attack against a flank, the general reserve of the defender should
be posted at such a distance in rear of the threatened wing that the
troops composing it will be sheltered to some extent from hostile
fire. In order that the fully deployed general reserve, when making
a counter-attack, may clear with its inner flank the outer flank of
the line holding the position, and not get into the latter’s zone
of fire, a sufficient interval must be left between the two. This
interval should increase with the size of the reserve. As a rule, the
counter-attack should be launched so as to produce the decision when
the assailant has arrived within assaulting distance of the defender.
This requires that the general reserve and the line holding the
position be separated by an interval of at least 200 m. In addition,
the counter-attack must be so made that it will actually strike the
assailant in flank; and this it cannot do unless the general reserve is
posted sufficiently far to a flank. The center of the reserve should
be launched so as to strike not only the flank of the enemy’s firing
line, but that of his supports as well. If the general reserve is
posted too near the first line, there is danger of it being enveloped
together with the first line, and committed to purely defensive action
(refusing a flank). On the other hand, if it is posted too far to a
flank, its timely entry into action is not absolutely assured; the
assailant may turn against it, cut it off from the defensive position,
and defeat it in detail. The farther the general reserve is off to a
flank, the more effectively will it strike the enemy in flank, but it
will be correspondingly more difficult to conceal it. The necessity
of pushing the general reserve far to a flank decreases, as the scope
of the attacker’s envelopment of the defensive line increases. It may
frequently be to the defender’s advantage to induce the assailant
to make a far-reaching envelopment, provided the line defending the
position is not placed in an unfavorable tactical situation by so
doing. Since the attacker will probably have detachments echeloned in
rear of his flank, the troops entrusted with the counter-attack must
similarly have an echelon in rear of their exposed flank in order to
protect themselves against a flank attack.
[Illustration]
It is impossible to lay down a fixed, normal strength for the reserve.
This depends upon the strength of the position, and the degree of
resistance the intrenchments are capable of rendering; but, in any
case, the force intended for local defense should be strong enough
to compel the enemy to deploy completely, and prevent his carrying
the defenses before the counter-attack is made. Large quantities of
ammunition and intrenchments capable of rendering effective resistance
must compensate for the shortage of men in warding off the enemy, in
order that the general reserve may be made as strong as possible. The
question, as to how thinly the position must be occupied, and how
strong the general reserve may be made, can only be answered in each
particular case. If the attack made by the general reserve is to
produce any effect, it must not be undertaken with too small a force,
as it could then be checked by weak detachments.
While the general reserve lies in waiting for the enemy, it may either--
1. Remain in a preparatory position, in one or more groups, and deploy
during its forward movement; or
2. Take up the attack formation from the start.
The first method has the advantage, when the space required is small,
of permitting the general reserve to be concealed, and allows changes
to be made in the direction of march and in the dispositions.
The second, although it enables the reserve to advance promptly to the
counter-attack, is rarely suitable, as the reserve in combat formation
is not so easily concealed, as it is more difficult to make changes
in the dispositions and the direction of march, and as this formation
seems only practicable for making an advance in one direction--straight
to the front.
It is of the utmost importance to know when the counter-attack should
be launched. In warding off the enemy by purely frontal action, no
special disadvantages result from prematurely launching the general
reserve; if it enters the action too late, it will still be able to
throw back the assailant who has penetrated into the position. With the
counter-attack it is different; it must take place when the opponent is
under the most effective fire at short range. If the counter-attack is
made prematurely, especially when the reserves and flank echelons of
the attacker have not as yet been used up, the latter, while, indeed,
exposed to the most violent fire of the defender, will be able to
take counter-measures. In that case, two entirely independent actions
may result, and the counter-attack made by the general reserve may be
checked by the retained echelons of the attacker and repulsed by their
fire. When launched prematurely, the counter-attack will not always
repulse the hostile attack; and when launched too late, it may perhaps
still bring about the decision, or avert a defeat, but it will never
produce decisive results.
A counter-attack made after the attacker has penetrated into the
position, and while he is endeavoring to dislodge the garrisons of such
supporting points as still offer resistance, reckons with the fact
that the hitherto victorious assailant, exhausted and in confusion,
will not be a match for a well aimed blow delivered by a considerable
number of troops. However, a defender will scarcely contemplate such
an employment of his general reserve; for him the important thing
is to repulse the attack in front of and not within the position.
Although military history presents comparatively numerous instances of
such _retours offensifs_, this may be explained by the fact that the
counter-attack was launched too late. The weakness of the assailant is
but momentary, and the most must be made of this by advancing against
him promptly by the shortest line. But if the assailant has had time to
re-form and to bring up his batteries, it will usually be too late to
make a counter-attack.
Aymard’s Division (French), which had penetrated into =Servigny=
under cover of darkness, but had made no attempt to occupy the town
systematically or to re-form the disordered troops, was driven out
again by a counter-attack made by only eleven Prussian companies.[462]
[462] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 52. _Das Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p.
181.
The numerous counter-attacks made by the French during the battle
of =Wörth= (for example the counter-attack made by Maire’s Brigade)
pushed too far forward into the zone of the German artillery
fire, and did not have the expected success. The well-led French
counter-attack made by about 1200 men from the south edge of
the =Niederwald=, was discontinued at a timely moment.[463] The
well-directed counter-attack made by the 1st Turco Regiment at
=Wörth=, after the capture of =Elsaszhausen=, was successful and is
especially instructive.[464] The attack made by General de Sonis for
the purpose of retaking =Loigny= was undertaken too late and with
inadequate forces.[465] The same is true of the counter-attack made
by the 3rd Bavarian Division on =Zella= (4th July, 1866).
[463] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, pp. 75 and 159.
[464] _Ibid._, XVI, p. 187, et seq.
[465] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 124.
The French regulations recommend a unique procedure, which may be
successful when employed against an opponent not prepared to meet
it. “Under certain circumstances, counter-attacks may be combined
with retreat maneuvers. The advanced troops should bring the enemy
to a standstill with their fire and compel him to deploy. Then they
should break off the action without becoming involved in a fight at
close quarters. In this manner, the attacker is drawn onto terrain
reconnoitered beforehand, where fresh troops, hidden up to the last
moment, attack him impetuously under favorable conditions at a time
when he is tired and worn out by a long movement.”
The most difficult thing about a counter-attack is to seize the
right moment for launching it. As it is impossible to foretell how
long it will take the enemy to arrive within assaulting distance,
no rule can be laid down as to the proper moment for launching the
counter-attack. The best plan would be to screen the movements of the
reserve, and, as the attacking troops approach, to bring it gradually
up to the point from which it is to move forward. A commander requires
wide practical experience and great force of character to judge the
situation calmly and dispassionately, while fully aware that launching
the counter-attack either too soon or too late may prejudice the
result. There is always danger that the suggestions which reach him
from various quarters may cause him to take half-measures. The stronger
the general reserve and the weaker the force holding the defenses, the
more numerous and urgent will be the requests for support; and he will
not find it easy to resist the temptation to grant these requests and
accordingly weaken the general reserve, which is intended for offensive
action.
We must now consider the question as to whether the counter-attack
should rely on fire action alone, or should resort to the bayonet as
well. The unexpected advance of a large body of troops against a flank
of the enemy will rarely fail to produce an effect. If the enemy does
not yield to fire, it is obvious that an assault will have to be made.
A counter-attack made unexpectedly is, as a rule, successful at the
start; but, if its commander follows up this initial success when not
supported by strong reserves, a reverse may take place resulting in the
defeat of the defender’s entire force.
A counter-attack made by three companies (9th, 10th, and 11th) of the
3rd Bavarian Infantry Regiment brought relief to the two batteries
which had gone into action near =Goury= (battle of =Loigny=). The
Ist and IInd Battalions, 3rd Infantry, the Ist and IInd Battalions,
12th Infantry, and the 7th Jäger-Battalion joined in this attack, and
when the batteries finally followed, the force succeeded in throwing
back the French battalions immediately opposing it. The twenty-one
companies now made the mistake of attacking =Ecuillon=, which they
occupied. The attacking force had traversed about 2000 m., and as
there were no reserves and flank echelons, the Bavarians were obliged
to give way before an assault made by seven fresh battalions against
their unprotected left flank. The mistake of pushing forward too far,
and the lack of supports in rear of the exposed flank, was bound to
exact a penalty, as soon as the French were in a position to advance
on their own account.[466]
[466] HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 43.
A very instructive episode occurred on August 26th, 1904, near
=Tsinortun=. Toward noon the Japanese Guard and the 10th Division
advanced through fields of tall kaoliang for the purpose of
enveloping the right wing of the IIIrd Siberian Army Corps. The
commanding general, Lieutenant-General Iwanov, directed the reserve
(apparently parts of the 3rd East-Siberian Rifle Division) to make a
counter-attack against the left flank of the Japanese. The Russian
counter-attack was taken in flank by a brigade of the Guard, which
followed in rear of the Japanese attacking force, and had to retire.
The decision was then brought about by the counter-attack made by the
140th Infantry, which unexpectedly appeared on the left flank of the
Japanese. The engagement at Tsinortun is moreover of special interest
as regards the Japanese method of attack.[467]
[467] LÖFFLER, _Allgemeine Lage_, I, pp. 68 and 69. V. HOEN, _Der
russisch-japanische Krieg_, in _Organ des militär-wissenschaftlichen
Vereins_, p. 166. NIESSEL, _Enseignements tactiques_, p. 158.
So far we have only considered the counter-attack made against
the flank of an attacker, and against the front of an enemy who
has victoriously penetrated into a position. The success of a
counter-attack against the enemy’s flank depends primarily on moral
factors; besides, after protracted fighting, supports and reserves in
rear of the flank are frequently lacking, so that the attacker cannot
quickly form an adequate firing front towards a flank.[468]
[468] Examples of successful counter-attacks against an enemy’s
flank: Battle of Loigny, on December 2nd, 1870; the counter-attack
made by 21 companies of the 4th Brigade at Goury (HÖNIG,
_Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 55), and that made by the Ist Battalion,
10th Infantry, and the Ist and IIIrd Battalions, 13th Infantry,
at Goury (_ibid._, p. 41); the flank attack made by Kottwitz’
Brigade (_ibid._, p. 82, and p. 220 supra); the flank attack made
by the garrison of Fougeu on the attacking columns of General
Sonis: the brilliant flank attack made by the IIIrd Battalion, 90th
Infantry, during the battle of Orleans, on December 4th, 1870 (KUNZ,
_Orleans_, p. 148); and the counter-attack made by General Bataille
on the Stiring Wald during the battle of Spicheren. The last-named
counter-attack is a good model, both as regards conception and
execution. (_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, pp. 93 and 96).
Theoretically, a frontal counter-attack, _i.e._, one made straight
to the front from a position, while the assailant is advancing to
the assault on a broad front, ought to offer the least chances of
success, but military history proves the contrary in those cases where
the defender awaited the proper moment. This moment arrives when the
defender clearly perceives that the enormous losses suffered by the
attacker begin to impair the morale of his remaining men. This becomes
apparent through a slackening in the attack, through an uncertainty of
movement, and, finally, through hesitation, the latter being usually
preceded by wavering.[469]
[469] “The defender will only be able to make a frontal
counter-attack from his position when he has repulsed the assault and
has made the most of fire action, or when it is important to drive
away the enemy who has been brought to a standstill in front of the
defender’s position. A premature counter-attack may lead to the loss
of the position.” (Par. 414 German I. D. R.).
The moral effect of a determined counter-attack with cold steel during
the closing moments of an attack will undoubtedly be great. Meckel
says[470]: “Here likewise, it is of the greatest importance to bring
up the supports promptly, so as to increase the volume of fire to the
utmost and to produce that superiority which quite naturally resolves
itself into an offensive movement. The defender who does not fix
bayonets is already casting furtive glances towards the best line of
retreat.”
[470] _Lehre von der Truppenführung_.
This “superiority” caused the French to advance from the wood of
=Elsaszhausen= against the skirmishers of the XIth Army Corps
appearing at the northern edge of the =Niederwald=. The success they
met with at the start induced the French to continue their advance,
and when a reverse occurred subsequently, the wood of Elsaszhausen
was taken by the Hessians without difficulty.[471]
[471] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p. 121, et seq.
Although such counter-attacks, directed against the strong firing line
of the attacker and unsupported by the defender’s fire, were frequently
successful in war, this was due to the moral effect produced on the
attacker by the sudden and unexpected onset of a long line of infantry.
Troops thus unexpectedly attacked, and, in addition, deprived of the
support of their own artillery, almost invariably lost their heads.
However, if the attacker is prepared for such an event, remains cool,
meets the counter-attack of the defender with a powerful fire at short
ranges, and brings up his supports, in order to follow up the effect of
his fire with an offensive movement, there can be no doubt as to the
result.[472]
[472] The battles of Soor and Kesselsdorf are interesting examples
of this. (_Kriege Friedrichs des Groszen_, II, pp. 75 and 234).
In both cases the defender’s frontal counter-attack forced the
assailant to face about; but at Soor a second line of infantry, and
at Kesselsdorf a charge made by the Bonin Dragoons finally turned the
scale in favor of the assailant.
Such a counter-attack, however, is only possible when the defender
still has strong, intact reserves at his disposal, which he has kept
in readiness in the closest proximity to the firing line until the
decisive moment. An organization acting as part of a larger force,
and whose flanks are secure, as a rule has no choice but to make a
frontal counter-attack, unless offensive action is to be dispensed with
altogether.
Short frontal counter-attacks from a position were made successfully
by the British in the battles at the opening of the 19th Century.
(In these counter-attacks, the British fired a volley and then
advanced to the assault). Such successful counter-attacks were made
during the battles of =Vimiero=, =Maida=, =Busaco=, and especially
=Waterloo=.[473]
[473] At Waterloo, the counter-attack made by Picton’s Division and
the British Guards repulsed the French attack. VON OLLECH, _Feldzug
von 1815_, pp. 230 and 247. See also note p. 151 supra.
At =Beaumont=, the 66th Infantry made a counter-attack when the
French had approached within 40 m. The 66th had already begun to
waver, here and there, when its energetic and unexpected advance
caused the French to retire.[474]
[474] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 53.
In the battles of the =Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78=, frontal
counter-attacks were successfully made in several instances.
In the engagement at =Kazeljevo= (5th September, 1877), the frontal
counter-attack made by the Russians, who were numerically far
inferior, saved them from defeat, as all their lines of retreat were
obstructed by their trains, which had gone astray.[475]
[475] SPRINGER, _Der russisch-türkische Krieg_, III, p. 171.
The most instructive fight in this connection is the engagement of
=Gorni Bugarov= (1st January, 1878). General Weljaminov’s detachment,
which consisted of the Pensa and the Tambov Infantry Regiments,
occupied a flank position on the southern foothills of the Balkans,
on the road leading from =Orchanie= to =Sofia=. The Russians allowed
the Turks to approach to very short range before they opened fire,
which was immediately followed by a counter-attack all along the
line. This seems to have been the result of the initiative of the
several battalion commanders. The Turks (15 battalions) faced about
and retired on Sofia. The Russian infantry was led back to its first
position.[476]
[476] _Ibid._, VII, p. 134.
On the same day, the attack made by the Preobrajenski Regiment
of the Russian Guard at =Tashkessen= was repulsed by the frontal
counter-attack made by a weak force of Turkish infantry.[477]
[477] BAKER-PASHA, _War in Bulgaria_, II, p. 57.
During the Russo-Japanese war such frontal counter-attacks were very
frequently made. When undertaken with inadequate numbers, they were
invariably repulsed by the fire of the Japanese, especially when the
latter found cover in previously constructed trenches.
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=Austria-Hungary.= If a counter-attack is contemplated, the commander
should resist every temptation to employ parts of the general reserve
for other purposes than for carrying out that attack. In this case,
the general reserve should be placed in readiness so that, while the
opponent advances within the decisive zone, it can quickly deploy
and carry out the counter-attack with determination by directing a
powerful fire against the flank of the enemy. Freedom of movement
on one flank is absolutely essential to the execution of the
counter-attack. Local frontal counter-attacks are to be avoided; the
enemy is to be annihilated by fire.
When it is not contemplated to make a counter-attack with the general
reserve, the latter is to be employed either for directly reinforcing
the troops in one of the sections, or for engaging the hostile troops
making an enveloping attack on the position.
=France.= The regulations make a distinction between counter-attack
(_contre attaque_) and offensive return (_retour offensif_). A
counter-attack is made by the reserve before the enemy penetrates
into the energetically defended supporting points. In contrast
herewith, every attempt to retake a captured position is called an
offensive return.
A counter-attack with troops of the second line is to be made as soon
as the assailant presses the fighting line too closely. A powerful
and suddenly executed counter-attack, supported by the fire of the
first line, will, at the very least, check the enemy until the
fighting line has had time to recover.
Occasionally, it may be advantageous not to await the crisis, but
to force the assailant to deploy by directing a heavy fire upon
him, then to break off the action, inducing the enemy to press
on, in order to draw him, by this means, onto previously selected
and reconnoitered terrain, where he is suddenly attacked in flank
by fresh troops. Military history shows that this very procedure
has frequently been successful. “If the attacker presses forward
too hastily and if he threatens to carry the defender’s position,
fresh troops, which have been assembled in a place sheltered from
view, attack him energetically, while the troops already engaged
increase the intensity of their fire. This powerful and energetic
counter-attack produces confusion in the enemy’s ranks and compels
him to retire, or at least to discontinue his forward movement until
he has had time to recover.”
“The same activity, the same determination to maneuver, must
prevail everywhere. Every mistake and every weakness of the enemy
must be quickly perceived and promptly utilized. The troops in the
counter-attack should move forward without hesitation and regardless
of the cost When such a forward movement has to be discontinued, the
commander must decide where it shall cease. The efforts of all should
be directed toward one object, that of tiring and demoralizing the
enemy by constant counter-attacks, until the moment arrives when the
commander must order the offensive to be assumed.”
=England.= The counter-attack may be made either by the garrison
of the firing trenches, as a frontal counter movement, or by the
general reserve, accompanied by artillery and cavalry, as a decisive
counter-attack. The moment when the attacker has used up his
reserves and is about to assault is generally considered as the most
propitious for making the counter-attack.
=Japan.= The Japanese entertain the same views as the Germans.
“The better the position, the location and construction of the
intrenchments, and the distribution of troops, the greater the
number of men that can be saved in garrisoning the position, and the
stronger the general reserve available for an offensive movement. By
this means the chances of victory are increased. * * * Frequently
there is danger that the defender will be committed to purely passive
defense, and that freedom of action will be lost. Therefore, when the
proper moment arrives, the decisive counter-attack should be made.”
XII. THE RETREAT.
(Par. 426 German I. D. R.).
A retreat under effective hostile fire means annihilation; only the
presence of cover immediately in rear of the fighting line should
induce a commander to come to the weighty decision of reaching
it by running. (Russia). On account of the great range of modern
weapons, defeated troops, on open ground, cannot escape from fire
by running.[478] No rules can be laid down in regulations as to the
conduct of a retreat after a defeat. As a rule, further resistance is
no longer possible; neither is it practicable to leave some troops
in position to cover the retreat. The defeated force must retire in
a direction perpendicular to the front of the enemy,[479] and cannot
re-form until the fire of the opponent ceases or at least abates. (Par.
428 German I. D. R.). Artillery which is moved to the rear at a timely
moment, and all available cavalry should cover the retreat of the
infantry, so as to prevent the hostile cavalry from making the most of
its opportunities for effective action.
[478] Furthermore, the danger of panic should not be
underestimated. See KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, XIII, p.
49, and XVI. p. 243, in regard to the panic created in a skirmish
line near the Bruch Mühle west of Gunstett (Wörth). This skirmish
line was running to the rear toward a rallying position and the panic
was produced by the command “To the rear. Double Time! March! March!”
The panic was nipped in the bud by the energetic action of a mounted
field officer. Major v. Below.
[479] The 57th Infantry, whose right flank had been enveloped and
roughly handled by a counter-attack made by the French, retired to
its left rear through the fragments of the 16th Infantry. This caused
the two regiments to change places. (The attack made by the 38th
Brigade at Mars-la-Tour). _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 25,
p. 35.
To order a retreat at the right moment requires military instinct;
rules cannot be laid down in regard to it.
“Troops which, while engaged with the enemy, are either withdrawn by
order or defeated, can no longer choose their line of retreat. If the
enemy pursues, they must retire perpendicularly to their former front,
without changing formation, and need a force on which they can rally
in order to prepare for renewed resistance. From this it follows that
a systematic retreat can only be carried out when the force still has
some distribution in depth. It would be wrong however, for a force
intended for decisive action to retain a reserve for covering the
retreat instead of employing it for the purpose of gaining the victory.”