line for the purpose of developing a strong fire, while the fourth
company is held in rear of a threatened flank or in rear of the center.
(See “d”). When it is desired to employ the reserve offensively, only
one or two companies are placed in the first line, the others being
held in reserve in rear of the flank which is to take the offensive.
Interval and distance increase with the size of this reserve.
[Illustration]
When a battalion from the reserve is called upon to make an immediate
attack which has been prepared by the fire of other troops, all its
companies may be taken at once into the first line. In this case
the battalion may be formed for attack with its companies at close
intervals. This might also be a suitable combat formation for night
operations. All these formations are subject to change however, as soon
as the proper utilization of cover makes it necessary.
The general principles stated for a battalion are also applicable to a
=regiment=. The regiment may either be directly formed for attack, or
the heads of the battalions may be deflected toward the points where
the deployment is to take place. An interval of 300-400 m. between
heads of battalions is best calculated to facilitate the subsequent
deployment. The distances depend upon the nature of the ground and the
purpose of the combat.
The regimental commander assigns tasks to his battalion commanders, but
leaves the latter entire freedom of action in regard to the formation
to be taken up and the manner of deploying. He should interfere with
companies only in exceptional cases. Such interference is justified
only when the conduct of subordinate leaders threatens to impair unity
of action in the combat and when time is lacking to observe the proper
channels in communicating an order.
[Illustration: Methods of Forming a Battalion for Attack.]
[Illustration]
In developing the =brigade=[220] for action, the depth of column
begins to exert an influence. Every concentration of the brigade
retards its entry into action. If the longest distance to be covered
in developing the brigade is assigned to the leading element of the
column, the march into action will be accelerated.
[220] For historical references in regard to the importance in
action of the brigade, see essay published in _Jahrbücher für
Armee und Marine_ (August-September number of 1877) entitled, _Die
Infanterie-Brigade in ihrer Entwicklung aus der Brigade von 1812_. In
regard to the employment of the regiments in line or in echelon, see
MOLTKE, _Kritische Aufsätze sur Geschichte des Feldzuges von 1866_.
MOLTKE’S _Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze_, p. 99, et seq.
[Illustration]
When an infantry brigade approaching the battlefield is to prolong the
flank of the fighting line, its entry into action might be hastened,
perhaps, by letting the rear regiment continue the march in the
original direction while the leading regiment takes the longer route.
The rear regiment would then be abreast of the leading one after about
15 minutes. If the battalions are subsequently developed on radiating
lines, the development of the whole force will, after a few minutes,
have progressed far enough to permit a deployment of skirmishers.
When the brigade takes up a combat formation, each regiment is assigned
a separate task (attack of a point, or defense of a section). If the
tasks assigned are definite and harmonize with each other, mutual
coöperation will be assured. The brigade commander ordinarily sends his
orders to the regimental commanders, but, when circumstances (haste,
correction of errors) compel him to depart from this rule, he should
inform those officers of the action taken. In a brigade consisting of
two regiments, its commander, in order to be able to influence the
action, will be compelled to retain at least one battalion as a reserve.
Brigades of three regiments[221] (each of three battalions) have an
advantage in this respect. But if such an increase in infantry units
were contemplated, it would be better, for reasons that will be given
later on,[222] to form the additional troops into a third division in
each army corps.
[221] The British division consists of twelve battalions formed
into three brigades.
In the United States the three unit organization is most clearly
marked. The division consists of three brigades, each brigade
of three regiments, and each regiment of three battalions. The
battalions have a strength of only 400 men.
[222] _Taktik_ (_Kriegsgliederung_), III, p. 31, et seq.
Base Units.
The possibility of regulating the movements of a body of troops by
means of a base unit, depends upon a number of preliminary conditions
which will seldom be fulfilled in war:
1. _The leader of the base unit would have to remain unharmed to the
very last._ If he were disabled the command of the unit would devolve
upon the next in rank who would perhaps not join it in every case.
2. _The fresh organisation which imparts the impetus necessary for
a further advance, would have to maintain the direction after the
original base unit had ceased to exist on account of the mixing of
organizations._
3. _The base unit would have to encounter less difficulties during
its advance than the other units of the force._ If the base unit were
to encounter greater difficulties than the other units, this might
serve as an excuse for reducing the rate of advance. In attack, the
organization nearest the enemy, in other words, the one that is led
better and more energetically than the others, is quite naturally
charged with maintaining the direction. Moreover, this organization
will be able to facilitate by its fire the advance of the elements in
rear.
The designation of a base unit[223] or unit of direction on the
battlefield cripples the energy of an entire line and the initiative of
the individual in favor of uniformity of movement. A base unit is only
profitable in night operations, in crossing unfavorable ground (woods),
and in bringing the fighting line up to the effective zone of hostile
fire. “With the entry into action, the importance of the base company
gradually decreases as the demands made by the combat increase”. (Par.
242 German I. D. R.). In all other cases, it is better to indicate
either the objective on which the troops are to march, or the flank
toward which they are to maintain connection.
[223] “A unit may also be designated upon which the others have
to regulate their movements without thereby being curbed in their
endeavor to advance (base unit of combat).” (Par. 371 German I. D. R.)
In France units of direction are prescribed (_la direction est
confidée aux unités qui suivent les chemins ou les lignes naturelles
du terrain_), but their duties are not given in detail. Units of
direction are also prescribed in Austria.
A _change of direction_ of march is executed by wheeling or turning
with the subordinate units toward the new front. (Par. 185 German
I. D. R.). A _change of front_ is effected in the same manner. With
long lines, echeloning and movements by the flank will result, which
can only be rectified gradually by issuing appropriate orders. When
skirmishers have been deployed in a wrong direction, or when a
deployment in another direction becomes necessary after the conclusion
of a combat, it is advisable to deploy a new line in the desired
direction, from the closed bodies still available, and to withdraw, at
the same time, those parts of the former skirmish line which are no
longer necessary.
Examples of Changes of Front.
1. Engagement at =Helmstedt=, on July 25th, 1866. The 20th Infantry
had to deploy to its left rear after its successful attack on the
Ütting Hill.[224]
[224] _Geschichte des Regiments Nr. 20_, p. 54.
2. The battalions of the XIth Army Corps wheeling toward the
=Niederwald= after crossing the Sauer (battle of =Wörth=).[225]
[225] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 254, sketch p. 262.
3. The wheel executed by Kottwitz’ Brigade during the battle of
=Loigny-Poupry= (2nd Dec., 1870). (This is also cited as an example
of the conduct of a counter-attack made by the defender). Toward noon
the advance guard of the 17th Infantry Division held =Lumeau=. The
33rd Brigade, its battalions in double column, was concentrated south
of =Champdoux=. The division commander retained two battalions as a
reserve and ordered Major-General von Kottwitz “to execute a quarter
wheel to the right and to form his command for attack in the general
direction of Loigny,” for the purpose of relieving the pressure on
the Bavarians defending =Schlosz Goury=. The attack was directed
against the French Division Jauréguiberry, which was attacking
Schlosz Goury. This division first came under fire at 3-400 m. and
then approached to within about 150 m. of the defenders’ position;
strong reserves followed in rear of its right flank, but otherwise
nothing was done to protect the right.
By wheeling at once to the right, the right wing of Kottwitz’ Brigade
would still have struck the eastern garden wall of Schlosz Goury,
and, as Loigny had been indicated to the general as the objective, a
fan-shaped extension of the brigade, precluding mutual coöperation,
would have been unavoidable. The general had fourteen companies
at his disposal and decided to advance in a southerly direction
until his second line overlapped the most advanced hostile line, so
that the attack as planned would have struck simultaneously both
the first and second lines of the enemy. The slight loss of time
involved caused the general no uneasiness, as he could carry out
his intentions without interference beyond range of the fire of the
enemy, whom he could observe during the entire movement. The brigade
formed for attack, during its movement to the south, when about 1200
m. from Goury. The general, who was on the right flank, halted the
brigade after it had advanced far enough, and wheeled it to the right.
[Illustration]
As the second line overlapped the first, the Füsilier Battalion of
the 76th Infantry had to shorten its step until the 2nd and 3rd
Companies of the same regiment had come abreast and until the 6th
and 8th Companies of the 75th Infantry had also joined the line. The
center half-battalion, (2nd and 3rd Companies of the 76th Infantry),
the unit of direction, was ordered to march on the church spire of
Loigny. All the units of the force, with the exception of the IInd
Battalion, 76th Infantry, at once deployed lines of skirmishers. The
1st and 4th Companies, 76th Infantry, and 5th Company, 75th Infantry,
covered the left flank and turned toward Ecuillon. Of the eleven
companies launched in this flank attack, six were in the first line
(approximately 1100 rifles on a front of 800 m.), and five in the
second.
The bulk of the second line, in an endeavor to close with the enemy
quickly, joined the firing line when 400 m. from the enemy. The
attack came as a complete surprise to the French; their lines were
taken in flank, and all their attempts to form new defensive lines to
oppose the onslaught of the Hansards proved unavailing. The dense,
unwieldy masses of the French were more and more crowded together by
the uninterrupted advance of the Hansards and offered good objectives
to the German marksmen. The advance of the brigade was supported by
the artillery in position near Lumeau. This artillery followed the
brigade to Ecuillon.
The Hansards traversed a distance of 3500 m. during this attack. The
right wing and the bulk of the 2nd and 3rd Companies, 76th Infantry,
which had been detailed as the unit of direction, with orders to
march on the church spire of Loigny, strayed to Fougon; the left wing
penetrated into Loigny.[226]
[226] See HÖNIG, _Volkskrieg_, IV, p. 80; also KUNZ, _Loigny_, p.
105.
4. The advance of six battalions of the IIIrd Army Corps against the
=Forbach Hill= (=Spicheren=).[227]
[227] _Gen. St. W._, I. p. 356.
4. DISTRIBUTION IN DEPTH AND FRONTAGE OF COMBAT FORMATIONS.[228]
[228] See _Taktik_, V, _Gefechtslehre_, p. 38.
The infantry combat is decided by the combined action of long firing
lines. Retained forces, not launched against the enemy for the purpose
of crushing him, exert no influence whatever on the decision, since
they only increase losses without contributing to the fire effect. In
the battles of the past, distribution in depth at the decisive stage of
the combat (unless necessary as a measure of precaution, in securing
the flanks, for example), was only permissible so long as the short
range of the weapons allowed reserves to be kept in readiness so close
to the firing line that they could assault _en masse_ at once and
without any diminution of their strength. The deciding factor, which
rested in retained reserves during the Napoleonic era, lies at present
in the firing line.[229]
[229] The French still entertain a contrary opinion.
=Distribution in depth= _is, therefore, only a means to an end; an
expedient made use of to maintain a dense firing line permanently at a
constant strength; to give the firing line the impetus for the assault;
to protect it against a reverse; and to secure its flanks. Victory
is assured only by the simultaneous employment of superior fighting
forces. A force should go into action in a deep combat formation, but
it must extend its front during the fight._ To launch an insufficient
number of troops for combat and to reinforce them gradually is a
fatal error, as we are thereby compelled to fight a superior force
continually with an inferior one, without being able to take advantage
of the superiority which we may actually possess.
The Russian attacks in the battles around =Plevna= are very
instructive in this respect. On July 30th, 1877, the =Grivica=
intrenchments were attacked by two columns consisting of nine
battalions. The Ist and IInd Battalions of the 121st Infantry
succeeded in reaching the trench, but then the attack failed. The
IIIrd Battalion then attacked, with a similar result Thereupon the
IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the 123rd Infantry were launched, but
these also only succeeded in reaching the edge of the ditch of the
trench. The attack of the left column proceeded in a similar manner,
likewise that made by the reserves. An attack made simultaneously by
the entire force undoubtedly would have been successful.[230]
[230] _Russisch-Türkischer Krieg_ (_Gen. St. W._), German
Translation, III, pp. 254 and 264.
On September 11th, 1877, after the attack made by the 63rd and 117th
Infantry Regiments on the =Omar Bey Tabia= had been repulsed, the
64th and 118th Infantry Regiments of the IVth Army Corps, and the
31st Infantry Division of the IXth Army Corps (the last mentioned
force was not under the orders of the commander of the IVth Army
Corps) were placed in readiness for a renewed attack at 3 P. M. In
spite of the heavy losses (42 and 49%) and the fact that the failure
of the first attack had demonstrated that such a small force was
insufficient for taking the Turkish work, only two regiments were
again sent forward to the attack (in other words, 6 battalions
instead of 18). When this assault had also been repulsed, and
one regiment from the reserve had in addition been thrown in, 6
battalions of the 15 still intact, were again sent forward, but they
likewise failed to take the work. A regiment began its attack only
when the preceding one had been repulsed with loss. The 24 battalions
lost 115 officers and 4319 men. A timely reinforcement by troops in
reserve would have averted a reverse at any rate, and a simultaneous
employment of adequate forces would have assured the success of the
Russian infantry.[231]
[231] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den
Russisch-Türkischen Krieg_, I, p. 211.
The same thing occurred at =Gorni-Dubniac=. As the Russians, who
advanced on a broad front, did not attack simultaneously, the weak
garrison of the trenches was able to concentrate its fire on the
isolated attacking groups which followed each other.
The same peculiar feature, namely, small frontage with insufficient
fire power and strong reserves, was frequently observed during the
battles in the =Russo-Japanese war=. On the left flank, at =Wafangu=
(15th June, 1904), the 1st East Siberian Rifle Division advanced
with one battalion of the 2nd Regiment and one of the 3rd in the
first line, with four battalions in the second line, and with three
battalions of the 1st Regiment in the third line. A full development
of the fire power of the division did not take place at all.[232] The
2nd and 3rd Regiments, in all about 6000 men, lost 49 officers and
1464 men. The 1¹⁄₂ batteries attached to the division were shot to
pieces in a short time and fell into the hands of the Japanese.
[232] LÖFFLER, _Russisch-Japanischer Krieg_, I, p. 56.
Distribution in depth is necessary during the preparatory stage of the
fight, as it enables the commander to meet unexpected developments in
the situation. Moreover, it is justifiable so long as the information
in regard to the strength and intentions of the enemy is insufficient.
When reconnaissance work is not thoroughly performed, the force may
be obliged to deploy in a direction other than the one originally
chosen. This will be difficult to do as changes of front and movements
by the flank can only be made when the front is narrow. Moreover,
after a force is once deployed within the zone of hostile fire, it is
committed to the direction chosen and can only move straight to the
front. Considerable changes of front can only be executed by the lines
in rear. The troops held in rear are to reinforce the firing line and
to increase its density to the maximum at the decisive moment. As the
losses are smaller in defense than in attack, a force can cover a
broader front and keep its supports in closer proximity to the firing
line in the former than in the latter case, especially if it was able
to strengthen its position. The reserve, however, should be kept at a
greater distance from the firing line than in attack, in order that it
may retain complete freedom of movement--in covering the retreat, or in
making a counter-attack--and may not be involved in the fire fight.
The reserves of the attacker are to protect the flanks, give the
impetus for the assault, serve as a force upon which the attacking line
can rally, and cover the re-forming of the troops after a successful
attack. The several echelons of the attack formation, except the small
fractions immediately supporting the firing line[233] and covering
its flanks, should have become merged with that line by the time the
decisive moment of the combat arrives. The commander who takes up an
unnecessarily deep attack formation dispenses with an advantage; on
the other hand, the one who prematurely deploys in force, exposes
himself to grave danger. _The troops should be sent into action in a
deep combat formation, since the firing line is to be fed from the rear
until the decisive moment arrives, but every available man should be
thrown in for the assault._
[233] The advantage of having such supporting forces in rear of the
line is clearly shown in the fights of the 18th Brigade at Wörth.
KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 14, pp. 110, 129 and 172.
=Distribution in depth and frontage= are interdependent; the greater
the frontage, the less the distribution in depth, and vice versa. In
every deployment for action the following question awaits solution
by the troop leader: “How deep ought the formation to be and how
great an extension of front is allowable.” The result of the combat
depends in many cases upon a happy answer to this question. Broad
combat formations have great initial energy, facilitate turning and
flank movements, but their energy is not constant when the means are
not available to replace casualties. In addition, the difficulty of
leading, the danger of the line being penetrated, and the weakness
of the flanks grow apace with the extension of front. Distribution
in depth makes it possible to initiate the combat with a part of the
force and to get information of the situation; to fight the action
with another part of the force in accordance with this information;
and, finally, to bring about the decision and reap the fruits of that
decision with the third part. A deep combat formation enables the
leader to exercise a constant influence on the course of action; it
gives him the means with which to execute turning movements or to
repulse them--something which would be entirely impossible, or, at any
rate, only possible under great difficulties, with troops deployed in
the first line. As only a limited number of rifles can be brought into
play in a deep combat formation, it is obvious that this is an element
of weakness of which an opponent deployed on a broader front, may take
advantage.
Although the danger of going too far in distributing a force in depth
is not inconsiderable, this is, at any rate, a smaller error than the
opposite extreme, that of deploying troops, from the very start, on too
broad a front.
At noon on August 6th, 1870, General von François received an order
for his brigade to dislodge the hostile artillery posted on the
=Roten Berg= of the =Spicheren Heights=,[234] it being assumed that
only insignificant hostile forces were in front. The other brigade
of the 14th Division was expected to be able to take part in the
action in about three hours. When the attacking force was 2000 m.
from its objective, the IInd Battalion, 74th Infantry, and the IIIrd
Battalion, 39th Infantry, were set in motion against the French right
flank, while the Ist Battalion and the Füsilier Battalion of the 74th
Infantry were retained as a reserve. The brigade accordingly covered
a front of about 4000 m. While the frontal attack on the Roten Berg
was undoubtedly difficult,[235] this wide extension, which made all
leading impossible, increased the difficulties still further. In the
first place, the brigade commander led his two reserve battalions
against the Roten Berg and fell finally while leading a company. The
brigade was too weak to carry out the task imposed upon it. The 28th
Brigade, which followed, came into action at various points of the
battlefield, so that the two brigades became mixed, thus considerably
increasing the difficulties of leading. At 3 P. M., the following
troops were in the first line on the right wing:[236]
I. Bn. II. Bn. 1. 2. and ¹⁄₂3. Cos. 4. and 1. Cos.
-------- ------------ -------------------- --------------
53. Inf. ~=74. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~ 77. Inf.
10. 11. and 12. Cos. ¹⁄₂3. Co.
-------------------- ------------
~=39. Inf.=~ ~=74. Inf.=~
[234] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 310.
[235] _Gen. St. W._, I, p. 318.
[236] The units printed in heavy type belong to the 27th Brigade.
The 4th Company of the 74th Infantry was separated by 2.5 km., as the
crow flies, from the left flank of its battalion.
The following troops were in the second line:
Füsilier Bn. 2. and 3. Cos.[237] II. Bn. and Füsilier Bn.
------------ ------------------- ------------------------
53. Inf. 77. Inf. 77. Inf.
[237] These two companies were separated by about 1 km. from the
other companies of their battalion.
This admixture of organizations along a front of about 1.5 km. might
have been prevented by the commander. Toward 6 P. M., a similar
situation existed on the Roten Berg and at the south end of the
Giefert Wald--39²⁄₃ companies belonging to the 12th, 39th, 40th, 48th
and 74th Infantry Regiments were scattered along a front of 1600
m. It is true, the peculiar situation existing on the German side,
operated against a simultaneous employment of the several bodies and
a mixing of units was unavoidable, but it would undoubtedly have
been possible to prevent such a complete dissolution of all units,
by François’ Brigade taking up a more suitable formation before
the action commenced. The mistake made here was repeated over and
over again in the other preliminary combats of the campaign, and
invariably led to the same result.[238]
[238] Consult _Erste Gefechtsentwicklung des XI. Armeekorps bei
Wörth_, KUNZ, _Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele_, 13, p. 10, et seq.
The failure of the attacks made by the British brigades at
=Magersfontain= and =Paardeberg= may be traced to the lack of
sufficient reinforcements. At Magersfontain, the four battalions
of the Highland Brigade were deployed on a front of 3000 m. and at
Paardeberg on a front of 4000 m.