against direct hits from guns having a curved trajectory, this object
must be attained by skillfully distributing splinter proofs along the
front. These should be inconspicuous and should not take up too much
room. The comfort of the troops in the trenches should also be provided
for by constructing kitchens, latrines, drainage ditches, and dressing
stations.
In addition, field magazines for storing ammunition should be built,
and alarm arrangements made. Moreover, covered communication should be
provided along the line and to the rear. The front and gaps in the line
may be very effectively flanked by fire from skillfully constructed
refused wings.
In constructing a battalion group of intrenchments, provision will have
to be made, in addition, for the following:
[Illustration: Intrenchments for a Battalion.]
[Illustration: Firing Trench with Cover Trench.]
[Illustration: Firing Trench with Splinter Proofs.]
[Illustration: Profiles.]
[Illustration: Firing Trench in ordinary soil.]
[Illustration: Splinter Proof.]
[Illustration: Communicating Trench.]
[Illustration: Communicating Trench without Parapet.]
[Illustration: Machine Gun Pit.]
1. =Observation of the foreground=, “for the purpose of reconnaissance
and security, as well as for noting the effect of one’s own fire.” In
order that observers may not betray the location of the position, it
is recommended that they be posted at inconspicuous points affording
a sufficiently extended view, and screened from the observation of
the enemy. When they have to be posted in the defensive line, the
terreplein is either lowered in places, so that they can just look over
the parapet, or special observation stations are constructed. Provision
must be made for communication between the several parts of the line
and with the next higher headquarters.
2. =Clearing the foreground.= As a rule, it will be practicable to
employ for this work troops not needed in digging trenches. As time
is lacking in field warfare for extensive work, such as cutting down
embankments and removing dead angles, one will have to be content with
trampling down or burning standing grain, removing objects which the
enemy might use as aiming points, and cutting clearings through woods.
It is not advisable to demolish stone walls and houses, as the debris
is difficult to remove and affords cover to the enemy.
3. =Dummy intrenchments and masks.=[457] These are to deceive the
assailant as to the position and extent of the defensive works.
They should not be located in the same fire swept zone as the
defensive works themselves, and at a distance should look like real
fortifications. Masks are to screen defensive works or troops, without
restricting the fire of the latter. Natural features are best suited
for this purpose, but may be replaced or supplemented by artificial
masks.
[457] _Taktik_, V, p. 291. At Magersfontain, the Boers constructed
dummy trenches on the crest, while the trenches actually held by them
were located at the foot of the slope. The result is well known.
In many cases, it will suffice to place a few skirmishers behind a
parapet that has been hastily thrown up with a plow.
4. =Cover trenches and communicating trenches.= These constitute a
considerable portion of the defensive works. Communicating trenches
may be either covered ways or zigzags, and connect the cover trenches
with the firing trenches. Sortie steps should be provided in order to
facilitate a prompt advance from the trenches. In many cases, it is
impossible to avoid placing firing and cover trenches so close to each
other that the enemy’s shells can strike both simultaneously.
5. =Obstacles.= These need only be constructed when two forces confront
each other for a protracted period. The purpose of obstacles is to hold
the enemy where he will be exposed to the most deadly fire; retard his
advance; compel him to confine his movements to certain avenues of
approach (this is especially valuable in night combats); and eliminate
dead angles in front of the position. The presence of extensive
obstacles forces the enemy to advance systematically. As a rule, they
can only be removed by pioneers. They should not be located too near
the position, as they are apt to be damaged by artillery fire directed
at the position, and interfere with the defender’s fire. When they
are too far in front of the position, the defender will not be able
to guard them and prevent their destruction. In general, they should
not be more than 200 m. from the position. It is better to construct
several lines of small obstacles than a single line of large ones. The
requirement that obstacles must not interfere with the defender’s fire,
must not afford the enemy an opportunity to approach under cover, and
must remain intact under hostile artillery fire, is best met by marshy
ground and by wire entanglements. Obstacles should be provided with a
slight glacis in order to prevent artillery fire from destroying them
prematurely. When wire entanglements are too high, they are easily seen
at a distance, and, although they are little damaged by artillery fire,
the attacker can make preparations to remove them.
Russian Views.
A defensive position consists of an advanced position, a fighting
line with firing trenches and batteries, supporting points in rear,
and, finally, a fourth line, which serves as a rallying position.
The key to a position, which lay formerly in the line of supporting
points, lies at present in the firing trenches in which supporting
points must be provided. (Colonel Golenkin advocates the use of
semi-circular works as supporting points, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Mordovin large closed works). “These semi-circular works are in
a sense the anchors by means of which the firing line clings to
the position which it has occupied.” It does not matter if the
enemy penetrates the first line and captures one or two of these
supporting points, for others remain on either side; the latter and
the second line of supporting points then form a new though somewhat
indented defensive line. As the attacking force which has penetrated
into the position, is hemmed in on both sides, it will hardly be able
to sustain the counter-attack made by the defender’s reserves, and
its temporary success will turn into defeat. But, in order that this
may be accomplished, a second line of supporting points is absolutely
essential. Large closed works of high command, but a smaller number
than is employed in the first line, are recommended for this purpose.
According to Russian opinions, several lines of fortifications are
essential in order to check an enemy who has penetrated the first
line, and to facilitate the defender’s final retreat in case of
necessity.
Particular importance is attached to advanced positions, to positions
for the reserves, echeloned to the right and left rear of the flanks,
and, finally, to rallying positions. Advanced positions are either
to serve “reconnaissance purposes,” by forcing the enemy to an early
deployment, or to do duty as “caponiers” from which a flanking fire
may be brought to bear on the foreground.
Advanced positions, doing duty as “caponiers,” are invariably to
consist of closed works, those serving “reconnaissance purposes” of
open works. The latter are to be defended “to the last ditch,” and
are not to be evacuated until the enemy approaches to about 400 m. or
less, but the garrison is not to allow itself to become involved in a
bayonet fight.
In contrast with this distribution in depth--2 km., in the model
given--Lieutenant-Colonel Jabel, whose views are based on the same
experiences, advocates the use of only one line of fortifications. He
states: “The length of the battles, which sometimes lasted two weeks,
as well as the terrible intensity of fire in general and artillery
fire in particular, produced such an absolute nervous exhaustion that
the decisive action could be fought only in a single line. With its
capture, further fighting had only small prospects of success * * *”
“When firing trenches have been constructed at the points where the
best effect can be obtained from long and short range fire, they
should not be evacuated prematurely, but held, in order to make the
most of this fire effect, until the enemy arrives close enough to use
his bayonets. If the troops holding the trenches retire immediately
before the bayonet fight, their retreat invariably becomes a rout,
and, in any case, entails tremendous losses, for, after leaving
their trenches, they will be helpless and exposed in the open to the
hostile fire.”
4. THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENSE.
In his _Tactical Handbook_, Major Hoppenstedt suggests a method,
well meriting attention, for decreasing the effect of artillery fire
on a defensive position. He believes that dummy intrenchments, not
too conspicuously located, partially, but not skillfully masked and
occupied, will deceive the attacker’s artillery for some time, at any
rate, until the advanced troops of the attacker induce the defenders to
man their parapet and expose themselves to shrapnel fire. The “defense
should be conducted in such a manner that the garrison of the main
position will not need to expose itself to the enemy’s artillery fire
as soon as his advanced troops appear.” Major Hoppenstedt believes that
this can be attained, in hill positions, by conducting the fire fight,
at long and medium ranges, from positions in rear, the defender moving
up into the main position, specially prepared for this purpose, when
the attacker disappears in the defiladed spaces in front of it. The
objection to this method is that it necessitates too large a force to
hold the position.
“In a protracted, obstinate fight, the defender’s trenches,
exposed to the combined hostile infantry and artillery fire, will
finally become filled with dead and wounded, and it will rarely
be practicable to remove them. The arrival of reinforcements will
increase the confusion and the losses, and the fighting energy of the
troops will decrease with tremendous rapidity. This is one of the
greatest disadvantages of the defense as compared with the attack and
its constantly moving lines.
“In such cases, which will be typical at points where the attacker
intends to penetrate the line, it may be a real act of salvation for
the defender’s firing line to rush to the front.
“In fighting at short ranges, especially just before the assailant
makes his assault, such a rush to the front on the part of the
defender’s line, may be a good move for another reason. As is well
known, the attacker’s artillery must change targets when its infantry
arrives within a certain distance of the defender’s position. The
Germans (par. 446 I. D. R.) fix this point at 300 m. from the enemy,
and the French, whose guns have a flatter trajectory, fix it at 500
m. In attacking a hill position, when the fire is well observed, the
distance of this point from the position will be considerably greater.
“But, no matter where the actual location of this point may be,
skillful infantry will start its assault very close to the point
fixed by the regulations, and never beyond it, so as to avoid
interfering with the fire of its artillery. Under such circumstances,
it may be a skillful move for a defender who is still full of fight,
to decrease the distance which separates him from the hostile
infantry, in order that, by so doing, he may escape from the hostile
artillery fire and from the smoke which obscures his vision. If he
finds cover farther to the front, so much the better, for he will
then have that much of an advantage over the attacker.”
The weakness of most defensive positions lies in the danger of a sudden
attack being directed against a flank. The assailant will endeavor to
avoid making an attack against the front of a position prepared for
defense, when such an attack has small chances of succeeding, and seek
the decision by attacking a flank, where conditions are, to a certain
extent at least, equalized. The danger of a flank attack increases
with the length of the defensive line. It is by no means a good move
to prolong the threatened wing (French VIth Army Corps at St. Privat)
for the purpose of warding off an envelopment. The power of extension
is bound to reach a limit sooner or later, and the wing attacked will
then be so weak and attenuated that it will not be capable of offering
serious resistance.
To ward off an employment by refusing a flank likewise promises little
success. The enemy’s superiority of fire will make itself felt,
first of all, at the salient thus formed (see p. 357 supra), and his
convergent artillery and infantry fire, which may even enfilade parts
of the line, will paralyze all tactical movements of the defender at
this point.
By prolonging the line and by refusing a flank, we only postpone
the decision a little while, but cannot effectively cope with an
envelopment. This must be accomplished in a different manner.
The best scheme would be to flank the enemy’s enveloping force by
posting an echelon in a suitable position, or to bring about a decision
by employing the reserve offensively. However, for carrying out these
measures, more time is required than for merely refusing a flank. Time
may be gained by making an extensive reconnaissance on the flanks with
strong detachments, and by occupying supporting points lying on the
flanks, which the enemy would have to take before he could think of
attacking the main position.
* * * * *
In employing machine guns in defense, it should be borne in mind that
they are unsuited for carrying on protracted fire fights, and that the
mobility of the machine gun batteries cannot be utilized when, from the
very start, they are assigned a section to defend.
In general, it will be advisable in defense to keep the machine
guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them, when necessary,
to reinforce the defensive line at threatened points, to prevent
envelopment, to repulse an assault, or to participate in an offensive
movement.
This does not preclude their coming into action at the very opening of
an engagement, for instance, where it is necessary to command important
avenues of approach.
When a withdrawal under cover is assured, it will also be possible to
post machine gun batteries in such a manner, in front or on a flank of
the main position, that they can bring a sudden fire to bear on the
area in which the opponent will in all probability post his artillery.
Machine gun fire may sometimes be employed to sweep defiladed spaces in
front of the defensive line.
* * * * *
If the direction of the hostile attack is known, the occupation of the
position should not be longer deferred. It is always risky to occupy
the position in the face of hostile batteries, especially as the fire
of the defender’s guns is masked by the skirmishers moving forward. If
the defender can manage to give the attacker the impression that the
position is still unoccupied, perhaps thereby inducing him to advance
less cautiously, and then surprise him with fire, a depressing moral
effect far exceeding the material success may be counted upon.[458]
The firing line should be made so strong that the fire fight will
have a chance of succeeding. A gradual launching of the troops should
not be decided upon, as the losses are comparatively insignificant in
defense, and as it is important to develop a heavy fire so as to make
it difficult for the enemy to gain the fire superiority. The principles
governing the moment for opening fire have already been discussed (pp.
147 and 154 supra).
[458] Engagement at Modder River, on November 28th, 1899.
Engagement at Colenso, on December 15th, 1899.
The enemy must be prevented from gaining the superiority of fire.
This should be accomplished by concentrating the fire from a large
number of rifles upon the parts of the enemy’s force in motion. The
defender should make the most of the advantage which his preparedness
gives him. The attacker’s firing line with its supports forms the
target. A departure from this rule is in order, in the case of a French
assailant, as the latter places the bulk of his force in the reserves
and not in the firing line. It will frequently be practicable for the
defender to discontinue his fire and to take cover when the assailant
lies down and fires; but, while under cover, everything should be
prepared for resuming the fire when the enemy rises to continue his
advance (p. 156 supra).
If it has been found impossible to prevent the enemy from reaching the
extreme limit of short ranges, the commander must decide whether to
continue the fight until a decision is reached, or whether to break off
the action.
When the opponent has entered the zone of short ranges, it will be too
late for the defender to retire, unless the terrain in rear of the
position is especially favorable, or other troops can take a hand in
the fight to cover the withdrawal. The onrushing assailant is received
with accelerated fire; the defender fixes bayonets, determined to risk
a fight at close quarters. “The defender who does not fix bayonets is
already casting furtive glances towards the best line of retreat.”
While repulsing an assault, it would be a good plan for the defender to
step upon the rear wall of the trench so that the latter would become
an obstacle for the attacker. But this scheme can only be employed when
the troops are completely in hand.
While the fire of the defender is increased to the utmost intensity by
the entrance into the fight of all the supports, the general reserve,
which now takes a hand in the fight, seeks to bring about the decision
by advancing to attack. On arriving close enough to assault, the attack
reaches its most critical stage, and even a counter-attack made by a
comparatively small force may turn the scale in favor of the defense.
5. THE COUNTER-ATTACK.[459]
[459] See F.C. V. H. _Zum Studium der Taktik_, p. 418 et seq.
In large engagements, the great power of resistance possessed by well
posted bodies of troops will often determine the commander of the
force on the defensive to contain the enemy at one point with a strong
defensive position, while at the same time assuming the offensive at
another. (This was planned, but not carried out, at Dresden, in 1813,
and at Troyes, early in February, 1814; carried out with success, in
Lee’s operations around Richmond, during the latter part of June,
1862, and on the Lisaine in 1871; and miscarried on the Shaho, because
Kuropatkin made his decision dependent upon reports in regard to the
position of hostile reserves, which were non-existent in reality).
Whether the offensive should be assumed while the enemy is still in the
act of deploying,[460] or whether one must be satisfied with assuming
the offensive at the last moment, is best determined by the relative
strength of the opposing forces. When battle-fronts are short this may
still be advantageous, but when the lines are long, a counter-attack
can affect only a small part of the assailant’s line, while the major
portion thereof successfully pushes the attack home. Then the position
and the day will be lost anyway, in spite of a local success.
[460] Roszbach, 1758; Austerlitz. 1805 (_Schlachterfolg_, p. 28);
Salamanca, 1812.
The initial measures taken assure freedom of action to the defense,
but the commander must not await exhaustive messages. Prompt action
is necessary, either for throwing back the advanced troops of the
assailant, or for striking a blow at the hostile flank. In the latter
case, it is an advantage if only weak reserves are struck, but hostile
forces making a turning movement may also be encountered, and the
commander will have to decide whether to deploy quickly and assail the
enemy, or whether to take his chances in a rencontre.[461]
[461] The advance of Memerby’s Brigade during the battle of
Noisseville. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 41.
Even a success gained at a tactically unfavorable point will make
itself felt, if it is won early enough and if the most is made of it.
As a rule, tactical considerations determine where the commander should
launch his reserves for the counter-attack.
The counter-attack here meant is an act of the commander of the whole
force; in bodies of troops acting as part of a larger force and in
numerically inferior forces, the warding off of the flank attack
remains almost always the only remedy.
“The general reserve should be posted at the point from which it can
best move forward, counter to the probable direction of the hostile
attack, while, at the same time, making the most of the features of
the ground. When only one flank is secure, the general reserve is, as
a rule, placed in echelon in rear of the unprotected wing. When both
flanks are in the air, nothing remains but to place sufficient reserves
in readiness in rear of one flank to ward off a hostile envelopment,
while retaining as strong a force as possible in rear of the other
for the purpose of bringing about the decision. The echeloned general
reserve must have room for development, whether this be for warding off
a hostile envelopment or for making a counter-attack.” (Par. 410 German
I. D. R.).
The general reserve should be posted in rear of the center of the
position only when the front is short and the situation is not as yet
cleared up. In this position it will frequently be exposed to the fire
directed against the first line, and its entry into action will usually
involve a loss of time. When adequate information is available of the
measures taken by the opponent, or the nature of the ground compels him
to direct his decisive attack against a wing, this alone determines
the position of the general reserve.
Since the counter-attack is to take the enemy by surprise, the position
of the general reserve must be concealed, and precautions must be taken
to keep hostile patrols in the dark, as long as possible, in regard to
its actual location. The ground over which the general reserve is to
advance should be free from obstacles, so that the counter-attack can
be made rapidly and with uniformity.