the principal point to be considered is the effect of fire. The
modern long range magazine rifle will, no doubt, enable us to defend
a position with a smaller force than was possible in the past with
the older less improved weapons. However, combats last longer
nowadays, and the shock action of Frederick the Great’s tactics is
no longer practicable. The fight is carried on at longer ranges, and
the tremendously costly decisive moments of the past are of rarer
occurrence. As a consequence, the casualties of the whole force engaged
are smaller, although, owing to unfavorable conditions, certain
organizations may suffer losses quite as great as those incurred in
the battles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.[239] Instead of the
sanguinary hand-to-hand fight with cold steel, we now have a prolonged
fire fight carried on by a firing line which requires to be constantly
fed by troops held in rear, who have to be sheltered as much as
possible from hostile fire until the moment of their employment. This
fire fight is frequently decided by psychological factors and without
the troops suffering material losses.
[239] At Wörth, the 1st Turco Regiment lost the enormous total of
93.1%, and twelve other French regiments suffered a loss of over 50%.
To be sure, the losses sustained during the retreat are included
in this total. At Albuera (16th May, 1811), the 57th Regiment
(British) and the Füsilier Brigade lost 70%; in four hours the army
of Beresford lost 25%, and of the British infantry, which originally
numbered 7000 men, only 1800 remained.
“The duration of the combat under modern conditions,” writes General
Négrier,[240] “leads to a considerable mental exhaustion of the troops
which is apparent in nervous lassitude. This explains the impotency
of leader and troops the day after a defeat and even after a victory.
This lassitude is still greater on the day of the battle. While it
is true that this has always been the case, the nervous exhaustion
has grown in an inconceivable manner, its intensity increasing at
the same rate as the invisibility of the opponent. _The invisibility
of the enemy directly affects the morale of the soldier, the sources
of his energy and courage. The soldier who cannot see his enemy is
inclined to see him everywhere. It is but a step from this impression
to hesitancy and then to fear._ The inertia of the troops for whole
days at Magersfontain, Colenso, and Paardeberg, frequently more than
800 m. from the enemy, was not caused by their losses, but by the
moral depression produced within the effective zone of rifle fire.
Another factor, which governs the modern combat at short ranges, the
_impossibility of the commander making his influence felt in lines
which are seriously engaged_, is of still greater importance. _The
influence of the officers who lead these lines is also limited. They
are scarcely able to direct the three or four men nearest them._ The
combat depends upon the individual fighters, and there never has been
a time when the personal efficiency of the individual soldier has
had a greater significance.” We should not forget that this change
occurred during a period in which we no longer fight our battles with
professional soldiers of long service, but, on the contrary, with peace
cadres of our conscript armies raised to war strength by Reservists.
[240] _Revue des deux mondes_, June number, 1902.
Another factor to be considered is the fighting quality of the
opponent. In an action against an enemy who is a match for us, the
necessity for distribution in depth is, of course, greater than when
fighting against poor troops.
General v. Werder could with impunity oppose the newly raised levies
of the French Republic on the =Lisaine= with 1.12 men per meter of
front. The victory was won by this very extraordinary extension of
front, which, if employed in the face of the Imperial army, would
have led to defeat.[241]
[241] KUNZ, _Entscheidungskämpfe des Korps Werder_, II, p. 11.
_Considerations of importance in deciding upon the extent of front to
be covered by a force, similar conditions on both sides being presumed,
are_--
1. _Whether it is compelled to fight an independent action alone_;
2. _Whether it is fighting, from the preparatory to the decisive stage
of the combat, as part of a larger body, with at least one, or perhaps
both flanks secured_;
3. _Whether it has been selected to make the decisive attack against an
enemy already shaken by other troops_.
In the last mentioned case a sudden effect, a short, powerful blow,
is required, and the maximum frontage of all the units employed on
the same line is admissible. But even a force advancing to the final
assault can by no means dispense with distribution in depth; supports
and reserves are needed to carry forward the firing line when it has
been checked, to cover its flanks, and to carry on the pursuit (second
line).
The frontage of an organization whose flanks are secure and which
is acting as a part of a larger force, depends upon other troops;
considerable extension of front is admissible provided the firing line
is constantly maintained at a strength which will enable it to gain a
superiority of fire over the enemy. “While an organization which has
only one flank protected, is less restricted as regards frontage, it
will have to provide for distribution in depth on the exposed flank.
In this case, it is a good plan to move the units held in rear toward
the particular flank (echeloning). Interval and distance increase with
the size of this echelon.” (Par. 290 German I. D. R.). The German
Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 397) further emphasize the fact that,
when well-trained infantry employs its rifles to good advantage in
defense, it is very strong in front; that it can hold a position with
a comparatively small force; and that, in this case, it has only one
weak spot, the flank, which it must seek to protect by distribution
in depth. This view is fully borne out by the recent events in South
Africa and in Manchuria. Under favorable conditions (deliberate
defense), a battalion fighting as part of a larger force may put all
of its companies into the first line, a front of 200 m. being assigned
to each. The battalion can thus defend a front of 800 m. The only
restriction is the requirement that the battalion commander must be
able, at all times, to direct the course of the combat.
An organization acting alone which has to fight an action independently
from beginning to end under varying conditions, cannot employ all of
its available strength in the first line at one time. A distribution
into three parts, viz., firing line, supports, and reserve, is
therefore required. During the preparatory stage, the firing line
should be as weak as possible, while, for sustaining and deciding the
action, the reserve should be as strong as possible. As a rule, this
distribution will not come into existence until the combat has begun;
it must disappear again, during the subsequent course of the fight,
through reinforcement of the troops that initiated the action, thus
resulting in an increase of the combat front.
While the frontage is thus increased, an equal density along the
entire attacking line is not produced. This is due to the fact that
one will endeavor to increase the distribution in depth only at the
point where the decision is sought (offensive wings), while one will
seek to obtain results by a generous expenditure of ammunition at
points where the enemy is only to be contained. When a broad front has
to be held with a weak force, it is a good plan to post the troops in
groups. Of the attack as well as of the defense it may be said, that
the skillful combination of the offensive and defensive advantages of a
piece of ground is a sign of good leadership. (Austerlitz). Frequently,
however, after an action is over, the assault that penetrated a line is
called the main attack, and the one that failed, a demonstration. An
organization fighting alone will generally begin an action by deploying
on a narrow front; it will protect its flanks by distribution in depth;
and, finally, mass troops at the decisive point in readiness to make
the assault. The force making an assault in attack or a counter-attack
in defense cannot be strong enough.
Another factor that must be considered in deciding upon the frontage is
the task which a force is to perform, _i.e._, whether it is to make an
attack or to stand on the defensive; whether it is to fight a delaying
action or is to withdraw. The object of distribution in depth is to
keep the firing line constantly at the same strength; this requires
stronger reinforcements in attack (owing to the greater losses), than
in defense, and leads, consequently, to a contraction of the front.
The number of troops which will be required to hold a given piece of
ground must be determined separately in each case. The strength of the
fighting line depends upon the effect of the hostile fire. Military
history tells us how many troops the leader sent into action in order
to gain the victory, but it seldom gives us a clue as to the number of
troops that might have sufficed in the particular case.
In deploying from route column in a rencontre, the leading battalion
may be fully engaged by the time the next one arrives on the
battlefield. In such cases, the tactical situation may require the
employment of longer firing lines than would be deemed proper for the
size of the command when making a more serious attack. (Par. 357 German
I. D. R.). The assailant should then endeavor to throw the enemy, who
is likewise advancing, on the defensive. The situation is similar to
that in which an advance guard has to cover the main body’s debouchment
from a defile.
At =Nachod=, five Prussian battalions, which had only two companies
in reserve, fought on a front of 2500 m. from 8 A. M. until noon.
The conduct of the advance guard of the 8th Infantry Division
at =Beaumont= is worthy of imitation. In this case, the support
battalion was deployed and the artillery went into position; strong
detachments were retained in rear of the left wing until the main
body had arrived. Likewise, a proper relation existed between
frontage (4 battalions on a front of 1400 m.) and distribution in
depth. According to the General Staff Account of the Franco-German
war (II, p. 1045), the distribution was as follows:
_First line_: 4th Jäger-Battalion, which was subsequently reinforced
by the IInd Battalion, 96th Infantry and the Ist and IInd Battalions,
86th Infantry.
_Support for the Artillery_: Füsilier Battalion, 96th Infantry.
_Reserve_: IIIrd Battalion, 86th Infantry.
We have already mentioned the deployment of the advance guard at
=Spicheren= (p. 226 supra). In that instance the whole force was
thrown in at once, whereas at =Beaumont= the deployment of the
different units was coördinated and proceeded systematically. An
advance guard should be able to repulse an attack and then assume the
offensive without outside assistance. An example which is not worthy
of imitation is the engagement of the 29th Infantry Brigade at the
=Hallue=. The brigade began the fight, without being compelled to do
so, and deployed its 4530 men on a front of 5000 m. The 30th Infantry
Brigade (4070 men) then entered the fight and deployed on a front
of 3000 m. in prolongation of the line of the 29th Brigade. If the
French had made a decisive attack at this point, the 15th Infantry
Division would not have been able to repulse it.
Distribution in depth, for the purpose of warding off an enveloping
movement and for making a counter-attack, is more necessary in defense
than in attack; besides, a greater front may be covered in the former
case on account of the smaller losses. The following factors in part
determine the extent of front to be occupied and the number of troops
required to defend it: (1) the strength, natural or artificial, of the
position; (2) obstacles in its front; (3) salient angles which can be
easily enveloped; (4) the intentions of the commander (_i.e._, whether
he contemplates fighting a purely defensive combat or one including
offensive action).
=Delaying actions= are usually fought at long and medium ranges as
purely passive defensive combats and no provision is made for replacing
casualties, the object of the fight being to avoid a decision. Few
men should, therefore, be placed in the firing line, but these should
be supplied with abundant ammunition. However, as the force desires
to avoid a decisive engagement by withdrawing, distribution in depth
should be provided to protect the flanks and to facilitate breaking off
the action. (Par. 419 German I. D. R.). This requires that distances be
great.
=Night attacks=, on account of the element of surprise involved, do not
require great distribution in depth; as a rule, the fight is decided
in a very short time by the collision of the opposing forces. However,
measures must be taken to protect the flanks, to ensure victory, and to
give the first line the impetus necessary to carry it forward in case
it is checked.
The British attack on the Egyptian position at =Tel el Kebir= (1882)
was made by only 11,000 men on a front of about 6 km. After a short
fight the works were taken.
An attempt will now be made to give some approximate figures for the
extent of front that may be occupied in various situations.
Assuming one rifle for every three meters of front occupied, the
following might suffice for temporarily defending a line 1000 m. long:
Firing line 300 rifles
Supports (one platoon in rear of each wing) 120 „
Reserve (two companies) 400 „
----------
Total 820 rifles
Thus 0.8 men per meter would be sufficient. This is borne out by the
Boer War. With a good field of fire, even a thin firing line, provided
with plenty of ammunition, is capable of bringing any attack to a
standstill, at least for the time being.
=A defense seeking a decision= requires fighting at short ranges; the
firing line must be kept constantly at the same strength; losses of
about one-fifth (killed, wounded, and missing) must be reckoned with;
and, finally, a reserve, consisting of about a third of the effective
strength of the force, is required for making the counter-attack.
The firing line is, from the outset, made as dense as possible, and
echelons posted on the flanks must oppose any advance against the
flanks.
The following would thus suffice for defending a front of 1000 m.:
Firing line 1000 men
Replacement of casualties 200 „
Flank protection (2 companies) 400 „
Reserve 800 „
--------
Total 2400 men
Hence, 2.4 rifles per meter of front would be available for defense.
The defense is decided by a successful counter-attack made by the
reserve, whereas the attack requires an additional force to cover and
assure the assembling and re-forming of the troops. The greater force
is naturally required by the attacker, who must be stronger than the
defender at the moment when the assault is made. The following would be
required for making an attack on a front of 1000 m.:
Firing line 1200 rifles
Replacement of casualties (¹⁄₂) 600 „
Flank protection 400 „
Reserve 2000 „
-----------
Total 4200 rifles
This would be equivalent to 4.2 rifles per meter of front.
These figures can only serve as a very general guide, of course, and
should be considered minima.
The number of troops required for attack or defense must be
determined separately for each individual case. At =Lovtcha=, 25
battalions, 92 guns, and 15 sotnias were not considered too large
a force for attacking 8000 Turks with only 6 guns. At =Gorni
Dubniac=, 3 infantry divisions of the Guard, with 90 guns, attacked
6 weak Turkish battalions having only 4 guns. After the first two
unsuccessful assaults on =Plevna=, the Russians overestimated the
strength of the enemy. Osman Pasha’s force was estimated at 80,000
men, and, consequently, during the September assaults, 90,000 men and
400 guns were deemed necessary to attack barely 40,000 Turks and 60
guns.
From a consideration of the foregoing, it appears that the =maximum
frontage= is justifiable, when a force whose flanks are secure,
occupies a position prepared for defense, or acts as a reserve and is
to bring about a decision which has been prepared by other troops.
On the other hand, the =maximum distribution in depth= is necessary
for a force acting alone in attack with both flanks exposed. Between
these two extremes lie many intermediate degrees, and it is therefore
impossible to lay down hard and fast rules for the frontage of an
attacking force. The German Infantry Drill Regulations (par. 373)
accordingly fix the frontage of a company in attack at 150 m. and that
of a brigade of six battalions at 1500 m. It is impossible to give a
definite ratio of effective strength to combat frontage. Thus, while
in attack a company puts into the line about 1.3 rifles per meter of
its front, the brigade employs 4 rifles per meter, and the larger units
a proportionally greater number. The necessity for distribution in
depth increases with the size of the force and with the number of units
composing it.
In a company, for example, a platoon is sufficient to fulfill, within
certain limits, all the functions of a reserve, while in a larger force
the duties of a reserve are so complex that each task (protecting
the flanks, reinforcing the firing line, giving the impetus for the
assault, and covering the assembling and re-forming of the attacking
force) must be assigned to a separate unit. Moreover, the duration of
a combat, and, in conjunction therewith, the necessity of reinforcing
the firing line and covering the flanks, increases with the size of the
force. During protracted periods of peace, one is too much inclined
to underestimate the wastefulness of a battle and the necessity for
reinforcing the fighting line; one cannot understand why 5 to 6 men
will not suffice, during the course of a combat, for a front wherein
only one man can use his rifle. From the foregoing it follows that the
frontage does not increase in proportion to the number of men. Thus,
an army corps would not occupy a front four times that of a brigade,
or twice that of a division. This is best illustrated by doubling or
trebling a plane area when both length and breadth have to be equally
increased.[242]
[242] See _Taktik_, V, p. 46, et seq.
The maximum frontage to be covered in attack by the firing line of
a =company= is fixed at 150 m., in order that the density and fire
power of that line may be constantly maintained during a prolonged and
costly action. During shorter (_i.e._, rear guard actions), or less
costly actions (defense), it is, however, permissible to exceed this
limit. The regulations by no means insist upon a literal interpretation
of this paragraph, since they mention the deployment of the entire
company, when it would certainly occupy a front of about 200 m. There
is no disguising the fact, however, that, when extended on a front of
200 m., it is out of the question for the company commander to lead his
men.
The regulations do not fix the combat frontage of a =battalion=, as it
depends upon the tactical situation, and the battalion commander is
at liberty to place one, two, three, or four companies into the first
line. The frontage of a battalion would thus be 300 meters when making
an independent attack, and not exceeding 600 meters when fighting a
purely defensive action as part of a larger force, in other words, a
mean frontage of 400 meters.
This is also true of the =regiment=. The combat frontage of a regiment
acting alone, will, at the start, seldom exceed that of two battalions
deployed abreast. From this we obtain a frontage of 600-800 m. for the
regiment when it is acting independently, and a frontage of about 1200
m. when it is fighting a purely defensive action as part of a larger
force.
Military history tells us that an army corps consisting of 25
battalions, acting as a part of a larger force in a deliberately
planned attack, occupies an average front of 2.5 to 5 km. According
to this, the frontage of a brigade would amount to about 800-1000 m.,
_i.e._, to 6-7.5 rifles per meter of front.
This limit was frequently exceeded during the =Franco-German war=
according to the circumstances under which the brigade went into
action and the commander’s estimate of the situation. If the brigades
had to cover the concentration of the columns in rear, and if the
battalions came into action successively, both brigade and battalion
frontages were frequently very great. The endeavor to close with the
enemy as soon as possible and the desire to bring a large number of
rifles into action, led to enormously increased frontages at the
expense of depth. The brigades which arrived later, entered the line
where other brigades were already engaged, and the result was a
dissolution and admixture of all tactical organizations.
At =Colombey=, the 25th Brigade covered a front of nearly 3 km. with
28 companies, only four or five companies remaining in close order.
Connecting with this brigade on the north, 22 companies, belonging to
two different divisions of the 1st Army Corps, covered a front of 4
km., supported by three or four companies in close order. With such
an overextension of front the offensive or defensive power of a force
is, of course, crippled.
During the battle of =Amiens=, the 3rd Prussian Brigade advanced in
three columns against the heights north of the Luce. On the left, six
companies of the 4th Infantry advanced from Domart, in the center,
four companies from Hangard, and on the right, two companies from
Demnin. A battery and a troop (_Eskadron_) were attached to each
column, and the right column was followed by the 44th Infantry.
The French advanced troops were pushed back without special
difficulty, but at the northern edge of the timber, the
brigade now found itself opposite the French main position
Cachy--Villers-Bretonneux. The attack on this position began at once,
and in a short time the 4th Infantry and two batteries were in action
on the line East corner of the Bois de Hangard--Gentelles (5 km.
long). At the same time, the 44th Infantry with one battery deployed
on a front of about 2000 m. to the right of this line. The right wing
of the 44th Infantry subsequently advanced to attack the trenches
southeast of Villers-Bretonneux and captured them. The enveloped
French left wing withdrew to the village named, and rallied on strong
reserves.
This was the situation when the fight came to a standstill toward 1
o’clock P. M. The brigade fought in a thin line over a mile (four
English miles) long. The reserve only consisted of three companies
of the 4th Infantry, at Gentelles, and four companies of the 44th
Infantry, in rear of the right flank.
A defeat was averted only by the timely interference of other
troops, especially of strong artillery (76 Prussian guns against 24
French).[243]
[243] KUNZ, _Nordarmee_, I, p. 47, et seq.
The frontage of a company is definitely fixed, so as to make it easier
for battalion and regimental commanders to designate combat sections;
the higher leaders reckon with regimental and brigade fronts. In war,
however, the numerical strength varies constantly, and it is therefore
advisable not to reckon with companies, but with a corresponding number
of rifles (200 on an average). The combat frontages mentioned in drill
regulations only give an approximate idea of the extent of front to
be covered by organizations which act as part of a larger force in an
attack seeking a decision. The extent of front to be covered in other
situations, under favorable or unfavorable attack conditions, requires
in each case a separate estimate.
In the Boer war, we notice for the first time overextensions of front,
which were undoubtedly caused by a desire to avoid the costly frontal
attack.
At Magersfontain, on December 11th, 1899, the British division under
Lord Methuen (7300 men) covered a front of 12 km.; and during the
attack on Pieters Hill, on February 27th, 1900, the troops under
General Buller (30,000 men) extended over a front of 11 km.