determined. Only the war diary of the IInd Battalion contains a note
showing that 14,206 rounds were expended. As the 5th Company did not
fire at all, and the 7th Company was only partially engaged, by far
the greater portion of the ammunition must have been expended by the
6th and 8th Companies.” The IInd Battalion, like the rest, has no
record showing what ammunition was supplied to it during the battle.
To cite an example: The 12th Company received about 3,000 rounds of
ammunition during the fight. As the strength of this company was 180
men in round numbers, each man received 17 additional cartridges.
He therefore had 97 rounds available, including the ammunition
originally supplied him.
“Now, as each man still had an average of 5 cartridges on going into
billets, he must have expended 92 rounds. From this we may assume
that during the nine hours’ fight, he fired a little more than ten
rounds per hour.”
In the battle of =Beaune la Rolande=, some of the companies of the
56th Infantry near Romainville had expended all their ammunition. In
the 38th Brigade, only the Ist Battalion, 57th Infantry, was able
to replenish its ammunition directly from the ammunition wagons
near Romainville. The defenders of Beaune did not receive such
assistance however, as only one ammunition wagon was brought up (by
the Füsilier-Battalion, 16th Infantry), toward the close of the
battle, for the units engaged there. The ammunition it contained was
distributed among the men, but was not used. Organizations belonging
to the IIIrd Army Corps turned over some of their ammunition, but,
in general, the brigade had to rely practically on the ammunition
carried by the men, for all the ammunition wagons had driven off at
the beginning of the battle. Consequently, this battle was fought
almost exclusively with the ammunition carried by the men--about
80 rounds per rifle. As the French attack was not simultaneously
directed against the whole front of Beaune, lulls occurred in the
fight, which enabled the officers to send a supply of ammunition
to the most seriously threatened points of the line. In a well
disciplined organization, it is not difficult to send ammunition
promptly to the most seriously threatened points by simply passing
it along the line. This was actually done at Beaune la Rolande. In
consequence of this redistribution, at some points in the cemetery,
men fired as many as 200 rounds each, but others fired only 40 or
less; the result, however, was the same, for the ammunition was
almost exclusively supplied from that carried by the men--80 rounds
per rifle. Moreover, a great many cartridges, and even unopened
packages of ammunition, were found, on November 29th, in the position
occupied by the 38th Brigade.
The following figures give an idea of the amount of ammunition
expended at =St. Privat= by the 2nd Regiment of the Guard. On August
19th, the Ist Battalion required 27,340, the IInd Battalion 17,820,
and the Füsilier-Battalion 7,870 rounds to replenish their ammunition
supply. When the heavy losses suffered by this regiment are taken
into account, the average expenditure of ammunition cannot be
considered excessive.[501]
[501] _Geschichte des 2. Garde-Regiments zu Fusz_, p. 250.
At 10:30 P. M., on August 18th, the Rifle Battalion of the Guard
managed to supply each one of its men with 20 rounds of ammunition,
without drawing upon the contents of the ammunition wagons, which
were left intact.[502]
[502] _Geschichte des Gardeschützen Bataillons_, p. 121.
The expenditure of ammunition on the French side was considerably
greater in all the battles. At =Champigny=, every French infantry
soldier carried 118 rounds of ammunition, which did not prove
sufficient, however, to meet the demand. In the French Army of the
Rhine, the average expenditure of ammunition from August 6th to 31st
was 30 rounds, and in the fights of August 16th and 18th, 13 to 27
rounds per rifle. In individual cases, the expenditure of ammunition
was far in excess of these figures. The men of Grenier’s Division,
against which the attack of the 38th Brigade was directed, claim
that they fired as many as 150 rounds apiece, on August 16th. In
the evening, at the close of the battle, the commanding general
of the IVth Army Corps reported a shortage of ammunition.[503]
Shortage of ammunition caused Marshal Bazaine to fall back to Metz
on August 17th. Notwithstanding the proximity of the fortress of
Metz, the French VIth Corps was unable to replenish its supply of
ammunition before it was attacked by the Prussian Guard. Detailed
information available in regard to the ammunition expended by the
25th Infantry (French)[504] shows that each man had only 30 instead
of 90 cartridges. (This was the regiment attacked by the Franz and
3rd Guard Regiments, who lost 2,160 men--9% hits). The statement made
in the history of the 2nd Guard Regiment (p. 233), that every French
soldier had 300 rounds of ammunition available on August 18th, cannot
be substantiated by French records.
[503] HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 159.
[504] PAQUIÉ, _Le tir en terrain varié_, p. 39.
The expenditure of ammunition in the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=,
amounted to 33 rounds per rifle and carbine on the Russian side.
The following detailed statements in regard to the expenditure
of ammunition are available. In the engagement at =Aiaslar=, on
August 23rd, 1877, the Sofia Regiment expended 94 rounds, and at
=Karahassankioi=, the 140th Infantry expended 155 rounds per man.
On December 28th, 1877, the 13th Rifle Battalion expended 122
rounds per man. In this connection, it may be remarked that the
Russian infantryman of that day carried 60 rounds of ammunition in
his cartridge boxes. The ammunition carts carried 55 additional
rounds per man, and the ammunition parks 62. If, as prescribed by
the regulations at that time, only one ammunition wagon followed an
organization into action, each infantryman had 78 rounds available,
and each man of a rifle battalion 106 rounds.
In front of =Plevna=, on July 20th, 1877, the Russians expended in
six hours all the ammunition carried by the men and by the ammunition
carts. On July 30th, during the second assault on =Plevna=, they
expended in four hours all the ammunition carried by the men.[505]
In the engagement at =Lovtcha=, the 3rd Rifle Brigade only fired
during the pursuit. The brigade commander explained afterwards that
his ammunition had run short nevertheless. During the advance, the
ammunition wagons did not follow in rear of the organizations to
which they belonged, and no provision had been made for bringing up
the necessary ammunition.[506]
[505] Details given in the German translation of the Russian _Gen.
St. W._ (Vienna), III, pp. 330-331.
[506] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 88.
On September 1st, 1877, the regiments which made the fruitless attack
on the =Omar Bey Tabia=, expended the following ammunition:
63rd Infantry[507] 55,296 rounds, or 21 per rifle
119th „ [507] 99,744 „ „ 43 „ „
64th „ 24,650 „ „ 10 „ „
115th „ 45,360 „ „ 24 „ „
[507] These two regiments were only engaged from 1 to 1¹⁄₂ hours.
In the Kasan Regiment (No. 64), which had expended less ammunition
than any of the others on this day, the ammunition began to run short
at the moment when the successful and decisive counter-attack of the
Turks commenced. The same misfortune befell other organizations,
after the fire fight had lasted but a comparatively short time, as
apparently they had neglected to remove the cartridges from the dead
and wounded.
During the assault on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, each man of
the 11th Rifle Battalion fired 120 rounds in four hours. This is an
average of 2 rounds per man, per minute.
The Turks took more advantage of the rapidity of fire of their rifles
than did the Russians.[508] It is said that at =Gorni Dubniac=, each
man had 800-900 rounds of ammunition available, and it is a fact,
that the force of 3,570 men garrisoning the group of works placed
3,533 Russians out of action, in a fight lasting 9¹⁄₂ hours, while
the Turkish losses in killed and wounded only amounted to 1,280
men. During the attack, some Turks managed to fire more than 100
rounds apiece. Kuropatkin found 120 empty cartridge shells beside
a dead Turkish soldier.[509] In the engagement at =Tashkessen=
(31st December, 1877),[510] which lasted eight hours, the Prisrend
Battalion expended 292, the Tuzla Battalion 275, and a Rifle
Battalion 263 rounds per man (30 rounds per man, per hour).
[508] Each Turkish battalion was followed into action by 30 pack
mules carrying 60,000 rounds of ammunition, and each man carried from
100 to 120 rounds on his person.
[509] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 170.
[510] BAKER, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 160.
There is very little information available in regard to the
expenditure of ammunition during the =Russo-Japanese war=. The
Russian infantryman carried 120 rounds of ammunition, the 8
one-horse ammunition carts carried 6,600 rounds per company, and
the 2 two-horse ammunition wagons of the battalions 14,400 rounds
each. Assuming the strength of a company as 200, this would give 210
rounds per man. In the engagement at =Hamatan= (=Yalu=), several
Russian organizations ran entirely out of ammunition. A number of
rifle companies (the 6th Company, 11th Infantry, and the 2nd, 3rd
and 4th, 12th Infantry), were able to replenish their supply without
difficulty from the ammunition wagons. The following is taken from a
thoroughly reliable report published in the _Kölnische Zeitung_ of
September 24th, 1905:
During the battle of =Liao Yang=, which lasted six days, the 138th
Infantry fired 99,460, and the 139th Infantry 96,040 rounds. On
September 1st, the 137th Infantry expended 189,000 rounds, in other
words, nearly twice as much in one day as either of the other
regiments expended in six. This excessive expenditure of ammunition
was due to the very severe attacks which this regiment had to
withstand on that day. These attacks were repeated on the next day
and the regiment expended 169,000 rounds of ammunition. From October
13th to 18th, at =Linshinpu=, the 139th Infantry expended 351,800
rounds. During this engagement the Japanese succeeded in getting
within 10 m. of the Russian lines. Thirty bodies were picked up at
15 paces, and 580 bodies from 100 to 150 paces from the Russian
position. The 139th Infantry lost 54 men killed, and 6 officers and
250 men wounded. Major V. Tettau[511] states that during the battle
of =Liao Yang= (30th August, 1904), the 36th Infantry expended
416,800 rounds of ammunition, and the 34th Infantry (two battalions),
250,000 rounds, or for 4,200 Russian rifles an average of not less
than 160 rounds per rifle.
[511] _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei._
The Japanese infantryman carried 120 rounds, and each company had, in
addition, one two-wheeled ammunition cart carrying 16,000 rounds of
ammunition. When packs were removed, each man carried a bag in which
were packed three days’ rations, and from 200 to 250 cartridges. The
Japanese infantry invariably followed the principle that each man
should be supplied with as much ammunition as possible before going
into action. In the engagement at =Kinchau= (26th November, 1904),
the 1st Infantry Division expended 64, the 3rd 54, and the 4th 143
rounds per man of the original effective strength.[512]
[512] _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, I. p. 224.
Although, according to the examples cited, 100 to 150 rounds of
ammunition per man will in general suffice in battle, cases may arise
where troops could fire a greater number of rounds to good advantage.
This must be taken into account when determining the number of rounds
with which the infantryman should be supplied--on his person and in the
ammunition wagons. Moreover, it must be remembered that the supply can
be replenished without difficulty from the ammunition columns after a
battle, so long as it is still possible to assign a separate road to
each army corps. When this is no longer practicable, the ammunition
columns will encounter almost insurmountable difficulties in supplying
the infantry with ammunition.
AMMUNITION SUPPLY OF THE PRINCIPAL ARMIES OF THE WORLD.
========++=======+=====+=======+============+======+=======++
~Coun- || Year | Cal-| Weight| System |Weight| Weight||
try.~ || of |iber.|of car-| of loading | of | of ||
|| con- | |tridge.| | clip.| clip ||
|| struc-| | | | |filled.||
|| tion. | | | | | ||
|| | mm. | g. | | g. | g. ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~GER- || 1905 | 7.9 | 27.19 |Mag. in rear| 7 | 126 ||
MANY~ || S. | | |of barrel, | | ||
|| | | |loaded with | | ||
|| | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~AUS- || 1895 | 8. | 28.35 |Mag. in rear|Frame | 158.25||
TRIA~ || | | |of barrel, | 16.5 | ||
|| | | |loaded with | | ||
|| | | |frame | | ||
|| | | |holding 5 | | ||
|| | | |cartridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~ITALY~ || 1891 | 6.5 | 22. |Mag. in rear| 12 | 138 ||
||Car- | | |of barrel, | | ||
||can- | | |loaded with | | ||
||Mann- | | |frame | | ||
||licher.| | |holding 6 | | ||
|| | | |cartridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~ENG- || 1908 | 7.71| 27.5 |Mag. in rear| Clip | 150 ||
LAND~ ||Lee- | | |of barrel, | 12.5 | ||
||En- | | |loaded with | | ||
||field. | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
|| | | |[514] | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~FRANCE~|| 1886- | 8. | 29. |Mag. under | -- | -- ||
|| 98, | | |barrel, car-| | ||
||1905 D | | |tridges | | ||
||Lebel. | | |loaded | | ||
|| | | |singly. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~RUSSIA~|| 1891 | 7.62| 25.812|Mag. in rear| 9.6 | 137 ||
[516] ||(Three | | |of barrel, | | ||
||line | | |loaded with | | ||
||rifle).| | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
~JAPAN~ || 1897 | 6.50| 22.4 |Mag. in rear| 8.5 | 120 ||
[516] ||Arisaka| | |of barrel, | | ||
||(Meidji| | |loaded with | | ||
|| 80). | | |clip holding| | ||
|| | | |5 car- | | ||
|| | | |tridges. | | ||
--------++-------+-----+-------+------------+------+-------++
========++==================++===========++=================++
~Coun- || Number of rounds || Ammunition|| Number of rounds||
try.~ || carried by a man.|| wagons. || carried by ammu-||
|| || || nition wagons. ||
|| || || No. ||
|| Weight|| || per rifle.||
|| No. kg. || ||No. [513]||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~GER- || 150 | ||4 Company || 14,400 | 77 ||
MANY~ ||N. C. O. 45| ||ammunition || | ||
||Trum- |4.5 ||wagons. || | ||
||peter 90| || || | ||
||Drummer 30| || || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~AUS- || 120 | ||4 Company || 9,450 | 47.2||
TRIA~ ||N. C. O. 40| 4.31||ammunition || | ||
|| | ||wagons. || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~ITALY~ || 162 | ||Infantry of the line, | ||
||Sergt. and |3.736||in field train | 24 ||
||Trum- | ||Alpini, on pack animals | ||
||peter 126| ||and on carts |244 ||
||Inf. | || | ||
||Pioneers 108| || | ||
--------++------------+-----++------------------------+-----++
~ENG- || 115 |3.48 ||8 Pack animals |250 ||
LAND~ || | ||8 Ammunition wagons | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~FRANCE~|| 120 | ||4 Company || 16,384 | 82 ||
||N. C. O. 56|3.48 ||ammunition || or | ||
|| | ||wagons. || 19,000 | ||
|| | || || [515] | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~RUSSIA~|| 120 |3.33 ||24 am. ||In each of | ||
[516] || | ||carts: ||the 8 1- | ||
|| | ||Ist ||horse carts| ||
|| | ||echelon, 8 || 6000 |=36 ||
|| | ||1-horse ||In each of | ||
|| | ||carts ||the 16 2- | ||
|| | ||IInd ||horse carts| ||
|| | ||echelon, 16|| 14,400 |=30 ||
|| | ||2-horse || | -- ||
|| | ||carts || | 66 ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
~JAPAN~ || 120 |2.9 ||Each com- || 16,000 | 80 ||
[516] || | ||pany has || | ||
|| | ||one cart. || | ||
--------++------------+-----++-----------++-----------+-----++
========++===============++=============+===========
~Coun- ||Reserve supply.|| Supply | Supply
try.~ || || available | available
|| || in a | in an
|| || division. |army corps.
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~GER- ||Each of the 34 || 150 | 150
MANY~ ||am. wagons of || 77 | 77
||the 4 inf. am. || --- | 144
||columns of an || 227 | ---
||army corps, || | 361
||carries 23,000 || |
||rounds or 144 || |
||per rifle. || |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~AUS- ||Each division ||16 battalions|3 divisions
TRIA~ ||has one div. ||of 800 rifles| 224
||am. park of 30 ||each. | 18
||am. wagons, || 120 | ---
||which carry || 47.2 |about 242
||769,500 rounds || 57 |
||or 57 per || ----- |
||rifle. || 224. |
||The corps am. || |
||park same || |
||strength as a || |
||div. park. || |
--------++---------------++------+------+-----------
~ITALY~ ||In the 3rd sec-||Line: | Alpi-|Inf. of the
||tion of the am.|| | ni: |line:
||column, 40 || 162 | 162 | 162
||rounds per || 24 | 244 | 24
||rifle; || 40 | 90 | 40
||In the Arty. || --- | --- | 45
||park of the || 226 | 496 | ---
||army corps, 45 || | | 271
||rounds per || | |
||rifle; || | |
||In the Alpini || | |
||am. column, 90 || | |
||rounds per || | |
||rifle. || | |
--------++---------------++------+------+-----------
~ENG- ||In the division|| 115 |400 rounds
LAND~ ||am. column, 125|| 250 |per 1,000
||rounds per || 125 |rifles.
||rifle. || --- |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~FRANCE~||In the corps || 120 | 110
||am. park: || 82 | ---
||Ist || --- | 312
||echelon 44.2|| 202 |
||IInd || |
||echelon 66.2|| |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~RUSSIA~||In the light || 120 | 267
[516] ||Arty. park 81|| 66 | 164
||In the reserve || 81 | ---
||park 164|| --- | 431
|| ---|| 267 |
|| 245|| |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
~JAPAN~ || -- || -- | --
[516] || || |
--------++---------------++-------------+-----------
By way of comparison with the above, the following table shows the
number of rounds to 3 kg. of the ammunition for the several rifles
specified:
{ Prussian smooth-bore infantry musket 85 rounds
Paper Shells { Prussian rifled infantry musket (new model) 55 „
{ Prussian needle gun M/41-69 78 „
{ French chassepot rifle M/66 90 „
{ Infantry rifle M/71 69 „
Metal Shells { Swiss rifle, M/67, 69/71, 81 98 „
{ Rifle, M/98 with loading clips 103 „
The cartridges are carried as follows by the soldier:
=Germany=: =45= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front,
and =60= in the knapsack;
=Austria=: =20= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes in front,
and =60= in the knapsack;
=Russia=: =30= rounds in each of the two cartridge boxes attached to
the waist belt, in a breast cartridge box, and in a reserve
cartridge box attached to the knapsack;
=France=: =120= rounds, in three cartridge boxes, two in front, and
one behind;
=England=: In eight pockets attached to the waist belt, each holding
=15= rounds (in addition each soldier carries a shoulder
belt holding =50= rounds);
=Japan=: =30= rounds in each of the cartridge boxes in front, and
=60= rounds in the cartridge box behind.
2. REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION IN THE VARIOUS ARMIES.
GERMANY.
(Pars. 479-482 F.S.R.)
On the march, it is best to assemble all the company ammunition wagons
of the battalions, as this renders supervision easier, and enables
the battalion commander to regulate the replenishment of ammunition.
Companies acting alone, as well as those forming the support of an
advance guard, are followed by their ammunition wagons. It does not
seem desirable to unite the ammunition wagons of a regiment or of a
brigade on account of the distance separating the different battalions.
During the march to the battlefield, the ammunition should be taken
out of the knapsacks, and the contents of the ammunition wagons
distributed among the men. The men carry this extra ammunition in their
haversacks and in their coat and trousers’ pockets, etc.
The two-horse company ammunition wagon, Model 1897, has a width of
track of 1.53 m., and, when empty, weighs 450 kg. Compared with the
ammunition wagon Model C, 1887, which was originally designed to
carry ammunition in boxes, it is lighter by 75 kg., and can be turned
within a shorter radius. The wagon body is provided with double doors
in front and in rear. The interior is divided into four compartments
(to be emptied separately), each capable of holding 16 bundles of
cartridges placed on end. Each bundle contains 15 packages of 15
cartridges in clips each. Each bundle of 225 cartridges weighs 7.25
kg.
As three bundles of cartridges are to be carried by one man,
according to the Field Service Regulations (par. 480), 1
non-commissioned officer and 21 men are detailed to unload the
ammunition wagon. The unloading is managed as follows: Four men take
post on each side of the wagon, two handing out the bundles to the
other two, who lay them on the ground. The remaining men place the
bundles in piles of three in such a manner that the carrying loops of
two in each pile can be interlaced and held together by a stick or a
bayonet. An ammunition wagon can be emptied in this manner in four
minutes. The two ammunition bundles tied together are slung over the
left shoulder, the rifle is slung over the right shoulder, and the
third bundle is carried in the right hand. In this way, a man can
carry 21.8 kg.
Each man is issued 60 to 75 cartridges from the ammunition wagon.
These weigh from 1.8 to 2.4 kg. When issued too soon, this additional
burden causes considerable inconvenience, and consequently reduces
the marching power of the men. The leader must also decide what shall
be done with the ammunition in case it has been issued prematurely,
and the troops fail to get into action. As soon as the ammunition
wagons are emptied, they are sent to the rear in charge of the mounted
wagonmaster, and refilled from the ammunition columns. When refilled,
they rejoin their proper organizations. If requested, ammunition must
be issued to any body of troops.
On the battlefield, ammunition wagons, unless they have been emptied,
follow the movements of the several companies and take up a position
under cover, indicated by the wagonmaster, as close as possible to the
firing line--never more than 800 m. in rear of it. In urgent cases,
this must be done without regard to losses. The firing line is supplied
with ammunition, when practicable, by the reinforcements sent forward.
When the firing line is about to run short of ammunition, this fact is
communicated to the troops in rear by repeatedly making the signal “m”.
This signal, when made to the front by the troops in rear, signifies,
“ammunition is coming up at once.”
In exceptional cases, when ammunition must be sent to the firing line
by individual men, the latter should invariably be detailed from troops
in rear which have not as yet been engaged. These men must endeavor to
reach the firing line by rushes or by crawling, and must then remain
with that line.
It is the duty of the battalion commander to see that the ammunition
taken from the ammunition wagons is promptly replaced. The higher
commanders would do well to provide a reserve supply of ammunition,
until the arrival of the ammunition columns, by assembling the
ammunition wagons of the troops held in reserve. (Par. 482 F. S. R.).
It will also be advisable to assign some of the ammunition wagons
of the troops held in reserve to the organizations who will, in all
probability, expend a large amount of ammunition.