fight, in order to gain a superiority of fire more quickly, naturally
leads to an extension of the firing line and to an overlapping of the
defender’s line. The advantage of overlapping the enemy’s line lies in
the fact that part of the line attacked is exposed to both frontal and
oblique fire. The effect of this oblique fire is increased by bending
the wing of the attacking line toward the enemy. If the attacking line
succeeds in pushing its firing line so far forward that not only the
hostile wing but also the hostile flank is struck, an envelopment is
brought about with the result that the lines of fire of the assailant
cross each other within the hostile position. If the defender refuses a
wing, portions of his line may be enfiladed. This will cause such heavy
losses that the defender will begin to succumb first at the salient
point of his line. A further advantage is gained by a pressure on the
enemy’s line of retreat.
[Illustration]
Pure frontal attacks offer little prospect of success;[377] they may
perhaps force the enemy back, but they cannot annihilate him.
[377] It is only necessary to invite attention to the first attacks
made by the Prussian Guard against St. Privat, and to the attack made
by the 72nd, 40th and 11th Infantry Regiments against the height
of Maison Blanche south of Rezonville, on August 16th, 1870. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-10, p. 128.
For carrying out the attack itself, it is immaterial whether the
commander launches it against the hostile front or a hostile flank;
individual companies, battalions, and, in large units, regiments,
finally make a frontal attack anyway. The fear of the front of the
enemy should not lead the enveloping force to attempt to execute
another enveloping movement when it encounters a newly formed front.
Surprise is, to a certain extent, essential to the success of a flank
attack.[378] The troops holding the enemy in front [secondary attack]
must, therefore, hold him in such a manner as to keep him in ignorance
about the true point of attack, must so engage his attention that he
will finally place the bulk of his force into the frontal action. If
this does not occur, the opponent will soon distinguish sham from
reality and will not oppose a weak, inactive containing force with
more troops than are absolutely necessary. In this connection, compare
the conduct of the 1st Army at Königgrätz and of the Prussian Vth Army
Corps at Wörth with the vacillating action of the Russian IIIrd and
Ist Armies at Sandepu.[379] So long as the enemy is not firmly held
in front, he will be able to evade an envelopment by withdrawing. The
combats of the Boers in the Orange Free State furnish numerous examples
of this fact. The Austrian regulations have very properly coined the
term “attack on two fronts”, which better indicates the task of both
parts of an attacking force.
[378] The attack of the Guard at Chlum (Königgrätz). V.
LETTOW-VORBECK, II, p. 474. The assault and capture of the hill of
Forbach at Spicheren by six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps. _Gen.
St. W._, I. p. 356. The assault and capture of the Mont de Brune
(Beaumont) by 6¹⁄₂ Prussian companies, which were followed by 4²⁄₃
companies more. The hill mentioned was defended by 6 battalions and 3
batteries; 6 guns were captured. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, pp.
132 and 227.
[379] _Taktik_. V. p. 42.
Whether the decisive blow is directed against the front or a flank,
depends upon the result of the fire. The advantages offered by an
enveloping movement must not lead to holding the enemy once and for
all in front, while the main attack is directed against his flank. A
frontal attack made in conjunction with a threatening demonstration
against the hostile flank frequently offers far greater prospects
of success.[380] If a superiority is to be employed to advantage,
an envelopment must be made; all objections advanced against the
“enveloping craze” are disposed of by this statement.[381] “A condition
precedent to an envelopment is that the enemy be held in front. For
this purpose a determined demonstration is most effective.” (Par. 392
German I. D. R.).
[380] The attack on Flanville, on September 1st, 1870, is an
instructive example. KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 87. _Gen. St. W._, II.
p. 1407.
[381] V. D. GOLTZ, _Das Volk in Waffen_, pp. 328 and 332. BLUME,
_Strategie_, p. 170. MECKEL, _Truppenführung_, p. 221.
The risks involved in an envelopment must not be
overlooked--overextension and dispersion of the troops;[382] the
possibility that the troops fighting in front and those fighting on the
flank, separated from each other, may be defeated in detail, whether
this be brought about by the defender assuming the offensive, or by
the force holding the enemy in front allowing itself to be enticed
into making a premature advance and suffering a defeat before the
envelopment has a chance to become effective.
[382] The attack made by François’ Brigade during the battle of
Spicheren. _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 318. Between 12 and 1 o’clock, this
brigade covered a front of 4000 m. See p. 262, supra.
“The envelopment is effected in the simplest manner if the forces
designated for this task, when still at a distance from the enemy, are
given a march direction that will bring them against the hostile flank.
“When initiated during the development for action or when carried out
by retained reserves, the envelopment is much more difficult.” (Par.
393 German I. D. R.).
In the last-mentioned case it may happen that the force detailed to
make the flank attack strikes the enemy’s front instead of his flank.
The same is true of attempts to envelop with parts of the infantry of
the first line that are already deployed, perhaps already engaged,
when the terrain is not specially favorable for such a movement. Such
movements may, in special cases, be carried out at night. (Enveloping
movements of the divisions of the Japanese IIIrd Army at Mukden). As a
rule, this brings about only an overlapping and flanking of the parts
of the hostile position next adjacent to the wing making the movement,
but does not produce a concentric effect on the hostile flank. Yet,
even weak detachments that reach positions from which they are able to
enfilade the enemy, facilitate the advance to the front.
In starting an enveloping movement when at a considerable distance
from the enemy, the force which is to make it, is directed upon a
point located in rear of the hostile position, approximately where
his reserves are presumed to be. If then the fighting line is further
extended toward the outer flank, the assailant avoids facing the
hostile front directly, and will almost invariably have a start over
the defender in extending the threatened wing. The troops still in the
act of withdrawing from the route column naturally take charge of the
protection of the flanks.[383]
[383] Compare the deployment for action of the 1st Guard Division
at Königgrätz with that of the 4th Japanese Division at Wafangu. In
the last-mentioned case, the leading (10th) brigade was launched
in a very skillful flank attack; the second brigade took charge of
protecting the flank.
If a flank march in front of the enemy should become necessary, it can
be undertaken with sufficient safety only when proper preparations
have been made--distribution in depth, shortening of route columns,
due regard being had to protection of the front and flanks--to permit
a deployment of the force at the right moment and in a suitable
formation toward the hostile side.[384] Within effective range of the
enemy, such a movement by the flank can be carried out only when cover
is available, otherwise the hostile fire will very quickly force the
troops making the flank march to face to the front.[385]
[384] V. SCHLICHTING. _Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_,
I, p. 90, et seq. The attack of the six Brandenburg battalions
against the Hill of Forbach (Spicheren) is especially instructive
in this connection. The attacking force was threatened by hostile
troops lodged in the Stiring Wald. The first deployment caused the
attacking force to face toward the front of the French position.
As soon as this was noticed, the skirmishers were withdrawn in
order to be pushed into the fight again at another place. GERNIER,
_Einmarschkämpfe_, p. 184.
[385] Look up the conduct of the 22nd Infantry Division at
Villermain-Cravant, on December 8th, 1870. It is indeed true that a
violent snow storm and thick weather made it possible for this force
to disengage itself from the enemy and to join the 1st Bavarian Army
Corps at Cravant.
The attempt of the 16th Infantry Division to envelop the French
position on the =Hallue=[386]: The 30th Brigade used the road leading
along the hostile front from Querrieux to Frechencourt, for its
movement. The leading regiment of the brigade, the 28th Infantry,
on debouching from Querrieux, immediately faced toward the annoying
flanking fire and endeavored to advance in the face of it, while the
brigade commander, energetically carrying out the orders given him,
led the 68th Infantry toward Frechencourt, thus forestalling several
French battalions that were hurrying up from the east. The village
was occupied and held by the 68th Infantry, but a frontal offensive
movement against the hostile main position could not be carried out
from here either, in spite of the inferiority of the French troops.
[386] V. MALACHOWSKI, _Frontalschlacht und Flügelschlacht_, p.
24, et seq. KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, I, p. 134, et seq. In regard to the
conduct of the 15th Infantry Division, which was to hold the enemy in
front and which advanced prematurely before the enveloping movement
of the 16th Division had become effective, consult p. 282 supra, and
_Taktik_, V. p. 163.
Whether an enveloping force can be sent into action at once without
being first placed in a preparatory position[387] or whether it should
first be concentrated, depends upon the situation of the troops engaged
in front with the enemy (the necessity of relieving the pressure on
the Ist Army engaged in front with the enemy at Königgrätz), and upon
the counter-measures taken by the enemy. If the assailant encounters
a newly formed front, it would be a mistake for him to attack
successively with the different units.
[387] According to the opinion of General V. SCHLICHTING, a
preparatory position should be taken up. _Taktische und strategische
Grundsätze_, III, pp. 133 and 154, et seq. See _Taktik_, V, p. 174.
Whether the troops holding the enemy in front participate in the
assault during an enveloping movement, depends upon circumstances. They
may frequently better ensure the success of the attack by delivering an
enfilading fire than by advancing. The commander should, at any rate,
not lose sight of this advantage. If both groups (the enveloping and
the holding group) advance to the decisive attack, they should do so
simultaneously. The group holding the enemy in front must resist the
temptation of moving to the front before the envelopment can become
effective.[388]
[388] Consult _Der 18. August_, pp. 377, 561 and 590. In regard to
the attack made by the Guard and the Saxons and the premature attack
made by the Guard at St Privat.
The attack on =Ste. Marie aux Chênes=, on August 18th, 1870,[389] and
that made by the 37th Infantry Brigade on =Ladon=[390] are models
worthy of imitation. “The brigade commander personally directed
Lieutenant-Colonel v. Hagen (commanding the troops holding the enemy
in front) to have the signal ‘forward double time’ sounded as soon
as he could see the skirmishers of the 78th Infantry coming over the
heights to the right front.”
[389] The 1st Infantry Division of the Guard received orders “to
form for attack against St. Privat, but not to attack that village
before the expected arrival of the Saxon Corps.” _Der 18. August_,
pp. 167 and 288.
[390] HÖNIG, _Gefechtsbilder_, III, pp. 58 and 49.
At =Gorni Dubniac=, on October 30th, 1877, the scheme of designating
the moment for attack by means of artillery salvos, failed. During
the attack on =Scheinovo=, on January 9th, 1878, the simultaneous
advance of Prince Mirski’s troops was regulated by the clock.
If the attacker desires to deliver an effective blow against the
enemy’s flank, _a considerable interval must be left between the troops
charged with the holding attack_ [secondary attack] _and those detailed
to make the flank attack_, when the envelopment is initiated. (Par. 393
German I. D. R.). The width of this gap is increased to a seemingly
dangerous degree by the range of modern weapons, but real danger is not
to be apprehended as a counter-attack of the defender exposes both of
his flanks to an enveloping attack. If the enveloping group continues
to advance, that advance in itself will very soon set a limit to the
enemy’s counter-attack. The seemingly dangerous gap in the line, at
the commencement of an action, is closed more and more as the enemy is
approached. Nevertheless, this gap may induce a cautious leader to draw
the enveloping group closer to the frontal group, thereby impairing
the effectiveness of the envelopment. The flanking groups accomplish
the best results, but in following up tactical objectives, they should
never lose sight of the annihilation of the enemy. The difficulty of
coördinating the action of the separated parts of the line is greater
than the danger to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack against
the frontal group. As a rule, the entry of the enveloping group into
action will be the signal for a general attack. The effectiveness of
the enveloping attack is proportional to the energy with which it is
made, but the danger to be apprehended from a hostile counter-attack
increases in the same ratio.
[Illustration]
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=Austria.= When possible, the reserve is to be designated to make the
enveloping movement. (Par. 407 Austrian I. D. R.). When practicable,
a part of the reserve is employed from the start for the envelopment,
and, under certain circumstances, also for the purpose of gaining
positions from which an enfilade fire can be delivered, and for
supporting the advance of the frontal attack. The group holding
the enemy in front may at first fight a purely defensive action to
prevent a hostile counter-attack, to screen our own dispositions, and
finally, by means of a fire fight at effective ranges, to hold the
hostile troops in their position.
=France.= The envelopment is occasionally mentioned in the
regulations (for example in pars. 290, 301 and 302). The Field
Service Regulations, in discussing the attack, whose different stages
may vary in length depending upon the intentions of the commander,
state, however, that the attacker “may assail a wing or a flank of
the enemy, with superior forces, for the purpose of annihilating him.”
=England.= The importance of flank attacks, even those in which
the defender is subdued by the flanking fire of mounted troops, is
specially mentioned, but, in this connection, it is emphasized that
it is immaterial whether the attack is finally directed against
the front or a flank of the enemy. The holding attack is to be
carried out with energy in front to prevent the enemy from drawing
reinforcements to other points.
=Italy.= While the regulations of 1891 still unqualifiedly
acknowledged that any frontal attack might succeed, the regulations
of 1903 called attention to the importance of the envelopment,
without denying “that the frontal attack might be the decisive one.”
Surprise is an advantageous factor for success, and for this reason,
even covering troops, for example, may have to be dispensed with on
the march.
If a force desires to take the enemy by surprise, it must carefully
take advantage of the ground. The surprise may be made more complete,
if the accompanying frontal attack is energetically pushed. On the
other hand, considerations for the troops in the holding attack, set
a limit to the extension of the flanking movement. The fire power of
the troops in the holding attack must not be exhausted, or the troops
themselves defeated by a hostile counter-attack, before the moment of
the general advance arrives. They must pay the strictest attention to
the course of events on the opponent’s side; if the enemy retires, or
shifts parts of his force in order to meet a flank attack, the troops
in the holding attack must act with energy. If such signs are not
apparent, a frontal advance will, as a rule, be proper only when the
pressure of the flank attack makes itself felt on the enemy’s line.
This is the only way in which “simultaneous action by both attacks
may be ensured, and this is of decisive importance to the successful
issue of the combat.”
7. REMOVAL OF PACKS.
It is advisable for infantry to remove packs for an attack; such
tremendous physical exertions await the troops that everything ought
to be done to reduce the load carried by the individual man.[391] “As
soon as it becomes doubtful whether the troops will be able to perform
the task assigned them in action without such relief, all independent
commanders, and, in organizations larger than a regiment, commanders
of regiments and of higher units, have authority to order the men to
remove their packs. In issuing such an order they should bear in mind
the disadvantages which may result from leaving the packs behind. When
knapsacks are removed, the ammunition and iron rations should be taken
from them. Overcoats, cooking utensils, canteens, bread bags, and
intrenching tools remain on the men.” (Par. 301 German I. D. R.).
[391] Examples from military history in _Militär-Wochenblatt_,
1902, No. 32.
According to the French Manual of Field Engineering, the skirmishers,
especially when intrenching, may utilize the knapsack as cover.
In a defeat knapsacks will frequently be lost. Thus the Russians,
after the second battle of Plevna, and Frossard’s Corps, after the
battle of Spicheren, lost their knapsacks with camp equipment and iron
rations, and, in consequence thereof, suffered great hardships during
the succeeding days. On the other hand, during their retreat, the
43rd, 44th and 45th Infantry Regiments of the Ist Army Corps managed
to recover without trouble the packs which they had removed before
entering the battle of Trautenau.
The infantry of the Xth Army Corps had left its knapsacks behind
on August 8th, 1870, and did not get them again until the early
part of September. The knapsacks were not hauled on wagons after
the organizations, but were left at the railroad station of St.
Ingbert. On August 6th, 1870, the Würtemberg Field Brigade had left
its knapsacks in a bivouac near Reimersweiler at the risk of never
seeing them again. Among other reasons, General v. d. Tann considered
it impossible for the 2nd Bavarian Division to advance beyond Wörth,
because the organizations might perhaps thereby have been separated
for several days from their baggage, which they had left behind
between Preuschdorf and Görsdorf.
When knapsacks are removed, a detachment will have to be left behind
to guard them, otherwise they may be robbed of their contents.[392]
The troops always consider the trip to the rear to get the baggage
a special hardship; wagons will very rarely be available for this
purpose, as after great battles all the wagons in the entire
neighborhood will be requisitioned for transporting the wounded, and as
supply wagons will, as a rule, not be at hand.
[392] This was neglected by the 20th and 35th Infantries, on August
16th, 1870.
8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUNS.
In an attack upon a defensive position which is held in force, machine
gun batteries will generally be held in rear for the time being. They
form a mobile reserve in the hands of the commander-in-chief, who may
employ it for quickly reinforcing threatened points, for exerting a
pressure upon the wings and flanks of the enemy, and for preparing the
assault. Machine gun companies, either broken up into platoons or not,
as the case may be, endeavor to reach positions from which they can
facilitate the advance of their infantry.
It is especially advantageous if the fire that is directed upon the
point where the hostile position is to be penetrated, comes from a
position permitting a good view, or from an oblique direction, because
the fire will not have to be discontinued even when the infantry
continues its advance or moves to the assault. If such a position,
permitting the greatest fire effect, is reached (at about 800 m. or
less from the hostile position) any further advance of the machine guns
is faulty, because it interrupts the fire and necessitates fresh laying
and adjustment.
Upon the victorious termination of a fight, the machine guns should
participate in the first stages of the pursuit by making an extended
use of their fire. They hurry forward into the captured position, as
soon as it is apparent that the victory has been gained, in order to
support the infantry in holding the position, to cover the infantry
while it is re-forming, and to reduce the last vestige of the enemy’s
resistance. If the attack fails the machine guns cover the retiring
troops.
9. THE CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK.
In an infantry attack, the art of minor troop leading consists of
pushing a firing line, superior to the enemy, to the strip of ground
from which the power of our rifle can be utilized to the best advantage
for vanquishing the enemy; secondly, of bringing up supports, without
exposing them to unnecessary losses, so that they will be promptly
available in case of need. The preparations which the enemy has
made for attaining the maximum fire power (by intrenching, placing
ammunition in readiness, and by ascertaining ranges) must be offset
by employing a superior number of rifles. The commander who brings a
greater number of rifles into action than his opponent, may count on
gaining a superiority of fire quickly and with certainty.
The task of higher troop leading consists of simultaneously launching
the troops against the common objective.
The effect of modern projectiles requires that, on open ground, the
first deployment be made when 4000-5000 m. from the enemy. The best
scheme would be to advance, without halting, to within decisive short
range of the defender, and then to open fire, but, as previously
stated, the defender should endeavor to prevent the assailant from ever
reaching these ranges. This design of the defender must be frustrated;
if artillery is unable to accomplish this, machine guns or a part of
the infantry must enter the fight; but all parts of the force not
required for this fire fight at medium ranges should continue their
movement without interruption.
The most difficult task that infantry may be called upon to perform
consists of advancing over an open plain, in the face of unsubdued
artillery, when the situation does not permit night or the effect of an
envelopment to be awaited.
The first deployment as skirmishers is made for the purpose of
protecting the advancing troops against surprise. Frequently, a squad
or a section per company will suffice for this purpose, but these units
should cover the entire front available for the organization to which
they belong. A uniform and simultaneous advance along the whole line
is impossible however, on account of the diversity of the ground at
various points. When cover is available, skirmish lines may be formed
quickly and pushed forward as entities, but when cover is lacking,
firing lines may have to be deployed slowly and piecemeal. The unit
that has pushed farthest to the front must facilitate with its fire the
advance of those who have encountered greater obstacles in advancing.