foreground is entirely open, an advance must be made under cover of
darkness up to the medium ranges.
(c) Preparation of the infantry attack by the closest coöperation of
infantry and artillery.
(d) Timely determination of the point at which the decisive attack is
to be made.
(e) Careful utilization of the terrain during the advance, so as to
allow of delaying the opening of fire until the force is as close as
possible to the enemy.
(f) Suitable disposition, distribution in depth, and deployment of
a strong force for the purpose of bringing about a superiority of
infantry fire. The organization detailed to make the attack must have
its entire effective strength available for accomplishing its proper
task, and not be compelled to detach parts for guarding its flanks.
(g) Ensuring concerted and simultaneous action on the part of the
attacking forces. As the enemy has given up any idea of assuming the
offensive, at least for the time being, the attacker should not allow
the advantage to escape him of choosing time and direction of the
attack.
[361] General VON SCHLICHTING, in his work _Taktische und
strategische Grundsätze_, maintains the opinion--in contrast to
General VON SCHERFF--that open terrain commanded by hostile fire is
impassable for infantry. At any rate, military history has yet to
furnish proof of this.
3. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK.
Reconnaissance. Preparatory Position.
“If the enemy decides to stand on the defensive, he renounces the
initiative for the time being. The attacker will then have time to
reconnoiter the hostile position and to weigh all the circumstances
that favor the attack. He should not limit himself to reconnaissance
by the cavalry and to observation through field glasses. Mounted
officers’ and infantry officers’ patrols should supplement this
reconnaissance, and complete the information gained as the enemy is
approached.” (Pars. 362 and 363 German I. D. R.).
The local reconnaissance (see p. 248 supra) should be conducted with
all possible care; timely directions should be given in regard to
it during the approach to the battlefield;[362] the activity of the
reconnoitering bodies should continually increase as the enemy is
approached; and the work itself should be divided in a systematic
manner. Excessive thoroughness may retard reconnaissance work to
such an extent, on short winter days especially, that success may be
jeopardized. (Par. 305 German I. D. R.). As a result freedom of action
will be lost and the energy of the attack weakened. It would be wholly
wrong to postpone the decision for making the attack until something
definite is known of the strength and dispositions of the enemy.
These matters are almost never cleared up until after the battle. The
decision as to whether or not an attack should be made is determined
primarily by the general situation. (Par. 355 German I. D. R.). The
latter may force a commander to advance promptly without permitting
him to await the results of the reconnaissance. The character of the
terrain and the preparation the enemy is known to have made, determine
whether the commander ought to attack at once, whether he ought to
utilize the cover of darkness for the advance of the attacking troops,
or whether he ought to attempt to maneuver the defender out of his
position.
[362] According to experience the reconnaissance work generally
flags during a halt, although that is the very time when an increased
activity is desirable. The reconnaissance work in the IXth Corps on
August 18th, 1870, from the arrival at Caulre until the advance guard
opened the fight, is particularly instructive. _Der 18. August_, pp.
124, et seq. and 215.
The information required as a basis for this decision will, as a rule,
not be obtainable without a fight. In spite of all the objections
arrayed against reconnaissances in force, they cannot be avoided, if
it is desired to gain prompt and certain insight into the enemy’s
situation. It cannot be expected that the defender will passively
permit the assailant to gain an insight into his dispositions. A
feint will accomplish nothing; the enemy must be seriously engaged,
so that he will show his hand.[363] Yet in spite of these combats,
misapprehensions are not precluded.
[363] It was the intention of the Japanese commander-in-chief, on
October 10th, 1904 (battle on the Shaho), to attack the Russian army
before it had completed its concentration for battle. The advance
guards of the Reserve Division and of the 5th Division encountered
advanced Russian detachments at Kushutsy (Xth Army Corps), and at
Wulitaisy (XVIIth Army Corps), whose weakness was, however, not
recognized. In the belief that the Russian main position had been
encountered, the advance on the hostile position was ordered for the
night 10/11th October, the attack to take place at daybreak on the
11th. 9th Supplement to the _Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1906, p. 327.
It is quite natural that isolated detachments, in their endeavor to
gain an insight into the hostile dispositions, may find themselves
suddenly within short range of the enemy. In such a situation, the
detachment should maintain its position, as its fire will frequently
facilitate the approach of the other attacking troops. Almost every one
of the more serious engagements furnishes examples illustrating this
feature.[364]
[364] The perseverance of Nambu’s Brigade on March 7th, in the
“three houses” (Yuhuntun near Mukden). _Vierteljahrshefte_, 1907,
p. 78. The perseverance of the troops in the Palungshan works,
captured on August 22nd, 1904, by being enveloped on both flanks.
(Port Arthur). _Streffleur_, _Einzelschriften_, 4, pp. 81 and 91.
The perseverance of parts of the IInd Battalion of the 3rd Guard
Regiment in the engagement at Towan (31st July, 1904). _Urteile und
Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 60.
In order to guard the reconnoitering troops from being driven back, if
for no other reason, it is advisable to place in readiness an adequate
force of artillery. As the artillery is protected by shields, it can
take up the fight even against superior artillery with better chances
of succeeding than in the past.
If the commander has decided to attack and has determined against
what part of the hostile position the main attack is to be made, the
foreground of the hostile position is at once occupied, and the enemy’s
advanced troops forced back, so as to prevent the defender from gaining
an insight into the dispositions of the assailant.
The assailant should launch as few troops as possible for initiating
the action. They should avoid engaging prematurely in a fire fight with
the infantry of the hostile main position, even if the terrain would
permit a covered approach to short range. If the advanced troops allow
themselves to be enticed into doing this, they expose themselves to the
danger of suffering a defeat, and oblige the commander of the whole
force to launch for their relief troops that were intended for the main
attack.[365]
[365] “It is a general principle to push as close as the terrain
permits to the enemy’s position with advance troops for the purpose
of opening fire.”
Insufficient information in regard to the enemy and undue precipitation
in issuing orders may place advanced troops in such an unfavorable
situation. If the defender allows himself to be tricked into assuming
the offensive for the purpose of driving off harassing detachments, so
much the better for the assailant, for the latter’s artillery will then
find an opportunity to fire on the enemy.[366]
[366] The French regulations hint at this. Look up the advance of
French infantry during the combats around Ste. Marie aux Chênes. _Der
18. August_, pp. 174 and 179.
=Austria.= “Under certain circumstances, the covering troops will
have to be reinforced at an early moment in order that a strong line
may be formed opposite the enemy, but, in many cases, they will
nevertheless still abstain from advancing into the zone of effective
fire.” The Austrians usually employ strong covering bodies. The
Germans desire to ensure simultaneous action on the part of all the
troops in opening the combat.
At =Spicheren= the commander of the 14th Infantry Division, under
the erroneous assumption that the heights of Spicheren were only
occupied by troops covering the entraining at Forbach, issued orders
to General von François to drive away the hostile artillery. All of
Frossard’s Corps, however, was in position on the heights on which
the artillery was posted.[367]
[367] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310.
At 10 A. M., on August 6th, 1870, the commanding general of the Vth
Army Corps issued orders to the advance guard to cross the Sauer with
four battalions at =Wörth= and =Spachbach= (1500 m. apart) and to
occupy Wörth and the heights beyond, where the entire corps of Mac
Mahon was in position.[368]
[368] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 320.
The advance of the attacking troops, under cover of the advance guard,
into a preparatory position, is made in such a manner that units are
opposite their objectives when the subsequent forward movement against
the enemy is begun.[369] This frequently requires a rearrangement of
the forces so that even an assailant who is numerically inferior may
be superior at the decisive point. A simultaneous attack from the
front and flanks requires reserves everywhere and is opposed to the
economical employment of the forces; it may easily lead to failure, and
is justifiable only when the assailant is greatly superior in numbers
or morale.
[369] The deployment of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Guard, near
Ste. Marie aux Chênes, against St. Privat. _Der 18. August_ p. 408.
A premature deployment impairs the leader’s influence on the course
of the combat and makes it difficult to change the direction of the
attack. Route columns, taking advantage of all available cover, will,
therefore, be retained as long as possible, and only subordinate units
permitted to march directly toward their proper objectives, until the
hostile fire compels a more extended deployment (development). The
preparatory position is taken up in the last sheltered area in front
of the hostile position, provided that that area is large enough to
accommodate the attacking force when deployed for action, and to shield
it from the observation and the fire of the enemy.
In country generally devoid of cover, infantry will have to be placed
in a preparatory position when three kilometers or more from the enemy,
even when the latter’s artillery will in all probability be neutralized
by our own.
“In order to ensure the concerted advance of the various units into the
preparatory position, it is advisable, especially in close country,
to have them move from one covered position to another. If this is
done, units whose march was favored by the nature of the ground, will
not arrive prematurely within dangerous proximity of the enemy, while
others who had farther to go, or whose advance was difficult, are
still a considerable distance to the rear. The leader should make his
dispositions so that no loss of time will result from this advance from
one covered position to another.” (Par. 369 German I. D. R.).
Where large forces are concerned, the attack on a position carefully
prepared for defense will consume several days, the assailant placing
his artillery in position on the first day and reconnoitering under
cover of infantry, which is pushed to the front.[370] The troops of
the first line are pushed forward far enough before daylight so that
they can intrench under cover of darkness and open fire at dawn.
This will be more difficult to accomplish when covering troops or
advanced positions are located in front of the hostile position. If the
assailant has succeeded, on the previous day, in driving these troops
back upon the main position, an advance to within effective range may
be made during the night in order that the fire fight may be opened on
the succeeding day. Although the chance of taking the enemy by surprise
is eliminated in such a case, the advantage of having diminished the
distance that will have to be crossed under fire remains.[371]
[370] The attack on fortified positions is discussed in detail
in _Taktik_, V, p. 237, et seq., as It depends upon the closest
cooperation of field artillery, foot artillery, infantry and pioneers.
[371] The engagement at Belmont, on Nov. 22nd, 1899, furnishes an
interesting example of unforeseen friction. The advance, in this
instance, was made during the night from a point 8 km. from the enemy.
It is difficult to find shelter for the rearward echelons, which must
be kept in readiness in very close proximity to the leading line. These
rear echelons must either be intrenched or at least sheltered by masks.
General actions should be avoided at night.
4. THE COÖPERATION OF INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY IN BATTLE.
Upon completion of the concentration for action (development), the
infantry has to advance within the zone of effective infantry fire. In
doing this the infantry must either pass by or through the artillery
which is already engaged.[372]
[372] See p. 316, et seq.
During the Russo-Japanese war, the effect of shrapnel, in spite of the
mediocre matériel and the lack of shields, forced the artillery of both
belligerents to seek shelter on the reverse slope of heights. When this
was neglected and when batteries went into position in the open, within
effective range, they were quickly silenced. The fear of shrapnel
caused both sides to advance cautiously, to relinquish all close order
formations at an early moment, and to employ the spade extensively.
This alone was evidence of the fact that the artillery had accomplished
a good deal. Moreover, it was not altogether accident that the first
few of the larger Japanese night attacks occurred coincidentally with
the appearance of Russian artillery matériel, which was superior both
as regards numbers and power. The new German I. D. R. (par. 444), in
contrast with the previous edition (II, par. 82). prescribe that the
infantry attack should not be postponed until a superiority of fire
has been gained. Thus, the regulations draw logical conclusions from
the modern armament and seek to avoid useless bombardments of hostile
positions (such, for instance, as the Russians indulged in at Plevna
and the British in South Africa).
“_The principal duty of field artillery is to support the infantry
in the most effective manner. Its duties are inseparably connected
with those of the infantry. It should, on principle, always fight the
targets that are most dangerous for its infantry._” (Par. 364 German F.
A. D. R.).
The German Field Artillery Drill Regulations prescribe that the guns
should fire over the heads of the advancing infantry (par. 375), and
that single batteries should accompany the infantry attack to within
close range of the enemy (par. 471). When an assault is to be made, the
infantry expects the artillery to direct its fire against the point of
attack until immediately before the assault begins.
“But our infantry should never be obliged to dispense with the support
of artillery. The gun shields afford considerable protection, even at
the short ranges. _At the decisive moment the artillery should not
shrink even from the heaviest infantry fire._” (Par. 369 German F. A.
D. R.).
“In selecting an objective, it is essential for the artillery to
consider whether, by fighting it, the infantry will be effectively
supported. Whether the hostile infantry or artillery is chosen as
an objective will depend upon the situation. As a rule, the hostile
artillery will be the proper objective for our artillery during the
preparatory stage of the action. As the distance between the opposing
infantry forces decreases, it will become more and more necessary for
the artillery to devote itself to the hostile infantry.” (Par. 432
German F. A. D. R.).
If the artillery is equipped with shielded guns, it can devote itself
for some time to the most important target without regard to the
hostile artillery, contenting itself with merely occupying the latter’s
attention. (Par. 469 German F. A. D. R.). To silence artillery in a
concealed position requires curved fire and a good deal of ammunition;
but, on the other hand, artillery so posted cannot fire upon advancing
skirmishers.[373] Therefore, the advancing skirmishers of the assailant
should force the hostile artillery to leave its cover and to expose
itself to the attacker’s artillery. (Pars. 330 and 496 German F. A. D.
R.).
[373] This is partly due to the fact that fire cannot be adjusted
quickly enough, and that it is difficult to follow moving targets.
Besides, when the targets are small and numerous, they are difficult
to hit.
The result of this procedure will be that the artillery of both sides
will engage each other’s attention with only a small part of their
guns, and concentrate the remainder on the hostile infantry. It is
obvious that the infantry will very soon demand of its artillery in
definite terms that it should first annihilate the hostile artillery
before the infantry can think of continuing the attack.
The provisions of the German regulations in regard to the fusion of
activities of infantry and artillery mark an entirely new departure.
The commencement of the infantry attack is accordingly no longer
dependent upon the result of the artillery combat; on the contrary,
both combats are of equal importance and proceed along parallel lines;
the only danger is that the infantry may make a headlong rush to the
front before a superiority of fire has been gained.
Confidential British instructions, dealing with the lessons learned
by the Japanese in Manchuria, contain the following: “Intrenched
artillery can be permanently silenced only under very exceptional
circumstances, as it will withdraw its personnel temporarily, as
soon as the hostile fire becomes too hot, and resume its fire again
when that of the enemy abates. The infantry attack should therefore
be launched without awaiting the result of the artillery combat, but
the infantry must insist upon the artillery completely engaging the
attention of the hostile guns during the advance. Another reason for
not awaiting the outcome of the artillery combat, lies in the great
frontage of battle lines. The unsuccessful attack made by a division
will then frequently cause the neighboring unit to make an immediate
attack.”
=Austria= (1904). “The artillery must be given an opportunity and the
necessary time for effectively preparing the infantry attack. So long
as the artillery engaged with the hostile batteries has not achieved
a noticeable success, or is not at least neutralizing the hostile
artillery, the infantry attack remains a difficult undertaking.”
=France.= The artillery during the preparatory stage of an action:
The artillery should endeavor to silence the hostile artillery as
quickly as possible, without employing more guns than are absolutely
necessary. The commander should give the order for the attack only
when the preparation is considered sufficient.
=England.= The regulations emphasize the necessity of pushing
infantry forward, and of supporting that infantry energetically, so
as to compel the defender to expose himself. “As soon as the hostile
batteries have been sufficiently silenced, or the infantry advances
to the attack, the fire is directed upon the point of attack in order
to prepare and to cover the assault.”
=Italy.= The regulations state that artillery is a supporting arm
for infantry. “If the hostile artillery discloses its position from
the start by employing direct fire against the assailant’s artillery
or infantry, the attacker’s batteries endeavor to silence it or to
draw its fire upon themselves, in order to facilitate the deployment
of their own infantry. If, on the other hand, the hostile artillery
remains concealed for the purpose of saving its fire for the infantry
when the latter offers a favorable target upon arriving within
effective range, then it would seem advisable for the artillery of
the assailant not to open fire at all, or to open fire only with
enough guns to cope with the available targets. The assailant’s
artillery brings the fire of all its batteries into play when the
defender’s artillery is compelled to come into action in order to
support its own infantry against the advance of the attacker’s
infantry.”
The difficulties of providing for coöperation between infantry and
artillery are due to the impossibility of distinguishing at all times
with certainty between friend and foe (assaulting guidons),[374]
since the elimination of powder smoke and the adoption of neutral
tinted uniforms; and, further, to the circumstance that, while we have
a signal for increasing the range of the artillery (g.g.g.), we have
none for indicating that the fire is to be concentrated upon certain
points. “Uninterrupted communication with the fighting line in front
must be provided for. For this purpose officers, who report by signal
or by telephone, should be sent forward. These officers are primarily
to ascertain how close their own firing line is to the enemy, in order
that the artillery may keep up its fire as long as possible.” (Par. 376
German F. A. D. R.). In England, it has been suggested to indicate the
point upon which fire is to be concentrated, by the colored ball of
smoke of a special projectile. It requires strict attention on the part
of the infantry to make its work harmonize with that of the artillery.
Every opportunity, for example, when the hostile infantry is forced
under cover by a burst of fire, should be utilized for advancing. This
is particularly emphasized in France. The defender is to be blinded by
a hailstorm of fragments. “Every rafale of the artillery will either
cause the most advanced line to make a rush, or the troops of the rear
line to come up to the firing line in order to reinforce it or to carry
it forward as much as possible. Thus the rafale becomes a veritable
shield for the infantry (_véritable bouclier de l’infanterie_).”
LANGLOIS.
[374] During the attack on the Waterberg, on August 11th, 1904, the
various units were ordered to carry, on their outer flanks, flags
attached to long poles. These flags were white in Estorffs, red in
v.d. Heyde’s, blue in Müller’s, and green in Deimling’s detachment.
5. THE POINT OF ATTACK.[375]
[375] See _Taktik_, V, p. 138.
The reconnoitering troops are charged with the duty of ascertaining
the parts of the hostile position which can be approached under cover,
which are weaker than the others (frequently true of the flanks),[376]
or which can be enfiladed. The attack will usually be directed
against the weakest point in the hostile position, or that on which
the greatest volume of fire can be concentrated from enfilading or
commanding positions. At all other points of the battlefield, the
assailant will endeavor to deceive the opponent, with weak forces, as
to his true intentions, but, at the decisive point, he should launch
superior numbers. The French regulations contend that such weak points
will only become apparent during the course of the fight, and therefore
separate the troops into a preparatory and a decisive combat group.
[376] Example: The right flank of the French position at Wörth, and
at Roncourt (St. Privat).
The desire to strike the weakest point in the enemy’s line causes
the decisive blow to be directed against a flank, and the numerical
superiority requisite for gaining the superiority of fire, leads to
6. ENVELOPMENT.
(Pars. 392-396 German I. D. R.).