fight, machine guns may take a hand in it, even when the terrain is
unfavorable for the employment of cavalry, by gaining the flanks at a
rapid gait, turning and firing upon the hostile flank or the hostile
masses launched for the counter-attack.
“It would be incorrect, however, at such a moment, simply to throw
the machine guns into the fighting line or to a flank. By doing this
the mobility of the guns would not be utilized, and they would lose
their character of a mounted arm.
“The assignment of machine guns to cavalry augments the fighting
power and independence of the latter and increases to the utmost its
desire to go ahead, its enterprise and bold initiative. With the aid
of machine guns, our militia cavalry, even when opposed by better
drilled cavalry, can go into battle calmly on our terrain, with the
firm conviction of defeating it.
“But a cavalry leader should never shrink from sacrificing his
machine guns when the object to be attained requires it, and when no
other means remain to save the force. _These weapons should never be
more to him than a welcome and powerful aid toward the fulfillment of
his mission. Cavalry which degenerates into a mere support for its
machine guns has ceased to be cavalry._”
VII. INFANTRY VERSUS CAVALRY.[302]
(Par. 451 German I. D. R.).
[302] _Taktik_, II, p. 137: _Die Attacke der Kavallerie auf
Infanterie_. For examples from military history consult the splendid
works of Major KUNZ, especially _Die deutsche Reiterei_, and
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5.
The individual infantryman whose rifle is loaded and who knows how to
use his bayonet is more than a match for the individual mounted man
even on open ground; and, if he remains cool, retains his presence of
mind, and uses his rifle properly while keeping the opponent constantly
in view, he is even superior to several mounted men. Infantry which
retains its steadiness has nothing to fear even when outnumbered by
cavalry. Its main strength lies in steadily delivered fire, while
cavalry relies on the possibility of making an unexpected rapid charge,
on quickly covering great distances, and on the moral effect which its
irresistible onslaught undoubtedly produces upon infantry. So long as
there is a possibility of surprise and misunderstanding, of infantry
allowing itself to become discouraged, and of the individual soldier
being exposed to hunger and hardships, so long will cavalry that is
energetically led be able to gain brilliant victories. Tactics would
look differently upon the possibility of making a mounted charge
during a battle if one or two German cavalry divisions had been on
the Japanese side during the pursuit after Mukden. “If we demand of
infantry that it close with the enemy after it has suffered tremendous
losses, why should we not demand the same of cavalry whose mobility
is disproportionately greater.” (_Skobeleff’s Order for the Day, June
15th, 1882_). The less the world believes in a victory of cavalry, the
greater the certainty of such success. The troops should be accustomed
in time of peace to the sight of charging cavalry. The recommendation
made by the late General Dragomirov of the Russian army is, at any
rate, worthy of consideration.[303] He proposed that cavalry ride at
full speed through infantry lines deployed with three paces between
files. Some infantrymen are, indeed, bound to be injured in such
charges, but the wounds produced are not likely to be serious. Infantry
accustomed to such charges will not lose its steadiness so easily in
action as when it comes in contact with cavalry for the first time on
the battlefield.
[303] _Vorbereitung der Truppen für den Kampf_, I, p. 55.
The success of the charge made by Captain Bechtoltsheim of the
Austrian army at =Custozza= with three platoons of Sicilian Uhlans,
may be ascribed principally to the fact that the Italian infantry
was not accustomed to field service and lacked training. This small
force of cavalry broke entirely through Pisa’s deployed Brigade
(Italian) and struck the route column of Forli’s Brigade, throwing
it into complete panic, so that of five battalions only one remained
intact. The three platoons of cavalry, which numbered about 100
sabers, lost 2 officers, 84 men, and 73 horses killed and wounded.
The charge made by three troops (_Eskadrons_) of the Dragoons of the
Guard at =Mars-la-Tour=, to facilitate the retreat of the defeated
38th Brigade, and that made by two platoons of the 7th Hussars at
=Sapignies= were likewise successful.
Any formation that permits effective firing is suitable for warding off
cavalry. Skirmish lines through which a cavalry charge passes suffer
losses that scarcely deserve mention. The fight is not hopeless even
when the hostile troopers halt within the ranks of the infantry. When
cavalry has charged through a skirmish line, the latter should be
careful not to face about to fire at the troopers,[304] as that would
give a second cavalry line an opportunity to approach and strike it
unawares.
[304] “The French firing lines through which the cavalry had
charged (evening attack made by Rauch’s Brigade in the direction
of Rezonville on August 16th, 1870) fired after the Hussars, while
the French Infantry units in rear fired in the opposite direction.
The result was a frightful cross-fire, which, while undoubtedly
disastrous for the Hussars, certainly must have worked havoc among
the French.” KUNZ, _Reiterei_, p. 153.
The supports in rear of the first line form the objective of the
cavalry after it has charged through the firing line. These supports
must therefore open fire on the cavalry regardless of the skirmishers
in front.
The flanks of a firing line can be bent back only when that line is
not exposed to hostile infantry fire. The threatened wing should never
be bent forward since that interferes with the fire of adjacent units.
The task of repulsing an attack directed against a flank had best be
left to the supports in rear of the flanks. The German Cavalry Drill
Regulations (par. 349) state, that toward the end of a fight the bulk
of the supports and reserves will have been absorbed by the firing
line; that the fire that such a line could direct toward a flank would
be insignificant; and that at any rate a _new_ firing line could not be
formed within a short time; and, therefore, that a charge against its
flank would be advantageous. This statement should be a warning for us
always to retain echelons or machine guns in rear of the flanks. The
most critical situation for infantry is that in which it is charged by
cavalry while retiring defeated under hostile fire with no supports
available to repulse the attack. A halt means annihilation; it must be
left to each individual to save himself as best he can.
During the battle of =Scheinovo=, three companies of the 11th Russian
Rifle Regiment made an unsuccessful attack and had to retreat under
the pursuing fire of the Turks, while Turkish cavalry began to
charge their left flank. When only 200-300 m. from the Turks, the
4th Company, which was most seriously threatened, halted and formed
square as if on the parade ground. During this maneuver, all the
officers and many non-commissioned officers were either killed or
wounded. The heavy losses of the battalion (50%) may, in the main, be
ascribed to this halt under the most violent fire of the enemy.[305]
[305] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 166.
When the cavalry charge comes more from the front, however, the hostile
infantry and artillery will have to stop firing, and it may then be
possible to rally or re-form the defeated force, provided the men will
heed their leaders.
Units in close order can deploy quickly toward the front or flank for
the purpose of firing. However, they will be able to fire in close
order only when not themselves subjected to hostile fire. The front and
flanks of a body of infantry in proper formation are equally strong,
but, in this connection, it should be borne in mind that a deployment
toward a flank, for the purpose of firing, always takes time and is apt
to impair the steadiness of the men.[306]
[306] General VON SCHERFF (_Kriegslehren_, II, p. 263) believes
that a frontal charge made by cavalry of sufficient strength has
better chances of succeeding than a charge in deep formation against
a flank. In a frontal charge, the suddenly appearing cavalry is
exposed “only to the fire at will of individual skirmishers whose
continuous front masks the fire of units in rear.” In the other case
(charge against a flank) the cavalry receives not only the fire of
the closed bodies first encountered, but also that of the supports
firing through the gaps between these groups. The frontal attacks
executed with superb gallantry by the French cavalry at Sedan rather
prove the opposite.
If time admits, a position may be looked for near obstacles, such as
ditches, hedges, swampy ground, etc., which impede the hostile cavalry.
It is not necessary, however, for the infantry to occupy the obstacle
itself; in fact, it is better to take up a position some distance
away. The shortness of our rifles obliges us to form the firing unit
at right angles to the line of advance of the approaching cavalry,
and to avoid aiming obliquely. The provision contained in a number of
drill regulations, including the French, that the bodies in close order
(supports, reserves) should be formed in echelon, is objectionable,
as this is apt to lead to their firing on one another (as the French
infantry did in repulsing the charge made by Bredow’s Brigade and
the Dragoons of the Guard at Vionville). The deployment from “broad”
and “deep” column to meet a sudden cavalry charge can, as a rule, be
ordered directly by company commanders on the caution of the battalion
commander, the method of meeting the attack being promptly decided
upon. The main thing is to be in instant readiness for firing and to
protect the flanks by means of echelons.
In a deployment from “deep column,” the measures taken by the
commanders of the rear companies must conform to those of the leading
companies. To meet a cavalry charge coming from the right front, for
example, the following scheme would be appropriate:
_The 1st Company_ forms left front into line so that its front is at
right angles to the line of advance of the cavalry;
_The 2nd Company_ forms as a support in rear of the left flank of the
first company;
_The 3rd Company_ forms right front into line, and prolongs the line
of the first company;
_The 4th Company_ also forms right front into line, or is held in
readiness as a support in rear of the right flank. In this way the
approaching cavalry can be met by the fire of from six to eight
platoons.
[Illustration]
It is a very simple matter to ward off a cavalry charge directed
against the flank of a marching column (form line by wheeling by
squads). When the cavalry charge is directed against the head or
the tail of a column, as recommended by the German Cavalry Drill
Regulations (par. 350), there will not be time enough, as a rule, for
the entire company or battalion to form line. It will suffice to let
the leading elements form line, the rear elements moving out of the
column and forming in rear of the flanks as supports.
Successful resistance does not depend upon the formation taken up; in
fact the latter is of importance only when it increases the feeling of
security. The morale of an organization is of more importance than the
formation taken up. A proud confidence in victory and morale are the
only factors which decide success, and the training of infantry should
be such as to develop these qualities.
Cavalry will in many cases consider that it has gained a success if it
causes infantry to discontinue a movement, or to take up formations
which interfere with the highest development of its fire, or which
offer favorable targets to the hostile infantry and artillery. This
is especially the case where infantry is in the act of beginning an
assault, when the slightest hesitation may jeopardize success. If
cavalry actually begins to charge at this moment, only the bodies
immediately threatened halt at the signal “attention,”[307] and face
the cavalry; the remainder continue the march.
[307] The German army is the only one that employs an appropriate
signal for this purpose. The attack made by the 28th Infantry Brigade
against the wood of Bor at Königgrätz is very instructive in this
connection. HÖNIG, _Taktik der Zukunft_, p. 56. At the signal,
“cavalry,” the threatened portions of the brigade halted and formed
square. Fortunately the Saxons had already begun to retire from the
edge of the wood. A stray hostile troop (_Eskadron_) had caused all
the trouble.
The sudden appearance of a line of charging cavalry produces such a
tremendous psychological effect on troops not immediately threatened,
that they either watch the attack passively, or else too many of them
take a hand in repulsing it. This moment, in which the attention of
the troops is so completely riveted on the cavalry, is seldom utilized
for the purpose of gaining ground to the front, or for effecting a
withdrawal.[308] It needs but little imagination to picture to one’s
self the success which the French army could have gained at Waterloo if
infantry masses had followed on the heels of Ney’s cavalry squadrons.
In the battle of Vionville the German infantry fired at the most
incredible angles at the charging French Guard cavalry. While Bredow’s
Brigade was making its charge during the same battle, part of the
infantry of the 6th Division stopped firing on the French skirmishers,
to follow with intense interest the cavalry charge that was taking
place on a totally different part of the battlefield. This conduct,
as natural as incorrect, suggests the advisability of profiting by
such moments of the enemy’s inattention for the purpose of executing
a movement or holding him with our own fire. It also seems absolutely
necessary to support with rifle fire the charge made by one’s own
cavalry, or at any rate to prevent the hostile infantry from firing
undisturbed on our troopers.
[308] “Every leader should carefully watch the progress of a
cavalry charge, and, as soon as he observes that friendly cavalry has
succeeded in penetrating the hostile line or that the enemy is shaken
and directs all of his fire against the charging cavalry, he should
immediately advance to the attack and be upon the enemy with the
bayonet before the latter recovers his senses. Such an attack will
not have been made in vain, even if the cavalry has been repulsed.”
General GURKO’S comments on the maneuvers of 1893.
Prince FREDERICK CHARLES, in his _Winke für die Offiziere der unter
Meinen Befehlen ins Feld rückenden Truppen_ (1870), also demands that
the infantry should quickly follow up cavalry attacks.
There are other reasons, however, why a sharp lookout should be
kept during a hostile cavalry charge. All cavalry drill regulations
recognize that a charge has greater chances of succeeding when it is
made in deep formation, in successive lines, or simultaneously from
several directions. The fire of the infantry is distributed, and,
unless a good lookout is kept, a part of the cavalry, scarcely or not
at all molested by fire, may perhaps succeed in driving the attack
home. This will be the case when infantry allows itself to be enticed
into developing a heavy fire in a direction from which only a feint is
made, while the main attack comes from another, or from several other
directions. Well led infantry will, therefore, never employ more rifles
in repulsing cavalry than are absolutely necessary, while the mere
threat of a cavalry charge will induce badly led infantry to develop an
excessive volume of fire.
On open terrain, when the approaching cavalry is visible at a
considerable distance, and when the infantry itself is exposed to
effective fire, the prone aiming position is to be preferred. The men
lying flat on the ground are not so easily wounded by the hostile
troopers, and the horses will generally avoid stepping on them, besides
which, the danger space is greater than when the men fire standing. In
rolling or close country, where cavalry cannot be seen by men lying
down, the aiming position kneeling or standing should properly be
assumed. The losses inflicted by hostile fire must then be endured.
Horses and riders are more apt to lose dash when charging an upright
human wall that is spouting fire, than when charging a kneeling or
prone opponent who scarcely offers an obstacle to the charge. What is
of greater importance, however, is that men standing upright can more
easily execute a change of front, fire on passing cavalry, and use
their bayonets in case the cavalry actually penetrates their line. The
British and Italian regulations very properly prescribe that the front
rank of a body of infantry in close order should kneel in such cases.
As the success of infantry depends to a great extent upon the
steadiness with which it receives the cavalry, it would seem to be
advantageous to withhold the fire until the cavalry gets within short
range.[309] General Dragomirov says in his forcible manner, “It is
not the bullet which has been fired, but the bullet which is still in
the rifle-barrel, and reserved for short range, that harms charging
cavalry.” If infantry in line was able to repulse a cavalry charge
in the past at 40 paces, with smoothbore muskets and at the first
volley,[310] the chances of doing this with modern rifles would be
still greater, if the “stopping power” of the 8 mm. projectiles were
absolutely certain at short ranges. As this is not the case, it is
necessary to open fire at an earlier moment.[311] If infantry does
not fire until cavalry gets within very short range, it will have to
reckon with the fact that even wounded horses will still be able to
carry their riders into its ranks. However, for purposes of instruction
in time of peace, it is proper to open fire late. If an infantry unit
is trained in time of peace always to open fire at the medium ranges on
charging cavalry, the unexpected appearance of hostile cavalry at short
ranges in actual war, is more likely to bring disorder into the ranks
of such a unit, than if it is trained in time of peace to reserve its
fire until the cavalry has come within short range.
[309] “The best preparation against rapidly executed mounted
charges is for all commanders to keep their eyes open, quickly and
coolly to size up the situation, and to act with determination. All
precipitation or haste would be disastrous, for it would communicate
itself to the troops. Infantry has never yet fired too late upon
cavalry.” Feldzeugmeister V. WÄLDSTATTEN.
[310] At Sedan, the 5th Company of the 46th Infantry fired only at
140 and 80 paces, and repulsed the charge. _Geschichte des Regiments
Nr. 46_, p. 186. In the same battle the 9th and 12th Companies of the
87th Infantry repulsed a charge at 60 paces. _Gen. St. W._, II, p.
1217.
[311] The _France Militaire_ contains the following statement
in regard to the effect produced on horses by bullets from the
French Lebel rifle in the engagements near Casablanca in 1907:
“Many officers serving in the field observed that the small caliber
bullets stopped horses only when a foot had been shattered or when
a vital organ had been hit. _At Casablanca, horses that had been
hit by several bullets continued to gallop for a long while._ This
is a remarkable phenomenon, for the gentlemen of theory count as
out of action every horse that has been hit by a projectile. This
is entirely incorrect. _Many wounded horses carry their riders into
the melée and do not die until the day after the fight._ This was
observed on the French as well as on the Moroccan side.
“Troopers charging full tilt, with the firm determination of
penetrating the hostile line, are not stopped so easily. In the first
place, they would have to be hit, and that, in itself, is not such
an easy matter. This is still more difficult for the infantry, if it
knows the dash of the hostile troopers. Let us cultivate the dash of
our cavalrymen, even if unreal situations are thereby produced in our
peace exercises. If, on the other hand, we teach our troopers in time
of peace to turn tail in the face of imaginary projectiles, we are
training our cavalry for panic in time of war.”
At =Garcia Hernandez= (1812), a French square was broken by a
wounded horse falling down within the ranks of the infantry. This
is, however, only true of closed bodies of infantry formed in two
ranks. Horses will frequently break through a skirmish line--whether
or not the horses are wounded is immaterial. Men are wounded in such
an event in exceptional cases only, and the wounds produced are
generally insignificant.
The following episode shows the effect produced on cavalry when it
attacks unshaken infantry which is in good formation and reserves its
fire. During the retreat after the battle of =Jena=, on October 28th,
1806, the Grenadier Battalion _Prinz August_, threatened by hostile
cavalry, did not feel equal to continue its march to Prenzlau and
attempted to cross the Ucker farther down. In the expectation that
a cavalry charge would be made, square was formed and the officers
were told not to fire until the cavalry had approached to within 20
paces. “Meantime, the French cavalry--the brigade which had crossed
at Golmitz as well as the remainder of Beaumont’s Division, under
its commander, in all nine regiments--approached. The first charge
was made by nine troops (_Eskadrons_) under the division commander.
They approached at a gallop. When the expected fire did not come, the
dragoons gradually reined in their horses, so that finally they were
going no faster than a slow trot. At 30 paces the command “Fire” was
given in the infantry and quite a number of troopers fell, the rest
galloping by the square on both sides. Eight subsequent charges were
repulsed in a similar manner.”[312]
[312] VON LETTOW-VORBECK, _Der Krieg von 1806-7_, II, p. 279. The
charge of the 5th Lancers at Beaumont forms a counterpart of the
above. KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 5, p. 18.
We have moreover to consider, in this connection, the strength of the
infantry, the formation of the cavalry, and whether the latter charges
from several directions or in several successive lines. A small force
of infantry, especially when it may anticipate attacks from several
directions, must open fire sooner than a strong infantry force which
has to contend with an attack coming from one direction only. In the
first mentioned case, an attempt must be made to meet quickly, one by
one, the attacks which follow each other at intervals.
It is quite a different matter when the infantry itself is not directly
threatened, but can take a hand in repulsing a cavalry charge made on
another unit; then it is advisable to open fire at an early moment
in order to break the momentum of the charge at long range. (11th
Jäger-Battalion at Wörth; 8th Company of the 46th Infantry at Sedan).
This in part determines the rear sight elevation that should be used.
The sights should not be changed on the battlefield, although this
has been done on the drill ground by well trained soldiers without
impairing the continuity or accuracy of the fire. According to the
table of ordinates of the trajectory (par. 23 German I. F. R.), a
bullet fired when the sight is set at 700 m. and aim is taken at the
feet of the horse, does not rise above the height of a mounted trooper
throughout that entire distance. The bullets may pass entirely over the
target however, when the men take too full a sight in the excitement
of battle, or when, in rolling country or terrain covered with grass
or crops, they cannot see the bottom of the target and aim above that
line. It is better, therefore, to aim at the breast of the horse, with
sights set at 600 m., and to fire as soon as the target gets within 800
m. On account of the excitement attending every cavalry charge, it is
not advisable to change sights.