company was assigned to the 1st, 3rd and 5th East Siberian Rifle
Brigades. This company consisted of 5 officers, 85 combatants, 13
non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 29 draft horses, and eight guns.
The latter were mounted on high carriages, and were protected by
steel shields. Of the ammunition, 1350 rounds, in belts holding 450
rounds each, were carried on each gun carriage, and 4500 rounds
on each of the six two-wheeled ammunition carts. The field train
consisted of nine one-horse carts. The loss of the machine gun
company at the =Yalu= was probably due to the fact that the guns,
mounted on high carriages, were quickly deprived of their mobility
in their second position, after they had, from their first position,
effectively flanked the advance of the Japanese infantry. Immediately
after this first lesson, the high wheeled carriage was apparently
abolished, and the tripod adopted. On September 26th, 1904, the
machine gun companies were reorganized. There were (old) wheeled,
and (newly-organized) so-called “mountain machine gun companies,”
the latter having pack animal transportation. These companies were
assigned to infantry and Rifle divisions and were designated by the
numbers of their divisions.
On December 12th, 1906, the machine gun organization was again
changed, because it was asserted that the assignment of machine gun
companies to divisions hampered the division commander; that the
employment of 8 guns at one point was injudicious; and that so large
a machine gun battery actually induced a scattering of the guns.
Infantry, Reserve, and Rifle regiments are each assigned a machine
gun organization consisting of 4 guns, mounted on tripods, equipped
with 6 mm. steel shields, with pack animal transportation.
Complement: 3 officers, 7 non-commissioned officers, 46 privates,
7 non-combatants, 10 saddle horses, 21 pack and draft horses (8 of
these for carrying ammunition), 4 ammunition carts, and 5 train
wagons. The personnel is drawn from a regiment in which the men to be
detailed for machine gun duty are trained.
According to an officer who commanded a machine gun company in the
battle of =Liao Yang=[296], his company went into position on August
30th, on the right flank of its division behind an earth embankment
at the south edge of the village of Gutsealing, and 300 m. from the
railroad running in a southwesterly direction. This position was
taken up with the object of preventing the envelopment of the right
flank of the division. Sufficient time was available for cutting
down the kaoliang crop for 650 m. Beyond this range the kaoliang
fields continued for several hundred meters. Directly in front of
the position of the company there was a hill, upon which several
mounted men showed themselves toward 10 A. M. As soon as fire was
opened on them, they threw themselves down in a field covered
with tall kaoliang. When these mounted men had reached a fairly
open space, about 900 m. from the machine gun company, they could
be clearly seen. In rear of them was observed a mountain battery
of artillery, which endeavored to go into position on the hill
mentioned, apparently with a view of directing a flanking fire on
the Russian skirmishers farther to the front than the machine guns.
Fire was opened at once, without first bracketing the target, the
first gun firing at 1200 paces (about 850 m.), and each succeeding
gun increasing the range by 25 paces, thus covering with fire a space
150 m. deep. Immediately after fire was opened on it, the mountain
battery attempted to escape to the right, but succumbed to the fire
of the machine guns. The latter had fired about 1¹⁄₂ minutes, and had
expended 6000 rounds of ammunition. About noon, hostile (Japanese)
skirmishers attempted to cross the railroad embankment, one by one,
apparently with a view of flanking the machine guns. The latter
opened fire on the Japanese, combined sights, and, for a short
period, rapid fire with sweeping being resorted to. The movement
made by the Japanese was discontinued; an advance made by groups
against the front of the machine guns got only as far as the edge of
the cleared kaoliang field. In the open, the skirmishers were unable
to advance a single step; every attempt, on their part, to rise,
was prevented. Whether it would have been possible to advance by
crawling, while keeping up a constant fire, can, of course, not be
determined now.
[296] _Russian Invalid_, October 1904.
At nightfall the Japanese again advanced in the kaoliang field and
annoyed the machine gun company throughout the night with rifle fire.
At daybreak they were again driven back by a continued fire from
the machine guns. The Japanese skirmishers remained in readiness,
however, in the kaoliang field, and fired on any target that offered.
When their fire became more and more galling, the machine gun
commander decided to send forward a non-commissioned officer and 15
men (Reservists and horse holders, armed with rifle and bayonet) to
drive them out. The undertaking was successful. It was found that
this continuous annoying fire had been kept up by only 1 officer and
24 men.
At 3 P. M., several Japanese assembled at the railway bridge; a
signal detachment also appeared. The fire at will of the infantry,
directed on this body of men, had no effect whatever; but after
two machine guns, one using an elevation of 1025, the other one of
1075 m., had fired on that point for a short time, the Japanese
disappeared. At 5 P. M., the machine guns succeeded in repulsing an
enveloping movement made against their right flank. This movement was
betrayed only by the motion of the kaoliang stalks. Toward 7 P. M.,
the Japanese directed artillery fire upon the machine guns, which
suffered considerable losses, although the personnel was protected by
an earth parapet and had ceased to work the guns. This fire did not
cease until nightfall, and, at 9 P. M., the position was evacuated
by order. An attack made by the Japanese during the night found the
machine guns gone. During the two days of the fight the company had
lost 30% of its personnel, and had fired 26,000 rounds of ammunition,
or only about 3200 rounds per gun during two days. The superiority
of the fire of these machine guns over that of the Japanese skirmish
line can perhaps only be explained by the small numbers of the latter.
In the defensive position on the =Shaho= and at =Mukden=, machine
guns were employed in favorable positions, behind sandbag parapets
and under splinter proof roofs. According to Lieutenant-Colonel
ANISINOW, good results were obtained against skirmishers up to 1050
m., against closed bodies of infantry and against troops of cavalry
(_Eskadrons_) up to 1400 m.; against batteries of artillery, halted
in the open, staffs, and columns, the fire was sufficiently effective
up to 1960 m.
8. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MACHINE GUN BATTERIES.
Machine guns will never be able to replace artillery at long ranges; on
the other hand, they will often find an opportunity to support other
arms with their fire at medium and short ranges.
It has been asserted that machine guns do not always follow the
movements of the firing lines in action, that the commander of a
force is not always able to find a good position for them; and the
question raised whether the space taken up by the machine guns and
their ammunition wagons in a column could not be more profitably filled
by companies of infantry or by a portion of an ammunition column of
corresponding length. To be sure, machine guns are a special arm; the
justification of their existence lies in the combination of constant
readiness for firing with highly developed mobility, so that, held back
under direct control of the commander of a force, they give him the
means wherewith to produce within a short time a sudden effect, in the
nature of a surprise. This is the very purpose for which machine guns
were created. They are not intended for prolonged fire action, not for
accompanying an infantry skirmish line in an advance by rushes, and,
least of all, for fighting well covered firing lines. In addition, the
fact that machine guns make it possible to concentrate fire quickly on
any space, whereby the moral effect is considerably increased, ought
not to be underestimated. It would seem to be advisable to employ
machine guns in conjunction with infantry when it is impossible to
develop a powerful fire on account of the conformation of the ground,
but when such fire is desirable for commanding approaches or defiles;
further, when fire alone suffices for delaying the enemy (for example,
in rear guard actions). In this case the guns may either be pushed far
to the front, or may be used in defensive positions, which can then be
held by a few men during the pauses in the fight.[297] Although machine
gun fire may perhaps be relatively less accurate than that of a body of
infantry, the value of pouring a large mass of projectiles on the enemy
within a brief space of time should not be underestimated.[298]
[297] At the Austrian Musketry School it was found that it was
not easy for a body of troops to fire on targets illuminated by the
shaft of a search light; few men possessed the requisite eyesight to
make this possible. It would no doubt be practicable, however, to
attach such men to the machine guns posted in a defensive position. A
considerable increase in fire effect could thus be obtained.
[298] Platoon volleys, directed for one minute on figures advancing
from 1200-1100 paces, resulted in 5, fire at will, in 1¹⁄₂, and
machine gun fire, in 3% hits. The three kinds of fire, when directed
against 30 prone skirmishers, resulted, in one minute, in 13, 18, and
10% hits, respectively.
Whether machine guns are distributed by platoons, or are employed as
a unit under control of superior leaders, will depend upon whether
it is contemplated to employ them in a purely defensive way for the
purpose of reinforcing the several weak points, or offensively in fire
surprises or in covering the flanks. The distribution by platoons
has the undeniable disadvantage that single guns will frequently
not find an opportunity to fire; that the difficulty of ammunition
supply is increased; and that the combined employment of the several
platoons will produce friction that cannot be easily avoided. On
the other hand, in machine gun batteries of three platoons each, an
employment by platoons is easy. Although a distribution by platoons is
permissible in a passive defense, the employment of the guns by battery
(company) against the flanks of the attacker permits the mobility and
fire power of the arm to be utilized to better advantage. While a
distribution of machine guns by platoons--if we except colonial and
mountain warfare--is, indeed, cheaper, it generally leads to a useless
frittering away of fighting units.[299]
[299] Lieutenant ULRICH (retired), who participated in the fighting
in Manchuria, voices the same opinion in _Jahrbücher_, March number,
p. 285:
“The opinion has been quite prevalent that the organization of
strong machine gun units is one of the most important requirements of
modern battle.”
Machine guns will be able to bring all their powers into play to the
best advantage at the beginning of a rencontre, when, from their
position as far forward as possible in the column, they are pushed to
the front to occupy important points and to compel the enemy to deploy
his infantry. The commander should, however, endeavor to withdraw the
machine guns from the fight as soon as his own infantry has deployed,
in order to avoid involving the guns in a protracted fire fight
necessitating an expenditure of a great amount of ammunition and in
which the accuracy of their fire would gradually suffer.[300] The
proper sphere of machine guns lies in their employment as a separate
arm, whether they are posted so as to flank an enemy, or are kept
at the disposal of the commander as an ever ready reserve, which
is pushed forward to keep the point to be attacked under fire, to
meet a counter-attack, or--and to this use they are best adapted--to
participate in the pursuit. Their employment is also proper in rear
guard actions, since they are able to remain in position longer, for
example, than rear guard infantry, whose energies are paralyzed by the
thought of getting away from the enemy in time. Machine guns are much
more independent than infantry on account of their ability to withdraw
at an increased gait. On account of their greater staying power and
the greater intensity of their fire, they increase the delay which
the enemy suffers, as well as the start gained by their own force;
they moreover enable their own force to get away from the enemy and to
escape pursuit.
[300] This applies particularly to machine guns which have air
cooled barrels. After four minutes of continuous fire, part of
the projectiles, and after seven minutes all of the projectiles
fired from a Hotchkiss machine gun go over the target (platoon).
_Kriegstechnische Zeitschrift_, January number, 1907.
In employing machine guns in defense, it must be borne in mind that the
guns are not adapted to carry on protracted fire actions; and that the
advantage of the mobility of machine gun batteries cannot be properly
utilized if they have been assigned, from the outset, a definite
section to defend. As a rule, it will be advisable, in defense, to keep
the machine guns at first with the reserve, and to employ them later,
as necessity requires, even by platoons, to reinforce the defensive
line at threatened points, or, by battery (company), to prevent an
envelopment, or to participate in offensive movements. This does not
preclude the employment of machine guns during the preparatory stage
of the engagement, for example, to command important approaches. When
a covered withdrawal of the guns is assured, it will also be possible
to post machine gun batteries in such a manner in front of, or to a
flank of the main defensive position, that they can suddenly sweep
with their fire the ground on which the opponent will probably place
his artillery. Flanking machine gun fire can sometimes be employed for
sweeping dead angles.
The provisions of the Austrian machine gun regulations correspond in
the main to those of the German Army. In Austria special stress is
laid upon the use of machine guns with cavalry, while in Germany they
are in addition a mobile reserve. Machine gun batteries accomplish the
principal objects which cavalry expects to attain by the assignment
of infantry,[301] viz., relief from fighting on foot, great fire
power, and mobility. Even in reconnaissance duty, machine guns will
be employed to break down the resistance of the enemy in occupied
localities and to augment the resistance of their own force in such
places. During an advance, machine guns should go into position at an
early moment in order to cover as effectively as possible the approach
and the deployment for attack. It is advisable to post the guns of
a machine gun battery together, so as not to have numerous lines of
fire interfere with the movements of the cavalry; this is especially
emphasized by the Austrian regulations. Machine gun batteries, like
horse batteries (artillery), remain with the cavalry divisions during a
battle.
[301] In regard to the employment of machine guns in the maneuvers
of 1905, see _Streffleur_, 1906, May number.
German machine guns are especially adapted for resisting cavalry, while
guns transported upon pack animals are entirely helpless on the march
and when going into position, and require the support of the other
arms. German machine guns, whether on their wheeled carriages or on
their sleds, are capable of warding off cavalry. The fire of the guns
should be distributed over the entire front of the mounted attacking
line. Special attention should be paid to lines following the first
attacking line, to the flanks of the guns themselves, and to covering
the carriages when they are not with the guns. Machine guns are able to
advance on open ground without regard to cavalry, so long as the latter
is not supported by artillery or infantry, or is not so superior in
force that it can attack simultaneously from several directions, or in
several lines.
In action against artillery it should be borne in mind that artillery
possesses an unquestioned superiority of fire at the longer ranges; at
ranges at which machine guns are able to fire at all, they must seek to
find protection under cover, or by distributing the guns. Artillery is
very susceptible to flanking fire. When that arm is to be engaged, the
machine gun sleds should be brought as close as possible to the hostile
batteries. In this case it is, moreover, advisable to have large
intervals between the machine gun platoons. The great mobility of the
machine gun battery, when limbered, will sometimes enable it to take up
a position from which it can flank the enemy. In distributing machine
gun fire it would be well always to assign the same task to two guns.
It is not a good plan to have all the machine guns sweep the entire
front of a firing battery (artillery).
The opinions in regard to machine gun employment in field
warfare--mountain and fortress warfare are not considered
here--differ considerably. In =England= machine guns are attached to
battalions, and Japan of late leans toward this mode of employment.
In =Switzerland= machine guns serve in addition as a substitute for
horse batteries, which their army lacks.
The =English= view is obviously affected by their experience in
colonial wars.
The following are given as the duties of machine guns _in attack_:
1. The machine gun is above all to be employed at long ranges. In
open country it will seldom be possible for the gun to reach a
position in the first line, where, moreover, the gun would offer too
good a target. Covered terrain should be taken advantage of to get
the gun close to the enemy. The advance of infantry may be supported
at long ranges by machine gun fire (fire of position).
2. The delivery of volley fire against any point of the hostile
position.
3. The warding off of counter-attacks or attacks made by cavalry.
4. The utilization of flanking positions.
5. The support of cavalry during delaying actions (ammunition being
in this case a substitute for men) although the fire effect against
low targets is very small.
6. The holding of captured positions.
_In defense_ the isolated employment of machine guns at a distance
from the organization is prohibited and their use against extended
skirmish lines cautioned against. Machine guns are well adapted for
protecting flanks and can be kept back as a reserve to prevent the
advance of hostile reinforcements, to support counter-attacks, to
direct fire against deep and dense targets, and, finally, to support
the firing line in action at short range.
_In defense_ the principal duties of machine guns will consist of--
1. Sweeping obstacles and commanding terrain which is specially
favorable for the attack; flanking of salients.
2. Reinforcing weak points.
3. Firing on advancing hostile reinforcements.
The cavalry regulations, contrary to those of the infantry, also
permit a massed employment of machine guns when ordered by brigade or
division commanders.
“As a rule, it will not be advisable to open fire on isolated mounted
men or small groups of approximately platoon strength, as this would
betray the position prematurely. In action, machine guns may be
employed in conjunction with dismounted skirmishers for the purpose
of forming a supporting point for movements, a rallying position, or
for protecting a flank. Finally, during an attack, machine guns may
support the fire of the horse battery, on the outer flank of which
they go into position, to serve as support, or to facilitate by their
fire a withdrawal.”
These official regulations are not entirely in accord with the views
entertained in the army. The combined use of the machine guns of
a brigade, such as quite naturally resulted in the engagement at
=Pieters Hill=, is advocated by many. At the longer ranges, machine
gun companies are to fire on favorable targets, discontinuing their
fire when their object has been accomplished. In addition they are to
cover the advance or withdrawal of the infantry; to fire on certain
points of the hostile position; to act against the enemy’s flanks in
pursuit; and, in defense, posted in pairs, they are to flank salient
angles and make it difficult for the enemy to approach the obstacles.
In =Switzerland= machine guns are considered an auxiliary arm. “Our
field army should be capable of accepting and sustaining battle in
the mountains and on highland plateaus without necessitating the
creation of numerous special detachments for that purpose. Machine
gun companies should be a tool which can be used in the mountains and
on highland plateaus, and which can be turned over for use to any
organization.”
The platoon is the firing unit; the company commander posts his
platoons at large intervals and regulates their mutual coöperation.
Fire, suddenly delivered from various points, frequently rather
far distant from each other, is considered to have a particularly
demoralizing effect; the scattered posting of the platoons makes it
difficult for the enemy to combat effectively the individual platoons
which are skillfully concealed on the terrain. “The indefinable,
uncanny and confusing aspect of their appearance enhances the effect
of the fire surprise.” The defensive character is here especially
clearly marked, for cavalry which counts in the first place on the
offensive will prefer a combined employment of machine guns, so as
not to be hampered in its movements by the various lines of fire. On
the march, machine guns are posted as far forward as possible in the
column; single platoons may also be attached to troops (_Eskadrons_)
of advance guard cavalry, and, in exceptional cases only, to troops
(_Eskadrons_) of reconnoitering cavalry. Machine guns, supported by
weak cavalry detachments, may be pushed forward to occupy defiles;
moreover, the machine gun company assigned to a cavalry brigade may
be sent into action either as a whole unit, or it may be divided from
the start or during the course of the fight. This machine gun company
may also be attached to regiments, troops (_Eskadrons_) or platoons
of cavalry charged with special missions, in which case it is, as a
rule, broken up into platoons. The premature detaching of machine gun
units is especially cautioned against. “The mobility of the machine
gun unit is such that it is not at all dangerous to hold them back
until the last moment before sending them to the actually threatened
point.”
The regulations deem a special support necessary for the machine
gun batteries when they are sent on independent missions. Single
guns are not to be so used. Machine guns, distributed by platoons,
invest cavalry dismounted for fire action with a special power
of resistance. It will frequently be advantageous to occupy the
enemy in front with weakly supported machine gun batteries, while
maneuvering with the main body of the mounted force so as to gain the
enemy’s weak point, and attacking him there with fire or a charge.
In a cavalry fight Maxim machine gun marksmen, by timely, hold,
and energetic action, will very often be able to create favorable
conditions for their own troops, facilitate the selection of a point
of attack, and retard and interfere with the hostile deployment.
The following statements taken from the regulations for the _Service
and Training of_ =Swiss= _cavalry_ (1904) are of interest:
“Machine guns invest pursuing cavalry with tremendous power.--Their
violent fire, suddenly breaking forth, especially when quickly
delivered at the flanks of the retreating mass, must have an
annihilating effect and convert the retreat into a rout.
“In a retreat, Maxim gun marksmen with their guns can quickly occupy
rallying positions (when possible, flanking), which, thanks to their
mobility, they are capable of holding longer than other arms. Thereby
they facilitate for the other troops the critical breaking off of the
engagement.
“The retreat will proceed with greater steadiness and time will be
gained for organizing resistance and for making that resistance more
obstinate.