At Poplar Grove, 7000 Boers with 7 guns fought on a front of_Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry

(0.4 men per meter), while the British deployed 25,000 rifles, 5000

troopers, and 116 guns on a front of 32 km. (0.8 men per meter). In

the engagement at Diamond Hill, on June 11th, 1900, the army under

Lord Roberts (40,000 men) advanced on a front of 37 km. Such liberties

could be taken only in the face of a shaken enemy who had given up all

thoughts of the offensive. At Paardeberg, February 18th, 1900, the 6th

Division and the Brigade of Highlanders succeeded in getting close to

the enemy, but there the attack failed on account of the lack of an

impetus from the rear. Even in the Russo-Japanese war the frontages

were greater than those to which we are accustomed. The reason for this

overextension lies in the fact that a numerically inferior assailant

was desirous of vanquishing the defender, and in order to accomplish

this purpose, he was obliged to make an extensive use of the spade and

to put all rifles into the first line.

===================+=======+=======+======+==========+==========

| | | |Per 10,000|

| | | age. |Jap.|Russ.|Jap.|Russ.

-------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+-----

| | | km. | m. | men.

South front) |106,700|150,000| 26 |2600| 1750|3.9 | 5.9

| | | | | | |

Shaho |148,000|257,000| 48 |3330| 1980|3. | 5.

| | | | | | |

of Yalu Army) |247,000|336,000| 96 |3960| 2970|2.6 | 3.4

-------------------+-------+-------+------+----+-----+----+-----

[244] According to data given by Lieut. Col. Yoda in the _Journal

of the Officers’ Association_, Tokio.

The realization that troops in fortified positions only require small

reinforcements or none at all, very naturally caused frontages to be

increased and depth of combat formations to be decreased. Gaps in the

attacking line, provided they were kept under observation, proved by no

means a disadvantage.[245]

[245] At Mukden, on March 3rd, 1905, there was a gap of 7 km.

between the Japanese IVth and Ist Armies, which was covered by

only one infantry regiment of Reservists, two dismounted cavalry

regiments, and one battalion of artillery. However, the Russians were

fighting on the passive defensive in this case. The insignificant

danger to be apprehended from such gaps is especially emphasised by

the French regulations.

During attacks it frequently appeared that the Japanese lacked the

necessary reinforcements.

~INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS RIFLES ON THE DENSITY OF BATTLE FORMATIONS.~[246]

[246] General MINARELLI-FITZGERALD, _Infanteristische Reflexionen_.

========+======+=======+=============+==================+================

| | | +-----+------+-----+

|of | | |Bat- |Esca- |Field|

|the | | |tal- |drons |guns.|

|Cam- | | |ions |@ 150 | |

| | | |ri- |ers. | |

--------+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------

Muzzle | 1815 |Water- |French | 12 | 19 |46 |After Napoleon’s

loaders.| |loo +-------------+-----+------+-----+concentration

| | |British | 10 | 15 |25 |for battle

+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------

| 1859 |Sol- |French and | 7 | 5 |19 |After the victo-

| | +-------------+-----+------+-----+the Austrian

| | |Austrians | 7 | 2.5 |21 |VIIIth Corps to

+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------

| 1866 |Cus- |Austrians | 8 | 2. |17 |

--------+ +-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------

Breech | |König- |Prussians | 9.5| 10 |39 |Situation at

loaders | |grätz +-------------+-----+------+-----+noon.

large | | |Austrians | 10 | 8.5 |43 |

+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------

| 1870 |Wörth |Germans | 9 | 5 |37 |

| +-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+

| |Grave- |Germans | 11.5| 9 |46 |

| |lotte +-------------+-----+------+-----+

| |St. |French | 8 | 6.5 |32 |

--------+------+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------

Mag. | 1899 |Colen- |British | 1.5| | 4 |Including 1¹⁄₂

of | |battle,| | | | |

small | |Dec. | | | | |

caliber.| |15th | | | | |

+------+-------+ +-----+------+-----+----------------

| 1900 |Colen- | | 2.5| 1.5 | 7.5 |Including 1¹⁄₂

| |so, 2d | | | | |heavy guns.

| |ary | | | | |

| |27th | | | | |

--------+---+--+-------+-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------

7.6 mm. | M | 1|Febru- |Russians | 1 | 0.4 | *5 |Total extension

against | u | 9|ary | | | | |from the Liao to

6.5 mm. | k | 0|20th | | | | |Tung-wha-sien.

Mag. | d | 5| | | | | |*Incl. 1 heavy

rifles. | e | .| | | | | |gun.

| n | | | +-----+------+-----+----------------

| | | | | 3 | 0.7 | *5.5|Excl. East and

| | | +-------------+-----+------+-----+----------------

| | | |Japanese | 3.5| 0.8 |*15.5|Exclusive of the

| | +-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+-----+----------

| | |March |West |Rus- | 5 | 0.8 |†18 |†Ex- |Excl. of

| | | | | | | | |of |Cossack

| | | | | | | | |heavy|Div.

| | | | |Japan-| 3.5| 1 |†11.6| |Excl. of

| | | | |ese | | | | |2d Cav.

| | | +------+------+-----+------+-----+ |

| | | |South |Rus- | 1.7| .5 | †6 | |

| | | | +------+-----+------+-----+ |

| | | | |Japan-| 2.2| .3 | †5.6| |

| | | | |ese | | | | |

| | +-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+ |

| | |March |West |Rus- | 4.6| 0.7 |†15.6| |Excl. of

| | | | | | | | | |Div.

| | | | +------+--- -+------+-----+ |

| | | | |Japan-| 4 | 0.6 |†10.5| |Excl. of

| | | | |ese | | | | |Cav. Div.

--------+---+--+-------+------+------+-----+------+-----+-----+----------

Let us now recapitulate the most important points which have a bearing

on combat frontage:

1. The frontage of individual units cannot be definitely fixed, as it

depends upon the situation and the purpose of an action.

2. Favorable terrain, cover, and intrenchments permit an extended front

to be obstinately defended with a weak force.

3. The frontage does not increase in proportion to the size of the

force.

4. An organization (company, battalion, or regiment) fighting as part

of a larger force is justified in deploying on a wider front than when

acting alone.

The necessity for distribution in depth increases with the size of the

force and with the number of units composing it Only the result can

decide whether a narrow or a wide frontage was justified in a given

case. A commander will endeavor to hold certain parts of the line with

a weak force, posted in groups, while, at the decisive point, he will

throw in every available man in order to gain the victory.

Provisions of Various Regulations.

=Austria-Hungary.= Frontage depends upon the tactical situation and

the terrain. The frontage of a company acting as part of a larger

force in attack is fixed at about 130-150 paces (97-112 m.). “In

other situations, a greater frontage is, as a rule, permissible.”

The battalion acting as part of a larger force in attack, “is, as

a rule, not to cover a frontage exceeding its own front when in

line”--in peace exercises, 300-400 paces (225-300 m.). With companies

of 200 men, 2 rifles, and in the battalion 2.6 rifles are reckoned

per meter of front. “The increased fighting power of infantry, due

to better fire effect, in general permits a greater frontage to be

covered. This will often be taken advantage of, in order to make

as many troops as possible available for the decisive stage of the

combat. But this frontage should not be so great, that the requisite

power of resistance is weakened, or that tactical coöperation or the

attainment of the object of the combat are impaired.” Further than

this nothing is prescribed.

=France.= Nothing definite is prescribed. The combat is carried on by

groups separated by intervals.

“When _an organisation is acting as part of a larger force_ and has

to advance directly to the front against a well-defined objective,

its commander may from the outset push a strong force into action,

retaining a reserve only in exceptional cases. If one of the flanks

of this force is in the air, it will be advisable to echelon units in

rear of the flank which may be threatened. When _an organisation is

acting alone_, and when both flanks are in the air, a weaker line is

pushed forward and a reserve is retained....”

The enhanced power of firearms permits an extended front to be held,

especially at the commencement of an action. The only restrictions

are those dictated by necessity--always to assure effective control

by the leader and mutual coöperation between the various tactical

units.

This mode of fighting does away with continuous firing lines which no

longer fulfill the requirements of modern battle.

=Belgium.= The frontage of a battalion acting as part of a larger

force in attack is fixed at 300 m.; in defense this is increased.

=Japan.= The provisions of the Japanese regulations are identical

with those of the German regulations of 1889. The frontage of a

company is not given. A battalion may cover a frontage not exceeding

that of three companies. The frontage of a brigade, as a rule, does

not exceed 1500 m. at the initial deployment.

=Russia.= The frontage of a company, unless otherwise specified, is

governed by the object of the action, the terrain, and the effective

strength, and, as a rule, does not exceed 250 paces (180 m.). No

figures are given for the larger units.

=England.= While great stress was laid upon narrow fronts and thin

firing lines prior to the Boer war, opinions swung to the opposite

extreme after that war. During a decisive attack, a battalion in the

first line may employ 125 rifles per 100 yards of front (_i.e._, 90

m.), distributed as firing line, supports, and battalion reserve;

the latter may consist either of one company or of parts of several.

Entire companies are deployed only in exceptional cases, for

instance in terrain devoid of cover where it is difficult to bring

up reinforcements. The size of the reserve depends upon the losses

likely to be suffered by the fighting line. When these losses will

be small in all probability, the reserve may be as strong as the

firing line and the supports combined. In accordance with these

general principles, a battalion may deploy for attack on a front

not exceeding 800 yds. = 720 m. (Formerly 540 m. was prescribed).

A brigade consisting of four battalions will thus be able to cover

either a front of 1400 or one of 2100 m., depending upon the number

of battalions put into the line.

=Italy.= Only general principles are prescribed. “Skill in judging

the proper frontage to be covered by a force is attained in time of

peace by exercises on varied ground and under different situations,

especially when organizations approximately at war strength are used.”

5. COMBAT ORDERS.[247]

[247] V. KIESLING, _Gefechtsbefehle_, Berlin, 1907.

Modern fire effect does not permit a commander to direct the course

of an action by despatching adjutants from time to time. This must

be borne in mind when issuing a combat order. Such an order can only

regulate the launching of the troops into action and prescribe a task

as a guide for their subsequent conduct. Since leaders change during

the course of the combat, the order must ensure coöperation of the

component parts of the force by thoroughly explaining the purpose of

the fight. The troops have a right to know what the commander expects

of them; it is not sufficient to order them to occupy a certain

point--they must be told whether or not they are to defend it. An order

which directs troops “to oppose” the enemy, conveys an extremely vague

meaning; it should specify instead whether they are “to attack” the

enemy, or whether they are “to defend” a position. The subordinate

leader’s pertinent question, as to the purpose of the combat, forces

the commander to indicate clearly whether he intends to attack, or

to stand on the defensive; whether he will fight a delaying action,

or avoid a decision by withdrawing. Even the lowest grades must be

informed of this decision of the commander. The troops will perform

anything that is demanded of them in definite terms. On the other hand,

the commander must demand that no subordinate “hide” behind an order

and that, on the contrary, he act on his own initiative when an order

is not received or the situation changes.

Clearly defined sections of the battlefield (par. 475 German I. D. R.)

and definite combat tasks, each complete in itself (par. 293 German

I. D. R.), are assigned to the tactical units to be employed in the

first line (battalions in case of a regiment; regiments, as a rule,

in case of a division). In attack, the order indicates the front upon

which each one of the larger units is to deploy and what portion of the

hostile position it is to attack. This demarcation defines the extent

of the combat sections (par. 371 German I. D. R.), within the limits of

which the particular unit must make the most of the accidents of the

ground. In carrying out these combat tasks, unity of action is ensured

by the mutual coöperation of the tactical units fighting abreast of

each other (par. 475 German I. D. R.), and by the designation of a

unit upon which the others regulate their movements, without, however,

thereby being hampered in their endeavor to advance. (Base unit of

combat). Moreover, by employing his reserves, the commander “can shift

the decisive point of the action to any place desired, reinforce where

he deems it advisable, equalize fluctuations of the combat, and,

finally, bring about the decision.”

The first orders--those for putting the troops in motion in the desired

direction--are usually verbal; more detailed orders, which are the rule

from the brigade on up, are issued subsequently. (Par. 274 German I.

D. R.). In most cases, the commander knows quite well what he wants,

but only the effort required in expressing in writing what he desires

to say, enables him to reproduce his thoughts with the necessary

clearness. Even in peace maneuvers, the officer who issued an order

and its recipients quite frequently disagree as to its interpretation;

the superior remembers only what he desired to say at the particular

moment, but not the language in which the order was couched. Written

orders minimize the possibility of a misunderstanding. They have the

further advantage that the recipient has in his possession a document

to which he can always refer in case of doubt.

Orders should not provide for maintaining communication, for protecting

flanks, and for keeping up local reconnaissance, since these matters

are attended to as a matter of course, every leader being held

responsible for making proper dispositions, within the limits of his

command, for the performance of these duties. The higher the rank

of the commander, the farther he should stay away from the scene of

battle. As the commander can exercise an influence on the course of

the action only by employing his reserves, he should remain near them,

or, at any rate, retain their leader on his staff. If the commander

selects a position too close to the point where the first line is

engaged, he loses sight of the action in its entirety, and allows

himself to be influenced too much by events within his immediate range

of vision.[248] The subordinate commander, in selecting his position,

has to consider only good observation of the enemy, communication

with neighboring units, with the next higher commander, and with his

subordinates.

[248] This was true of Sir Redvers Buller at Colenso, and likewise

of Kuropatkin. The latter led in person too much and was completely

lost in the details of minor troop-leading.

At headquarters, the work to be performed must be carefully apportioned

among the different members of the staff.

The commander, assisted by an officer of his staff, observes the enemy

and his own force, while another officer maintains communication with

the neighboring force and with the next higher headquarters (signal

flag squads, telephone), and receives and prepares reports. (The scheme

described would be appropriate for a brigade staff, for example). It is

furthermore desirable to despatch information officers to neighboring

troops, and to detail officers from subordinate units to receive orders.

The detailing of adjutants from subordinate units for the purpose of

facilitating the issue and despatch of orders of higher headquarters is

very properly prohibited by par. 83 German F. S. R.; on the march, this

is permissible temporarily only. The battalion supply officers will,

however, frequently be utilized as information officers, for, on the

day of battle, they would thus be most profitably employed.

In =France= this is regulated by _Agents de liaison_. These are to

keep the commander informed in regard to the special situation, the

action of subordinate units, and the intentions of their commanders.

“The importance of permanent communication between leader and

subordinate increases with the distances separating troops in action;

the leader’s influence on the course of the combat can be ensured

only by these _agents_.

As a general rule, one mounted officer from every infantry unit,

from the battalion up, reports to the next higher commander for the

purpose of maintaining communication. This officer may detail a

cyclist or trooper to accompany him. He is to be prepared to give all

necessary information in regard to his unit, and to keep in touch

with the general situation in order to inform his immediate superior

in regard to it. He communicates with his own unit either by sending

orderlies with messages, or by carrying the orders of the commander

in person.”

6. COMMUNICATION ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

Cyclists and mounted messengers can be employed on the battlefield

only when the conditions are exceptionally favorable; even intrenched

connecting posts communicating with one another by means of shouts

or signals do not absolutely ensure communication in a protracted

engagement. Heliographs or signal lamps are valuable only during the

approach to the battlefield and in large battles.[249] The same is

true of the field telegraph, by means of which, for example, division

headquarters may be connected with the headquarters of the corps. In

an infantry combat, only the field telephone, wig-wag flags,[250] and

signal flags can be used. The employment of telephone and telegraph

has the advantage of ensuring greater quiet at headquarters, since the

coming and going of messengers is eliminated; on the other hand, the

commander is at once informed of every reverse (which may perhaps be

only temporary) and will not always be able to resist the temptation of

leading subordinate commanders by apron strings. The Japanese made a

very extensive use of the various means of communication, but neglected

to guard against an interruption of their lines of information by

installing signal flag stations. This cannot be dispensed with. In the

Japanese army visual signals[251] were not used, and in the Russian

army they were not adopted until October 4th, 1904. Thus means of

communication did not develop beyond the rudimentary stage in both

armies. According to all previous experience, telephone lines, as

now operated, are practicable in attack only for the purpose of

establishing communication down to brigade headquarters.[252]

[249] See _Taktik_, III, p. 116, et seq.

VON LÖBELL’S _Jahresberichte_ 1906, p. 390: _Employment of

Heliographs and Signal Lamps in Southwest Africa_.

[250] Wig-wag signals have been abolished and Morse signals

prescribed in their stead by Cabinet Orders dated January 16th, 1908.

[251] Sir IAN HAMILTON, _A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book_, I, pp.

173-174, 196, 241 and 323.

[252] The station apparatus furnished by the firm of “Zwietusch” of

Charlottenburg, weighs 5.5 kg. with its battery.

In defensive positions, which are held for a prolonged period,

it is, of course, practicable to establish telephonic connection

with the most advanced line. This was, for example, the case in the

Japanese 10th Division on the morning of March 3rd, 1905 (Mukden).

On this occasion the division commander in rear was informed by

telephone of the presence of wire entanglements in front of the

Russian position, and permission was asked and granted to postpone

the attack.

Until recently, both signal and wig-wag flags were used in

Germany.[253] The signal motions are made in an upright position,

the Morse code, which is rather difficult to learn, being used. This

method of signaling permits communication to be kept up within a radius

of 7 km.; moreover, it can be used at night and in combined land and

naval operations. The wig-wag signals are easily learned and entirely

sufficient for communicating over distances within 3 km.; they also

permit information to be despatched rapidly, as abbreviations are

employed for certain frequently recurring movements. These signals

possess the additional advantage that they can be made by a man while

in a prone position.[254] Wig-wag signals are a very effective means of

communication and will rarely fail.[255]

[253] _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, June number, 1906, and

March number, 1907.

[254] Signals with wig-wag flags can be made by a man lying flat

on his belly or on his back; this is, however, frequently impossible

with outstretched arms and the sender must be content to make the

signals by grasping the staves of the two flags in the middle, then

placing them in appropriate position relative to each other (for

example in making the letters, d, e, k, l, p, u).

[255] The signals prescribed in par. 11 German I. D. R. are very

effective if made with wig-wag flags; if made with signal flags they

require constant observation, without, however, precluding mistakes.

For example, when given with signal flags, the signal “halt” - “h,

h, h,” (.... .... ....) is frequently confused with the signal “the

assault is about to begin” (... ... ...). This mistake is not so apt

to occur when wig-wag flags are used.

When General Stakelberg, after his right flank had been turned at

Wafangu, sent orders to withdraw to General Gerngross, the commander

on the left flank, it took the officer who carried the order through

this mountainous country, nearly an hour to cover the 5 km. which

separated the two commanders. An order sent by means of wig-wag flags

could have reached the leader in question within a few minutes.

A commander should not exercise a constant influence on his

subordinates just because modern means of communication permit him

to do so, as this would destroy all initiative and independence. The

permanent communication to which we are accustomed in time of peace,

and the method of leading produced thereby, do not allow real qualities

of leadership and initiative to develop. It is unquestionably not easy

for a commander to refrain from interfering when a deployment does

not progress with sufficient rapidity or not in accordance with his

wishes.[256]

[256] Interference of the Commander-In-Chief of the IIIrd Army

with the deployment of the 1st Bavarian Army Corps at Wörth. KUNZ,

_Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 15, p. 44, et seq. The impatience

of the commander-in-chief was natural perhaps, but, due to his

interference, the enveloping movement skillfully initiated by General

v. d. Tann, could not be executed.

Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry · 第 21 / 46 段

At Poplar Grove, 7000 Boers with 7 guns fought on a front of 17 km.