of the individual disappears and that the rules laid down in drill
regulations degenerate into a pattern devoid of all spirit.
In =Austria= (1906), Captain Wachtel[441] suggests that, when a
decision is not sought, an attack in groups be made, and that, when a
decision is sought, a united attack be made. In =Switzerland=, Major
Sonderegger[442] advocates a procedure based on that of General von
Scherff.
[441] _Gruppen- und Einheitsangriff_.
[442] _Der ungebremste Infanterieangriff_, 1906.
The initiative of the individual should carry the troops over
difficulties occasioned by the terrain or the enemy. Such checks
occur most frequently from the time a force enters the zone of
effective hostile fire until the assault has been decided upon. In
the author’s opinion, the individualized attack is a concession made,
at the expense of united action, for the purpose of making the attack
succeed at all.
XI. THE DEFENSE.[443]
[443] _Taktik_, V, p. 308. HOPPENSTEDT, _Taktisches Handbuch für
den Infanterieoffizier_, p. 30.
The invariable guiding principle in defense is to make the most
profitable use of fire. This principle governs in the selection of a
position and in strengthening it artificially.
The defender’s object may be--
1. =Temporary occupation= of a piece of ground;
2. =Purely passive defense=, outpost, rear guard, and delaying actions;
3. =Offensive-defensive action=, _i.e._, to bring about a decision by
combining the offensive with the defensive.
In fortress warfare, situations may arise which may make it necessary
to hold a piece of ground obstinately, without it being possible to
assume the offensive. In the French, Russian, and Italian regulations,
only the offensive-defensive is considered. The Italians see in the
defensive nothing but a preparation for the offensive; the Russians
seek to shake the enemy with fire in defense, so that they can
subsequently assume the offensive.
The defensive is dependent upon the terrain, and is subject to the
condition that the locality where the tactical situation requires
a stand to be made offers a position favorable for employing fire
to good advantage, and that the opponent actually attacks where the
defender expects him. The employment of the defensive is restricted
by its dependence on the ground and on the measures of the enemy. Its
employment may frequently be explained by the fact that one of the
contending parties allows itself to be checked to such an extent by the
initiative of the other that it can only offer a passive resistance.
Such passive resistance may here and there score a success by chance
(Plevna, St. Privat), but, as a rule, only the assailant reaps a
benefit from such situations.
1. THE PASSIVE DEFENSE
seeks to avoid a decision, and must therefore endeavor, by opening fire
at an early moment, to prevent the enemy from reaching short ranges.
(See p. 147 supra). It is not absolutely necessary to have a clear
field of fire or strong reserves, but the latter, kept a considerable
distance in rear, must be strong enough to enable the force to
disengage itself from the enemy.
Since only a temporary resistance is to be made, it is permissible for
the force to cover a greater front. The defender should endeavor to
compensate for his numerical inferiority by expending a large amount of
ammunition and by employing machine guns. It is an advantage to have
obstacles in front of the position and cover in rear of it, because the
former retard the enemy’s advance and the latter shelters the troops
from his fire in case of a retreat.
2. THE DEFENSE SEEKING A DECISION.[444]
[444] During the attack on the large work at Gorni Dubniac, the
Finnland Regiment was unable to advance from its last position, only
70-100 paces distant from the enemy, over the foreground swept by
grazing fire. Several attempted assaults were repulsed.
Decisive results can only be obtained at short and medium ranges. Long
range fire may, indeed, inflict losses on the enemy and delay his
advance, but it cannot repulse him. (See p. 148 supra).
It is not sufficient merely to ward off the attack with fire; the
offensive must be assumed. When this is not done, the assailant can
repair his losses and try another attack. When the defender has
repulsed the enemy, he should follow up this success with an attack.
However, as he will rarely be able to do this with the force at his
disposal, fresh troops will be required. (Beaune la Rolande, Lisaine).
The change from the tactical defensive to the offensive offers the same
difficulties as the corresponding strategical move; but, in the former
case, there is present, in addition, the element of danger and the
difficulty of perceiving the right moment.[445]
[445] _Taktik_, V, p. 320. Compare this with Benedeck’s hesitation
at Königgrätz.
A position is of value only when it compels the enemy to attack,
directs his movements into definite channels, and induces him to make
wide turning movements, which cause him to lose time and produce
favorable conditions for the assumption of the offensive on the part
of the defender. Every position that enables the defender to use all
his weapons, and does not deter the enemy from making an attack, is
suitable for this purpose.
“By placing our troops in an unassailable position, we actually refuse
battle and force the enemy to seek the decision in another manner.
* * * A defensive position approaches its ideal to the extent that
its strength is hidden and opportunity is offered of surprising the
enemy by our tactical combinations. One should endeavor to conceal
the advantages which one intends to derive from the formation of the
ground, just as one hides from the enemy the bulk of one’s troops and
their actual position. This is, indeed, only practicable to a certain
extent, and requires perhaps a peculiar and little used method of
treatment.”[446]
[446] CLAUSEWITZ, _On War_, VI, 12 (_Militär-Klassiker_, p.
364). The Boers were masters of the art of concealing defensive
positions. At Colenso, on the Modder River, and at Magersfontain,
their positions were located in places where neither the British
artillerists nor the reconnoitering detachments suspected them to be.
Modern firearms make the defense so strong in front that it suffices to
hold this part of the position with a weak force supplied with plenty
of ammunition, and provided with weak supports, at a few points, to
replace losses. As these supports have a definite task to perform, they
are posted as near the first line as the available cover permits, in
order to cut down the distance to be traversed by them under fire.
When practicable, they are intrenched within the firing line itself. As
it is advisable to supply these troops with a great deal of ammunition,
some of the ammunition wagons belonging to the battalions held in
reserve may be turned over to them. The general reserve intended for
offensive action should be kept far in rear of the line. When kept too
close to the first line, the defender will be unable to move it to any
point desired, after the direction of the attack becomes apparent.
The defender should examine his position from the point of view of
the attacker, and ask himself, “_With how weak a force may I occupy
the position and still obtain the frontal strength described in the
regulations, and how strong can I make the general reserve so as to
bring about a decision?_”
At some parts of the position, an attack will have good prospects of
succeeding, at others it would encounter difficulties, and, finally,
at others it could not possibly succeed. While many troops are needed
in the first-mentioned portions (sections), comparatively few troops
will suffice to hold those sections which are less favorable for
the attacker (on account of their free field of fire, obstacles,
and the absence of artillery positions in which the attacker can
place his guns). This leads to a division of the defensive position
into sections, each forming a separate unit of command (battalion
or company) and, when necessary, detailing its own reserve (section
reserve). When the frontage of the sections, as determined by the
above-mentioned examination of the position, is considerable, or when
obstacles lie within the position, a further subdivision may become
necessary. This does not imply that the position must be held in
equal strength all along the line; portions of the line that are very
difficult to attack need only be kept under observation. Gaps in the
defensive line are, as a rule, of very little value to the assailant,
as the defender will frequently be able to sweep the space in front of
them from a flank. “In order to keep all parts of the foreground under
observation, and to prevent portions of the hostile force from escaping
the defender’s fire, a division of the foreground corresponding to the
division into sections must be made when necessary.” (Par. 403 German
I. D. R.).
Weak points, _i.e._, points against which the assailant can suddenly
mass superior forces at short range, or in the defense of which a
coöperation of infantry and artillery is impossible, must be specially
strengthened: by obstacles; provision for flanking the hostile advance;
and preparation of supporting points in rear of the position. In
addition, such weak points must be occupied with a strong garrison, by
employing two firing lines, one above the other; reserves; and machine
guns.
Enclosed farm yards (Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870), and small
patches of timber, are best not occupied at all; they are far more
valuable as sham defenses in that they draw the fire of the assailant.
At any rate, it is a question whether, at the last moment, when the
hostile assault must be warded off, it will be possible to occupy such
points.
As a general rule, only a single defensive position, consisting of an
infantry and an artillery line, is selected.
The Russians invariably posted strong advanced detachments in front
of their main defensive positions. As a result, the most serious
fights usually occurred in the positions taken up by these advanced
troops.[447] At =Haicheng=, for example, a strong main position had
been prepared, in which a stand was to be made. In spite of this,
the IInd Siberian Corps was left in a strongly fortified advanced
position west of =Simutcheng=. This corps, in its turn, fortified two
lines of advanced positions far in its front.
[447] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 109. See
_Taktik_, V, p. 305, in regard to the numerous positions in the
valley of the Shaho.
“Thus, on July 31, 1904, only seven battalions of this corps finally
fought at =Daputsi= and =Liadapu=. When they were thrown back by
superior forces, the mistake was made of bringing up fresh troops
to regain the position captured by the enemy. These troops arrived
too late and had to make a difficult attack on the Japanese, who
had already occupied the captured position. Naturally their frontal
attack accomplished nothing.
“The force thus suffered a defeat needlessly, and, although the
defensive had been decided upon, a lot of men were sacrificed in an
attempt to retake an advanced position that had been captured by the
enemy. The corps evacuated its strong position without a fight when
its line of retreat was endangered by Mistshenko’s being forced back.
The Russians likewise evacuated their main position at Haicheng when
news was received that strong hostile forces were advancing against
the left flank of the position.”[448]
[448] See _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 41/42, p. 49.
As a rule, it is not advisable to occupy =advanced positions=,[449]
_i.e._, positions lying within effective range of the main position.
Supporting points immediately in front of the main position, projecting
from it like caponiers, and flanking the ground over which the
assailant will have to make his attack, must not be confounded with
these advanced positions. St. Hubert and St. Marie aux Chênes, on
the battlefield of Gravelotte are good examples of both classes of
positions. In order to gain time, a commander may sometimes find it
advantageous to occupy and temporarily defend advanced positions lying
still farther to the front. (Lisaine, and Shaho). In doing this,
favorable terrain (Chavannes on the Lisaine) and skillful leadership
are essential.
[449] _Taktik_, V, p. 270, et seq. No objection can be made to
the contemplated construction of advanced positions in front of
the Shaho position, as the Russians desired to gain time for the
offensive movement to be made by their left wing. The uncertainty
and hesitation produced by the constant changes in orders, and the
excessive reinforcement of the advanced detachments, which allowed
themselves to be led into making a stubborn defense, was fatal.
In =France= and =Russia= much is expected of advanced positions.
In =England= particular importance is attached to them when they
draw the enemy in a direction facilitating the conduct of a
counter-attack. The British consider that supporting points lying in
front of the position had best be left unoccupied, unless they can be
supported by artillery fire from the main position.
“Smokeless powder and the great range of modern firearms will
frequently make reconnaissance so difficult that it will be possible
to gain an approximate idea of the enemy’s strength only by a fight.
For this reason, in situations similar to that existing west of
Belfort, in January 1871, advanced detachments, whose mission it is
to deceive the enemy as to the defender’s strength, and to compel
him to deploy, will have a greater justification now than at that
time. Nowadays, such detachments may cover a considerable front
without danger, especially when they are plentifully supplied with
ammunition. This will make it still more easy to deceive the enemy,
and a skillful defender will know how to make the most of it.”[450]
[450] _Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik_, II, p. 237.
Advanced positions[451] are apt to mask the fire from the main
position, and fights for their possession may easily lead to the defeat
of the troops holding them. The danger of the fight taking place and
being decided in the advanced position must be reckoned with. (Battles
of Ligny and on the Hallue). On the other hand, it may be advantageous
to employ scouting detachments, cyclists, and machine guns, and to
construct dummy intrenchments in front of the main position. (Par. 407
German I. D. R.). The French, more than anyone else, are convinced of
the advantages to be derived from an employment of advanced positions
(for example in deceiving the enemy as to the location of the main
position). In a deliberately planned concentration and advance into
action, such positions are, however, so effectively enveloped that
they do not come into play at all and fall an easy prey to the enemy.
However, we do not wish to deny their occasional usefulness in
cases where it is necessary to gain time for concentration and for
strengthening the main position. In fights for their possession, an
idea may frequently be gained of the intentions and dispositions of the
assailant. Moreover, they offer opportunities for surprising the enemy
with fire, and induce him to make premature attacks and to mass his
troops in the ones he has captured.
[451] Par. 21 German _Manual of Field Engineering_: “Their use is
principally restricted to special cases in fortress warfare.”
Next to a free field of fire (clearing the foreground, and ascertaining
ranges), the determining factors in selecting a position are elbow room
in and in rear of the position, supporting points for the flanks, and
cover. The natural cover available on the ground is made use of as best
suits the purpose of the action.
The line in which the artillery intends to fight the decisive action
constitutes the “framework” of the position. Although artillery will
rarely be able to perform all its tasks in a single position, its first
position is selected with due regard to the position of the hostile
artillery. The most important position is that from which the hostile
infantry attack is to be repulsed. This should be selected far enough
in front of the artillery to enable the latter to fire over it, and to
deprive the assailant’s artillery of the opportunity of hitting the
defender’s infantry and artillery at one and the same time. (Par. 401
German I. D. R.). A distance of 600 m. between infantry and artillery
is considered sufficient for this purpose. In view of the protection
afforded by gun shields against infantry fire, it is scarcely necessary
to post skirmish lines in advance of the artillery. But, where the
infantry line is not continuous in front of the artillery, troops
should be posted, so as to protect the artillery personnel from
being annoyed by hostile patrols. It will seldom be possible for a
commander to do justice to the requirements of both arms; in every
compromise, one or the other arm is only too apt to be placed at a
disadvantage. The needs of the infantry, whose choice of a position is
more restricted, take precedence. While infantry can govern its action
by that of the artillery during the preparatory stage of an attack,
this is impossible in defense, as the infantry is obliged to carry the
fight through to its logical conclusion in the position in which it is
begun.[452]
[452] As the artillery is less restricted in the choice of
positions, and as the final outcome of the fight depends, after all,
on the outcome of the infantry action, the demands of the infantry,
contrary to par. 292 German I. D. R., must be considered in the first
place.
3. FORTIFYING THE POSITION.[453]
[453] Germany: _Manual of Field Engineering_, 1905. France:
_Instruction pratique sur les travaux de campagne_ (December 24th,
1906). England: _Manual of Military Engineering_, 1905. Russia:
_Mitteilungen vom Ingenieur Comité_, No. 41 (1906). The Austrian and
Italian regulations are undergoing revision.
The apprehensions formerly entertained in regard to prematurely
fortifying a position, and which are still shared by the French
regulations, are no longer to be found in the new regulations. The
construction of field fortifications requires time, if they are to be
of value, and if they are to give leaders and troops the assurance
that they can be defended by the minimum number of men.[454] Even
intrenchments that have been constructed in vain will frequently prove
useful in deceiving the enemy. In many cases, it will be necessary to
be prepared to meet a hostile attack made from several directions. This
contingency should be taken into account by at least preparing for the
work beforehand.
[454] At 10 A. M., on August 18th, 1870. General Canrobert received
orders to place St. Privat in a state of defense. At 11 A. M., the
first reports of the approach of the Prussian Guard were received,
and at 4 P. M., Ste. Marie aux Chênes was in German hands. Hence,
only five hours were available for these preparations for defense.
“If the situation turns out to be different than was expected, the
intrenchments already constructed should not influence the decisions
of the commander. On the other hand, the consideration that the works
might be built unnecessarily must not cause their construction to be
omitted altogether.” (Par. 311 German I. D. R.).
In the preface to the French regulations, it is emphasized that
intrenching a position ought neither to impair the spirit of the
offensive nor hamper the movement to the front. “Intrenchments are
a means to an end, but not the end itself. They should only be used
when no violence is done thereby to the tactical situation, and one
should never hesitate, for a single moment, to abandon them, if the
situation requires, or to construct others, at another place, if it
becomes necessary.” The men should therefore be trained in handling
the portable intrenching tools, until they can use them skillfully in
any position of the body.
“The use of intrenchments may also be abused. To remain inertly
in a place is just as fatal as to advance without making use of
cover. When temporary halts are made, the commander for the time
being, often placed in that position by chance (_chef du moment,
chef d’unité ou chef de groupe éventuel_), indicates whether or not
intrenchments are to be constructed.”
Battle intrenchments are to protect the soldier against hostile
fire, without hampering him in using his rifle. “They are one of
the factors which ensure economy in men, in that they save a body
of troops from suffering unnecessary losses. But their importance
always recedes before the general requirements of an action, and they
should never in any way interfere with the advance of troops; on the
contrary, intrenchments are to make it possible to bring troops
within effective range of the enemy, without impairing their physical
condition or their morale.”
Intrenchments enable a commander to save troops, which he can use
offensively at the decisive point. They do not fulfill the object
for which they were intended, when they make it easier for the enemy
to pick out the position. “Works which cannot be perceived from the
foreground even through powerful field glasses, afford the most
effective protection against artillery fire.” Trenches should therefore
be deep, have a low parapet, and be properly masked.
The commander indicates when work is to begin. Every unit must intrench
the portion of the defensive line which it is to defend; working
parties, specially detailed from troops not intended for the immediate
defense of the position, can be counted on only when extensive works
are to be constructed.
Continuous lines of trenches are seldom built; it suffices to construct
a line of works with intervals, _i.e._, battalion groups, the intervals
being simply held by a weak force.
These battalion groups (par. 24 German Manual of Field Engineering)
are constructed without regard to any fixed form, as the tactical
employment of the companies requires. They consist of firing trenches
(flanks refused and echelons in rear of the wings), provided with
splinter proofs, and adequate cover trenches, so that all the men, if
possible, will be sheltered from artillery fire.
The aim is, first of all, to construct inconspicuous standing firing
trenches. These should have low parapets and be provided with numerous
traverses to restrict the effect of high explosive shell. In order
that these traverses may not betray the location of the position, they
should not rise above the parapet.[455]
[455] These traverses afford very little shelter against enfilading
fire; it is advisable to keep sand bags in readiness as a protection
in case such fire is received.
Deep, narrow trenches afford the best protection against artillery
fire (the trench should be about 0.60 m. wide at the bottom). Narrow
trenches are especially difficult to pick out from a balloon. In
constructing trenches having no parapet at all, special precautions
must be taken in order that their location may not be betrayed by the
scattered earth or by their rear wall, which will be visible when they
are located on the slope facing the enemy. When the trenches are to
be held for some time, provision must be made for the construction
of splinter proofs,[456] other overhead cover, and loopholes of
observation.
[456] These lie about 0.50 m. below the natural surface of the
ground and accommodate 5-6 men: they are separated from each other by
an earth wall 1 m. thick.
Numerous light splinter proofs are generally to be preferred to a
few larger and stronger ones, as they afford sufficient protection
against shrapnel bullets and fragments. They may be protected against
direct hits from field guns, or other guns having a flat trajectory,
by sloping their roofs to the rear at an angle as nearly as possible
coincident with the angle of fall of those projectiles.