m. of a hostile position; beyond that an advance by rushes had to
be resorted to, in which the attacking force avoided showing itself
simultaneously in long lines. The simplest scheme might be to move
forward in column of sections, each section in skirmish line. Formation
“a” is well adapted for quickly crossing fire swept places, and when
there is hope of re-forming the column subsequently. Formation “c”
is suitable for quickly deploying from company column. However, the
last-named formation no longer guarantees a proper leading of the
company, and quite naturally does not absolutely prevent losses. After
the Japanese 5th Brigade (Nambu) had taken possession of Yuhuntun[319]
and the three houses during the night of March 6/7, 1905, the following
dispositions for attack were made by the Russians about noon on the
7th: On the right, the 5th and 10th Rifle Regiments, in five lines,
each consisting of one battalion (total depth of the formation 600 m.);
in the center, the 123rd Infantry (Koslov) of which the companies of
three battalions were deployed in single rank lines, each consisting
of one company, with the men at intervals of from 3 to 5 paces, the
companies in rear of each other at distances of 100 paces; the IVth
Battalion, similarly formed, was posted in echelon to the left rear.
The 124th Infantry advanced on the left flank. The Koslov Regiment,
advancing without hesitation in quick time and at attention, was fired
on by three Japanese batteries while it was moving from 4000 to 2000 m.
The regiment lost about 600 men. This loss is insignificant when the
size of the target (about 600 m. wide and 1000 m. deep) is considered.
The Japanese did not care to become involved in a serious infantry
action and therefore evacuated the place. It would have been better
to advance by rushes with smaller units, as the terrain afforded no
cover whatever. Whenever the Japanese had sufficient time, they crossed
such plains singly, one by one, and then assembled under cover for the
attack.
[319] V. TETTAU, _Achtzehn Monate mit Russlands Heeren in der
Mandschurei_, II, p. 334.
SPAITS, _Mit Kasaken_, p. 310.
Col. CSICSERICS V. BACSANY, _Unser neues Feldgeschütz_, 1907, pp.
17 and 21.
3. FIRING ON ARTILLERY IN POSITION
was in the past a pet fire problem. The effect of frontal fire on
artillery whose guns are protected by shields is so small that the
expenditure of ammunition is not justifiable.[320] The gap between the
steel shields of the French field gun is not large enough to exert a
noticeable influence. Steel shields, 3 mm. thick, afford protection
against steel jacketed bullets fired at or beyond 300 m.; against
“S” and “D” projectiles they afford protection, it is said, beyond
500 m. only. Machine guns directing continuous fire on a point may
obtain better results. According to firing tests 3 mm. armor plate
can be pierced up to 1000 m. only by special projectiles (solid steel
projectiles and those having a steel core), the adoption of which is
precluded on practical grounds (variations in sectional density, and
difficulty of manufacture).[321] For this reason, it is better to leave
the task of destroying shielded batteries, even when they are in the
open, to one’s own artillery, than to attack them with infantry. The
fire effect of the infantry is not noticeably increased when delivered
obliquely against the front of the battery. (Par. 184 German I. D. R.).
In Germany the gun commander and cannoneer No. 3, who is posted at the
trail, are then especially endangered; but in order to flank the guns
effectively and to reach in rear of the shields with its fire, the
infantry must move to a flank a distance at least equal to ¹⁄₃ of the
range, and even then the fire effect is very small. The effect may even
be entirely nullified when the flanking fire is delivered from the side
on which the caisson bodies are posted. In this case it suffices to
push forward the caisson body to protect the personnel. It is a good
plan for infantry to direct its fire on the limbers and the reserve.
And again, infantry should not let any opportunity pass to fire on
artillery in motion or in the act of limbering or unlimbering within
effective range. Guns moved by hand into positions from which direct
laying can be employed for the purpose of warding off the infantry
attack, offer particularly favorable targets. Infantry that is to
capture artillery must approach its objective by means of irregular
rushes made by small groups, and increase its fire to the utmost
intensity when the limbers are brought up to the guns. The effect of
artillery fire is small under 200 m., in the absence of canister.[322]
[320] Even prior to the adoption of shields it was demonstrated
that infantry was unable to destroy the matériel of batteries
so as to render them immobile; it could only interfere with the
_personnel_, but could not demolish the batteries.
[321] _Mitteilungen über Gegenstände des Artillerie und
Geniewesens_, 1907, No. 5.
[322] The capture of the Smolenski Artillery Battalion on October
14th, 1904 (Shaho). _Artilleristische Monatshefte_ for March, 1908.
[Illustration: Germany.
Field Howitzer.
Field Gun.]
[Illustration: France.]
The disaster which overtook Trautmann’s Battery at St. Hubert, during
the battle of Gravelotte, demonstrates how difficult it is to unlimber
on open ground when under effective infantry and artillery fire; but,
if five limbers with their teams had not stampeded, perhaps it might
have been possible after a while, for the battery to reopen fire.
Hasse’s Battery, also at St. Hubert, was rendered incapable of moving
in a short time, but, in spite of the greatest difficulties, managed to
continue its fire for about two hours, though with only a part of the
guns. Gnügge’s Battery managed to unlimber under cover of a garden wall
at St. Hubert and to maintain itself there under enfilading infantry
fire till the end of the battle. Trautmann’s Battery lost 17 men and 37
horses; Hasse’s Battery, 38 men and 77 horses; and Gnügge’s Battery, 15
men and 40 horses.[323]
[323] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, III, p. 227.
Unlimbering under uninterrupted hostile fire at short range will always
produce conditions similar to those in Trautmann’s Battery, and in
the two British batteries of Colonel Long at Colenso.[324] These two
batteries did not cease firing because they had suffered too heavily,
but only because they had expended all their limber ammunition and the
caissons were unable to come up. It was impossible for these batteries
to limber up under the hostile fire. It was likewise impossible to
destroy a battery, though without protecting shields, even when great
quantities of ammunition were expended.
[324] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 32, p. 43.
At the battle of Beaumont, the artillery of the 7th Infantry Division
suffered heavy losses. “Although the first caisson sections were up and
the men with them were detailed to assist in working the guns, the gun
squads in both batteries had dwindled down to 2 or 3 men each by 1 P.
M., _i.e._, within half an hour.” Immediately after the French attack
had been repulsed, one of these batteries was able to accompany the
advancing infantry, however, while the other (the 4th Light Battery)
could not move its guns until an hour later, as it had lost 29 men and
34 horses.[325] This example proves again that when artillery has once
managed to go into position and to open fire, it cannot be annihilated
by infantry alone, and therefore need not fear to take up a more than
temporary position in the first line.
[325] HOFFBAUER, _Deutsche Artillerie_, 8, pp. 44 and 210.
HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER, _Beaumont_, p. 40.
The best way for artillery to protect itself against annoyance from
hostile infantry fire is to push forward an infantry screen, even
if only a weak one. In the days when batteries had no shields, this
screen enabled artillery to devote its entire attention to the
principal target without regard to hostile infantry. At the present
time, especially in positions in rear of a crest and in long artillery
lines, the principal object of such a screen is to prevent hostile
patrols from molesting the artillery. Small detachments posted at wide
intervals are sufficient for this purpose. The flanks and rear are now
as in the past the vulnerable points and are most exposed to daring,
sudden attacks, even if only made by weak hostile detachments. (Par.
448 German I. D. R.).
At the battle of =Vionville=,[326] about 5 P. M., four horse and
seven field batteries of the IIIrd Army Corps were engaged near
=Flavigny= with ten French batteries. After this artillery duel had
lasted half an hour, French Guard Infantry advanced to the attack.
This was repulsed by artillery fire at a range of 800 m., but the
fire of the artillery was diverted from its proper objective by the
advance of this infantry. Similarly, at =St. Privat=, two batteries
of the Guard Artillery had to direct their fire on French skirmishers.
[326] _Gen St. W._, I, p. 557.
IX. THE ATTACK.
The defense may repulse the enemy, but only the attack can annihilate
him. The decision as to whether the force is to attack or stand on
the defensive depends upon the tactical situation and the will of the
commander, and not upon numerical superiority, of which one is not
aware, as a rule, until after the battle.[327] Determined attacks,
again and again repeated, in spite of all failures, are the surest
means of gaining victory and of preventing the enemy from becoming
aware of his superiority. Only pressing reasons (marked hostile
superiority, necessity for awaiting approaching reinforcements, or
the failure of an attack), and never favorable terrain conditions,
should determine a commander to stand on the defensive. In defense the
eventual assumption of the offensive is kept constantly in view. A
commander who voluntarily stands on the defensive for the purpose of
letting the opponent attack, and then attacks him in turn, reaps only
the disadvantages and never the advantages of both the offensive and
the defensive.
[327] See _Taktik_, V, p. 121, et seq.
The attack may take various forms, depending upon whether the
dispositions have to be made under hostile fire (surprise and
rencontre), or whether the enemy has renounced the initiative and
awaits the attack in a deployed formation, or in a position prepared
for defense (deliberately planned attack). In the last case the
attack requires more careful preparation and in many instances even
necessitates the employment of special auxiliaries (such as guns
capable of high angle fire, and engineer trains). However, the advance
of a strong firing line to within assaulting distance of the enemy, and
the uninterrupted fight for the superiority of fire, are common to all
attacks.
Aside from the attack against an enemy in position and the rencontre
there is an attack formation more closely resembling the rencontre in
character, which may be called the _abridged attack_.[328] This attack
formation is used in forestalling the enemy in occupying important
points, in preventing enveloping movements, in carrying out flank
attacks, in surprising the enemy, in warding off a hostile surprise,
in relieving the pressure on a neighboring force, etc. It is moreover
appropriate where the conformation of the ground or the time of day
prohibit a use of the rifle.
[328] _Abgekürzter Angriff_.
The first stages of the fight of the 6th Infantry Division at
=Vionville= are of this character. The fire fight was relegated to
the background in view of the constant movement to the front. The
situation prohibited our properly taking advantage of our superior
marksmanship.--The attack on the railroad cut of =Nuits=, during the
late afternoon of December 18th, 1870, progressed similarly.[329]
[329] KUNZ, _Gefecht von Nuits_, p. 19, et seq.
1. THE SURPRISE.[330]
[330] See _Taktik_, V, p. 190.
Insufficient reconnaissance may place a force in a situation where it
will be obliged to go into action directly from route column or from
a formation unsuitable for combat, against an enemy who unexpectedly
opens a lively fire at short range, thus increasing the moral effect of
the surprise by actually inflicting losses. The force which is taken by
surprise will without doubt overrate the seriousness of the situation
and will be inclined to overestimate the strength and morale of the
opposing force. This must be taken into account in coming to a decision.
Above all else, it is important to develop, as promptly as possible,
a fire effect at least equivalent to that of the enemy, to let the
troops regain confidence, and to secure the initiative. A bold
decision is best calculated to extricate a force from such a critical
situation.[331] It is of little use to deploy, take cover, and open
fire, when the enemy is well concealed; a decision to retire is still
less to be approved, because at short ranges it is bound to lead to a
complete annihilation of the force. As a rule, a defeat can only be
averted, in such a case, by assuming the offensive and thus repulsing
the enemy. The decision for attacking directly from route column
(or, when the enemy is still at a distance, at least for deploying
toward the front) is the more justifiable, since an enemy who prepares
an ambuscade for us is, as a rule, conscious of his inferiority in
numbers, morale, and training, and resorts to deceit because he does
not dare to meet us in the open. Therefore, overwhelm the enemy with
fire and then charge him with the bayonet. An impetuous advance may
perhaps intimidate him, and our losses will be less, at any rate, than
if we turn our backs on him and await our fate in what is at best but
a poor position, as it is taken up, as a rule, during the first moment
of panic. However, even if a force that is taken by surprise cannot
avert disaster by making a determined counter-attack, it can at least
save its honor and morale. This is equally true of the rencontre on the
battlefield.
[331] “No matter how unexpectedly the enemy may appear, you should
never forget that he may be annihilated either with the bayonet or
with fire. The choice between the two is not a difficult one, and the
formation to be adopted is of secondary importance. When the enemy
is at close quarters, always use the bayonet; if he is still at a
distance, fire on him, and then use the bayonet.” DRAGOMIROV.
Examples of Surprises.
The surprise at =Baalon= on September 17th, 1870.[332] The surprise
at =Vouziers= on December 15th, 1870.[333] The conduct of the French
infantry when surprised in its camp at =Beaumont=.
[332] CARDINAL VON WIDDERN, _Krieg an den rückwärtigen
Verbindungen_, I, p. 149.
[333] _Ibid._, II, p. 125.
During the battle of =Noisseville= there occurred an unusually
instructive episode, the disastrous results of which could have been
easily avoided if the mounted officers on duty with the force had
been sent out to reconnoiter. Six companies of the 44th Infantry
(Prussian) were advancing from =Flanville= against =Montoy=. On
the French side, the 62nd Infantry was likewise advancing against
Flanville and had arrived at Montoy when the 44th Infantry (Prussian)
very unexpectedly appeared on its left flank. The French regimental
commander decided to attack at once. “The Prussian detachments
advancing south of Montoy were about to scale the west slope of
the ravine near there, when, at very short range, they suddenly
encountered the rapid fire of a dense French skirmish line, which was
immediately followed by the counter-attack, consisting of columns
in close order. At the same moment, the left flank of the Prussians
was attacked from the south, and other hostile columns advanced from
the park through the west entrance of the village. The Prussian
skirmish lines were repulsed in an instant, and thrown into complete
confusion. The hostile fire had an annihilating effect on account of
the short range, and the situation was at once completely reversed.
The Prussians sought in vain to gain a firm foothold in the eastern
outskirts of the village of Montoy. Their losses were heavy. The four
companies (3rd, 9th, 11th and 12th) of the 44th Infantry numbered
in all 18 officers and 840 men; they lost 7 officers and 480 men,
of which number 1 officer and 82 men (all unharmed) were taken
prisoners. The 9th Company suffered least; but the 3rd, 11th and
12th Companies (44th Infantry) lost in all 55.5% of their effective
strength, the 3rd Company even losing 67%.”[334]
[334] KUNZ, _Noisseville_, p. 32, et seq.
This surprise could without doubt have been avoided. If the 44th
Infantry had sent mounted men ahead, it would have been in a position
to let the French walk into its fire. Soon after this occurrence,
the French infantry also unexpectedly received flanking fire from
Flanville, which forced it to abandon the pursuit after suffering
some losses.
When two forces unexpectedly collide in close country, the advantage
rests decidedly with the one that opens fire and advances to the charge
first. This onslaught with cold steel should become second nature
to the troops. In traversing close country, a force should be in a
formation that enables it to develop an adequate fire and to make a
charge in compact formation. A line formation is entirely unsuitable,
as a rule, on account of the difficulties of the terrain to be
overcome, and in a skirmish line the officers cannot properly control
the men.
For passing through thinly scattered timber without underbrush,[335]
company column is a suitable formation, and for dense woods platoons
advancing either abreast or echeloned, each platoon in line of squads
in columns of files. If the platoons or sections were to advance in
single file, the columns would be too long, and it would be next to
impossible to maintain the intervals. The six or eight small columns
of files of a platoon are, on the other hand, close enough together to
keep each other in view; besides, they are easily and quickly deployed
for firing and charging, and can meander through the woods more readily
than an organization in close order. Moreover, the leaders can exercise
better control over the men than in skirmish line, which invariably
bunches up at the places that are most easily passed, while connection
is not maintained at all at other points and march direction and
cohesion is lost. (See the passage of the Bois de Givodeau during the
battle of Beaumont).[336]
[335] See _Taktik_, VI, p. 117, et seq.
[336] See _Taktik_, VI, p. 125, with sketch. HOPFFGARTEN-HEIDLER,
_Beaumont_, p. 112, et seq.
Examples: The conduct of the infantry of the IXth Army Corps in
passing through the Niederwald of Wörth, may serve as a model. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, p. 108, et seq.
Engagement of La Landrière on January 11th, 1871. _Geschichte des
Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 292.
_Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 109.
2. THE RENCONTRE.[337]
(Pars. 315-317 and 352-361 German I. D. R.).
[337] See also _Taktik_, V, p. 192, et seq.
“Uncertainty and haziness of the situation are the rule in war. During
marches in campaign the opponents will frequently not gain detailed
information of each other until they come into actual contact. Thus
the rencontre develops out of a collision of route columns.” (Par. 352
German I. D. R.).
Both forces are marching toward each other, and the collision occurs
frequently at a point not intended by either; as every minute brings
the heads of the two columns closer together no time is to be lost.
The commander who desires to wait until he can come to a decision
consonant with the results of the reconnaissance will arrive too late.
The tactical situation in its entirety determines whether or not an
attack should be made. If we do not take advantage of the fleeting
moment the enemy will surely do so, and, as a rule, he will not be
any better prepared for action than we are. Frequently the deployment
from route column is not made because the commander desires it, but
because it is necessary in order to avert a crisis in the leading line.
The commander who is acting under hostile pressure should endeavor to
regain the upper hand as quickly as possible so that he can dispose
of the troops of the main body with a definite object in view. In a
rencontre, the advantage rests almost invariably with the commander
who quickly sizes up the situation, attacks promptly, and succeeds in
throwing the opponent on the defensive. A bold, impetuous attack, which
would lead to disaster in the presence of an opponent already deployed,
may, in this case, be productive of victory. The direction in which the
attack is made is of less importance than a prompt decision on the part
of the commander and the simultaneous launching of the whole force in a
definite direction. We must take the terrain as we find it. In covered
terrain, the effect of the surprise will be increased still more, while
in open country, the preparatory stage of the combat will soon lose
that character, because the side which has an advantage as regards
terrain will make use of it, and the conviction will force itself upon
the opponent that victory cannot be gained by an impetuous attack
alone. It will be easy for a commander to come to a decision as to the
action to be taken if he is conscious of his own strength or fears that
the enemy desires to avoid an attack. (The commanders of the advanced
troops of the IIIrd Army Corps at Vionville). _The rencontre increases
the difficulties of troop leading, but makes the attack easier for the
troops._
* * * * *
The difference between a deliberately planned attack and a rencontre is
most clearly apparent in the conduct of the advance guard. Its task is
to secure the prospective artillery position and to create favorable
conditions for the combat of the main body. This requires that ground
be gained to the front so as to enable the main body to deploy while
moving forward. In addition, the advance guard should seize and hold
important points, without, however, anticipating the intentions of
the commander of the whole force. It is moreover desirable for the
advance guard to interfere with the hostile deployment. Points lying
on the flanks or in advance of the artillery position, especially if
they command the latter, should be quickly seized; when necessary, the
advance guard must fight for their possession. Its commander should
quickly pick out the points that are important for this purpose; he
should, by no means, be satisfied always to begin the fight where the
point of the advance guard happens to be. Under certain circumstances
the main body will have to concentrate for action farther to the rear
so as to hasten the deployment and to take advantage of favorable
terrain. When the enemy has an undeniable start in deployment, the
commander may decide to let the opponent advance to the attack, and
then bring about the decision by simultaneously launching his main
body. Only thus can one in the long run avoid fighting superior
numbers with an inferior force. (Par. 360 German I. D. R.). It is much
easier to decide whether this or that point is of importance, than to
answer the question as to whether the strength of the advance guard
will suffice for the task of taking it. The reports of the cavalry in
regard to the enemy’s strength and the composition and formation of his
columns, will scarcely furnish an adequate basis for a pertinent answer
to this question. Moreover, one will usually not be able to tell,
until after the action has commenced, how far the hostile deployment
has progressed. But, in any case, long hostile firing lines demand
caution. However, a start in deployment is not indicated by the combat
frontage alone. A factor of far greater importance is which force has
been most successful in making preparations for going into action by
developing its main body and by having artillery near at hand. It is
artillery that clears up the situation. When an infantry division
encounters a hostile force deployed on a front of 400-600 m., this
does not necessarily mean that the entire division must systematically
concentrate for action, as this would cause a considerable loss
of time, thus giving the enemy a great advantage. _The general
situation and the mission of a force are of greater importance for the
commander’s decision, than the state of readiness for action of the
opposing forces._
_Issue of orders._ See _Taktik_, V, p. 197.