your disinclination to

vote on the question of the Irish Church. They unanimously decided

that we had a claim upon you, and you were good enough to consent,

stating the grounds you mention in your letter of yesterday.

It is of course too late for any practical result to our

controversy as regards to-night, but I hope you will consider

that I have a claim on you for the future, when your vote is of

importance. I shall never ask you unnecessarily to come over.

An intimation of this kind from an official chief could not well be

disregarded, but the reply to Lord Granville's letter is conclusive in

its arguments.

* * * * *

Paris, July 27, 1871.

Your letter of the 17th about my voting in the House of Lords

goes farther than Lord Clarendon did on the previous occasion.

Lord Clarendon originally acquiesced in my not voting on the Irish

Church Bill, and when he subsequently begged me to come over,

unless I objected to the Bill, he founded his request principally

upon a strong opinion of Mr. Gladstone's that it was the duty of

a peer not to abstain from voting, and that every vote was of

consequence. On this ground he expressed a hope that I should come

over unless I was opposed to the Bill.

Of my predecessors, the only one who was in a position

resembling mine, was the present Lord Cowley; and certainly he will

always be a high authority with me.

I have been for more than thirty years, and I still am,

devoted to my own profession, and I am sure that if I can be of

any use in my generation, and do myself any credit, it must be

as a diplomatist. I have worked my way up in the regular course

of the profession, and have served under successive Governments,

both before and since I became a peer, without any reference to

home politics. In fact, I received my original appointment to the

service from Lord Palmerston; I was made paid attaché by Lord

Aberdeen; I was sent to Rome by Lord Russell; to Washington by Lord

Malmesbury; to Constantinople by Lord Russell; and finally to Paris

by Lord Derby. The appointment was given to me in the ordinary way

of advancement in my profession, and I was told afterwards by Lord

Clarendon that my being wholly unconnected with any party at home

had been considered to be a recommendation. I have myself always

thought that a regular diplomatist could only impair his efficiency

by taking part in home politics, and I have throughout acted upon

this conviction. During the thirteen years or thereabouts which

have elapsed since I succeeded to my father's peerage, I have given

only one vote in the House of Lords; the question, the Irish Church

vote, was one on which there really did seem to be a possibility

that the decision might turn upon one vote; and the question, as it

stood before the House, was hardly a party question.

In addition to all this, I must say that while I have a very

great reluctance to give blind votes, I do not wish to be diverted

from my diplomatic duties by having to attend to home questions;

also, I would rather give my whole energies to carrying out the

instructions of the Government abroad, without having continually

to consult my conscience about voting in the House of Lords.

I did not intend to have given you the trouble of reading

a long answer to your letter, but I have just received another

summons from Lord Bessborough. I hope, however, you will not press

me to come over to vote on Monday. You were at all events good

enough to say that you should never ask me to come unnecessarily;

but if, after considering my reasons, you insist upon my coming, I

must of course defer to your opinion and do what you desire.

It is difficult to believe that Lord Granville, who was one of the

most amiable and considerate of men, was acting otherwise than under

pressure in thus endeavouring to utilize an Ambassador as a party hack.

His arguments certainly do not bear much investigation. If a foreign

government could not feel any confidence in an Ambassador who failed to

support his party by a vote in Parliament, what confidence could they

possibly feel in him if his party were out of office, and he continued

at his post under the orders of political opponents? If the Clarendon

Cabinet really decided that they had a claim upon diplomatists as party

men it only showed that they were conspicuously wanting in judgment and

a prey to that dementia which occasionally seizes upon British statesmen

when a division is impending. That state of mind is intelligible when

a division in the House of Commons is concerned, but what passes

comprehension is that pressure should be put upon members of the House

of Lords to vote, whose abstention is obviously desirable, whilst scores

of obscure peers are left unmolested. One peer's vote was as good as

another's in 1871, just as it is now; but in the division on the vote of

censure on the Army Purchase Bill only 244 peers voted out of a House

containing about double that number.

Before long the question of the prolongation of Thiers's powers for a

fixed period became the chief topic of interest. He was infinitely the

most important personage in France, and a large number of members were

desirous of placing him more or less in the position of a constitutional

sovereign, and obliging him to take a Ministry from the majority in

the Assembly. The majority in the Assembly not unnaturally thought

that their ideas ought to prevail in the Government, and they resented

being constantly threatened with the withdrawal of this indispensable

man, an action which, it was thought, would amount to little short of a

revolution. What they wanted, therefore, was to bestow a higher title

upon him than Chief of the Executive Power, which would exclude him from

coming in person to the Assembly; and it was only the difficulty of

finding some one to take his place, and the desire to get the Germans

out of the Paris forts that kept them quiet. Like many other eminent

persons considered to be indispensable, Thiers now began to give out

that he really desired to retire into private life, and that it was

only the country which insisted upon his staying in office, while as a

matter of fact, he was by no means as indifferent to power as he fancied

himself to be. In the Chamber he damaged his reputation to some extent

by displays of temper and threats of resignation, but there was never

much doubt as to the prolongation of his powers.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Aug. 25, 1871.

Thiers quitted the Tribune in a pet yesterday, and the whole

series of events in the Assembly has very much lowered his credit.

In the one thing in which he was thought to be pre-eminent, the

art of managing a deliberative body, he completely failed: and his

first threatening to resign, and then coming back and half giving

in, has very much damaged him. Nevertheless the general opinion

is that the prolongation of his powers will pass, upon his making

it a condition, as a vote of confidence, of his remaining. But it

is difficult to believe, even if it be passed by a considerable

majority, that things can go on smoothly between him and the

Assembly very long. If any party had a leader and courage, it might

do almost anything in France at this moment.

Arnim[2] is expected on Saturday. I knew him years ago at

Rome. I doubt his being a conciliatory negotiator. The French

believe that Bismarck is so anxious to obtain commercial advantages

for Alsace, that he will give them great things in return. He

is supposed to wish, in the first place, to conciliate his new

subjects; and, in the second, to divert for a time from Germany

the torrent of Alsatian manufactures which would pour in if the

outlets into France were stopped up. The French hope to get the

Paris forts evacuated in return for a continuance of the free

entrance of Alsatian goods into France until the 1st of January,

and they even speculate upon getting the Prussians to evacuate

Champagne, and content themselves with keeping the army, which was

to have occupied it, inside the German frontier, the French paying

the expenses, as if it were still in France. All this to be given

in return for a prolongation of commercial privileges for Alsace.

It would be ungenerous of 'most favoured nations' to claim similar

privileges.

Thiers was too full of the events of the afternoon in the

Assembly to talk about the Commercial Treaty. I don't believe he

has brought the Committee round to his duties on raw materials.

At the end of August, the Assembly by a very large majority passed a

bill conferring upon Thiers the title of President of the Republic and

confirmed his powers for the duration of the existing Assembly, adopting

at the same time a vote of confidence in him personally. The result

of these proceedings was that the attempt to make a step towards the

definite establishment of a Republic and to place Thiers as President

for a term of years in a position independent of the Assembly, failed.

The bill asserted what the Left had always denied, viz. the constituent

power of the Assembly, and declared that the President was responsible

to it. So far, it expressed the sentiments of the moderate men, and the

minority was composed of extreme Legitimists and extreme Republicans. It

also proved that Thiers was still held to be the indispensable man.

The Assembly, which had adjourned after the passing of the

above-mentioned bill, met again in December, and was supposed to be

more Conservative than ever, owing to the fear created by Radical

progress in the country. Thiers's Presidential Message did not afford

much satisfaction to the extreme partisans on either side, and it was

evident that he did not desire any prompt solution of the Constitutional

question, preferring to leave himself free, and not to be forced into

taking any premature decision. As for the Legitimist, Orleanist, and

Moderate Republican groups, their vacillation tended only to the

advantage of two parties, the Bonapartists and the Red Republicans.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 26. 1871.

The New Year will open gloomily for France. The Germans appear

to be alarmed, or at all events irritated, by Thiers's military

boasts and military preparations. The boasts are certainly unwise,

and preparations or anything else which encourages the French

to expect to get off paying the three milliards are extremely

imprudent. The Germans mean to have their money and keep the

territory they have taken, and they say that they had better have

it out with France now that she is weak, than wait till she has

got strong again. The irritation of the French against the Germans

seems to grow, and the Germans are angry with the French for not

loving them, which after the conditions of peace, to say nothing of

the events of the war, seems somewhat unreasonable.

Thiers so far holds his own, and no party seems willing to

displace him, while no party agrees with him. The one thing in

which men of all parties seem to agree is in abusing Thiers, and

I must say that a good deal of the abuse is exceedingly unjust.

But with the members of the Assembly in this inflammable state of

feeling towards him, an unexpected spark may at any moment make

them flare up and turn him out almost before they are aware of

it. The general idea is that the Assembly would appoint the Duc

d'Aumale to succeed him; the acceptance of the Duc d'Aumale by

the country would depend upon the amount of vigour he showed in

putting down illegal opposition by force. There are members of the

Assembly who wish to declare that in case of Thiers's abdication

or dethronement, the President of the Assembly is to exercise the

Executive Power. This is with a view of bringing forward Grévy, who

is an honourable, moderate man, but an old thoroughbred Republican.

The immediate event people are looking forward to with interest

and anxiety is the election of a deputy for Paris on the 7th of

next month. No one will be surprised if a Red is returned, in

consequence of the men of order declining to vote. The Legitimists

and the Orleanists seem to be at daggers drawn again.

Arnim says that Bismarck's fierce despatch was partly intended

to strengthen Thiers's hands in resisting violence against the

Germans. If this is so, the ferocity went too far beyond the mark

to be successful, great as the provocation on the French side was.

I will write a mild disclaimer of the accuracy of Jules

Favre's accounts of his communications with me. There is no _malus

animus_, I think, in them. My Russian and Italian colleagues are

very much annoyed by the language he attributes to them.

The fierce despatch referred was a harsh communication from Bismarck

complaining of the recent acquittal of some Frenchmen who had

assassinated German soldiers of the army of occupation.

At the close of 1871, the Bonapartist Party, although scarcely

represented in the Assembly, appeared to be that which caused the

Government the most anxiety. That party had undoubtedly made progress

in the country; it held out the hope of a vigorous and determined

maintenance of public order, and a vast number of Frenchmen were so much

out of heart, so wearied and disgusted by the results of the attempts

at political liberty, and so much afraid of the triumph of the Commune,

that they were prepared to sacrifice anything in order to be assured of

peace and tranquillity. The peasants, shopkeepers, and even many of the

workmen in the towns, sighed for the material prosperity of the Empire.

They believed that the Emperor had been betrayed by his Ministers and

Generals, and were willing to excuse his personal share even in the

capitulation of Sedan. If more confidence could have been felt in his

health and personal energy, the advocates of a restoration of the Empire

would have been still more numerous. As it was, a great mass of the

ignorant and the timid were in favour of it, and it was the opinion

of so impartial an observer as the British Ambassador, that if a free

vote could have been taken under universal suffrage a majority would

probably have been obtained for the re-establishment upon the throne of

Napoleon III. If the Imperialists could by any means have seized upon

the executive Government and so directed the operations of a plébiscite,

there was little doubt as to their securing the usual millions of votes

under that process. With them, as with the other parties, the difficulty

lay in bringing about such a crisis as would enable them to act, and the

Emperor himself was disinclined to take any adventurous step.

The Legitimists had the advantage of holding to a definite principle,

but it was a principle which carried little weight in the country in

general. Their chief, the Comte de Chambord, had shown himself to be so

impracticable, that it really seemed doubtful whether he wished to mount

the throne, and the party had more members in the existing Assembly than

it was likely to obtain if a fresh general election took place; added

to which it had quarrelled with the Orleanists, a union with whom was

essential to the attainment of any practical end.

The Orleanists were weakened by their dissensions with the Legitimists

and discouraged by what they considered the want of energy and

enterprise of the Princes of the family. The members of the Orleans

party suffered from the want of a definite principle, and consisted

chiefly of educated and enlightened men who held to Constitutional

Monarchy and Parliamentary Government; in reality they were a

fluctuating body willing to accept any Government giving a promise of

order and political liberty.

The moderate Republicans included in their ranks many honest and

respected men, but they had to contend with the extreme unpopularity of

the Government of National Defence in which they had formed the chief

part, and although the existing Government was nominally based upon

their principles, they did not appear to be gaining ground. The extreme

Republicans endeavoured to make up by violence what they wanted in

numerical strength, and as they saw no prospect of obtaining office in

a regular manner, founded their hopes upon seizing power at a critical

moment with the help of the Paris mob.

Amidst this collection of parties stood Thiers's Government, supported

heartily by none, but accepted by all. By skilful management, by

yielding where resistance appeared hopeless, and by obtaining votes

sometimes from one side of the Assembly, and sometimes from the other,

Thiers had carried many points to which he attached importance, and

had never yet found himself in a minority. His Government was avowedly

a temporary expedient, resting upon a compromise between all parties,

or rather upon the adjournment of all constitutional questions. To the

monarchical parties which formed the majority of the Assembly, Thiers's

apparent adoption of the Republican system rendered him especially

obnoxious. On the other hand, the Republicans were dissatisfied because,

the whole weight of the Government was not unscrupulously used for the

purpose of establishing a Republic permanently, with or without the

consent of the people.

On the centralization of the administration, on military organization,

on finance, and on other matters, Thiers's personal views were widely

different from those generally prevalent in the Assembly, and there was

plenty of censure and criticism of him in private; but no one party saw

its way to ensuring its own triumph, and all were weighed down by the

necessity of maintaining endurable relations with Germany. In forming

such relations, Thiers had shown great skill and obtained considerable

success in his arduous task. Bismarck, in imposing the hardest possible

conditions of peace, had acted avowedly on the principle that it was

hopeless to conciliate France, and that the only security for Germany

lay in weakening her as much as possible. This policy having been

carried out, the German public and the German press appeared to be quite

surprised that France was slow to be reconciled to her conquerors,

and even to doubt whether already France was not too strong for their

safety. The apparent recovery of the French finances may well have

surprised them disagreeably, but Thiers was not over careful to avoid

increasing their distrust. His intention to create a larger army than

France had ever maintained before, and his frequent praises of the army

he already possessed, was not reassuring to them. It was, therefore,

not altogether surprising that they should have felt some doubts as to

the consequences of finding themselves confronted by an immense army,

when they called upon France to pay the remaining three milliards in

1874. Nevertheless the German Government had expressed its confidence in

Thiers, and it would have been almost impossible for any new Government

to have placed matters on as tolerable a footing.

All things considered, therefore, it seemed not improbable that the

existing Government might last for some time, although its life was

somewhat precarious, since it was liable to be upset by commotions

and conspiracies, and having no existence apart from Thiers, its

duration was bound to depend on the health and strength of a man nearly

seventy-four years old.

In January, 1872, Thiers, in consequence of a dispute in the Chamber

over the question of a tax on raw materials, tendered his resignation,

but was persuaded with some difficulty to reconsider it. 'I have never

known the French so depressed and so out of heart about their internal

affairs,' wrote Lord Lyons. 'They don't believe Thiers can go on

much longer, and they see nothing but confusion if he is turned out.

The Legitimists and Orleanists are now trying for fusion. They are

attempting to draw up a constitution on which they can all agree, and

which, when drawn up, is to be offered to the Comte de Chambord, and if

refused by him, then to the Comte de Paris. I hear they have not yet

been able to come to an understanding on the first article. It all tends

to raise the Bonapartists. Many people expect to hear any morning of a

coup by which Thiers and the Assembly will be deposed, and an _appel au

peuple_, made to end in a restoration of the Empire.' Probably it was

the knowledge of a Bonapartist reaction in the country that led Thiers

to make a singularly foolish complaint against an alleged military

demonstration in England in favour of the ex-Emperor.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Feb. 9, 1872.

M. Thiers said to me yesterday at Versailles that he had

been told that a general of the name of Wood had marched 6000 of

Her Majesty's troops to Chislehurst to be reviewed by the Emperor

Napoleon.

M. Thiers went on to say that no one could appreciate more

highly than he did the noble and generous hospitality which England

extended to political exiles, and that he had indeed profited by

it in his own person. He admired also the jealousy with which the

English nation regarded all attempts from abroad to interfere with

the free exercise of this hospitality. He should never complain

of due respect being shown to a Sovereign Family in adversity. But

he thought that there was some limit to be observed in the matter.

For instance, he himself, while on the best terms with the reigning

dynasty in Spain, still always treated the Queen Isabella, who was

in France, with great respect and deference. Nevertheless, when Her

Majesty had expressed a desire to go to live at Pau, he had felt it

to be his duty to ask her very courteously to select a residence at

a greater distance from the frontier of Spain. In this, as in all

matters, he felt that consideration for the exiles must be tempered

by a due respect for the recognized Government of their country.

Now if the Emperor Napoleon should choose to be present at a review

of British troops, there could be no objection to his being treated

with all the courtesy due to a head which had worn a crown. It was,

however, a different thing to march troops to his residence to hold

a review there in his honour.

Thiers had not taken the trouble to substantiate his ridiculous

complaint, and his action was an instance of the extreme gullibility

of even the most intelligent French statesmen, where foreign countries

are concerned, and so perturbed was the French Government at the idea

of a Bonapartist restoration, that according to Captain Hotham, British

Consul at Calais, two gunboats, the _Cuvier_ and _Faon_, were at that

time actually employed in patrolling the coast between St. Malo and

Dunkirk with a view to preventing a possible landing of the Emperor

Napoleon. A little later, the Duc de Broglie, French Ambassador in

London, made a tactless remonstrance to Lord Granville with regard to

the presence of the Emperor and Empress at Buckingham Palace, on the

occasion of a National Thanksgiving held to celebrate the recovery of

the Prince of Wales from a dangerous illness.

* * * * *

_Lord Granville to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, March 1, 1872.

The Duc de Broglie told me to-day that he had been rather

surprised when he heard of the Emperor and Empress having been at

Buckingham Palace on so public an occasion as that of last Tuesday,

that I had not mentioned it to him on Monday afternoon, when we had

had a long conversation. It would have enabled him to write to M.

de Rémusat,[3] and thus have prevented any of the effect which a

sudden announcement in the papers might create in France.

I told him that I had not been consulted and did not know the

fact of the invitation when I saw him, and that if I had, I should

probably have mentioned it to him, although not a subject about

which I should have written.

I should have explained to him that it was an act of courtesy

of the Queen to those with whom she had been on friendly relations,

and that it was analogous to many acts of courtesy shown by the

Queen to the Orleanist Princes.

He laid stress on the publicity of the occasion, and on the

few opportunities which he, as Ambassador, had of seeing the Queen,

of which he made no complaint; but it made any attentions to the

Emperor on public occasions more marked. He was afraid that the

announcement would produce considerable effect, not upon statesmen,

but upon the press in France.

I repeated that the admission of the Emperor and Empress had

no political significance, but had been in pursuance with the

long-established habit of the Queen to show personal courtesy

to Foreign Princes with whom she had been formerly on friendly

relations.

The fall of the Finance Minister, Pouyer Quertier, in the spring had

given rise to hopes that the French commercial policy would become more

liberal, but the letters quoted below show how powerless were the

arguments of the British Government and how completely wasted upon the

French Ministers were the lamentations of the British free traders,

and their prognostications of ruin to those who were not sufficiently

enlightened to adopt their policy.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 5, 1872.

I suppose Pouyer Quertier is really out, but we see so many

changes from hour to hour in resolutions here, that I shall not

report it officially until his successor is gazetted. We cannot

have a more Protectionist successor; but, after all, no one is so

bigoted a Protectionist as Thiers himself.

Nevertheless the change of Minister will give a chance or an

excuse for a change of policy to some extent. I think that with a

view to this some stronger expression of displeasure, or rather

perhaps of regret than we have hitherto ventured upon, might have

a good effect. The new Minister and perhaps even Thiers himself

might be struck by a report from Broglie that you had put strongly

before him the impossibility, whatever efforts the Government might

make, of preventing public opinion in England becoming hostile to

France if the present commercial policy is persisted in. It is in

fact plain that there is no probability of France obtaining the

concessions from the Treaty Powers, on which Thiers professed to

reckon. The result already is that, whatever may have been the

intention, the Mercantile Marine Law is in practice a blow which

falls on England, and not on other European Powers. Unless the

French Government means to give us a real most favoured nation

clause, the result of denouncing our treaty will be to place us,

when it expires, at a special disadvantage as compared with other

nations. And what it now asks us to effect by negotiation, is to

hasten the moment at which it can accomplish this. It is quite idle

to talk of special friendship for us, when its measures practically

treat us much worse than they do the Germans. M. de Rémusat and

some other people are fond of saying that it is quite impossible

that France could bear to see two nations so friendly as Belgium

and England placed exceptionally in a position inferior to Germany.

But France seems to bear this with great equanimity so far as our

merchant navy is concerned.

The demand we have made to be exempted from the _surtaxes de

pavillon_ under our most favoured nation clause would give the

French Government a means of remedying the injustice _if it wished

to do so_. At any rate some strong expressions of discontent on

our part might increase the disinclination of the Assembly and

some members of the Government to insist on imposing the duties on

the raw materials. It would be very convenient if there were some

retaliatory measures to which we could resort, without injuring

ourselves or departing from our own Free Trade principles. The

French Government grossly abuses, in order to influence the

Assembly, our assurances of unimpaired good will, and reluctance

to retaliate; and so, in my opinion, is preparing the way for the

real diminution of good will which its success in carrying its

protectionist measures, to our special injury, must produce in the

end.

The present Government of France does not gain strength; far

from it. The Imperialists are gaining strength, as people become

more and more afraid of the Reds, and feel less and less confidence

in the power either of Thiers, or the Comte de Chambord, or the

Comte de Paris, to keep them down. The end will probably be brought

about by some accident when it is least expected. It would not be

wise to leave out of the calculation of possibilities, the chance

of Thiers's Government dragging on for some time yet, and it would

be very difficult to predict what will succeed it. At present the

Legitimists and Orleanists seem to have lost, and to be daily

losing prestige, and naturally enough, to be bringing down with

them the Assembly in which they are or were a majority.

Perhaps I ought to say that the despatch which I send you

to-day about the sojourn of our Royal Family in the South of

France applies exclusively to them. Everybody knows or ought to

know that affairs are uncertain in France, but I should not think

it necessary or proper to warn private people against coming to

France or staying there. The conspicuous position of members

of the Royal Family increase the risk of their being placed in

awkward circumstances, and circumstances which would be of little

consequence in the case of private people, would be very serious

and embarrassing if they affected members of the Royal Family of

England.

The last passage referred to a stay at Nice contemplated by the Prince

of Wales. In the event of any change of Government, it was always feared

that disorders would take place in the southern towns of France.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 14, 1872.

The commercial disputes with the French Government which, as

you know, I always apprehended, are coming thick upon us. I foresaw

what was coming and begged Thiers, Rémusat and other members of

the Government over and over again to guard against vexations in

the execution of the Treaty while it lasted. I make little doubt,

notwithstanding, that all these violent and unfair proceedings are

prompted, not checked, from Paris.

The Spaniards have found out the only way to deal with the

Protectionist spirit here. The slightest hint at retaliation would

have such an effect in the Assembly as to stop the onward career of

illiberality. As things now are, the extortioners have the game in

their own hands. They levy what duty they please, and pay just as

much or as little attention as may suit them, to our remonstrances.

It is a very disagreeable affair for one who, like myself, is

really anxious that there should be good feeling between the two

countries. We are in a fix. On the one hand, we cannot, without

injuring ourselves and abandoning our principles, retaliate; and

on the other hand, while they feel sure we shall do no more than

remonstrate, the Protectionist officials will care very little.

If indeed the general opinion is to be relied upon, the present

Government and its chief may come down with a crash at any moment,

but I don't know whether a change would benefit us commercially.

Lord Lyons, like Lord Granville and other English public men and

officials of the day, was a Free Trader, as has already been stated.

But it would be difficult for the most ardent Protectionist to make

out a stronger case against the helplessness of a Free Trade policy

when negotiating with a foreign Government than is disclosed in these

letters, and there are any number of others all in the same strain. All

the protestations of goodwill, of sympathy, and benefit to the human

race, etc., were, and presumably are still, a pure waste of time when

addressed to a country about to frame a tariff in accordance with its

own interests, unless the threat of retaliation is used in order to

retain some bargaining power, as apparently the Spaniards had already

discovered.

It has already been stated that Thiers's plans of military

re-organization and his somewhat imprudent language had caused some

agitation in Germany, and when the German Ambassador, Count Arnim,

returned to his post at Paris in the spring of 1872, it was freely

rumoured that he was the bearer of remarkably unpleasant communications.

These apprehensions turned out to be exaggerated, and Thiers in

conversation always assumed a lamb-like attitude of peace. He denied

that the Germans had addressed any representations to him, said that all

suspicions against him were grossly unjust, that it would be absolute

madness for France to think of going to war, and that, for his part,

the keystone of all his foreign policy was peace. As for his army

reform schemes, he was a much misunderstood man. He was undoubtedly

reorganizing the military forces of France, and it was his duty to place

them upon a respectable footing, and so provide a guarantee for peace.

It was, however, quite false to say that he was arming, for that term

implied that he was making preparations for war, and that he was putting

the army into a condition to pass at once from a state of peace to a

state of war. He was doing nothing of the sort; on the contrary, his

efforts were directed to obtaining the evacuation of the territory, by

providing for the payment of the war indemnity to Germany, and it could

hardly be supposed that if he were meditating a renewal of the contest,

he would begin by making over three milliards to her.

From Arnim's language, it appeared that the German public was irritated

and alarmed at the perpetual harping of the French upon the word

'Revenge,' and that the German military men (the _militaires_ who were

always so convenient to Bismarck for purposes of argument) conceived

that the best guarantee for peace would be to keep their soldiers as

long as possible within a few days' march of Paris.

The German fears were, no doubt, greatly exaggerated, but if they

existed at all they were largely due to Thiers's own language, who,

while not talking indeed of immediate revenge, was fond of boasting of

the strength and efficiency of the French army, and even of affirming

that it was at that very moment equal to cope with the Germans. That he

was conscious of having created suspicion may be inferred from the fact

that when the Prince of Wales passed through Paris on his way from Nice

to Germany, he begged H.R.H. to use his influence at the Court of Berlin

to impress upon the Emperor and all who were of importance there, that

the French Government, and the President himself in particular, desired

peace above all things, and were resolved to maintain it. A letter from

the British Ambassador at Berlin throws some light upon the prevalent

German feeling.

* * * * *

_Mr. Odo Russell[4] to Lord Lyons._

British Embassy, Berlin, April 27, 1872.

Since your letter of the 9th inst. reached me feelings have

changed in Berlin.

Thiers's Army bill and Speech have irritated the Emperor,

Bismarck and indeed everybody.

The Generals tell the Emperor it would be better to fight

France before she is ready than after; but Bismarck, who scorns the

Generals, advises the Emperor to fight France _morally_ through

Rome and the Catholic alliances against United Germany.

Although he denies it, Bismarck probably caused those violent

articles against Thiers to appear in the English newspapers, and he

tells everybody that Thiers has lost his esteem and may lose his

support. The next grievance they are getting up against him is that

he is supposed to have made offers through Le Flô to Russia against

Germany.

In short, from having liked him and praised him and wished for

him, they are now tired of him and think him a traitor because he

tries to reform the French Army on too large a scale!

Gontaut[5] does not appear to do anything beyond play the

agreeable, which he does perfectly, and every one likes him. But

it is said that _Agents_, financial Agents I presume, are employed

by Thiers to communicate through Jewish Bankers here indirectly

with Bismarck. Through these agents Thiers is supposed to propose

arrangements for an early payment of the 3 milliards and an early

withdrawal of the German troops of occupation,--the payment

to be effected by foreign loans and the guarantee of European

Bankers,--in paper not in gold. Bismarck has not yet pronounced

definitely, but the Emperor William won't hear of shortening the

occupation of France. Indeed, he regrets he cannot by Treaty leave

his soldiers longer still as a guarantee of peace while he lives,

for he is most anxious to die at peace with all the world.

So that nothing is done and nothing will be done before Arnim

returns to Paris. He has no sailing orders yet and seems well

amused here.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Mr. Odo Russell._

Paris, May 7, 1872.

Many thanks for your interesting letter.

Arnim's account of public opinion at Berlin entirely confirms

that which you give, only he says Bismarck would be personally

willing to come to an arrangement with France for payment of the

milliards and the evacuation of the territory, but that he will not

run any risk of injuring his own position by opposing either Moltke

or public opinion on this point.

I don't think the Germans need the least fear the French

attacking them for many years to come. The notion of coming now

to destroy France utterly, in order to prevent her ever in the

dim future being able to revenge herself, seems simply atrocious.

The French are so foolish in their boasts, and the Germans so

thin-skinned, that I am afraid of mischief.

I should doubt Bismarck's being wise in setting himself in

open hostility to the Vatican. The favour of the Holy See is seldom

of any practical use, so far as obtaining acts in its favour, to a

Protestant or even to a Roman Catholic Government; but the simple

fact of being notoriously in antagonism to it, brings a vast amount

of opposition and ill-will on a Government that has Catholic

subjects. The fear of this country's being able at this moment

to work the Catholic element in Germany or elsewhere against the

German Emperor appears to me to be chimerical.

I wish the Germans would get their milliards as fast as they

can, and go: then Europe might settle down, and they need not be

alarmed about French vengeance, or grudge the French the poor

consolation of talking about it.

Arnim was a good deal struck by the decline in Thiers's

vigour, since he took leave of him before his journey to Rome, but

he saw Thiers some days ago, when the little President was at his

worst.

* * * * *

_Mr. Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._

British Embassy, Berlin, May 11, 1872.

I have nothing new to say about the relations of France and

Germany, but my friends here seem so alarmed at the idea that

France cannot pay the much longed for three milliards, that if

Thiers really does pay them, all the rest will be forgiven and

forgotten, and the withdrawal of the German troops will then be

impatiently called for. Like yourself I write the impressions of

the moment and am not answerable for future changes of public

opinion. Clearly the thing to be desired for the peace of the world

is the payment by France and the withdrawal by Germany, after which

a normal state of things can be hoped for--not before.

The Pope, to my mind, has made a mistake in declining to

receive Hohenlohe. He ought to have accepted and in return sent a

Nuncio to Berlin, thereby selling Bismarck, and controlling his

German Bishops and the Döllinger movement.

Bismarck is going away on leave to Varzin. He is so irritable

and nervous that he can do no good here at present, and rest is

essential to him.

Your letter of the 7th is most useful to me, many thanks for

it. I shall not fail to keep you as well informed as I can.

In reality, the Germans made little difficulty about the arrangements

for the payment of the indemnity and evacuation of French territory, and

early in July Thiers was able to state confidently that he felt certain

of being able to pay the whole of the indemnity by March, 1874, and

that he had only obtained an additional year's grace in order to guard

against accidents.

A curious incident which occurred in July, 1872, showed how, if

sufficient ingenuity be employed, a trivial personal question may

be turned to important political use. The Comte de Vogué, French

Ambassador at Constantinople, who possessed little or no diplomatic

experience, before proceeding on leave from his post, had an audience

of the Sultan. The Sultan received him standing, and began to talk,

when Vogué interrupted His Majesty, and begged to be allowed to sit

down, as other Ambassadors had been accustomed to do, according to him,

on similar occasions. What the Sultan actually did at the moment was

not disclosed, but he took dire offence, and telegrams began to pour

in upon the Turkish Ambassador at Paris desiring him to represent to

the French Government that if Vogué came back his position would be

very unpleasant--intimating in fact that his return to Constantinople

must be prevented. The French Foreign Minister, however, refused this

satisfaction to the Sultan, and the Turkish Ambassador in his perplexity

sought the advice of Lord Lyons, who preached conciliation, and urged

that, at all events, no steps ought to be taken until Vogué had arrived

at Paris, and was able to give his version of the incident. The French,

naturally enough, were at that moment peculiarly susceptible on all

such matters, and more reluctant to make a concession than if they

were still on their former pinnacle of grandeur at Constantinople,

although Vogué was clearly in the wrong, for Lord Lyons admitted that

he had himself never been asked to sit. The importance of the incident

consisted in the fact that it gave an opportunity of cultivating the

goodwill of Russia, as the traditional enemy of Turkey. No Frenchman

had ever lost sight of the hope that some day or other an ally against

Germany might be found in Russia, and there were not wanting signs of a

reciprocal feeling on the part of the latter. It had, for instance, been

the subject of much remark, that the Russian Ambassador at Paris, Prince

Orloff, had recently been making immense efforts to become popular

with all classes of the French: Legitimists, Orleanists, Imperialists,

Republicans, and especially newspaper writers of all shades of politics.

As it was well known that neither Prince nor Princess Orloff were really

fond of society, these efforts were almost overdone, but nevertheless

they met with a hearty response everywhere, from Thiers downwards,

for all Frenchmen were eagerly hoping for a quarrel between Russia

and Germany, and were ready to throw themselves into the arms of the

former in that hope. Russia, on her side, was clearly not unwilling to

cultivate a friendship which cost nothing, and might conceivably be of

considerable profit.

On November 5 the new Anglo-French Commercial Treaty was signed,

indignant British Free Traders striving to console themselves with the

thought that France would soon discover the error of her ways and cease

to lag behind the rest of the civilized world in her economic heresy.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Nov. 12, 1872.

I saw Thiers on Friday after I wrote to you on that day; and

I dined with him on Saturday. He looked remarkably well, and was

in high spirits and in great good humour, as he ought to be, with

us. He spoke, as indeed he always does, as if he felt quite sure

that he should have his own way with the Assembly in all things.

As regards the organic measures, he talked as if the fight would

be entirely with the Right; but both sections of the Left have

declared against organic changes to be made by this Assembly. I

suppose, however, Thiers is pretty sure to get his own powers

prolonged for four years certain, and this is what he cares about.

I do not, however, find in my Austrian, German, and Russian

colleagues so unqualified an acquiescence in Thiers remaining

in power as they professed before I went away. It is said that

the three Emperors at Berlin were alarmed at the prospect of the

definitive establishment of any Republic, and still more so at

the apparent tendency of M. Thiers's policy to leave the country

to drift into a Red Republic, whenever he quitted the scene.

However this may be, there is certainly a change in the language

of their Representatives here, not very marked, but nevertheless

quite perceptible. Orloff in particular talks as if an immediate

Imperialist restoration were not only desirable but probable. If he

really thinks it probable, he is almost alone in the opinion.

The Prince de Joinville, who came to see me yesterday,

said that he had been a great deal about in the country, and

that he found everywhere an absolute indifference to persons

and dynasties, and a simple cry for any Government which would

efficiently protect property. He thought that Thiers would be

supported for this reason, but that whatever institutions might

be nominally established, they would last only as long as Thiers

himself did, and that afterwards everything would be in question,

and the country probably divide itself into two great parties,

Conservatives and Reds, between whom there would be a fierce

struggle notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the

former.

In the absence of exciting internal topics, the year closed with a

slight sensation provided by Gramont, who, it might have been supposed,

would have preferred not to court further notoriety. Count Beust had

recently asserted that he had warned France against expecting help

from Austria in the event of a war with Prussia. Gramont replied

by publishing a letter in which the following statement occurred.

'L'Autriche considère la cause de la France comme la sienne, et

contribuera au succès de ses armes dans les limites du possible.'

This quotation was supposed to be taken from a letter from Beust to

Metternich, dated July 20, 1870 (the day after the declaration of war),

and left by Metternich with Gramont, who took a copy and returned the

original. Metternich was believed to have shown the letter also to the

Emperor Napoleon and to Ollivier. The letter was represented as going on

to say that the neutrality proclaimed by Austria was merely a blind to

conceal her armaments, and that she was only waiting till the advance of

winter rendered it impossible for Russia to concentrate her forces.

It was generally believed that there was plenty of evidence that an

offensive and defensive alliance was in course of negotiation between

France and Austria in 1869, though no treaty was signed, and the record

appears to have consisted in letters exchanged between the two Emperors,

but as Gramont had nothing more than a copy of a letter from Beust to

Metternich his evidence was legally defective, whatever its moral

value, and it was questionable whether as an ex-Minister he had any

right to disclose such secrets.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, Dec. 31, 1872.

Gramont's further revelations confirm what I told you in my

letter of the 24th. The question is becoming tiresome. I conceive

there is no doubt that Beust at Vienna, and Metternich here,

fanned the flame of French discontent after Sadowa, with a view

to avenging themselves when Austria and France should be ready,

and circumstances favourable. I think also that Gramont came back

from Vienna full of Beust's warlike ideas, and very well inclined

to carry them out. What exchange of letters may have taken place

between the two Emperors, or what record of any kind there may be

of engagements between the two countries to help one another, it is

more difficult to say.

The assertion is that after war had been declared, Austria

engaged to move on the 15th September. Others say that she also

required that France should have an army in Baden.

This is not inconsistent with her having dissuaded France from

war in July, 1870, when she knew positively it would be premature

for herself, and probably had some suspicion that France was also

not really prepared.

Early in January, 1873, the Emperor Napoleon died at Chiselhurst. The

view of Thiers was that this event would render the Bonapartists, for

the time, more turbulent and less dangerous. He believed that the

Emperor's personal influence had been used to quiet the impatience

of his followers, while, on the other hand, his death removed the

only member of the family who was popular enough in France to be a

formidable candidate. Thiers's childish susceptibility with regard to

the Bonapartists showed itself in his expressed hope that the Emperor's

death would be followed by the disappearance of the public sympathy in

England with the family in its misfortunes.

The opinions of Thiers seem to have been generally prevalent. The

Emperor was remarkably kind and courteous to all who approached him; he

was a firm friend; not, as a rule, an implacable enemy, and he inspired

no small number of people with a warm attachment to him personally. He

was also generally popular, and the glittering prosperity of the early

part of his reign was attributed by a large part of the common people

to his own genius and merits, while they were prone to consider that

its disastrous close was due to treason. No other member of the family

excited feelings of the same kind, and in France a cause was always so

largely identified with an individual that there was no doubt that the

hold of the Imperialists upon the country was largely weakened by the

loss of their chief.

It is perhaps worth noting that Lord Lyons, although it was notoriously

difficult to extract any such opinions from him, did in after years

admit reluctantly to me, that although he liked Napoleon III.

personally, he had always put a low estimate upon his capacity.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Jan. 31, 1873.

I cannot say that the political atmosphere grows clearer. The

Right are in their hearts as anxious as ever to depose Thiers.

They believe as firmly as ever that if he makes the new elections,

he will have a Chamber, not only of Republicans, but of very

advanced Republicans. They see that all their little endeavours to

restrain him and to establish ministerial responsibility will have

no political effect. The death of the Emperor has not strengthened

Thiers's position with regard to the Right. On the contrary,

they are less disposed to bear with him since the removal of the

candidate for the Throne of whom they were most afraid, and from

whom they justly thought that Thiers would make every effort to

shield them. They are consequently, even more than they usually

are, employed in casting about for something to put in Thiers's

place. The Fusion is again 'almost' made, and MacMahon is again

talked of as ready to take the Government during the transition

from the Republic to the King.

Orloff, the Russian Ambassador, propounded to me to-day a plan

of his own for preventing conflicts between Russia and England

in Central Asia. So far as I understood it, it was that England

and Russia should enter into a strict alliance, should encourage

and protect, by force of arms, commerce between their Asiatic

Dominions, and unite them at once by a railroad. He said there

was a Russian company already formed which desired to connect the

Russian railway system with the Anglo-Indian railways. He told me

that Brünnow was always writing that war between England and Russia

was imminent and that England was preparing for it. If Brünnow's

vaticinations are believed, they may perhaps have a not unwholesome

effect upon the Russian Government.

Prince Orloff seems to have had in contemplation that Trans-Persian

Railway which has met with the approval of the Russian and British

Governments at the present day. The Russian advance in Central Asia

in 1872 and 1873 had been the subject of various perfectly futile

representations on the part of Her Majesty's Government, but Baron

Brünnow must have been a singularly credulous diplomatist if he really

believed that we were making preparations for a war with Russia or any

one else.

If Orloff with prophetic insight foresaw a Trans-Persian Railway, Thiers

might be acclaimed as being the first person to suggest the project of

the Triple Entente between England, France, and Russia. Strangely enough

it was the affairs of Spain that put this notion into his head, the idea

prevalent in France being that Germany was bent on making that country a

dangerous neighbour to France, and bestowing a Hohenzollern prince upon

her as sovereign. The prospect of an 'Iberic Union,' which was being

discussed at the time, was considered to be exceptionally threatening to

France, and Thiers had had quite enough of united states on the French

frontier.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Granville._

Paris, March 4, 1873.

M. Thiers spoke to me last night very confidentially about

Spain and Portugal. The Spanish question was, he said, becoming so

serious that it could hardly be considered an internal question.

Among other things, the independence of Portugal was at stake. Now,

in his opinion, the best chance of avoiding a collision between the

Powers of Europe would be that England, France, and Russia should

come to an understanding on the subject. He did not think that

there would be any difficulty in effecting such an understanding;

and indeed he had reason to believe that Russia was at this moment

particularly well disposed to act in concert with England. He was

far from being so absurd as to propose a new Holy Alliance; indeed,

he desired to avoid all show and ostentation--indeed all publicity.

He simply wished that, without any parade, the three Powers he had

named should concert measures in order to avert events which might

imperil the peace of Europe. After some further conversation, he

observed that it would be impossible to avert a collision, if the

Peninsula were formed into one Iberic state with a Hohenzollern for

a monarch.

I did not invite M. Thiers to state more definitely in what

form he proposed that the understanding between France, Russia, and

England should be effected, or what combined action he proposed

they should adopt. I thought indeed that it would be very dangerous

for France to enter into any sort of an alliance with Foreign

Powers against Germany at this moment, and that the smallest result

might be to delay the evacuation of French territory. Nor indeed

did I know that there was any evidence that Germany was actively

pursuing designs in Spain in such a way and to such a degree,

as would render it proper or advantageous to try the hazardous

experiment of undertaking to settle a European question without

her, not to say in spite of her.

I consequently only listened to what M. Thiers said. He

concluded by telling me to treat his idea as most strictly

confidential and to confide it only to your ear in a whisper.

As regards the state of Spain, M. Thiers said that he believed

the Federal Party was after all the party of order; that at all

events it was predominant in all the outer circumference of

Spain; that the Unitarians existed only in Madrid and the central

provinces, and that the North was Carlist or Federal. This being

the case, his advice to the Government of Madrid had been to make

concessions to the Federals. He did not think that, if properly

managed, their pretensions would go much beyond what was called in

France 'decentralisation administrative.'

The view of the Federals being the party of order in Spain

was new to me, but M. Thiers was beset by a host of deputies and I

could not continue the conversation.

A letter from Lord Odo Russell[6] to Lord Lyons admirably defines

the attitude of Germany, and is an exceptionally lucid summary of

Bismarckian policy in general.

* * * * *

British Embassy, Berlin, March 14, 1873.

Thanks for yours of the 4th instant.

As regards Spain, Thiers, and Bismarck I cannot add anything

more definite or more precise. Bismarck and the Emperor William

are so far satisfied that the Republic will make room for the

Alphonsists so that they can afford to wait and look on.

What Bismarck intends for Spain later, no one can guess, but

clearly nothing favourable or agreeable to France.

The two great objects of Bismarck's policy are:

(1) The supremacy of Germany in Europe and of the German race

in the world.

(2) The neutralization of the influence and power of the Latin

race in France and elsewhere.

To obtain these objects he will go any lengths while he lives,

so that we must be prepared for surprises in the future.

A change has come over the Emperor and his military advisers

in regard to the evacuation of French territory, as you have seen

by his speech on opening the German Parliament.

His Majesty is now prepared to withdraw his garrison as soon

as the fifth and last milliard shall have been paid by Paris and

received at Berlin.

So that if it is true that Thiers proposes to pay the fifth

milliard in monthly instalments of 250,000,000 fs. beginning from

the 1st of June, the evacuation might be expected in October and

France be relieved of her nightmare.

This I look upon as a most desirable object. It appears to

me that the re-establishment of the future balance of power in

Europe on a general peace footing, is _the_ thing Diplomacy should

work for, and that nothing can be done so long as the Germans have

not got their French gold, and the French got rid of their German

soldiers.

The Germans, as you know, look upon the war of revenge as

unavoidable and are making immense preparations for it.

Germany is in reality a great camp ready to break up for any

war at a week's notice with a million of men.

We are out of favour with the Germans for preferring the old

French alliance to a new German one, as our commercial policy is

said to prove, and this impression has been lately confirmed by

Thiers's _exposé des motifs_.

Thiers is again out of favour at Berlin, because the Russian

Government has warned the German Government that Thiers is working

to draw Russia into the Anglo-French Alliance contrary to their

wishes. I believe myself that the alliance or understanding between

Russia and Germany, Gortschakoff and Bismarck is real, intimate, and

sincere; and that they have agreed to preserve Austria so long as

she obeys and serves them, but woe to Austria if ever she attempts

to be independent!

Then the German and Slav elements she is composed of, will be

made to gravitate towards their natural centres, leaving Hungary

and her dependencies as a semi-oriental vassal of Germany and

Russia. However, those are things of the future, at present I can

think of nothing but the crisis at home and the deep regret I feel

at losing my kind benefactor Lord Granville as a chief. My only

consolation is that he will the sooner return to power as our

Premier, for he is clearly the man of the future.

I hope you will write again occasionally.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord O. Russell._

Paris, April 8, 1873.

Many thanks for your most interesting letter of the 14th. I

entirely agree with you that the one object of diplomacy should be

to re-establish the balance of power in Europe on a peace footing.

The payment of the indemnity and the departure of the German troops

from France are of course necessary to the commencement of anything

like a normal state of things. The French all more or less brood

over the hope of vengeance, and the Germans give them credit for

being even more bent upon revenge than they really are. So Germany

keeps up an enormous army, and France strains every nerve to raise

one; and what can diplomatists do?

In Germany they seem to attach a great deal more than due

importance to the Commercial Treaty, as a sign of a tendency

towards a renewal of the Anglo-French Alliance. But then the

Germans have always been more angry with us for not helping to blot

France out of Europe than the French have been with us for not

helping them out of the scrape they got into by their own fault.

Germans and French are to my mind alike unreasonable, but we only

suffer the ordinary fate of neutrals.

Thiers professes to have no thought of forming any alliance at

present; and to consider that it would be absurd of France to try

for more at this moment than to ward off great questions, and live

as harmoniously as she can with all Foreign Powers, without showing

a preference to any. This is no doubt the wise and sensible policy.

Thiers certainly acts upon it so far as England is concerned. Does

he also act upon it as regards Russia? I cannot say. I think there

is a little coquetry between him and the Russians.

Lord Granville appears to have sent through the Duchesse de Galliera

a private message warning Thiers of the dangers of his advances to

Russia; but the latter asserted that although the French Ambassador at

St. Petersburg had been directed to maintain the most cordial relations

with the Russian Government, matters had not gone further than that, and

that he had made no communications which he should object to Germany

knowing of. Thiers's tenure of power was, however, destined shortly to

come to an end. On May 24, the veteran who had rendered such invaluable

services to the country was defeated by a combination of opponents, and

Marshal MacMahon became President of the Republic in his stead. The

change of Government was received quietly by the country; the elaborate

precautions which had been taken in case of disorder proved superfluous,

and the funds rose on the assumption that the Marshal was to prove to

be the new saviour of society. MacMahon, who had reluctantly accepted

the honour thrust upon him, was generally regarded as a French General

Monk, but which of the three pretenders was to be his Charles the Second

remained a matter of complete uncertainty. The fickle crowd hastened to

prostrate itself before the rising sun, and the first reception held by

the new President at Versailles constituted a veritable triumph; swarms

of people of all sorts attending, particularly those members of smart

society who had long deserted the salons of the Préfecture. Amongst the

throng were particularly noticeable the Duc d'Aumale and his brothers,

wearing uniform and the red ribands which they had never been known to

display before. All looked smooth and tranquil, as it usually did at

the beginning; but the Government so far had not done anything beyond

changing Prefects and Procureurs. The political situation, for the time

being, might be summed up in the phrase that the French preferred to

have at their head a man _qui monte à cheval_, rather than a man _qui

monte à la tribune_.

Although the dismissal of Thiers savoured of ingratitude, it was not

altogether unfortunate for him that he had quitted office at that

particular moment, for little doubt was felt that, with or without any

error of policy on his own part, the country was gradually drifting

towards communism. At any rate, he could compare with just pride the

state in which he left France to the state in which he found her.

Although the last German soldier had not yet left French soil, the

credit of the liberation of the country was due to him, and by his

financial operations, successful beyond all expectations, he had not

only paid off four milliards, but provided the funds for discharging

the fifth, and so admirably conducted the negotiations that the German

Government was willing to withdraw the rest of the occupying force.

The fall of Thiers caused searchings of heart at Berlin, and a

conversation with Count Arnim, the German Ambassador at Paris, in June

showed that the German Government regarded MacMahon with anything but

favour. Arnim stated that displeasure had been felt at Berlin, both

at language held by the Marshal before his appointment, and at his

neglect in his former position to act with proper courtesy towards the

Emperor's Ambassador in France. The German Government did not doubt that

the remainder of the indemnity would be paid, but Thiers indulged less

than other Frenchmen in hostile feelings towards Germany, and he and a

few of the people about him seemed to be the only Frenchmen who could

bring themselves to act with propriety and civility in their relations

with Germans. In fact, Thiers's foreign policy had been wise and

conciliatory, but as for his internal policy, he, Count Arnim, avowed

that he entirely concurred in the opinion that it would have thrown the

country in a short time into the hands of the Red Republicans.

The unfortunate Arnim was apparently at this time unconscious of his

impending doom, although, as the following interesting letter from Lord

Odo Russell to Lord Lyons shows, his fate had been sealed months before.

* * * * *

_British Embassy, Berlin, Jan. 18, 1873._

What I have to say to-day grieves me to the soul, because it

goes against my excellent friend and landlord Harry Arnim.

Said friend, it is said, could not resist the temptation of

turning an honest penny in the great War Indemnity Loan at Paris,

and the Jew Banker he employed, called Hanseman, let it out to

Bismarck, who could not understand how Arnim was rich enough to buy

estates in Silesia and houses in Berlin.

Now Bismarck, who is tired of Arnim, and thinks him a rising

rival, will make use of this discovery with the Emperor whenever he

wants to upset Arnim and send a new man to Paris.

He thinks him a rising rival because Arnim went to Baden

last autumn and advised the Emperor, behind Bismarck's back, to

go in for an Orleanist Monarchy and drop Thiers, in opposition to

Bismarck's policy, who wishes to drop all Pretenders and uphold

Thiers as long as he lives.

Besides which Arnim hinted at a readiness to take office at

home if Bismarck came to grief.

The Emperor is fond of Arnim and listened with complacency and

told Bismarck when he returned from Varzin,--Bismarck has vowed

revenge! I have not written all this home because it would serve

no purpose yet,--but it may be useful to you as a peep behind the

curtain. Meanwhile Bismarck has appointed one of his _secret_

agents as Commercial Secretary to the Paris Embassy to watch Arnim.

His name is Lindau and as he is a very able man and an old friend

of mine, I have given him a letter to you. He might become useful

some day.

Let me add _in confidence_ that he corresponds privately and

secretly with Bismarck behind Arnim's back.

* * * * *

It will be observed that the views expressed by Arnim to Lord Lyons in

June are not altogether consistent with those attributed to him in the

above letter, but Lord Odo Russell's opinion that his implacable chief

would crush him at the first opportunity was only too well justified

before long.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: June, 1871.]

[Footnote 2: German Ambassador at Paris.]

[Footnote 3: Foreign Minister in succession to M. Jules Favre.]

[Footnote 4: Subsequently Lord Ampthill.]

[Footnote 5: French Ambassador at Berlin.]

[Footnote 6: Formerly Mr. Odo Russell.]