the whole force. The short burst of rapid fire preceding the assault
is suddenly terminated by the command “attention” (_attenti_), and
at the command “to the assault” (_per l’assalto_), the men throw
themselves with loud cheers, accompanied by the sounding of trumpets
and the beating of drums, upon the enemy. When a unit has already
gotten so close to the enemy that further waiting would be useless,
it advances to the assault, after getting permission therefor, or,
otherwise, on its own responsibility. All the rest of the troops are
to join in this movement.
DEFENSE.
So long as it is not definitely known in which direction the enemy
will approach, the position is to be occupied with as weak a force as
possible. The decision is to be brought about by a =counter-attack=.
Long range fire is only considered proper on broad stretches of open
terrain devoid of cover; and, in general, fire is not to be opened
until the enemy arrives at short ranges. As soon as fire is opened,
all the supports are to be in the firing line. A counter-attack is
undertaken by the first line only in exceptional cases.
THE FRENCH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1904.
ATTACK.
Both the French and the German regulations show a decided preference
for the offensive, and both have eliminated all rules which might
produce normal formations. There is an unmistakable inclination
towards shock tactics in the French regulations, although the term
“shock troops” has been replaced by “maneuvering troops”. “The
forward movement alone is decisive and irresistible.... The fire is
the element that executes”. The habit of looking upon the German army
as a probable opponent leads the French to provide for reconnaissance
with mixed detachments. The regulations do not touch upon the tactics
of the rencontre, and prescribe a more cautious conduct for the
advance guard than the German regulations.[488] The advance guard
is to occupy supporting points, under cover of which the main body
can deploy, and to complete the reconnaissance by its fight. The
necessity of infantry detachments completing the reconnaissance made
by the cavalry is particularly emphasized.
[488] See pars. 354, 356, 357 and 366 German I. D. R.
Another difference between the two regulations considered lies in the
manner of making use of the cover afforded by the ground. The danger
of going too far in this direction is guarded against in the German
regulations by assigning combat sections to the various units. The
French regulations prescribe a group formation of the several combat
elements, and a concentration at favorable points, while the plain
devoid of cover is left unoccupied. The center of gravity of a French
attack does not lie in the firing line--the fight for the superiority
of fire is not mentioned--but in maneuvering troops cautiously led
after the firing line. The defender is to be engaged all along the
line and, when the weak points of his position are recognized, the
commander-in-chief is to give the order for the assault.
This division of a force into a fire and a shock group causes the
French to prefer the echelon formation on general principles. A
brigade is formed as follows, for example: Two battalions of the 1st
regiment in the first line, which is followed at 400 m. by the third
battalion (_troupe d’entrainement_); the 2nd regiment follows at a
like distance as a reserve.
The regulations divide the attack into the artillery and the
infantry preparation (_préparation_), the decisive action (_l’action
décisive_), and the completion (_l’achèvement_).
=The artillery in the preparatory action.= The artillery is to
endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as quickly as possible,
without, however, expending more ammunition than is absolutely
necessary.... The commander is not to give the order for the attack
until the preparation is considered sufficient.
The troops are led forward over the terrain in a particularly careful
manner (see p. 208 supra), and are then concentrated in a sheltered
and protected place. Twelve mounted men (Reservists) are attached
to every infantry regiment for reconnaissance purposes. The manner
in which the French utilize the ground is typical. In this, widely
separated parts of the force may unexpectedly encounter a strong
hostile firing line, and may be defeated in detail.
The official regulations are supplemented by special regulations
issued in March 1907 for the army maneuvers by General Lacroix,
formerly commanding the VIIth Army Corps, and at present Vice
President of the Supreme War Council.
=Assembly.= The division is assembled in division square (_carré de
division_), in which the brigades are in line or in echelon, the
regiments in line of double columns or in line of company columns,
abreast or in echelon. If a frontal attack is to be made, in which
successive lines are pushed forward without any attempt to envelop
(in other words a pure frontal attack), the division is concentrated
with the brigades abreast, their regiments in echelon. If a flank
attack is to be made, in which the leading brigade must be protected
by an echelon and a reserve ready for any eventuality, the division
is concentrated with the brigades in echelon, their regiments
abreast. The artillery is posted in section column near a road in
rear of the _carré_. The pioneer company is divided into four parts,
corresponding to the four heads of columns of the assembled troops,
for the purpose of removing obstacles and cutting passages during the
forward movement. The cavalry is pushed forward and the assembled
force is protected in all directions by outposts of infantry and
cavalry.
=Preparations for the advance in mass formation.= During the
concentration, mounted officers reconnoiter the covering features of
the terrain which are to be utilized during the advance of the massed
division, and later these officers act as guides.
Preparatory attack formation.
=A. Pure frontal attack.= The leading regiment in each brigade is to
have two battalions in the firing line and supports, the third to
be echeloned in the rear of the outer flank. All of the battalions
are to be protected by infantry patrols and by a small detachment of
cavalry. The second regiment is to have one battalion echeloned in
rear of the inner flank of the leading regiment, and the divisional
cavalry is to be held in rear of the division, in readiness to
advance to the right or the left.
=B. Flank attack.= The two regiments of the leading brigade are to
furnish their own firing lines, supports, and reserves. The third
regiment is to be echeloned 500 m. in rear of the others, and the
fourth regiment is to form the general reserve. The cavalry is to
reconnoiter on the outer flank. In this case, as well as in a pure
frontal attack, the artillery is to take up a position from which it
can support the attack. Drummers, trumpeters, and bands, are to march
with the general reserve. The regulations state that it is absolutely
essential for infantry units to be sheltered from hostile observation
during their forward movement, and that they must remain under
control of their leaders up to the last moment. Troops are not to
deploy until they enter terrain swept by the enemy’s fire. (According
to the decision of umpires at peace maneuvers, this would be at 5000
m.). It should be borne in mind that deployed troops cannot move by a
flank, but only straight to the front.
The forward movement, in which the terrain will invariably cause
lateral displacements of troops, is made from cover to cover, when
necessary, from one supporting point to another. No hard and fast
rules or normal formations are prescribed for this advance.
The advance is to be made as long as possible without firing a shot.
When this is no longer practicable, recourse is to be had to fire, as
the only means of making a further advance possible.
=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will (_feu à volonté_), principally used at
short ranges, for the purpose of retarding the enemy’s advance; fire
with counted cartridges (_feu à cartouches comptées_), the number
being given (this is the fire usually employed); magazine fire (_feu
à répétition_); and the fire of specially designated marksmen. Volley
fire has been again prescribed. “Bursts of fire” (_rafales_) are
typical of French fire tactics. (See p. 164 supra).
After fire has been opened, the advance is to be made by rushes, but
the regulations do not prescribe how these shall be made.
The regulations contain a very realistic description of the infantry
combat with its fluctuations, isolated attacks, and reverses. They
emphasize that all must be animated by a desire to carry forward, by
means of reinforcements, any troops that may have been checked. At
the point where an advance is absolutely impossible, as many hostile
troops as possible are to be held fast by an energetic fire fight,
while the troops in the decisive attack engage the enemy and advance
impetuously.
A series of attacks is to be made from the various covering features
all along the line. These, made with the impetuosity inculcated
by the regulations, are very apt to fail prematurely. This is
particularly likely to happen because some of the troops will fall
behind, while others are able to push ahead more rapidly. These
attacks are to destroy the power of resistance of the enemy and to
exhaust him physically. The leading units are to cover with their
fire the advance of those who are less favored by the terrain.[489]
During peace maneuvers, the fight now comes to a standstill at a
range of 600 to 800 m.
[489] According to DENCAUSSE, in _Journal des Sciences Militaires_,
1906, and November-December number 1907, the infantry should endeavor
to approach within 700-800 m. of the enemy’s position without firing
a shot.
The supports (_renforts_) follow in a similar manner, ready to move
up into the firing line at the first signal to that effect, or
independently in case the situation requires it. Their entry into
action is in a general way determined by the commander of the whole
force. They are to augment the fire power of the firing line or
to carry it forward. The efforts of all are to be directed toward
constantly keeping up the advance.
At some points, the troops, when reinforced by their supports,
will be able to attack some of the enemy’s supporting points,
and to effect a lodgment on the ground captured. At other points
the attacking group will be too weak to push the attack home. In
such a case, the troops are to effect a lodgment on the terrain
(_s’accrochent sur le sol_) in rear of the nearest cover, as close
as possible to the enemy’s position, and are to maintain themselves
there until artillery or neighboring troops can support them. The
fire of these troops is to give the enemy the impression that an
attack is to be made here also. “No matter how successful these
usually protracted fights may be. troops must be launched in a
decisive attack at some points. The infantry should endeavor to
compensate for its numerical inferiority by skillfully utilizing the
ground and intrenchments, by great activity, and, above all else, by
invincible pertinacity. The supporting point will thus become the
center of the fight of a separate combat group.”
The commander should endeavor to maintain cohesion, and to equalize
fluctuations in the combat by controlling the activity of the
artillery and by putting in fresh troops. During this group combat,
the commander must decide where the retained troops should be
launched for the assault. The selection of a point of attack is
essentially the personal task of the commander and is an index of
character and of eye for the value of ground, neither of which can be
regulated by fixed rules. The regulations do not believe that close
order formations can be dispensed with in launching the assaulting
troops. Troops in close order, utilizing the ground to the best
advantage, so as to suffer but slight losses from hostile fire, are
to be brought up to the fighting line in a flexible echelon formation
in order to give to that line, as _troupes d’assaut_, the impetus for
the assault.
According to Thomas de Colligny,[490] formerly general staff officer
of the 9th Infantry Division, a battalion designated to make an
assault should form in four lines, each consisting of one company;
the distance between lines being 150 m., and the front covered
likewise 150 m. Each of the three leading lines should be formed
in line of platoons in columns of route at deploying intervals
sufficient to allow single rank line to be formed, and the fourth
line in a similar formation with 10-pace intervals between platoons.
When one of the lines is checked, the next succeeding one is to carry
it forward. If the French believe such close order formations to be
indispensable, they will be compelled to make a more extensive use of
cover.
[490] _Conseils à mon bataillon_, p. 107.
Colonel Dencausse is the exponent of a suggestion made by General
Bonnal. The latter forms a division for attack as follows: One
regiment, on a front of 600 m., as the advanced line (_avant ligne_),
in rear of that, the assaulting troops (_troupes d’assaut_). First
line: one regiment, its twelve company columns abreast; second line:
one regiment, its three battalions in double column at extended
intervals, 300 m. in rear of the first line; third line: the fourth
regiment, its battalions in route column abreast of each other, 300
m. in rear of the second line. While, during our peace maneuvers, we
continue to fire on the enemy’s firing line in the expectation that
his supports and reserve will in the end enter our zone of fire, it
might be advisable, when confronted by a French opponent, to direct
our fire on his reserves as soon as these become visible.
=Envelopment.= This is occasionally mentioned in the regulations
(for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). However, the Field Service
Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose phases may vary in
length depending upon the intentions of the commander, state that the
attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of the enemy with superior
forces for the purpose of annihilating him.”
For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 392 supra.
DEFENSE.
The French defense is characterized by group fortifications, advanced
positions, and advanced posts[491] (intended to prevent hostile
reconnaissance), and numerous counter-attacks.
[491] These frequently consist of detachments of all arms
(_détachements de couverture ou de contact_). General BONNAL.
(_Deutsche Revue_, December number, 1907) says: “The French
regulation--in contrast to the German--provide in defense for
detachments of all arms, which are pushed forward for the purpose
of compelling the enemy to show his dispositions, and to draw him
on in a direction favorable for the defender. Both systems have
their advantages and disadvantages, and we, for our part, are of the
opinion that in sending out advanced detachments one must exercise
great care in order that these may not be defeated in detail, for
this is invariably detrimental to the whole force.”
For defense, a force is divided into the firing line with its
supports, and the maneuvering troops (general reserve) intended
for offensive action. In addition to calling attention to the
necessity of overwhelming with fire the hostile troops advancing over
open ground, the regulations recommend that the fire be withheld
occasionally and that the enemy be allowed to run into the greatly
accelerated fire which is unexpectedly directed upon him. The fire is
to be discontinued as soon as the enemy takes to cover, and is to be
increased to the utmost intensity when he moves in dense formation
over open ground. The supports are to be used to augment the fire
power of the firing line.
=Counter-attack.= General Lacroix states: “The frontal attack is
met by the offensive return (_retour offensif_), the flank attack
by the counter-attack. In order to prepare for this, the commander
should ride ahead to examine the ground, and to consider what
counter-measures he should take. The artillery can render the most
effective assistance by registering its fire upon the points at which
the enemy will probably advance, and by preventing him from leaving
his position. If the attack is successful, the local reserve advances
beyond the firing line, which has entered the hostile position, and
fires upon the retreating enemy. The general reserve now becomes the
local reserve, and the former firing line re-forms and becomes the
general reserve.”
The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack
(_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A
=counter-attack= is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates
into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast
herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an
=offensive return=. (For details see p. 439 supra).
Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but
to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon
him. then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press on,
in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected and
reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank by
fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure has
frequently been successful.
“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must
prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy
must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the
counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless
of the cost. When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the
commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should
be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the
enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the
commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”
THE BRITISH DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1905.[492]
[492] _Infantry Training._ _Combined
Training_.--_Vierteljahrshefte_, 1906, III, _The Development of the
Tactical Views in the British Army after the Boer War_.
ATTACK.
The regulations do not mention the rencontre. A normal offensive
battle consists of “an advance from point to point. Every lodgment
made in a new firing position weakens the enemy’s strength in his
main position, and paves the way for a further advance; every advance
must be thoroughly prepared and systematically carried out.”
In the following, the attack made by a brigade of four battalions
is used as a basis. While the commander reconnoiters under the
protection of his advance guard, the troops are concentrated in a
“preparatory formation”, the battalions in one or more lines of
“quarter columns” (column of companies). As soon as the commander
has decided which flank of the enemy he will envelop, against which
portion of the enemy’s line he will launch his decisive attack,
he assembles his subordinate commanders to receive the orders.
According to the regulations, it will rarely be possible to issue
orders while the troops are still in march. The orders are, as a
general rule, to be given in writing, and are to be supplemented
by verbal instructions, in which the commander calls attention
to the peculiarities of the terrain, especially where a hostile
counter-attack is possible. In exceptional cases, the brigade
commander designates the position to be taken up by the machine
guns, and gives directions to them in regard to supporting the
advance by long range fire. A base battalion is to be designated.
When the enemy’s position is visible, a point of attack is assigned
to every unit. When this is not practicable, the base battalion is
led forward by officers familiar with the ground, or it is given
a compass direction. Every leader is to provide independently for
reconnaissance and for communication by signal flags and also by
telephone; a mounted signal corps man accompanies the brigade
commander.
Every unit is formed in three lines for attack.
The =first line=, consisting of scouts and skirmishers with supports,
is made as weak as possible; without supports rarely more than
one-fourth of the whole force.
The =second line=, the reserves of the firing line, is under the
orders of the appropriate battalion commanders, and is to reinforce
the firing line, protect the Hanks, and deliver long range fire. The
second line is to fill up the firing line to the maximum density,
_i.e._, to one man per yard of front (0.9 m.).
The =third line=, the general reserve, is to assure the success of
the attack. It is to be made as strong as possible, seldom less than
one-fourth of the whole force.[493] “The general reserve is directly
under the orders of the commander of the whole force. It enables
him to meet the varying contingencies of an engagement or to ward
off counter-attacks. If the attack succeeds, the general reserve
pushes forward rapidly to take up the pursuit; if the attack fails,
it serves as a rallying force, but before the commander decides
to leave behind even a part of it, he should consider whether, by
launching all the troops at his disposal, he could break down the
resistance of the defender. The commander can only exercise an
influence on the course of the action by means of a reserve. If he
keeps in his own hands a strong reserve, he will have it in his power
to take advantage of any mistake the enemy may commit, to restore
the battle should the leading troops meet with a serious check, to
meet a counter-attack in force, or, in case of need, to provide the
additional strength required to drive the attack home.”
[493] According to the old regulations, a part of the general
reserve had to remain in rear in rallying positions. (See p. 397
supra).
In contrast with these provisions, we find, strangely enough, under
the heading “Brigade”, the hint that, when advancing to the assault,
it is advisable to keep back a portion of the reserve in a rallying
position. Even a battalion commander is invariably to retain at least
half a company at his disposal. The British were not without reason
censured because their flank attacks were ineffective in South Africa
on account of the lack of energy of the frontal groups, and their
new regulations accordingly contain detailed rules for the conduct
of the “holding attack”. The troops holding the enemy in front are
to threaten him for the time being. This is to be accomplished by
wide extension, and by deceiving the enemy by occasional bursts of
lire (_rafales_), by employing machine guns, by retaining supports
far in rear, and by retraining, for the time being, from advancing to
decisive ranges. But the troops are to be ready to join in the main
attack when the latter advances. The regulations state that, in order
to deceive the enemy effectually, adequate forces will have to be
launched and that the commander will have to act vigorously. (See p.
447 supra).
Fixed rules for the front to be covered by a unit in action are no
longer given. A unit fighting alone may cover considerably more
front than when acting as part of a larger force. In a decisive
attack, a battalion in the first line may put 125 rifles on every 100
yards (90 m.) of front; these are distributed between firing line,
supports, and battalion reserve; the latter may consist of one or
more companies. Entire companies are only deployed in exceptional
cases, for example on open ground, where it is difficult to bring
up the supports. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses to
be anticipated in the firing line; when these will be small, in all
probability, the reserve may be made as strong as the firing line
plus supports. In attack, a battalion may accordingly deploy on a
front not exceeding 800 yards (formerly 540 m. was prescribed). A
brigade of four battalions may deploy on a front of 1400-2100 m.,
depending upon the number of battalions engaged.