are formed in two lines of companies. Each company in the first
line is preceded by a platoon in close order, and this is in turn
protected by scouts. As soon as these scouts can advance no farther,
they lie down and await the arrival of the fighting line. The latter
advances under cover of the supporting fire of infantry, machine
guns, and artillery. Fire of position is considered necessary. Fire
at will is from now on used. This is to vary in intensity according
to the character of the target, and the range. It is to increase to
special violence when the attacking infantry advances over level
ground or encounters obstacles. The fire is to be discontinued when
the advancing skirmishers reach cover. The firing line is to advance
as close to the enemy as it can without suffering excessive losses.
Fire is to be opened when the hostile fire makes this necessary, but
small losses are to be borne.
After the fire fight is once begun, it is to be conducted with
more rifles than the enemy has in action. “Battles are only won by
controlled fire directed upon targets at decisive ranges” (according
to the regulations, at ranges under 540 m.). Within the zone of
effective fire, all the troops are to deploy. In consequence of
this, skirmishers, who endeavor to work forward independently, are
scattered all over the terrain over which the attack is being made.
At the initial deployment, the interval between skirmishers is to
be about 5-15 paces; at short ranges, at points where the decision
is sought, there is to be at least one rifle for every two or three
yards of front (1.80-2.70 m. = 2¹⁄₂-3¹⁄₂ paces). Another paragraph
of the regulations prescribes that the maximum density is to be one
rifle per yard of front. The British views, when compared to those
entertained by them immediately after the South African war, have
undergone a noticeable change, especially as regards the frontage of
a firing line; dense firing lines, possessing strong fire power, are
at present deemed essential to a decisive fight, while the fire of
widely extended lines is considered ineffective. The intervals may
vary considerably, but the regulations state that it should be borne
in mind that the difficulties of conducting a fight are increased and
the fire power reduced when too great a front is covered; moreover,
that in covered terrain, and when counter-attacks may be anticipated,
an overextension is actually dangerous. Because of the necessity of
moving in thin skirmish lines, it is considered essential that the
men be trained to act independently, to continue the fight even in a
difficult situation, and to do everything in their power to carry
out the original intentions of the commander.
=Rushes= over open ground are not to exceed 80-100 yards (72-92
m.) in length; as a rule they are to be shorter. According to an
example given in the Firing Regulations, rushes are to be 25 yards
(22 m.) long, at ranges from 650-500 yards (580-450 m.). A rush is
to be continued while the enemy’s surprise lasts and he finds no
opportunity to deliver aimed fire. In covered terrain, the rushes are
to be made from one covering feature to another.
“On open ground and within effective range, long lines of
skirmishers, rising simultaneously, will suffer heavy losses even
when making short rushes; the sudden movement of smaller units may
take the enemy unawares, so that for a time at least well aimed fire
is avoided. The rush is continued only while the surprise of the
enemy lasts. The shorter the range, the smaller the advancing unit
will have to be, and the shorter the length of the rushes.”
The dispositions for a rush are to be made as unostentatiously as
possible. The rearward detachments, which follow by rushes, are to
advance, if possible, beyond the group already firing. When squads
are unable to advance by rushes, the men may crawl forward singly.
The regulations state that, when in close order, units of the
strength of company columns (80-100 men, 4 platoons, in column of
platoons at full distances), having a front of 10-12 files, suffer
comparatively small losses when exposed to long range fire (1800-1200
m.). The troops are to deploy before reaching effective ranges
(1200-600 m.), as they will otherwise suffer serious losses. At
decisive ranges the firing line is to be filled up to its maximum
density.
The whole force, a small part excepted, is to be launched in the
=assault=; a sudden and unexpected advance of the assaulting troops
is considered particularly important. The order for the assault is
to be given by the commander of the whole force, but the manner of
conducting it is left to company commanders.
When the attack would be too costly by day, however, the troops are
to intrench, wait until it is dark, and then advance to assaulting
distance, where they again intrench (machine guns, and even single
field guns are to be taken along). The assault is to be made, after a
brief but violent fire fight, at the first streak of dawn.
DEFENSE.
In defense, a force is divided into the fighting line with supports,
and the reserve. The latter furnishes the outposts and the garrisons
for the advanced positions (so-called temporary positions). The
object of =advanced positions= is to mislead, deceive, and check
the enemy. They are to be evacuated before the troops in them
become seriously engaged. It is not considered necessary for the
=main position= to consist of a continuous line of trenches; every
platoon and even every squad may have its own trench. The principal
requirements are good field of fire and mutual support by oblique or
enfilade fire.
The strength of the garrison is to be governed by the size of the
field of fire and the character of the works. The regulations state
that, under favorable conditions, a few men can defend a broad
front, but that, when the attack is favored by the terrain, a strong
garrison is required. Firing trenches, unless they are to serve as
dummy intrenchments, are not to be constructed so as to stand out
against the horizon. The importance of masking firing trenches, and
of constructing overhead cover is emphasized; special cover trenches
for the supports may be constructed in rear of the crest.
Against skirmishers, fire is to be opened at 1000 m., but it is also
considered desirable to withhold the fire until they get within short
range. It is believed that this will be attended by success when the
assailant is ignorant of the position of the defender or makes his
attack with poorly disciplined troops. Continuous long range firing
tires the eye and the hand. The decision is to be brought about by a
=counter-attack= made by the general reserve. Local counter-attacks
by section reserves are also recommended. The tendency of the
British to make the section reserves very strong has been frequently
observed. The final stage of the combat consists, as in Wellington’s
day, of a counter-attack all along the line. As soon as the opponent
has arrived within assaulting distance, the troops holding the
position are to fix bayonets and, after delivering magazine fire, are
to make a short frontal counter-attack.
THE JAPANESE DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.
ATTACK.
The Japanese views coincide almost exactly with the German, but take
their peculiar theater of war into consideration.
=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will, volley fire, and rapid fire are used.
=Rushes= are not to exceed 100 m. in length, as a rule, but the
regulations admonish leaders to “guard against the mistake of making
rushes that are too short. When rushes are shorter than 30-40 m.,
their value will be insignificant, as a rule.” Leaders are likewise
to avoid sending forward units smaller than a platoon, in order that
the advance may not be too much retarded and the difficulties of
leading increased.
The regulations particularly emphasize that it will rarely be
possible “to shoot an enemy out of his position”, and that, on this
account, the decision will, as a rule, be brought about by the
assault with cold steel. They further state that, when the enemy can
be kept down by artillery fire, the advance of the infantry will
be easy; that, as it is difficult to obtain a timely effect from
artillery fire directed upon an enemy who takes advantage of cover or
who occupies a fortified position, the infantry cannot wait for the
successful termination of the artillery combat, but, on the contrary,
should advance while that combat is in progress, for only by so doing
can it count upon the effective coöperation of its artillery. But,
nevertheless, infantry is to make the attack independently, even if
it has to dispense entirely with the coöperation of the artillery.
The regulations consider the rencontre and the attack on a position
prepared for defense.
=Rencontre.= The regulations prescribe that in a rencontre the
advance guard should make a vigorous but, at the same time,
deliberate attack; that the commander should promptly decide what
to do, even if the situation is not entirely clear; and that, when
practicable, the main body should be launched as an entity. A fight
against a superior enemy is only to be avoided, for the time being,
in case the latter has gained a start in deployment.
=Attack on a position prepared for defense.= The commander frames
his plan of attack according to the results of the reconnaissance,
and leads his troops forward provisionally into a preparatory
position, where he assigns deployment spaces and, if practicable,
combat sections to the different units. In order that they may
utilize the covering features of the ground to the best advantage,
the different units are to avoid advancing abreast. On account of
the difficulties attending an advance over ground swept by hostile
fire, it is considered desirable for the troops to take advantage
of the cover afforded by darkness. In order that, in such a case,
serious lateral displacements of the troops may be avoided, the
fighting line is to be sent forward the day before to endeavor to
drive back the troops posted in front of the enemy’s main position.
The regulations state that, when an attack is contemplated to be
made during daylight against a strong position prepared for defense,
there is no alternative but to approach the assaulting position by
intrenching successive attack positions, but that, when circumstances
permit, an attempt must be made to advance under cover of darkness to
the enemy’s position. In the latter case, the assaulting position is
to be designated during the day, after a thorough reconnaissance, and
detailed preparations are to be made for the advance. As soon as the
troops arrive during the night in the selected position, they are to
construct cover quickly, and to intrench. When the ground is so hard
that intrenching tools cannot be used without difficulty, recourse is
to be had to the sand bags that are carried along. The men engaged in
digging trenches are at all times to be ready for action.
The regulations state that whether a force which has occupied an
assaulting position should make the =assault= immediately at dawn or
should first prepare it by fire, will depend on circumstances; and
that, if attempted at dawn, the success of the assault will depend
on the suddenness and rapidity with which it is carried out. The
reconnaissance of the position and the work of removing obstacles is
to be completed, if possible, during the night, so that avenues of
approach will be open for the assaulting troops.
If the reconnaissance has gained all the necessary information, and
if the preparations are completed, the assault may be made before the
night is over. The regulations say that, when an assault is made at
night, the distance to be covered should be very short; and that it
will depend on circumstances whether the assault is made suddenly,
directly from the last firing position, or whether it is carried
out upon the completion of works of approach. When necessary the
assaulting bodies are to carry along hand grenades and demolition
tools, the latter being selected in conformity with the results of
the reconnaissance.
The regulations state that to have captured a position does not
suffice; that only the pursuit and dispersion of the enemy makes the
victory complete. The troops that have penetrated into the hostile
position are to continue the advance until they again find a field
of fire, whereupon they are to fire upon the retreating enemy. The
troops which do not take part in this fire are to re-form quickly,
secure the captured position, take requisite measures for security,
and make preparations to meet any hostile counter-attack. Troops are
not to be assembled in large bodies at points exposed to hostile
artillery fire. As soon as the enemy has gotten out of range, all the
troops are promptly to resume the forward movement, and are to pursue
him vigorously so far as due regard for cohesion and order permits.
=Intrenching tools= are to be used in attacks on fortified positions,
and in strengthening ground captured from the enemy.
DEFENSE.
In defense, the Japanese regulations, like the German, provide
for economical occupation of the front (group fortifications) and
a general reserve, which is to be used offensively or to protect
the flanks. Dummy intrenchments, patrols, and outposts are to make
it difficult for the enemy to gain information of the defensive
position. The Japanese views in regard to =advanced positions= are
not so pronounced as the German, for, while their regulations mention
the combat of the outposts pushed forward from the position, the
danger of advanced positions is not especially emphasized.
The training of the soldier is to be such that even after he has
fired away all of his ammunition, he will still defend his position
with the bayonet.
Nothing is said in regard to the distance of the infantry position
from that of the artillery. If information is received that the
attacker has made a lodgment during the night in the assaulting
position, small detachments are to advance and prevent him from
strengthening his position.
THE RUSSIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1907.
The present regulations only treat of the formal matters of training
and combat.
THE SWISS DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1908.
ATTACK.
There is considerable similarity between the Swiss and the German
regulations. The keynote is the offensive. The purpose of the
combat and the condition of the troops are to govern the commander
in deciding whether to stand on the defensive or to attack. The
regulations state that decisive results are only offered by the
attack; that considerations of a presumable hostile superiority and
other apparently unfavorable conditions should not diminish the
energy of the attack; and that the decision to launch the troops
should never be made dependent upon the receipt of reports in regard
to the enemy.
The offensive is invariably to be assumed, unless the situation
or the mission compel the force to stand on the defensive. The
regulations state that, in attack, success does not rest alone upon
superiority of fire and superiority of numbers; but that an impetuous
advance and an unswerving determination to win are of just as much
importance. The conduct of the Swiss attack varies, depending upon
whether it is made in a rencontre or on a position prepared for
defense.
The views entertained in regard to the =rencontre= coincide with
the German views. The regulations say that the result of the
reconnaissance should not be awaited, because success depends largely
upon prompt action. The commander may launch parts of his main body
in succession, as soon as they arrive, when the force is operating
in close country, when it is necessary to gain ground quickly on
debouching from a defile, or when the enemy makes an impetuous
advance. The commander is to direct all his efforts toward throwing
the enemy upon the defensive, and then to launch the main body as an
entity.
The Swiss regulations, similar to those of the Japanese, only
discuss the =attack on a fortified position=; various modifications
of the attack, depending upon the preparations made by the enemy,
are authorized. Advantage is to be taken of the cover afforded by
darkness, and an extensive use is to be made of =intrenching tools=.
The regulations state that an assault by day only has a chance of
succeeding when the defender is completely subdued, and when only
insignificant obstacles and defenses are encountered. When this is
not the case, the day is to be used for making preparations for the
attack, and the night for executing it.
DEFENSE.
The regulations consider the involuntary defense in a rencontre; the
deliberately prepared defense seeking a decision and contemplating
an assumption of the offensive; the defense for the purpose of
gaining time; and the occupation of a position in readiness, when the
direction in which the hostile attack will be made is still in doubt,
or when the commander intends to assail the enemy while the latter
is in the act of deploying. In the =defense seeking a decision=,
advanced positions are not to be used, because it is believed that
the employment of detachments of troops in front of the defensive
position will weaken the latter, and a hostile enveloping attack will
soon force the advanced troops to fall back upon the main position.
The regulations point out that if the advanced troops are supported
by fire from the main position, the latter will be prematurely
disclosed to the assailant. The employment of advanced troops is,
however, considered justifiable to hold defiles, to deceive the
enemy, or to support the cavalry.
The works of a position are not to be continuous, but are to be
constructed in groups. Infantry positions over which artillery is to
fire are not to be less than 500 m. in front of the latter.
XV. THE EXPENDITURE AND SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.[494]
[494] Lieutenant-Colonel KOVARIK, _Versuch eines kriegsbrauchbaren
Systems für den Munitionsersatz im Infanteriekampf_, Berlin, 1903.
1. HISTORICAL SKETCH.
The question of ammunition supply in action is of vital importance to
the infantry. To solve it correctly means to assure the success of the
infantry in fire action. The first question that needs consideration
is, whether the experiences of past wars show that the ammunition at
present carried by the infantry is sufficient, under all circumstances,
even when ammunition columns cannot reach the battlefield in time
because all the roads are choked with troops.
For our purpose, it is sufficient to go back as far as the
=Franco-German war=, in which breechloaders were used for the
first time against breechloaders. Every German soldier carried 80
cartridges, and the 6-horse battalion ammunition wagons carried 20
additional rounds per man.[495]
[495] Historical data given by D. GÜNTHER in _Die Entwickelung der
Feuertaktik der Infanterie_, 1902.
When one considers the total number of cartridges expended during any
campaign, it seems impossible that a shortage of ammunition could
ever have taken place. In the =Franco-German war=, the expenditure
of ammunition in the Ist Bavarian Army Corps amounted to 4,163,000
rounds (166 per rifle); in the IInd Army Corps, 1,105,600 rounds (44
per rifle); and in the Saxon Army Corps, 1,450,000 rounds (about
58 per rifle). The compilation of a table, showing the amount of
ammunition expended in the Prussian army, was begun, but was soon
discontinued, as it was found that the necessary data were lacking,
the only information available being the record of the number of
rounds issued by the reserve ammunition parks. The troops sent to
the field army from the depot battalions, must have brought with
them in each case a very considerable amount of ammunition, as each
man carried 80 rounds, but no records are available to show how
much ammunition was forwarded in this way. Furthermore, there is no
record of the number of rounds actually expended and of the amount
of ammunition lost or left on the dead and wounded. It is well known,
that in the long periods, during which no engagement had taken place,
an enormous amount of ammunition was lost on marches and in bivouacs.
This applies likewise to battlefields. The commander of an ammunition
column had his men pick up 22,000 rounds of needle gun ammunition in
unbroken packages on the battlefield of =Hühnerwasser=.
A shortage of ammunition first manifested itself where the troops,
on removing their knapsacks, had neglected to take out the tin boxes
filled with ammunition (for example in the 12th Jäger-Battalion at
=Sedan=),[496] or where the ammunition wagons had been sent to the
rear with the field train (for example in the 50th Infantry, on
January 19th, 1871, in the battle at =Mont Valérien=, and in the 38th
Brigade, at the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=).[497]
[496] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1175.
[497] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, II, p. 259.
The regimental histories contain only a few statements in regard
to the amount of ammunition expended in the various engagements.
Moreover, these statements are only approximations and, as a rule,
cannot lay claim to trustworthiness.
The amount of ammunition expended in the opening battles of the war
was very small, due to the training and fighting methods of the
Prussian infantry, and to the support it received from the artillery.
Moreover, the short range of the rifle prohibited long range firing.
“In order to hold its own against the intensity and long range of
the hostile fire, the German infantry was compelled to fire more
rapidly and at longer ranges than it had intended. In addition, the
difficulties of fire control and fire direction were frequently
increased on account of the tremendous loss of leaders. Under these
circumstances, so much ammunition was expended that, among the troops
fighting in the first line, the ammunition carried by the men was
no more than enough. This explains why it not infrequently happened
that the fighting efficiency of the infantry was impaired by a lack
of ammunition. The first general shortage of ammunition occurred
at the battle of =Mars-la-Tour= in the infantry of the IIIrd Army
Corps.”[498]
[498] _Gen. St. W._, V, p. 1460.
On August 16th, at the battle of =Vionville=, the Prussian IIIrd Army
Corps, whose effective strength was 21,050 rifles, expended 720,486
cartridges, which corresponds to only 34.5 rounds per rifle; yet,
in spite of this, the ammunition ran short. During the lull in the
battle at noon, by removing the cartridges from the dead and wounded,
each man in the 35th Infantry[499] was again supplied with about 200
rounds of ammunition, which were then expended in the course of the
afternoon, so that toward evening another shortage occurred.
[499] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 35_, p. 32.
The following figures in regard to the expenditure of ammunition
during the battle of =Vionville= are taken from _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Beispiele_, 8 and 9, by Major KUNZ:
IInd Bn. Leib Regt. 12,749 rounds for 850 rifles, or 15 per rifle.
Ist Bn. 40th Inf. 35,000 „ „ 450 „ „ 78 „ „
IInd Bn. 40th Inf. 6,650 „ „ 350 „ „ 19 „ „
IIIrd Bn. 40th Inf. 4,520 „ „ 300 „ „ 15 „ „
A very annoying shortage of ammunition occurred in those parts of the
Leib Regiment which were with the 72nd and 40th Infantry Regiments in
front of the wood. The retained echelons in the wood had sufficient
ammunition, but the troops in front lacked the means wherewith to
inform the retained units of the shortage. In the 11th and 72nd
Infantry Regiments a serious shortage of ammunition occurred after
they had been engaged but a short time. (In a little less than two
hours, the 72nd Infantry suffered the following percentage of losses:
Ist Battalion, 53.2%; Füsilier Battalion, 48.2%).[500]
[500] For data in regard to the expenditure of ammunition at
Beaumont, see HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 184.
The defense of the stone wall at =Buzanval= by the 50th Infantry
(German), on January 19th, 1871, was one of the most obstinate
defensive fights of the war. The numerical superiority of the enemy
at this point was overwhelming and his troops were excellent,
nevertheless the regiment maintained the same splendid fire
discipline it had already exhibited at Lundby. The fight lasted nine
hours. In his history of the regiment (p. 350), Lieutenant-General v.
Boguslawski says: