commander (_i.e._, whether he intends to attack, to concentrate for
attack farther to the rear, or to let the enemy attack[338]) and of the
location of the prospective artillery position. The attack order should
be withheld until the combat of the advance guard has sufficiently
cleared the situation, but a development of the force should be ordered
at once.
[338] Par. 350 German I. D. R.
The advanced detachments should endeavor to gain a start in deployment
over the enemy and cover the advancing artillery in front and flank,
by quickly deploying strong firing lines and pushing machine guns to
the front. After they have done this, they should promptly advance
to the attack. Through this, our firing line, while in the act of
deploying, runs the serious risk of suddenly encountering, at short
range, the fire of superior hostile troops, at a time when all the
troops approaching the field are still too far distant to increase its
fire power.[339] Whether the quickly formed firing lines should at once
move forward to the attack in a rencontre, depends upon the impressions
received by the commander. His dispositions should be such as to compel
the enemy to disclose his available forces at an early moment. Every
fighting line is so sensitive to fire simultaneously delivered against
its front and flank, that an attempt to turn the hostile position will
instantly force the enemy to take counter-measures. If the enemy is
unable to keep pace with us in deploying a firing line, if he is unable
to deploy skirmish lines as dense as ours, this state of affairs
should induce our commander to proceed to the attack; if the reverse
state of affairs exists, he should await the arrival of reinforcements.
But in order to obtain this insight into the existing situation the
troops must get close to the enemy. Such an insight into the hostile
dispositions cannot be gained at long range. The extent of a hostile
position may perhaps be determined at long range with the best field
glasses, but the strength and power of resistance of the enemy can
never be gauged in this manner. If one threatens to push an attack
home, however, the enemy will be compelled to show his hand. When
opposed by an enemy whose strength is unknown, it will unquestionably
be necessary to approach to the extreme limit of short ranges. From
here the dispositions of the enemy may be clearly recognized, and, in
addition, at 600-800 m., a firing line that has made a lodgment in
some feature of the terrain will not as yet be exposed to annihilating
losses. Misconceptions are scarcely to be avoided in such a situation.
One must trust to luck and take some risks. On the other hand, the
training of the infantry should afford the assurance that it will not
give up the position it has once reached; it should firmly hold the
ground gained, and persevere.[340]
[339] This induces the British _Infantry Training_ to prescribe
that in a rencontre a concentration for attack should invariably be
ordered.
[340] Military history furnishes a multitude of examples of
the fact that a force can persevere in spite of the most galling
fire (St. Privat. Gorni Dubniac). A reverse does not occur, as a
rule, until the advent of unforeseen circumstances. The Brigade of
Highlanders held out for hours at Magersfontain, and an insignificant
change of front on the right flank subsequently caused the whole line
to retire. See _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 74.
When infantry is compelled to go into action, the necessity of
occupying important supporting points and of gaining ground for the
concentration for action, requires a broad front to be covered. (Par.
357 German I. D. R.). The artillery, which will arrive soon thereafter,
will then bring relief to the infantry in critical situations.
In every rencontre there comes a moment when the fight is at a
standstill. At this moment an attentive observer may notice that,
although it is impossible to push the attack home without further
reinforcements, the space in which the concentration for action is to
take place, is secured against a hostile attack, or that the enemy has
been deprived of the initiative and has been thrown on the defensive.
This is the moment in which the commander regains the initiative
and in which, by means of an _attack order_, he can dispose of the
troops of the main body as he sees fit. _The “rencontre” differs
from the “deliberately planned attack,” in that, in the latter, the
concentration for action can proceed smoothly as desired by the
commander, while in a rencontre the opponent, for the time being,
dictates the course of action. Therefore the commander should make
efforts to free himself from this restraint, i.e., he should endeavor
to launch his troops in a manner not influenced by the dispositions of
the enemy._
The degree of control which a commander retains over the course of the
combat depends upon the promptness with which he gains a general idea
of the situation. For this, if for no other reason, he should be as
near the head of the column as possible while on the march. The troops
sent first into action, supported by the artillery, must put every
available man into the fight, in order to repulse attacks made by the
enemy and to enable the commander to launch the main body as an entity.
In any case, the battalions of the main body should not be successively
thrown into the fight as soon as they arrive, for the purpose of
overcoming a temporary crisis, or for relieving the advance guard from
a dilemma. The machine gun batteries, whose employment was particularly
important during the preparatory stage of the fight, should be
withdrawn as early as possible so as to be available as a reserve in
the hands of the commander.
In bringing the main body into action, deployments by the flank should
be avoided. The deployment should be initiated by subordinate units
(in an infantry division, by regiments) moving out of the route column
and toward the objective points determined by the purpose of the
combat.[341]
[341] General VON SCHLICHTING holds a different view in his work
_Taktische und strategische Grundsätze_, I, p. 106. “In a rencontre,
the piece on the board of the battlefield can be moved only when the
next one is clear of the march column and ready for action. Further
action is then not only permissible but imperative.”
Provisions of Various Regulations.
In all the regulations, those of Germany excepted, the rencontre is
treated with marked reserve.
=Austria.= “When a collision occurs with an opponent who is likewise
in the act of advancing--_rencontre_--the different parts of the
force and their subdivisions must make strenuous efforts to advance
in the designated direction. In a rencontre, it will be proper to
concentrate the main forces, prior to making the attack, only in case
it becomes apparent during the preparatory stage of the action that
the enemy has gained a visible start in deployment. The endeavor
to forestall the enemy, and the necessity of promptly reinforcing
the troops already engaged, will often curtail or preclude the
preparatory concentration of the main body in a rencontre, and force
the commander to permit at least parts of his approaching troops to
go directly into action.” If conditions are eminently favorable for
the enemy at the point where the collision occurs, it may sometimes
be more desirable to stand provisionally on the defensive with the
advance guard until other troops come up.
“Under such circumstances, it may even be advisable to withdraw the
troops covering the march; but in that event, the relation of the
force to neighboring columns should be considered.”
=France.= The commander should decide promptly whether to attack, to
stand on the defensive, or to avoid an engagement for the time being.
The regulations do not provide for employing the troops directly
from route column. The advance guard is frequently thrown on its own
resources; it is often forced to fight on a very broad front, and
to place all of its troops into action at the very beginning of an
engagement for the purpose of seizing and holding supporting points
necessary for the subsequent deployment.
Examples.
1. The deployment for action of the 5th Infantry Division from the
defile of Gorze, against the French Division Vergé, at the battle of
=Vionville= (16th August, 1870), is especially instructive.[342]
[342] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 549. VON SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II,
p. 50. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 32, et seq.
_Taktik_, V, p. 210.
2. The engagement of the 2nd Bavarian Division at =La Thibaudine=
(=Beaumont=). The French concentration for action had progressed
farther than that of the Bavarians. The reconnaissance by the cavalry
was insufficient.[343]
[343] HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 90.
3. The fight of Mondel’s Brigade at =Trautenau=.[344] Likewise the
fight of the Vth Army Corps at =Nachod= on June 27th, 1866.
[344] _Taktik_, V, p. 206. STROBL, _Trautenau_, p. 8, et seq.
KÜHNE, _Kritische Wanderungen_, 3, p. 16.
X. THE ATTACK ON AN ENEMY DEPLOYED FOR DEFENSE.
1. LESSONS OF WAR.
During the =Boer War= (1899-1902), the British infantry always
attacked positions prepared for defense. Aside from the superannuated
fire tactics and deficient marksmanship training of the British,
their failures in the early engagements of the war may generally be
traced to the following causes:--
1. Insufficient reconnaissance. This caused British detachments to be
surprised, in a number of cases, by fire at short range. (Brigade of
the Guards at =Modder River=). In many instances, the British forces
were even surprised by fire while in close order formations. (Hart’s
Brigade at =Colenso=).
2. Pure frontal attacks, in which equal forces were frequently pitted
against each other. (=Modder River=, =Magersfontain=, =Colenso=).
3. Insufficient protection of the flanks by echelons against fire
surprises carried out by small detachments.
4. Insufficient coöperation of the artillery and infantry.
5. Isolated attacks made by brigades (consisting of 4 battalions).
The employment of several brigades simultaneously for concerted
action was a rare exception.
6. Insufficient support of the firing line. A timely reinforcement of
an organization that had already been shaken never did occur.
7. Hesitating use of reserves in the crisis of the fight. At
=Magersfontain= only 8¹⁄₂ battalions out of 13, and at =Colenso=
only 6 battalions out of 16¹⁄₂, had been seriously engaged. When
=Spionskop= was evacuated, 11 battalions had not as yet been engaged.
The attacks were begun, but not pushed home.
The Infantry Attack in the Russo-Japanese War.
The combat tactics of the Russian infantry[345] (Russian I. D. R.
of 1903) were based on shock action, narrow frontage, and deep
formations. The bayonet training preached by Dragomirov was the
result of the belief in decisive psychological impressions and the
consciousness that the Russian fire tactics, based upon volley fire,
were inadequate to annihilate a well concealed defender. Thus, the
endeavor to cross blades with the opponent as quickly as possible,
led to a headlong rush to the front, without creating the preliminary
conditions necessary for pushing the attack home. The hesitation of
the higher commanders to throw in every available man at the decisive
stage, and the tendency, reaching down to the lowest grades, of
creating detachments and separate missions, contrasted unfavorably
with this splendid offensive spirit.
[345] “The Russian infantry is embued with a mixture of defensive
spirit and instinct for hand to hand fighting.” COUNT MARENZI.
The Japanese infantry was trained according to the letter and spirit
of the German regulations of 1889. It had fought shy of unhealthy
tendencies after the Boer war, cultivated the independence and
initiative of all leaders, and recognized the necessity of night
combats and of using the spade. In addition, the way for success was
carefully, almost cautiously, prepared by the commander-in-chief, who
left nothing to chance. It is easy for subordinate leaders to be bold
and daring, when they know that the commander-in-chief has neglected
nothing to ensure victory. The principal characteristics of the
Japanese combats were--
1. The cautious advance, frequently under cover of darkness;
2. The systematic preparation of the attack by the coöperation of
infantry and artillery, and the determined advance along the whole
front;
3. The attempt to induce the enemy to launch infantry at a point
where the decisive attack was not to take place;[346]
[346] The advance of the Vth Army at Mukden.
4. The sudden launching of the decisive attack;
5. The prompt preparation of every captured position for defense;
6. The absence of pursuit.
The fights at =Wafangu=,[347] as well as the attack made by the Guard
and the 12th Division at the =Yalu=[348] proceeded entirely according
to German pattern.
[347] _Einzelschriften über den Russisch-Japanischen Krieg_,
Vienna, 1906, I, p. 226. The envelopment of the Russian right flank
by the Japanese 19th Brigade is especially instructive.
[348] _Ibid._, I, p. 79, et seq. _Kriegsgeschichtliche
Einzelschriften_, 39-40, p. 123, et seq. Consult also VON LÜTTWITZ,
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 2.
A change took place in the tactical methods of the Japanese when the
Russian artillery--whose ballistic properties were superior to those
of its antagonist--brought a greater number of guns into the field,
and when, in addition, the Japanese infantry became numerically
inferior in the battles after Liao Yang.[349]
[349] The statements in regard to the strength of the opposing
forces are still very contradictory. At Liao Yang 120,000 Japanese
confronted 150,000 Russians; at Mukden the Russians had perhaps
10,000 rifles, 300 field guns, and 100 heavy pieces of ordnance more
than the Japanese.
The task set commanders of armies and leaders of troops by the
government, had to be met by a continuance of the offensive.[350]
The peculiar character of the theater of war made it difficult to
maneuver the enemy out of his strong positions; so at best nothing
remained for the Japanese--unless they wished to renounce the
offensive entirely--but to conquer the enemy by attacking him in
front. Since the advantages of the attack--superior numbers and the
freedom of choosing the point of attack--were thus dissipated, the
victory had to be gained by making use of defensive expedients. As
the demoralizing and retarding effect produced by fire increased
more rapidly than the morale of the assailant, nothing remained but
to intrench and to take advantage of the cover afforded by darkness
as in fortress warfare. Moreover, the inferior forces available
precluded deep formations and necessitated an immediate development
of the entire force in one line. Thus the desire to push forward
resolved itself into an advance along a broad front. Favored by the
purely passive conduct of the Russians, this led to an envelopment of
their flanks and a pressure on their line of retreat. The Japanese
were able to overcome the constantly growing power of resistance
of the Russian defense, because, while strictly adhering to the
offensive, they availed themselves of defensive expedients although
their movements were retarded thereby.
[350] C. H. _Über das innere Wesen der japanischen und
neuzeitlichen Offensive. Streffleur_, 1907, October number.
The conduct of the attack was, of course, considerably influenced
by the character of the terrain. The 1st Army, fighting in hilly
country, perhaps remained true longer to regulation formations and
long rushes than the other Japanese forces, but was finally obliged
to resort to a wide extension of closed bodies. The IInd and IVth
Armies were differently situated, as the attack over open plains fell
to their lot.
Speaking generally, the following details may be given in regard
to the method of attack of the Ist Japanese Army:[351] Units were
pushed into action abreast; objective points were assigned to each;
and certain lines or points, according to which they had to maintain
touch, were indicated to subordinate units. To avoid a surprise, if
for no other reason, thin firing lines were formed at the outset, and
in a serious attack whole companies, in dense firing lines capable of
developing a strong fire, were at once thrown in; these advanced to
mid ranges in order to open fire, as a rule, under 1000 m. The Ist
army had a special _penchant_ for making rushes of 80-100 m.,[352]
usually by entire companies; the assault was, in many instances,
begun as far as 300 m. from the hostile position, and then pushed
home; supports and reserves followed in extended formation, but
assembled promptly on reaching cover. The infantry was disinclined
to intrench during an advance, but never neglected to fortify
quickly a captured position. In the combats of the Ist Army we will
find the best lessons applicable to our conditions.
[351] _Streffleur_, 1907, January number.
[352] This is not true of the 4th Guard Regiment. See VON LÜTTWITZ,
_Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 24: Rushes of 50 m. were made
“as the men otherwise got out of breath and shot badly.” An advance
was made by squads and crawling was tabooed. The new Japanese Drill
Regulations warn against making rushes less than 30-40 m. long. On
the other hand, according to the opinion of von Lüttwitz, the length
of rushes will seldom exceed 100 m.
Examples.
1. The engagement of the Guard Division at =Yangtsuling= on July
31st, 1904.[353]
[353] GERTSCH, I, pp. 92 and 100 (Good maps). SIR IAN HAMILTON, _A
Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, p. 313. _Urteile und Beobachtungen
von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 57.
2. The attack made on October 11th, 1904, by the 15th Infantry
Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) against =Temple Hill= (=Terrayama=),
which was held by 4-6 companies.[354]
[354] BRONSART V. SCHELLENDORFF, _Beim japanischen Feldheer_, p.
132.--VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 23.
Fire was opened at 900 m.; long rushes were used and firing line and
supports were deployed; after a brief but violent fire action at 500
m., the hostile position was reached in a single rush and carried.
The artillery, to be sure, supported this attack with accelerated
fire.
3. The attack made by the 4th Guard Regiment on October 12th, 1904,
against a height south of =Huaku= (battle on the =Shaho=).[355]
[355] _Ibid._, p. 24.
4. The attack made by the 3rd Brigade (2nd Infantry Division) under
General Matsanuga, on October 12th, 1904 (long rushes), against the
heights south of =Shotasko= (battle on the =Shaho=).
_Outline Sketch of the Formation of the 3rd Brigade._
Frontage about 2000 m.
4. Infantry: 29. Infantry:
5. and 6. 4. and 2. 12. and 11. Cos. 10. and 2. Cos.
--------- --------- ----------- ----------
7. and 8. 1. and 3. Cos. 9. and 3. Cos.
Brigade Reserve:
9. and 10. Cos. 11. and 12._ Cos.
--------------- -----------------
4. Infantry. 29. Infantry.
Troops in the act of coming up, but not employed:
1. and 4. Cos. II. Bn.
-------------- and -------------
29. Infantry. 29. Infantry.
First line: Eight companies (apparently entirely deployed). Interval
between skirmishers 3 paces; between companies 40 paces.
The first halt (lasting seven minutes) was made at 1500 m. and
the distance to 800 m. was then covered at a rapid run. The men
that could not keep up, halted to recover their breath and then
followed independently. At 800 m., the line opened a lively fire at
will, which lasted for two minutes, and then advanced by rushes
by companies (first the right, then the left companies of the
battalions). During this advance the supports (2 battalions) were
absorbed by the firing line. At the same time the brigade reserve
approached closer to the firing line (the original distance between
reserve and firing line, before the advance began, was 300 m.). The
last halt for firing was made at 250 m., from the enemy’s position,
and the latter was then carried in one rush. The losses amounted only
to 235 men.[356]
[356] VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 24. SIR IAN
HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, II. Consult the same work
on the unsuccessful pursuing action fought by the 3rd Brigade at the
Chosenrei Pass.
* * * * *
In the IInd and IVth Armies, who fought, as a rule, on terrain
devoid of cover, a far more cautious method of attack was produced.
The distinguishing features of this mode of attack were thin firing
lines (skirmishers at intervals of 5-10 paces) increasing only very
gradually in density, and great frontage (a company 250, a battalion
800, and a brigade 2000-3000 m.).[357] This caused the attack to
falter in many instances as soon as it had come within 400 m. of the
hostile position, whereupon nothing remained but for the line to
intrench and to work forward slowly from one position to another.
[357] VON LÜTTWITZ, _Angriffsverfahren der Japaner_, p. 47.
Examples.
1. The engagement of the 3rd Infantry Division on October 12th, 1904,
at =Shiliho= (battle on the =Shaho=).[358]
[358] _Ibid._, p. 26.
2. The engagement of the 5th Infantry Division, from March 6th to
9th, north of =Madiapu= (battle of =Mukden=). This division required
three days to work forward from 1100 m. to within assaulting
distance of the enemy’s position. Cover for men standing upright was
constructed at 1100, 950, 530, 390, 300, 200, 160 and 125 m., that
under 300 m. being built of sand bags.[359]
[359] _Ibid._, p. 52. The attack order of the 5th Infantry
Division, in _Urteile und Beobachtungen von Mitkämpfern_, I, p. 121.
3. The combats of the 10th Division on March 3rd and 10th, 1904
(battle of =Mukden=).[360]
[360] BRONSART VON SCHELLENDORFF, _Beim japanischen Feldheer_, pp.
217, et seq., 225, et seq., 242 and 244, et seq. On the use of sand
bags, consult _ibid._, pp. 236 and 292.
Confidential British instructions dealing with the tactical lessons
of the =Russo-Japanese war=, make the following deductions:
“* * * * The above shows the great importance of local reconnaissance
by infantry, of which considerably more must be demanded than has been
done up to the present time in European armies. It shows, moreover,
the advantages of thin firing lines during the preparatory stage of
the action, and the insignificant effect produced by shrapnel and
long range fire on such lines in which it is desirable to advance,
without halting on the way, to within 1000 yards of the enemy. The
necessity of gaining a superiority of fire before advancing to the
assault, and the necessity of an increased supply of ammunition, are
confirmed anew. It is further demonstrated that the bayonet of the
infantryman is still capable of playing an important role in battle.”
2. THE CONDITIONS UPON WHICH SUCCESS DEPENDS.
The Russo-Japanese war confirms the opinion that the issue of combat
is but little influenced by the formations taken up; that _esprit_
and the determination to conquer are of far greater importance than
any formation. The most difficult task that infantry can be called
upon to perform consists of successfully pushing home an attack over
open ground commanded by hostile fire. “It would be wrong,” said
Fieldmarshal Moltke, “were one to attempt to lay down in regulations
that a force should not advance over a plain against an enemy under
cover. _But every superior commander ought to consider what such an
operation portends._” Heavy losses are unavoidable in a destructive
fire fight lasting for hours.[361] The attack will not succeed so long
as the enemy commands the plain with his fire. The commander of the
attacking force must find ways and means to wrest this command from the
enemy. All of the battles of recent campaigns have demonstrated that
an attack is bound to succeed if it is thoroughly prepared by infantry
and artillery fire, is undertaken by adequate forces, and is pushed
with determination close to the enemy; and that such an attack is, in
fact, superior to the defensive. The success of an attack on a position
prepared for defense might depend upon the following preliminary
conditions:
(a) Careful reconnaissance, for the purpose of determining the most
favorable direction for the attack.