conduct of the assault. If the physical and moral power of the enemy is
so broken by the preceding fire fight that he commences to evacuate his
position, it is quite immaterial what sort of an assault is made; the
men simply fire and rush quickly after the retiring enemy. In this case
the assault is nothing but a postlude of the fire fight.
A brave and well disciplined opponent who is energetically led, will
not allow himself to be forced to evacuate his position by fire alone;
to compel him to evacuate his position will at the very least require
that an assault be threatened.
Before the Boer war, the British held the view that the effect of the
fire fight alone was so great that the assault would strike nothing
but an evacuated or, at most, a feebly defended position. The assault
was to commence after the enemy had ceased firing and had sought
protection in his trenches. The following statement is made by one who
fought on the Boer side:
“The artillery supported the advance until the latter had arrived
within 300 or 400 m. of the enemy; then it ceased firing. After a
brief period of preparation by fire, the British infantry began the
assault simultaneously in one long line. This assault, made without
fire support, was repulsed without trouble by the Boer fire. On
several occasions, short lines of our opponent had begun to advance,
but these were in every instance forced to throw themselves down
after a few moments had elapsed. Thereupon the whole British line,
in my estimation at least 300-400 men strong, began to advance. One
could clearly hear the British leaders call to their men to cease
firing, could clearly hear the command ‘fix bayonet’, and the cheer
‘God save the Queen’! run along the British line. Then the whole
hostile line rose. As they rushed toward us, they looked to me like a
grayish yellow swarm, the men being almost shoulder to shoulder and
the line being in places three to four men deep, just as frequently
happens in charges made during our own peace maneuvers. At the same
moment, we began firing. Our fire was at first somewhat wild, but
was soon better controlled by our more experienced fighters calling,
‘Steady boys, steady, then none of them will reach us’. More and
more men fell in the British line, and, when it had arrived within
100 or 80 paces of our position, its energy had spent itself. A
part of the men threw themselves down behind boulders and fired,
while the majority rushed back to the shelter of some bushes; but
even there it was for the most part impossible to hold them. An
assaulting enemy who does not fire, is not dangerous, even if he is
numerically superior. In this case, the defender can fire a number
of times, and the closer the assailant is to the defender’s position
the more quickly and certainly will his force dwindle away. No one
will, however, be able to induce the same men to advance again under
hostile fire over an open field, that is, to expose themselves
without shelter to the hostile fire.”[401]
[401] Supplement 8 to the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1901.
The same lesson was learned long ago at =Gorni Dubniac= and at
=Plevna=.
It is obvious that fire support is essential to the success of such an
assault. This should be furnished in the first place by the artillery.
In furnishing this support, artillery can employ time fire only until
the infantry arrives within 300 m. of the enemy, while percussion fire
may be continued until the infantry arrives within 150 m. of the enemy.
During the attack on Pieters Hill (1900), Colonel Kitchener is said
to have told his artillerymen that he would not censure them if two
or three of their shrapnel burst in the ranks of his infantry. The
following statement appears in a British memorial on the lessons of
the war in the Far East: “The moral effect produced by artillery fire,
which forced the defenders to take to cover and did not even permit
them to raise their heads above the parapet, was so highly esteemed
by the Japanese infantry that it requested the batteries to continue
firing, without regard to the losses thereby inflicted in its own
ranks, until it had taken the position or unfurled small national flags
as an indication that fire support was no longer necessary. According
to the opinion of the Japanese themselves, the losses inflicted in
their infantry by their own guns were insignificant in comparison to
the losses which the defender could inflict by delivering his fire
undisturbed at a range of a few hundred meters, when not kept down by
the attacking artillery.” According to the Austrian regulations, one
unit is to remain halted for the purpose of directing its fire upon the
point of attack or upon any reserves that might appear. This provision
involves a grave danger, in that it may induce the leader to retain
a considerable number of troops in rallying positions, instead of
launching his whole force in the assault.
When fire support is deemed necessary in an attack, the artillery will
perhaps be best able to furnish it until the infantry has reached
a certain point. Then a moment will arrive, however, when the guns
will have to cease firing, and when even the infantry units which
have been left behind to support the attack, will no longer be able
to direct their fire upon the enemy on account of the wide frontage
of the assaulting force. The defender’s troops would have to be poor
indeed, if they would not at this moment, when the assailant’s fire has
practically ceased, raise their heads above the parapet for the purpose
of emptying their magazines once more at the assailant, even though the
fire be unaimed.
If the assault is to succeed, it is essential however, that, while the
attacker covers the last 100-150 m., the defender be compelled to keep
under cover. _This can only be accomplished by employing fire while in
motion._
This fire is practicable because the defender, who has been overwhelmed
in the fire fight, has sought shelter in his works; it is advantageous,
as it is only to compel the enemy to keep under cover. It would
unquestionably be a mistake, and not justifiable in any case, to employ
fire while in motion, when these conditions are not fulfilled, when the
enemy is not completely subdued and is perhaps waiting under cover,
ready to meet the assailant’s assault. Supporting the infantry assault
with fire has, moreover, the additional advantage of preventing the
defender from bringing up his reserves.
The following is taken from a private letter of Sir Ian Hamilton,
perhaps the foremost British infantry tactician, who had the good
fortune, at Elandslaagte and Doornkop, of leading his command close
up to the enemy: “It is my opinion that no matter what regulations
are promulgated in time of peace, the men will fire during the
assault. You may rest assured that nothing will prevent their doing
this. One would do well, therefore, to reckon with this factor from
the very start. The greatest danger is always that the men will throw
themselves down instead of continuing the advance. And, if the men
have once thrown themselves down during the assault, they will rise
only for the purpose of retreating.”[402]
[402] In _Ausbildung der Infanterie für den Angriff_, p. 63,
Colonel VON DER GOLTZ makes the following statement in regard to an
experiment: “As the line gradually drew closer to the defender’s
position, the desire of the individual men to get into the hostile
position as quickly as possible, became more and more apparent; the
prone position for firing was abandoned for the kneeling position,
finally for the standing position, and, quite naturally, fire while
in motion resulted in the end. Fire while in motion is authorized
by the regulations and is, in this case, certainly permissible. Its
employment in this case may be traced to the very proper desire of
not allowing the enemy, who has been held down this long, to raise
himself above his parapet. This fire while in motion should not be
confused with the fire while in motion formerly employed by long
skirmish lines at long ranges, and condemned at that time. The
latter had for its object not the keeping down of an enemy already
overwhelmed, but, on the contrary, was intended to overpower an
unshaken opponent.”
=Russia.= The attacking force approaches the enemy so close (35 m.)
that the troops are enabled to throw themselves upon him. The point
at which the hostile position is to be penetrated is designated and
the men form in rear of their platoon leader. The reserves move at a
run or by crawling close up to the firing line. If the assault is
begun at a greater distance than 35 m. from the hostile position,
fire while in motion is employed, “in order that the enemy may not
regain his senses and may be prevented from rising above his parapet.”
During an unexpected encounter at night, on unfavorable terrain
(Swiep-Wald at Königgrätz), as well as during obstinate fights for the
possession of fortifications (the Grivica Work at Plevna, Scheinovo),
bayonet combats are unavoidable, provided both forces are equally
determined. During the fight for the possession of Servigny, on the
evening of August 31st, 1870, serious hand to hand fighting occurred
in the narrow village streets.[403] The Russo-Japanese war also proved
beyond the shadow of a doubt that determined troops will maintain their
positions until they are thrown out of them by cold steel.[404]
[403] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 51. See p. 134 supra. Fieldmarshal
MOLTKE makes the following observations in regard to the bayonet
fights of the campaign of 1859: “General Niel credits his victory at
Solferino to the use of the bayonet. The question as to how often the
advance to hand to hand conflict is carried out, may be left open. As
a rule, it is employed only when it may be presumed that the enemy
will not await the onslaught.” In his memoranda of 1865, in regard
to the influence of improved fire arms on tactics, he states: “If
the bayonet fights, so often mentioned in French accounts of the
campaign of 1859, were stripped of their dramatic splendor, and if
the simple prosaic truth could be ascertained, by far the greater
number of these reports would be corrected in so far as to state that
the opponent, shaken by more or less heavy losses, avoided the actual
collision.”
[404] Examples: The attack on Tempel Hill on October 11th, In
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, VON LÜTTWITZ.--The capture of
works No. 17 and No. 18 by the 2nd Division, on March 1st, 1905
(Mukden).--Description by an eyewitness of a bayonet fight. Sir IAN
HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, p. 252.--A bayonet fight
occurred in the day time, in the open, when the 11th Rifle Regiment
broke through the line at Hamatan during the battle on the Yalu,
(see _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 39-40, p. 131), and in
Bernaul’s Regiment, during the engagement at Datshishiao, on July
24th, 1904.
The defender will never retire simultaneously all along the line;
frequently isolated groups and then entire units will leave his
line when the superiority of the attacker’s fire becomes effective.
Officers, non-commissioned officers and capable privates will endeavor
to keep the weak-kneed from running away.[405]
[405] At Villepion, Captain von Hoffmann made a wavering section
hold its position by springing toward them, revolver in hand, and
yelling: “I’ll shoot the first man who gets up! my revolver will
hit too, whether Chassepot bullets will hit you is a question.”
_Geschichte des Bayerischen Leibregiments_.
If the assault is not made at this moment, the crisis may pass, but
a determined rush by the attacker will, as a rule, bring about the
decision. The threat of a bayonet attack usually decides those who have
remained in the position, to make no further resistance. The attacker
must make use of the moral factors in an assault, hence the importance
of running, cheering, and accompanying the advance of all bodies in
close order by the beating of drums and the sounding of trumpets.[406]
[406] One must read KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, pp.
80, 116, 123 and 156, in order to appreciate what an electrifying
influence the beating of drums may have even on retreating lines.
“The French were unable to withstand an energetic attack, when
undertaken in anything like sufficient strength and accompanied by
cheers and beating drums.” BOGUSLAWSKI.
“Suddenly some soldier shouted: ‘Columns! Columns!’ Captain von
Wobeser rose to see what was going on, but at the same moment his men
rushed back and made straight for the Bois.”--“The mere launching of
the attack from the direction of =Point du Jour= sufficed to induce
the well concealed force of about 400 men, which held the gravel
pits, likewise to beat a retreat that very much resembled a rout.”
HÖNIG.
In time of peace there should be instilled in the soldier the
conviction that, with the bayonet, he is a match for any opponent;
that, in bayonet fighting, no other infantry is the equal of his own.
The soldier should not be taught to shrink from the bayonet attack, but
to seek it. If the infantry is deprived of the _arme blanche_, if the
impossibility of bayonet fighting is preached, and the soldier is never
given an opportunity in time of peace of defending himself, man to man,
with his weapon in bayonet fencing, an infantry will be developed,
which is unsuitable for attack and which, moreover, lacks a most
essential quality, viz., the moral power to reach the enemy’s position.
“The rarity of bayonet fights does not prove the uselessness of the
bayonet, but shows that opponents will rarely be found who are equally
capable of making use of it. Indeed, the bayonet cannot be abolished
for the reason, if for no other, that it is the sole and exclusive
embodiment of that will power which alone, both in war and in every-day
life, attains its object, whereas reason only tends to facilitate the
attainment of the object.
“Let us assume that there exists an army which bases success in battle
on fire action, and takes for granted that the enemy will not be
able to get near enough to make a bayonet attack. If this army were
to encounter another army which, without undervaluing the effect of
fire, remembers the bayonet at the proper time, it would be filled
with the most dreadful dismay when the enemy actually assails it with
the bayonet. With modern rifles, bullets are unquestionably a good
substitute for the bayonet at close quarters, but this is true only
of troops who do not fear annihilation, _i.e._, troops trained to use
the bayonet and capable of closing with the enemy after firing. If
this is not the case, such firing at close quarters is a pure waste
of ammunition, since men who are afraid to close with the enemy, if
necessary at such a moment, will usually fire into the air.
“If the soldier has been taught, however, to annihilate the enemy
from a distance and from behind cover, he will naturally prefer this
mode of inflicting losses, since he runs very little risk of getting
hurt, and will, moreover, acquire an aversion for exposing himself to
danger, _i.e._, he will shrink from bayonet work. Hence, if we attach
too much importance to marksmanship, we produce a more or less trained
soldier, who may possibly be a very good shot at long ranges, but who
is not especially inclined to take his chances in a bayonet fight.
Incidentally, target practice develops the mentality of the man, but
does not improve his morale.” DRAGOMIROV.
Of every 100 wounds, the following percentages were produced by cutting
weapons:
Campaign of 1859 1.67%
Campaign of 1864 4.0 %
Campaign of 1866 (Prussians) 5.4 %
St. Privat (Germans) 1.0 %
Russo-Turkish war 0.9 %
In time of peace the assaulting distance is to be about 150 m. During
the Franco-German war, the assault against Elsaszhausen (battle of
Wörth) was launched at about 300 m.[407] and that against St. Hubert
at 100-200 m. from the enemy.[408] The 107th Infantry, after charging
over a distance of more than 500 paces, captured a hedge which was held
by the French north of St. Privat, and, in the assault against the
northern outskirts of the village, a distance of 300 paces had to be
covered.[409] In the attack on Le Bourget, on October 30th, 1870, the
center column halted when 600 m. from the village; “then began a wild,
headlong assault against its outskirts.”[410] The Japanese frequently
had occasion to cross similar stretches at a run, but there were also
instances where their assaulting troops had only to cover a few meters
(1st Division at Kinchau, 20 m.).
[407] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 267.
[408] HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 127.
[409] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 804.
[410] KUNZ, _Le Bourget_, p. 21.
=If the attacker succeeds in carrying the position=, he will be
at a disadvantage for the moment; his troops will be in confusion
and exhausted, and a large number of officers will be gone. If the
defender, reinforced by fresh reserves, takes advantage of this moment,
he may be able to turn the tide of the battle. The inclination of
the men to pursue the enemy with the bayonet, instead of halting and
making the most of the fire power of their rifles, is noticeable in
all battles. The attacker will have to take steps to restrain his
victorious infantry, and, as soon as opportunity offers, to pursue
the enemy with fire. Under cover of this fire fresh troops or quickly
assembled detachments should advance on the flanks in pursuit of the
enemy. There is a wide difference between a wild, headlong rush after
the enemy and a systematic pursuit. Infantry that rushes headlong to
the front after penetrating a position must be brought back at any
cost, unless it can enter a second position simultaneously with the
enemy.[411]
[411] The conduct of the 47th Infantry Brigade after the capture
of Ste. Marie aux Chênes. _Der 18. August_, p. 184. The second line
of the position at Düppel was carried by the pursuing victors at the
first rush. _Gen. St. W._, 1864, II, p. 539.
In addition to pursuing the enemy with fire, the attacker should
re-form his troops without regard to their original arrangement (if
the enemy gives him time enough, the original organizations should
be re-formed), occupy the position, replenish ammunition, and remove
the prisoners. It is a mistake to mass more rifles in the captured
position than can be employed to advantage, as the enemy will in all
probability direct a heavy fire upon it. As soon as the fight has been
decided, the echelons in rear should be halted, so that they can be
employed as occasion demands. The leaders of these units will often
have to act independently in such a case. (Par. 350 German I. D. R.).
Preparations should be made to the end that hostile counter-attacks
may be at once repulsed. These rules are particularly important when
the position that has been carried is not the main position but only
an advanced post.[412] These measures must be taken independently
by all leaders who participated in the assault, without waiting for
orders from superior authority. The pursuit should be begun as soon as
possible with formed bodies of troops (if practicable, while the enemy
is being pursued by fire), in order to interfere with his re-forming,
to prevent his taking up route column, and to overrun his rallying
positions. The battle of Beaumont consisted of a whole series of such
pursuing actions. The arrival of night should by no means be used as an
excuse for discontinuing the pursuit, for night above all else is the
mightiest ally of a bold victor.[413]
[412] See _Taktik_, V, p. 359, et seq. See also the measures taken
after the capture of St. Privat. _Der 18. August_, p. 533. The
situation in Fröschweiler; KUNZ. _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_,
17. pp. 109 and 153. As in peace, the signals, ‘the whole force
assemble,’ and ‘the whole force halt,’ was sounded everywhere. How
little the infantry was inclined to pursue is shown by the conduct
of the 94th and the 32nd Infantry Regiments. _Ibid._, pp. 87-90. The
10th Company of the 32nd Infantry marched fully two miles to the rear
to a bivouac which they had left in the morning.
[413] See _Taktik_, V. p. 436.
=If the attack fails=, it will be the duty of the commander to arrest
the flight of the skirmishers who are rushing to the rear under hostile
fire. It will be impossible, however, to halt these men while they
are exposed to the most effective fire of the enemy. Only when the
nearest cover is reached can there be any question of halting. (Par.
327 German I. D. R.). When cover is not available near at hand, the
exhaustion of the troops will soon stop the flight, or the leaders
may be able to face them again to the front, as soon as the hostile
fire abates. However, the retreating troops will have placed quite a
distance between themselves and the enemy before this can be done, and
the latter, unmolested by fire from the attacker, will be able to take
full advantage of the technical qualities of his rifle, unless the
attacker’s artillery or cavalry prevent his doing so. No matter where
the retreating troops come to a halt and face to the front, there they
must stay, and, if the hostile fire permits, intrench.
The perseverance of the Prussian Guard 600-800 m. in front of
=St. Privat=,[414] and of the British Brigade of Highlanders at
=Magersfontain=, immediately in front of the Boer position, on
December 11th, 1899, is worthy of imitation.
[414] The distance at which the first attack came to a standstill
is variously given as 300 (3rd Guard Regiment and IInd Battalion of
the 1st Guard Regiment) and 800-900 paces (2nd Guard Regiment). See
_History of the 3rd Guard Regiment_, pp. 276, 279 and 280; that of
the _1st Guard Regiment_, p. 165; that of the _2nd Guard Regiment_,
p. 232. “Headed by a few of the officers who still remained,
the depleted lines clung to the slope; with iron endurance and
self-sacrifice they maintained the dearly bought positions.” _Gen.
St. W._, II, p. 872.
The assault on =Gorni Dubniac= came to a standstill at very short
range, and a part of the skirmishers of the Moscow and Pavlov
Regiments maintained their positions 50 m., the remaining Russian
skirmishers 320 m., from the trench.[415]
[415] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde_, p. 126.
11. THE USE OF THE SPADE IN ATTACK.
(Pars. 157, 313, 339, 380 and 381 German I. D. R.).
In every attack there are situations in which it may be advantageous to
use intrenching tools--
1. In fortifying rallying positions.
The Japanese, whose mode of waging war was very cautious, fortified the
initial positions from which their attacks were made, in order that
they might have rallying positions in case of defeat.[416]
[416] On July 19th, 1904, the 12th Infantry Division (Ist Army)
had pushed back Russian troops at Shaotao and at once fortified a
position 2700 m. from the new Russian position at Yushuling. From
this position the 12th Division advanced, on July 31st, as a Russian
attack had not taken place. The extended fortifications facing the
Russian Shaho position were made with the same end in view. The war
in the Far East was one of positions, since neither army possessed
sufficient freedom of action. See p. 341, et seq., supra.
2. In intrenching after making an advance under cover of darkness to
within effective range of the enemy for the purpose of opening fire at
daybreak. In this case, the advancing force is, as a rule, instructed
to advance until it comes under hostile fire and then to intrench.[417]
[417] During the attack on Paardeberg, on February 27th, 1900, the
Canadians were ordered to advance before daybreak from their trenches
located 500 m. from the Boer position, and to throw themselves down
and to intrench as soon as they were fired upon. This was done
when the force was 100 m. from the enemy. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 60.