The effect of canister had decreased considerably with the introduction

of rifled guns, and this was the more noticeable, because,

simultaneously therewith, the accuracy and rate of fire of the infantry

rifle was greatly increased. The attempts to re-invest the artillery

with its one-time superiority were directed in two channels: one aimed

at perfecting shrapnel, which had been rather neglected up to this

time (England, Prussia, Austria), while the other resurrected the

mediaeval idea of the “barrel-organ gun,” with a view of assembling a

number of rifle barrels and of combining thereby the accuracy of the

small arm with the moral effect of canister. Thus, among others, the

4-10 barreled _Gatling_ gun was invented in America in 1861, it being

the oldest representative of this type of weapon. In order to obtain

a weapon matching the Prussian _needle_ gun, Bavaria adopted the 4

barreled _Feldl_ gun and France the 25 barreled _mitrailleuse_.[274]

The name _canon à balles_, which was given the gun, sufficed to

indicate the manner in which it was intended to be used. As these guns

frequently failed in action, offered the same target and required the

same equipment and approximately the same road space as field guns,

the states who had first adopted them, finally decided to dispense

with them on European theaters of war. The further development of

machine guns was not especially accelerated by the fact that the French

_mitrailleuses_ had not fulfilled the expectations entertained for

them during the Franco-German war, isolated cases excepted,[275] and

that they were quickly silenced by the German artillery, which was

equipped only with percussion shell, as soon as their position was

ascertained. Thus, these guns seemed useful only in colonial wars and

on board war ships for warding off torpedo boats. Although they took up

very little room when in position, they were not considered useful for

flank defense in fortresses, on account of the frequent breakdowns. In

addition to their height, other defects developed; for example, they

could obtain only a very insignificant rate of fire, betrayed their

position by the powder smoke, and lacked the means for ascertaining

ranges.

[274] The 25 barreled _mitrailleuse_, cal. 13 mm., fired volleys at

the rate of 125 rounds per minute. Its fire was considered equivalent

to that of 50 needle guns; its weight was 1,485 kg., each of its

four horses pulling 371 kg.; its maximum range was 3,000 m. Its most

favorable, practical range 500-1,500 m.--A glaring defect of the

gun was that fire pauses occurred whenever cartridges were fed into

the slot and that the lateral spread of its cone of dispersion was

extremely small.

[275] Battle of Gravelotte. _Gen. St. W._, pp. 705-712, 723 and

781. The employment of three Gatling guns in rear of the park wall

of Yoré, during the defense of the plateau of Auvours. (_Revue

d’artillerie_, 1900, p. 297; _Gen. St. W._, IV, p. 817).

The situation changed entirely when a practicable, smokeless powder

was invented, and Hiram Maxim, an American, succeeded in utilizing the

energy of the recoil (a factor neglected up to that time, although

annoying to the marksman) for opening the breech, inserting a fresh

cartridge into the chamber, closing the breech, and automatically

firing the piece.[276] Through this invention it became possible to

fire a maximum of 900 and an average of 500 rounds per minute, from a

single barrel moving laterally back and forth. The desire to obtain a

still greater rate of fire was checked effectively, because of the fact

that with such an increase the danger of jamming increased and the use

of infantry ammunition was precluded. The water in the jacket continues

to be a decided drawback to this type of gun, for it is not always

easily procured, impairs the mechanism by freezing, makes it difficult

to change barrels, and constitutes a considerable weight. If cooling

the barrel by means of water were to be dispensed with, the accuracy of

the piece would rapidly diminish, and, after 1000 rounds of continuous

fire, bullets would tumble even at short ranges. At the present time

water is still the most effective means of cooling the barrel.[277]

[276] Of the other types the following may here be mentioned:

_Hotchkiss_ (France), insufficient cooling of the barrel by air;

_Schwarzlose_ (Austria), machine gun model 7, a very simple weapon

which has only a single spring.

[277] In the _Colt_ Machine Gun, which is not water-cooled, after

500 rounds had been fired, a cartridge inserted into the piece

exploded in seven seconds, and cartridges placed in the chamber a

quarter of an hour later exploded in 20 seconds.

Machine guns fire ordinary small arms ammunition carried in loops on a

canvass belt (weighing 1 kg. when empty), which is generally capable

of holding 250 rounds of 8 mm. cartridges weighing 8.315 kg. These

belts are very carefully manufactured, the material being shrunk, so

as to prevent their shrinking when in use. Two men can refill an empty

belt with 8 mm. cartridges in seven minutes, according to Swedish

experiments, while a belt filling machine can refill one in a still

shorter time. The rate of fire of machine guns is approximately 500

rounds per minute. They are variously mounted,[278] according to

circumstances, on sleds (in which the gun rests on a frame similar

to that of a wheelbarrow), on tripods, or, for mountain warfare, on

basket frames. Although the greatest readiness for firing was obtained

with guns mounted on cavalry carriages (two-wheeled carts, similar to

limbers, and equipped with shafts), which also permitted the greatest

amount of ammunition to be carried along, these guns offered such a

high target that their use, in an infantry action, was entirely out of

the question, leading only to their being quickly silenced. Another

defect was that the guns were unable to follow immediately upon the

heels of the organization to which they were attached. Guns mounted

on light tripods possess the least readiness for firing, as the gun

must be dismounted during each change of position; but tripods are

indispensable in mountain warfare. In India a tripod frame on wheels

is employed. The basket frame, which is very light and is carried on

the back of a soldier, affords nothing but a rest for the gun. This

type of mount has the disadvantage of necessitating, in reality,

freehand firing when the barrel is supported near the muzzle; that

the operator, when firing continuously, becomes greatly fatigued,

and that the accuracy suffers in consequence thereof. The advantages

of the tripod and the wheeled carriage have been skillfully combined

in the carriage adopted in Germany. In this the gun rests on a sled;

this is in turn supported by the carriage proper, which is wheeled.

In exceptional cases the gun may be fired from the carriage, but

ordinarily it is fired from the sled, which is detached from the

carriage for that purpose. This sled permits the gun to be laid at any

desired height and enables it to follow the infantry anywhere during an

action.[279]

[278]

British cavalry machine gun with mount 152.3 kg.

Machine gun with tripod } 16.5 + 18 = 34.5 „

Machine gun with basket frame } latest model 35.0 „

Machine gun with sled } 16.5 + 24 = 40.5 „

[279] The following complement per gun is considered necessary:

Germany 14¹⁄₂ men 9 horses.

Switzerland 8¹⁄₂ men 12 horses.

In the Russo-Japanese war the machine gun detachments of the Russian

cavalry were equipped with _Rexer_ guns which can scarcely be

considered machine guns owing to their slow rate of fire and extreme

heating of the barrel.

Machine guns can be transported upon larger vehicles capable of

being unlimbered; they can also be carried on pack horses or other

pack animals, and for short distances by men. Although pack animal

transportation enables the guns to follow the troops anywhere, the

amount of ammunition that can be carried along is limited, and the

opening of fire is retarded, since gun and tripod must first be

assembled; the opening of fire may even be delayed when a pack animal

falls; ammunition cannot be carried on the gun; and the animals get

sore backs even if pack saddles are carefully adjusted.

2. THE POWER OF MACHINE GUNS.

The machine gun is noted for its adaptability to any terrain, and the

constancy of its high rate of fire as compared with that of a body of

infantry, which decreases with the range, the diminishing visibility

of the target, and prolonged fire. On the other hand, a single jamming

can make a machine gun valueless, at least for the time being. For

this reason, the Germans employ machine guns only in platoons, as a

rule, and the Swiss let both guns of a platoon fire simultaneously

only in exceptional cases. Theoretically, the maximum rate of fire of

600 rounds per minute will rarely be attained; and 200-300 rounds per

minute will usually suffice against prone targets. In Germany volley

and continuous fire are employed; fire by a single piece is used only

to ward off patrols when the machine guns do not want to betray their

position.[280]

[280] The following kinds of fire are used in the countries named

below:

Austria: Single shots; volleys (20-25 rounds); fire by a single

piece.

Switzerland: Fire by a single piece; volleys (20-30 rounds); rapid

fire (volleys of 100 rounds); and fire at will (both pieces of a

platoon simultaneously employing rapid fire). The last-named is

only employed in exceptional cases, for example, when the danger is

imminent and when favorable opportunities offer.

A volley consists of about 25 rounds and is followed by a pause for

observing the effect of the fire. It is employed in adjusting the fire

upon difficult targets in rolling country. Fire for effect consists,

as a general rule, of “continuous fire,” and is interrupted only when

the tactical situation requires it. The water in the jacket should be

renewed and oiling attended to during the pauses in the fire, whether

these grow out of the tactical situation, or are made necessary by

technical considerations.

The fire is either directed upon a point (concentrated fire), the

elevation and direction of the piece being fixed, or it is distributed

over the entire target or over a designated part of the same (sweeping,

and progressive fire).[281]

[281] For example, when sweeping the crest of the parapet of a line

of trenches, or the edge of a wood, both hands move the gun slowly

and evenly from side to side. When searching an area in the direction

of depth and obliquely (progressive fire with sweeping), the left

hand gives the gun the proper horizontal direction, while the right

manipulates the slow motion elevating gear. When firing on rapidly

moving targets--for example skirmish lines advancing by rushes--or

targets advancing over rolling country, both the traversing and

elevating movements may be unclamped. The rapidity with which the gun

is moved, when sweeping or searching, depends upon the range and the

kind of target on which the fire is directed. As a rule, the piece

is moved slowly and steadily. The accuracy of the fire is impaired

when the gun is moved too rapidly. When the fire is well observed,

it might be advantageous, in exceptional cases, when firing against

either stationary or moving targets, to direct the gun, without

aiming, after the bullets have been seen to hit their mark, by

properly manipulating the elevating and traversing apparatus while

the firing is in progress.

The ballistic properties of the gun are the same as those of the

infantry rifle.[282]

[282] The destructive power of the projectiles fired from a machine

gun, as they strike within a small space, is, of course, much greater

than that of the scattered projectiles of a body of infantry. Trees

having a circumference of 30 cm. are felled by machine gun fire in

about 15 seconds at a range of 450 m.

In the machine gun an important factor in the dispersion of infantry

fire--flinching and errors in aiming--is eliminated, while the heating

of its barrel and the vibrations of its carriage in continuous fire do

not produce a corresponding increase in dispersion. On this account

the cone of dispersion of the machine gun is more compact than that

of the infantry rifle and its accuracy at long ranges is therefore

considerably greater than that of the latter.[283] Firing tests

indicate that the accuracy of machine gun fire diminishes only very

slightly with increasing range, provided the appropriate elevation is

used.[284]

[283] According to Austrian experiments the depth of the beaten

zone of a machine gun is only ¹⁄₃ to ¹⁄₂ that produced by the fire of

a platoon of infantry.

[284] The following average results were obtained in experiments

made at the Musketry School, while firing on infantry targets

advancing alternately at quick and double time:

At ranges from 2000-1600 m. 1.72% hits

„ „ „ 1500-1200 m. 2.53% „

Firing against disappearing head targets placed at intervals of

0.60-0.70 m.:

At 600-800 m. 1.89% hits „ 800-1100 m. 1.69% „

In firing first with an elevation of 1800, then with one of 1750 m.

(the range being 2000-1600 m. and 254 rounds being expended per gun),

on 50 advancing, kneeling targets, placed at intervals of 1 m. 3.10%

hits were obtained and 52% figures were placed out of action in 1¹⁄₂

minutes.

In firing at the same targets for 2¹⁄₃ minutes, with an elevation of

1900 m. (304 rounds expended), the result dropped to 0.3% hits and

8.3% figures placed out of action.

In war the influence of the compact cone of dispersion will be still

more potent, for we will then have to reckon with a single, specially

selected machine gun marksman who is well protected, while the

excitement of battle will produce a far different impression upon an

organization composed of men differing materially from each other. The

compactness of the cone of dispersion of the machine gun requires

that the appropriate elevation be used if the fire is to be effective

against well concealed prone skirmishers. This can be accomplished only

in part by employing range finders. Since the probable error of these

instruments is ±5% of the range, this determination is so inaccurate

for machine gun fire that nothing remains but to increase the

dispersion artificially. When it is impossible to observe the strike of

the bullets, the dispersion may be artificially increased by employing

combined sights, two in a single platoon and three in a machine gun

battery (company), and above all by sweeping. The employment of

combined sights would appear to be too rigid a method; sweeping fire is

at any rate better.[285]

[285] Lieutenant-General ROHNE, _Schieszlehre_, 2nd Ed. p. 185, et

seq.

From general ballistic data, Lieutenant-General ROHNE[286] computes

that the following results would be obtained by a machine gun and a

detachment of skirmishers when firing with the appropriate elevation at

a broad target 1 m. high:--

Machine Detachment

gun of skirmishers

At 500 m. 32.4 16.8% hits

„ 1000 „ 15.3 8.1% „

„ 1500 „ 10.2 5.1% „

„ 2000 „ 6.4 3.2% „

[286] _Jahrbücher für Armee und Marine_, 1901, IV, p. 268.

This nearly double superiority is reversed, however, when the

appropriate elevation is not used:

======+========================================================

|Firing on a target 1 m. high, the following percentages

| of hits may be expected when the error in estimating

| the range is--

Range.| 50 m. | 100 m. | 150 m. | 200 m.

+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------

|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-|Machine|Skir-

| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-| guns. |mish-

m. | | ers.| | ers.| | ers.| | ers.

------+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------

500 | 27.5 | 16.0| 19.0 | 13.8| 7.0 | 11.7| 1.3 | 7.3

1000 | 9.2 | 6.8| 2.0 | 4.8| 0.2 | 2.7| -- | 1.0

1500 | 3.6 | 3.9| 0.2 | 1.8| -- | 0.5| -- | 0.1

2000 | 1.7 | 2.2| -- | 0.8| -- | 0.2| -- | --

------+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+-----+-------+------

From this it follows that the good qualities of the machine gun can be

utilized to the fullest advantage only when the appropriate elevation

is used. When this is not accurately known, the fire effect of the

machine gun drops down to zero more quickly than that of a skirmish

line. Where local conditions are at all favorable, the determination of

the appropriate elevation is facilitated by observing the strike of the

projectiles in “volley fire.”

According to British firing tests, at ranges from 500-1000 yards an

error of estimation of 100 yards, reduces the effect of the fire

50 per cent. According to firing tests 75% of all shots fired by a

machine gun and body of infantry are distributed as follows:

=====+==================+==================+====================

| Machine gun. | Detachment of |Errors of estimation

| | infantry. | permissible for the

At |Depth of 75% strip|Depth of 75% strip| machine gun.

m. | m. | m. | m.

-----+------------------+------------------+--------------------

450 | 112 | 192 | 54 = 12 %

900 | 63 | 108 | 31 = 3.5%

1350 | 54 | 90 | 27 = 2 %

1800 | 67 | 140 | 31 = 1.8%

-----+------------------+------------------+--------------------

It is clearly apparent that the permissible error of the range finder

is smaller than the depth of the vertical dispersion strip covered by

75% of the bullets.

The difficulty of hitting a target lodged in some feature of the

terrain requires that the machine gun be used first of all against

large targets that are visible for a short time only. When the

appropriate elevation is used, a decisive effect may be confidently

counted on within a short space of time; when an inappropriate

elevation is used and the fire is not properly observed, only

accidental hits can, as a rule, be expected, even when the fire

is directed on tall, dense targets. When the fire is directed on

skirmishers lying down, the effect produced is not commensurate with

the amount of ammunition expended, and a slight error in the elevation

used may nullify the effect entirely. A straight line of trenches,

which is plainly visible, is, on the other hand, an eminently favorable

target. The heating of the barrel, and the difficulty of replenishing

ammunition and renewing the water in the jacket, tend to work against a

participation of machine guns in a protracted fire fight. The machine

gun is not at all suited for carrying on a prolonged fire action.

It is very difficult to determine the relative combat value of a body

of infantry as compared with that of a machine gun. One will not be far

wrong in placing this value between 50 and 60 men.

In experimental field firing at the Swiss Infantry Musketry School, it

was demonstrated that 30-40 skirmishers almost in every case rapidly

gained the upper hand over a machine gun in the open, at 900 m., but

that the infantrymen had small chances of success when the position of

the machine gun could not be accurately determined. In Switzerland a

machine gun is considered equivalent to 50 infantrymen. Skirmishers are

the most difficult target for machine guns to fight, and, at the same

time, they are the most dangerous. When the fire is well observed, a

good effect can, indeed, still be counted on, when the fire is directed

at prone skirmishers at ranges up to 1000 m., but this is not true when

the fire cannot be observed; in the last mentioned case, no effect

worth mentioning is produced.

=Austria.= In a field firing test (which was repeated four times)

between a machine gun (gun pointer covered by a shield) and 30

infantrymen, the following results were obtained at 600 m. in 1¹⁄₂

minutes:

Infantrymen 120 rounds 10 hits (9%)

Machine gun 215 „ 14 „ (7%)[287]

[287] Firing tests of the Army Musketry School at Bruck, a.d.

Leitha, 1905. _Streffleur_, Apl. 1906, p. 524.

=England.= At the Infantry School at Hythe, in a firing test at 300

yards, lasting 5 minutes--perhaps the longest period during which

continuous fire is possible--the power of a Maxim gun was found to

be equivalent to 60 rifles. In field firing this comparative power

dropped down to 25-35 rifles. In this connection, it should be

borne in mind that moral influences do not make themselves felt in

firing under peace conditions, and that, on the other hand, a single

favorable hit can place the machine gun out of action for a long

period, while the skirmishers can keep up the fire.

3. INFANTRY VERSUS MACHINE GUNS.

It will rarely be possible to concentrate upon a machine gun battery

of six guns a fire equivalent to its own. Because of the small

target offered by machine guns, it is necessary for a firing line to

concentrate its fire upon one machine gun at a time, thus gradually

silencing the battery in detail. This procedure is feasible because

it is very difficult for the machine guns to reach with their fire

all parts of a well concealed skirmish line. The normal relation,

unfavorable for the infantry, changes in its favor, however, as machine

guns cannot keep up a high rate of fire for a prolonged period, even

when nothing is considered but ammunition supply; as serious breaks are

especially apt to occur when the gun is worked to its maximum capacity;

and as the ammunition expended in one minute (3600 rounds) cannot

produce an effect unless not only the correct range but also the proper

elevation is accurately known.

The fight against machine guns may be advantageously conducted

according to the following principles:[288]

1. Infantry skirmishers should conceal themselves so well that it will

be difficult for the hostile machine gun battery to find them. Color of

immediate vicinity (shade) and background should be considered; platoon

and other leaders must not stand upright; objects that are clearly

visible should be avoided.

2. It should be made difficult for the hostile machine guns to observe

their fire (ricochets) and to measure the range. (No prominent features

that would facilitate such measurements should be located near the

infantry position).

3. The firing line, as far as this is possible, should not be

continuous; the several parts of the line should be posted in echelon.

4. Kinds of fire: Lively fire at will should be used.

5. Expenditure of ammunition: At least 600 rounds should be expended

against each machine gun.

6. At the outset a single company should concentrate its fire upon a

single machine gun, picking out the one that is most clearly visible.

Machine guns on the flanks are not good targets, as a strong wind may

deflect the fire directed upon them.

[288] Switzerland: Machine guns, “on account of their small gun

squads, are more sensitive to losses than artillery. They cannot

adjust their fire so easily as artillery, but, when once on the

target, the effect of their fire is great.

“The principles governing the combat against artillery are

applicable, in general, to the fight against machine guns. It may be

assumed that at medium ranges, one platoon of infantry will suffice

for silencing one machine gun, provided the platoon of infantry

fights the action under favorable conditions. At short ranges, a few

good marksmen suffice for silencing a machine gun. For this reason

selected men are sent forward, when the situation permits, to sneak

up to the machine guns and to pick off the men serving them.”

The following rules, governing the conduct of infantry when exposed to

machine gun fire, may be deduced from the above:

Even skirmish lines cannot continue their advance over terrain devoid

of cover, when exposed within a range of 1500 m. to the unsubdued fire

of machine guns; nothing remains but for them to lie down, and to gain

ground to the front in groups, or one by one.

The same is true of route columns. They can only deploy to the right

and left front at double time, and take cover.

The most unsuitable formation under machine gun fire is the column of

platoons, whether lying down or in motion.[289]

[289] Within ³⁄₄ to 1 minute a column of platoons (lying down)

sustained an average of 4.22% hits at 1400 m. and 4.31% hits at

900-1100 m. with 42 and 32%, respectively, figures placed out of

action.

If the column of platoons is reached by effective machine gun fire,

when lying down, line must be formed. The men must not rise, however,

to execute this movement, but the platoons should crawl forward into

line. For the men to rise would mean annihilation.

The low target offered by machine guns makes them a difficult target

for field artillery to hit, in spite of the accuracy with which the

latter can adjust its fire.

4. MACHINE GUNS IN GERMANY.

Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry · 第 23 / 46 段