will. It is not easy for infantry, while awaiting the onrushing mass
of cavalry, to reserve its fire until, in the opinion of the leader,
the first shot may be fired. But this waiting is of great importance
to prevent the fire from becoming wild and ineffective. Since the
elimination of powder smoke, there is no reason why other volleys
should be fired after the first, for in the excitement of the fight
the volley cannot produce a moral effect. The horses certainly find
the rattling of fire at will more unpleasant than the sudden crack of
a volley. The advantage of the volley, of permitting a unit to be kept
better in hand, may be an important factor under certain circumstances
however. The volley should, as a rule, be used by supports that are not
exposed to fire. (8th Company of the 32nd Infantry at Wörth; the 1st
and 2nd Companies of the 83rd Infantry, and the 5th Company of Jägers
at Sedan).
Since the principal object of the fire is to destroy the cohesion
of the charge, and as cavalry always closes toward the center while
charging, no special importance need be attached to the distribution of
the fire.
As regards relative numerical strength, a platoon of infantry
consisting of 60 rifles (firing 360-500 rounds per minute), should be
a match for 1-3 troops (_Eskadrons_), and a company of infantry, under
favorable conditions, may be able to deal with a cavalry brigade.[313]
Cavalry can become dangerous for infantry only when the infantry is
surprised, finds no opportunity to fire, loses its steadiness and
morale, or attempts to reach cover by running.
[313] A German cavalry brigade consists of eight troops
(_Eskadrons_). _Translator_.
The Charge of the French Cuirassiers of the Guard at Vionville.
At half past 12 on the afternoon of August 16th, 1870, the companies
of the 10th Prussian Infantry Brigade were advancing east of Flavigny
towards the Metz--Mars-la-Tour _chaussee_. As French infantry was
not on the spot to put a stop to this movement, the 3rd Lancers and
the Guard Cuirassier Regiment received orders to attack. The former
regiment went to the rear, as no definite objective (?) had been
assigned to it.
The Guard Cuirassier Regiment was formed in two lines, 150 m.
distance between them, with two troops (_Eskadrons_) in each line, a
fifth troop (_Eskadron_) following as a reserve. Although hampered
in its movements and thrown into disorder by abandoned baggage
wagons and other camp litter that covered the ground, the regiment
nevertheless made the charge with superb gallantry.
The charge struck the 6th and 7th Companies of the 52nd Infantry,
under Captain Hildebrand. These companies, rifles in hand and their
leader in front, awaited the French cavalry, which came into view
at a distance of 1200 m. The first echelon (6th and 4th Troops) was
received with rapid fire at 250 paces. On the right, the 6th Troop
(_Eskadron_) approached to within 60-80 paces of the Prussians,
but a part then turned to the rear while a few troopers turned to
the left. It is said, that of the leaders only one officer and one
non-commissioned officer remained in the saddle, and that only
twenty cuirassiers were rallied after the charge. The left troop
(_Eskadron_) missed its objective completely. The Prussian rear rank
faced about and fired on some French troopers who attempted to make
an attack from the rear and who now also received fire from other
units of Prussian infantry.
During the charge, the distance between the first and second lines
had become greater than at first ordered. When the first line broke
in two, the second was still some 300 m. distant from the Prussian
infantry and suffered some losses, probably from stray shots, which
did not stop the movement however, as the fire soon ceased. German
accounts, to be sure, do not mention that the second line could
not be seen on account of the powder smoke, and that the fire was
discontinued to let the smoke clear away. When the French line was
100 m. away it received the command _chargez_ and the Prussian
infantry again resumed its rapid fire, which shattered the attack,
the leading troopers breaking down in a ditch about 10 paces in
front of the Prussian line. The third line, its cohesion impaired
and its advance hampered by fallen horses and riders, was just as
little able to reach the Prussian companies. The right wing of the
Cuirassiers raced around the left flank of the companies of the 52nd
Infantry and encountered the Füsilier Battalion of the 12th Infantry,
deployed in a single firing line, dense in the center. Some parts
of this battalion formed squares. The charge was definitely stopped
by the fire of this battalion. An attempt to rally the Cuirassiers
was prevented by Prussian cavalry which now moved out. The French
regiment, which had begun its attack with 575 sabers, had lost 22
officers, 208 men (36.2% of its strength), and 243 horses. According
to Dick de Lonlay,[314] after this charge, the regiment was able to
form only 4 troops (_Eskadrons_) of 62 troopers each, instead of 5
troops (_Eskadrons_) of 115 troopers each, which would mean a loss
of 248 men. The first line had suffered the heaviest losses; in
the 4th troop (_Eskadron_), which had lost all of its officers and
non-commissioned officers, only 18 men were left.
[314] _Français et Allemands_, III, p. 84. KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5, p. 11. The French _Gen. St. W._,
II, pp. 301-309, gives the losses as 18 officers, 170 men, and 208
horses.
A charge has a better chance of succeeding if it is prepared by
artillery fire.
During the attack made by two troops (_Eskadrons_) of Landwehr
Hussars against the 1st Battalion _Gyulai_ at =Tobitschau=, an
Austrian square was broken by shells before the cavalry penetrated
it. During the attack of Bredow’s Brigade at =Vionville=, the
artillery was able to send its last shells against the enemy
immediately past the right flank of the cavalry brigade.
The employment of cavalry in masses, contemplated in all armies,
compels us to consider the case when infantry must advance over open
ground in the face of hostile cavalry. Special units must then be
designated, who, by means of long range fire, repulse the cavalry or
keep it at a distance. At Minden (1759), Anglo-Hanoverian infantry
succeeded in driving the hostile cavalry from the field, and at
Vauxchamps and Etoges (14th February, 1814), Prussian infantry
succeeded in breaking through the French cavalry. It will be easy to
do the same thing with modern weapons, so long as cavalry is not very
superior in numbers, and is not supported by infantry, machine guns, or
artillery.
Infantry attacking dismounted cavalry should endeavor to bring long
range fire to bear on the led horses or threaten them by a flank
attack. For infantry to prolong the action at long and medium ranges
is only playing into the hands of the cavalry, and besides, the better
marksmanship of the infantry is bound to make itself felt at short
ranges. When the infantry has once gotten to within 700 paces (560 m.)
of the dismounted cavalry, it is very doubtful whether the latter will
still be able to mount; at the very least, it will be difficult for it
to do so (par. 362 German C. D. R.), even though the withdrawal can be
effected under cover, or when fresh troops take a hand in the fight.
Provisions of Various Regulations.
=England.= The possibility of a successful cavalry charge is almost
universally contested. When necessary, the skirmishers that are
immediately threatened close in toward the center. Bayonets are to be
fixed. An opportunity for successful employment of cavalry is offered
when infantry has fired away all of its ammunition; when it is forced
to retire; and when the approach of the cavalry is facilitated by
dust, fog, or heavy rain.
=Austria.= _Brave and steady infantry has nothing to fear from
cavalry charges, so long as it retains its steadiness, presence of
mind, and morale, and delivers its fire steadily and with good aim at
short range._
When fighting cavalry, movements and changes of formation should be
ordered only when sufficient time is available, and then only for the
purpose of bringing a sufficient number of rifles into action and
for better utilizing the terrain. When a cavalry charge is suddenly
made from a short distance, it is better to remain in a narrow
formation than to deploy hastily, provided the fire is delivered with
steadiness. As cavalry frequently attacks only for the purpose of
forcing the infantry to discontinue its advance, or to induce it to
take up a close order formation, all units not immediately threatened
by the attack should continue their movement or remain in their
positions.
When a force has to cover long stretches under conditions which make
it probable that a cavalry attack will be made, the battalions,
companies, or platoons should be so grouped that they can quickly
meet the cavalry attack in any direction, and can mutually support
each other in warding it off. Staffs and vehicles should place
themselves within the protected area thus formed.
The threatened units turn in the appropriate direction, properly
utilizing cover and obstacles while so doing, and, when necessary,
fix bayonets. Only such a part of the force is designated to fire as
seems necessary for warding off the attack; the other parts continue
to carry out the task assigned them. The commander retains a part of
his force in readiness for warding off unexpected attacks.
“When exposed to hostile fire while warding off a cavalry charge, the
men should assume the position offering the smallest target.
“If a platoon is _directly attacked_ by cavalry, it will only in rare
cases be advisable to open fire at ranges beyond 600 paces (450 m.);
_frequently it will be a good plan, however, to let the cavalry come
up close_. When the platoon participates in warding off a cavalry
attack made against another unit, it may open fire at longer ranges.
“Fire at will is the principal kind of fire to be used in warding off
cavalry.”
=France.= Infantry, no matter in what formation it may happen to be,
has nothing to fear from hostile cavalry, even if the latter is in
superior numbers, provided the infantry remains cool, well in hand,
and makes good use of its fire.
When cavalry surprises infantry, the effect is as great as of old.
Infantry should therefore carefully protect itself in all situations
of combat, especially during critical moments.
If cavalry is reported, infantry can guard against all contingencies
by echeloning. It should not allow itself to be diverted from its
task so long as the cavalry does not begin an attack.
Any disposition that enables infantry to change front quickly to meet
a charge, and to deliver a strong fire, is calculated to stop even
the boldest cavalry.
When fighting dismounted cavalry, it is considered desirable for
the infantry to advance quickly to medium and short ranges for the
purpose of firing upon the cavalry as it mounts.
=Russia.= Nothing prescribed.
=Japan.= Infantry which, while engaged with the enemy, is forced to
discontinue its movement or to change its formation for the purpose
of warding off hostile cavalry, has already suffered a partial
defeat. Only those fractions that are absolutely necessary for
repulsing the cavalry should take up the fight against it.
VIII. INFANTRY VERSUS ARTILLERY.
1. THE PASSAGE OF INFANTRY THROUGH ARTILLERY LINES.
The artillery of a mobilized German army corps with its twenty-four
batteries takes up approximately 2500 m. of the front of about 4000
m. available for the corps. When the ground is unfavorable, the front
available for the other arms may be still further reduced. All remedies
suggested for reducing the frontage required by artillery offer no real
solution of the difficulty; in fact, they have resulting drawbacks,
such as the reduction to ten paces of the interval between guns, and
the posting of artillery in two lines, one in rear of the other. On
account of these drawbacks, a commander will avail himself of these
remedies only in case of the most urgent necessity. The question as
to how infantry can best pass through these long artillery lines is
therefore of especial interest. While artillery will generally seek
commanding positions and avoid covered terrain, infantry will make use
of depressions and cover as the natural routes of advance for passing
by batteries in action and for deploying subsequently in front of them.
In this case the solution of the problem is simple. The difficulties
are disproportionately greater when terrain impassable for artillery
is lacking. Nothing could be more desirable for hostile artillery
which has adjusted its fire upon our batteries, than for the intervals
between our guns to become suddenly filled with infantry, whereupon
our artillery, until now under fire, would have to cease firing so
as not to endanger our infantry. This pause in the fire will be more
noticeable, when our artillery has not yet succeeded in gaining a
superiority of fire over the hostile guns; and its length will depend
upon the depth of the infantry formation. In this case the infantry
cannot avoid heavy losses as it must cross the fire-swept space in rear
of the guns, and soon thereafter must enter the zone of the opponent’s
actual “fire for effect,” besides losing for the time being the support
of its own artillery fire. It is obvious that for infantry to advance
in deployed lines through artillery in action, condemns the latter
to long silence, and even exposes it to the danger of being placed
altogether out of action. Infantry can pass through artillery lines at
certain points only, its passage being subject to an agreement between
the infantry and artillery commanders. It is advisable to have those
batteries cease firing whose fire has the least influence on the course
of the artillery combat. It is, however, of the utmost importance
that the fire of all hostile batteries which possibly could fire on
our infantry, be kept down by the increased fire of our artillery. In
this manner, we may perhaps be able to draw the fire of the hostile
artillery away from those points at which our infantry is to pass
through our artillery line. This is especially important. It will also
be advantageous to designate successively, different points in the
artillery line for the passage of infantry. This should be done for two
reasons: first, in order that a favorable target whose re-appearance
the hostile batteries could await with loaded guns, may not be
presented to the enemy at one point for a prolonged period; second,
in order that movements by the flank on the part of the infantry may
be obviated. The column of squads would be a suitable formation in
which two battalions of infantry could simultaneously pass through the
line of guns approximately within the space occupied by one battery.
These battalions should then at once deploy, executing front into line
toward their respective outer flanks. The guns can resume firing only
when their infantry has reached a point 3-400 m. in front of them. The
artillery will be able to resume its fire earlier when it is posted in
rear of a crest, and for this reason such points should be selected for
the passage of infantry.
2. THE ADVANCE UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.[315]
[315] A lecture delivered by Major C. E. D. BUDWORTH, R.A., at
the Royal Artillery Institution, on December 3, 1908, entitled,
_Infantry Formations in the Attack: from an Artilleryman’s Point of
View_, contains some interesting information. The lecture mentioned
appeared in _The Journal of the Royal Artillery_ for February, 1909.
_Translator_.
In almost every attack, infantry will be obliged to advance for
considerable distances under artillery fire without being able to
take advantage of cover. It should guard against being surprised by
artillery fire while in an unsuitable formation.
In the first place, everything that facilitates the enemy’s adjustment
and observation of fire should be avoided. (See p. 119 supra). To this
end, infantry should not remain unnecessarily long near objects that
are clearly visible at a great distance. If it is noticed that the
enemy is beginning to adjust his fire on some prominent feature of
the terrain, that point should be passed as quickly as possible; the
same is true of a plain in the enemy’s zone of fire. Narrow columns,
separated by intervals of 50 m., their heads not on the same line, are
advantageous. This formation prevents shrapnel from simultaneously
striking two columns, and makes it difficult for the enemy to judge
the relative position of the smoke from the burst of his shrapnel with
respect to the target. This increases the difficulties of the enemy’s
observation of fire, as it is not easy for him to determine whether his
shots go over or fall short. A shallow echelon formation (about 50 m.
deep, as used in Russia, for example) is valueless for reducing losses,
owing to the depth of the beaten zone of modern projectiles.
The narrowest possible front should be presented to the enemy when
within his zone of fire.
It is moreover desirable to make the further observation of fire
difficult for the hostile artillery, and to diminish the effect of his
projectiles at the target (see p. 120 supra) by taking up suitable
formations. Broad, shallow formations were suitable against the shell
fire of the past. However, they had the great drawback of considerably
facilitating the observation of shots falling short or going over, as
the smoke from the burst hid the target in the first case, and as
the target appeared silhouetted against the smoke from the burst in
the second. The cone of dispersion of the modern base charge shrapnel
combines comparatively small lateral spread with great effect in depth.
The effect of a well-placed shrapnel may be confined to one target, and
that of projectiles bursting in the intervals reduced by taking up a
formation in which narrow columns (columns of squads) are separated by
wide intervals (up to 50 m.).
[Illustration]
The range is determined or verified by bracketing; that is, by
enclosing the target between shots which, fired at a known difference
of range, strike respectively, short of and beyond the target. In
France this is done either by battery salvo or by piece. In the former
case, the French distribute the fire equally over the entire space
which they wish to cover with fire; hence, they do not direct it upon
the individual columns, especially when they employ indirect laying,
their favorite mode of procedure. It is in this kind of fire especially
that narrow columns, separated by wide intervals, are a great
advantage, because it is pure accident if a projectile falls so that
its burst can be observed. Moreover, when the columns are not abreast
of each other, the observations of bursts may be contradictory. Thus,
in one salvo, “over” and “short” bursts may be obtained, especially
if several bursts could not be reliably observed, and the salvo will
have to be repeated. When a projectile bursts “short,” immediately
in front of the 1st company, for example, it may be assumed that the
next projectile will be fired at a range increased by 100-200 m. The
1st company should therefore move to the front at double time, the 2nd
and 3rd likewise, while the 4th executes platoons front into line and
takes to cover in anticipation of an “over” shot. The “over” meant
for the 1st company will then be the signal for the 4th company to
rush forward. _The following general rule may be given: A projectile
bursting “over” or just “short” of the target requires that the force
fired upon move quickly; a projectile bursting far “short” of the
target requires that cover be taken._ The platoon and squad leaders of
the attacking force should not betray its presence by standing upright;
the force should disappear absolutely without leaving a trace.
A force cannot, in the long run, prevent artillery from effecting an
adjustment of fire upon it; all it can do is to postpone the beginning
of the fire for effect.
Fire for effect is of three kinds:
1. “Progressive fire” (_tir progressif_).[316] In this fire, after
establishing a bracket (as a rule, one of 200 m.), every piece fires
two rounds at each of four ranges, viz., at a range 100 m. less than
the short limit of the bracket, at both ranges of the bracket, and at a
range 100 m. greater than the long limit of the bracket. For example,
if a bracket has been established for the target at 3000 and 3200 m.,
the battery would fire at 2900, 3000, 3200, and 3300 m.
[316] Called “Zone Fire” in our field artillery. _Translator_.
2. “Sweeping” (_fauchage_) is employed when it is desired to cover
a broader zone. In this every gun fires three rounds at each of the
ranges designated. The first round is fired with the line of sight
directed on the right portion of the target (or on the aiming point).
Before firing each of the succeeding rounds, the direction of the piece
is changed to the left by three turns of the traversing handwheel. At
the next range this process is reversed, the direction of the piece
being changed to the right by three turns of the traversing handwheel
after each round. At 2500 m., for example, a battery can cover, in this
manner, a space twice the width of its own front.
3. “Fire at successive ranges” (searching fire). In this fire salvos
or volleys are delivered at the target at a number of ranges to be
designated by the battery commander.[317]
[317] The Belgian Drill Regulations (1907) give the following
details in regard to the fire effect of a French four gun battery: In
“progressive fire” (_tir progressif_), 32 rounds cover a space 100
m. wide and 400 m. deep (1 fragment covers 6 sq. m.). When direct
laying is employed, one fragment covers 2 sq. m. In “progressive fire
with sweeping” (_tir progressif avec fauchage_), 48 shrapnel cover a
space 200 m. wide and 400 m. deep, each fragment covering 8 sq. m.
Depending upon the range, 1¹⁄₂ to 5 minutes are required to secure
adjustment. (See p. 119 supra).
During the Russo-Japanese war, all close order formations proved
unsuitable under artillery fire, except when the terrain afforded
cover. The Japanese infantry recognized very soon that the best
protection against artillery fire lay in constant motion (irregular
rushes made by small units) and in wide extension. The following
procedure, employed at Yoshirei on July 31st, 1904, seems worthy of
imitation:[318] The several platoons of the companies followed each
other in deployed lines at distances of 200-300 m. When they had to
cross open ground in order to reach a designated line, the platoons
sought to advance by squads, whose men were deployed at intervals of
5-10 paces and who moved at a rapid gait interrupted by breathing
spells. The men invariably assembled when cover was reached. The losses
were insignificant. The Russians also made use of a similar procedure
after their first disastrous experiences. In many instances the
platoons ran forward in single rank. “Change of gait and direction, as
well as the use of loose irregular skirmish lines make it difficult for
the artillery to hit anything.” (Par. 450 German I. D. R.).
[318] SIR IAN HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, p. 337.
Formations used by Infantry during the Russo-Japanese War when under
Artillery Fire.
[Illustration: a.
A platoon in route column forms four columns of files.]
[Illustration: b.
A company in column of platoons, each in line of skirmishers with the
men 2-4 m. apart.
(It would be better to use sections instead of platoons).]
[Illustration: c.
The ranks of the sections in each platoon of the company following each
other at a distance of 100 m.
This formation was taken up from company column (German).]