to such heavy losses in open country, even at long ranges, that their
advance will soon hesitate. Moreover, the defender will only fire
on targets whose size and density promise a great number of hits.
Therefore, the assailant should endeavor to lead his infantry forward
in loose, disconnected skirmish lines, which are difficult for the
enemy to hit. As a rule, the assailant should not open fire until
after he has been reinforced and has sufficient fire power available.
(Par. 334 German I. D. R.). The situation in which these thin firing
lines are placed is by no means a favorable one, as the defender will
concentrate his fire on the points where the assailant seems to be
filling up his line “for the purpose of overwhelming the defender
permanently by a superiority of fire.” (Par. 413 German I. D. R.). The
skirmishers will then quite naturally open fire for the purpose of
interfering with the cool delivery of the defender’s fire.
Such a piecemeal, almost independent advance, during which the effect
of the accustomed word of command is considerably reduced and control
and supervision of the individual skirmisher is impossible, presupposes
that the troops are well-drilled, individually trained, and, above all,
intelligent. Attention must also be called to the fact that the firing
line can offer but a weak resistance to an enemy advancing unexpectedly
in force. But, in spite of these drawbacks, this mode of advance
has its advantages for crossing a plain devoid of cover. It permits
favorable fire positions to be reached with greater safety, especially
if these positions can be picked out with the aid of field glasses,
than would be the case if dense skirmish lines were led forward
simultaneously.
The advance of the infantry under hostile fire, over open ground, may
accordingly be conducted--
1. At a walk, by long rushes made by strong units (by platoons at
least), supported by powerful artillery fire or by the fire of a
machine gun battery or a detachment of skirmishers posted in a
favorable position;
2. By shorter rushes made by smaller units (“proper only when
conditions demand it”);
3. By crawling, or, in exceptional cases (for example in passing
through fields of standing grain), by employing
4. Fire while in motion.
The fire fight at long ranges and near the extreme limit of mid ranges
is only a means for the purpose of reaching the decisive battle ranges,
and of interfering with the undisturbed delivery of the enemy’s fire.
Fire must be opened at as late a moment as possible. Our firing line
should in any case be strong enough, upon entering the zone of mid
ranges, to reply effectively to the enemy’s fire. Experience has shown
that an assailant who opens fire at “long” ranges rarely reaches short
ranges. (See p. 149 supra).
The distances at which the echelons in rear follow the firing line
should be less (as laid down in the Italian and Russian regulations)
than the distance which separates the firing line of the attacker from
that of the defender. The distances may be increased without danger at
this stage of the combat, as the decision is not imminent, but on the
flanks the supports will have to be brought up closer in order that an
unexpected flank attack may be effectively opposed. All parts of the
attacking force move--as long as possible at a walk--straight to the
front. Subordinate leaders, taking advantage of all available cover,
should endeavor to lead the supports skillfully after the firing line.
This requires that the ground to be crossed be reconnoitered. As a
rule, a movement by the flank upon leaving cover is costlier than an
advance by squads or sections over open ground. Long lines make it
easier for the hostile artillery to adjust and observe its fire, while,
when a greater number of targets of smaller frontage is exposed, this
is made more difficult. For this reason, supports are not led forward
as entire units, but, on the contrary, they are broken up, and, under
certain circumstances, even disintegrated into smaller units. The
units following in rear remain as long as possible in close order
formations, preferably in route columns. “Man is by nature exceedingly
timid. Soldiers, even those drawn from the educated classes, who were
fully aware of the supreme importance of gaining the victory, broke
down on coming under fire. In close order the moral encouragement due
to the proximity of superiors and comrades kept up their courage.”
(Hessert).[393] Where cover is lacking, the supports will also have to
be deployed. Large units are broken up into platoons, which deploy and
follow each other at considerable distances.[394]
[393] “We are prone to place the individual on too high a pedestal,
and, in doing so, to ignore the psychological element of combat.”
Major-General Stieler.
[394] The losses sustained during the advance of the Russian
reserves at Plevna (11th September, 1877), and during the attack made
by the Guard on Gorni Dubniac, led to a spontaneous deployment on the
part of the reserves.
As soon as the enemy opens fire, platoon commanders must decide
whether or not it ought to be returned; but the closer one can get to
the enemy without firing a shot, the better. According to the German
F. S. R. (par. 296), a prolonged, uninterrupted forward movement of
skirmish lines in the open, at less than 1000 m. from the enemy, is
possible only when supported by adequate fire. On the other hand, even
skirmishers lying down suffer serious losses when 600 m. from the enemy.
Thus, at mid ranges, begins the actual, protracted fire fight, which,
in the first place, is to make a further advance possible, and which,
subsequently, is to produce a superiority of fire. As taught by
experience, this cannot be accomplished from a single position, if the
enemy is efficient.
A so-called “main firing position”, which was to be located 400-600
m. from the enemy, was frequently used during peace maneuvers for the
purpose of bringing cohesion and harmony into the attack. In making
use of such a position, the principal difficulty of every serious
infantry attack, that of crossing the space lying between the first
firing position and the assaulting position, was not appreciated.
=Austria.= (Par. 589 I. D. R.). “When conditions are very favorable,
it might be possible to choose the firing position in which the
decisive fire fight is to be begun, so close to the enemy that the
decision can be gained from it.”
The fire fight must be taken up by enough troops to make it
impossible for the defender, who holds his position strongly, to gain
a superiority of fire over some parts of the attacking force. The
supports will now move closer to the firing line, in order to fill
every gap in that line and to meet every attempt of the defender to
gain the upper hand. The echelons of the second line which have not as
yet been absorbed by the firing line, move up in a similar manner. If
the hostile fire abates, parts of the firing line should endeavor to
get closer to the enemy; they are followed by the next adjoining units.
At this stage of the action the attacker will have to give up, to some
extent, his distribution in depth.
Superiority of fire is an essential condition to victory. It is
attained by better marksmanship, fire control and fire direction, by
taking advantage of cover, and by concentrating a powerful fire against
the decisive point. When the attacker’s troops are not well trained,
a greater number of rifles and more ammunition will be required to
gain this superiority. Accordingly, the attacker will either make an
envelopment or employ fire of position. The attacker possesses a great
advantage, in that he does not need to gain a superiority of fire
along the whole front, but only at a single point. It suffices for
him to contain weak portions of the hostile front with suitable, well
concealed combat groups capable of quickly developing a powerful fire,
while he masses the bulk of his forces against the decisive point. The
defender, who never knows where the decisive blow is going to fall,
ought not to allow himself to be enticed into occupying portions of his
line more weakly than the rest.
The attainment of the superiority of fire requires time, and, in
addition, coolness and patience on the part of the leaders. All the
ammunition that is expended in gaining this superiority is later
compensated for by fewer losses. The heavy losses sustained by the
Prussian troops on the slopes of Point du Jour, on August 18th, 1870,
may be traced directly to the fact that the leaders did not know how to
wait.
Superiority of fire[395] is absolutely essential to the success of the
attack. Any failure to appreciate this principle will lead to such
heavy losses that even if the assailant were to reach the enemy’s
position, he would be too weak to gain the victory.[396]
[395] For the situation of the British Guard at Modder River
(28th November, 1890), see p. 182 supra. The Guards were closely
hugging the ground at a distance of 800 m. from the enemy. After
29 ammunition carriers had been shot at the very beginning of the
engagement, all attempts to carry orders or ammunition to the firing
line were abandoned. No attempts were made to relieve the pressure by
means of the fire of sharpshooters, by bringing up reinforcements, or
by gaining ground by crawling.
[396] “Battles are won by the superiority of fire.” FREDERICK THE
GREAT in his _Military Testament_, 1768.
During the fluctuating fire fight, which lasts for hours, the attacker
will have succeeded in working forward little by little until he is
close to the enemy’s position. His superiority will now make itself
felt; the fire from the part of the hostile line that is to be
penetrated will begin to abate; and, at first, single groups, then
several, and finally, whole units of the enemy’s line will commence to
crumble away. The attacker should wait until this effect is produced
before he begins the assault; if he does not do this, the attack is
sure to fail.
_Austria._ (Par. 590 I. D. R.). “The close approach of a long firing
line to an enemy who occupies a good position, may well pass as a
proof of the assailant’s superiority. Nevertheless, this does not,
under all circumstances, furnish assurance that a forward movement for
the purpose of penetrating the hostile position will now succeed; a
premature assault may still result in disaster. _As long as the conduct
of the opponent does not show clear indications that his fire power is
crippled, nothing remains for the attacker but to continue the fight
for the superiority of fire._”
Even in this, mistakes are not precluded. It is far from easy to
recognize when the defender of a position has been sufficiently subdued
by fire to make an assault feasible, and when the proper moment has
arrived for launching the reserves. It is only necessary to recall the
premature advance of the artillery and cavalry over the ravine of the
Mance brook, on August 18th, 1870.
The cessation of the defender’s fire, in itself, is not a sure
sign that his firing line is shaken, as the attacker is unable to
distinguish between a fire pause ordered by the commander on the
defensive and the forced discontinuance of the fight. Sure indications
are not available until men actually leave the defender’s fighting line
here and there, and attempts of the leaders to hold the wavering ones
are clearly apparent.
At this moment, a leader who has resolved to assault, should order
bayonets fixed.
* * * * *
The temporary interruption of the fire occasioned by fixing bayonets is
of no importance, as the superiority of fire has already been gained.
If bayonets are prematurely ordered to be fixed, the accuracy of the
fire will soon be impaired, as the firing of rifles, weighted down
by the attached bayonets, increases the fatigue of the men. When the
troops are excited, the downward deflection of the bullets caused by
fixing the bayonet can, however, only produce a good effect. It is
best to fix bayonets at the signal “Fix bayonet”. In the excitement
prevailing at the moment, it will be impossible to execute the order
with any uniformity, but it is a good plan, in time of peace, to
require one man of each file to fire while the other one fixes his
bayonet. The approaching reserves fix bayonets while on the march.
10. THE ASSAULT.
“The assault does not, strictly speaking, belong to the domain of
tactics. Rules, showing in what formations and under what conditions
the assault should be made in war, cannot be formulated. At any rate,
fire tactics are not only an essential factor but also the crowning
act of combat; the assault is nothing but the postlude. All modern
combats show that the morale of the men suffers most, and that, in
consequence thereof, troops deteriorate quickly when they are exposed
to the annihilating effect of fire. This lesson was thoroughly learned
by the Austrians in 1866, and by the Russians in front of Plevna. Of
what avail were ‘self-sacrifice’, the ‘unconquerable determination to
gain the victory’, the ‘desire for hand to hand conflict’, and all
the other terms that are employed to prove that the moral factors are
the decisive ones in war? That they are the decisive factors needs
no proof whatever; it follows, as a matter of course, from uniform
training, uniform leadership, and uniform arms. But tactics fit for
use in war, are to furnish, above all else, ways and means, showing
how and by what methods the fighting energy of troops may be preserved
most effectively, and thus contribute directly toward preventing the
premature deterioration of the morale of the troops.”[397]
[397] Colonel KEIM in _von Löbells Jahresberichte_, 1899, II, p.
561.
“The defeat of the opponent is consummated by the assault with fixed
bayonets.” (Par. 324 German I. D. R.). A premature advance to the
assault, with all the peculiar features attending it, produces an
aversion against the attack, an undue extension of battle lines, and
makes it impossible for reinforcements to come up, except under cover
of darkness.
The decision for making the assault emanates either from the
subordinate leaders in the firing line or from the commander of the
whole force. The latter may give the impulse for the assault by
launching the reserve. This is undoubtedly the safer procedure. “When
the decision to assault emanates from the commanders in rear, notice
thereof is given by sounding the signal ‘fix bayonet’, which must be
repeated by all the units that are to take part in the assault. At this
signal the skirmishers increase their fire to the utmost. The parts of
the firing line which are still in rear, move forward, as quickly as
possible, to a position close to the enemy. All reinforcements in rear
hasten straight to the front. As soon as the leading line is to form
for the assault, all the trumpeters sound the signal ‘forward, double
time’, all the drummers beat their drums, and all parts of the force
throw themselves with the greatest determination upon the enemy. It
should be a point of honor with skirmishers not to allow the supports
to overtake them earlier than the moment of penetrating the enemy’s
position. When immediately in front of the enemy, the men should charge
bayonet and, with a cheer, penetrate the position.” (Pars. 346-348
German I. D. R.).
It is very difficult for a superior commander to perceive when the
proper moment for making the assault has arrived, as he is compelled
to remain so far in rear of the fighting line, especially where large
forces are concerned, that he can only follow the general course of
the attack. The first indication which he receives as to whether the
enemy’s fire power has been broken all along the line, is the advance
of his own firing line. He will still more rarely be able to see in
time when the resistance of the enemy abates at some one point, and
it will be quite impossible for him to issue orders with sufficient
promptness to turn such an advantage quickly to good account.[398]
[398] “The attack fed from the rear, which may be likened to the
closing of a telescope, is one of the most peculiar results of
constructive theory, which seeks, by this means, to increase the
energy of the first line, but only succeeds in massing too many men
in front of the enemy, a better condition than which the enemy could
not desire.” VON MALACHOWSKI, _Scharfe Taktik und Revue-Taktik_, p.
230. Incorrect estimate of the situation by the commander of the
Ist Army on August 18th, 1870. F. HÖNIG, _Vierundzwanzig Stunden
Moltkescher Strategie_, p. 145. _Der 18. August_, p. 271.
The firing line will, therefore, frequently have to take the initiative
in bringing about the assault. It is absolutely necessary, especially
if the enemy evacuates the position, that the firing line, quickly
taking advantage of this moment, pass over to the bayonet attack. If
the firing line were to wait until the reserves are up, valuable time
would be lost, under certain circumstances; the enemy might recover
from his temporary bewilderment and re-form, or might even receive
reinforcements. In addition, hesitation on the part of the attacker
would enable the enemy to gain time, evacuate the position unmolested,
retire in good order, and perhaps take up a new position, or at least
evade quickly the pursuing fire of the assailant. The firing line
would be the first, in such a case, to perceive when and where the
resistance of the enemy abates; it should therefore make the most of
this knowledge and throw itself upon the part of the defender’s force
that is in the act of withdrawing.
When the impulse for the assault emanates from the firing line, there
is danger that instead of a general attack only a local one will
result. It is impossible to conceive that the whole firing line will
simultaneously consider that the moment for the assault has arrived;
in general, only a part of that line at a time will come to this
conclusion. Such local attacks are hazardous, however, and have some
chance of succeeding only in covered terrain. A local assault made
by a single battalion or company will usually attract the fire of a
considerable portion of the hostile line and quite naturally dash
itself to pieces against it. Even assuming that a gallantly charging
unit succeeds in unexpectedly penetrating the hostile line at some one
point, the defender will at once attack it in vastly superior force
and compel it to retire with heavy loss. Furthermore, the failure is
usually not confined to the one unit. The troops on the right and left
of it, although they are perhaps farther from the enemy, and have not
yet shaken him sufficiently by their fire, nevertheless join in the
assault, as soon as they see the first unit rush forward. As a rule,
when the decision to assault emanates from the firing line, a series
of unsuccessful assaults will result. These will, however, bring good
troops closer and closer to the enemy, until the great moment of
definitely gained superiority finally arrives.
The General Staff account of the Franco-German war[399] very aptly
describes the decisive moment for the assault: “The tension of
the tactical situation was increased to the highest pitch by the
prolonged fight at close range; the time was now ripe for the
decision and the German corps commanders issued orders for the
assault. Before this order reached the leading line, however, the
German general officers on the spot had decided, at about 7:30 P.
M., to undertake the assault on their own responsibility, as they
considered the attack sufficiently prepared. On the signal given by
them, and in many instances of their own accord, the Prussian and
Saxon battalions hurled themselves, just as the sun was setting, on
the position which had been so long and so tenaciously defended by
the enemy.” (=St. Privat=). Consult, _Der 18. August_, pp. 525 and
571.
[399] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 800.
“When the XIth Army Corps issued from the =Niederwald= (near
=Wörth=), the infantry encountered such a heavy fire from the
direction of =Elsaszhausen= that the troops had to choose between
either advancing farther or giving up the advantages that had been
gained at such great sacrifices. The former course was indeed open
to objection, as the troops were exhausted, as organizations were in
confusion from the fighting they had just gone through, and as only
three formed and fresh battalions were available.”--“General von Bose
now ordered a general attack. At the signal ‘the whole force will
advance’, the firing lines rushed from the Niederwald and, with loud
cheers, threw themselves upon the enemy.”[400]
[400] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 267.
The assault was thus not a result of the superiority that had been
gained, but an act of desperation in a situation that had become
unbearable. Moreover, the success of the assault was not due to any
numerical superiority of the attacker, but to the lack of initiative
of the defender, and to the fact that he confined himself to purely
defensive action.
It is, therefore, after all, an open question whether the initiative
of parts of the line should govern the conduct of the entire force. In
some instances, it certainly ought not to govern, if disaster is to be
avoided. When a portion of the firing line advances, however, and the
tactical situation in any way permits, neighboring units should at once
conform to the movement. The units in rear, in particular, should, in
this case, promptly hurry forward by the shortest route without regard
to losses, support the firing line, and prevent it being repulsed.
(Par. 345, German I. D. R.).
This brings up the question, as to whether the trumpeters of the
assaulting units should sound the signal “fix bayonet,” in this
assault, and thus bring about a prompt general assault by the entire
line. This might obviously cause the troops to advance prematurely
to the assault, a danger which might be brought about by the junior
platoon commander. No one but the supreme commander, therefore, has
the right to order this signal to be sounded when he wishes a general
assault to be made. This is prescribed in the German Infantry Drill
Regulations (par. 347). If the commander of the firing line decides
to assault, he transmits his decision to the rear by means of signals
(s. s. s.). The supreme commander can still restrain the skirmishers
by the signal h. h. h., or bring about a general assault all along the
line by giving the signal “fix bayonet”. If a unit moves to the assault
contrary to the wishes of the supreme commander, he should possess
enough nerve to look on calmly while it is being defeated. It is much
better for him to allow a single unit to be defeated than to cause the
failure of the general attack by a premature advance.
“Although the assault should be made as nearly simultaneously as
possible, this is not to be understood as meaning that all the units
should penetrate the hostile position at one and the same time. Such
simultaneous action is immaterial, and might, indeed, cause parts of
the line who had a chance of successfully carrying out the assault,
to hesitate because others are still in rear. The power of the attack
would accordingly be impaired. All units that have once started must
continue to advance uninterruptedly.” (Par. 349 German I. D. R.).
It depends upon the situation whether the troops intended for the
holding attack finally participate in the assault itself. If they can
bring an effective fire to bear upon the point of attack from an
oblique direction and thereby ensure the success of the attack, they
should make the most of this advantage. (Par. 340 German I. D. R.).
When the enemy advances to the frontal counter-attack, as laid down in
the Russian and British regulations, the skirmishers throw themselves
down for the purpose of firing. The supports in the act of moving up
continue their march. If the enemy faces about, all the troops press
after him.
The French regulations (par. 270) also consider such a counter-attack:
“If the attacker presses forward too hastily and if he threatens
to carry the defender’s position, fresh troops, which have been
assembled in a place sheltered from view, attack him energetically,
while the troops already engaged increase the intensity of their
fire. This powerful and energetic counter-attack produces confusion
in the enemy’s ranks and compels him to retire, or at least to
discontinue his forward movement until he has had time to recover....
The troops in the counter-attack should move forward without
hesitation and regardless of the cost. When such a forward movement
has to be discontinued, the commander must decide where it shall
cease. The efforts of all should be directed toward one object, that
of tiring and demoralizing the enemy by constant counter-attacks,
until the moment arrives when the commander must order the offensive
to be assumed.”