situation of the IIIrd Army Corps on the afternoon of August 18th,
1870, when Prince Frederick Charles yielded to the entreaties of
General von Alvensleben and permitted him to advance south of the
Bois de la Cusse.[430] Similar situations resulted in the case of the
Austrian 1st and VIth Army Corps at Königgrätz, the French IIIrd and
IVth Army Corps, on a front of 2.75 km., with the Guards in rear,
between Noisseville and Failly, and, finally, the advance of the
1st East Siberian Rifle Division at Wafangu. The French regulations
likewise contemplate a decisive attack made by large masses on a narrow
front. If these troops which are to clinch the success gained by the
fighting line, are deployed on the front laid down in regulations, they
will be unable to use their weapons. It isn’t mechanical shock action,
but fire effect that decides the battle. In such a mass of troops, only
fractional parts will be able to fire, the major portion is crowded
together and becomes a dense, defenseless target, exposed to all the
psychological impressions produced by crowding human beings into a
narrow space.[431]
[430] _Der 18. August_, pp. 484 and 558, sketches 34 and 35.
[431] The successful attacks made by masses of fanatical warriors
in colonial wars are carried out under such peculiar conditions that,
for our purposes, deductions therefrom are not admissible. The defeat
of the two French brigades at Bang-Bo (24th March, 1885), and at
Ki-lua (28th March, 1885). LEHAUCOURT, _Les Expéditions de Tonkin_.
The defeat of the Italians at Adua (1st March. 1896).
A brigade, therefore, should not deploy on a front of 1500 m., _i.e._,
put only about ¹⁄₄ of its men in the first line; but no objection can
be made if the brigade, in moving to the final decisive assault, at
once advances on a front of 2500-3000 m.
13. THE CONDUCT OF THE LEADERS IN ACTION.
The difficulties of troop leading increase as the power of the
commander to control and direct all ranks in action by words of command
diminishes. In action, therefore, those means must be adopted that will
facilitate the transmission of orders. This requires first of all the
choice of an appropriate position for the leader.
The beginning of an action should find the leader as far forward as
possible; during the advance to the battlefield, with the advance
guard (par. 277 German I. D. R.), for neither messages nor reports,
nor a map can adequately take the place of personal inspection of the
situation of the enemy, of neighboring units, and of the ground. So
placed, he can best direct the first deployment, upon which the future
course of the action so largely depends, secure advantages by making
prompt decisions in face of the enemy, save his own troops from making
detours, handle them in accordance with a definite plan, and preclude
arbitrary action on the part of the commander of the leading unit.
During the action, the superior commander can influence the course
of the fight, his personal example excepted, only by employing his
reserves. His place is, therefore, near the reserves, at a point that
can be readily found, and never in the firing line.
A company commander should remain where he believes he can best control
his company, as a rule, perhaps in the firing line. He provides for the
supply and distribution of ammunition that is brought up from the rear,
and regulates the coöperation of the platoons. (Pars. 216, 457 and 458
German I. D. R.).
A battalion commander should only in very exceptional cases take post
in the firing line; he should nearly always remain with parts of the
force that are held back for the time being, but, in any case, where
he can effectively supervise his battalion. The choice of a regimental
commander’s position is influenced by the same considerations; when his
regiment is acting as part of a brigade, he must select his position so
as to facilitate the transmission of orders from brigade headquarters.
The brigade commander will, as a rule, remain near his reserves, at a
point from which he can best overlook the deployment of his brigade.
On account of the fact that extended order fighting predominates,
leaders of all grades must be particularly careful to maintain
connection between the several parts of their command, with each other,
and with adjoining units, and to preserve their influence over their
firing lines. Superior commanders should, in addition, see that their
troops do not get out of hand, and all subordinate leaders, after
carrying out a task assigned them, should endeavor promptly to rejoin
their proper commands, or place themselves at the disposal of the
commander of troops still engaged with the enemy.
These requirements will be fulfilled, if superior commanders order
nothing that they should not and cannot order, and if the officers
charged with the execution of the orders coöperate to attain the
desired end, and do not abuse the freedom of action allowed them.
While subordinate leaders, up to and including company commanders,
are mainly occupied with fire control and fire direction, and should
influence the men by their personal example, superior commanders have
other tasks, which they must not neglect for the purpose of interfering
in the sphere of action of their subordinates. They can influence the
fire action only by sending the necessary forces to those portions
of the firing line whose fire they wish to augment. An interference
on their part with the action of subordinates is permissible only in
case of obvious misunderstandings or mistakes, which would cause the
combat to take a course other than that intended. The larger the unit
commanded by an officer, the greater the latitude that must be allowed
him. The leaders should concentrate their attention upon the general
execution of their special tasks as part of the whole scheme, rather
than upon supervision of details. It is by no means essential for all
parts of the force to employ identical means to attain one and the same
object. Every leader should bear in mind that _omission or neglect are
greater crimes than a mistake made in the choice of means_.
The initiative of leaders of all grades is the foundation of great
victories in war, but this initiative must neither jeopardize unity of
action nor direct the course of events into channels not intended by
the commander.[432]
[432] See _Taktik_, III, p. 174, and V, p. 57, et seq.
The best safeguard against the results of an act of unjustifiable
initiative is to ask oneself: “What orders would my superior have to
give me, if he were in my place and knew what I know?”
14. UNITED ACTION VERSUS TACTICAL MISSIONS.
Although no one disputes that victory depends upon a superiority of
fire at the decisive point, yet there is a great diversity of opinion
as to how this superiority is to be attained.
General Bronsart von Schellendorff states:[433] “Every battle seeks
to bring about a decisive victory, but this is, after all, invariably
the sum of local victories. Successful battle-tactics consist of
correctly estimating the tactical value of these local successes
and of contriving to gain a victory at the decisive point; in other
words, to manage so that the sum-total of positive factors will be
greater than that of the negative factors.”
[433] _Betrachtungen über die zeitgemäsze Fechtweise der
Infanterie_, 1891, p. 36.
In the opinion of the advocates of this course,[434] unity of action
is attainable by practice and study, but not by set formations. If
unity of action could be ensured in all bodies of troops by means
of study and practice, there would seem to be no reason why the
regulations should lay down still more definite rules to govern the
manner in which an attack should be conducted. The matter is not
so simple, however. Bearing in mind the great latitude that the
regulations allow each individual in choosing the formation which he
deems proper in a given case, it is obvious that many very different
procedures may result. This in itself is no drawback, and to a
certain extent this condition must exist, as the task in hand, the
nature of the country, and the existing situation vary. But, if a
given problem can be correctly solved in several ways, it will also
admit of a decidedly incorrect solution; and it is the more likely
to be solved incorrectly, the less study and practice is indulged in
by a large part of the corps of officers, and the less this class of
officers finds in existing regulations as a guide to conduct. When,
in spite of undeniable progress, we see dispersed attacks and an
unquestionably incorrect conduct in every maneuver, and this with a
corps of officers nearly all of whom are professional soldiers, who
have had the advantage of study and practice, what may we expect
in war, where the corps of officers will be very largely composed
of officers of the Reserve and Landwehr, who have but very limited
opportunities for study and practice, but who, after the very first
battle, may have to command companies.
[434] General VON SCHLICHTING, _Taktische und strategische
Grundsätze der Gegenwart_. See also the essay in the July number of
_Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, 1898.
General von Scherff,[435] the chief advocate of “united action,” is
opposed to the “combat with units of command” (_Kommandoeinheiten_)
briefly sketched above. He makes a distinction between battle-tactics
and the tactics of detachment warfare. In his opinion, the sum of
the local successes can by no means gain the victory; that can only
be done by the united launching of adequate forces at the decisive
point. “No weapon in the world will ever alter the fact that five
battalions united in one body have a greater inherent fighting
power than five separate battalions--not to mention twenty separate
companies--always provided that a united body of troops is also
launched as one body.”
[435] _Kriegslehren in Kriegsgeschichtlichen Beispielen der
Neuzeit_, I-IV, _Ein Schlachtenangriff_, 1898.
Examples Illustrating the Necessity of a United Attack.
1. The 26th Infantry Brigade was alarmed and put in march toward the
battlefield to support the advance guard brigade of the VIIth Army
Corps, engaged at =Colombey=. The commander of the 26th Infantry
Brigade received orders from the commanding general to engage. It
was not necessary for the brigade to provide its own reserve as the
25th Brigade had been directed to concentrate between Marsilly and
Colligny, and to be at the disposal of the corps commander. The
troops already engaged were in a critical situation; their moral and
physical energy was exhausted. It is only too patent that the first
battalion (1st Battalion, 13th Infantry) appearing on the scene was
thrown into the fight to afford at least temporary relief, but this
insufficient reinforcement was involved in the general failure. After
about a quarter of an hour, the 25th Brigade (the IIIrd Battallion,
73rd Infantry had remained in bivouac at Pange) was concentrating
for action at Coincy, but, instead of its making a united attack,
only the 1st Battalion of the 73rd Infantry was launched. This
battalion did, indeed, penetrate into the “Tannenwäldchen” at the
“Todten-Allee”, but was then surrounded on three sides, had to fall
back with considerable losses, prevented the further advance of the
IInd Battallion of the 73rd Infantry, and rallied on the Füsilier
Battalion of the 13th Infantry, on the bank of the Vallières brook.
“Although the General Staff account of the war is silent on this
subject, we are justified in assuming that only the presence of the
brigade commander, who had learned a lesson from the second local
assault, prevented the Füsilier Battalion of the 13th Infantry from
making a fourth isolated effort. After re-forming the organizations,
the new attack, which was made with indomitable spirit, proceeded
more in connection with that of three other battalions advancing on
the same line, and this united advance was closely followed by a
second echelon consisting of the last battalion of the brigade (the
IInd Battalion of the 13th Infantry), which had arrived just in time.
The result was that the enemy was completely routed.”[436]
[436] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 470. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, I, p.
41, et seq.
2. At the Gorze-Rezonville road, on August 16th, 1870, the isolated
attacks made against Hill 970 by eight battalions, belonging to three
different brigades, likewise accomplished nothing, whereas, had a
higher commander been present, a united attack launched by him would
undoubtedly have been successful.[437]
[437] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 631. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p.
271. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 128, et seq.
3. The well executed attack made against the hill west of the suburb
of =St. Martin=, on January 19th, 1871, by six battalions of the 29th
Infantry Brigade shows the importance of the united launching of a
large body of massed infantry. The engagement of the 16th Infantry
Division, in particular the attack made on =Grugies= (battle of =St.
Quentin=) is the antithesis of the above-mentioned attack. Although
the situation did not necessitate the simultaneous launching of the
available forces, the brigade attacked in driblets. The attack made
by these fractions, launched one after another, was not able to
bring about a decision. In the first place, at about 11 A. M., three
companies (5th, 6th, and 7th of the 69th Infantry), soon afterwards
supported by the 8th Company of the 29th Infantry, and the 8th
Company of the 69th Infantry, attacked the French position at the
railway embankment and cut. The Prussian troops fought with great
gallantry, the 5th, 6th and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry making
four attacks, and the other two companies, three. Although these
five companies succeeded in gaining temporary successes, they lacked
a common commander, and were supported from the rear only when they
were thrown back after fighting for three-quarters of an hour.
About noon, the four companies of the Ist Battalion, 29th Infantry,
were brought up, but did not engage until the first line had been
forced back and the 5th, 6th, and 7th Companies of the 69th Infantry,
at any rate, were out of action for the time being. Incidentally,
it may be mentioned that the Ist Battalion of the 29th Infantry
attacked in three groups, the strongest of which consisted of 2-l/2
companies, the weakest of only half a company. Only the strongest
of these groups scored a success, and the Ist Battalion of the 29th
Infantry was completely routed after a bloody fight. The 9th and 10th
Companies, 29th Infantry, did not arrive on the battlefield until
after the companies of the Ist Battalion of this regiment, whose
heroic fight cannot be sufficiently praised, had ceased to exist as
tactical units.
At 12:30 P. M., the 3rd and 4th Companies of the 70th Infantry
were brought up and threw back the French, but were in their turn
defeated. At this moment the 10th and 11th Companies of the 40th
Infantry arrived; these companies were also able to advance, but
their success was a temporary one only.
At 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion of the 40th Infantry appeared,
threw the French back, but was soon attacked by superior forces and
suffered the same fate as its predecessors.
At 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion of the 70th Infantry and the
9th and 12th Companies of the 40th Infantry were brought forward, but
only the former engaged seriously at once--again without success.
A little while later, the 9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry,
advanced energetically. At about 3:30 P. M., the French made a very
strong counter-attack; all that had been gained seemed about to
be lost again, when the decision was finally brought about by the
vigorous action of the 41st Infantry and a charge made by Reserve
Dragoons.
The capture of Grugies, of the sugar mill, and, a little later, of
Gauchy, now followed.
The resistance of the French was broken. General von Barnekow
had thus, apparently, gained his object; but at what a price? In
this engagement, the launching of troops in driblets may be very
accurately followed:
1. At 11 A. M., five companies were launched in two separate groups
(5th, 6th, and 7th Companies, 69th Infantry--8th Company, 29th
Infantry and 8th Company, 69th Infantry);
2. Toward noon, four fresh companies (1st Battalion, 29th Infantry)
were also launched in separate groups;
3. A little later, two fresh companies were put in (9th and 10th
Companies, 29th Infantry);
4. At 12:30 P. M., two fresh companies were launched (3rd and 4th
Companies, 70th Infantry);
5. A little later, the 10th and 11th Companies, 40th Infantry, were
pushed in;
6. About 1:30 P. M., the IInd Battalion, 40th Infantry, was brought
up;
7. About 2:30 P. M., the Füsilier Battalion, 70th Infantry, and the
9th and 12th Companies, 40th Infantry, advanced.
Thus, between 11 A. M. and 2:30 P. M., General von Barnekow gradually
drew into the fight twenty-five companies, in seven different
detachments, from the reserve formed by the 16th Infantry Division
at Essigny le Grand. Besides, the troops generally did not appear on
the battlefield until the energy of the troops already engaged was
exhausted.[438]
[438] KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, II, pp. 135 and 212.
Moreover, the retreat of the several detachments was not a voluntary
one, for the French, thanks to their great superiority, generally
forced them to retire. This engagement thus presents a series of
partial successes, which became reverses, however, in a very short
time.
_Launching reinforcements in driblets increased the numbers required
beyond all reasonable bounds, produced heavy losses, and involved
the weak reinforcements, which arrived successively, in disaster,
without turning the tide of the battle. Decisive victories can only
be brought about by simultaneously launching masses._
“The system of close order battalion tactics was no longer
practicable under Chassepot fire, and everyone promptly went to the
opposite extreme of extended order, company column tactics, with
which all were sufficiently familiar, since it had been carefully
practiced in minor field exercises in time of peace.” (The attack
made by the 26th Infantry Brigade against =Schlosz Aubigny=, August
14th, 1870[439])
[439] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 466; VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, I, p.
16; VON MALACHOWSKI, _Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik_, p. 18. This
example is the more instructive, as both advocates of these opposing
views show how, in their opinion, the attack should have been made.
The same attack is, moreover, treated in _Militär-Wochenblatt_,
1901, Numbers 41 and 42, under the title _Selbständigkeit und
Auftragsverfahren_.
There is always danger that unity of action will be sacrificed by the
continued assignment of individual tasks; that the leader will not
be able to count with confidence on the initiative of subordinate
leaders restoring this unity, and “that, in the end, no higher
commander will any longer have the assurance that his wishes will
be carried out.” The battles around Metz during August, 1870, show
a tendency on the part of the infantry to leave behind, in reserve
and in rallying positions, parts of the troops launched to perform a
certain combat task, “to detach parts to maintain communication (very
often not at all endangered) with neighboring detachments”, and to
despatch others to a distance to cover a flank, or to make a wide
turning movement for the purpose of enveloping the enemy’s flank.
To prevent a battle from degenerating into a number of disconnected,
local combats, and to ensure that the enemy will be actually
subjected to the fire of as many rifles as the supreme commander
intended, General von Scherff proposes that the battle formation,
consisting of several echelons separated by fixed distances, be taken
up outside of the zone of hostile fire, and that these echelons
then advance simultaneously and as uninterruptedly as possible upon
the enemy. In this movement the terrain is to be taken advantage of
only so far as the orders permit. In view of the flat trajectory of
the modern rifle, he concedes that fire while in motion, formerly
considered permissible by him at long and medium ranges, may be
replaced by an advance by rushes of the firing line, alternating
with firing in a prone position, the ammunition to be expended at
each halt being fixed by the officer charged with fire direction.
He moreover considers it necessary to have a main firing position,
located approximately at the outer limit of short ranges, for the
purpose of gaining the superiority of fire. Base units must be
designated in order to prevent weak detachments from encountering the
enemy single-handed. Moreover, he intends to keep the advance going
by increasing the fire, and by detailed and definite orders providing
for the constant reinforcement of the firing line by men of the
steadily following supports and reserves. Further, since according to
his proposal, a halt by the rear echelons of an attack that has once
been launched, is excluded on principle, it follows of necessity,
that, for the fire effect of the firing line at the really decisive
ranges, there can remain only a very brief period of time, measurable
in minutes, which is amply sufficient, in his opinion, for the object
to be accomplished.
It is charged that General von Scherff’s proposal[440] (see p. 205
supra) favors a set scheme for conducting every fight. This is not
true; there is quite a difference between “more definitely regulating
the conduct of an attack”, aimed at by the author of _Kriegslehren_,
and the formulation of a normal procedure.
[440] The 10th Supplement of the _Internationale Revue_ 1900, gives
General von Scherff’s ideas on the infantry attack. See also his
_Reglementarische Studien_, p. 58, and _Ein Schlachtenangriff_, p.
102. _Vergleichender Rückblick auf die neueste Tagesliteratur über
den Infanterieangriff_, 1906.
“Where a number of individuals are to coöperate for the purpose of
performing a certain task, the nature of the case requires that
each one be able to picture to himself beforehand the nature of the
task, so that his share in it will appear clear and definite. Each
one must know what he is to do, when and where he should engage,
what his role is to be, etc. etc., or the result will be hopeless
confusion.”--“The drill regulations must supply this picture and the
drill-ground is the place where its general forms should be impressed
upon every individual participating in the performance of a task.”
Experience has taught us that this image of the drill-ground becomes
distorted in war through influences which have almost never permitted
it to appear on the battlefield in its true form. The initiative of
subordinate leaders should overcome the obstacles which stand in the
way of a realization of this ideal image.
=The system of tactical missions= reckons with the sum-total of local
successes, assigns tasks to the different units of command, and
leaves to the latter the choice of the means, without restricting
their independence. The course of the combat can be influenced only
by the action of retained forces, and it is sought to produce united
action by acquainting all leaders with the object of the combat, they
in turn endeavoring to attain this object even though they do so in
different ways.
=The system of united action= seeks to ensure victory by
simultaneously placing in readiness all the forces intended for
the general combat, by an orderly concentration for action, and by
launching the troops at one and the same time, without, however,
requiring all parts of the force to employ the same formations. This
system dictates to the leader the number of troops he should launch.
Since in action everything is ordered as necessity therefor arises,
the result is that the leader loses sight of the general action in
view of the great number of separate orders that must be issued.
In the system of tactical missions, there is danger of arbitrary
action on the part of subordinates, and of dispersion; moreover,
it is not always easy to deploy strong firing lines, and there is
an increased tendency to overestimate the value of cover and, in
consequence, to overstep the assigned frontage.