with the enemy,[480] is only possible if the force still has reserves
available, if cavalry and artillery are in a position to take a hand in
the fight, or if the troops that have been withdrawn are sheltered from
the enemy’s fire by features of the ground--all of which depends in
many cases on chance.
[480] _Taktik_, V, p. 344.
It is much more difficult to break off an action in defense than in
attack, as in the former case, the assailant approaches closer with
every moment. This brings up the question, as to whether it would not
be better for the defender to hold out until darkness sets in than
expose his troops to the incalculable results of a retreat under fire.
When the assailant has once entered the zone of short ranges, the
defender will no longer be able to effect a systematic retreat. If the
defender has used up all his reserves, the withdrawal should be begun
at the point where the enemy is not pressing his attack, or where he
has been unable to gain a superiority of fire. When a withdrawal is
made, the whole local front should retire at once and simultaneously;
it would be a mistake to reduce gradually the strength of the units
engaged, for this would only give the enemy an opportunity to
annihilate completely the remaining parts. If a company cannot maintain
its position, a platoon certainly could not do so.
[Illustration]
As soon as the commander decides to break off the action, the reserve,
if one is still available, should be sent to the rear to take up a
rallying position, which should be so situated that it can make its
influence felt as soon as the main position is evacuated. As every
defeated force, or one that is withdrawn by order, retires straight to
the rear, the rallying position, in order to allow the troops holding
it to fire effectively, must be located as far as possible to a flank
of the line of retreat. If the outer flank of the position can be
advanced, fire may be opened at an earlier moment, but this will only
be practicable in minor engagements. The distance of the rallying
position from the main defensive position should be such as to compel
the enemy to advance again under fire, and prevent his carrying both
the main defensive position and the rallying position at one rush. On
the other hand, the rallying position should not be so far to the rear
that the retreating troops may be annihilated before they enter its
effective zone. However, as the troops in the rallying position are
also to effect a withdrawal, it is not a good plan for them to engage
the enemy from the start at too short a range. “It is most desirable
when artillery and machine guns supported by cavalry suffice for this
purpose, while the infantry uninterruptedly continues its retreat. The
mounted arms follow later at an increased gait.” (Par. 429 German I. D.
R.).
The rallying position should be occupied in time, so that all
dispositions for holding it can be made calmly and without
precipitation. A powerful fire at mid and long ranges is requisite
to prevent the enemy from reaching decisive ranges. The firing line
should, therefore, be strong and the supports weak. If a reserve
is still available, it is at once sent back into a second rallying
position, to cover the withdrawal of the troops occupying the first
rallying position. A free field of fire down to the shortest ranges is
not necessary. If the position is on elevated ground, the firing line
should be posted so far in rear of the crest that, while its fire can
still sweep the ground at mid ranges, and perhaps at the extreme limit
of short ranges, the skirmishers, on retiring, will be sheltered as
soon as possible. Fire should be opened as soon as possible, in order
to retard the enemy’s advance.
The troops holding a rallying position should delay the enemy’s advance
long enough to give the retiring force ample time and room to re-form,
so that it can effect its retreat in good order. When this has been
accomplished, the troops occupying the rallying position retire, unless
there is hope that fresh troops may bring about a change in the state
of affairs. As a rule, a second rallying position will be necessary,
but it would be a mistake to halt in every seemingly favorable
position. When a retreat has once been decided upon, it is generally
necessary to get away from the enemy as quickly as possible.
“The commander must conduct the combat attending a retreat according to
a well-ordered plan. He must indicate where the rallying position is to
be, what troops are to occupy it, and assign march directions to the
different columns. Only after he has given these orders and has assured
himself that they will be executed, does he leave the battlefield, in
order to meet his troops soon thereafter with new orders.[481] The
rest is the business of subordinate leaders.” (Par. 432 German I. D.
R.). The latter remain with their organizations for the purpose of
maintaining order and cohesion. (Par. 297 German I. D. R.). Adjutants
and officers detailed to receive orders should be sent to the rear
ahead of the troops.[482]
[481] This sentence in our regulations, not to be found in those of
other armies, was necessary to absolve a superior commander from all
blame for leaving his troops and the battlefield. V. SCHLICHTING, I,
p. 115. See _Taktik_, V, p. 350.
[482] For the conduct of a retreat, see _Taktik_, V, p. 373, et seq.
XIII. CONTAINING ACTIONS.
THE DELAYING ACTION AND THE HOLDING ATTACK.
Since the attacker will invariably seek to overpower the defender,
and the latter will endeavor to prevent this by force of arms, it is
obvious that an enemy can be “delayed” or “held” only when he permits
this to be done. It is difficult to conduct a delaying action or a
holding attack, because our training, which is based on offensive
action, causes subordinate leaders to follow up every little advantage.
In delaying actions, the defensive, and in holding attacks, the
offensive intention predominates. The latter may consist of merely
threatening the enemy with an attack, or of seriously engaging him.
(Par. 392 German I. D. R.). Both the delaying action and the holding
attack aim at deceiving the enemy.[483] Accordingly, the characteristic
features of these combats are great frontage, large expenditure of
ammunition, and long range fire, but, at the same time, few rifles,
in order to deceive the enemy as to the strength of our force. In
both combats, troops require considerable distribution in depth. The
object of a delaying action is to gain time until the troops in rear
can deploy, neighboring columns can come up, or a turning movement
can become effective. (Par. 417 German I. D. R.). Troops fighting a
delaying action require considerable distribution in depth so that
they can effect a withdrawal. Distribution in depth is still more
necessary in a holding attack,[484] in order that the troops may be
able to repulse a counter-attack made by the enemy, or, by attacking
him energetically, prevent his withdrawing. A force fighting a delaying
action should keep its supports far to the rear, while a force charged
with holding the enemy should keep them in close proximity. By properly
employing his artillery, the commander can best exercise an influence
on the course of the combat. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). Since a
delaying action is to be fought at long ranges, a field of fire is
only required at those ranges; defiladed spaces in the foreground may
frequently be a positive advantage. The fire fight is kept up only so
long as it is necessary to keep the enemy at a distance. In a holding
attack, it will not be proper to keep up a continuous fire; the violent
fire breaking forth from time to time must teach the defender that a
force is lying in waiting opposite him, ready to rush forward at a
moment’s notice.
[483] This is still more pronounced In demonstrations. (_Taktik_,
V, p. 11). “Feints are to deceive the enemy as to our intentions,
but they may consist of offensive action. The regulations do not lay
down specific rules either for them or for other more rare methods
of combat; accordingly, their conduct will vary with the situation.”
(Par. 420, German I. D. R.).
[484] _Taktik_, V, p. 161.
The object of threatening with an attack may frequently be accomplished
by engaging the enemy with several detachments which are separated
by intervals. (Par. 288 German I. D. R.). The negative object of
preventing the enemy from withdrawing may be accomplished with a
weak force; the positive object of compelling the enemy to use up
his reserves in the early stages of the fight and at a less decisive
point, requires that lie be engaged with a stronger force. A determined
commander will not allow himself to be held by demonstrations. The
manner in which the Vth Army Corps forced the French to bring up their
reserves into the first line at Wörth, is worthy of imitation.
The size of the group charged with holding the enemy depends upon the
extent of front to be covered and the probable duration of the combat.
The conduct of such a force will vary considerably, depending upon the
distance to the point where the decisive action is to be fought. When
the holding force is close to this point, it should engage the enemy
energetically.
=England.= The holding attack is to deceive the enemy as to the
direction in which the main attack will be made, and, when the
crisis of the action approaches, prevent his withdrawing troops from
those parts of his front which are only threatened and opposing the
decisive attack with nearly his entire force. Accordingly, the troops
making the holding attack should act vigorously, as soon as the
attack develops, and be in readiness to transform their demonstration
instantly into a real attack.
XIV. THE INFANTRY COMBAT ACCORDING TO VARIOUS DRILL REGULATIONS.
THE AUSTRIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903.[485]
[485] The various provisions of the German and Austrian Infantry
Drill Regulations are skillfully compared by Major-General
REGENSPURSKY V. REGENY, Austrian Army, in an article entitled _Die
taktischen Lehren des Exerzierreglements für die k. k. Fusztruppen
vom Jahre 1903. Ein Vergleich mit dem deutschen Reglement 1906_.
(_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, Nos. 7 and 8).
ATTACK.
Both the rencontre and the attack on a position prepared for defense
are considered. The regulations in regard to the rencontre have been
revised, so as to permit a commander to launch the battalions of his
main body directly from route column, or to concentrate his main body
farther to the rear, while his advance guard stands on the defensive.
The =attack on a position prepared for defense=, even after the
attacker’s artillery has succeeded in paving the way for its
infantry, consists of a laborious advance from one firing position
to another. The question as to whether an attack is feasible without
the support of artillery fire, is answered to the effect that it
will, as a rule, be a difficult undertaking, unless the artillery has
sufficiently silenced the batteries of the defender. The regulations
divide the attack into two clearly defined phases, viz., the advance
to the decisive firing position (the main firing position), and the
decisive action.
The provisions of the regulations coincide very nearly with the views
considered sound in Germany, and therefore an attempt will here
merely be made to point out several differences. The combat formation
necessary for the decisive stage of the action is taken up during
the preparatory stage, so that, when the forward movement commences,
the troops need only move straight to the front. (Par. 568). In a
division, by appropriately combining “tactical units”, echelons are
formed, whose strength depends upon the purpose of the combat, the
information of the enemy, and the relation of the division to other
bodies of troops. (Pars. 533, 540 and 541). Rules for the employment
of thin or dense firing lines are not given. “The attacker should
advance impetuously to the point where he can employ his rifles
effectively,” (Par. 582).
“In an attack, everything should be done to get within effective
range of the opponent before fire is opened by the whole line.” (Par.
323). When acting as part of a larger force, a platoon may open
fire independently, if it suddenly encounters the enemy or if it
finds a good opportunity for firing which the company commander has
overlooked. (Par. 338). Unless the battalion commander has reserved
to himself the right of designating the moment for opening fire, the
company commanders direct when fire shall be opened, and conduct the
fire fight at mid and short ranges. At long ranges, the battalion
commander designates the companies that are to fire.
=Kinds of fire.= Fire at will and volley fire are employed. As a
rule, volleys are only used when the troops are in close order, but
may also be used in skirmish line to test the range. According to
par. 331, the rate of fire may be accelerated, and in pars. 327 and
686, fire surprises are authorized.
When exposed to effective fire, the firing line is to =advance by
rushes=. These are to be made by alternate units moving forward,
supported by the fire of those remaining behind. Rushes are only in
exceptional cases to be made by units smaller than a platoon. “The
length of the rushes depends upon the character of the ground and
the tactical situation, as well as upon the physical condition of
the men. They serve as an expedient for reaching the next firing
position.” (Par. 313).
Movements under effective hostile fire may sometimes be made by
=crawling=. This is considered especially useful in rectifying
alignments. (Par. 196).
For =envelopment=, see p. 362 supra.
For the =use of the spade in attack=, see p. 393 supra.
=Assault.= “The close approach of a long firing line to an enemy who
occupies a good position, may well pass as a proof of the assailant’s
superiority. Nevertheless, this does not, under all circumstances,
furnish assurance that a forward movement for the purpose of
penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a premature
assault may still result in disaster.
“As long as the conduct of the opponent does not show clear
indications that his fire power is crippled, nothing remains for
the attacker but to continue the fight for the superiority of
fire. In doing this, the commander should not hesitate to put in
his last man if necessary. The assault--in case the enemy still
offers resistance--should not be made until the attack has been
pushed sufficiently close to the enemy’s position, and the power of
resistance of the enemy is palpably broken.
“It is immaterial what formations are taken up for this closing act
of the combat, as it should be the natural culmination of a situation
strained to the utmost. The troops must understand that there is no
longer any chance to go back; that on the contrary, at this moment,
honor and salvation lie wholly in moving to the front.
“When the assault has once begun, the hostile position should be
carried in one rush. Any hesitation or halting, at this critical
stage of the action, may nullify the previous success, and must
therefore be quickly overcome by the reserves, if any are still
available, taking a hand in the fight.” (Pars. 590-592).
The decision to assault may emanate either from the firing line, from
the commander of the whole force, or from the commander of one of the
units. If the decision emanates from the firing line, all the troops
are to conform to the movement of that line. The following provision,
which applies even to a company acting alone, differs from the German
regulations, viz., “During the assault, a part of the assailant’s
force should, whenever practicable, continue its fire and direct it
upon any hostile reserves that may appear.”
DEFENSE.
The regulations governing the =defense seeking a decision= differ
but little from the views entertained in Germany. The actual work
of preparing a position for defense is not to commence until the
direction in which the enemy is going to make his attack is known.
The assailant is to be prevented, as far as possible, from obtaining
information of the position and the measures taken for strengthening
it. This is to be accomplished by pushing small detachments to the
front to hamper the enemy’s advance.
In the past, =advanced positions= were decidedly opposed by the
Austrians, but at present their use is recommended in cases where
time is to be gained or the enemy is to be deceived, or where
fire from such positions would inflict considerable losses on the
enemy. However, the regulations seek to obviate the danger of the
principal fight taking place in the advanced position instead of in
the main position, by adding: “But such a measure should not cause
the commander to swerve from the firm determination to carry out his
original intention.”
The tremendously increased fire power of infantry is to make it
possible to hold the front with a comparatively weak force, while
the remaining troops are concentrated as a reserve with which the
actual decision is to be brought about. The commander should resist
every temptation to use the general reserve for other purposes than
for carrying out the =counter-attack=, which should be ordered when
the assailant is under the most effective fire of the position. The
general reserve should then be quickly deployed and should make its
attack with determination, by directing a violent fire against the
flank of the enemy. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided.
The garrison is only charged with the task of annihilating the enemy
with its fire, which should be increased to the utmost intensity.
THE ITALIAN DRILL REGULATIONS OF 1903 AND 1906.[486]
[486] Major-General MIKULICZ RADECKI, Austrian Army, _Das neue
Exerzierreglement der italienischen Infanterie_, Vienna, 1906. V.
GRÄVENITZ, _Die neueren taktischen Vorschriften für das italienische
Heer_, in _Vierteljahrsheft_, 1905, I, p. 90, et seq. _Der
Infanteriekampf in der oberitalienischen Tiefebene_, in _Streffleur_,
1907, October and November numbers (also obtainable in special
pamphlet form).
P. RATH, _Der Kampf in der italienischen Kultur_, in _Militärische
Welt_, 1907, January-February number.
ATTACK.
The peculiar character of the probable Italian theater of war in
Upper Italy, with its numerous forests of tall timber, and its many
defiles, causes special attention to be paid to the offensive.[487]
The regulations emphasize the necessity of the coöperation of
infantry and artillery.
[487] Unless otherwise ordered, the advance guard advances against
the hostile forces which it encounters in its march, whether its
action be to determine, as quickly as possible, the strength of the
opponent and to save its main body from an unnecessary delay, or
whether it be to deceive the opponent as to the location of its own
forces, or, in certain cases, to make the most of a surprise. (Par.
37).
Although the platoons intended for the firing line are brought up
in close order formation, the actual combat formation is not taken
up until the situation makes this necessary; but, in any case, the
leading element is to enter the zone of hostile fire in a deployed
formation. To neutralize the mixing of units as much as possible
as the action progresses, the firing line is formed into groups
separated by intervals of 4-5 paces, although this increases the
casualties. These intervals may be increased, when required, to 10
paces. (Intervals between skirmishers in the firing line are usually
at least 15 cm., otherwise 3 paces). The firing line is to advance
until increased casualties force it to open fire.
=Kinds of fire.= Only fire at will is employed. (This is also used
when the troops are in close order and formed in four ranks). The
battalion commander in the first line directs that fire be opened, as
soon as it is certain that a good effect can be produced. When two
targets appear, the fire is to be directed upon the one promising the
best results (_i.e._, not necessarily the one that is tactically most
important). “In order that the intensity of the fire may correspond
to the requirements of the tactical situation existing at the moment,
officers, by reason of their tactical training, should be able to
state approximately how many rounds are necessary to produce the
desired effect, the range, degree of visibility and character of the
target, the nature of the terrain and of their position, as well as
the physical condition and morale of their men being given. From
these estimates may be deduced how many rifles must be employed in
order to bring about a decisive result in the shortest possible time.”
The =advance by rushes= may be made either at a walk or at a run, but
the regulations do not prescribe in detail how it shall be conducted.
The following points are considered especially important: The time
for making a rush, its length, and whether it should be made by
a whole unit simultaneously or in echelon. All this depends upon
various circumstances, which the leader, alter due consideration
of the terrain and the hostile fire, as well as of the physical
condition and morale of his men, is to judge in each particular case.
In doing this, he is to bear in mind that the rush must be made as
unobserved by the enemy as possible, so that the latter cannot direct
his lire upon the advancing unit.
The rushes are to be made first by those parts of the firing line
which are favored by the terrain and which have gained a superiority
of fire over the hostile troops immediately opposed to them. Units
which could only advance by rushes at the cost of considerable and
useless losses, are to wait until the neighboring units have pushed
ahead, support these with their fire, and then advance in turn under
cover of the fire of the others.
As a general rule, so long as the hostile fire permits, rushes are
to be made by entire companies, or at least by whole platoons. The
length of the rushes and whether they are made at a walk or at a run,
depends upon the nature of the terrain. Upon completing a rush, fire
is to be opened at once.
When the intensity of the hostile fire increases, or after the
organizations have become mixed, rushes can no longer be made by
entire units but only by squads or like fractions. These leave the
firing line and endeavor to reach the next cover at a rapid run.
or, if cover be lacking, throw themselves down in order to open
fire again at the shorter range thus gained. As a rule, the leading
echelons open fire at once from their new positions, so as to
facilitate the advance of the others, unless special circumstances
make it advisable to delay the firing until all the other units have
reached a good position and are able to direct an effective fire upon
the enemy.
At short ranges, in covered terrain, or on ground swept by hostile
fire, the best way to avoid losses is to advance in small groups
consisting of several skirmishers. During each rush, the adjoining
flanks of neighboring units cease firing, so as not to injure the men
of the advancing unit. Platoon and company commanders hurry ahead,
while squad leaders see that all of the men move forward.
Standing crops frequently enable the echelons in rear to follow the
firing line in closer order, and may even permit supports, which are
to carry that line forward, to come up in that formation.
The =assault= is to be made either in close or extended order to the
tune of the Royal March and with loud cheers.
The regulations assume, however, that the superiority of fire, gained
by the mutual coöperation of infantry and artillery and by the
participation of the reserves, will induce the opponent to retreat.
When engaged with an obstinate opponent, who remains in his position,
only a part of the leading line is to be launched against certain
sections (_tratti_) of the defensive position, while other parts, by
means of rapid fire, prevent the enemy from supporting the threatened
sections. In conjunction with this frequently emphasized scheme of
penetrating several specially important sections of the hostile
position, the regulations express the view--by no means generally
considered sound-that the capture of several judiciously chosen
points will force the enemy to retreat.