to every infantry division and brigade of mountain troops.[257]
These detachments are charged with the duty of keeping up the
visual signal and telegraph service in field and mountain warfare.
The Morse alphabet is used in visual signaling and in telegraphic
communication. In this the Austrian regulations differ from the
German. The infantry telegraph detachment attached to an infantry
division is divided into three sections, and is equipped with
telephones, wire, heliographs, and signal flags. Each section
consists of 15 men (6 of whom are telegraphers), and is equipped with
24 km. of wire.
[257] _Streffleur_, 1905, April-May number.
=France.= Provisional signal detachments have been formed in some of
the infantry organizations. These detachments are to take care of
visual signal and telephone communication. The telephone sections are
expected to maintain two stations (12 km. wire).
=England.= Each brigade (4 battalions) has one telephone detachment.
Wire (9.6 km.) is carried along on two pack animals.
7. LOCAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THE INFANTRY.
(Pars. 305, 319, 355, 363 and 376 German I. D. R.).
It is a strange fact that, while splendid work was done in strategic
reconnaissance in the large maneuvers of recent years, not only in
Germany but also in France, the local, tactical reconnaissance was less
good and often deficient, so that in consequence thereof surprises
were not rare. Frequently a gap occurred in the reconnoitering line
when the cavalry in front of the various parts of the army was brushed
aside and the stronger cavalry force deprived the weaker of the freedom
of choosing its line of retreat. Occasionally, when this happened,
cavalry patrols were sent out with orders to report directly to the
infantry, or, at any rate, to find the hostile route columns, but
this expedient was only partially successful. It must be remembered
that troopers cannot ride close enough to the enemy to see anything
of importance, and that they frequently are in ignorance of the very
things which are of value for the infantry. In addition, the divisional
cavalry is entirely too weak to perform all the tasks assigned to
it. Therefore infantry and artillery should not rely upon cavalry
reconnaissance. The mere fact that infantry has sent out cavalry
patrols in a certain direction does not relieve it from the duty of
providing for its own reconnaissance.
The greatest obstacle to infantry reconnaissance lies in the fact
that its cyclists are confined to good roads; that its mounted
officers cannot be withdrawn from their appropriate duties except
for short periods; that, as a rule, orderlies are not available for
carrying messages; and that, if officers carry messages in person, the
reconnaissance is interrupted. Infantry patrols, on account of the
slowness of their movements, cannot transmit messages quickly, and,
as a result, such messages frequently arrive too late to be of any
value. On the other hand, infantry patrols possess an advantage in
that, by utilizing cover, they can get close to the enemy without being
observed. The need of local reconnaissance is greater now than it was
in the past, because troops can no longer change front when deployed,
and because those which come under hostile fire while in close order
formations may, in a short time, suffer well-nigh annihilating losses.
In the South African war the British infantry was frequently placed
in difficult situations by the suddenly delivered fire of the Boers
(=Magersfontain=, =Colenso=), which induced it to deploy all of its
lines on a wide front at an early moment.
The Japanese attached much importance to local reconnaissance,
whereas the Russian leaders considered it as something unusual, so
that Kuropatkin was finally obliged to prescribe it in army orders.
“Local reconnaissance was performed by 20 to 30 infantrymen. These
carefully approached our positions in small groups. One man of each
group laid his rifle aside and crawled close up to our trenches,
raised his head and observed, while three or four of his companions,
whom he had left farther in rear, opened fire on the trenches.
Occasionally all of these men threw themselves flat on the ground for
protection. This mode of procedure continued for seven hours.”
The thoroughness of the reconnaissance generally made a timely
deployment possible, even when the enemy was well concealed, but that
neglects occurred nevertheless is borne out by the advance of the
Japanese 2nd Division at =Fuchau= and =Kapukai= on March 10th, 1905.
This division advanced without reconnoitering, struck the fortified
Russian position, was unable to move forward or to the rear, and had
to fight under unfavorable conditions, and while suffering heavy
losses, from early morning until 4 P. M., when the general situation
compelled the enemy to evacuate the position. The advance of the
Russian 54th Division (Orlof) during the battle of =Liao Yang= (2nd
Sept.) is a similar example of disproportionately greater importance
and with a tragic ending. The noise of the battle at =Sykwantun=
caused the commander of the 54th Division to leave the position
assigned him on the heights of the =Yentai= mines and to march toward
the sound of the cannonading. The division, advancing over covered
terrain without adequate reconnaissance, was taken in flank and rear
by the Japanese 12th Brigade (Sasaki),[258] and thrown back in utter
rout upon its former position, carrying with it the troops which had
been left there. Thus the Yentai heights fell into the possession of
the Japanese.
[258] For details of the attack made by Sasaki’s Brigade, see
GERTSCH, _Vom russisch-japanischen Kriege_, I, sketch 14.
The primary object of local reconnaissance is to protect a force from
surprise. This may be accomplished by sending out combat patrols, and
by company commanders riding ahead in time. (Par. 457 German I. D. R.).
The latter are likewise charged with picking out avenues of approach to
selected fire positions, and the sooner they begin the reconnaissance
the better, for the accidents of the ground can then be utilized to the
best advantage.
The difficulties of the reconnaissance are increased when we have to
reckon with the measures taken by the enemy to screen his force.[259]
[259] The attacker’s reconnaissance must be prevented as long as
possible. Frequently patrols in the foreground will suffice for this
purpose. (Par. 406 German I. D. R.)
Weak infantry patrols can neither break down this resistance nor create
the necessary opening through which the leaders can reconnoiter in
person. Stronger forces are requisite, and “reconnaissance companies”
may have to be sent out toward the enemy to serve as a support for the
patrols, to reinforce them when necessary, and to constitute natural
collecting stations for messages. “Reconnaissances in force” are the
result of these endeavors to obtain information,[260] for the defender
will not reveal his dispositions unless the attacker threatens an
attack. Reconnaissances in force are especially appropriate in this
case, since the information obtained in regard to the position and
strength of the enemy can be utilized at once. (Par. 134 German F. S.
R.).
[260] See _Taktik_, IV. p. 214, et seq. The results of the
reconnaissance in force made at Neuville aux Bois were very
unsatisfactory.
In France great importance is attached to forcibly gaining information
by means of detachments of all arms which also prevent hostile
reconnaissance. In minor operations the French send out infantry
detachments, which, from secure hiding places, pick off observers,
screen the position of their own force, and prevent the enemy from
using covered avenues of approach. However, these very patrol combats
may cause the commander to come to a false conclusion in regard to
the hostile position. If the cavalry reconnaissance has determined
that the enemy intends to accept battle within a particular area, the
details of his intentions must be obtained by local reconnaissance.
Then the commander will wish to know whether or not an immediate attack
is feasible, or whether it is advisable to wait until nightfall for
bringing up the infantry. The local reconnaissance determines where
the flanks of the enemy are located; whether the position in front is
the hostile main position or only an advanced post; whether the enemy
has made preparations for defense; and where the hostile artillery is
posted. As a rule, it will be impossible, until after the engagement
has begun, to recognize a skillfully located fortified position,[261]
to distinguish between the real and dummy trenches, determine the
position of obstacles and estimate whether they can be surmounted with
or without adequate apparatus. Then it likewise becomes necessary
to find and mark covered avenues of approach.[262] In moving to new
firing positions, it is important that advanced positions, masks, and
dummy trenches be recognized in time. The commander of a unit on a
flank should make dispositions for observation on his flank, and for
permanent communication with neighboring units, even though no specific
orders have been received by him to that effect. Strange as it may
seem, the troops deployed on the road Gorze--Rezonville (battle of
Vionville), by their failure to get into early communication with the
troops which had been on the ground for some time, neglected to take
advantage of the information gained by those troops.[263]
[261] See _Taktik_, V, p. 243, et seq.
[262] HOPPENSTEDT (_Schlacht der Zukunft_, pp. 134 and 140) draws a
graphic picture which is a faithful reproduction of reality.
The procedure outlined by that author (_Ibid._, p. 122) for
indicating, by means of flag signals, points sheltered from hostile
fire, seems practicable. He states: “Holding his flag upright, the
member of the patrol proceeds steadily on his way to Weyer. Now he
has arrived at the point where the road bends slightly toward the
south; his flag descends,” etc.
[263] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 128, et seq.,
p. 243.
The necessity for thorough reconnaissance is illustrated by the
successful “fire surprises” carried out by the Boers at Modder River
on November 28th, 1899, and at Colenso, against Hart’s Brigade
advancing in dense masses, on December 15th, 1899.
The enumeration of these tasks shows that local reconnaissance should
not be restricted to the preparatory stage of the combat alone, but
that it must be kept up during the whole course of the action. To
the duties enumerated, we may add, occasional tasks, such as picking
off staffs and signal men; sneaking up on artillery that has been
incautiously pushed forward; and annoying the enemy by flanking fire.
For such tasks, so-called “scouting detachments,”[264] after the
Russian pattern, have frequently been recommended. Their usefulness
in difficult country and in operations against the enemy’s flank
and rear cannot be denied. In minor operations, if provided with
ample ammunition and advancing on side roads, they can hamper the
reconnaissance of the enemy, secure the flanks of their own force,
ascertain the probable extent of the prospective battlefield, and
finally, having made a skillful lodgment, they can become very annoying
to the hostile artillery. In a large battle the necessary elbow room
for such employment is lacking. To form picked men into special
organizations, as is done in Russia, is always of doubtful value. The
constant transfer of their best men to the mounted infantry during
the second part of the South African war was fatal to the British
infantry battalions. An organization cannot dispense with its good
men; it needs them to replace wounded non-commissioned officers. While
everything goes without a hitch, the withdrawal of good men from an
organization is of little importance; the drawbacks to this procedure
become apparent, however, when the line begins to waver, when, in the
absence of officers, only the example of the courageous men prevents
the weak-kneed from running away. Our regulations properly appreciate
the importance of psychological impressions during critical combat
situations; they state: “The man who feels his courage and coolness
going, in the excitement of battle, should look toward his officers.
Should they have fallen, he will find plenty of non-commissioned
officers and brave privates, whose example will revive his courage.”
(Par. 268 German I. D. R.).
[264] V. TETTAU, _Die Jagdkommandos der russischen Armee_, Berlin,
1901.
HOPPENSTEDT, _Patrouillen- und Radfahr-Kommandos_, 1907.
If it becomes necessary to despatch a stronger infantry force on a
mission of minor importance, it will usually be better to detail an
entire company than to improvise a detachment whose leader would know
his men only imperfectly.
Before the 95th Infantry (French) made its attack on the brewery
of =l’Amitié= (south of =Noisseville=), on August 31st, 1870, a
reconnoitering detachment had ascertained the strength of the
position and the manner in which it was held by the defender.[265]
[265] _Wald- und Ortsgefecht_, p. 192.
=Examples of the successful employment of flanking fire by small
forces:=
The flanking fire, delivered from the =Bois des Ognons= by about
30 men of the 12th Company, 72nd Infantry, compelled the French to
withdraw their left flank. (Combat on the Gorze--Rezonville road,
16th August, 1870).[266]
[266] KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 8-9, p. 146.
At =Gravelotte-St. Privat=, flanking fire is said to have caused the
withdrawal of nine French battalions which had until then delivered
an effective fire upon the Prussian Guard Artillery.[267]
[267] _Ibid._, 10, p. 24, and 12, p. 24, et seq.
8. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TERRAIN.
The defense requires extensive, open terrain, permitting unobstructed
view, while the attack requires stretches of ground hidden from the
observation of the enemy and sheltered from his fire, in order that
the troops may be deployed for action at the decisive ranges. A piece
of ground will rarely possess all these advantages, but, nevertheless,
well-trained infantry will be able to defend successfully a piece
of ground that has a poor field of fire, and infantry which is
energetically and skillfully led will be able to cross even an open
plain.
At the longer ranges, a force will, in the first place, endeavor to
keep concealed. While advancing, troops will rarely be able to take
advantage of available cover, but at a halt and while firing they
will be able to do so. Their taking advantage of the ground should
not lead to a diminution of the energy of the advance, and should
not cause parts of the force to fall behind.[268] “The terrain
exerts considerable influence on the formation of troops. Open
country requires that distances be increased so that the losses may
be minimized, while close country permits distances to be reduced.
The commander should take particular care not to let this advantage
escape him, since it is often necessary in this case to reinforce the
first line promptly. Close order formations may be retained longest on
covered terrain.” (Par. 307 German I. D. R.).
[268] This is equally true of ground that is difficult to march
over; the troops must cross it. The evasion of difficult portions of
terrain usually leads to disorder and a dispersion of the troops.
For the advance of the 18th Infantry Brigade at Wörth, see KUNZ,
_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, p. 101. (Thick underbrush in
the woods on the Fuchshübel.)
An attack over a plain devoid of cover “should be avoided as far as
possible, or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered
to advance over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point
where an approach under cover is practicable. If suitable terrain is
lacking to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over
the open plain.” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). In contrast with the
continuous skirmish lines of the past, which are still favored by the
Austrians, the German regulations permit a gap to be left in the line
where an open plain devoid of cover exists, without thereby implying
that it cannot be crossed. The French regulations (par. 257), contrary
to the German, contemplate that “only weak detachments be left in the
open, fire swept spaces,” and that the troops intended for the fire
fight be pushed forward under available cover, separate groups being
thus formed.[269]
[269] This should be an important hint for the opponent. The lines
of approach may perhaps be sheltered with reference to a certain
point, but there will always be portions of the enemy’s line from
which a fire may be directed upon these avenues of approach and the
troops marching thereon.
“This mode of fighting in groups does away with the continuous firing
lines of the past which no longer fulfill the requirements of modern
battle.
“The rearmost fractions of the force endeavor to avoid open spaces,
or such as are swept by hostile fire, by moving, sometimes in a close
order formation and again widely extended, toward the lines of cover,
without regard to the direction in which the enemy may happen to be.
The unit that finds the advance easiest takes the lead, and all the
others, supported by the fire of their immediate neighbors, endeavor to
follow it.
“Depending upon the character of the terrain and available cover, the
forces deployed for the fire fight will, therefore, advance in a
rather dense formation in the areas favorable for such a procedure,
while weak forces only will be found on open and fire swept ground. The
advance is regulated by designating the objective of the attack and by
stipulating the necessity of mutual coöperation.”
This French group attack owes its existence to the silently accepted
fact that an open plain cannot be crossed when swept by unsubdued
hostile fire; it reckons with an unfavorable terrain such as an
attacker will only find in exceptional cases. We by no means fail to
recognize the fact that individual portions of the attacker’s force,
when favored by the terrain, will be able to advance more quickly than
others, and that other portions may even be compelled to discontinue
their advance for a time; but it seems a precarious proceeding to lay
down this result of the hostile fire effect as a guide in the training
of troops. The group tactics of the Boers stood the test only on the
defensive; they could not prevent individual groups from being attacked
by far superior forces. In an attack, the units favored by the terrain
will constitute the framework upon which the units which are compelled
to advance more slowly, will form. There is, however, danger that these
leading groups will succumb to the superior fire of a defender who is
deployed on a broader front. Although this may not happen, the spirit
of the regulations tempts leaders to drive everything forward, to rush
ahead with isolated parts of the force. An additional drawback of these
systematic group tactics lies in the difficulty of deploying the troops
moving in the narrow avenue of approach. If the French infantry really
desires to avoid the plain and wants to stick principally to cover,
who will guarantee that the great freedom allowed it, will not cause
it to crowd together under cover, lose the direction to its objective,
and become completely mixed up?[270] This danger is the more imminent
since no importance is attached to a more definite limitation of the
frontage to be covered, while wide extension is, on the contrary,
actually preached. The fear of losses will gain the upper hand and
the attack will lose its energy. “It is easy to teach troops to be
over-cautious, but it is a precarious undertaking to lead such troops
against the enemy.” (Sir IAN HAMILTON).
[270] The plentiful cover along the ravine of the Mance brook was
by no means an actual advantage for the Ist Army. The 18th of August
presents the strange phenomenon of the success of the attack on St.
Privat, made over terrain devoid of cover, and the failure of the
attack on the French IInd Corps, made over the most favorable terrain
imaginable.
Whither such an endeavor to utilize cover must lead, is shown by the
advance of the 35th Füsilier Regiment past =Vionville= on =Flavigny=
and the group of trees north of that village. The violent fire
directed upon these companies caused them to deviate to right and
left, to leave their battalions, and to lose the march direction
designated by the regimental commander.[271] One company of the IInd
Battalion 35th Füsilier Regiment, which formed the center (march
direction, a point north of Flavigny), participated in the assault
made on Flavigny by the IIIrd Battalion; the other companies moved to
the left against Vionville and were joined by a company of the IIIrd
Battalion.--“A peculiar feature of this fight was the fire directed
from the group of trees on the attacking force which advanced against
the center of the hostile position. Ten of the twelve companies of
the attacking force (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of the
35th Füsilier Regiment, and 9th, 10th and 12th of the 20th Infantry)
were scattered to right and left by this fire, and forced to move
in a totally different direction than was originally intended. The
direction was maintained to a certain extent only by two companies
(the 3rd and 11th of the 20th Infantry).”[272]
[271] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 560.
[272] V. SCHERFF, _Kriegslehren_, II, p. 106. With a sketch (A)
showing lines of advance of the companies.
While the new German Infantry Drill Regulations do not underestimate
the difficulties of an advance over open ground, they require that the
march direction be maintained and that cover be utilized only within
the assigned “combat section”; they leave it to subordinate commanders
to choose suitable expedients for crossing such unfavorable ground.
“Within the limits of the section assigned to an organization for an
attack, the plain devoid of cover should be avoided as far as possible,
or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered to advance
over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point where an
approach under cover is practicable. _If suitable terrain is lacking
to permit this, then the decisive attack must be led over the open
plain._” (Par. 325 German I. D. R.). For purposes of instruction, it
is entirely correct to require “that even on terrain devoid of cover,
well-trained infantry should not open fire until the medium ranges are
reached.” (Par. 326 German I. D. R.). The necessity, when under hostile
fire, of adapting movements to the accidents of the ground, should not
impair the energy of the advance and cause portions of the attacking
force to lag behind, thereby disintegrating it. On the other hand, we
should not be afraid to leave gaps in our attacking line, as the enemy
would, in any case, not be able to use them for his own advance.
Thus we have here the German united attack, on the one hand, and
the French group attack, on the other. Since group tactics no
doubt diminish losses, they should be used in delaying actions, in
holding attacks, and in defense; they should unquestionably not be
employed when a concerted, rapid movement of skirmishers to the front
becomes necessary. How should the Vth Corps at Wörth and the Guard
at St. Privat, for instance, have attacked, according to the French
regulations?
VI. MACHINE GUNS.[273]
[273] _Exerzierreglement und Schieszvorschrift für die
Maschinengewehrabteilungen_, 1904.
Captain BRAUN, _Das Maxim-Maschinengewehr und seine Verwendung_,
Berlin, 1905.
1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARM.