against Oerrshikiatsi (Shaho) was first fired upon at a range of 1000
m., whereupon the men threw themselves down and intrenched; when the
hostile fire abated, the regiment advanced again, and when the enemy
resumed his fire, it intrenched. A third advance brought the regiment
within 500 m. of the defender’s position and it was able to make the
assault during the forenoon of October 12th, 1904.
3. In intrenching an echelon posted to cover advancing infantry.
4. In fortifying a captured position. The want of intrenching tools in
quickly putting captured positions in a state of defense, so often felt
during the Franco-German war and the Russo-Turkish war, has now been
removed by the introduction of portable tools.[418] The necessity of
quickly preparing captured positions for defense presented itself in a
number of instances.
[418] Examples: The French in St. Privat. The Germans and later
the French in Noisseville. on September 1st, 1870. Villepion,
on December 1st, 1870 (HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, III, p. 257; KUNZ,
_Loigny_, p. 49): Les Granges, on January 11th, 1871 (_Geschichte des
Regiments Nr. 20_. p. 297). Fortifying the position on the second
ridge of the Green Hills in front of Plevna, on September 10th, 1877
(KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, II, p. 178). Tempel Hill (Terrayama), on October
11th, 1904. In the last mentioned case three offensive returns were
repulsed from the captured position, which had been prepared for
defense. The fights for the possession of the village of Linchinpu
(on the right bank of the Shaho, north of the railway), captured
on October 14th, were still more obstinate; the position had to be
prepared for defense under hostile artillery fire. (VON TETTAU,
_Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der Mandschurei_, II, p.
136).
5. In holding ground that has been gained in an attack when further
advance is impossible, that is, in situations such as confronted the
infantry of the Guard on August 18th when its first attack came to a
standstill. During the attack on Gorni Dubniac, in the Russo-Turkish
war, the Russian Guard intrenched when a further advance became
impossible. During the attack on Telish, which occurred a few days
later, specific orders were issued for the troops to intrench when
1000-2000 m. from the Turkish works.[419]
[419] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde_, p. 166.
As a result of the lessons gained in the Russo-Turkish war, general
instructions were issued to the Russian infantry on the subject of
intrenching in attack. According to these instructions, the spade was
to be used in attack in the following cases: In fortifying a captured
position, as a protection against a possible offensive return of the
defender; in holding supporting points necessary to a continuation of
the attack; and in placing rallying positions in a state of defense.
The order directing troops to intrench was to be given, in all cases,
by the supreme commander. The following procedure was to be observed:
“Every man equipped with a spade and who is not sheltered by some
feature of the terrain, places his rifle on the ground and, lying on
his left side, begins to excavate a hole parallel to his body. This
hole should be as long as the distance from his left elbow to his knee,
as wide as the length of the spade-handle, and as deep as the width of
the blade of the spade. The excavated earth and sod he places in front
of his head, which he endeavors to protect as quickly as possible. When
this work is completed, he rolls over into the excavated hole, and,
lying on his right side, repeats the operation. When he has obtained
sufficient cover, he hands his spade to the other man of the file, who
proceeds in a similar fashion.”
The Japanese, on account of their numerical inferiority, found it
necessary to get along with few supports and reserves, and therefore
made use of the spade in terrain devoid of cover, or utilized sand
bags,[420] which were carried along. In this manner, they laboriously
worked their way to within assaulting distance of the enemy. In many
instances, this necessitated whole days of fighting when an envelopment
was impossible. Sand bags were an advantage when the ground was frozen
or when the sod was not thick.
[420] See p. 344 supra. Frequently the bags, which could be tied
with a string, were filled near the place where they were to be used.
The advance was considerably retarded by carrying along sand bags.
During the attack on Yuputz, on March 1st, 1905, by the 8th Infantry
Division of the IInd Army, the first sand bag cover was constructed
700 m. and the last 250 m. from the village.
_Results of Russian experiments._ The sand bag employed was made
of coarse linen of grayish green color and when filled and tied,
was approximately 50 cm. long (width of a man’s shoulders), 30-35
cm. wide, and 30-35 cm. high. The filled sand bag weighed 14-20
kg., depending upon the filling material (sand or broken stone).
When filled with sand or broken stone, the sand bag stopped all
projectiles, while, when filled with earth, even two bags placed in
rear of each other did not afford sufficient protection. The sand
bags were scarcely discernible with the naked eye at 400 m. They were
not an easy target to hit, and, even at 300 m., it was difficult to
aim at them.
The men had a distinct aversion against constructing shelter trenches
while lying down. During the war they could be made to intrench only
by great exertions on the part of the officers. The reason for this
is obvious; digging with the small spade while in a prone position
is uncomfortable. The skirmisher considers it much more profitable
to fire than to puzzle out how he can best stir up the soil with the
small spade while in a prone position. Moreover, he knows that at any
moment he may have to make a rush to the front.
The beautiful idea that these trenches were to be used and widened
by the reserves, was usually not carried out. The reserves preferred
to make longer rushes and to take advantage of folds of the ground
rather than occupy themselves with intrenching under hostile fire.
At ranges from 2000-1000 m., single men made short rushes, only 30-40
m. long, as the filled sand bag constituted a considerable load.
Before a man ran forward, he slung his rifle, grasped the sand bag
with one hand at the tied end, with the other at a loop specially
provided for that purpose; then he jumped up, ran forward 30-40 m.,
as rapidly as he could in a crouching position, placed the sand bag
on the ground, and threw himself down behind it. Under effective
hostile fire, at 1000-550 m. (during our peace maneuvers at 420-280
m.), the men then crawl forward, utilizing the sand bag as cover.
The men would rather crawl a greater distance with the sand bag than
intrench while lying down.
From the position of the enemy, the skirmishers lying behind grayish
green sand bags could not be recognized with the naked eye at
2000-1000 m. It is reported that both officers and men were at first
very much disinclined toward making these experiments, but that they
changed their views after one or two exercises, and the principal
apprehension, that of increasing the weight of the field equipment,
disappeared because of the undeniable advantages of the sand bag.
Such cover constructed by the assailant has no greater value than
natural cover found on the ground over which the attack is made; it
affords protection during halts and induces retreating skirmishers to
face to the front again at an earlier moment than would otherwise be
the case.
“It should not be forgotten, however, that time gained is of greater
benefit to the defender than to the assailant. Moreover, the great
difficulty of inducing a firing line which has made a lodgment under
hostile fire, to advance from its laboriously constructed cover,
admonishes us to be cautious in employing the spade during an attack.
The construction of cover ought never to impair the desire for making
an impetuous attack, or destroy the offensive spirit.” (Par. 313 German
I. D. R.).
When a body of troops intrenches during an attack, it must detach
half of its force to keep up the attack; this cannot be offset by an
increased rate of fire, even if squad leaders, range finders, and
musicians, take part in the fight, as the men offer a taller target
while intrenching, and as the newly turned earth facilitates the
enemy’s aim. A superiority of fire that has been gained may thereby be
lost. However, when the defender’s troops have been so shaken that the
assailant can detach half of his rifles with impunity, the latter need
not remain lying on the ground, but can advance, in most cases, closer
to the enemy’s position. The use of the spade is, therefore, proper
only when ground that has been gained is to be held, and when the
enemy’s fire permits intrenching.
=Russia.= In instructions issued by General Kuropatkin, the following
statement in regard to the Japanese infantry appears: “It advances in
widely deployed lines. The firing line advances by short, alternating
rushes, the men then throwing themselves down and intrenching. In
spite of our extraordinarily violent fire, the firing line continues
to advance by alternate rushes, leaves its half completed shelter
trenches and begins to dig new ones. The supports then advance by
alternate rushes, occupy the first line of trenches and complete
them. When the firing line advances from the second line of trenches,
they are occupied by the supports, while the reserves move up into
the first line of trenches. In this manner, the advance is continued
by successive rushes. From this, it is apparent that the infantryman
in the firing line must act on his own initiative in selecting a
point for intrenching.”
=Japan.= In a number of cases, the Japanese conducted an attack in
the manner described. At Liao Yang, on September 1st, 1904, shelter
trenches were dug at 750 and at 530 m. from the Russian position.
The advance beyond this was so managed that the men intrenched after
every rush, finally arriving, in the course of the day, within 300
m. of the enemy. An assault made from this position on the afternoon
of the 2nd was repulsed. The whole Japanese line again faced to the
front on arriving in the shelter trenches which they had dug 300 m.
from the hostile position. The Japanese now perfected their weak
intrenchments and were even able to repulse two counter-attacks
made by the Russians. This was certainly an exceptional case, and,
besides, it involved an attack on a fortified position.
The German Manual of Field Engineering (No. 46) recommends that the
man, when lying on his left side, construct in the first place a
parapet 30 cm. high, as head cover and rifle rest. This produces pits
50 cm. wide, 60 cm. long, and 40 cm. deep, usually deeper in front
than in rear, which makes aiming uncomfortable.
=France.= According to the _Instruction pratique sur les travaux de
campagne_ (24th October, 1906), the men are to improve available
cover; where natural cover is wanting, artificial cover is to
be constructed when the hostile fire compels a halt or the men
are forced to halt to regain their breath. At short ranges, the
skirmishers dig individual pits. It is desirable for the soldier to
use his knapsack as cover while working, and to leave it in position
later also, to get better head cover.
=England.= Although the troops are not equipped with portable
intrenching tools, it is prescribed that captured positions be
fortified; in open country, when the hostile fire is too hot, this is
to be done at night.
The suggestion of creating cover for skirmishers by using the
pits produced by short shell salvos, is a singular one. Detailed
experiments have been made in =Austria=.[421] In instructions issued
by the commander of the XIth Corps, it was recommended that, when
exposed to moderate hostile fire, the soldier should hug the ground
as closely as possible while at work. The intrenching proceeded
most rapidly when the soldier first excavated the ground in front
and threw it forward. But in order to do this, the man has to push
himself backward during the work and must throw the earth some
distance. The parapet is low, but affords sufficient protection.
[421] _Streffleur_, 1906, III, p. 387.
[Illustration]
The task is greater when the soldier lies first on his left, then on
his right side, removes earth from a borrow pit at his right and then
from one on his left, and piles it up in front. As the skirmisher
lies on the natural surface of the ground during this operation, he
naturally constructs a higher parapet.
The following general rules governing the use of the spade in attack
may be laid down:
1. An invariable use of the spade in attack must be unhesitatingly
condemned. The best means of gaining the superiority of fire, and the
best protection against hostile fire, is our own fire.
2. It must not be left to the soldier’s discretion, as to whether or
not he shall intrench. The order for intrenching should in every case
emanate from the supreme commander.
3. As a rule, the spade should be used in those phases of combat that
partake more of a defensive character, in particular--
(a) To protect artillery and prepare rallying positions during the
preparatory stage of the action;
(b) To shelter troops detailed to contain the enemy while enveloping
movements are in progress;
(c) To shelter troops that are to keep down the hostile fire by their
own delivered from enfilading or commanding positions;
(d) To maintain a strip of ground or a supporting point that has just
been gained, whether this has been captured from the enemy or whether
the attack has come to a standstill at that point and a pause in the
fighting occurs.
4. An attack with the aid of the spade from trench to trench is
advisable only in exceptional cases, when the attack is a purely
frontal one and is made over ground devoid of cover.
12. THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVES.[422]
(Pars. 294, 295, 366, 388, 393, 427 and 436 German I. D. R.).
[422] _Taktik_, V. p. 334, et seq.
The infantry attack may be characterized as a fire fight. It would seem
desirable to surround the enemy’s zone of approach, or the position
one wishes to attack, from the very outset with a dense, continuous
line of rifles, and to overcome the resistance of the enemy in the
earliest phases of the combat by means of an overwhelming volume of
fire from as many rifles as possible. The impediments that stand in
the way of carrying out this idea lie in the terrain, the ignorance of
the enemy’s position, and in human nature. The defender can be driven
from his position only by an attack; the impulse for an advance must be
given by fresh troops; and the success gained by the firing line must
be clinched by a retained assaulting force. The necessity of having
a formed body of troops available, until the fight is in full swing,
to meet unforeseen contingencies, further requires that a reserve
be provided. Organizations should not be broken up any more than is
absolutely necessary. The number of troops which the commander will
retain for the time being, will depend upon the amount of information
he has in regard to the situation. During an attack the reserve is
frequently not designated until a preparatory position is taken up. In
attack about ¹⁄₄-¹⁄₃, and in defense ¹⁄₆-¹⁄₂ of the whole force is put
in the reserve, depending upon whether the ensuing action is to be a
purely defensive one or the decision is sought.
The reserve enables the commander to “shift the center of gravity of
the fight to the point desired by him, to reinforce his line where he
considers proper, to equalize fluctuations of the combat, and, finally,
to bring about the decision.” (Par. 294 German I. D. R.). As the combat
progresses, the commander must decide whether the situation is such
as to compel him to employ the reserves to cover his retreat,[423] or
whether it is proper for him to put in his last troops for the purpose
of gaining the victory. If the reserve has been put in and the attack
fails (or, as at Wörth, the defender succumbs after putting in all the
reserves) defeat is certain; but it would be a mistake not to employ
the reserve, to keep it in readiness to cover a possible retreat, if
its intervention can yet bring about a favorable termination of the
combat.
[423] See deliberations of General v. d. Tann at Coulmiers. HELVIG,
_Das erste bayerische Armeekorps_, p. 203.
The employment of the reserves by the Russians at =Plevna=, on
September 11th, 1877: The general reserve consisted of nine
battalions and was too weak to make an impression at one point;
fifteen battalions were detailed to cover the lines of communication
and the artillery (which was not at all in danger). Forty battalions
that did not enter the fight were scattered all over the battlefield,
no one being able to account for their presence.[424] When Skobeleff
had effected a lodgment in the Turkish position, every available
man should have been sent to this point. Although there were 9
battalions, 30 guns, and 4 troops (_Eskadrons_) available, only
the Schuja Regiment (1300 men), which had suffered heavy losses in
previous actions, was despatched to the point in question, and that
more for the purpose of covering the retreat than to make the most of
the success that had been gained.
[424] In the Franco-German war, the same thing happened on the
German side. _Der 18. August_, p. 221.
In contrast to the Japanese commanders, who promptly launched all
their troops, the Russian commanders were inclined to despatch
numerous detachments, to organize provisional units, while completely
ignoring existing organizations (this had, indeed, also the
advantage that a suitable leader could be found for carrying a
special mission into execution), and to form strong reserves by
details from any and all imaginable units. These reserves were
frequently not used at all.[425]
[425] On July 31st, 1904, when, in pursuance of orders from General
Headquarters, a regiment and a battery was to be despatched to
Mistshenko’s Cavalry Division, 15 km. away, a provisional regiment
of two battalions was formed, without apparent reason, for the
purpose from the 139th and 140th Infantry Regiments. In regard to the
inclination of the Russians to form detachments, see LÖFFLER, I, pp.
11, 27, 53 and 54.
On March 5th, 1905, the commanding general of the Xth Army Corps
(Zerpitzki) had available one brigade of his 31st Division, one
regiment of his 9th Division, one regiment of the VIIIth Corps, three
Rifle regiments of the mixed Rifle Corps, the 5th Rifle Brigade, and
one regiment of the Vth Siberian Army Corps.[426]
[426] See V. TETTAU, _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der
Mandschurei_, II, p. 483.
On October 15th, in the battle on the =Shaho=, the general reserve
of the army consisted of 32 battalions belonging to five different
divisions and five different army corps. In his order for the battle,
Kuropatkin laid particular stress on the necessity of forming
reserves (Army Orders dated August 15th, 1904): “Keeping back more
than half of the force in reserve is the best guarantee for success.”
On December 27th, 1904, he made a similar statement.
The reserves are created to be used; every available man must
participate in the decisive stage of the combat. If the enemy yields
before the reserve is launched, so much the better; if he does not give
way, all the troops that are at hand must be put in. The main thing is
to gain the victory; scruples may be indulged in afterwards. A defeated
commander who leaves the battlefield with troops that are still
partially intact, has not made the most of the means at his disposal
for combat, provided the situation was such that the launching of the
reserves could have secured the victory. As shown by Hastenbeck (1757),
by Idstedt (1850), and by Bapaume, at the moment of the crisis there is
no sharp dividing line between victory and defeat, and the reserves may
decide the fate of the day. The decision of Archduke Albrecht, during
the battle of Custozza (1866), to push his last reserves into the fight
was worthy of a great commander.
In contrast with this, =Russia= (1904): “In employing the general
reserve, the commander-in-chief must be even more economical than
the troop leader; he should, when necessary, detail single units to
support this or that section, _but he should in no case use up his
whole reserve before the decision has occurred_.” The failures of
the British in the South African war may likewise be traced in part
to a faulty use of the reserves. Thus, we read in the regulations of
1896: “The reserve should occupy a favorable defensive position in
order to check the enemy in case of defeat; if the attack succeeds,
the reserve should move up into the position and take charge of the
pursuit.”
“Troops that give up a fight are like the swimmer who, after having
made the most inconceivable exertions to swim across a broad, deep
river, shrinks from the last spurt and drowns, although he need only
stretch out his arm to reach the opposite shore.” (DRAGOMIROV).
In employing the reserve, it should be remembered that the whole
available force must be launched at the decisive moment at the decisive
point, and that the commander ought not to detach portions of the force
intended for the decisive blow for tasks of secondary importance.
The launching of L’Estocq’s Corps at =Preussisch-Eylau=, is still a
model worthy of imitation.[427]
[427] LETTOW-VORBECK, _Feldzug von 1806 und 1807_, IV, p. 107.
In the battle of =Vionville=, three battalions and four batteries
were detached from the 20th Infantry Division, which had arrived
during the afternoon, and sent to the right flank to take part in
the action of the 5th Infantry Division, as infantry support seemed
necessary on the right flank. When the head of the division reached
Tronville, the question was discussed, as to whether it was desirable
first to concentrate the division for action, or to throw the leading
battalions into the Tronville forest, where portions of Lehman’s
Brigade were still holding their ground. As an advance of the French
out of the woods would have endangered the left flank of the Prussian
artillery line, three battalions were at once thrown into the forest,
while the six remaining battalions were kept in reserve for the time
being. Subsequently, three more battalions were sent forward to
reinforce the infantry engaged in the forest
“What a decisive blow the 20th Division could have struck, if it had
been employed in one body!” (V. LIEBERT).[428]
[428] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 595. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 18, p. 580.--V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II,
p. 146.--Essay by V. LIEBERT published in Supplement of the
_Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1895. From the description contained in
the 4th Supplement of the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1895, p. 177. It
appears, at any rate, that the support given by the 39th Half-Brigade
was not absolutely necessary. On the right flank as well, a united
employment of the force for the attack of Hill 970 ought to have
been possible; as it was, regiments were cut up in making isolated
assaults, which had no effect whatever on the outcome of the general
action. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8/9, p. 128, et seq.
The decision is usually brought about by pressure on a flank, but it
might become necessary to accomplish this result by launching large
masses against some point of the hostile front.[429]
[429] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteriemassen im Angriff_.
Colonel CSICSERICS VON BACSANY of the Austrian Army, in a brilliant
study entitled _Die Schlacht_ (Vienna, 1908), argues that with the
increased combat frontage of armies, local successes have no longer
the same Influence on the outcome of the battle as of old. Compare,
for example, the envelopment of the Russian left flank at Liao Yang,
and the penetration of the line at Yuhuntun (Mukden), with the effect
produced by the capture of Chlum and St. Privat on the outcome of the
battles of Königgrätz and Gravelotte, respectively.